The Judicial ‘Bail Out’ of the European Stability Mechanism: Comment on the Pringle Case Gianni Lo Schiavo DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES Research Paper in Law 09 / 2013 European Legal Studies RESEARCH PAPERS IN LAW 9/2013 Gianni Lo Schiavo The Judicial ‘Bail Out’ of the European Stability Mechanism: Comment on the Pringle Case Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, [2012] not yet reported © Gianni Lo Schiavo, 2013 European Legal Studies/Etudes Européennes Juridiques Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Brugge, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 47 72 61 | Fax +32 (0)50 47 72 60 E-mail
[email protected] | www.coleurope.eu The Judicial ‘Bail Out’ of the European Stability Mechanism: Comment on the Pringle Case Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, [2012] not yet reported Gianni Lo Schiavo* Abstract Since the beginning of the crisis, many responses have been taken to stabilise the European markets. Pringle is the awaited judicial response of the European Court of Justice on the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a crisis-related intergovernmental international institution which provides financial assistance to Member States in distress in the Eurozone. The judgment adopts a welcome and satisfactory approach on the establishment of the ESM. This article examines the feasibility of the ESM under the Treaty rules and in light of the Pringle judgment. For the first time, the Court was called to appraise the use of the simplified revision procedure under article 48 TEU with the introduction of a new paragraph to article 136 TFEU as well as to interpret the no bail out clause under article 125 TFEU.