Sandoval 2005 Contemporary Anti-Sweatshop Movement

10.1177/0730888405278990WORKArmbruster-Sandoval AND OCCUPATIONS / ANTI-SWEATSHOP / November 2005 MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE Workers of the World Unite? The Contemporary Anti-Sweatshop Movement and the Struggle for Social Justice in the Americas

RALPH ARMBRUSTER-SANDOVAL University of California, Santa Barbara

The contemporary anti-sweatshop movement emerged more than 10 years ago. During that time period, numerous campaigns have challenged sweatshop labor practices (particularly in the garment industry) throughout the Americas. This article examines four such campaigns that primarily involved Central American garment workers and U.S.-based nongovernment organizations. The results of these case studies were relatively mixed. Gains (better wages and working conditions) were usually not broadened or sustained over time. What factors explain these dispa- rate outcomes? Following and expanding on theoretical concepts and models embedded within the globalization and transnational social movement literatures, the author explores that ques- tion, describing each campaign’s dynamics and comparatively analyzing all four. The author concludes with some short-term, medium-term, and long-term proposals for addressing the various obstacles that the anti-sweatshop movement currently faces.

Keywords: sweatshop; garment workers; Central America; cross-border labor; maquiladora

orkers of the world unite” remains a potent and powerful rallying “Wcry, especially when one considers the globalization of the apparel industry and the miserable wages and working conditions that the world’s garment workers currently face (Ross, 2004). Transnational (or cross- border) labor solidarity could potentially mitigate the possibility and reality of capital mobility and thereby restrain the seemingly intractable, never- ending race to the bottom, but this is no simple task. Marx predicted that capitalism’s inequities (long hours, low wages, etc.) would gradually minimize racial, ethnic, gender, and regional differences among workers, sparking the initial development of nationally based and subsequently internationally based labor unions (Howard, 1995). The rich, although highly contentious, history of labor internationalism during the past 150 years supports this view (Waterman, 2001). Cross-border labor solidarity has taken place. Workers have crossed borders for decades and many have benefited from these

WORK AND OCCUPATIONS, Vol. 32 No. 4, November 2005 464-485 DOI: 10.1177/0730888405278990 © 2005 Sage Publications 464 Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 465 various efforts, but these gains have not often been broadened or sustained over time. The contemporary anti-sweatshop movement confronts a similar dilemma today. Garment workers and social justice activists from the Ameri- cas (North, Central, and South), Asia, Africa, and Europe have successfully challenged some transnational corporations for their sweatshop labor practices during the past decade (1995 to 2005), but these victories have usually been short-lived. The literature documenting these antisweatshop campaigns is extensive.1 Despite these numerous studies, very few researchers—until quite recently (see Armbruster-Sandoval, 2003, 2005)—have theoretically examined why most antisweatshop (or cross-border labor solidarity) campaigns typically succeed in the short run but fail over the long run. Moreover, the links between the historical and contemporary antisweatshop movements have rarely been explored.2 What lessons can garment workers, activists, and academics learn from the past for today’s struggle against sweatshop labor? The relationship between this movement and the larger global justice movement also warrants greater discussion. This article addresses these questions through a comparative analysis of four antisweatshop campaigns. These cases primarily involved Central Ameri- can and U.S. garment workers, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and labor unions. They targeted high-profile, brand-name companies—Phillips Van-Heusen (PVH), the Gap, J.C. Penney, Wal-Mart, Target, and Kohl’s. Within each campaign, workers and activists obtained some important con- cessions (better wages or working conditions or both), but the improvements they made were eventually limited or completely overturned. The following sections explore these campaigns’ dynamics, highlighting what factors generated these various outcomes. Before doing this and commenting on these four case studies’ larger theoretical and political implications, I start with a brief analysis of the literature on globalization and transnational social movements.

GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE BOOMERANG EFFECT

Andrew Herod (2001), following Gibson-Graham’s (1996) incisive analysis, suggests that most geographers and social scientists, from a wide variety of ideological perspectives (conservative, liberal, radical, etc.), contend that globalization is an inexorable process that workers cannot effec- 466 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005 tively challenge. Transnational corporations (TNCs), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and other mul- tilateral bodies are often portrayed as near-invincible institutions that have single-handedly reorganized the global economy. Because they have tremen- dous power and resources, workers and social justice activists have very little, if any, agency. Globalization and the geographical dispersion of production (especially in the highly mobile garment industry, where factories can be moved rather quickly) have ostensibly transformed them into hapless, powerless victims. This pessimistic viewpoint is widely held today. TNCs such as Nike, the Gap, and PVH hold the upper hand because they can simply cut and run when they are confronted with labor-organizing campaigns in a developed or developing country. Because this particular outcome has occurred numerous times, it cannot be easily dismissed as one possible scenario. However, framing it as a near-automatic certainty overlooks the fact that there are, to borrow two book titles from David Harvey (1982, 2000), “limits to capital,” and “spaces of hope” that still exist within the global economy. Where are those spaces of hope? How can garment workers and social justice activists confront sweatshop labor practices? Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, pp. 12-13) maintain that “domestic nonstate actors” (e.g., workers, unions, and NGOs) can effectively attack intransigent targets (e.g. states, institutions, TNCs) and generate social change through a feedback-oriented mechanism they call the “boomerang effect.” The boomerang effect takes place when powerful states restrict domestic nonstate actors from redressing their grievances. States with relatively closed political opportunity structures can undermine, for instance, a labor- organizing campaign through bureaucratic delays, arrests, intimidation, and violence (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Given these unfavorable conditions, domestic nonstate actors can establish ties with NGOs beyond their borders, forming a “transnational advocacy network” (TAN; Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 8-10) of allies, whose members can, in turn, lean on their states to put indirect or direct pressure on the original recalcitrant state (see Figure 1). Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest that the purpose of the TAN is to per- suade the state or some other powerful target to change or enforce its laws or policies or introduce new reforms. TANs can achieve these goals by engag- ing in four types of politics: information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability. Information politics involves publicizing and disseminating facts (concerning sweatshop conditions, human rights abuses, etc). Symbolic Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 467

Intergovernmental Organization

Boomerang Effect

State A State B (Blocked Access) Boomerang Effect

NGO NGO NGO NGO Information Transnational Advocacy Network

Figure 1: The Boomerang Effect NOTE: NGO = Nongovernment organizations. SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. politics revolve around framing or explaining complex issues or events through signs—alternative fashion shows, mock awards, pictures, posters, or guerrilla theater (McAdam et al., 1996). Leverage politics seek to undermine powerful targets through moral or material means. Accountability politics typically highlight the contradiction or legitimacy gap between the target’s words and deeds through, for example, a careful analysis of its mission statement or code of conduct. These strategies are not mutually exclusive; they are often used simultaneously. Given the model’s assumptions, how well does it correspond with the four antisweatshop campaigns I have examined? Despite Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) rather perplexing comments about the transitory nature of labor- oriented TANs,3 I contend that their conceptual model is, for the most part, useful. They do place too much emphasis on the role of the TAN, however, making it virtually the proverbial white knight in shining armor. This perspective unconsciously marginalizes (mostly “women of color”) garment workers from narratives of resistance while privileging White, First-World, middle-class activists and consumers (Brooks, 2002). The analysis taken here is hopefully more balanced. I suggest that these four campaigns indicate that positive and negative outcomes mainly, but not entirely, depended on the dialectical relationship between garment workers and the TAN, a point that the first case study clearly illustrates. 468 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

THE PVH CAMPAIGN, 1989 TO 1999

The PVH campaign began when the company’s predominantly female labor force started organizing its two wholly owned subsidiaries, named Camisas Modernas I and Camisas Modernas II (or Camosa I and II) in Gua- temala City in 1989 (Armbruster-Sandoval, 1999). Despite comments that the plants’labor relations policies made them the crown jewels of the Guate- malan maquiladora industry, workers’grievances—low pay, arbitrary piece- rate hikes, and restricted bathroom breaks—contradicted those claims (Petersen, 1992). Guatemalan labor confederations provided the fledging union (called STECAMOSA—the Camosa Workers’ Union) with assis- tance, but the company derailed the campaign through co-optation and repression (Johns, 1998; Petersen, 1992). STECAMOSA resurfaced 2 years later and filed, after receiving legal, technical, and financial support from Guatemalan labor organizations, the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project (U.S./GLEP), and rather surpris- ingly, the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organiza- tions’s (AFL-CIO’s) controversial Latin American affiliate, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), a petition with the Guatema- lan labor ministry asking for legal recognition (Johns, 1998).4 The company responded, once again, with consent and coercion, offering union members severance payments and bribes, establishing a company union, and warning that it would shut down one of the two factories if the union was recognized (Petersen, 1992). These activities—combined with death threats and the shooting of one of the union’s leaders—undermined this particular effort. STECAMOSA withstood these attacks, electing new leaders and filing another application for legal recognition in 1992 (Johns, 1998). U.S.-based NGOs and unions soon followed suit, filing a labor rights petition with the office of the U.S. trade representative asking for a formal review of Guate- mala’s trading benefits under the worker rights provision of the generalized system of preferences (GSP; Moberg, 1998; Traub-Werner & Cravey, 2002). The potential threat of losing $500 million in trading benefits provided STECAMOSA and its transnational allies with leverage and pressured the Guatemalan government into recognizing one of the industry’s few unions. This was a major victory. How was it achieved? Using Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) model, we can see that the PVH workers’ union faced two targets— the Guatemalan government and PVH (see Figure 2). It initially had little, if any, leverage over either one. The union, therefore, cultivated ties with U.S.- based NGOs, creating a TAN. The TAN pressured the U.S. government to review Guatemala’s trading benefits. This strategic decision gave the PVH workers material leverage over the Guatemalan government, which feared Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 469

Trade Pressure (GSP) Boomerang (Leverage Politics) Effect

Guatemalan Gov’t PVH U.S. Gov’t (Target #1) (Target #2) (USTR) (No Leverage) (No Leverage)

STECAMOSA U.S./GLEP U.S.-Based (PVH Workers’ Union) Unions/NGOs (Transnational Advocacy Network)

Figure 2: Union Recognition and the PVH Campaign Note: GSP = generalized system of preferences;NGO = nongovernment organizations; PVH = Phillips Van-Heusen; STECAMOSA = Camosa Workers’ Union; USTR = United States Trade Representative; U.S./GLEP = U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project. SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. the loss of its trading privileges, and therefore, it recognized STECAMOSA. This was a remarkable feat, illustrating how TANs can generate boomerang effects and create social change. This breakthrough did not mean the campaign was over—far from it. The PVH workers still did not have a contract. Guatemalan labor law stipulates that employers are required to negotiate with any union that represents more than 25% of all workers in a particular factory or work site (Human Rights Watch, 1997). STECAMOSA fell far below that threshold after obtaining legal recognition. Firings, factory closing threats, and fear sapped the union’s strength. During the next 3 years (1992 to 1995), it essentially disappeared (T. Casertano, personal communication, January 18, 1997). Monica Felipe Alvaréz, one of the union’s two remaining leaders, then contacted Teresa Casertano—a representative with the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF—the international trade secretariat for garment worker unions all over the world)—in June 1995 to try to revive it (T. Casertano, personal communication, January 18, 1997). STECAMOSA and ITGLWF’s Latin American affiliate (the Inter-American Textile and Garment Workers Federation) developed a clandestine organizing model to strengthen the union. During Labor Day weekend in late August 470 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

1996, STECAMOSA conducted a 3-day organizing blitz to reach the 25% level. Upon surpassing that mark, union members presented surprised company officials with a petition calling for contract negotiations (STECAMOSA, personal communication, August 5, 1997). This incident sparked a lengthy deadlock. As government and company officials dragged their feet, PVH workers held rallies outside the factory while U.S.-based activists did the same outside shopping malls and department stores (Moberg, 1998). U.S./GLEP then made a crucial move—it called on PVH Chief Executive Officer Bruce Klatsky to invite Human Rights Watch (whose board of directors he coincidentally sat on) to investigate the 25% issue (Moberg, 1998). In January 1997, Human Rights Watch officials discovered that STECAMOSA had reached and surpassed the 25% mark. Klatsky could not ignore the report without tarnishing the company’s “socially responsible” image. He, therefore, started contract negotiations with STECAMOSA. On August 14, 1997, after 8 long years, the union signed a 2-year contract that included wage increases, grievance procedures, subsidies for transportation, child care, and lunch, resources for an off-site union office, and guaranteed employment levels (U.S./GLEP, 1997). This was an even greater achievement than obtaining legal recognition because this was the only collective bargaining agreement that existed, at that time, in Guatemala’s 500 maquiladora factories. To accomplish this victory, a three-pronged strategy was used—the TAN first gained moral leverage (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) over PVH (Target #2) through image or symbolic politics (see Figure 3). Naomi Klein (2000) calls this tactic the brand boomerang. The TAN also used trade (GSP) pressure to obtain material leverage over the Guatemalan government (Target #1). These strategies were not enough, however. STECAMOSA gained strength through a process that I call organization-building politics, putting direct pressure on PVH. This was the crucial difference between this phase of the campaign and the earlier one, and it shows the flaw in Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) model. They contend that TANs can almost single-handedly generate social change for powerless domestic nonstate actors—this happened here (the union was recognized), but the chances for more successful and substantial results are greater when the TAN and the domestic nonstate actor (a maquiladora union, in this case) are strong and work together on a collaborative basis. The PVH contract victory was unfortunately short-lived. The company claimed that the loss of a major client forced it to shut down Camisas Modernas in December 1998 (U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project [U.S./LEAP], People of Faith Network, and United Students Against Sweat- shops, 1999). STECAMOSA and U.S.-based NGOs within the TAN pressured PVH to reopen the factory during the next 7 months. Some union Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 471

Trade Pressure Leaflets, Rallies, (Material Leverage) HRW Report Boomerang Boomerang (Moral Leverage) Effect Effect

Guatemalan Gov’t PVH (Target #1) (Target #2)

STECAMOSA U.S./GLEP U.S. Unions/ NGOs

Organization-Building Politics

Figure 3: Contract Negotiations and the PVH Campaign NOTE: HRW = Human Rights Watch; NGO = nongovernment organizations; PVH = Phillips Van-Heusen; STECAMOSA = Camosa Workers’ Union; U.S./GLEP = U.S./ Guatemala Labor Education Project. SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. members, for instance, held a round-the-clock vigil outside the factory while its secretary-general (president) and U.S. activists protested outside PVH’s annual shareholder meeting in New York City in July 1999. A new GSP petition was also filed. These strategies provided STECAMOSA with moral and material leverage, but the factory remained closed. What went wrong? Well, one could argue nothing went wrong—the workers and activists did all that they could—the company simply had too much power. This is undoubtedly true, but internal conflicts, activists claimed, within STECAMOSA also played a contributing factor (B. Padilla, personal communication, August 4, 1999). This finding reinforces the assertion that the relationship between the TAN and domestic nonstate actor is crucial for examining antisweatshop campaign outcomes (see Table 1). When STECAMOSA was weak, the TAN used trade pressure to facilitate union recognition (Phase #1). During the campaign’s second phase, the union and TAN were both strong and internally unified and the outcome was the 2-year contract. The union’s decline made reopening the factory much more difficult during the final phase. What these results show is that strong 472 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

TABLE 1: The Phillips Van-Heusen Campaign, 1989 to 1999

Level of Unity Within Transnational Campaign Union Advocacy Phase Strength Network Types of Politics Outcome

1989 to 1992 Low High Material leverage Union (#1) (Generalized system recognition of preferences) 1995 to 1997 High High Organizational building, 2-year (#2) material or moral contract leverage 1998 to 1999 Low High Material or moral Factory (#3) leverage closure

SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. worker organizations are critical for challenging sweatshop labor. Highly unified TANs can independently achieve meaningful, tangible results, but they can do more when they work with robust maquila unions. The next case study sheds greater light on this thesis.

THE GAP CAMPAIGN, 1993 TO 2004

The Gap campaign started when workers for one of its contractors, named Mandarin International, a Taiwanese-owned maquila factory, started organizing in El Salvador in 1993.5 Low wages and poor working conditions (forced overtime, unsanitary drinking water, sexual harassment, and no health care benefits) sparked this campaign (J. Fernández, personal communication, September 9, 1999). This effort, along with another one a year later, failed, but these setbacks did not dissuade the Mandarin workers. They tried a third time with the hope that that their newly created union could start contract negotiations with Mandarin. Salvadoran labor law states that employers must negotiate with unions that represent more than 50% of all workers in a particular work site. The Mandarin International Workers Union (called SETMI) had more than 300 members in early 1995 (Anner, 1998). Because the factory em- ployed more than 800 workers, the union was near the 50% mark. Before SETMI could reach that level, however, Mandarin fired numerous workers Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 473 and established ties with a company union. These activities were designed to intimidate the union’s members, but they did not back down. They blocked, for example, the free trade zone’s gates where Mandarin was located, shut down production inside the factory, and cut off its electricity (Esbenshade, 2004; SETMI, personal communication, August 28, 1999). This was the third strike that involved the company and union between February and June 1995. Mandarin responded to those earlier actions with mass firings—this time was no different, as the company dismissed 300 members and physi- cally barred SETMI’s leaders from entering the factory. These measures practically eliminated the union (SETMI, personal communication, August 28, 1999). Several days after these events transpired, the National Labor Committee (NLC), a New York City–based labor and human rights group with a long history of activism in Central America in the 1980s and 1990s, became more closely involved with the campaign (Krupat, 1997). Through background research, the NLC discovered that the majority of Mandarin’s production orders came from the Gap (Anner, 1998). The trendy, “socially responsible” company, therefore, became the campaign’s primary target. To highlight sweatshop conditions inside Mandarin and thus attack the Gap, the NLC relied on three strategies; first, it, along with UNITE (the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees), flew two Central American women maquiladora workers (Judith Viera and Claudia Molina) to the United States to speak before the union’s founding convention in July 1995 (Brooks, 2002). Viera (a fired SETMI member) and Molina also spoke in 25 U.S. cities. The NLC also produced a short documentary film called Zoned for Slavery: The Children Behind the Label about sweatshop conditions in Central America. This film was widely shown on college campuses and universities. These activities generated major press coverage in key newspapers all over the country. These articles (the third part of the NLC’s model) highlighted the gap between the Gap’s progressive public image and the reality that its Salvadoran workers faced. The NLC wisely recognized the company’s image was its soft spot. It exploited that weakness in every single leaflet, press release, and public statement. Through these attacks, the NLC gained moral leverage over the Gap. As the campaign proceeded, pressure mounted. The Gap finally capitu- lated, signing the first-ever independent monitoring agreement with the NLC and four Salvadoran-based NGOs in December 1995 (Esbenshade, 2004).6 Independent monitoring involves noncompany paid-for NGOs that conduct periodic factory inspections to determine whether garment contractors are complying with corporate codes of conduct and national labor laws (Esbenshade, 2004). Mandarin initially opposed independent monitoring, 474 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

Material Leverage (Suspended Production) Boomerang Effect

Mandarin The Gap Moral Leverage (Blocked Access) (Image Attacks) (No Leverage)

SETMI NLC UNITE U.S. NGOs (Transnational Advocacy Network)

Figure 4: Independent Monitoring and the Gap Campaign NOTE: NGO = nongovernment organizations; NLC = National Labor Committee; SETMI = Mandarin International Workers Union; UNITE = Union of Needletrades, In- dustrial and Textile Employees. SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. along with demands that it rehire fired union leaders and members. The Gap then pulled out its trump card, threatening to permanently sever its ties with Mandarin. Faced with the potential loss of its largest supplier, Mandarin relented, reinstating all SETMI leaders and members and embracing independent monitoring. Reports and interviews indicate that this strategy has dramatically improved working conditions inside the factory, although wages remain quite low (Anner, 1998; Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005; Esbenshade, 2004). What factors account for these various results? The campaign’s crucial moment came when the NLC started targeting the Gap rather than Mandarin. Before this decision was made, SETMI had basically been eliminated—all its members had been fired, giving it absolutely no leverage. The NLC under- stood that SETMI had no power over Mandarin but realized that the Gap did. The Gap initially did not want to use its material leverage—stopping production orders—to force Mandarin to improve wages and working conditions inside the factory. The NLC thus launched a sophisticated, media-savvy campaign (the workers’ speaking tour, documentary film, and press coverage) to smear the Gap’s socially responsible image, giving SETMI and the NLC moral leverage. Because the company did not want to be associated with what NLC Executive Director Charles Kernaghan (1999) calls “sweatshops Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 475 paying starvation wages” (n.p.), the Gap temporarily suspended its ties with Mandarin. This step showed, once again, the power of brand-based politics (Klein, 2000). The NLC recognized the Gap’s image was the campaign’s key hook, using it over and over again to open up space and produce social change through the boomerang effect (see Figure 4). Mandarin eventually relented, after recognizing that it could lose its largest supplier for good. It, therefore, accepted monitoring, rehired the union’s leaders and some of its members, and improved working conditions inside the factory. These results are remarkable given how difficult it is to challenge sweatshop labor practices in the Salvadoran maquiladora industry. Despite these positive accomplishments, the Gap campaign cannot be called a clear-cut victory because wages have not improved since independent monitoring began.7 One could blame Mandarin, the Gap, or the broader subcontracting system, but doing so ignores the stubborn fact that the three main U.S. organizations (the NLC, UNITE, and AFL-CIO) involved with this campaign differed greatly about what strategy—independent monitoring or unionization—was more effective for combating sweatshop labor. This conflict has long-standing historical roots, stemming from the NLC’s oppo- sition to the AFL-CIO’s support for authoritarian regimes in El Salvador that committed gross human rights abuses in the 1980s (Krupat, 1997). Had the NLC and UNITE been more united, some activists suggested,8 wages and working conditions inside Mandarin might have improved. Divisions within the anti-sweatshop movement, therefore, limited the Gap campaign from being more successful. This finding reinforces my earlier assertion—strong maquila unions and highly unified TANs are essential for confronting sweatshop conditions. The next case challenges, to some extent, this perspective.

THE KIMI CAMPAIGN, 1993 TO 2000

Kimi de Honduras (Kimi for short), a Korean-owned maquiladora factory that received orders from J.C. Penney, Macy’s, and the Gap, was initially located in a free-trade zone near the booming, northeastern city of San Pedro Sula. Long hours, low pay, and poor working conditions sparked a partially successful organizing drive in 1993, but the union’s members (mostly all women) were all eventually fired (Traub-Werner & Yanz, 2000). After working closely with UNITE, the Kimi workers’ union (named SITRAKIMIH) resurfaced 2 years later (S. Aguillón, personal communication, September 28-29, 1999). Upon organizing clandestinely and meeting the country’s labor code requirements, SITRAKIMIH filed for legal recogni- 476 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

Honduran Gov’t

Kimi J.C. Penney U.S. Gov’t Material Leverage (Letters, Image, (GSP Pressure, (Possible Loss of Moral Leverage) Material Leverage) Production Orders)

SITRAKIMIH NLC UNITE (Weak Ties)

Organization-Building Politics

Figure 5: Contract Ratification and the Kimi Campaign NOTE: GSP = generalized system of preferences; NLC = National Labor Committee; SITRAKIMIH = Kimi Workers’ Union; UNITE = Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees. SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. tion in July 1996. Kimi’s managers then fired most the union’s leaders and members, prompting a 5-day strike that ended with the company pledging to recognize SITRAKIMIH in 6 months. Kimi did no such thing, however. The NLC and five Honduran-based NGOs thus became involved in the campaign (N. del Cid, personal communication, September 21, 1999).9 Those latter groups created the Independent Monitoring Team to investigate working conditions inside the factory and to put pressure on Kimi to recognize the union. As the Independent Monitoring Team carried out its inspections, the NLC and U.S./GLEP put pressure on J.C. Penney, Kimi’s largest buyer, to resolve the dispute. This strategic decision paid off when Kimi finally recognized the union in 1997. This was a substantial victory, but strategic conflicts between the NLC and UNITE about the efficacy of independent monitoring versus collective bargaining—combined with a powerful, deadly hurricane—slowed down the next step—contract negotiations. Shop-floor activism, combined with consumer and trade pressure eventually broke the impasse, with SITRAKIMIH signing a 2-year contract in March 1999. This outcome (see Figure 5) illustrates that TANs can be effective when they are moderately or Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 477 highly unified—provided that they work collaboratively with strong maquila unions (B. Fieldman, personal communication, September 20, 1999). The Kimi campaign took a dramatic turn several months later. Upset about the slow pace of salary talks, SITRAKIMIH organized a virtual general strike in August 1999 that crippled production within the entire free-trade zone where Kimi was located (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2003). This action generated higher wages, but the free-trade zone’s owner, a long-time conservative power-broker in San Pedro Sula, pulled the factory’s lease. Kimi, therefore, moved to a new site with the union’s backing, but it shut down in May 2000 (Campaign for Labor Rights, 2000). Despite pressure from the factory’s workers and student anti-sweatshop activists in the United States, Kimi never reopened in Honduras.10 Capital mobility thus cut short this promising campaign. A different, although equally intractable, obstacle limited the effectiveness of the final case study.

THE CHENTEX CAMPAIGN, 1996 TO 2001

Chentex is located in the Las Mercedes free-trade zone in Managua, Nica- ragua. In the late 1990s, when the campaign first surfaced, Chentex’s nearly 2000 workers (mostly young women) made 30,000 pairs of jeans a day for Wal-Mart, K-Mart, J.C. Penney, Kohl’s, and Target (NLC, 1997). Nien Hsing—a Korean-owned transnational corporation with production facilities in the Americas, Asia, and Africa—owns Chentex. The Chentex campaign took off when investigators from the televi- sion series Hard Copy discovered miserable conditions inside and outside the factory (NLC, 1997). The exposé gave the Chentex workers, who had begun organizing under the auspices of the Sandinista Workers Central (CST) before the series ran, moral leverage over its three secondary targets— Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and J.C. Penney (G. Manzanares, personal communication, August 1, 2000). The CST seized this opportunity, filing a petition for legal recognition, but the company responded with mass firings. The union then organized two militant strikes that included 90% of the factory’s workers (G. Manzanares, personal communication, August 1, 2000). The NLC and U.S.-based NGOs, for their part, passed out leaflets and held rallies outside department stores while these events were taking place in Nicaragua (Ricker & Wimberley, 2003). The Labor Ministry, feeling pressure from all sides, eventually conceded, recognizing the union in February 1998. The next step should have been contract negotiations, but Chentex resisted. No progress was made during the next few months. In the midst of 478 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005 this impasse, a broad coalition of U.S.-based solidarity, human rights, labor, and religious organizations swung into action (Ricker & Wimberley, 2003).11 These groups pressured the CEOs of Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and J.C. Penney through a constant barrage of faxes, e-mails, and letters and their members continued passing out leaflets across the United States. These strategies eventually turned the tide. In August 1998, Chentex finally relented, signing a 2-year contract that included provisions calling for overtime pay, a health clinic inside the factory, and free school supplies for the workers’children (“Contract victory at Nicaraguan Maquila,” 1998). The pact did not include wage increases, however. Chentex claimed that wages would be raised within a year, but that never happened. The CST thus organized two more strikes in April and May 2000. Both work stoppages generated mass firings. Hundreds lost their jobs. Chentex also hired armed guards, set up security cameras, and installed barbed wire, turning the compound into a virtual panoptic-like prison (G. Manzanares, personal communication, August 1, 2000). These draconian measures drove the union from the factory, but the campaign continued. Between May 2000 and June 2001, every conceivable strategy was used. The CST held several rallies, with representatives from U.S.- based NGOs and unions, outside Chentex, whereas activists organized more than 130 leafleting actions all over the United States. U.S. Congressman Sherrod Brown (Democrat-New York) and 63 other congressional representatives, moreover, sent a letter to Taiwanese President Chen asking him to meet with Nien Hsing’s owners to resolve the conflict (Ricker & Wimberley, 2003). As these events were taking place, the CST and the TAN switched targets to Kohl’s and Target. Kohl’s was selected because the company was holding several grand openings that the TAN hoped to disrupt through rallies and demonstrations that included fired Chentex workers. These actions— combined with several high-profile delegations that included U.S. labor and religious leaders, pressure from the U.S. trade representative, demonstrations outside Nien Hsing’s corporate headquarters in Taipei, solidarity and support from Nien Hsing’s Lesotho-based workers, and a congressional inquiry into allegations that the Pentagon was buying Chentex-made goods and selling them on military bases—had little or no effect, however. A Nicaraguan court finally ordered Chentex to reinstate the union’s nine leaders in April 2001 (Campaign for Labor Rights, 2001). Only four were actually rehired (several hundred fired union members never got their jobs back), but they soon resigned, citing constant harassment and surveillance from company supervisors (U.S./LEAP, 2001). The CST Chentex workers’ union thus permanently disappeared in July 2001. Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 479

CAMPAIGN OUTCOMES— MAPPING THE LARGER PICTURE

What factors explain these four campaigns’ various results? Following and expanding on Keck and Sikkink (1998), I initially suggested that strong maquila unions and highly unified TANs were crucial for successfully confronting sweatshop labor practices. The PVH and Kimi cases support this argument (see Table 2). In both those campaigns, wages and working conditions improved through collective bargaining and TAN activism. The Kimi case showed, however, that TANs can still be effective when they are moderately, rather than highly, unified. The Gap campaign further illustrates this point. The main organizations (NLC, UNITE, and AFL-CIO) that were involved with that latter case were sometimes deeply divided, but working conditions still improved through independent monitoring. Wages remained quite low, however. These outcomes indicate that when vibrant unions and moderately or highly unified TANs are both present, the potential for more substantial, far-reaching change (higher wages and better working conditions) is greater. The Chentex campaign challenges this perspective. That case involved a militant, well-organized maquila union and a highly unified, geographically diverse, and extremely persistent TAN. The outcome here should have been the same as the PVH and Kimi cases, but that did not happen. Working conditions improved, but wages did not. What explains this paradoxical outcome? Based on Naomi Klein’s (2000) work on brand-based politics, I contend that the degree of “corporate vulnerability” often plays a critical role in anti- sweatshop campaigns. Corporations that claim that they are socially responsible are more susceptible to brand-based attacks, whereas companies that do not make those assertions are less vulnerable. This is precisely what took place in the Chentex campaign—the two secondary targets (Target and Kohl’s) were deeply concerned about being tagged with sweatshop allegations, but the contractor’s owner, Nien Hsing, was not. This finding demon- strates the “limits of brand-based politics” (Klein, 2000, pp. 421-437). Cam- paigns with multiple targets are complicated because each one has its own strengths and weaknesses. Had Nien Hsing been more vulnerable, the results from the Chentex campaign might have mirrored those from the PVH and Kimi campaigns. The same goes for the Gap case—had the union been stronger, wages probably would have risen. These four campaigns thus indicate that most optimal conditions for combating sweatshop labor practices include strong maquila unions, moderate or highly unified TANs, and moderate or highly vulnerable corporations. When all three factors are present, chances for success are greater. This does not Degree of Degree

Transnational of Degree Better

Degree ofDegree Advocacy Corporate Higher Working

Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas:The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle by R.by LLC. Armbruster-Sandoval. Group, & Francis permission of Routledge/Taylor Reproduced by Campaign Outcomes—Explanatory Factors Campaign Outcomes—Explanatory

TABLE 2: TABLE Campaign (Guatemala)Phillips Van-Heusen Kimi (Honduras)Gap (El Salvador) (Nicaragua)Chentex SOURCE:Copyright (© 2005) from High social justice for Union Strength High High Network Unity High Low Vulnerability Moderate High Moderate High Wages Moderate Conditions Yes High Low Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

480 Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 481

TABLE 3: Campaign Outcomes—Positive and Negative Results

Campaign Positive Result Negative Result Obstacle

Phillips Van-Heusen 2-year contract Factory closed Capital mobility (Guatemala) (1997) (1998) Kimi (Honduras) 2-year contract Factory closed Capital mobility (1999) (2000) Chentex (Nicaragua) 2-year contract Low wages; union Corporate (1998) eliminated (2001) intransigence Gap (El Salvador) Independent Low wages; factory Divisions within monitoring agree- still open; moni- the anti- ment (1996) toring continues sweatshop movement

SOURCE: Copyright (© 2005) from Globalization and cross-border labor solidarity in the Americas: The anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice by R. Armbruster-Sandoval. Reproduced by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. mean that even under the most ideal circumstances that positive results will last over time, as the PVH and Kimi cases show (see Table 3). Capital mobility was the key obstacle that undermined both those campaigns. In the Chentex and Gap campaigns, corporate intransigence and divisions within the anti-sweatshop movement respectively limited both from being more effective.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Given these divergent results, where does the contemporary anti- sweatshop movement go from here? How can garment workers and social justice activists confront the three obstacles mentioned above? I contend that each one should be addressed on a short-term, medium-term, and long-term basis. Internal conflicts within the anti-sweatshop movement should be focused on first because corporate intransigence and capital mobility cannot overcome until strategic and historical differences between NGOs, activists, and workers are discussed and resolved. In the medium term, antisweatshop organizations should continue targeting corporations that claim they are socially responsible or who have a widely branded label. The Gap and PVH fall into these two categories. Brand-based politics can be quite effective, but this strategy might not be useful in all cases, especially those that involve multiple targets (the Chentex campaign illustrates this dilemma). 482 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / November 2005

One might think that ideally speaking, greater unity within the anti-sweatshop movement, combined with strategic targeting, would be sufficient, but corporations could still cut and run. Garment workers and social-justice activists should therefore, in the long term, organize regionally or even glob- ally. This strategy (“Workers of the world unite”) has great political and emo- tional appeal, but one must ask, “How realistic is it?” Three factors are crucial for labor internationalism—strong labor movements, sufficient resources, and a solid commitment toward organizing and empowering all workers, especially women. Organized labor in the Ameri- cas unfortunately fares poorly on all three counts. Union density rates in Cen- tral America and the United States are strikingly low, particularly in the pri- vate sector. Central American and U.S. unions also do not have the financial means for organizing garment workers on a national, let alone, regional or global basis. They also generally do not consider organizing women garment workers a top priority. This explains why that some of the most innovative and creative garment worker organizing efforts have emerged outside tradi- tional labor unions during the past 20 years (Louie, 2001). These issues— combined with the contemporary anti-sweatshop movement’s framing of Central American women garment workers as victims and U.S. activists as saviors (Brooks, 2002)—do not portend well for those calling for cross- border labor solidarity. This does not mean that creating small or large-scale social change is impossible. Let us imagine, for a moment, that the anti-sweatshop movement was united, corporations were vulnerable, and garment workers, especially women, were organized in the Americas. How would these conditions affect the lives of millions of poor, starving people? What would they gain from cross-border labor solidarity? They would, quite frankly, achieve very little. Cross-border labor solidarity campaigns targeting sweatshop conditions cannot address these broader issues because this particular strategy focuses too narrowly on the point of production (wages and working conditions) rather than the larger political economy. I contend that the four case studies examined here indicate that the contemporary anti-sweatshop movement’s gains will remain ephemeral until neoliberal capitalism, which thrives on capital mobility (companies could still cut and run even if all workers in the Americas were organized) and the attendant race to the bottom, is challenged and ultimately replaced. I realize that this is a very long-term and perhaps even unrealistic goal, but I think that garment workers, activists, consumers, and academics should not take their “eyes off the prize.” We should openly name the enemy or system (Starr, 2000; Yates, 2003), learn from previous social movements, and develop new strategies for creating, in Subcomandante Marcos’s (2001, p. 88) famous Armbruster-Sandoval / ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT & SOCIAL JUSTICE 483 words, “a world where many worlds fit”—one where sweatshops and all forms of misery no longer exist.

NOTES

1. Space considerations limit mentioning these citations here. See Armbruster-Sandoval (2005) for these references. 2. For one key exception, see Bender and Greenwald (2003). 3. Keck and Sikkink (1998) claim that labor support networks such as the National Labor Committee (NCC) are transitory, but the NLC has existed for over 20 years now. 4. For many years, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) helped undermine left-leaning labor unions and supported authoritarian regimes in Latin America. For more on its activities, see Buhle (1999). AIFLD was disbanded in the mid-1990s. 5. Mandarin is now named Charter (Brooks, 2002). 6. Those four groups were the University of Central America Human Rights Institute, the Legal Aid Office of the Archbishop of El Salvador, the Archdiocese of Salvador, and the Center for Labor Studies. 7. Brooks (2002) points out more than 300 union members were never rehired. She calls these workers “forgotten casualties” because U.S. activists ignored them after the monitoring agreement was signed. 8. Because the conflict surrounding this issue was so controversial, interviewees asked that their names not be used. Many repeatedly claimed that these divisions limited the campaign’s scope and effectiveness. 9. Those five organizations were the Collective of Honduran Women; the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras; the Reflection, Research, and Communication Team; Caritas Diocesana; and the Mennonite Church. 10. Kimi’s owners, incidentally, reopened the factory in Guatemala shortly after closing it. 11. These organizations included the NLC; Inter-American Textile and Garment Workers Federation; International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF); Ameri- can Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS); Witness for Peace; U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project (U.S./LEAP); Nicaragua Network; the Campaign for Labor Rights; TecNica; Quest for Peace; and the Upper Westside/Tipitapa Sister Project.

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Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval is an associate professor of Chicana and Chicano studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research, teaching, and activist-oriented interests include globalization, labor, social movements, Central American studies, critical theory, racial studies, and urban studies. He recently published his first book titled Globalization and Cross-Border Labor Solidarity in the Americas: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement and the Struggle for Social Justice (Routledge, 2005). This article is adapted from that volume. The author thanks all the garment workers and social justice activists inter- viewed for this study. Edna Bonacich, Eileen Boris, and Meg Beard also merit special praise here.