THE ROLE of COMMUNICATORS in COUNTERING the MALICIOUS USE of SOCIAL MEDIA James Pamment Et Al
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COUNTERING MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATORS IN COUNTERING THE MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA James Pamment et al. ISBN 978-9934-564-31-4 ISBN: 978-9934-564-31-4 Authors: James Pamment, Howard Nothhaft, Henrik Twetman, and Alicia Fjällhed Project manager: Sebastian Bay Text editor: Anna Reynolds Design: Kārlis Ulmanis Riga, November 2018 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe James Pamment is Head of the Department of Strategic Communication at Lund University and a senior analyst at the Centre for Asymmetric Threats Studies (CATS) at the Swedish National Defence University. Howard Nothhaft is associate professor at the Department of Strategic Communication at Lund Uni- versity. Henrik Agardh-Twetman is a project manager at the Department of Strategic Communication at Lund Univeristy. Alicia Fjällhed is a PhD-student at the Department of Strategic Communication at Lund University. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of NATO StratCom COE. NATO StratCom COE does not take responsibility for the views of authors expressed in their articles. Introduction This brief discusses the role of communicators in countering the malicious use of social media. It is based on the report ‘Countering Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art’ (2018) developed by the Department of Strategic Communication at Lund University and published by the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB). This brief is divided into three sections: understanding, identifying, and counteracting information influence activities. The Understanding section covers defnitions, diagnostics, and vulnerabilities. Identifying provides a basis for analysing the narratives, target groups, and techniques used in information influence activities. Counteracting covers preparation, action, and learning. Understanding Information influence activities should now be counted among the many techniques hostile actors employ to negatively impact democratic societies together with activities such as espionage, cyber threats, and the deployment of irregular forces. These are all part of the toolkit used in what we now call hybrid, asymmetrical, or unconventional warfare. Information influence activities are used to manipulate public opinion, disturb elections, isolate vulnerable social groups, and destabilise entire regions and countries. For the purposes of this brief, we understand information influence activities as the illegitimate efforts of foreign powers or their proxies to influence the perceptions, behaviour, and decisions of target groups to the benefit of foreign powers. Our focus is on how information influence activities can be used to exploit the vulnerabilities in media systems, our cognitive biases, and in public opinion formation processes. While using information to influence others is not a new phenomenon, the speed, reach, and intensity through which information can be disseminated online creates new challenges, especially in relation to social media. Information influence operators leverage their understanding of how the modern information environment functions to achieve the effects they desire. This includes activities such as 4 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� We understand information influence activities as the illegitimate efforts of foreign powers or their proxies to influence the perceptions, behaviour, and decisions of target groups to the benefit of foreign powers manipulation of social media algorithms, data hostile foreign actors posing as citizens collection for use in sociographic targeting, involved in democratic debate. By leveraging doxing, impersonation, and other malicious the personal data most people expose operations. daily on social media, such falsehoods can be accurately targeted toward specific The concept of legitimacy is the cornerstone audiences to create a desired impact. of our approach to understanding these activities. We use the words ‘malicious’ Information influence further exploits the and ‘illegitimate’ to highlight the fact that social character of public opinion formation, information influence activities mimic for example through closed chat groups, legitimate forms of communication such friends sharing stories they haven’t read, as advocacy, public relations, lobbying, and bots that boost circulation numbers. advertising, and public debate on social The results can include secret debates media platforms to undermine and pervert based on false or manipulated sources, the rational formation of opinion. They are the appearance of friends approving of illegitimate because they use falsehoods information they share, and the false to poison the principles of communication appearance of a broad public debate. essential to the healthy functioning of Information influence techniques also democracies, such as free deliberation and exploit shortcuts in our thinking (heuristics) debate, factual bases for claims/knowledge, either by learning about us through the rational public opinion formation, and mutual data we share, or by applying ‘nudges’ that trust. manipulate our cognitive biases. The results of these techniques can include targeting Information influence activities also exploit based on psychological traits and framing trends in the digital media system, such information to induce logical shortcuts or as the inaccessibility of quality journalism to nudge decision-making in some pre- behind paywalls, the culture of ‘clickbait’ determined preferred direction. headlines, and the prevalence of unvetted citizen journalism. The results include Finally, information influence activities untrustworthy news sources mixing contribute to the breakdown of social spurious information with real news, news trust and social cohesion—political debate articles designed to provoke outrage, and becomes polarised and political decision- ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 Information influence techniques also exploit shortcuts in our thinking (heuristics) either by learning about us through the data we share, or by applying ‘nudges’ that manipulate our cognitive biases making becomes more difficult. When These four defining factors can be used groups within a society mistrust one as diagnostic criteria for differentiating another they become more easily agitated, legitimate communication from illegitimate and government institutions lose credibility, information influence. To qualify as which can lead to negative consequences information influence, an activity should for public health and safety. Information contain at least two of these factors. You will influence activities disrupt social cohesion rarely be able to ascertain the presence of all through many small individual acts (‘death of them. The appearance of any two factors by a thousand cuts’), through coordinating a suggests further investigation is necessary; series of activities aimed at achieving a single three or more suggest a reasonable goal (‘information influence operations’), likelihood of information influence activities. and through combining information The diagnostic checklist is designed to influence and hybrid activities over the long- be flexible enough for communication term (‘Information influence campaign’). professionals to adapt the criteria to their It is important to understand how these professional fields and their knowledge and strategies work, which vulnerabilities they experience of what is ‘normal’ for the work seek to exploit, and how to counteract them. they do, and to make empowered choices regarding how to proceed. We have developed a simple diagnostic tool—the DIDI diagnostic—to help professional communicators recognise information influence activities based on four characteristics that define such activities. Information influence activities are deceptive: they involve falsehoods in some way or another; they have the intention to exploit vulnerabilities to benefit a foreign power or its proxies; they seek to disrupt constructive debate; and they interfere in debates or issues in which foreign actors play no legitimate role. ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6 Intention Information influence activities are Deception exercised with hostile intent and deliberately exploit vulnerabilities that Information influence activities aim can influence the process of opinion to deceive audiences by mimicking formation; they betray the generosity established forms of media, hiding of liberal democratic systems where their true identities, and deliberately free and open public discussion is introducing false information. the nexus for opinion formation and turn one of our greatest strengths into a liability. Interference DIDI Disruption Information influence activities Information influence involve actors with little or no activities disrupt normal legitimate reason to interfere with democratic dialogue by breaking domestic issues; this encroaches on the the normative rules that govern sovereignty of the state and the legitimacy constructive debate by systematically of open and free debate. silencing opinions, polarising society,