GEORGII FLOROVSKII on DIGNITY and HUMAN RIGHTS Nicholas Sooy

GEORGII FLOROVSKII ON DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Nicholas Sooy

Georgii Florovskii (in alternative English transcription Georges Florovsky, 1893-1979) was a patristic scholar, historian, and theologian. He was not a lawyer, diplomat, or politician. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that Florovskii said very little directly about human dignity and essentially nothing on the topic of human rights.1 Furthermore, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, contemporary human rights movements, and therefore most contemporary discourse around human rights, are shaped by events in the 1970s, 1990s, and beyond.2 Therefore, we should expect nothing from Florovskii on these specific contemporary concerns. Beyond this, Florovskii himself stated his aversion to anything remotely political. “I am an antipolitical being: politics is something I do not like. It does not mean I ignore the existence of politics, I know it does [exist], but I have not the slightest desire to be involved.”3 The prima facie ambiguities and difficulties of bringing Florovskii into dialogue with contemporary concerns about human dignity and Human Rights are only compounded by the larger ambiguities regarding the relationship between Orthodox Christianity and human rights. The contemporary voice of Orthodox Christianity concerning the issue of Human Rights is anything but homogenous, beyond a certain level of critical adoption. The Ecumenical Patriarchate sees human rights advocacy as central to its global

1 While lack of evidence is not necessarily itself evidence of anything, the lack of discus- sion of human rights in Florovskii’s writings is more likely to be evidence of his implicit support rather than his implicit opposition. Florovskii would have had the opportunity to express any misgivings about international law, but it was apparently not a concern for him, and he apparently did not challenge those he knew personally who were involved in any such efforts. 2 This is suggested by some of the recent contributions to the field, as e.g. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA, 2010). 3 Quoted in Paul Gavilyuk, Georges Florovsky and the Russian Religious Renaissance (Oxford, 2013), p. 72. 328 Nicholas Sooy leadership, with Metropolitan John Zizioulas providing a theological justifi- cation for human dignity and rights in terms of Christian personalism.4 This emphasis is not as strong in every Orthodox Christian body. For example, while the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate endorses the notion of intrinsic dignity and supports human rights, many caveats are often made (for example, rights must not conflict with national interests, religious incli- nations, or moral obligations) such that the intrinsic nature of human rights seems to be up for debate.5 Given Florovskii’s international standing as an Orthodox thinker of the highest pedigree, it is therefore natural to ask what light Florovskii’s thought might shed on the notion of dignity and on prac- tices of human rights. Florovskii is becoming increasingly popular in Russia, with his rhetoric about a “Western captivity” of Orthodox theology aligning with other “clash of civilizations” rhetoric which is currently in vogue in some corners. At times this rhetoric has even been used to cast aspersions on human rights movements, which can be construed as tools of foreign interference in the affairs of a nation. However, recent work on Florovskii has questioned the anti-Westernist interpretation of his thought, while an ecu- menically minded theologian like John Zizioulas was himself a student of Florovskii’s and his personalism can be read as a direct continuation of the Florovskian project.6 As such, this article will argue that Florovskii’s thought

4 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew betrays a general, albeit not always uncommented acceptance of, and support for Human Rights in his various writings. See for example, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Speaking the Truth with Love (New York, 2011), pp. 171, 254, etc. Metropolitan John Zizioulas has been instrumental in articulating the social vision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. For example, the draft text of the ‘Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’ document adopted at the 2016 Council in Crete was largely the brain-child of Metropolitan John. 5 The main patterns of the Moscow Patriarchate’s official attitude towards human dignity and Human Rights are entailed in its ‘Basic Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights’, released in autumn 2008. Cf. for an English version https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/. Controversy around this document produced a vast corpus of literature. A good insight can be taken from Alek- sandr Agadjanian, The Russian Orthodox Vision of Human Rights. Recent Documents and their Significance, Erfurter Vorträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums, 7 (Erfurt, 2008); id., ‘Tradition, Morality and Community: Elaborating Orthodox Iden- tity in Putin’s Russia’, Religion, State & Society, 1 (2017), pp. 39–60. 6 Indeed, Florovskii’s concepts of a “Sacred Hellenism” in connection with his critical, although not categorically negative stance towards Western influences on Orthodox theology can be misinterpreted. The question is, to what extent do binary or even anti-Western Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 329 bears a conception of human dignity that is complementary to contemporary movements which appeal to dignity, and that Florovskii’s historical and social vision is compatible with the aims of such movements.

Florovskii on Dignity

At times, Florovskii appears to be ambivalent about human dignity. For example, when summarizing Dostoevskii’s view of contemporary society, Florovskii states (and possibly endorses the view), “Modern man is an arro- gant, rebellious creature; he may even make blasphemous claims and assign a God-like dignity to himself.”7 Florovskii himself resisted any utopian idealism such that humans, by their own efforts and nature, could create a perfect society. He even resisted the idea that a theocratic society could live up to the eschatological vision of the Kingdom of God. Elsewhere, Florovs- kii summarizes the fall in terms of man’s misplaced sense of dignity: “The evil one caught man, having promised him divine dignity.”8 One might think that such a statement reflects both Florovskii’s familiarity with some of the early Church fathers and his initial rootedness in a 19th century anthropological tradition.9 However, at other times, Florovskii seems quite enthusiastic about human dignity. For example, in an article on the anthropomorphite controversy, Florovskii attempts to revive the reputation of Aphou and others who were accused of anthropomorphizing God.10 Florovskii insisted that “Aphou only contended that man, even in his present condition and in spite of all his

models formally derived from these concepts actually do justice to the complexity of his thought, which on closer look was neither categorically anti-Western nor did it aim at any kind of Greek nationalism or the like. For a both balanced and critical comment see Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), pp. 268-270. 7 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Theology and Literature’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 11 (Vaduz, 1989), p 25. 8 Georgii Florovskii, ‘The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 9 (Vaduz, 1987), p. 267. 9 Cf. the articles by Petr Mikhaylov and Konstantin Antonov in this volume. 10 The “anthropomorphite conteroversy” refers to a fourth century dispute, where certain Egyptian monastics were accused of holding that God had a body. The discovery of the “Life of Aphou” changed the received picture of this controversy, for Aphou (who was accused of anthropomorphizing God), clearly did not do so. Instead, Aphou was defending the incarnate Christ as representing God, and emphasized the dignity of the human 330 Nicholas Sooy misery and destitution, had to be regarded still as being created in the image of God, and must be, for that reason, respected. Aphou was primarily concerned with man’s dignity and honor.”11 Florovskii takes it to be admirable for Aphou to be concerned with the dignity of the human being, despite any sin or destitution. This interpretation of Aphou is remarkable, for what Aphou spoke about was the imago Dei. Thus, we see that Florovskii inter- preted defending the imago Dei as defending an intrinsic dignity of the human person. These two strands in Florovskii’s thought are not as incompatible as they might first appear. Philosophically and historically, we can distinguish between two different notions of dignity. Dignity can mean worth, or dignity can mean status. The more classical sense is dignity as status, which refers to a person or thing’s extrinsic value which appears as a function of the thing’s place in a hierarchy.12 Dignity as worth refers to the intrinsic value that inheres in a person or thing simply because it is what it is. If we distinguish these two senses of dignity, then it becomes much easier to interpret Florovskii’s comments. Insofar as the human being claims for itself a status proper only to God, a “divine dignity,” humanity is fallen and blasphemous. However, there is a worth, an intrinsic value to the human being, which comes from the image of God in humanity (according to Gen 1: 26), which is proper, and which should be claimed and defended. When Florovskii does speak about human dignity and social responsibility, it is almost always in this latter sense. When writing about the impact of Christianity in Russia, for example, Florovskii states: “the impact of Christian principles on the whole life was not negligible: it was the same traditional emphasis on mercy and compassion and on human dignity which is never destroyed, even by sin or crime.”13 Here and elsewhere, Florovskii explicitly endorses the idea of intrinsic and inalienable human dignity. Florovskii’s conception of dignity is not of some status which is a function

in doing so. Cf. Paul A. Patterson, Visions of Christ: The Anthropomorphite Controversy of 399 CE (Tübingen, 2012), on Florovskii, ibid., pp. 10-12. 11 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Aspects of Church History’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 4 (Belmont, MA, 1975), p. 199. 12 See the introduction to this volume. 13 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 2 (Belmont, MA, 1974), p. 136. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 331 of our moral standing or redeemed state. The human being is valuable intrinsically and deserves mercy and compassion on that basis alone. What is more, as Florovskii will go on to say, a dignity shared by all, regardless of position, also requires a certain equality among all humans. Dignity thus becomes the flashpoint for all social responsibility. This last point, that others have a social responsibility towards the human being simply in virtue of its (his or her) dignity, is remarkably close to most conceptions of human rights. Indeed, Florovskii often talks about this sort of social responsibility. On this subject, Florovskii repeatedly references John Chrysostom and his call to social action. “Chrysostom was after justice in defense of human dignity. Was not every man created in God’s image? Did God not wish salvation and conversion of every single man, regardless of his position in life, and even regardless of his behavior in the past?”14 From Chrysostom, Florovskii took the lesson that not only do humans have intrinsic dignity, based on the Iimago Dei, but that we have a responsibility to defend this dignity. Justice itself requires defense of dignity through addressing the social conditions of humanity. The natural question at this juncture is just what the nature of this “we” is in the claim that we have a responsibility to defend this dignity. Is this responsibility universal and the duty of every person? Is this a duty that holds of nations or the international order? Is it only a Christian imperative? The answer to this question can help to indicate just what sort of idea of human rights can be based on this conception of dignity. To find answers to these questions, we must look to Florovskii’s social thought.

Florovskii’s Social and Historical Vision

Florovskii might have kept his distance from socio-political debates, but social concerns are central to his vision of Christianity. Florovskii begins his essay on social problems by boldly proclaiming that “Christianity is essentially a social religion. There is an old Latin saying: unus Christianus nullus Christianus. Nobody can be truly Christian as a solitary and isolated being…. To build up the Church of Christ means, therefore, to build up a new society

14 Florovskii, ‘Aspects of Church History’ (see n. 11), p. 85. 332 Nicholas Sooy and, by implication, to re-build human society on a new basis.”15 Social concern as social engagement is central to Christianity for Florovskii. As he states elsewhere,

Christianity is, of course, not merely a proclamation of certain general principles, but fundamentally a program of daily life. Christianity must be practiced and put into action here and now, hic et nunc; it must be applied to any and all situations, at any point and at any time, semper et ubique. The other-worldly character and goal of the Christian message does not signify cold indifference to earthly needs, to the needs of suffering and helpless man. Charity and Mercy are the marks and tests of any genuine Christian life. Human dignity and social justice are inevitably among the most immediate concerns of the Church.16

Furthermore, there is a dual basis for this social concern. One is the faith, and the other is the nature of the human being, which is corporal and social by nature. Florovskii makes this point when speaking of the early Church:

In particular, since man was essentially a “social being,” the Church had to wrestle with the task of the “redemption of society.” She was herself a society, a new pattern of social relationship, in the unity of faith and in the bond of peace. The task proved to be exceedingly arduous and ambiguous. It would be idle to pretend that it has been ever completed.17

The incompleteness of this project would seem to indicate that it is up to the Church today to continue it. As such, in some way or another Christians at the very least have a responsibility to work for the redemption of society in accordance with the social nature of humanity. To better understand Florovskii’s view here, it is important to put it in the context of his Christian personalism, following the Slavophiles, Dostoevskii, and others. Roughly speaking, personalism is defined by the belief in the irreducibility and uniqueness of the human person. Furthermore, personalism historically was a position that presented itself as an alternative both to pure individualism and simple collectivism. Personhood is something in between the atomic,

15 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p. 131. 16 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Ecumenism I: A Doctrinal Approach’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 13 (Vaduz, 1989), p. 23. 17 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), pp. 96-97. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 333 isolated individual, and the individual subsumed into some collective. Florovskii does not present a fully fleshed out account of personhood, but his thought bears these marks. First, as to the uniqueness and irreducibility of the human, Florovskii insists on this point and it is central to his philosophy of history. Florovskii rejected the Hegelian model of history, whereby history pro- ceeds according to some definite and knowable pattern. Such romantic ideas of progress, culminating in some earthly utopia devalue the radical freedom of the human person. Even belief in providence or in God’s actions in history is not sufficient grounding for understanding some pattern in history. Instead, history must remain a mystery, centered around the actual circum- stances of human life, with all its freedom and contingency.18 The freedom of the human person determines the course of history. “History is a realm of personal agency, hence a realm of creativity and freedom. Person is the true subject of history.”19 Despite this rejection of one notion of progress, there was still something of progress in history for Florovskii. Florovskii’s idea of progress is rooted in his rejection of ancient models of time, which were cyclical and deterministic.

[T]ime was validated by [Christ’s] coming, by him and through him. It was “consecrated” and given meaning, the new meaning. In the light of Christ’s coming history now appears as a “pro-gress,” inwardly ordered toward “the end,” to which it unfailingly precipitates. The hopeless “cycles” have been exploded, as St Augustine used to say.20

This new conception of history was connected to the new conception of the human person. According to Florovskii, “The antique world did not know the mystery of personal being. There was no word in ancient languages that

18 “Actually, the purpose of a historical understanding is not so much to detect the Divine action in history as to understand the human action, that is, human activities, in the bewildering variety and confusion in which they appear to a human observer. Above all, the Christian historian will regard history at once as a mystery and as a tragedy – a mystery of salvation and a tragedy of sin. He will insist on the comprehensiveness of our conception of man, as a prerequisite of our understanding of his existence, of his exploits, of his destiny, which is actually wrought in his history.” – Ibid., p 65. 19 Quoted in Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), p. 82. 20 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p. 85. 334 Nicholas Sooy could strictly designate personality.”21 Prior to Christianity there was no conception of personhood. The person is thus a unique category, something irreducible which explodes any deterministic reading of history. The destiny of humanity cannot be reduced to any deterministic schema, whether natural or divine. Florovskii’s personalism was central to his historical method, a third way between the progressivism of German idealism, and the cyclic view of antiq- uity. This emphasis on freedom, taken together with Florovskii’s insistence that humans are social beings, exhibits the second mark of personalism, that the person is not reducible to either individuality or to a collective. On the one hand, freedom is essential to human nature (and human dignity), “The dignity of man, his human identity, is perilously grounded in his freedom,”22 or as he states elsewhere, “’The ancient law of human freedom’ as St Irenaeus states, is still respected by God, who has granted from the beginning this dignity to spiritual beings.”23 On the other hand, the human is fundamentally social, as we have already quoted, and the freedom of each individual is balanced against the equality of each person. Thus, Florovskii writes that Christianity inspired “the recognition of an ultimate equality of all men. This egalitarian spirit is deeply implanted in the Eastern Orthodox soul.”24 Furthermore, the egalitarian sociality of humanity and the freedom of humanity are intertwined. “Freedom is just only through love, but love is possible only in freedom— through love for the freedom of one’s neighbor.”25 Social action springs from this dual root of love for the other, and freedom. “‘The church as a social ideal’; this was Dostoevskii’s basic idea, as Vladimir Soloviev put it in his admirable addresses on Dostoevskii. The same was Soloviev’s leading vision. The key words were in both cases the same: freedom and brotherhood.”26 Part of the personalists’ rejection of both pure collectivism and pure individualism (pure freedom or pure brotherhood, as we might gloss it), had to

21 Quoted in Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), p. 84. 22 Florovskii, ‘Theology and Literature’ (see n. 7), p 22. 23 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Creation and Redemption’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 3 (Belmont, MA, 1976), p 83. 24 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p 135. 25 Georgii Florovskii, ‘Ways of Russian Theology, Part Two’, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 6 (Vaduz, 1987), p. 66. 26 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p. 137. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 335 do with the anti-ideological import of personalism. Individualism and collectivism represent different ideological principles on the basis of which society is meant to be run. Opposed to one totalizing system of ideals or utopia, the personalists (such as Emmanuel Mounier) postulated that the human person was the only subject of social concern.27 The irreducibility of the person meant that real persons and their real needs were always more important than some system of ideals. This position is likewise reflected in Florovskii’s thought. “The main emphasis [of Eastern Christian social concern] was on a direct service to the poor and the needy, and not on elaborate schemes for an ideal society. Immediate human relationship is more important than any perfect scheme.”28 With this conception in view we are now in a position to reinterpret Florovskii’s self-proclaimed anti-politicism. His concern was with the irreducible human person, which always trumped ideals. This anti-idealism was not itself meant to be ideological. Instead, Florovskii’s view was quite sober. Grand utopian claims should be avoided, but that itself should not turn into an ideology that rejects social action or attempts at social reform or grand concerns.

Ideals are never fully realized … Yet, ideals must not be overlooked. They are both the guiding principle and the driving power of human life. There was always a clear vision of the corporate nature of Christianity in the East. There is still, as it has been for centuries, a strong social instinct in the Eastern church in spite of all historical involvements and drawbacks. And possibly this is the main contribution which the Eastern church can make to the contemporary conversation on social issues.29

From this personalist basis, Florovskii argued for the necessity of social action and the importance of Christianity in addressing present concerns. In conceptualizing the relationship between Christianity and social action, Florovskii was quite nuanced. Having examined elements of Florovskii’s personalism, we can now return to the question of what role the Church is to play in social work, and how broad the “we” of social responsibility is to be construed. The great nuance of Florovskii’s view is evident in his famous

27 See for example Emmanuel Mounier, A Personalist Manifesto (London, 1938). 28 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p 135. 29 Ibid., p 132. 336 Nicholas Sooy contrast between the “Empire and Desert.” Florovskii contrasts the two devel- opments of 4th century Christianity, monasticism and imperial Christianity, as two failed paths for Christian engagement with the world. Withdrawal from the world and the creation of a pure, egalitarian society based on freedom and Christian personalism is a mistake, for it does not redeem society. However, attempting to turn society at large into this monastic utopia through imperial or theocratic edict is similarly a failed path. Instead, the Church must be both in the world serving the world, but not controlling the world. Florovskii’s vision is for a third way between empire and desert, similar to his third way between progressivism and determinism. This third way is grounded in the destiny and personality of humanity as revealed in the Church.

[T]he faith of the church provides a solid ground for social action, and only in the Christian spirit can one expect to build afresh a new order in which both human personality and social order would be secured.30

Note that Florovskii does not say that it is only in the Church that a new social order can be built. Rather, such an order is built outside the Church, but in a Christian spirit. To say that it is only in the Church that such an order comes is to lapse into the error of the desert. The social concern of the Christian involves actual social engagement with society, and not just inter- nal Church matters. On the other hand, to say that it is only the responsibility of the Church to safeguard personality and dignity, such that the Church as an institution should be the primary driver of civic and political society would be to lapse into the error of the empire. What then is Florovskii’s third way for social engagement? The first point that must be made is that it does not operate according to any ideology except for the real concern for humans whose dignity is violated. The second point that seems to come through Florovskii’s thought is that Christians must engage socially and work for a new order that is just and inspired by Christian principles. Florovskii’s key move here seems to be that while the Church itself addresses Christians with its ethical teachings, Christians themselves as citizens of the world must take these ethical teachings into

30 Ibid., p 138. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 337 non-ecclesial contexts and attempt to work for a more humane and just world on this basis. As Florovskii summarizes,

The church was, both in the East and in the West, a supreme teacher of all ethical values. All ethical values of our present civilization can be traced back to Christian sources, and above all back to the gospel of Christ. Again, the church is a society which claims the whole man for God’s service and offers cure and healing to the whole man, and not only to his “soul.” If the church, as an institution, cannot adopt the way of an open social action, Christians cannot dispense with their civic duties for theirs is an enormous contribution to make “in the material sphere,” exactly as Christians.31

What is striking about this position is that not only should Christians fulfill their civic duty and Christian duty simultaneously in social action, but that the civic duties, or civic notions of ethics and responsibility, themselves are reflections of Christian principles. With this move, Florovskii removes any distinction between secular and ecclesial values. There are not two sets of values or two kingdoms. There are simply ethical values, which originate in the Church, but which then are propagated beyond the boundaries of the Church in part through Christian action, and presumably also in part through the actions of non-Christians. In this way the Church never separates itself from the world, but neither does it as an institution seek to run things. Rather, the Church transforms and redeems society through the transmission of ethical ideas and through the support for these by Christians. Perhaps unsurprisingly, according to Florovskii the central idea which Christianity has contributed to the world is personhood. “The idea of personality itself was probably the greatest Christian contribution to philosophy.”32 This comment by Florovskii is especially relevant for our purposes, for personalism is a significant movement in the history of human rights. In particular, one of the philosophical architects of the 1948 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) was Charles Malik, a personalist philosopher, diplomat, and Eastern Orthodox theologian. For Malik, human rights are rooted in the dignity of the human person,

31 Ibid., p. 141. 32 Quoted in Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), p. 84. 338 Nicholas Sooy which he explained in Christian terms.33 Florovskii’s views come remarkably close to Malik’s, though Florovskii does not discuss rights in particular. Whatever influence Malik had in shaping the UNDHR, it appears that his work is perfectly in line with what Florovskii says a Christian should do: work for social justice, dignity, and a new order for society that accords with the Christian understanding of the person. Thus, it appears that Florovskii’s position is compatible with the human rights discourse, at least as of 1948. However, Florovskii’s position may be even more radical than mere compatibility. To recall, Florovskii claimed that all ethical values stem from the Church. Thus, a Florovskian reading of 1948 could be that not only is Christianity compatible with the UNDHR, and not only does Christian witness require someone like Malik to participate in this work, but the ethical import of the UNDHR itself can ultimately be traced back to the Church and its personalist legacy. This sort of argument is not unheard of in Orthodox studies. Byzantine historian Fr. John McGuckin makes a similar claim in his work on Human Rights and Orthodox Chris- tianity,

It was, therefore, Orthodox philosophical theology that historically brought the very terms of “person” and “individual” from the margins of irrelevance to the central stage of anthropological philosophy. They made them key terms in the definition of the human telos, but also radically reoriented Aristotle’s apprehension of what that telos of the humanum was, by depicting a transcendentalist end for it. It is this theological stance underpinning all Orthodox theology, the deification of the human race by the grace of divine incarnation within it, which is the root of how Christian-inspired philosophers of a later age could declare, “We hold these truths to be self-evident,” and go on to cite the inalienable dignity of the human person as one of the “self-evident” things they took as axiomatic.34

For McGuckin, Human Rights are only possible because of the “invention” of the concept of personhood by Christianity. This position is also reminiscent

33 Cf. Anthony G. Roeber, ‘Orthodox Christians, Human Rights and the Dignity of the Person. Reflections on Charles Malik (1906-1987)’, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 70 (2018), pp. 285-306. 34 John McGuckin, ‘The Issue of Human Rights in Byzantium’, in Christianity and Human Rights: An Introduction, eds. John Witte Jr and Frank Alexander (Cambridge, 2010), p. 179. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 339 of that of Metropolitan John Zizioulas, who as we noted was both a student of Florovskii’s and is one of the leading advocates for human rights among contemporary Orthodox theologians. Zizioulas argues that the idea of personhood originated with Christianity and that it is on this basis that we should engage the world today.35 To draw further potential parallels with Florovskii’s thought, let us consider the following cryptic remark which Florovskii makes at the end of his essay on the “Empire and the Desert”:

And, on the very eve of the fall of “corrupt Byzantium,” there is the glorious flowering of mystical contemplation on Mount Athos and the renaissance in art and in philosophy which was to nourish the Western Renaissance, too. The fall of the Empire and the Fulfillment of the Desert …36

By this statement, does Florovskii really mean to indicate that the fulfillment of the hopes of the monastic way of the desert, the hope of building a Christian society, is paradoxically fulfilled with the fall of Byzantium and the flowering of the Renaissance, even in the West? The Renaissance is an important stepping stone in many genealogies of human rights and human dignity. At the very least, this passage does seem to suggest what we have noted as Florovskii suggesting elsewhere: that all the good ideas of the contemporary world come from Christianity.

Florovskii and Human Rights?

So where does this leave us regarding Florovskii and human rights? First, it is clear that Florovskii has a notion of intrinsic and inalienable human dignity which compels us to act. Who is us? Mainly, for Florovskii, it is Chris- tians (which may include the institutional Church, but not in any imperial sense). However, the reason that Florovskii addresses Christians and the Church is because he is a priest and a theologian. It is clear that what he recommends Christians do is address everyone, non-Christians included, in the appeal for social justice, equality, and dignity. This process will involve building up a new order. However, this order will not be a utopian order,

35 See for example John Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY, 1997). 36 Florovskii, ‘Christianity and Culture’ (see n. 13), p. 130. 340 Nicholas Sooy one based on ideology. Instead it will be a real order that involves protecting the dignity and personhood of real individuals, and thus will not be so much a system as a continual appeal to and proclamation of dignity and personhood. Insofar as this succeeds in larger society it will be rooted in Christian principles of personhood, even if the context is secular. At one level of description, this is precisely what human rights movements are about. Human rights are themselves not meant to be political but are precisely anti-political in the same sense that Florovskii is anti-political. Human rights are not meant to be an ideological system but are declarations of the basic dignity of the human person. The internationality and transna- tionality of the human rights claim is meant to be universal, non-partisan, and non-political. What human rights aim to do is put the human at the center and proclaim that every other ideology or concern is secondary. There is no basis for violating human dignity, and no principle or ideal can super- sede the irreducible worth of the human. This conception of human rights (which may be a controversial one) fits quite well with the personalism of Florovskii. In this respect, Florovskii may be read as much closer to Zizioulas and Malik than to the above-mentioned position of the Moscow Patriarchate, which says human rights must be balanced against other interests. If we accept this reading, then there is still one outstanding question. As stated at the outset, the historical trajectory of contemporary human rights movements is considered by some to be separate from, though rooted in, the intellectual and social trajectory that culminated in the UNDHR. It is con- ceivable that someone might accept the legitimacy and importance of the UNDHR, while still questioning the application of the human rights concept in present day human rights movements. In particular, one could claim that contemporary human rights movements, for all their rhetoric of univer- sality, are simply tools of Western intervention in the national affairs of non-NATO nations. Such a claim is not that far off from the claims made by the Eurasians in Florovskii’s own day.37 Florovskii was associated with the Eurasians for a time. They were a movement with a strong anti-Western bias, privileging the Eurasian heritage as central and important for the world going forward. There are some elements

37 For a full account of Florovskii’s participation in the Eurasian movement and eventual cri- tique, see ‘The Eurasian Temptation’, in Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), pp. 60-79. Georgii Florovskii on Dignity and Human Rights 341 of Eurasian thought in Florovskii’s works. The Eurasians dismissed Western claims to universal values as mere rhetoric meant to justify interference in the affairs of others. On this point, Florovskii flatly dismissed the Eurasians, and eventually Florovskii left the movement and criticized it. Florovskii was never quite on board with the “clash of civilizations” thesis at the heart of the Eura- sian movement. Instead, Florovskii’s attraction to the movement was in precisely the vein that we have already examined. Florovskii did not say that Eurasian values competed with Western values, or that Byzantine values competed with contemporary values. Rather, Florovskii claimed that Western and contemporary values are themselves ultimately Eurasian-Byzantine values. What is good about the West (such as a concern for dignity and human rights perhaps) comes from Byzantium ultimately. Thus, while any response of Florovskii to contemporary debates about human rights movements is entirely hypothetical, a natural projection of Florovskian thought might be to respond to such criticisms of human rights movements precisely as Florovskii responded to the Eurasians. The point is not that human rights are rhetorical tools of the West. Rather, the good idea at the heart of human rights is itself a patristic idea. Indeed, such a response to contemporary human rights is precisely the response that we see from followers of Florovskii like Zizioulas.38 With all of this in mind, perhaps we are then justified in drawing the tentative conclusion that Florovskii’s thought is not only compatible with contemporary conceptions of human dignity and rights, but that a careful reading of Florovskii might even lead one to conclude that working for a just society based on the dignity of the person, and the primacy of the human in every economic and social sphere is truly a Christian duty. As a final post- script, we may note that this view is no more clearly articulated than in a joint statement adopted by the WCC in 1954, which Florovskii was instrumental in preparing together with a team of other theologians (which may have included Charles Malik),

It is God’s will that “justice roll down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream.” We must be ever alert to seek a greater measure of justice in social and

38 Though, there are other followers of Florovskii, such as Yannaras and Romanides, who would draw a different conclusion. For an interpretation see again Gavrilyuk, Religious Renaissance (see n. 3), pp. 247-251, 298-300. 342 Nicholas Sooy

political relationships, and to do battle against every unjust discrimination against class or race, and every denial of human rights, whether political or economic. We do not hold with those who think that they themselves can bring about a perfect social order, if necessary by the employment of terror and the silencing of the individual conscience. But neither do we hold with those who are content to be mere onlookers in the face of the miseries of prisoners, refugees, and the dispossessed, the displaced, and the exploited, as if nothing could be done to better their lot.39

Abstract

Father Georgii Florovskii was certainly one of the most influential Orthodox theologians of the 20th century. Being a scholar, historian and theologian, he kept a natural, partly conscious distance towards matters of jurisprudence, diplomacy and politics. His most active years fell into a phase where Human Rights only slowly became an issue on the international scene. Nonetheless, his theological anthropology, in particular his personalist concepts, developed with regard to history and social life, prove to be of more than theoretical relevance for the debate. Many of his statements can directly be related to the problems discussed in discourses on human dignity and rights.

39 Florovskii and Malik were part of a team of 32 theologians that was responsible for drafting the 129-paragraph report for the second assembly of the WCC, ‘Christ – The Hope of the World’ in 1954. Only 20 of these theologians were present at the final meeting at which the report was adopted. There are conflicting reports regarding who was present at the final meeting, though all reports agree that Florovskii was present at all meetings, indicating his active participation. Among those on the committee were Florovs- kii, Malik, Karl Barth, and T.S. Eliot. The full report can be found in The Christian Hope and the Task of the Church: Six Ecumenical Surveys and the Report of the Assembly, World Council of Churches, 2nd Assembly (New York, 1954). The quotation above is from pp. 44-45. While the statement is not solely Florovskii’s he evidently agreed with it. Furthermore, a close reading of the document shows many places where the argumentation and views adopted by the committee are very close to the argumentation from Florovskii on the subject which we have quoted above. In the quotation above we see something of the avoidance of both “Empire”, which would attempt to build a perfect social order, and “Desert”, which would take no action on social issues. The rest of the statement expresses a nearly identical view to Florovskii’s on history and the eschaton (pp. 12-13; 27-28). The document also repeats the view that what is good in modernism comes from Christian sources (p. 29). Finally, the statement insists upon the view which Florovskii repeated, that Christianity demands social engagement in the here and now (pp. 34; 42-44).