March-April 2010 | Volume 23 | Issue 2
Articles 9 The Great UW Debate The article takes a look at the long-standing debate over the articu- lation of an effective UW definition.
18 Effective Use of FID Expands SF Influence Soldiers from the 10th SF Group use the conduct of foreign in- ternal defense, or FID, to shape the battlefield in Operation Iraqi Freedom
26 The Lion, the Starfish and the Spider Today policy-makers, law-enforcement officials and military lead- 9 ers struggle to come up with innovative ideas for neutralizing terrorist organizations and their activities. One such idea, not given much thought until after Sept. 11, is attacking terrorist financing structures, methods and sources.
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Departments 4 From the Commandant ON THE COVER U.S. Army Special 5 Update Forces Soldiers and the governor of Najaf award Career Notes diplomas to soldiers who 30 completed training to become members of the 31 Book Reviews An Najaf SWAT. Special Warfare Commander & Commandant Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
Editor Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor Janice Burton
Graphics & Design Jennifer Martin
Webmaster Eva Herrera
18 SUBMISSIONS
Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly Special Warfare welcomes sub- in a timely manner. Special Warfare publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy missions of scholarly, independent reserves the right to edit all contribu- Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of research from members of the armed tions. Special Warfare will attempt to special-operations forces by providing a forum for the ex- forces, security policy-makers and afford authors an opportunity to review amination of established doctrine and new ideas. -shapers, defense analysts, aca- the final edited version; requests for Views expressed herein are those of the au- demic specialists and civilians from the changes must be received by the thors and do not necessarily reflect the official Army position. This publication does not super- United States and abroad. given deadline. sede any information presented in other official Army Manuscripts should be 2,500 to Articles that require security clear- publications. 3,000 words in length. Include a cover ance should be cleared by the author’s Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should letter. Submit a complete biography chain of command prior to submission. be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DTD- MP; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: with author contact information (i.e., No payment or honorarium is autho- DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 complete mailing address, telephone, rized for publication of articles. Mate- or send e-mail to [email protected]. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. fax, e-mail address). rial appearing in Special Warfare is Published works may be reprinted, except where copy- Manuscripts should be submitted in considered to be in the public domain righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and plain text, double-spaced, and in a digi- and is not protected by copyright un- the authors. tal file. End notes should accompany less it is accompanied by the author’s Official distribution is limited to active and reserve works in lieu of embedded footnotes. copyright notice. Published works may special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superin- Please consult The Chicago Manual of be reprinted, except where copyright- tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Style, 15th Edition, for footnote style. ed, provided credit is given to Special Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available Submit graphics, tables and charts Warfare and the authors. on the Internet (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/). with source references in separate By order of the Secretary of the Army: George W. Casey Jr. files from the manuscript (no embed- Submit articles for consideration to: General, United States Army ded graphics). Special Warfare may Editor, Special Warfare; Chief of Staff accept high-resolution (300 dpi or Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; USAJFKSWCS; Official: greater) digital photos; be sure to Fort Bragg, NC 28310 include a caption and photographer’s or e-mail them to [email protected]. credit. Prints and 35 mm transparen- For additional information: Joyce E. Morrow cies are also acceptable. Photos will Contact: Special Warfare Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army be returned, if possible. Commercial: (910) 432-5703 1001303 All submissions will be reviewed DSN 239-5703 Headquarters, Department of the Army In April, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the Army Special Forces Command will host the Special Forces Symposium, our annual conference that gives us a chance to honor our lineage, to hear from the leaders of the force, to brief those leaders on the current status of training and discuss where we are headed in the future. The theme of this year’s symposium will be “Training the SF Soldier.” Although we have been doing that for nearly 60 years, the training is never static. The current program of SF training is an evolutionary result of refining our longstanding program to produce Soldiers with the capabilities, as well as the language and culture skills, that are required in our current operations. We are constantly reviewing lessons learned to identify areas that require new or additional emphasis, as well as to retain training that maintains its value year after year. As we look ahead, our vision for SWCS is that we will use a variety of methods to identify future challenges, to describe the force that will be needed to defeat them and to ensure that our doctrine and training will always produce Soldiers who will be more than equal to any of the ever-increasing number of threats they may encounter. The Symposium also gives us a chance to discuss changes in doctrine. SF doctrine is also constantly evolving, and it has also gone through a number of changes over the years. In this issue, Colonel David Witty examines the debate over the definition of unconventional warfare and the various views of UW during the years since SF was founded. He identifies the various schools of UW thought, compares them and discusses their rise to prominence and their decline based on lessons learned from operations and the consensus of thought among SF Soldiers. Also in this issue are the names of the newest inductees to an elite group, the distinguished members of the SF Regiment. Future issues of Special Warfare will contain announcements of other DMRs, and the magazine’s Web page will soon contain biographies of more than 40 DMRs who have been honored previously. In a regiment in which excellence is a prerequisite, the DMRs are outstanding for their experience, dedication and valor. As we honor their contributions, we also show new members of the Regiment an example of what success in special operations looks like, and we put a human face on the SF Values. If our selection and training are truly successful, members of the Regiment will see that face not only in the Hall of Heroes but also in the mirror. Throughout changes in training, doctrine and operations since 1952, one constant has been the quality of the personnel in SF and their commitment to the mission and to the SF brotherhood.
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
4 Special Warfare U P D A T E 3rd SF Group Soldiers Awarded Silver Star Medals Soldiers from the 3rd Special so Clarke quickly and calmly applied a of his vehicle to reposition an element Forces Group gathered to recognize tourniquet to his right leg and dragged of ANA soldiers, said Captain Blayne the valor and sacrifice of 40 of their him from the burning vehicle. With no Smith, Siriwardene’s team leader. own during a valor award ceremony cover and enemy fire on both sides, “The enemy forces would have held Dec. 16, 2009, in the John F. taken advantage of the ANA element Kennedy Auditorium. and would have destroyed their unit if Staff Sergeant Linsey Clarke, Master Sergeant Siriwardene had not who serves as a medical sergeant for directed them into the right positions,” Operational Detachment-Alpha 3123, said Smith. Company B, 1st Battalion, 3rd SF As the battle raged on, the insur- Group and Master Sergeant Anthony gents called for reinforcements and Siriwardene, an operations sergeant regrouped into stronger units in order of ODA 3236, Co. C, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF to attack again. Group, were each awarded the Silver The sixth engagement found the Star Medal for acts of valor during team taking extraordinary volumes battles in Afghanistan. of machine-gun fire and a vicious on- “‘Strength and honor’ was the mot- slaught of rocket-propelled grenades. to given to Task Force Dagger,” said Siriwardene again risked his life by Lieutenant General John F. Mulhol- sprinting to the last truck, which was land Jr., who presented the awards. taking the brunt of the attack. “Strength and honor is exactly what As the turret burst into flames, you heard exemplified here today in Siriwardene pulled the gunner to the combat actions of our Silver Star safety, and then, using the cover of Medal recipients.” a vehicle, he began to gather up ANA battle leader Lt. Gen. John F. soldiers who had been pinned down A daily patrol Mulholland Jr., commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, pins a by enemy fire. On Feb. 20, 2009, the sky was Silver Star Medal on Master Sgt. Anthony The following morning, Siriwar- clear, the air had a bite to it, but for Siriwardene during a 3rd SF Group Awards dene’s team was joined by a quick- Ceremony at Kennedy Hall. U.S. Army photo. Afghanistan, it was a beautiful day, reaction-force element, and in the according to Clarke. Clarke returned to the destroyed vehicle fiercest of the seven battles, was able Clarke was the driver of the sec- to help Master Sergeant David Hurt. He to crush the enemy forces. ond of four vehicles that came under again dragged his comrade to safety. “We had pinpointed and fixed ambush while conducting a joint- With the team’s other medic tend- the enemy,” said Siriwardene. “Now, operations patrol with members of ing to the wounded, Clarke volun- we basically controlled the tempo of the Afghan National Army, Afghan teered to stay in the firefight to secure the battle.” National Police and Czech special- the remains of the fallen Soldiers. When the fighting was over, the team operation forces in Khordi, a village Clarke still doesn’t believe he is was able to confirm 65 enemy kills. in southern Afghanistan. a hero. Like Clarke, Siriwardene doesn’t The third vehicle in the convoy was “It’s something any one of those believe he did anything to deserve struck by an improvised explosive de- guys would’ve done for me. There recognition over his teammates. vice, and the lead vehicle was engaged wasn’t a second thought,” he said. “The way the guys in the detach- by rocket-propelled grenades, while ment performed — it was amazing,” he small-arms fire rained down. Siriwardene directs the fight said. “This is what we do.” Clarke immediately backed up In August 2005, Siriwardene and “It’s not without sacrifice. It’s his vehicle to assist those who had his teammates had battled for 56 not without loss. But, victory is the been struck by the roadside bomb. He hours through seven enemy engage- end state achieved by these men,” dismounted and ran through a volley ments in Zabol Province, Afghanistan. said Mulholland. of fire to discover that three of the Working alongside the Afghan Along with the two Silver Star Med- men inside had been killed instantly. National Army, or ANA, Siriwardene’s als, Mulholland presented nine Bronze Two of his remaining teammates were team came under heavy enemy fire Star Medals with Valor Devices, six alive, but both were badly wounded. while on patrol in the Buka Ghar Val- Purple Hearts and 25 Army Commen- Clarke found Staff Sergeant Eric ley, an insurgent stronghold. dation Medals with Valor Device, all to Englehardt first. Both of his legs were During the second engagement, Soldiers of the 3rd SF Group. broken, and he was bleeding heavily, Siriwardene repeatedly left the safety — USASOC PAO
March-April 2010 5 SWCS Inducts DistinguisheD
On Jan. 13 and Feb. 18, the members of the Special Dickel Gang.” After completion of the Infantry Officers Advanced Forces Regiment honored two of their own as Course, he returned to Southeast Asia as a team leader at the Distinguished Members of the Regiment. Distinguished Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand. His next assign- Members of the Regiment are appointed to supplement ment was in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, as an operations the ceremonial duties of the Honorary Colonel of the officer, field investigator and corps desk officer, and in 1975 he Regiment. Persons appointed may be active-duty or became an action officer in the U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché retired officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel or Office. While serving with the special planning group for the civilians who served on active duty in the regiment. evacuation of Saigon with the U.S. Embassy Defense Attaché Of- fice, Petrie helped evacuate Saigon. Major George Petrie From late 1975 to 1976, Petrie was assigned to the 1st Bat- On Jan. 13, Major George talion, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, as the S3, and Petrie was named a Distinguished Member of the Regiment. Petrie Between 1976 and 1980, he returned to the Joint Casualty then as assistant operations officer for training. entered the U.S. Army as a private on June 22, 1958, and attended Ba- Resolution Center, located in Hawaii, as operations officer and sic Infantry Combat Training and executive officer, with additional duty as the Special Operations Advanced Infantry Combat Train- He served in that capacity in Korea, as well, before retiring from Division escape-and-evasion officer, in the U.S. Pacific Command. ing at Fort Jackson, S.C. He then active duty on May 31, 1980. received basic airborne training at Major Petrie’s numerous awards include: the Silver Star Fort Bragg, N.C. Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze From December 1958 to May 1962, he served in the 82nd Air- Star Medal with “V” Device and OLC, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart with OLC, Army Commendation Medal was with the 319th Airborne Field Artillery, 82nd Abn. Div., where with “V” Device and three OLCs, Joint Service Commenda- borne Division, with a brief stint in Korea. Petrie’s first assignment he spent the greater portion of his junior enlisted service. tion Medal with three award devices, Navy Commendation In 1962, Petrie graduated fom the Special Forces Communi- Medal with three award devices, Navy Commendation Medal cations Course as the honor graduate. After graduation, he was with Combat “V” Device, Army Good Conduct Medal with three assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group as a senior radio supervi- award devices, National Defense Service Medal with bronze sor. Between 1962 and 1965, he completed the Scuba and Under- service star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two water Demolitions School and Spanish Language School, all while bronze service stars, Vietnam Service Medal with arrowhead serving as a radio supervisor with the 8th SF Group at Fort Gulick, devices (one Silver Star and one Bronze Star), Korean Defense Panama Canal Zone. Service Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal with #3, Armed In 1967, Petrie returned to the 5th SF Group to serve in Forces Reserve Medal, Army Overseas Service Ribbon with #6, Vietnam as a team sergeant and company commander of a mo- Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with gold star, silver star and bronze bile guerilla force. He received numerous awards for his service star, Vietnam Honor Medal First Class, Vietnam Wound Medal, in Vietnam. Vietnam Civic Action Medal (First Class), Vietnam Campaign In 1968, Petrie moved to the 3rd SF Group to be a team ser- Medal with “60” device, Inter-American Peace Force Medal, Presidential Unit Citation, Valorous Unit Citation, Meritorious SF Group, where he served as a team sergeant. During this time, Unit Citation with OLC, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry Unit Cita- geant and first sergeant, followed by a move in 1969 to the 6th he graduated from the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence tion, Vietnam Civic Action Unit Citation, RVN Civil Action First Course and the Special Forces Intelligence Analyst Course. Class with Palm, RVN Staff Service Medal First Class, RVN Civil - Action Unit Citation with palm and RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation with palm. His badges include: Combat Infantryman’s In 1970, Petrie received a direct commission to first lieuten Benning, Ga., he returned to Vietnam as part of the Joint Chiefs of Badge, Jungle Warfare Expert Patch, Master Parachutist Badge ant. After completion of the Infantry Officers Basic Course at Fort Staff Contingency Task Group and led an assault team, “Blue Boy.” with combat jump star, Pathfinder Badge, Scuba Badge, Special Forces Tab, RVN Master Parachute Badge, Republic of Korea prison camp at Son Tay. Master Parachute Badge, Thailand Master Parachute Badge with He was the first raider to hit the ground during the assault on the Petrie returned to the 5th SF Group in 1971 to work as an fourragère and the Gold Order of St. Phillip Neri. assistant operations officer, and he later became commander of In retirement, Petrie is a volunteer and community leader Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group, known as the “George for several organizations. He has been president of the Special Members of the SF Regiment
Forces Association, Chapter 31, for the past 18 years and has at the Psychological Warfare Center, where he assisted in the worked with Vet-to-Vet, Operation “Safe Refuge” and the Jimmy development of doctrine, lesson plans and training aids. Civitella Dean Scholarship Fund. was one of the original instructors to teach guerrilla warfare and
Major Caesar J. Civitella enlisted). His follow-on assignment was at the newly established air operations to the first two Special Forces classes (officer and Major Caesar J. Civitella was 77th SF Group, the precursor of today’s 7th SF Group. inducted as a DMOR on Feb. 18. He In 1955, Civitella was assigned to the 10th SF Group in Bad joined the U.S. Army in February Toelz, Germany. In that assignment, he continued to teach and re- 1943 as an enlisted Soldier. He fresh personnel on guerrilla warfare and Special Forces doctrine. completed basic training and was In 1958, Civitella returned from Europe and was assigned to initially assigned to the Amphibi- ous Engineers at Cape Cod. He and School, where he was involved in the development of Special the Combat Development Office of the Special Warfare Center then volunteered for and attended basic airborne training at Fort Forces doctrine, equipment and techniques. Benning, Ga., and was assigned During this time, he also worked on different insertion and extrac- In January 1961, he began the first of three tours in Vietnam. to duty at Camp Mackall, N.C. Within a week of this assignment, tion methods, including Scuba, HALO and the Fulton “Skyhook” he was ordered to appear before a screening board for testing of extraction system. Eighteen days before his retirement, he was successfully “snatched-up” by a Caribou airplane using the Fulton Skyhook. On Aug. 31, 1964, Major Civitella retired from the U.S. his Italian language fluency and was thoroughly questioned about Services, or OSS. Army. Following a 24-hour retirement, he joined the CIA and was his background. Thus began his career with the Office of Strategic In 1943, after intense training in Bethesda, Md., Civitella, assigned to the agency’s Air Branch to support clandestine-service along with 12 other enlisted men and two officers, was assigned to a 15-man operational group, or OG, and continued training. In air requirements. Between 1967 and 1969, he served in Vietnam early 1944, he shipped out to North Africa for further training supervising special-operations forces and Vietnamese personnel. as the senior province officer in charge for Kien Phong Province, and preparation. In 1976, Major Civitella was assigned to the CIA’s Plans Branch On Aug. 15, 1944, Civitella’s OG initially supported Operation Dragoon — the allied invasion of southern France. As a member of position, he was heavily involved in the development, validation as the liaison officer to the Pentagon for special operations. In this lines. Team Lafayette, along with two other OGs, captured nearly Force. This unit passed its last validation exercise on Nov. 4, 1979, Team Lafayette, he made his first operational jump behind enemy and certification of the first emergency response force — Delta 4,000 Axis soldiers by employing psychological warfare against the same day the Iranian hostage crisis began. Major Civitella pro- vided key intelligence support to Operation Eagle Claw. mission in southern France, Civitella and his OG were sent to Italy. On Feb. 1, 1981, Major Civitella began his last assignment the finance section of a Nazi division in France. Following their There he participated in 21 air operations as a “bundle kicker.” with the CIA. He was the interagency representative to the U.S. In April 1945, Civitella conducted a second operational Readiness Command, or US REDCOM, and the newly established jump as a member of Team Sewanee. Operating along the Swiss Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF, both based at border in the Alps, the team reported on German activity, as- MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Civitella coordinated the interagency sisted downed airmen and prevented German “scorched-earth” operational and intelligence training for those two commands. activities. The team was also tasked with the mission of captur- On Jan. 1, 1983, the RDJTF became the U.S. Central Command, ing Benito Mussolini. Despite much planning and hard work, and in 1987, USREDCOM was deactivated and replaced by the the team did not get to carry out the mission, because Italian U.S. Special Operations Command. On Aug. 31, 1983, Major partisans killed Mussolini. Civitella retired from the CIA. He was awarded the Intelligence In 1946, Civitella was discharged from the Army and attended Medal of Merit for his work as, “an extremely talented and gifted the University of Pennsylvania, re-enlisting in 1947. Following operations officer.” his re-enlistment, he received counterintelligence training and Major Civitella has authored and co-authored several was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division as an intelligence published articles. On May 19, 2008, he was presented the Bull NCO. In 1951, while assigned to the 82nd, Civitella applied for and Simons Award for his outstanding and dedicated service to the received a direct commission. special-operations community. In retirement, he continues to be involved in the community as an active member of the OSS into the new Special Forces program. His initial assignment was Society and the Special Forces Association. In 1952, 2nd Lieutenant Civitella was among the first recruited U P D A T E
5th SF Group Medic Named SF Medic of the Year For the second year in a row, a effective fire. Wendelin continued Soldier from the 5th Special Forces his actions until a helicopter could Group has been named the U.S. medevac his injured team members. Army Special Operations Command “I was just doing my job,” Wendelin Special Forces Medic of the Year. said, exemplifying the “quiet profes- Sergeant First Class Owen Wende- sional” motto of Special Forces. lin, of B Company, 2nd Battalion, Service in combat is not the only 5th SF Group, received the award consideration for the award. Duty for actions performed while serving performance while in garrison is in Afghanistan and at Fort Camp- also a factor. When not deployed, bell, Ky. Wendelin trained other Soldiers in While on patrol in Helmand the principles of tactical-combat TOP DOC Colonel Peter Benson, the USASOC Province in northeast Afghanistan, casualty care. surgeon, presents Sergeant 1st Class Owen Wendelin’s team came under heavy Wendelin has been serving as an Wendelin the SF Medic of the Year award at and accurate fire from machine guns, SF medical sergeant for four years and the annual special-operations medical confer- small arms and rocket-propelled gre- has deployed twice to Iraq and once ence. U.S. Army photo. nades. Several members of the patrol to Afghanistan. best of the best among special-opera- were injured by small-arms fire. The USASOC surgeon, Colonel Pe- tions medical sergeants. Wendelin raced to each man, ter Benson, presented Wendelin the The SF Medic of the Year award rendering life-saving measures, award at the 2009 Special Operations is presented annually to a medical placing his own life at risk. He gave Medical Conference in Tampa, Fla. sergeant who has exhibited exemplary medical treatment while returning Benson said the award represents the performance. — USASOC PAO SF Legend, Medal of Honor Recipient Howard dies at age 70 Retired Army Colonel Robert L. Howard, a Medal of Honor recipient, U.S. Army Ranger and Special Forces veteran, died at 70 years of age Dec. 23 at his residence in San Antonio, Texas. He died of natural causes. Howard, born July 11, 1939, in Opelika, Ala., was known throughout the Army and the military’s special-operations community for his courage and leadership in combat. He entered the service on July 20, 1956, and was medically retired on Sept. 30, 1992. Howard received the Medal of Honor for actions in Vietnam Dec. 30, 1968. He was nominated three times for the award in 13 months; the first was downgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross, and the last was downgraded to a Silver Star Medal. All three nominations came while he served as an NCO in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group. FAREWELL Sergeant Robert Howard, Jr. accepts the flag that draped He received a direct commission from master sergeant to first lieutenant in the casket of his father, the late Colonel (Ret.) Robert Howard during December 1969 and went on to command several units throughout his career. the funeral and burial held on Monday, Feb. 22, at Arlington National His military assignments include time with the 82nd and 101st Cemetary, VA. Airborne divisions; the 2nd Ranger Battalion; the 3rd, 5th and 6th Special Medal; Army Good Conduct Medal (four awards); National Defense Ser- Forces groups; the 5th Infantry Division; the 7th Corps and the XVIII vice Medal; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Vietnam Service Medal; Airborne Corps. Armed Forces Reserve Medal; NCO Professional Development Ribbon; Howard participated in two movies concerning airborne and special- Army Service Ribbon; Overseas Service Ribbon; Vietnamese Gallantry operations missions, both of which featured John Wayne. He made a Cross with gold, silver and bronze stars; and the Vietnam Wound Medal. parachute jump during the filming of The Longest Day and appeared as an He was also authorized to wear the Army Presidential Unit Citation; airborne instructor in The Green Berets. Navy Valorous Unit Citation; Army Meritorious Unit Citation; Vietnamese His awards and decorations include the Medal of Honor; Distin- Gallantry Unit Citation with Palm; Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal guished Service Cross; Silver Star Medal; Defense Superior Service Med- (two awards); Vietnam Civil Action Medal (two awards); Republic of Korea al; Legion of Merit (three awards); Bronze Star for Valor (three awards); Order of National Security Merit (Samil Medal); Combat Infantryman’s Purple Heart (eight awards); Meritorious Service Medal (two awards); Air Badge; Expert Infantryman’s Badge; Army Aircrew Badge; Master Para- Medal for Valor (two awards); Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army chutist Badge; Pathfinder Badge; Air Assault Badge; Vietnamese Ranger Commendation Medal for Valor (three awards); Joint Service Achievement Badge; Special Forces Tab and Army Ranger Tab. — USASOC PAO
8 Special Warfare Un•con•ven•tion•al War•fare: noun Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. — approved definition June 2009
The Great UW Debate by Colonel David M. Witty
The Special Forces community the new UW definition approved by insurgency, or COIN.5 FID defends has been trying to articulate a defi- the commanders of the U.S. Special a government, while UW coerces nition for unconventional warfare, Operations Command, or USSO- or overthrows one.6 UW should be or UW, for well over 50 years. The COM, and the U.S. Army Special defined in terms that leave no doubt pages of previous issues of this Operations Command, or USASOC, about what it is.7 The traditional- magazine are full of articles dis- in June 2009. ist school of thought appears to be cussing the definition and scope closest to what the original founders of UW. The community’s failure Schools of Thought of SF meant by the term UW. to clearly state a concise defini- A review of articles on UW pub- The methodologist school be- tion of UW to itself, the Army, the lished in Special Warfare reveals lieved that UW was defined by joint force, and other government that until recently, there were three its means of working by, with or agencies makes it appear that it primary schools of UW thought, through indigenous forces.8 In many is at best, doctrinally adrift, or at named here as the “traditionalist,” cases, anything that was not an SF worst, intellectually lacking. Given “methodologist” and “universalist.” unilateral mission was considered the increased emphasis on irregu- The traditionalists believed that UW UW, including FID and COIN.9 The lar warfare and the fact that UW is was exclusively either support to term “unconventional operations,” one of the five IW activities,1 the SF indigenous resistance movements or UO, although never accepted in community needs to agree on what aimed at ending foreign occupa- doctrine, was coined to describe UW is or risk losing credibility. tions or support to indigenous working through indigenous coun- This article will: 1) review pre- insurgencies aimed at coercing or terparts; UO supported FID during vious UW schools of thought; 2) overthrowing hostile governments.2 peace and UW during war.10 In other briefly review how the original UW could be employed in support of writings, methodologists said that founders of SF defined UW and the a conventional-force campaign, but SF’s core purpose was to conduct confusion caused by the various it would still have to be conducted UW; FID; special reconnaissance, doctrinally approved UW definitions; through an indigenous resistance or SR; direct action, or DA; and 3) discuss the most current beliefs movement or insurgency.3 UW could counterterrorism, or CT, through about UW; 4) describe the results of not be employed against nonstate indigenous populations.11 Finally, the UW Definition Working Group actors, because they have no overt methodologists believed that by us- held at the United States Army John infrastructure or occupying force to ing indigenous forces, UW could be F. Kennedy Special Warfare Cen- attack.4 Traditionalists made a clear employed against nonstate actors or ter and School, or SWCS, in April distinction between UW; foreign in- insurgents inside sovereign regimes 2009; and 5) examine the merits of ternal defense, or FID; and counter- that the U.S. supported.12 A varia-
March-April 2010 9 TStoryhe great title uw debate
tion of the methodologist school guerrilla warfare, field intelligence In February 1969, FM 31-21, gained considerable influence dur- gathering, espionage, sabotage, Special Forces Operations, stated ing the years following the 9/11 subversion and escape and evasion “UW consists of the military, po- terrorist attacks, when its viewpoint activities.”24 Bank believed that a litical, psychological or economic was codified into doctrine. resistance movement had to have actions of a covert, clandestine or The universalist school believed external support in order to gain overt nature within areas under that UW was everything and that liberation from a foreign occupation the actual or potential control or the definition of UW needed to or freedom from a hostile regime.25 influence of a force or state whose change to ensure its applicabil- However, through the years, interests and objectives are inimical ity. UW was SF’s primary task, and the original scope and definition to those of the United States. These everything else was a subset of it, of UW was poorly defined in doc- actions are conducted unilaterally including DA, SR and FID.13 They trine, although doctrine still had to by United States resources, or in held that UW was applicable in ev- serve (as it does today) as the basis conjunction with indigenous assets, ery operational environment.14 Even for any UW discussions. Doctrine and avoid formal military confronta- before the attacks of 9/11, univer- provides a common language of un- tion.”32 This definition introduces salists believed, SF was involved derstanding and a body of thought the concept of unilateral UW. daily in UW in scores of countries.15 on how to operate. It is intended In December 1974, FM 31-21, Because UW was the core purpose to serve as a general guide, not Special Forces Operations, defined of SF,16 its definition and scope as a fixed set of rules that must UW as “a broad spectrum of mili- needed to be greatly broadened to be rigidly applied in every situa- tary and paramilitary operations make it relevant for the 21st cen- tion. FM 3-0, Operations (February conducted in enemy, enemy-held, tury.17 In fact, linking UW to guer- 2008), states that doctrine pro- enemy controlled or politically sen- rilla warfare and insurgency made it vides “an authoritative guide for sitive territory. UW includes, but irrelevant, because the U.S. would leaders and Soldiers but requires is not limited to, the interrelated never support a resistance move- original applications that adapt it fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion ment or insurgency in the future.18 to circumstances.”26 Doctrine also and escape, subversion, sabotage, UW needed to be redefined so that drives training and resource al- direct action missions and other SF could conduct UW unilaterally location, and it is agreed-upon by operations of a low-visibility, co- without indigenous or surrogate all concerned parties. But from the vert or clandestine nature. These forces.19 The universalist school inception of SF, doctrinal confu- interrelated aspects of UW may be had much influence at the turn of sion always existed about its roles prosecuted singly or collectively by this century, and in the summer of and missions,27 and even Bank predominantly indigenous person- 2001, the U.S. Army Special Forces expressed concern about the misuse nel, usually supported and directed Command, or USASFC, adopted of terms concerning UW.28 in varying degrees by (an) external UW as an all-encompassing term As of June 2009, there have been source(s) during all conditions of for everything that SF conducts,20 10 different doctrinally approved war or peace.”33 although that was never accepted UW definitions,29 many of which FM 31-21A, Special Forces Op- into doctrine. The universalist have been vague or confusing. erations (December 1974) (Secret), school has faded in recent years, Although amplifying paragraphs in the classified portion of FM 31-21, likely because of the success of UW doctrinal publications following the expanded on the above definition campaigns employing resistance definitions of UW usually tied it to by stating, “UW operations may movements in Afghanistan in 2001 resistance movements and insur- be conducted against the external and in northern Iraq in 2003, thus gencies,30 the definitions themselves sponsor of an insurgent movement proving the continuing relevance of were often created with ambiguity. in a host country, or against insur- the traditionalist school.21 The first doctrinal definition, found gent movement in a host country, in FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare (May or against insurgent activities in Original Concept, Definitions 1955), states, “UW operations are a third country which either will- When the founders of SF, Aaron conducted in time of war behind ingly or unwillingly accepts the use Bank and Russell Volckmann, enemy lines by predominantly in- of its territory by the insurgents defined their term for UW, special digenous personnel responsible in for bases, movement, or sanctu- forces operations, or SFO,22 it was varying degrees to friendly control ary. Their purpose is to support or support to resistance movements, or direction in the furtherance of complement IDAD (internal defense based on their experiences during military and political objectives. It and development) in the host coun- World War II.23 SFO were defined consists of the interrelated fields of try.”34 The ambiguity of the 1974 as “the organization of resistance guerrilla warfare, evasion and es- definition is evident. movements and operation of their cape, and subversion against hostile In 2007, there were two doctrin- component networks, conduct of states (resistance).”31 ally approved definitions of UW,
10 Special Warfare one in joint doctrine and the other Doctrine developers believed that makes UW a methodology rather in Army/Army special-operations the new ARSOF definition would end than a operation that has a specific forces, or ARSOF, doctrine. The joint confusion about the scope of UW purpose, such as to coerce, disrupt definition of UW found in JP 3-05, by clearly defining its purpose as or defeat a hostile government. In Doctrine for Joint Special Operations support to resistance movements, addition, UW could be used not only (December 2003), defined UW as insurgencies or conventional military against state and nonstate actors but “a broad spectrum of military and operations. Stating that UW could also against insurgents or terrorists paramilitary operations, normally support conventional military opera- in states that the U.S. supports. of long duration, predominantly tions demonstrated UW’s relevance The existence of two doctrinally conducted through, with, or by to the Army and the joint force. In- approved but different definitions — indigenous or surrogate forces who cluding “by, with or through irregular the joint definition and the ARSOF are organized, trained, equipped, forces” was meant to end confusion definition — caused more confu- supported, and directed in varying of UW with FID or other coalition sion, because the term UW could degrees by an external source. It activities that use regular forces.39 be applied to many things. SF units includes but is not limited to, guer- FM 3-05.130 (September 2008) also were said to be conducting UW rilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, states that UW can be used against when in fact they were conducting intelligence activities and uncon- nonstate actors, increasing its rele- what others would classify as advis- ventional assisted recovery.”35 This vance to the Global War on Terrorism ing and training foreign security definition is also ambiguous, be- while recognizing that nonstate ac- forces, creating intelligence net-
“The community’s failure to clearly state a concise definition of UW to itself, the Army, the joint force and other government agencies makes it appear that it is at best, doctrinally adrift, or at worst, intellectually lacking.” cause it contains words and phrases tors do not have the same centers of works, conducting DA and SR, or that provide no specificity, such as gravity or infrastructures that have performing other tasks in support “a broad spectrum,” “normally of a been critical in the past to traditional of FID and COIN.41 long duration,” “predominantly,” “in uses of UW. It also says that UW The USSOCOM Global Synchroni- varying degrees” and “includes, but campaigns can be conducted “within zation Conference of October 2008, is not limited to.” or behind the laws of nonbelligerent attended by staff officers from US- At the same time, the ARSOF states with which the United States SOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, definition approved by the U.S. is not at war.”40 the Naval Special Warfare Command Army Special Operations Command, USSOCOM non-concurred with and the theater special-operations or USASOC, commander in January the new ARSOF definition and recom- commands, identified a lack of un- 200736 and found in FM 3-05.201, mended that it be redefined to sup- derstanding of UW throughout the Special Forces Unconventional War- port current and future applications Department of Defense and within fare (September 2007) (Secret) and of UW. However, the real problem the special-operations community. FM 3-05.130, Army Special Opera- with the 2007 ARSOF definition was The lack of understanding of UW tions Forces Unconventional Warfare that it stated that UW can be used to was attributed to the joint defini- (September 2008), defined UW as support “conventional military opera- tion’s ambiguity and the ARSOF “operations conducted by, with or tions,” eliminating the requirement definition’s narrow scope. In real- through irregular forces in sup- for UW to be tied to a resistance ity, the 2007 ARSOF definition was port of a resistance movement, an movement or an insurgency. The problematic because it was not insurgency or conventional mili- use of any irregular force to support specific enough and was open to a tary operations.”37 Irregular forces conventional military operations, broad interpretation. Following the are defined as “armed individuals be they militias, gangs, mercenar- conference, USSOCOM tasked USA- or groups who are not members of ies or criminal networks, constituted SOC to examine the definition and the regular armed forces, police, or UW. Defining UW as operations by, provide a recommended solution to other internal security forces.”38 with or through irregular forces also the problem.
March-April 2010 11 TStoryhe great title uw debate
ASO UWDWG Statements Agree Disagree Unsure Agree Disagree Unsure
The use of irregulars (such as militias, tribes or clans) in support 79 29 10 80 of COIN or FID operations can be considered UW.
The mission of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, in 30 26 43 15 70 Vietnam was a UW operation. 43
The CIDG mission of Vietnam was a FID/COIN operation. 59 3 38 70 15
UW can be conducted against insurgent groups or terrorist 87 10 30 50 networks.
The use of irregular forces exclusively for the purpose of con- 70 23 20 65 ducting DA/SR or intelligence-collections can be considered IW.
The SF community has a problem articulating what UW is. 77 17 90 0
The Army and DoD do not understand what we mean by UW. 90 3 85 5
In order to determine the ex- Current UW Schools of Thought exclusively unilateral or as actions tent of the misunderstanding of Based upon the results of the taken with the recognized security UW, SWCS developed a 75-ques- UW survey and numerous discus- forces of a state and not involving tion UW survey to solicit the com- sions within the SF community, irregular forces. munity’s thoughts on the scope, SWCS determined that there are The advantage of this school purpose and definition of UW. The two current schools of thought, of thought is that it demonstrates survey was taken by two groups, the irregular forces methodologist that UW is relevant today and can one at the Advanced Special Op- school (a variation of the methodolo- be used against the United States’ erations, or ASO, Conference in gist school described earlier in this principal enemy, al-Qaeda, a non- March 2009 and one at the UW article), and the broad traditional- state actor. However, if UW opera- Definition Working Group, or ist school (a slight expansion of the tions to end a foreign occupation UWDWG, in April 2009.42 The re- original traditionalist school). or overthrow a hostile government sults showed that there was little According to the irregular forces employ irregular forces, such as mi- consensus on some fundamental methodologist school, UW is an litias, gangs, mercenaries, warlords, issues concerning UW, particular- umbrella concept that encompasses tribes, criminal networks or op- ly when it came to making a dis- a wide variety of activities conduct- portunists, who are not based in a tinction between UW, FID, COIN ed by irregular forces. The concept resistance movement or insurgency and CT. See the above chart for includes support to resistance that has the support of the civilian some statements from the survey movements and insurgencies, but population, success is less likely. and the groups’ responses. it also includes other operations In fact, using those types of ir- Another example that demon- conducted by irregular forces. This regular forces and attempting to strated the confusion over UW concept distinguishes UW from manufacture resistance or insurgent was an excerpt from a Combined other operations by the methodol- movements that lack the support of Forces Land Component Com- ogy of employing irregular forces: a state’s population can lead to fail- mand OPLAN previously used Any use of irregular forces would ure. Mao Zedong considered the em- at the U.S. Army Command be considered UW operations. In ployment of those types of irregular and General Staff College: “2nd this context, strikes, raids or sabo- forces a “corrupt phenomena” that Battalion/10th SF remains re- tage missions conducted by SF and should be eradicated because they sponsible for FID in Georgia and irregular forces are UW. The mis- are dissociated from the people and conducts unconventional warfare sions could be conducted against a unorganized.45 Examples include (counterinsurgency) in conjunc- state, terrorist organization or non- U.S. efforts in Albania and Latvia tion with the Georgian SOF com- state actor. The SF missions of DA, from 1951 to 1955, the Bay of Pigs pany to interdict … insurgents.”44 SR and CT are denoted as being in 1961, North Vietnam from 1961
12 Special Warfare to 1964, and Nicaragua from 1980 and insurgencies. According to would seldom be employed, and it to 1988.46 Developing a guerrilla the broad traditionalists, UW can could be seen as largely irrelevant, element without first developing involve numerous activities not because the U.S. might lack the a sufficient base of support is an exclusive to UW. These activities political will to support resistance unsustainable and doomed practice. predominantly include guerrilla movements or insurgencies in the As Mao stated, any resistance move- warfare, subversion and, to a lesser future. Another criticism is that ac- ment that is not firmly grounded degree, escape and evasion using an cording to the broad traditionalist with the popular support of the indigenous network, sabotage and definition, UW could not be em- population “must fail.”47 intelligence-collection. They could ployed against nonstate actors, al- Another drawback to the irregu- also include SR, DA, CT, advanced Qaeda in particular, until they have lar forces methodologist school is special operations, preparation of reached a point where they become that irregular forces are increasing- the environment and other activities de-facto states with overt ruling ly being employed on the battlefield employed in support of UW but not authority and infrastructure. by conventional forces, and by this exclusive to it. school’s line of thought, they are In this school’s view, while the The UW Definition Working Group conducting UW, which endangers tactics, techniques and procedures In an attempt to end the debate UW’s status as a task conducted associated with working with the about the definition and scope of predominantly by SF. An excellent components of resistance move- UW, SWCS convened the UW Defi- example is the Sunni Awakening ments and insurgencies, i.e., guer- nition Working Group, April 7-9, Movement in Anbar Province in rilla forces, undergrounds and aux- 2009, composed of key stakeholders Iraq, also known as Concerned Lo- iliaries, greatly enable SF to perform in the SF community, to develop a cal Citizens, and later as the Sons a wide array of other special opera- consensus on the definition of UW. of Iraq, or SOI. Many of the SOI tions, such as SR, DA, CT and FID, The UWDWG comprised 25 repre- were indigenous Sunni tribal insur- the use of irregular forces during sentatives selected from USSOCOM, gents who had fought with al-Qae- the conduct of operations does not USASOC, USASFC, SWCS, the Naval da in Iraq against the coalition and make them UW. Postgraduate School, or NPS, the Iraqi security forces, but they later The broad traditionalist school Joint Special Operations University, defected from al-Qaeda because of categorizes operations by what or JSOU, and the SOF Cell from the its brutality. they aim to achieve rather than the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leav- As irregular tribal militias, they type of force that conducts them. enworth, Kan. The methodology of began to assist coalition forces — Within that scope, the target of UW the working group was: 1) present who paid, organized, equipped and must be vulnerable to the effects a series of briefings on doctrine, employed them to provide local of resistance and insurgency. The the operational environment and security — and the movement later adversary must have some overt the history of the UW definition; 2) spread throughout Iraq. Although infrastructure that is susceptible to divide into three groups to de- the coalition forces wanted to physical or psychological attacks. velop three proposed definitions; 3) incorporate the SOI into the Iraqi The adversary does not necessarily present each group’s definition for security forces, the Shia-dominat- have to be a state government, but discussion and debate; and 4) reach ed government of Prime Minister it does have to possess state-like agreement, either through con- Nouri al-Maliki was mistrustful of characteristics, e.g., a de-facto gov- sensus or vote, on one definition. the SOI, and Iraqi security forces ernment or an occupying military USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC, NPS conducted raids against them and force exercising authority. Groups and JSOU had one vote each; SWCS arrested their leaders.48 Clearly, and networks that are strictly un- served as the facilitator. The only the SOI were not part of the regular derground or clandestine in na- stipulations placed on the defini- security forces of Iraq and could ture have different vulnerabilities tion were that it adhere to doctrine only be labeled irregular forces. and represent different challenges; (i.e., non-doctrinal terms could not Conventional forces from the U.S. these challenges require different be used in the definition), that it Army played a significant role in skill sets and approaches. In other adhere to Army standards for the the organization and employment of words, UW cannot be employed content of doctrinal definitions, and the SOI.49 against nonstate actors unless they that it be based on classic theories The other current school, the take on significant state-like char- of warfare that are still valid.50 broad traditionalist school, is acteristics. At the conclusion of the UWDWG, slightly more encompassing than An advantage of this school of the members agreed on the following the original traditionalist school. thought is that it makes it con- definition of UW: “activities conduct- According to this school, UW is a siderably easier to identify what ed to enable a resistance movement specific type of special operation is and what is not UW. However, or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or that enables resistance movements critics of this school argue that UW overthrow a government or occupy-
March-April 2010 13 The great uw debate
ing power by operating through or lication, TC 31-20, Special Forces power; a nonstate actor is neither. with an underground, auxiliary and Unconventional Warfare, which However, the fact that UW cannot be guerrilla force in a denied area.” incorporates the new definition. The used against nonstate actors does Every word in this definition was new definition is being included in not mean that those actors cannot thoroughly debated. UW was de- all new doctrine. be attacked — they could still be scribed as “activities” instead of “op- targeted using FID, DA, CT or SR. erations” because “activities” denote Merits of the new definition UW would be appropriate against actions that could be nonmilitary, Critics of the new definition will al-Qaeda if the group accomplished while “operations” are military- argue that it is so narrow that UW its goal of establishing a new Islamic centric.51 “Resistance movement will seldom be conducted, if at all — caliphate.55 If there was a need to de- and insurgency” were included to the United States will not have the velop clandestine surrogate networks connect UW to its historical context. political will to support resistance in a country without its knowledge “To coerce, disrupt or overthrow a movements or insurgencies in the for the purposes of targeting terrorist government or occupying power” future. However, the decision to organizations such as al-Qaeda, that was included to define UW by its make war utilizing UW is for policy- would be CT, not UW.
“The new definition provides clarity on what UW is, and while it might not be perfect, it does reduce confusion. In defining UW by what it is meant to achieve rather than by the methodology employed, we can ensure that we are training to achieve the required skills and capabilities.” purpose rather than by its method- makers, not for those responsible By maintaining the histori- ology of working with indigenous or for developing doctrine and train- cal concept of UW as supporting irregular forces. “Underground, aux- ing to maintain capabilities.54 The a resistance movement or insur- iliary and guerrilla force” were in- United States has not employed gency, the new definition makes cluded because they are considered nuclear warfare since August 1945; evident that only SF are trained to be the three common components however, it did not attempt to rede- and equipped to conduct UW within of insurgencies.52 “Denied area” was fine it to make it relevant. The fact the U.S. military and have spe- included so that a support element that the United States possessed a cific supporting doctrine. Although far from the operational area would nuclear capability was invaluable other forces may be knowledgeable be described as “supporting UW” during the Cold War by deterring of techniques for employing irregu- rather than “conducting UW.” Non- a Soviet attack. Today, the use of lar forces, that does not mean that state actor was not included in the UW is at least as likely as the clash they know how to advise or enable definition because it has no overt of regular armies in open warfare. a resistance movement or insur- infrastructure to attack and was not In addition, it is conceivable that gency. By defining UW as strictly deemed vulnerable to UW. UW could be used in support of a support to resistance movements The commanders of USSOCOM FID or CT campaign. If a hostile and insurgencies, we can ensure and USASOC approved the defini- government were to support an that we develop and maintain the tion in June 2009, stating that it insurgency in a country where the skills needed to enable them. That was immediately the only approved United States is conducting FID to will prevent what occurred in some definition for SOF and will be pro- enable a host nation’s COIN efforts, previous UW attempts when plan- posed for inclusion in all doctrine. the United States could employ UW ners demonstrated a lack of ex- They directed SWCS to rescind against the hostile government. pertise in supporting resistance the existing UW publications, FM Another argument against the movements and insurgencies. In 3-05.201 (September 2007) (Secret) new definition is that it does not some U.S. efforts, planning started and FM 3-05.130 (September 2008), allow UW to be used against non- late or overly focused on the purely and publish new doctrine.53 SWCS state actors. UW is designed for use military aspects of creating units is currently developing a new pub- against a government or occupying that were more like commandos
14 Special Warfare than guerrilla units, with support- operational and strategic condi- ourselves. Should we continue to ing clandestine elements with in- tions.”61 It is often the only way to redefine the meaning of a term just digenous support. Supported forces link tasks, effects, conditions and because it might not be immediate- were disconnected from the popula- end states, especially in activi- ly relevant? Probably not, but that tion and appeared to be manufac- ties involving nonmilitary factors,62 is what we have done with UW. We tured by the United States.56 such as UW and FID. Lines of effort should accept the new definition, The new definition is also eas- in FID could include developing end the debate and execute the nu- ily understood and is applicable security forces, conducting combat merous tasks at hand rather than to what an adversary does against operations, securing the population, periodically dividing into schools of U.S. interests. For instance, Iran developing governance, establish- thought to debate the true meaning has supplied weapons and advisers ing essential services and promot- of UW. The new definition provides to multiple resistance movements ing economic growth.63 However, in clarity on what UW is, and while it in Iraq;57 we can now clearly define UW, the lines of effort could include might not be perfect, it does reduce that the Iranians were conducting a organizing insurgent infrastructure, confusion. In defining UW by what UW campaign in Iraq and conceptu- gaining popular support, conduct- it is meant to achieve rather than ally respond to it. ing armed conflict to de-legitimize a by the methodology employed, we In the course of attempting government and conducting subver- can ensure that we are training to redefine UW as a methodology sion to undermine a government.64 to achieve the required skills and for employing irregular forces, we Thus, if one believes he is conduct- capabilities.67 We hope the debate changed doctrine to describe FID as ing UW and is in reality conducting is over. not employing irregular forces, only FID, the wrong lines of effort could the recognized forces of a host na- be applied. For example, following Notes: tion. We characterized UW as using the overthrow of a hostile regime 1 Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, irregular forces that are not part of by a successful UW campaign, SF Irregular Warfare, 1 December 2008, 2. a state’s recognized security forc- might not rapidly transition to FID 2 MAJ Robert G. Brady, “Mass Strategy: A es.58 As noted already, if that were lines of effort to protect the newly Different Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” the case, conventional forces would established government and instead Special Warfare, Summer 1989, 27; MAJ have been categorized as having remain focused on the UW line of Kenneth E. Tovo, “Special Forces Mission Focus conducted UW in Iraq through the effort of capturing former regime for the Future,” , December Sons of Iraq, who were not orga- members who would then have little Special Warfare nized by or approved of by the Iraqi power or influence. That would al- 1996, 8; COL J.H. Crerar, “Commentary: Some government. Furthermore, previous low other segments of discontent Thoughts on Unconventional Warfare,” Special doctrine stated that the employ- within a state the breathing space Warfare, Winter 2000, 38; and D. Jones, “UW/ ment of irregular forces is an aspect needed for them to establish insur- FID and Why Words Matter,” Special Warfare, of FID.59 That is more doctrinally gent undergrounds and transition July-August 2006, 26. A resistance movement is correct, as FID is actions taken to to guerrilla warfare.65 We would defined as “an organized effort by some portion protect a government,60 while UW commit what Clausewitz considered of the civil population of a country to resist the is now clearly used for coercing or the most grievous error in war: not legally established government or an occupying defeating one. The Sons of Iraq and determining the “kind of war” that power and to disrupt civil order and stability.” the Civilian Irregular Defense Group we were conducting and instead See Joint Publication 1-02, Department of of South Vietnam were employed to turning it into something that is Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and conduct COIN in support of FID, not “alien to its nature.”66 Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended UW. The employment of irregular through 19 August 2009), 470. Insurgency is forces that are not a part of the host Ending the debate defined as “the organized use of subversion and nation’s recognized security forces The definition and scope of UW violence by a group or movement that seeks is still for the purpose of accom- have always been an emotional is- to overthrow or force change of a governing plishing the host nation’s goals or sue for the SF community. Perhaps authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group U.S. goals for the host nation. because UW was the original, and itself.” See JP 1-02, 268. The most important aspect of for a time, only SF task, the com- 3 Brady, 27; and LTC Mark Grdovic, the new definition is that it makes munity feels a need to be able to “Understanding Unconventional Warfare and a clear distinction between UW and apply the term at any time. How- U.S. Army Special Forces,” Special Warfare, FID. That is vital, because the lines ever, by calling something UW that September-October 2006, 20. of effort in UW and FID are oppo- is not, we endanger the capability 4 site. A line of effort “links multiple of actually supporting resistance D. Jones, 25-26. tasks and missions using the logic movements and insurgencies and 5 FID is defined as “participation by civilian of purpose — cause and effect — to following the correct lines of ef- and military agencies of a government in any of focus efforts toward establishing fort. We also continue to confuse the action programs taken by another government
March-April 2010 15 The great uw debate
or other designated organization to free and capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated 29 FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare, May 1955, 2; protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, targets. Direct action differs from conventional FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces and insurgency.” See JP 1-02, 216. COIN is offensive actions in the level of physical and Operations, September 1961, 251; FM 31-21, defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, political risk, operational techniques, and the Special Forces Operations, June 1965, 4-5; FM economic, psychological, and civic actions taken degree of discriminate and precise use of force 31-21, Special Forces Operations, February by a government to defeat insurgency.” See JP to achieve specific objectives. See JP 1-02, 1969, 3-1; FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations, 1-02, 130. 163. CT is defined as “operations that include December 1974, 3-1; FM 31-20, Special Forces 6 MAJ Mike Skinner, “The Renaissance of the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, Operations, September 1977 (Confidential), Unconventional Warfare as an SF Mission,” pre-empt, and respond to terrorism.” See JP 1-02, 43; FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Special Warfare, Winter 2002, 19; D. Jones, 23; 132. Operations, April 1990, 3-1; JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, December 2003, and Grdovic, “Understanding UW,” 18. 12 MAJ Dean S. Newman, “Operation White II-7; FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 7 D. Jones, 27; and Grdovic, “Understanding Star: A UW Operation Against An Insurgency,” August 2006, 2-1; and FM 3-05.201, Special UW,” 22. Special Warfare, April 2005, 29, 32-33. Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2007 13 8 COL Mark D. Boyatt, “Special Forces: Our COL Michael R. Kershner, “Unconventional (Secret), 1-1. Core Purpose,” Special Warfare, Winter 2001, Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of 30 For instance, see FM 31-20, April 1990, 8; and CPT Robert Lee Wilson, “Unconventional Military Operations,” Special Warfare, Winter 3-2; FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Warfare: SF’s Past, Present and Future,” Special 2001, 2-7. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Warfare, Winter 2001, 27. Today, describing UW 14 Kershner, 4. Forces, September 1994, 1-24; FM 3-05.20, as by, with or through indigenous forces would be 15 Kershner, 2-3. Special Forces Operations, 2-1; and JP 3-05, problematic, since UW would be widely conducted 16 COL Gary M. Jones and MAJ Christopher December 2003, II-7. by U.S. conventional forces. For instance, General 31 FM 31-21, May 1955, 2. Raymond T. Ordierno, Commander, Multi-National Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Force-Iraq, said, “Our forces continue to conduct Special Forces,” Special Warfare, Summer 1999, 5. 32 FM 31-21, February 1969, 3-1. full-spectrum operations – by, with, and through 17 Gary Jones and Tone, 9, 14. 33 FM 31-21, December 1974, 3-1. the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces).” See “An Interview 18 Gary Jones and Tone, 9. 34 FM 31-21A, Special Forces Operations, with Raymond T. Odierno,” , Issue 55 (4th JFQ 19 Gary Jones and Tone, 12-13; and Dr. Keith December 1974, (Secret), 3-1. IDAD is defined Quarter 2009), 121. D. Dickson, “The New Asymmetry: Unconventional as “the full range of measures taken by a nation 9 MAJ Christian M. Karsner, “21st-Century Warfare and Army Special Forces,” Special to promote its growth and to protect itself from Relevance of Mao’s Theory on Popular Support Warfare, Fall 2001, 18. subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It in Guerrilla Warfare,” Special Warfare, February focuses on building viable institutions (political, 20 D. Jones, 22-23. 2005, 32; and Wilson, 24. economic, social, and military) that respond to 21 A final UW school, although 10 Boyatt, “Unconventional Operations Forces the needs of society.” See JP 1-02, 276. undocumented, is the Ambiguous School. The of Special Operations,” Special Warfare, October 35 JP 3-05, December 2003, II-7. This Ambiguousists desire to keep the definition of 1994, 10. Note that doctrinally, FID can be definition is also found in the current version of UW vague so that SF missions can be labeled conducted during wartime. JP 1-02. as UW as required, for reasons that go beyond 36 11 Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and doctrinal considerations. In academic circles, CW4 Jeffery L. Hasler, “Defining War: New What are We?” Special Warfare, Summer 1998, UW is generally described as anything that is Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional 37; Boyatt, “Special Forces Core Purpose: What not conventional warfare, giving it a very loose and Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare, vs. How,” Special Warfare, Winter 1999, 19; and definition. See Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and April-March 2007, 22. Boyatt, “Special Forces: Our Core Purpose,” 8. SR the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare 37 FM 3-05.201, September 2007, (Secret), is defined as “reconnaissance and surveillance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 16. 1-1; and FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations actions conducted as a special operation , September 2008, 22 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: Forces Unconventional Warfare in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive para 1-2. Both FM 3-05.201 September 2007, The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.: environments to collect or verify information of (Secret), and FM 3-05.130, September 2008, have Presidio Press, 1986), 152, 156. strategic or operational significance, employing been rescinded. 23 Bank, 149-51; and Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., military capabilities not normally found in 38 JP 1-02, 282. conventional forces. These actions provide U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Revised 39 FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 1-11. an additive capability for commanders and Edition (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas supplement other conventional reconnaissance Press, 2002), 120. 40 FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 3-90. and surveillance actions.” See JP 1-02, 509. DA 24 Bank, 163. 41 For instance, see Dr. C.H. Briscoe, is defined as “short-duration strikes and other 25 Bank, 132. “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF small-scale offensive actions conducted as a Operations During Balikatan 02-1,” Special 26 FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008, para D-2. special operation in hostile, denied, or politically Warfare, September 2004, 56, where the 1st 27 sensitive environments and which employ Paddock, 120. Special Forces Group leadership envisioned a specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, 28 Bank, 151. UW campaign in the Philippines vs. FID following
16 Special Warfare the 9/11 attacks; Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, “Civil could return to insurgency,” Los Angeles Times Foreign Internal Defense, June 2008, para 1-2; and Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island,” – Article Collection, Aug. 23, 2008, available FM 3-05.130, September 2008, para 1-11. Special Warfare, September 2004, 30, where the at
March-April 2010 17
Effective Use of FID Expands SF Influence By Captain Stephen C. Flanagan effective use of fid
During the past six years of com- or MDMP, reassessing how to more This was a noteworthy accomplish- bat rotations to Iraq, United States effectively shape the operational en- ment, persuading the Shiite Kurdish Army Special Forces have refined vironment. The ODA found that mul- soldiers of the 4th IA to train with their lines of operation, or LOOs, to tiple friendly elements redundantly and later conduct missions alongside meet the ever-evolving challenges focused on insurgents in the Kirkuk the Sunni soldiers of the 18th SIB. presented on the battlefield of coun- City area, collected intelligence from The FID training promoted a healthy terinsurgency, or COIN. the same sources and partnered with competition between the Iraqi units The LOOs directed by combined the same Iraqi elements. to be the best ISF direct-action force joint special-operations task forces, Meanwhile, the detachment’s in the area, demonstrating a vast ex- or CJSOTFs, in Iraq and Afghani- intelligence preparation of the bat- pansion of the ODA’s influence. stan have varied greatly over time tlefield indicated that the greatest The QRF platoon leader soon and have included: targeting enemy threat had shifted to an area out- introduced the ODA commander to networks, conducting tribal engage- side of Kirkuk City: Diyala Province a retired major general of the Iraqi ments, conducting information and was teeming with violence between police. The general commanded the psychological operations, conduct- al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, and Jaysh loyalties of the dominant tribe in the ing combined lethal operations and al-Mehdi, or JAM.1 Intelligence indi- area. The timing of the meeting was developing networks of influence. cated the Hamrin Mountains, run- crucial. AQI had recently killed a trib- However, one LOO that has remained ning along the Salah ad-Din/Kirkuk al member because it believed he had the constant emphasis for the 10th provincial boundary, provided an cooperated with U.S. forces. AQI had SF Group in shaping the battlefield unimpeded supply route into Diyala established the Islamic State of Iraq, in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the for AQI.2 The key AQI node at the or ISI, implementing strict, radical conduct of foreign internal defense, northern end of that supply line was Sunni Sharia law, and it maintained or FID. the Zaab Triangle, formed by the dominance in the general area. Joint Publication 1-02 defines FID towns of Bayji, Hawijah and Sharqat, AQI regularly distributed ISI as “participation by civilian and mili- with Zaab Village at its center. newsletters full of propaganda tary agencies of a government in any There were virtually no coalition against the government of Iraq, or of the action programs taken by an- forces, or CF, and few ISF forces in GOI, and the U.S. government, and it other government or other designated the triangle because it was on the corrupted local leaders of the ISF and organization to free and protect its seam between three CF brigades and government. AQI conducted grisly society from subversion, lawlessness four provinces: Ninewah, Kirkuk, Irbil executions for minor infractions of and insurgency.” The 10th SF Group and Salah ad-Din. AQI firmly con- the Sharia law, including beheadings has prioritized FID, emphasizing mili- trolled most of the Zaab Triangle. The in the center of towns. Through those tary training and combat-advising, to Hamrin Mountains essentially formed coercive tactics, AQI gained the abili- improve the capabilities of Iraqi Secu- an AQI “supply snake” into Diyala ty to collect local taxes and command rity Forces, or ISF, and ultimately to Province, with the Zaab Triangle at control of the area. However, with the protect Iraqi society from insurgency. its head. The ODA’s MDMP concluded execution of the tribesman and the During OIF V and VI, SF Operational that the best way to attack the snake arrival of ODA 0324 to the area, that Detachment-Alpha 0324 learned that was to cut off its head. was all about to change. effective FID not only led to improved In August 2007, therefore, ODA The ODA developed a close re- employment of ISF but also enabled 0324 constructed a combat outpost lationship with the general and the the ODA to develop strong networks in the heart of the Zaab Triangle, area tribal leaders, who previously of influence and effectively accom- co-located with the largely AQI-cor- had been wary of CF, ISF and the plish the desired effects along their rupted 18th Strategic Infrastructure GOI. The ODA fostered the develop- assigned LOOs. Battalion, or SIB. The ODA estab- ment of a tribal sahawa, or “awak- Based in Kirkuk during OIF V, lished close ties with the commander ening,” against AQI, in the form of a ODA 0324 spent the first half of its of the 18th SIB, mitigated his cor- network of concerned local citizens. deployment conducting FID training ruption, and initiated intensive FID The sahawa organization slowly be- with 84 Kurdish soldiers of the 4th training with his best platoons. The gan providing the ODA with atmo- Iraqi Army Intelligence-Surveillance- ODA advised NCOs from the 4th Iraqi spherics and intelligence. With that Reconnaissance Company. In July Army ISR Company who were train- intelligence, the ODA began combat- 2007, the ODA conducted training in ing platoons of the 18th SIB Scout advising its counterparts in the 4th the military decision-making process, and Quick Reaction Force, or QRF. IA, ISR and 18th SIB to conduct
20 Special Warfare TEam leader An SF captain and members of his team combat-advise Iraqi forces prior to going on a mission. U.S. Army photo. direct-action raids against AQI facili- training paid off — the SIB Scouts had been responsible for manufac- tators and weapons caches. responded professionally. turing IEDs and directing numerous As the ODA and FID partners The combined element returned IED attacks against CF and ISF.3 degraded AQI control of the area, fire, pushed beyond the kill zone The operation was an ISF victory and the sahawa grew in its strength, and quickly began clearing back resulted in the degradation of AQI in willingness and ability to provide through that portion of the village. the Hugna area. intelligence. Local ISF also began The ODA synchronized maneuver Also in September 2007, the ODA cooperating more with the ODA and of the combined assault force, the received a tip from a sahawa contact even asserting itself to enforce the Humvee-based support-by-fire ele- about a regional AQI leader in Old GOI rule of law. The regional po- ments, close air support from the Zaab Village. The ODA and the 18th lice chief began coming to sahawa 2-6 Cavalry, and a company-sized SIB QRF Platoon conducted a day- meetings and cooperating fully with QRF provided by the 18th SIB and light time-sensitive raid and arrested the ODA. The commander of the the 5-82 Field Artillery Battalion. Sattam Hamid Khalif, the area AQI 18th SIB also grew less corrupt and The action resulted in no friendly leader, former Baath Party leader and began to employ his line companies casualties, 14 detained AQI opera- 3/25 BCT HVT, who had been the in ODA-advised clearing operations tives and one enemy killed. The dead primary target of nearly a dozen CF- against AQI. man, Baha Turki Abd Shabib, had led raids since 2003.4 The celebration On Sept. 17, 2007, the ODA and been on the ODA’s high-value target, in the streets over his capture lasted the 18th SIB Scout Platoon were en or HVT, list. He was the AQI leader of for the next several days. route to recover a cache when the the Hugna area and had been linked Sattam’s capture was a huge psy- combined force was caught in a two- to the deaths of more than 60 inno- chological blow to area AQI. In just sided ambush in a tight alley in the cent Iraqis, including the notorious three months, the ODA had trained AQI stronghold of Hugna. All the FID beheading of an Iraqi soldier. Shabib the formerly stagnant 18th SIB and
March-April 2010 21 effective use of fid
Testing Mettle An SF Soldier from the 10th SF Group keeps a close watch on the recruits for the new An Najaf SWAT team. U.S. Army photo. advised them as they performed 32 the sahawa in order to secure the sible by the foundation of FID train- successful direct-action operations, roads of the central Zaab Triangle. ing. The ODA’s ability to neutralize a captured or killed 43 AQI operatives From the beginning, the ODA influ- previous AQI stronghold and pro- and recovered seven caches. These enced the Kirkuk provincial govern- mote the primacy of the ISF was no operations demoralized the AQI in ment to co-sign the SOI contract aberration. Detachments from the the Zaab Triangle and asserted the to ensure the sahawa’s loyalty to 10th SF Group accomplished similar ODA-advised ISF as the authority of the GOI. Seeing the value of the results across all of northern Iraq the area. SOI program, the 1-87 commander during OIF V. In a third activity in September employed it across his entire battal- ODA 0324 had a similar experi- 2007, the ODA arranged a “Sons of ion battlespace. The effect was rapid ence in gaining influence through Iraq,” or SOI, contract between the and remarkable. Camp McHenry, FID during OIF VI in the holy city of sahawa and the 5-82 Field Artillery the 1-87 headquarters in Hawijah, Najaf, the capital of the Shia world. Battalion to assist the ISF in securing had received daily indirect fire for The previous ODA in Najaf focused the IED-laden roads of the northern the previous year; but by November on conducting leader engagements Zaab Triangle. This SOI contract 2007, the attacks had ceased.5 and collecting atmospherics and proved so successful that the 5-82 FA The 1-10 Infantry BCT followed had conducted only four SF-advised expanded the concept to other groups suit and employed the SOI program ISF operations during the previous across its sector of the southern across its entire sector. The new alli- year. The provincial governor and Ninewah Province. ance was the single largest volunteer the provincial director of police had In October, the ODA encouraged mobilization since the war began.6 a standing agreement with JAM in the 1-87 Infantry Battalion, in Hawi- The expansion of SF’s influence and Najaf that JAM would not be targeted jah, to work closely with the Zaab the long-term shaping of the opera- if it refrained from conducting at- ISF and to initiate a SOI program for tional environment was made pos- tacks there. Therefore, JAM and JAM
22 Special Warfare Keeping Watch A busy check point in Hugna keeps this SF Soldier from the 10th SF Group on guard. U.S. Army photo.
Special Groups, or JAM-SG,7 had select NCOs to run future qualifica- their skills in combat marksmanship freedom of movement in Najaf while tion courses and sustainment train- and small-unit tactics, or SUT. Once they facilitated and planned attacks ing for the unit. The ODA taught the that was complete, the ODA lever- in other provinces. So while JAM-SG ANSWAT NCOs how to lead training aged its new influence with Majid to conducted attacks against CF con- and then supervised them as they supply the special-forces company voys in adjacent provinces, in Najaf, trained the unit. By September 2008, with flashlights for their weapons and the ISF elements, the police and the Najaf had a 110-man SWAT company trained them extensively on nighttime IA’s 30th Brigade, 8th Division, were that was fit, motivated, tactically marksmanship and SUT. Those night stagnant. On the surface, Najaf ap- sound and sustainable. skills proved critical during subse- peared calm; in reality, it resembled a Brigadier General Majid, com- quent operations. turbulent JAM-SG beehive. mander of the 30th IA, witnessed The training and skills-devel- Soon after its arrival in May 2008, the development of the ANSWAT and opment of both Iraqi units led to a ODA 0324 implemented an intensive grew receptive to the ODA’s sugges- healthy competition to be the best FID training program with the bur- tions. He accepted the ODA’s recom- in Najaf. Each unit wanted more geoning An Najaf SWAT, or ANSWAT, mendation to unite the three special- training and combat-advising from and special-forces platoons within forces platoons in his brigade into the ODA to improve their skills and the 30th IA BDE. The ODA revamped one unit, the 30th IA Brigade Special reputation, which expanded the the ANSWAT qualification course Forces Company. The ODA conducted ODA’s influence significantly. Soon program of instruction, or POI, into an assessment of the IA special-forc- the commander of the Najaf police’s a five-week course that began with a es soldiers and developed a training Thu Al Fuqar Battalion approached challenging selection phase, followed POI. The soldiers had been trained by the ODA to request training for his by an operator training phase. The SF in the past, and the ODA deter- “special platoon.” This was significant ODA helped the ANSWAT commander mined that they needed to refresh because he, the provincial director of
March-April 2010 23 effective use of fid
recruiting station Special Forces Soldiers recruit for the An Najaf SWAT team at the Najaf Police Academy. U.S. Army photo. police and the lieutenant governor collection, as well. Cooperation with al-Rahtma. The ODA combat-advised had served in Badr Corps8 together the ISF units’ intelligence sections the 30th IA Brigade SF Company in for decades and now formed the true helped the ODA develop more reliable the successful arrest of the Multi- power trio in Najaf. targets. The expansion of the ODA’s National Corps-Iraq’s number-three Although the governor held the influence with provincial leaders HVT, Ali Hamza Hadad; the ODA’s governorship,9 those three actually also led to relationships whereby key HVT, Sayid Jihad Musawi; and the possessed more power in the prov- governmental leaders often shared Multi-National Division-Central’s ince because of their standing within valuable intelligence with the ODA. HVT, Nasir the Fat. Those raids Badr Corps and the Islamic Supreme Ultimately, the FID program enabled ended Hay al-Rahtma’s status as a Council of Iraq.10 In recent years, the the ODA to develop dependable intel- JAM-SG safe zone. secretive Thu Al Fuqar had gained ligence and served to influence the From October 2008 to Janu- a reputation as a rogue but effective provincial governor and ISF leaders ary 2009, ODA 0324 continued to unit that operated on behalf of the to begin approving SF-advised direct- combat-advise the ANSWAT, the 30th Badr Corps. The ODA capitalized on action operations to arrest mid- and IA Brigade SF Company and Thu Al the opportunity to gain better ac- high-level members of JAM-SG seek- Fuqar during 23 raids across the An cess and influence with these actual ing refuge in Najaf. Najaf Province with 21 of them (91 leaders of Najaf, trained the police The Hay al-Rathma neighborhood, percent) resulting in the arrest of the battalion’s special platoon, and later in the Sadr City of Najaf, was long primary target. In all, 38 warranted combat-advised its operations to ef- considered a JAM-SG controlled area, JAM-SG insurgents were put be- fectively neutralize a JAM-SG IED cell off-limits to ISF and CF. On Oct. 23, hind bars. These terrorists included in northern Najaf. 2008, the ODA gained intelligence an unprecedented nine HVTs of the The FID program expanded the and approval to conduct a series of MNC-I, MND-C and Task Force-17. ODA’s influence in intelligence- raids against three targets in Hay Intelligence feedback indicated that
24 Special Warfare not only was Najaf no longer a safe the ODA’s robust FID programs. 8 The Badr Corps (also known as Badr Brigade haven for JAM-SG but also that ter- The detachment’s ability to gain or Badr Organization) was based in Iran for two rorists who once found sanctuary influence and shape the operational decades during the rule of Saddam Hussein. It in Najaf were fleeing the province to environment through FID during OIF consisted of thousands of Iraqi exiles, refugees and seek refuge elsewhere. V and VI was no anomaly. The 10th defectors who fought alongside Iran in the Iran–Iraq The ODA’s FID program not only SF Group ODAs had similar accom- War. Returning to Iraq following the 2003 coalition led to degradation of JAM-SG but plishments in dozens of outstations invasion, the group became the armed wing of the also enabled the ODA to expand its across Iraq. During OIF V and VI, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. influence into the rural tribal areas the 10th SF Group-led CJSOTF-AP 9Although the Najaf governor was a member of of the province. The commander of conducted 4,644 FID training events, ISCI, he was a moderate who was new to the party. the 5th Department of Border En- an average of 15 events per day, ISCI leadership expected him to follow the guidance forcement, or DBE, approached the with a unit of only brigade strength. of the lieutenant governor. ODA to request training for his Cobra Direct extensions of the 10th Group’s 10 The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq is an Force. The ODA provided some train- FID priority, CJSOTF elements Iraqi political party currently led by Abdul Aziz ing and developed a relationship that brokered 3,011 tribal engagements al-Hakim. Its support comes from the country’s Shia would facilitate intelligence-gathering and conducted 1,783 direct-action Muslim community and the Islamic Republic of Iran. and access to area sheiks. operations, resulting in the capture It was previously known as the Supreme Council The sheiks were totally disen- of 1,138 primary targets and 1,743 for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Supreme chanted with the GOI, especially the persons of interest. FID, as exempli- Islamic Iraqi Council. Badr-led provincial government and fied by ODA 0324 and all 10th SF 11 The tribes won six seats on the An Najaf Pro- police. In November 2008, the ODA Group elements in OIF V and VI, vincial Council under the political party names of “Loy- learned that several sheiks were so directly expands SF influence, and it alty to Najaf” and “Najaf Unity”: http://www.niqash.org/ angry with the provincial government will remain paramount to success- content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2395&lang=0. that they were making plans to con- ful COIN campaigns in both Iraq and duct a provincial coup with 300,000 Afghanistan. armed tribesmen. Through FID Captain Stephen C. Flanagan training and integrating Civil Affairs Notes: is commander of ODA 0324 projects funded by Najaf’s provincial 1 Jaysh al-Mehdi is an Iraqi paramilitary force and conducted two tours to OIF reconstruction teams, the ODA was created in June 2003 by the radical Iraqi Shia cleric with his detachment. Commis- able to gain great influence over the Muqtada al-Sadr. JAM was responsible for most of sioned through ROTC as an 5th DBE and the tribes and eventu- the insurgent violence in southern Iraq from 2004 Infantry lieutenant in May 2001, ally convinced the sheiks to conduct to 2007. he completed the Infantry Of- a “democratic revolution” instead of 2 Kirkuk Province is also known as At Ta’mim ficer Basic Course and Ranger an armed one. Province to westerners. School and then served as a For the first time, these tribes be- 3 The Hugna ambush story is reported at: http:// rifle platoon leader in the 1-501 gan to acknowledge the new GOI and www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content Parachute Infantry Regiment became involved in the democratic &task=view&id=14106&Itemid=128. from 2002 to 2003. He served process. The sheiks began organizing 4 The ODA paid out the standing $10,000 reward as a rifle platoon leader and conventions and political rallies. Dur- for the information that led to Sattam Hamid Khalif’s support platoon leader in the ing the 2009 provincial election, they capture. 1st Ranger Battalion from 2003 won six seats in the Najaf provincial 5 Information about the effects of the Hawijah to 2005, during which time parliament and helped elect the new SOI program come from: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/ he completed one tour in Iraq Najaf governor, Adnan Zurfi, of the index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=186 and one tour in Afghanistan. Beni Hassan tribe.11 14&Itemid=128. After completing the Infantry ODA 0324’s ability to build confi- 6 The USA Today report on the SOI mobilization: Captain’s Career Course and dent and competent ISF, to persuade http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-11- the Special Forces Qualifica- previously distrustful Shia and Sunni 28-iraq-wednesday_N.htm?csp=34. tion Course, he reported to the tribes to support the GOI, and to in- 7 Jaysh al-Mehdi - Special Groups are the cell- 10th SF Group in May 2007. He fluence provincial and ISF leaders to based Shia insurgent organizations operating within holds a bachelor’s in electrical support effective direct-action opera- Iraq, backed by Iran. These groups have some con- engineering from Rensselaer tions that ended AQI and JAM-SG nections with Jaysh al-Mehdi and are largely funded, Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y. sanctuaries was all made possible by trained and armed by the Iranian Quds Force.
March-April 2010 25 by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bruce E. DeFeyter
26 Special Warfare “You can’t always get what you tactic, we risk fighting this war along- more quickly than centralized organi- want, but if you try sometime, you just side other ill-defined wars declared zations can react by passing laws or might find you get what you need.”1 on poverty, drugs, cancer and obe- effective legislation. Finally, and more Today policy-makers, law-enforce- sity. Therefore, for the purpose of this ominously, smaller, autonomous, de- ment officials and military leaders paper, a terrorist is better defined as centralized organizations have a habit struggle to come up with innovative a nonstate actor, someone who acts of sneaking up on centralized orga- ideas for neutralizing terrorist orga- on the international stage outside the nizations, or spiders.6 That effect has nizations and their activities. One knowledge or permission of the state been noted separately by Jeanne K. such idea, not given much thought to which he or she owes allegiance. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, who until after Sept. 11, is attacking ter- The quintessential nonstate actors are observe, “A decentralized, networked rorist financing structures, methods Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. al-Qaeda composed of self-funded and sources.2 The nonstate actor is the ultimate cells is more flexible and less vulner- Attempting to destroy terrorists by persona non grata, operating across able to attack.”7 denying them financing or interrupting country lines and boundaries, re- The second major reason that their money stream is unlikely to suc- stricted by nothing but conscience. financing reform will not work is that ceed as a sole point of effort for at least By definition, nonstate actors do not there has never been a single case of three reasons. First, organizationally, have a state (or legitimate author- a terrorist organization that ceased terrorists are structured to slip behind, ity) to report to and can be involved to exist as a direct result of financ- around and underneath centralized or- in criminal activities, such as sell- ing problems. This is due, in no ganizations, rules and bureaucracies. ing drugs, smuggling weapons or, of small part, to the fact that nonstate Second, terrorist organizations can course, terrorism. Primarily, nonstate actors conduct operations for liter- conduct operations for literally pennies actors remain behind the scenes and ally pennies on the dollar. Thomas on the dollar, and any serious effort to out of sight of the state, emerging only J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert note interrupt these financially insignificant to make demands, threats or attacks. several high-profile terrorist opera- activities will have serious second- Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, tions and their associated costs, such and third-order effects on the larger authors of the book The Starfish and as the 2002 Bali bombings ($20,000- financial community. Third, even with the Spider, also define and classify $35,000); the 1998 U.S. Embassy the thousands of laws enacted and the most nonstate actors as decentralized bombing in Africa ($50,000); the historically unprecedented coopera- organizations. It is this organizational 1993 World Trade Center bombing tion between partner nations, terror- definition that will illuminate a signifi- ($18,000); and more recently, the ism continues to escalate by nearly cant difficulty in attempting to attack 2004 Madrid attack, estimated to have every conceivable measure.3 Bluntly a nonstate actor. cost less than $10,000.8 put, counterterrorism financing reform Simply put, the cost of any single simply doesn’t work. Current game one of these operations could have This is not to say that the United Brafman and Beckstrom note sev- been bankrolled by an average middle- States and the larger worldwide eral interesting “rules” about decen- class American family. Imagine the community should ignore terrorist tralized organizations, which they call difficulty, complexity and absurdity financing — instead, it should take a “starfish.” First, “When attacked, a of attempting to pass legislative and different approach, using the lion, the decentralized organization tends to be- financial laws that can distinguish African predator, as a model. In order come even more open and decentral- between a nonstate actor bent on to understand the predator model, we ized.”4 In plain language, an already terrorism and an American fam- need to define who our enemy actually dark and secretive organization, when ily taking out a loan to purchase a is and understand the three reasons attacked, becomes more dispersed recreational vehicle or a home. Giraldo given above for the failure of financing and darker; meaning that it becomes and Trinkunas deal with the issue reform. Only then will we be able to exponentially harder to find. squarely: “The truth is that such structure a more effective mechanism Furthermore, the increased small amounts cannot be stopped,” no for interdicting terrorist organizations decentralization does not affect the matter how badly we wish otherwise.9 through their financing rather than by organization’s performance — in some Finally, the third reason for change trying to starve them out of existence. scenarios, performance actually im- is obvious — the 2007 report from proves. Granted, there might be some the National Counterterrorism Center Define the enemy “trophies” captured in the attack, noted a steady increase in terrorist In any conflict, it is imperative to but the larger organization continues events, even excluding operations in understand exactly who the enemy is. to exist in a more nebulous fashion. Iraq and Afghanistan.10 This increase It is generally understood that terror- Furthermore, the starfish, operating is in stark contrast to the decrease ism is a tactic and not an organization in a more open environment, are more in the number of terrorists assets be- or group. Consequently, if we do not capable of mutating.5 That mutation ing frozen. “In the 16 weeks after the further define the enemy beyond a allows starfish to adapt and change 9/11 attacks, 157 suspected terrorism
March-April 2010 27 The lion, The starfish and the spider
fundraisers were identified, and assets lifeblood.”12 So if money acts as the through distributors, suppliers and valued at $68 million were frozen. lifeblood of terrorists, why can’t we trainers in order to gain access to the The numbers fell after the initial rush use that to our advantage by taking network’s plans and intentions. by authorities. The totals for 2005 — the analogy further? Another significant reason for $4.9 million frozen in the accounts of Imagine that a terrorist organiza- encouraging nonstate actors to use 32 suspects or organizations — sug- tion is like a human body, with its our financial networks would be that gest the effort is losing intensity.”11 different elements acting as the heart, it would give us the ability not only As stated above, counterterrorism fi- brains, legs and arms. Most dark net- to monitor financial activity but also nancial reform has been and is failing. works will employ a series of cutouts to set up financial deception opera- These statements are consistent with and security measures to isolate and tions designed to degrade terrorist the theory described and articulated protect the organization from pen- networks. Joel Garreau, author of the by Brafman & Beckstrom. Therefore, etration. The only common thread article “Disconnect the Dots,” suggests armed with theory and facts, why do throughout the organization is money. that there are different ways of fight- we insist on pursuing a method that It flows from the collectors to the ing terrorist networks. is clearly failing? brains and outward to the limbs, and Garreau makes the first point it identifies people associated with the by recognizing that networks are Predator model organization by their very contact with not built along the lines of physi- Since it is difficult, if not impos- it. Instead of automatically shutting cal infrastructure. Instead, “they sible, to pass financial or legislative down financial ties when they reach are political and emotional connec- laws that will starve nonstate actors arbitrary thresholds of $10,000, why tions among people who must trust into inactivity, is there another way? not monitor, investigate and infiltrate each other in order to function.”13 As stated earlier in the paper, the the organization through its money Trust is the key point of attack in a African predator model might be a stream? Instead of making modern network — not the leadership, and better choice and strategy for dealing banking methods risky for terrorists, certainly not the finances. “There’s with terrorists and their money. The we should make the banking systems no reason organizational glitches, African male lion, with his pride, pa- of the U.S. and partner nations attrac- screw-ups, jealousies and distrust trols an area of more than 100 square tive and encourage terrorists to come that slow and degrade performance miles. Often, the pride will stake out to our “watering hole.” can’t be intentionally introduced.”14 a watering hole in the knowledge that That technique would have sev- Money might be one of the easiest sooner or later, dinner will have to eral advantages. First and foremost, ways to do just that. Accounts that come for a drink. As the prey drinks we would control the playing field are suddenly flush with money — or water, the lions position themselves and rules, as opposed to Third World conversely, empty — could and will along the exit route and “cherry pick” hawallas (debt transfers) and other cause friction, as individuals attempt dinner off the trail. Could we not use traditional financial methods. The to explain unusual activity. Tensions money the same way to lure nonstate rules that we control do not have to be would gradually build until the unity actors into our sights? made public, and we could institute that was previously taken for granted The predator model would have random measures that would vary on a would be ineffectual, as the group several advantages. First, it would use daily or weekly basis, requiring banks would have to sort out issues of trust money to our advantage by illuminat- to submit names, accounts and activi- and betrayal, thus turning the net- ing and possibly destroying a dark ties to a central database for further work in on itself. network, without disrupting average investigation. American families. Second, money Second, we should not disrupt Caveats can serve as a means of centralizing terrorist financial networks when we Clearly, there would be some starfish and thus making them more discover them. Instead, we should use stipulations with regard to encourag- vulnerable to attack by traditional our system of banking to trace the ing nonstate actors to use our finan- law-enforcement mechanisms. Third, money as it comes into accounts and to cial networks. First, if the organization it would overcome the problems noted see where it is transferred and who is we are investigating knows that it is earlier with attempting to “starve” accessing it, thus using money to illu- being monitored through its financing, nonstate actors into nonexistence. minate a potentially dark network. This the game is up, and we will need to Less than two weeks after 9/11, illumination would then give military send in police, lawyers and bankers to President George W. Bush noted, and police forces the surgical precision arrest, collect and seize what they can “Money is the lifeblood of terrorist to remove “cancerous lesions” instead of before the terrorists disappear. Sec- operations,” and a few days later, randomly seizing property and accounts ondly, and more challenging, the net- Gordon Brown, then-finance minister by arbitrary activity and associations. work would have to be exposed when for Great Britain, echoed that senti- Third, this illumination would generally it is ready to commit catastrophic op- ment: “If fanaticism is the heart of provide intelligence agents with access erations that would result in the loss modern terrorism, then finance is its points for penetrating the organization of life and or property. The trick would
28 Special Warfare be to determine what thresholds need tiny amounts of money it takes to sponses,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinku- to be established in order to safeguard launch spectacular attacks.17 Ac- nas, eds., Terrorism Financing and State Responses: lives. Will the U.S. need to intercept cording to the authors of The Starfish A Comparative Perspective (Palo Alto, Cal.: Stanford the nonstate actor before it detonates and the Spider, our very efforts to attack University Press, 2007), 283. a small bomb with no expected loss of decentralized networks might be 3 Adam Blickstein, Global terror increasing, says life? These are the questions policy- contributing to their proliferation and US state department (30 April 2008), (http://www. makers and law-enforcement agencies success.18 Because current methods democracyarsenal.org/2008/04/global-terror-i.html) will need to grapple with early on in are failing, it is only prudent that Accessed 25 May 2008. the investigation in order to deal with we change strategies in an attempt 4 Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The Starfish them as they occur. to thwart nonstate actors and their and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless intentions. Because terrorists seem Organizations (Portfolio Hardcover, 2006), 21. Risks to have a preference for using our 5 Brafman and Beckstrom, 40. The current practice of freezing financial networks, why can’t we use 6 Brafman and Beckstrom, 41. assets is virtually without real peril. that weakness to our advantage by 7 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Freezing assets, as well as legal and centralizing them through the preda- Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,” in Giraldo financial reforms, reward politicians tor model outlined here? and Trinkunas, eds., Terrorism Financing and State and law-enforcement officials with The predator model allows ter- Responses, 16. the illusion of success — it provides rorists to use our financial systems, 8 Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, headlines, figures and what appear to like prey at a watering hole. The only Countering the Financing of Terrorism (New York: be results. Yet, as noted earlier, the difference is that we need to enact a Routledge Press, 2008), 6. very organizations that are supposedly series of random checks and triggers 9 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing the target of the reforms continue to to identify suspicious movement. Once Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Giraldo exist and even flourish. The predator that movement has been identified, and Trinkunas, eds., Terrorism Financing and State model is not without risks. It would be it can be turned over to investigative Responses, 31. an extraordinary politician who would services who will try to trace the orga- 10 National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report publically admit that a terrorist group nization rather than arrest individuals on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government that was being monitored had commit- for prosecution. Since we control the Printing Office, 2008), 36. ted an act of violence on their watch. banking rules and methods, we might 11 Kevin Johnson, “U.S. freezes fewer terror The public backlash could unseat even be able to insert a question of assets,” USA Today, 30 January 2006. (http://www. all but the most stable or successful trust into the network by inserting usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-29-terror- politicians. Next, much of what goes funds into various accounts or delet- freezes_x.htm) Accessed 12 September 2008. on would be done in secret, and ac- ing them. That course of action would 12 Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism colades would have to be given anony- carry some caveats and some risks. In On the Cheap,” The Washington Post, 24 August 2008 mously as “tips” that brought down the end, it would be better to take that (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ the terrorists. Again, very few political new course of action than to continue article/2008/08/23/AR2008082301962_pf.html). establishments are willing to take on spending disproportionate sums of Accessed 11 September 2008. that kind of risk without some politi- money on a method that has been 13 Joel Garreau, “Disconnect the Dots,” The cal recognition for their actions when proven to fail. Washington Post, 17 September 2001: C1. things go right. Finally, if money was 14 Garreau. introduced into terrorists’ accounts in notes 15 National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report the attempt to destabilize the network, 1 Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, “You Can’t on Terrorism. as Joel Garreau suggests, the average Always Get What You Want,” 1969. 16 Whitlock . citizen might not be so understanding, 2 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, 17 Biersteker and Eckert, 6. especially if the terrorists were able to “Terrorist Financing: Explaining Government Re- 18 Brafman and Beckstrom, 21. carry out a successful operation under the eyes of the very people who put it This article was written while Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bruce E. DeFeyter there. However, it might be prudent to was a student in the Warrant Officer Advanced Course at SWCS. He is as- remember the adage, “With great risk signed to the 3rd SF Group. He has served on ODA 3123 and ODB 3120 for comes a great reward,” and realize that six years as the assistant detachment commander, detachment commander the current game, with little to no risk, and company operations warrant during three rotations to Afghanistan in sup- carries no reward at all. port of Operation Enduring Freedom. He has also served at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School as a doctrine writer assigned to the Directorate Conclusion of Training and Doctrine. Mr. DeFeyter holds a bachelor’s in management Terrorism is increasing,15 in spite and administration from Excelsior College in Albany, N.Y., and a master’s in of a plethora of legal and financial defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. efforts enacted to control it.16 This is due, in no small part, to the relatively
March-April 2010 29 Enlisted
Af-Pak Hands program engagement across the battlefield. “opt out.” CSM candidates in Army Afghanistan and Pakistan Personnel who are interested in special operations will compete Hands is a new program designed the program should contact their under two boards: the Army open to develop a cadre of AF-PAK ex- assignments manager at the Army board and the ARSOF board. Eli- perts. It is a volunteer program un- Human Resources Command. gible Soldiers need to ensure that der which selected personnel will they are competing for the board receive language, regional-cultural Promotion boards scheduled that holds the positions they training, and repetitive deploy- Beginning in December, the would like to fill. ments in key positions to allow Army will select Soldiers to fill all Under the ARSOF board, in ad- them to focus on AF-PAK issues for command-sergeant-major posi- dition to positions in ARSOF orga- an extended period of time. Selec- tions through a separate, com- nizations, Soldiers can compete for career notes career tion for the positions is competitive petitive, CSM command-selection positions in combined joint special- and requires operational experi- board. The change will establish operations task forces, in theater ence and expertise in the Afghani- a lateral-appointment process special-operations commands, on stan and Pakistan area of opera- between sergeant major and CSM. the joint manning document, in tion. The intent is to create greater All Soldiers eligible for the CSM AF-PAK Hands and in special-oper- continuity, focus and persistent board will compete unless they ations coordination elements.
Warrant Officer
New 180A Career Manager counterterrorism and psycho- - A critical skills accessions at Human Resources Command logical operations, civil affairs bonus of $20,000 for eligible In May 2010, CWO 4 Terry and other missions related to active-duty Soldiers and $10,000 Baltimore will assume duty as special-operations capabilities, for National Guard. the Special Forces warrant of- as directed. NCOs seeking additional infor- ficer career manager at the Army - Serving in joint, strategic, mation may go to the www.usarec. Human Resources Command. operational and tactical assign- army.mil/hq/warrant or http:// Baltimore’s PCS from the 7th ments at all levels of planning www.1800goguard.com/warran- SFG to HRC coincides with the and execution of special opera- tofficer/warrant.html. They can movement of HRC from Alexan- tions worldwide. also get assistance by contacting dria, Va., to Fort Knox, Ky. He - Having opportunities for the unit senior warrant officer or can be reached by email terry. Intermediate Level Education at by contacting CWO 3 Craig in the [email protected]. Fort Leavenworth, Kan., with the Directorate of Special Operations potential to obtain a master’s Proponency: DSN 239-7597, com- SF WArrant Officers Needed for degree through the Interagency mercial (910) 432-7597, or send Active and Reserve Components Studies Program. e-mail to [email protected]. Special Forces NCOs who seek greater opportunities can apply to become SF warrant officers. Recruiting efforts are in full swing CAN’T FIND A COPY OF SPECIAL WARFARE? in order to meet SF warrant officer online: www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag inventory requirements as growth Check us out online to download past issues from our archives. in the force continues. Some of the opportunities open to SF warrant email: [email protected] or [email protected] officers are: Send a request via e-mail to have a PDF version of the publication - Serving in a direct, ground- sent directly to your e-mail account. combat leadership role as the as- (910) 432-5703 sistant detachment commander of Get added to the Mailing list: a detachment. Never miss an issue! Give us a call to get your unit - Spending an average of five additional years on a detachment. or organization added to our mailing list. - Leading specialized teams in advanced special operations,
30 Special Warfare TO DARE AND TO CONQUER: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to al-Qaeda In To Dare and To Conquer, Der- wars. The chapters are divided by ek Leebaert illustrates more than a thematic focus on select ac- the military spectacle and prowess tions that represent the particular of the commando — he shows the period’s conduct of warfare. Addi- political impact of special operations tionally, Leebaert’s extensive notes on the direction and development of and expansive bibliography make nations and world leaders. He also further research on any specific raises some vital questions concern- topic uncomplicated. ing the future of special operations. One of the key strengths of To Leebaert goes outside the normal Dare and To Conquer is its sheer definition of special operations to breadth of scope. By expand- include a wider range of innovative ing beyond the current doctrinal actions, even in the world of orga- definitions of special operations nized crime. He uses this wider view and special-operations forces, the to show a common thread in the author brings the theoretical un- type of person required for success derpinnings of special operations to Details in these highly innovative and risky light. Leebaert first exposes some endeavors. He also uses the broad fundamental properties of special By Derek Leebaert view to illustrate what truly makes operations, such as originality, in- New York.: some operations special, instead of novation, deep purpose and high Back Bay Books, 2006. simply fortuitous. risk. He then examines strategic ISBN: 9780316014236 To Dare and To Conquer offers a actions from both sides of war, 688 pages. $19.99. broad look at the impact of special from ancient Greece to European operations on the implementation imperialism, to the American and Reviewed by: of international relations and world French revolutions to both world Major Cliff Keller politics. From the earliest history of wars, to Korea and to the present Naval Post-graduate School international conflict in the Trojan conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Monterrey, Calif. War to the current post-9/11 politi- Leebaert concludes with some poi- cal environment, Leebaert also illus- gnant questions about the future trates how a bold and determined of special operations and special- evant, the reader may find himself few can change the world. Leebaert operations forces. He implies that lost in the story and far away from clearly presents how the formation, the current institutionalization the book’s central theme. training and application of special- of Special Operations Forces, the To Dare and To Conquer is a operations forces affects the internal tendency for selection to create a very good source for anyone in- power flows of both militaries and new homogeneity, and the impact terested in a concise and compre- governments. He concludes by ex- of defined doctrine on originality hensive anthology of the history amining the influence of the current may turn special operations into “a and development of special opera- special-operations organization and more clever level of routine.” tions. Above all, though, the book doctrine on the historical essence of Admittedly, To Dare and To is meaningful reading for any special operations. Conquer is not particularly light member of the special-operations This book is a rather large reading. The book is written much community who may be concerned volume but it is very neatly or- like a historical anthology and is with the direction and future of ganized so that reference to the very heavy on details. While the the profession. With so many reader’s particular interests is broad scope of the book is meant to recent publications regarding quite easy. The book is organized develop the core elements of special the future of special-operations chronologically into four parts that operations and their impact on forces, Derek Leebaert provides encompass the ancient world, the history, the inclusion of so many a concise historical context for great European empires, the pre- actions can be a bit overwhelming. many of the concerns within and industrial revolutions and modern While each of the anecdotes is rel- outside the community.
March-April 2010 31 Department of the Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School ATTN: AOJK-DTD-MP Fort Bragg, NC 28310
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