Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations
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BULK METADATA COLLECTION: STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Professor Laura K. Donohue* Georgetown Law INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 2 I. BULK COLLECTION RUNS CONTRARY TO FISA’S GENERAL APPROACH ....................................... 6 A. PRIOR DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE ...................................................................................................................................... 6 1. NSA Programs ................................................................................................................................................................ 8 2. Broader Context ......................................................................................................................................................... 12 B. PROTECTIONS BUILT INTO FISA ................................................................................................................................... 16 1. Entity Targeted Prior to Acquisition ................................................................................................................ 17 2. Probable Cause and Showing of Criminal Wrongdoing Prior to Collection .................................... 18 3. Minimization Procedures for Acquisition and Retention ........................................................................ 21 4. Establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review ................... 22 C. SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT ............................................................................................................................................. 23 1. Physical Search, Pen/Trap .................................................................................................................................... 23 2. Business Records, Tangible Goods, and Section 215 .................................................................................. 25 D. BROAD SURVEILLANCE IN PLACE OF PARTICULARIZATION ........................................................................................ 29 1. Wholesale Collection of Information ................................................................................................................ 29 2. No Prior Targeting ................................................................................................................................................... 30 3. No Higher Threshold for U.S. Persons ............................................................................................................... 30 E. ROLE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ALTERED ................................................................. 31 1. Reliance on NSA to Ascertain Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion ........................................................ 31 2. Issuance of Detailed Legal Reasoning and Creation of Precedent ....................................................... 40 3. Judicial Design ............................................................................................................................................................ 42 II. BULK COLLECTION VIOLATES FISA’S STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................................................ 48 A. “RELEVANT TO AN AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATION” ...................................................................................................... 49 1. Relevance Standard .................................................................................................................................................. 50 2. Connection to “an Authorized Investigation” ............................................................................................... 52 B. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ............................................................................................................................................... 57 1. Not for Fishing Expeditions ................................................................................................................................... 59 2. Specificity ...................................................................................................................................................................... 60 3. Past Crimes ................................................................................................................................................................... 60 4. March 2009 FISC Opinion ...................................................................................................................................... 60 C. EVISCERATION OF PEN/TRAP PROVISIONS .................................................................................................................. 61 D. POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW ......................................................................... 62 III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................. 64 A. THE PROBLEM WITH SMITH V. MARYLAND ................................................................................................................... 65 B. MORE INTRUSIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PRIVACY ......................................................................... 69 C. JUDICIAL TENSION: TRESPASS AND KATZ’S REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY ............................................. 71 1. The Prohibition on General Warrants ............................................................................................................. 71 2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test .......................................................................................................... 77 D. THE PROVERBIAL NEEDLE IN THE HAYSTACK ............................................................................................................. 82 IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................................................................... 84 * Professor of Law, Georgetown Law. Special thanks to George Jameson and Allegra MacLeod for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This Article is forthcoming in the HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2014). See also Laura K. Donohue, Written Testimony, Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 2, 2013 (providing an earlier iteration of this Article). 1 INTRODUCTION On May 24, 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved an FBI application for an order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1861, requiring Verizon to turn over all telephony metadata to the National Security Agency.1 The Court approved similar applications for all major U.S. telecommunication service providers. Over the next seven years, FISC issued orders renewing the bulk collection program thirty-four times.2 Almost all of the information obtained related to the activities of law-abiding persons who were not the subjects of any investigation.3 This program remained secret until mid-2013, when a combination of leaks by Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency employee, and Freedom of Information Act litigation launched by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, forced key documents into the public domain.4 In response, the Obama Administration issued statements, fact sheets, redacted FISC opinions, and even a White Paper, acknowledging the existence of the program and arguing that it is both legal and Constitutional. According to these documents, the purpose of the telephony metadata program is to collect information related to counterterrorism and foreign intelligence.5 The data includes all communications routing information, including (but not limited to) session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, identity of the communications device, etc.), trunk identifier, and time and duration of the call.6 The metadata collected as part of this program does not include the substantive content of communications, nor does it include subscribers’ names, addresses, or financial information.7 1 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06- 05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf (released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s FOIA litigation). Note that the specific telecommunications company from which such records were sought were redacted, as well as the remaining title; however, the government also released an NSA report that provided more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.p df. For purposes of a more precise citation, I draw from both sources. 2 Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211- administration-white-paper-section-215.html [hereinafter “Section 215 White