Fischer 2020 Monopolisierungsstrategien in Zweiseitigen Märkten

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Fischer 2020 Monopolisierungsstrategien in Zweiseitigen Märkten CHEMNITZER INTERNET- UND TECHNIKSOZIOLOGIE: WORKING PAPERS Working Paper 2020-02 Monopolisierungsstrategien in zweiseitigen Märkten – Analyse der Auswirkungen von Exklusivität in der Videospielindustrie Felix Fischer Felix Fischer Monopolisierungsstrategien in zweiseitigen Märkten – Analyse der Auswirkungen von Exklusivität in der Videospielindustrie Chemnitzer Internet- und Techniksoziologie: Working Paper 2020-02 ISSN 2367-296X Felix Fischer felix.fi[email protected] © 2020 by Felix Fischer Felix Fischer ist Student des Masterstudiengangs Digitale Arbeit an der TU Chemnitz. Abstract: This paper explores the consequences of exclusivity on the video game industry. The analysis is based on existing empirical evidence and reports about current developments in the video game industry. The comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of exclusivity will help formulate a conclusion about the adequacy of this strategy in the current market and a debate about the restriction of exclusivity. The findings of this paper show that exclusivity is especially beneficial to platform operators, while on the other hand consumers face high adoption costs. Also, game developers face long-term consequences through exclusivity despite the financial advantages. Furthermore it becomes clear that a reduction of exclusivity can bring benefits to the industry through higher user satisfaction. This however would result in new strategic obstacles for platforms. Zusammenfassung: In dieser Forschungsarbeit werden die Auswirkungen von Exklusivität auf den Videospielmarkt genauer erforscht. Die Grundlage für die Analyse, bilden bereits existierende empirische Befunde sowie Berichte über aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Videospielindustrie. Die Gegenüberstellung der Vor- und Nachteile von Exklusivität dient der letztendlichen Einschätzung über die Nützlichkeit dieser Marktstrategie im aktuellen Markt sowie einer Debatte über die Einschränkung von Exklusivität. Die Befunde der Arbeit zeigen, dass vor allem Plattformbetreiber von Exklusivität profitieren. Für die Konsumenten entstehen hingegen hohe Adoptionskosten und auch Entwickler von Videospielen werden neben finanziellen Vorteilen mit negativen Langzeitfolgen durch Exklusivverträge konfrontiert. Es wird zudem ersichtlich, dass eine Reduzierung von Exklusivität Vorteile für die Industrie in Form von gesteigerter Nutzerzufriedenheit bringen kann. Dies würde jedoch auch in neuen marktstrategischen Hürden für Plattformen resultieren. Inhalt — Contents 1 Einleitung 5 2 Forschungsstand 6 3 Monopolisierung durch Exklusivität 7 4 Plattformen als zweiseitige Märkte 9 5 Aktueller Videospielmarkt 10 6 Exklusivität von Videospielen 12 7 Folgen der Exklusivität. 18 8 Diskussion 27 9 Fazit 33 Literatur 35 Fischer 2020 Monopolisierungsstrategien in zweiseitigen Märkten 1 Einleitung Exklusiver Vertrieb zählt zu den effektivsten und weit verbreitetsten Marktstrategien zur Vergrößerung von Plattformnetzwerken. Bereits im Bereich des Online-Streaming von Filmen lassen sich die Folgen einer Fragmentierung des Marktes durch Exklusivität sehen. Auch in der Videospielindustrie sind Exklusivverträge keine neue Entwicklung, jedoch zeigt der neueste Trend eine Intensivierung dieser Verfahren. Dies sorgt unter anderem für neue soziale Phänomene zwischen den Marktteilnehmern, verschiedene Konfliktsituationen und umfangreicheren Möglichkeiten zur Gewinnung von Marktanteilen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Auswirkungen von Exklusivität auf den Videospielmarkt und die entstehenden Phänomene und Strategien analysiert. Die Untersuchung wird damit sowohl marktwirtschaftliche als auch soziologische Aspekte in den Fokus stellen. Da sowohl Spieler, Videospielentwickler und Publisher sowie Plattformbetreiber am Markt teilnehmen, unterschiedliche Interessen verfolgen und verschiedene Stellungen im Markt einnehmen, werden die Auswirkungen für jede Partei separat betrachtet. Es werden dabei der PC-Spielmarkt und der Konsolenmarkt genauer untersucht. Bei den Konsolen beschränkt sich die Mehrheit dabei auf stationäre Heimkonsolen. Handheld-Konsolen und Smartphones werden nicht mit in die Betrachtung einbezogen, da die Märkte für diese Konsolen eher für Gelegenheitsspieler ausgelegt sind. Es ist dadurch zu vermuten, dass die Folgen der Exklusivität in diesen Märkten weniger gravierend wirken und damit nicht im Fokus dieser Betrachtung stehen. Für die Erforschung der Auswirkungen wird sowohl auf Forschungsliteratur, als auch auf Artikel und Beiträge von Onlinequellen und Videospielmagazinen zurückgegriffen. Dies liegt daran, dass es für die neuesten Entwicklungen im Bereich der Videospielexklusivität nur wenige wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen gibt. Gleichzeitig liefern Videospieljournalisten jedoch auch tiefe Einblicke in die Videospielmärkte, die unterstützend zur Forschungsliteratur verwendet werden können. Im theoretischen Rahmen der Arbeit werden die Mechaniken der Exklusivität und des zweiseitigen Marktes genauer erklärt. Diese Mechaniken bilden die Grundlage für die Untersuchung der Videospielmärkte. Anschließend folgt eine grundlegende Erklärung zu den beiden analysierten Bereichen des Videospielmarktes, um die unterschiedlichen Marktteilnehmer und deren Stellung im Markt zu erklären. Im darauf folgenden Kapitel werden die aktuellen Entwicklungen von Exklusivität separat für den PC sowie den Konsolenmarkt betrachtet. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, wie intensiv die jeweiligen Marktteilnehmer Exklusivität nutzen und zu welchem Erfolg dies in der momentanen Marktsituation führt. Anschließend werden signifikante Phänomene und Auswirkungen, die durch Exklusivität entstehen, thematisiert und analysiert, welche Folgen 5 Fischer 2020 Monopolisierungsstrategien in zweiseitigen Märkten dies für die beteiligten Marktteilnehmer hat. Zum Ende werden die Auswirkungen gegenübergestellt und ein Urteil über den Erfolg der Marktstrategie des Unternehmens Epic Games gebildet, das momentan durch die Nutzung von Exklusivität einen besonders hohen Einfluss auf den Markt hat. Es wird außerdem diskutiert, ob staatliche Limitierungen für Exklusivverträge langfristig positive Folgen für die Videospielindustrie haben könnten, wenn Plattformen dadurch auf andere Wettbewerbsstrategien zurückgreifen müssten. 2 Forschungsstand Für die Erklärung von Internetplattformen und deren Marktdynamiken gibt es mehrere Forschungsgrundlagen. Dolata (2019) liefert dazu einen breiten Überblick über aktuelle Entwicklungen von Plattformen und stellt eine Übersicht der verschiedenen Plattformarten dar. Wernerfelt (1984) publizierte eine Analyse der Wichtigkeit von verschiedenen Ressourcen für Unternehmen, durch die ersichtlich wird, welche Strategien Unternehmen zur Sicherung von Marktanteilen nutzen können. Katz und Shapiro (1994) thematisieren das Konzept der Netzwerkeffekte und welche Auswirkungen diese auf Marktdynamiken haben. Caillaud und Jullien (2003) fanden dazu heraus, dass es aufgrund der Netzwerkeffekte ein „Chicken and Egg problem“ gibt, das neue Plattformen überwinden müssen, um sich im Markt zu etablieren. In einer Forschungsarbeit stellen Gawer und Cusumano (2008) die Aspekte des „coring“ und des „tipping“ dar, die Plattformbetreiber in ihre Unternehmensstrategie mit einbeziehen sollten, um am Markt erfolgreich zu sein. Cennamo und Santaló (2013) nutzen die Theorie von Gawer und Cusumano (2008) als Grundlage für eine tiefgreifendere Untersuchung der Dynamiken in zweiseitigen Märkten. Darin liefern sie Beweise, dass das Erschaffen des größten Netzwerkes im Markt nicht automatisch die Marktführung garantiert. Zudem zeigen sie, dass unterschiedliche Marktstrategien miteinander im Konflikt stehen und dadurch Kompromisse geschlossen werden müssen. Neben genereller Forschung zu Plattformen, gibt es auch Auseinandersetzungen mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Videospielindustrie. Davidovici-Nora und Bourreau (2012) identifizieren den Videospielmarkt als einen zweiseitigen Markt und erklären damit die Existenz von Netzwerkeffekten. Sie liefern genauere Einsicht über die Probleme, denen sich Entwickler und Plattformbetreiber im Markt stellen müssen. Engelstätter und Ward (2013) untersuchen zudem Aspekte, die sich auf die Verkaufszahlen von Videospielen auswirken. Eine qualitative Studie von Johnson und Luo (2017) befasst sich mit der Gaming-Kultur. Dabei wurden Spieler befragt, welche Aspekte sie zum Kauf von Videospielen bewegen. Aus diesen Daten konnten sie neue Konzepte für das Verständnis der Gaming-Kultur entwickeln. Eine Forschungsarbeit von Cennamo und Santaló (2019) befasst sich außerdem mit den Auswirkungen von Generativität auf 6 Fischer 2020 Monopolisierungsstrategien in zweiseitigen Märkten den Videospielmarkt und unterstreicht unter anderem die Wichtigkeit von Nutzerzufriedenheit für die Verkaufszahlen von Software. Die Forschung zu Videospielplattformen beschränkt sich dabei vorwiegend auf Konsolen. Jedoch befasst sich eine Dissertation von Joseph (2017) umfassend mit der Funktionsweise der PC-Plattform Steam, die die größte Vertriebsplattform auf dem PC- Markt darstellt. Offizielle Daten zu Verkaufszahlen und Umsätzen gibt es in diesem Bereich nur selten. Bestimmte Statistiken und Schätzungen werden jedoch von Marktforschungsunternehmen herausgegeben. Die allgemein am häufigsten verwendeten Schätzungen liefert dabei das Unternehmen VGChartz. Corts und Lederman (2007) nutzen diese Schätzungen und vorhandene Daten für ihre eigenen Kalkulationen. Damit untersuchen sie das Ausmaß der Netzwerkeffekte auf die Videospielindustrie, unter Einbezug von Exklusivität. Die neuesten Entwicklungen
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