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Home , Abdurrahman Wahid, Aceh, Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, North Sumatra, Sumatra

briefing

Aceh

Geography and history became an umbrella group for anti- brought under the control of the state establishment forces in in the peri- and lost their traditional role as political Aceh is located on the northern tip of od before the Second World War. When and religious leaders. , bordered on the north by the the Japanese invaded in 1942 they were The economic development under Strait and on the south by the welcomed for ridding the Acehnese of the favoured particular . About 4 million people the Dutch, even though the Japanese elites, which resulted in the decline of live in the province, which covers an carried on with the same colonial prac- other social groups. All regional develop- area of nearly 250,000 square km. The tices. After the war the Dutch did not ment – as we have seen in previous sec- capital is and the main lan- attempt to reoccupy Aceh, but this did tions – was centrally planned and paid guage spoken (next to Bahasa ) not stop the Acehnese from joining the for with central government funds, and is Acehnese. independence struggle to free themselves staffed by people from the centre. The Since 1988, the conflict in Aceh is of the traditional local gentry who had local government was often not even said to have claimed 30,000 lives.1 Many been collaborating with the Dutch and aware of these development plans and thousands more have been traumatized the Japanese. In the process, the PUSA had no control over them. Although by the random brutalities, murder, rape took over the leadership role Aceh’s ‘special region’ status was never and torture committed by the armed from the traditional aristocracy.2 revoked, it only existed on paper. In forces under the pretext of suppressing As long as the war for independence practice, the deep penetration of the an armed separatist movement and pro- kept the ‘central government’ busy, the New Order into traditional structures, tecting the unity of the nation. The PUSA leadership operated with full and the many social changes this injustices suffered by the Acehnese have autonomy over Aceh. Once independ- brought, made the Acehnese very hostile led to a strong call for independence as ence was won, Aceh was incorporated towards the regime and its imposed the first, if not only solution to the into the province of and symbols of ‘unity’ and ‘nationalism’. problems. PUSA’s political control was eroded. Violence committed by security person- The Acehnese, like people in most of In 1953 a rebellion broke out, led by nel, mainly by the military, in their role the outer regions, unanimously voice a PUSA leader Daud Beureueh. The ‘as agents of Indonesian unity’, led to common grievance: that the tremendous movement had widespread popular sup- the belief that the idea of ‘a united profits from the exploitation of natural port and the central government was Indonesia was terrifying in itself’.3 resources have returned no real benefit unable to quell the movement by force. to their community. Yet the roots of the Aceh was granted provincial status in Oil and gas conflict date back to the end of the 1957 and the insurgency ended. Two nineteenth century when the Dutch years later Aceh obtained ‘special region’ The discovery of massive reserves of nat- colonial powers decided to expand their status with autonomy over religion, cus- ural gas in northern Aceh in 1971 and colonial rule to the sultanate of Aceh, tomary law and . the development of the starting a war which lasted for 40 years. Industrial Zone (ZILS) five years later In the end the Dutch were able to estab- Aceh and the New Order represented a turning point in contem- lish control because the Acehnese lacked porary Acehnese history. There is a unity: the Acehnese nobility were only Problems started in 1969 when direct link between the discovery of interested in protecting their own ’s New Order regime began to huge reserves and the respective territories. The last of centralize power further, leaving no increase in military activity, eventually Aceh was exiled in 1907 and by 1913 room for regional autonomy or forces leading to all-out repression and human the Dutch had established administra- like . All independent institutions rights abuses on a massive scale.4 tive control over Aceh. Since Aceh was and alternative sources of power were Paradoxically the richness of its resources staunchly Islamic and very distinct from brought under the control of the regime, turned Aceh – one of the most fiercely the rest of Sumatra and what is now creating new institutions when neces- independent regions – unwillingly into called Indonesia, the Dutch tried to sary. What was left of the traditional vil- the main financial backer of the central depoliticize the ulamas (religious teach- lage structures after the independence government. There were now huge sums ers). Still, a reformist religious revival led war was either destroyed or co-opted by of money to be earned. For the local to the formation in 1939 of the All- the New Order government. The ulamas population, the impact of the new Aceh Association (PUSA) which in general, and PUSA in particular, were industries was mainly negative. Livelihoods were destroyed by the appro- exploitation but it did not have an tortured and children were left priation of land. The industries provided Islamic agenda. It also lacked arms, seri- orphaned. employment only for skilled labour from ous preparation and foreign assistance, outside Aceh. Transmigrants were and, as a resistance force, it was no After the New Order brought to Aceh to set up food-crop match for the military. In the 1980s, the sites, and to work on plantations and military actions against GAM increased During reformasi (reformation era), after timber estates for the pulp and wood- people’s fear of the army. While the pow- the fall of the New Order regime, a for- processing industries. The sites were ers of the lowest level of government mal ending of military operations and a opened in forest areas, depriving local were eroded, GAM regrouped, re-armed partial troop withdrawal was announced. communities of forest resources and and developed an ideology to win the The resulting power vacuum provided increasing the rate of forest destruction. support of the masses. GAM re-emerged GAM with the opportunity to re-estab- The improved infrastructure and utilities in the beginning of 1989, taking the lish itself. As the political climate were not immediately available to the central and even the local government by changed, civil society in Aceh revived local population. Instead local prices surprise. and blossomed. The people of Aceh were driven up by the demand of the The counter-insurgency operation by found the courage to come forward and residents of the industrial complexes, and the army (Dareah Operasi Militer, bring the years of terror and brutality to pollution reduced the quality of life of DOM) started in 1989 and was designed the attention of the national and interna- the local population. Meanwhile, the as a campaign that would terrorize the tional communities.10 There are now local economy stagnated and landowner- population and make them withdraw close to 100 NGO groups working in ship diminished. their support for GAM. The army was at the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. The For the national government and its the height of its power and thought itself student movement became a new chan- close ally the army, the industrial zone essential to the survival of the New nel to air the continuing frustration of was an important ‘national’ asset. The Order. In the first two years of the the population. The fast-growing non- authorities desperately needed the DOM, 2,000 unarmed civilians were violent movement for a referendum income generated in Aceh to pay for eco- killed by the military.5 Many more were served as a focus for the common will of nomic development. The slightest distur- harassed, tortured or made to disappear. the Acehnese and as a measure of their bance would have a national impact. Thousands of women were widowed, political activism after years of suppres- Thus the national ideology of ‘economic their husbands murdered or kidnapped. sion under DOM. The student and development and political stability’ need- Children were orphaned. Some women NGO activists have built up wide net- ed to be enforced strictly at the expense faced sexual violence from soldiers, in works, penetrating the villages and coop- of the development of the province of part as a deliberate instrument of terror erating with local people to strengthen Aceh and its people. against their communities. These women their communities’ local defence. This became pariahs in their own communi- resulted in a decline in influence as well The ties, as some people did not want to as in popular support for GAM. associate with those singled out for such Inspired by the events in East , and the counter-insurgency attention by the military. These single where the referendum in September operation women, with children to support, could 1999 resulted in Indonesia being forced no longer go out safely to work in the to give up its claim on the territory, the The repression by the army, the social fields. Some of these women now work people of Aceh demanded to be given a transformations and the profound eco- for other people in return for a few kilos similar choice. In November 1999, just nomic injustices reinforced both the of rice. Others are reduced to feeding after became presi- sense of separateness and the deep dis- their family on boiled trunks of banana dent, nearly 2 million of the province’s 4 trust the Acehnese felt towards the secu- trees.6 million inhabitants rallied in Banda Aceh larism of the state, and can be marked as Then developments in Jakarta took an in support of a referendum, and an end the root causes of the current conflict. unexpected turn as President Suharto to military violence. The grave injustices left the people in started to shift his power-base from the President Wahid had extended several shock and, with the destruction of tradi- armed forces to the Islamic movements. olive branches to the Aceh militants as tional leadership, they were left without Suharto stimulated a national debate on well as to the population, but most did any appropriate channels for political reducing the role of the armed forces in not mean much in terms of improving expression. So when the Aceh-Sumatra civilian affairs.7 The army became less the security or the human rights situa- Liberation Front (ASNLF), led by Hasan sure of its position and needed the con- tion, nor have they had any effect on the M. Tiro declared Aceh an independent flict to continue, both to secure its role people of Aceh’s overwhelming sense of state on the 4 December 1976, his as the sole guarantor of the New Order’s injustice. movement began to draw considerable interests and to maintain its financially In an attempt to deal with the issue of attention and sympathy. The ASNLF profitable position in Aceh.8 Crushing justice, an Independent Commission to was crushed by the army but it revived the Acehnese rebellion completely was Investigate Violence in Aceh, was estab- again some years later as the Free Aceh therefore not in the best interest of the lished by presidential decree no. Movement (Gerakan Aceh , military. During the mid-1990s the army 88/1999. It compiled evidence on five GAM). Relatively little is known about fought GAM only half-heartedly.9 For cases. The first case was brought to trial the history of GAM. To begin with, the population this meant that the in a combined civilian-military court in GAM was not successful because it did incredible suffering continued unabated. May 2000. While 24 soldiers and one not have the support of the village ula- During that period, thousands of civilian were convicted of killing a reli- mas. GAM rhetoric attacked Javanese Acehnese civilians were killed, raped and gious leader and 50 of his students, only ordinary soldiers and junior officers were ror, actually intensified. The pause was result is the same: the moderate and convicted. Senior officers escaped trial meant to halt the violent aspects of the democratic voices – those who should be after the ‘disappearance’ of a command- conflict temporarily, to allow humanitar- consulted in a dialogue for peace – are ing officer, who was a key witness on the ian aid and development aid to flow into quickly disappearing from Acehnese soci- links with higher levels of the military. the impoverished province. In addition ety. They are being intimidated and The trial failed to meet popular to reducing the suffering of the local silenced by both groups.16 Acehnese demands for justice for the population, this aid was to serve as a The armed struggle between the massive human rights abuse, particularly confidence-building measure, and to and the Aceh Freedom during the anti-insurgency campaign of help move towards a peaceful solution. Movement has been disastrous for the 1990–92, nor did it meet international In this respect the agreement has been civilian population. Tens of thousands of standards of independence and impar- unsuccessful: a year after the first negoti- people have been uprooted and chased tiality. For many Acehnese it was just ations were held, while millions of dol- from their homes. Either they fled from another sign Jakarta was not serious lars were promised by the international the fighting or were forced to leave by about delivering justice.11 community, no significant aid, humani- troops and now huddle in make-shift In that same month the government tarian or otherwise, has reached Aceh. camps. Living conditions in many camps of Indonesia and GAM formally agreed The Humanitarian Pause provided no are appalling. Many have only plastic to a pause in the conflict to distribute punishment for taking up arms and, sheets as shelter. Malnutrition is rampant humanitarian aid. The Joint despite Wahid’s intentions, the agree- among pregnant women and children. Understanding on Humanitarian Pause, ment gave acknowledgement as well as Sickness due to lack of clean water and as the agreement is called, was seen as a formal (international) recognition to exhaustion is commonplace. Dozens of first step towards peace. On 2 June GAM. The movement in turn took babies have been born in the camps, 2000, 15 days after the signing of this advantage of the new security situation with few or no medical facilities. historic accord, fighting between Aceh to consolidate its hold over villages and In the Islamic province, which calls rebels and Indonesian forces was to be embark on a terror campaign, in which itself the Veranda of , it is women suspended for an initial period of three killings, disappearances and cases of who suffer a double burden. Like the months. Two weeks later a six-point arson and intimidation have become men, they face the brutality of the state. agreement, ‘The Permanent Procedure of common practice.12 Children have been But they also continue to be repressed by the Joint Committee on Security severely traumatized by their experience patriarchal social practices. Men make all Modalities’, was signed in Banda Aceh. of the war and by being displaced. the decisions in the camps. Women, This document stipulates that the Hundreds of schools have been burnt. many of them war widows without male Committee set up non-offensive moni- According to one report, the war has dis- family members, are deprived of infor- toring procedures, draw up basic imple- rupted schooling for more than 11,000 mation and of facilities. mentation rules, and reinstate and speci- Acehnese children. Non-Acehnese minorities in the fy police peacekeeping duties. Since the signing of the Pause and the province have become the target of The Indonesian government claims subsequent extensions, the killings and GAM attacks during the last decade. the accord is not a recognition of GAM, kidnappings have continued unabated. During the period before the June 1999 nor an indication that both sides enjoy Acehnese are forced to make financial elections, transmigration sites were tar- similar status. President Wahid – con- contributions to GAM.13 Wealthier vil- geted by GAM: death threats were post- trary to earlier promises that he would lagers, such as business people, found ed on the houses, warning transmigrants allow a referendum (though without themselves openly harassed by GAM not to vote and to leave Aceh. At the specifying the contents of such a referen- members demanding money. People have same time, the military put pressure on dum) – has since emphasized that his had their houses burned down or, worse, transmigrants to use their vote.17 The set- government has no intention of with- are being killed when they refuse to con- tlers, mostly from , were unjustly drawing troops or of conducting a refer- tribute. In such a situation, criminal ele- branded as tools of Suharto’s attempt to endum on Aceh’s independence. Wahid’s ments, often consisting of renegade enforce national unity and Javanese refusal to grant self-determination is con- troops, take advantage and create further hegemony through social engineering. sistent with his belief in maintaining the suffering for the population. Many transmigrants responded to death unity of the country. In signing the Anyone who openly questions GAM’s threats by leaving sites en masse and flee- agreement he may well have hoped to stance on independence has reason to ing to neighbouring North Sumatra or prevent the domino-style disintegration fear for his or her life. Acehnese journal- back to Java. of Indonesia. ists say they now continuously fear retri- While the people of Aceh rally behind In contrast, those GAM leaders who bution from both the army and GAM, the call for a referendum on independ- desire peace consider the agreement a and say it has become impossible to ence, the real issues and demands cannot step towards achieving their goal of an report accurately.14 Human rights work- be debated in this climate of fear. GAM independent Islamic state. The agree- ers, ulamas and university staff are in the hardly qualifies as a popular democratic ment on a Humanitarian Pause, while same position. Many are targeted and movement, and its leader, di Tiro, is not hailed at the time as a breakthrough, killed, others have disappeared and revered as a sultan’s descendant, as he proved to be a setback for civil society, schools have been burned. ‘Police look likes to portray himself. While not all which had flourished briefly after a peri- for GAM in the hills, but actually they Acehnese would express support for od of repression. It led to a decrease in are your neighbours’, complained one GAM or for outright independence, all media-reported violence, but in fact the human rights lawyer.15 With the violence of them hold the Indonesian government everyday violence faced by the popula- now coming from all directions it is dif- responsible for their suffering. The popu- tion, as well as the intimidation and ter- ficult to identify the perpetrators. The lar demands therefore include: working to secure the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples

1. accountability and redress for past Notes and ongoing injustices and abuses, 1 Figures according to the pro-independ- 9 Based on analysis of newspaper reports including trials and sentences of the ence movement. This is an unconfirmed and personal interviews. most notorious offenders from the figure. In fact, it is probably on the high 10 Some villagers started suing Mobil Oil military; side. estimates that Corp. for allegedly allowing the Indonesian 2. more provincial power at the local 2,000 were killed between 1989 and 1993 military to use its base to hold and torture level along with more economic at the height of the military operations civilians and borrow their equipment to wealth shared within the province by against GAM. Indonesia’s National dig mass graves. Acehnese; Commission for Human Rights has con- 11 International Crisis Group (ICG), 3. increased international interest and firmed 1,021 deaths and 864 disappear- ‘Indonesia: justice and reconciliation’, presence (UN, NGOs, etc.) accompa- ances. According to the Aceh Human paper for ICG seminar on Truth, Justice nied by effective pressure from appro- Rights Care Forum, 393 people were and Reconciliation, Jakarta, September killed in 1999 and 841 between 1 January 2000. priate foreign and regional powers and 10 December 2000. The total number 12 Interviews with monitors and other well- upon Jakarta to reform the military, of deaths since 1988 probably lies some- informed sources on Aceh. For security correct human rights violations and where between the 2,000 cited by reasons the author protects the identity of devise a new power arrangement for Amnesty and the 30,000 figure used by these sources. The fact that nobody feels Aceh. the pro-independence movement. confident to criticize GAM openly under- 2 Kell, T., The Roots of the Acehnese lines the extent of fear of GAM retaliation. Despite its gestures of reconciliation, Rebellion, 1989–1992, Ithaca, NY, Cornell 13 ‘When asked for money you can never the new authorities in Jakarta have failed University Press, 1995. refuse. The average contribution is 20,000 to move quickly to reduce tensions in 3 Quote from the chair of the Indonesian rupiah (US $2.10) each time’ (Confidential Aceh, and have thereby made any alter- Legal Aid and Human Rights Association Interview, Banda Aceh). (PBHI) Hendardi (interview, October 14 Interview with Acehnese journalists, natives to independence increasingly less 2000). October 2000. acceptable. Until the government shows 4 Kooistra, M., The Role of Oil and Gas in 15 Djalal, D. ‘A bloody truce’, Far Eastern a real commitment to fulfilling the Conflict, Henry Dunant Centre, Geneva, Economic Review, 5 October 2000. Acehnese’s basic demands on justice, 2000. 16 Things are made more complicated by the human rights, economic rights as well as 5 Amnesty International estimates that fact there is more than one GAM. There is autonomy, there is no reason to think around 2,000 civilians, including women the armed wing called A-GAM and there that this will change. and children, were killed between are several other splinter groups. One of 1989–93 alone. the aims of the agreement signed in Extracted from ‘Indonesia: Regional 6 Interviews with NGOs in Aceh. in May 2000 is to eliminate Conflicts and State Terror’, by Mieke 7 Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 282–6. the criminal or rogue elements and unite 8 The security forces are involved in legal the ‘real’ GAM under the current leader- Kooistra, 2001. © Minority Rights and illegal businesses and earn huge ship, which then can enter into a political Group International sums of money through the ‘protection’ of dialogue with Jakarta. industrial installations such as those of 17 TAPOL, A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Exxon-Mobil. See Kooistra, op. cit. Violations in Aceh 1998–2000, London, TAPOL, 2000, p. 13.

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