DOCSLIB.ORG

The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the 22Nd of JULY, 1947 by Registered As a Newspaper

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the 22Nd of JULY, 1947 by Registered As a Newspaper tRurnb. 38023 347i SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 22nd of JULY, 1947 by Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 24 JULY, 1947 FLEET AIR ARM OPERATIONS AGAINSJ These were not available until ILLUSTRIOUS TARANTO ON IITH NOVEMBER, 1940. arrived on the Station early in September. 6. A considerable amount of night flying train- The following Despatch was submitted to The ing was also necessary before the pilots and Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the observers could be regarded as fully com- i6th January, 1941, by Admiral Sir Andrew petent to undertake the long flight required for B. Cunningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., Com- this hazardous enterprise and it was not until mander-in-Chieft Mediterranean. mid-October that the necessary state of training Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the was reached. accompanying report of the Fleet Air Arm 7. The attack was first planned to take place operations against Taranto on nth November, on the night of 2ist October, but owing to a 1940. fire in ILLUSTRIOUS' hangar a few days be- fore, which destroyed and damaged a number 2. An attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto of aircraft, the operation had to be deferred. by the Fleet Air Arm with torpedoes had been It was considered again for the night of under consideration for many months and long 30th/3ist October, when the fleet was operating before the outbreak of war with Italy. The off the West coast of Greece, but it was decided bridge between planning and execution was, not to attempt it as there was then no moon however, a wide one, since several requirements and the attack would have had to be carried had to be met before the operation could be out with flares, in the use of which the aircraft undertaken with a reasonable prospect of crews had had little practice. success. 8. In the meantime further photographs had 3. The most important of these requirements been taken of the outer anchorage at Taranto was good'and timely photographic reconnais- by the Glenn Martins, and close examination sance, since to plan 'the attack it was necessary revealed the presence of balloons and of nets to know not only that the battleships were in surrounding the battleships. This discovery was harbour but also then: position and berthing most fortunate as these defences naturally with some accuracy. It was not until the Glenn affected the method of attack very considerably. Martins arrived at Malta that such reconnais- 9. It -had always been intended that 'both sance was possible, war experience having ILLUSTRIOUS and EAGLE should take part shown that flying boats are too vulnerable and in this attack. Two days before the fleet sailed slow to approach defended ports with impunity. for the operation EAGLE developed serious defects to her petrol system, caused undoubtedly 4. In the event, the success of the Fleet Air by the many near bomb misses she had ex- Arm attack was due in no small degree to perienced in the early days of the Italian war, . the excellent reconnaissances carried out by the and she therefore had to °be left behind. Six Royal Air Force Glenn Martin Flight (No. 431) of her T.S.R.* aircraft and crews, however, from Malta, under very difficult conditions and were embarked in ILLUSTRIOUS, so that the often in the face of fighter opposition. EAGLE, whose squadrons had reached a high 5. An undetected approach to the selected state of efficiency, was to some extent repre- flying off position was also most important, and sented in the attack. to achieve this the use of long range tanks in * Admiralty footnote:—T.S.R. = Torpedo/Spotter/ the Swordfish aircraft was very desirable. Reconnaissance. 3472 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 JULY, 1947 10. The operation is well described in at that time. The second range of 12 air- ILLUSTRIOUS' report and needs no elabora- craft to be flown off in about the same position tion. It was admirably planned and the deter- at 2100. mined and gallant manner in which it was (ii) The first attack to be made at about carried out reflects 'the highest credit on all 2245 and the second at about 2345 and air- concerned. craft to be landed on in position 270 degrees 11. The results achieved,* as disclosed by Kabbo Point 20 miles. subsequent photographic reconnaissance, (iii) Both attacks to be carried out in the appear to have been: — following form: — One CAVOUR class battleship beached and " The squadron of 12 aircraft to pass apparently abandoned. up the centre of the Gulf of Taranto and One CAVOUR class battleship heavily approach the harbour from the south- -damaged and beached. west. The primary attack to be by six One LITTORIO class 'battleship damaged torpedo aircraft against the battleships and subsequently docked in the Taranto grav- in the Mar Grande. This attack to be ing dock. immediately preceded by two aircraft There is no definite evidence of damage to dropping flares (and bombs) along the cruisers and small, craft as a result of the bomb- eastern side of the Mar Grande in order ing attacks but it seems probable that two to illuminate the targets arid distract attention from the torpedo aircraft, and cruisers may have been hit. by four aircraft making a dive bomb 12. This was the first occasion on which attack on the attractive target pre- Duplex pistols were used in the Mediterranean. sented by the line of cruisers and It is considered that the results achieved have destroyers in the Mar Piccolo. It was proved the value of this weapon and that the expected that this attack would also many years of research and experiment devoted distract attention from the torpedo to its development have been well repaid. attack." 13. There can be little doubt that the crip- pling of half the Italian Battlefleet is having, NARRATIVE. and will continue to have, a marked effect on Preliminary Movements. the course of the war. Without indulging in 3. ILLUSTRIOUS had left Alexandria on speculation as to the political repercussions, it November 6th with the Mediterranean Fleet is already evident that this successful attack in order to cany out Operation " Coat" has greatly increased our freedom of move- (M.B.8)*. ment in the Mediterranean and has thus 4. Before sailing from Alexandria, in order strengthened our control over the central area to provide the maximum number of aircraft of this sea. It has enabled two battleships to that could be flown off in two ranges with no be released for operations elsewhere, while the surface wind (24), and as EAGLE, to their effect on the morale of the Italians must be great disappointment, was unable to take part considerable. As an example of " economy of in the operation due to defective petrol tanks, force " it is probably unsurpassed. eight pilots and eight observers were embarked (Sgd.) A. B. CUNNINGHAM. in ILLUSTRIOUS from EAGLE, all being ex- Admiral. perienced in night flying. Five of EAGLE'S Swordfish were also embarked. 5. All Swordfish aircraft embarked were From:—The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. fitted with the 60 gallon internal auxiliary ILLUSTRIOUS. petrol tanks. Date:—I3th November, 1940. 6. The only incidents that affected the opera- tion during the preliminary movements were" INTENTION. that three Swordfish forced landed in the sea on It was intended to' cany out this operation November gth, loth and nth respectively and as .proposed in Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers, •the aircraft were lost, thus reducing the number Mediterranean's 00478/97 of 28th October, available for the Striking Force to 21. The 1940, as amended by Rear-Admiral Aircraft crews were, however, picked up, two crews Carriers, Mediterranean's 00478/106 of 6th returning to ILLUSTRIOUS at Malta, the third November, 1940. being picked up by GLOUCESTER and flown on board in GLOUCESTER'S Walrus in time 2. The proposed plan was as follows: — to take part in the operation. (i) H.M.S. ILLUSTRIOUS and escort to 7. While at Malta the opportunity was taken be in position 270 degrees Kabbo Point to discuss with Air Officer Commanding, (Cephalonia) 40 miles at 2000 on November Mediterranean, the reconnaissance and nth and fly off the first range of 12 aircraft meteorological forecasts required, and on the morning of November nth one aircraft was * Admiralty footnote :— From subsequent information it was confirmed flown to Malta to collect 'some extremely good that the results were: — photographs of Taranto taken by the Royal Battleship CAVOUR—Hit ' by one torpedo Air Force on the previous day. Further reports abreast No. 2 turret. Bulkheads gave and after were received from Air Officer Commanding, some hours ship sank. DUILIO—Hit by one torpedo near No. 2 turret. Mediterranean and Royal Air Force recon- Sank by the bows. naissance aircraft during the day confirming ITALIA—Hit by three torpedoes—two on the that no important"movements had taken place, starboard side forward and one port side aft. Sank. Cruiser TRENTO—Hit by one bomb which per- * Admiralty footnote:— forated the deck and side but failed to explode. Operation " Coat " was an attack by Naval air- Destroyer LIBECCIO and PESSAGNO—Slight craft from H.M.S. ARK ROYAL on Cagliari damage from near miss bombs. (Sardinia), on gth November, 1940. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 JULY, 1947 3473 and a Royal Air Force aircraft carried out a dropped his torpedo at a range of approxi- patrol of the Gulf of Taranto until 2230 to mately 700 yards. An explosion, probably that ensure that the Italian Fleet did not leave of the torpedo, was observed at the ship about harbour unobserved.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cvf) Programme
    CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit POPULATION AND AGING research organization providing PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY objective analysis and effective SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges TERRORISM AND facing the public and private sectors HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND around the world. INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Europe View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Options for Reducing Costs in the United Kingdom’s Future Aircraft Carrier (cvf) Programme John F. Schank | Roland Yardley Jessie Riposo | Harry Thie | Edward Keating Mark V. Arena | Hans Pung John Birkler | James R. Chiesa Prepared for the UK Ministry of Defence Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United King- dom’s Ministry of Defence.
    [Show full text]
  • General HMS York - OP Deference
    J Royal Naval Medical Service 2011, 97.1 28-31 General HMS York - OP Deference S Schofield In March 2010, when I left HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, eventuality had to be considered including use I was saddened at the thought of never of different ports (Benghazi/Tripoli), use of returning to a sea-going unit – but less than a different assets (coming alongside/using sea- year later I was back at sea and the following boats/using helicopter) and how to react to 10 days reminded me just why I love my job as different situations ashore (aggression and a Medical Officer in the Royal Navy…..! hostility from locals/being welcomed into On the 19 February, after months of hard Libya). There were a lot of unanswered work, HMS YORK finally set sail for her APT questions, a lot of “ifs” and a lot of “buts” but (South) Deployment. She was due a 5 day eventually a flexible plan came together. run-ashore in Las Palmas starting on In Malta, elements of HMS YORK’s Wednesday 23 February, however, on Command team went ashore to the makeshift Tuesday 22 February, twelve hours before Joint Task Force Head Quarters which had reaching Las Palmas, she received instruction been established in the High Commission to turn about and make best speed to building, and as a result our mission became Gibraltar for a different tasking; the ship was clearer; we were to embark Royal Marine to prepare for a possible Non-combatant security troops and proceed to just outside Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Libya, territorial waters off of Tripoli.
    [Show full text]
  • UK Maritime Power
    Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 UK Maritime Power Fifth Edition Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 UK Maritime Power Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 (JDP 0-10) (5th Edition), dated October 2017, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff Director Concepts and Doctrine Conditions of release 1. This information is Crown copyright. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) exclusively owns the intellectual property rights for this publication. You are not to forward, reprint, copy, distribute, reproduce, store in a retrieval system, or transmit its information outside the MOD without VCDS’ permission. 2. This information may be subject to privately owned rights. i Authorisation The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is responsible for publishing strategic trends, joint concepts and doctrine. If you wish to quote our publications as reference material in other work, you should confirm with our editors whether the particular publication and amendment state remains authoritative. We welcome your comments on factual accuracy or amendment proposals. Please send them to: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Ministry of Defence Shrivenham SWINDON Wiltshire SN6 8RF Telephone: 01793 31 4216/4217/4220 Military network: 96161 4216/4217/4220 E-mail: [email protected] All images, or otherwise stated are: © Crown copyright/MOD 2017. Distribution Distributing Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-10 (5th Edition) is managed by the Forms and Publications Section, LCSLS Headquarters and Operations Centre, C16 Site, Ploughley Road, Arncott, Bicester, OX25 1LP. All of our other publications, including a regularly updated DCDC Publications Disk, can also be demanded from the LCSLS Operations Centre.
    [Show full text]
  • The First Royal Navy Aircraft Carrier Deployment to the Indo-Pacific
    NIDS Commentary No. 146 The first Royal Navy aircraft carrier deployment to the Indo-Pacific since 2013: Reminiscent of an untold story of Japan-UK defence cooperation NAGANUMA Kazumi, Planning and Management Division, Planning and Administration Department No. 146, 3 January 2021 Introduction: Anticipating the UK’s theatre-wide commitment to the Indo-Pacific in 2021 On 5 December, it was reported that the UK Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth would deploy to the Indo-Pacific region in early 2021 and conduct training with Japan and the US.1 It is the first time in the eight years since the disaster relief operations for the Philippines affected by typhoon in November 2013, that a Royal Navy aircraft carrier will deploy to the region. It is highly possible that the UK would clarify its theatre-wide commitment to the Indo-Pacific through the deployment of a brand-new aircraft carrier. According to a previous study on the UK’s military involvement in the region, for example, in Southeast Asia, “the development of security from 2010 to 2015 is limited” and “in reality, they conducted a patchy dispatch of their vessels when required for humanitarian assistance and search and rescue”.2 However, the study overlooked that in the context of disaster relief and search and rescue of missing aircrafts, considerably substantial defence cooperation has been already promoted between Japan and the UK, resulting in a huge impact on Japan’s defense policy. Coincidently, the year of 2021 is also the 100th anniversary of the Washington Conference which decided to renounce the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, so it will be a good opportunity to look at Japan-UK defence cooperation.3 The Japan-UK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) came into effect on 1 January 2021.
    [Show full text]
  • Broadcast Bulletin Issue Number 86
    O fcom Broadcast Bulletin Issue number 86 4 June 2007 Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin 4 June 2007 Contents Introduction 3 Standards cases Notice of Sanction 4 In Breach 5 Not Upheld 10 Resolved 12 Fairness & Privacy cases Upheld 13 Not Upheld 14 Other programmes not in breach/outside remit 45 2 Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin 4 June 2007 Introduction Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code took effect on 25 July 2005 (with the exception of Rule 10.17 which came into effect on 1 July 2005). This Code is used to assess the compliance of all programmes broadcast on or after 25 July 2005. The Broadcasting Code can be found at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/bcode/ The Rules on the Amount and Distribution of Advertising (RADA) apply to advertising issues within Ofcom’s remit from 25 July 2005. The Rules can be found at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/advertising/#content From time to time adjudications relating to advertising content may appear in the Bulletin in relation to areas of advertising regulation which remain with Ofcom (including the application of statutory sanctions by Ofcom). 3 Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin 4 June 2007 Standards cases Notice of Sanction Channel Four Television Corporation (“Channel Four”) and Sianel Pedwar Cymru (“S4C”) Celebrity Big Brother (15-19 January 2007) On 24 May 2007, Ofcom published its decision to impose a statutory sanction on Channel Four and S4C for breaches of the rules of Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code concerning Rule 2.3 (broadcasters must when applying generally accepted standards ensure that material which may cause offence is justified by the context) and Rule 1.3 (children must be protected by appropriate scheduling from unsuitable material).
    [Show full text]
  • The Old Pangbournian Record Volume 2
    The Old Pangbournian Record Volume 2 Casualties in War 1917-2020 Collected and written by Robin Knight (56-61) The Old Pangbournian Society The Old angbournianP Record Volume 2 Casualties in War 1917-2020 Collected and written by Robin Knight (56-61) The Old Pangbournian Society First published in the UK 2020 The Old Pangbournian Society Copyright © 2020 The moral right of the Old Pangbournian Society to be identified as the compiler of this work is asserted in accordance with Section 77 of the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, “Beloved by many. stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any Death hides but it does not divide.” * means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior consent of the Old Pangbournian Society in writing. All photographs are from personal collections or publicly-available free sources. Back Cover: © Julie Halford – Keeper of Roll of Honour Fleet Air Arm, RNAS Yeovilton ISBN 978-095-6877-031 Papers used in this book are natural, renewable and recyclable products sourced from well-managed forests. Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro, designed and produced *from a headstone dedication to R.E.F. Howard (30-33) by NP Design & Print Ltd, Wallingford, U.K. Foreword In a global and total war such as 1939-45, one in Both were extremely impressive leaders, soldiers which our national survival was at stake, sacrifice and human beings. became commonplace, almost routine. Today, notwithstanding Covid-19, the scale of losses For anyone associated with Pangbourne, this endured in the World Wars of the 20th century is continued appetite and affinity for service is no almost incomprehensible.
    [Show full text]
  • Former HMS ILLUSTRIOUS Sales Summary
    This advert has closed and was archived 18 August 2016. For information on current or future sales of surplus Ministry of Defence equipment please visit: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/disposal-services-authority Disposal Ship: Former HMS ILLUSTRIOUS Sales Summary Ship or Vessel in Service Name: ILLUSTRIOUS R06 Dated: 08 Feb 2016. Where lying: PORTSMOUTH UK Picture for illustration only Contents Section 1 General particulars Hull and Structure Deck Gear Machinery and Systems Documentation Stability and Ballasting Section 2 Tank Contents Statement – to be forwarded Section 3 Inventory of Potential Hazardous Material on Board – to be forwarded General particulars Date and Place of Build Launched 01 Dec 1977:, Swan Hunters Wallsend UK Completed: 1982 Date ceased operational November 2014. service Type of Vessel CVS - Carrier Vertical Strike (Light aircraft carrier) Summary of condition Non-operational hulk in sound condition. Displacement in Tonnes Current Displacement: c17000 Estimated metal weight 9000 tonnes including machinery 1 DRSO 30/1/04 This advert has closed and was archived 18 August 2016. For information on current or future sales of surplus Ministry of Defence equipment please visit: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/disposal-services-authority Disposal Ship: Former HMS ILLUSTRIOUS Sales Summary Estimated metal % 95% steel Draughts Anticipate 5.2m fwd. 6.0m Mid. 6.2m aft. Prop 7.6m. Ship is upright. Length OA 211m. W/L 193m Beam Extreme 36m. Ex walkways 32m. W/L 27.53m OA height Mast-head to W/L 46m (estimated, at current draught) Last programmed Docking Mar -Nov 2010 Rosyth Repair and refit periods RP2-Full Refit 2002- 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • King's Research Portal
    King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1177/0968344517702417 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Benbow, T. (2019). The contribution of Royal Navy aircraft carriers and the Fleet Air Arm to Operation ‘Overlord’, 1944. War in History, 26(2), 265-286. https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344517702417 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • SUPPLEMENT -TO the of TUESDAY, the Loth of AUGUST, 1948
    ffhimb, 38377 4469 SUPPLEMENT -TO The Of TUESDAY, the loth of AUGUST, 1948 Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, n AUGUST, 1948 MEDITERRANEAN CONVOY OPERATIONS. OPERATION " EXCESS " 4. With regard to the dawn action reported in Enclosures Nos. 6 and 9,* it is thought that The following Despatch was submitted to the this must have been a chance encounter, as Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on so small an Italian force would hardly have the igth March, 1941 by Admiral Sir Andrew been sent unsupported to attack a heavily B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Comman- defended convoy. The heavy expenditure of der-in-Chi'ef, Mediterranean Station. ammunition by BON A VENTURE, largely in- Mediterranean, curred in an effort to sink a crippled ship, serves to emphasise the importance of using iqth March, 1941. the torpedo at close range on such occasions. 5. I fully concur with the remarks of the OPERATIONS M.C.4 AND M.C.6 Vice-Admiral, Light Forcesf concerning the towing of GALLANT by MOHAWK (Enclo- Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the sure No. i if), and consider that this was a enclosed reports on Operation M.C 4 (which in- most ably conducted operation. cluded Operation " Excess ") and Operation It cannot be satisfactorily determined M.C.6,* carried out between 6th and i8th whether GALLANT was mined or torpedoed, January, 1941. but the absence of tracks and failure by the 2. These operations marked the advent of enemy to claim her sinking lend probability the German Air Force in strength in the Medi- to the supposition that it was a mine.
    [Show full text]
  • Bravereport Issue 33
    Issue 33 Page !1 Brave Report ! A Fairey Swordfish similar to those used by Torrens- Spence NI Naval air ace’s lead role in sinking three battleships Northern Ireland - Service in the Royal Navy - In Remembrance Issue 33 Page !2 On the night of 11/11/1940, Michael Torrens- Spence DSO DSC DFC (Gr), piloted one of the 21 Swordfish "Stringbag" aircraft from the carrier Illustrious which flew off in two waves to mount one of the most daring naval air raids ever attempted. Two squadrons of Fleet Air Arm (FAA) torpedo- bombers from the aircraft-carrier HMS Illustrious – Nos 815 and 819 – and two from HMS Eagle – Nos 813 and 824 – attacked the Italian fleet as it lay at anchor in Taranto harbour. A total of 21 Fairey Swordfish aircraft took part in the operation, codenamed Judgement. All the planes flew from Illustrious since Eagle had been damaged in action off Calabria. # # The Swordfish flew off in two waves and achieved complete surprise. Three battleships, Conte di Cavour, Caio Duilio and Italia (previously Littorio) were sunk at their moorings. This reduced the battleship strength of the Regia Marina (the Italian Royal Navy) by half. Conte di Cavour was never to see action again although both Caio Duilio and Italia were raised and repaired. The survivors were transferred to less exposed bases which also reduced their effectiveness. A heavy cruiser, Trento, and some Northern Ireland - Service in the Royal Navy - In Remembrance Issue 33 Page !3 ! Captain Michael Torrens-Spence destroyers were also damaged as was the oil storage depot.
    [Show full text]
  • Op Patwin Part 2: HMS ILLUSTRIOUS' Medical Response To
    J Royal Naval Medical Service 2014, Vol 100.2 205 Operational Op Patwin Part 2: HMS Illustrious’ medical response to typhoon Haiyan Surg Cdr A Dew Abstract Operation PATWIN was the United Kingdom’s (UK) response to the disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan. The UK deployed a force including HMS DARING and HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and this article describes the medical response including the deployment of a Role 2 medical team and the hosting of a UK civilian medical team UK Med. The deployment followed humanitarian guidelines in UK doctrine and contained in the Oslo guidelines, but demonstrated a unique example of a civilian team supported by the military. Background Typhoon Op PATWIN was the UK military response to the disaster At 2040L on 7 Nov 13 Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as caused by Typhoon Haiyan. The UK deployed a force Yolanda) made landfall on the Philippine Islands; Haiyan was the strongest recorded at landfall and the deadliest including HMS DARING and HMS ILLUSTRIOUS to hit the Philippines with over 6,000 people killed (2). and this article is the second of two articles describing The typhoon followed a north-westerly course across the the Maritime contribution to OP PATWIN; the first was Philippines weakening slightly as it went. Its effect varied published in the previous issue of this journal (1). according to local conditions such as height above sea level and shelter from headland, but the greatest damage was HMS ILLUSTRIOUS (LUST) is a CVS (Carrier Vessel caused by the storm surge striking low-lying communities. Support) now re-roled as an LPH (Landing Platform Helicopter).
    [Show full text]
  • British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945 – 2010
    Corbett Paper No 9 British uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945 – 2010 Tim Benbow The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies March 2012 British uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships: 1945 – 2010 Tim Benbow Key Points . Recent British debates about defence policy and military capabilities have revealed a lack of understanding of the roles of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces. This paper provides a historical survey aiming to offer some empirical evidence to help correct this weakness. Aircraft carriers and amphibious forces have a repeatedly proven ability to conduct the more common smaller-scale operations alone or to act as the foundation enablers of rarer, larger-scale operations; they are particularly well suited to long- term engagement, crisis prevention, deterrence and early action that can make larger scale intervention unnecessary; and air bases and overflight rights have again and again proved unavailable or inadequate despite policy assumptions to the contrary. This survey shows the options and flexibility that carriers and amphibious ships have provided for policy makers over many years in just the sort of activities and operations that are likely to be required of the British armed forces in the future. Carriers and amphibious forces are not a strategic panacea and have limitations in their ability to dominate ground and in the scale of effort that they can take on without the backing of land-based forces. Nevertheless, they offer unique advantages and are essential for a viable British strategy. Dr Tim Benbow is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London, at the JSCSC.
    [Show full text]