Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats
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Electric Grid Security and Resilience Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats June 2016 Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats Disclaimer This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States and Canadian governments nor any agencies thereof, nor any of their employees, make any warranty, express or implied; or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed; or represent that its use would not infringe on privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States and Canadian governments or any agencies thereof. The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States and Canadian governments or any agencies thereof. Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats Table of Contents Executive Summary ___________________________________________________________ 1 1. Overview _______________________________________________________________ 6 1.2.1. Changes impacting the grid and its components, assets, and systems 7 1.2.2. Increasing sophistication in threats 10 1.2.3. Representative grid security efforts 11 1.2.4. Implications 13 2. Analysis of Incidents ____________________________________________________ 14 2.1.1. Overview 14 2.1.2. Selected events 14 2.2.1. Overview 17 2.2.2. Selected events 18 3. Physical Threats and Vulnerabilities _______________________________________ 21 3.3.1. Social media and new technologies are increasing the potential for security events 23 3.3.2. ICT infrastructure embedded in the grid 24 3.3.3. Increased awareness of insider threats 24 3.3.4. Unwitting insider threats 25 Table of Contents 3.3.5. Increased concerns about electromagnetic pulse events 25 3.3.6. Natural hazards and high-impact/low-frequency events as surrogates for threats 25 3.4.1. Grid asset and system vulnerabilities 26 3.4.2. Increased importance of understanding dependencies and interdependencies 27 3.4.3. System design issues 27 3.4.4. Institutional issues 28 3.5.1. Intelligence 29 3.5.2. Risk mitigation and protection measures 30 4. Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities _________________________________________ 36 4.1.1. Sources of threats 36 4.1.2. Trends for cyber threats 38 4.2.1. Critical assets 39 4.2.2. Supply chains 43 4.2.3. System configuration and within-system interdependencies 43 4.2.4. Institutional issues 44 i Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats 4.3.1. Intelligence 45 4.3.2. Information sharing 46 4.3.3. National coordination structures 47 4.3.4. Risk mitigation 48 4.3.5. Protection 50 5. Consequences _________________________________________________________ 52 6. Response and Recovery _________________________________________________ 56 6.1.1. Immediate identification, investigation, and action 57 6.1.2. Investigation 59 6.1.3. National response efforts 59 6.2.1. Technical strategies for an efficient recovery 64 6.2.2. Institutional strategies supporting an effective recovery 65 7. Roles and Responsibilities in North America __________________________________ 66 7.1.1. U.S. Department of Energy 67 7.1.2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security 69 7.1.3. U.S. Department of Justice 70 7.1.4. Other U.S. Departments and Agencies 71 7.2.1. Natural Resources Canada 72 7.2.2. Public Safety Canada 73 7.2.3. Canadian Security Intelligence Service 73 Table of Contents 7.2.4. Royal Canadian Mounted Police 73 7.2.5. Defence Research and Development Canada 74 7.2.6. Canadian National Energy Board 74 7.2.7. Canadian Department of Justice 74 7.3.1. State entities 74 7.3.2. Provincial entities 77 7.4.1. North American Electric Reliability Corporation 78 7.4.2. Information sharing and coordination 78 8. Financial and Insurance Incentives ________________________________________ 81 8.1.1. Insurance for electric grid security 81 8.2.1. Federal Terrorism Insurance Program 83 8.2.2. FERC rate recovery 83 8.2.3. FERC enforcement of reliability standards 83 ii Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats 9. Issues Specific to North American Grid Security _____________________________ 88 10. Lessons Learned From Other Nations and Events ____________________________ 91 11. Conclusions and Next Steps ______________________________________________ 96 Acronyms __________________________________________________________________ 99 Appendix A: Government and Industry Actions ___________________________________ A-1 Appendix B: Privacy and Cybersecurity _________________________________________ B-1 B.1.1. Smart meters B-1 B.1.2 Smart meter data management B-3 B.2.1. Federal B-3 B.2.2. State B-5 Appendix C: Endnotes ______________________________________________________ C-1 List of Tables Table of Contents Table 1: Potential Adversarial/Human-Caused Security Events .................................................... 22 Table 2: Future Trends and Their Likely Impacts on Physical Security ......................................... 34 Table 3: ESF #12 Core Capabilities ............................................................................................... 60 Table A-1: Listing of Major Efforts ................................................................................................ A-1 Table A-2: DOE Projects Addressing the Grid Security Strategy Elements ................................ A-4 List of Figures Figure 1: Past, Present, and Future of the Electric Grid .................................................................. 8 Figure 2: Twelve-Month Timeline of Significant Events (2013–2014) ........................................... 15 Figure 3: Illustrative Restoration Process ...................................................................................... 63 iii Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats Executive Summary Purpose This report provides an overview of the current state of the security and resilience of the entire U.S./Canadian electric grid (the bulk electric system, as well as intermediate and smaller voltage systems attached to the grid) through data and information from publicly available sources to assist policy and decision makers. The focus is on security and resilience in the context of adversarial threats, not natural hazards, technological accidents, aging infrastructure, changes in capacity and demand, climate change, or any of the other important aspects of maintaining a reliable grid and ensuring national/state/local security, public health and safety, and economic stability now and in the future. The state of the security of the integrated U.S. and Canadian electric grid is dynamic, with new threats and hazards emerging even as we prevent, protect against, or minimize the impacts of known threats and hazards, and improve our ability to respond to, and recover from, incidents that occur. Technological advancements within the grid improve reliability and capacity, but can introduce new vulnerabilities in cases where additional means of remote access are added or where redundancy is reduced. Other advancements may reduce inherent vulnerabilities in design or remove the potential for human errors. At the same time, the dependence of the public, business, government, schools, hospitals, and other critical infrastructure on reliable and secure electricity continues to grow, increasing overall sensitivity to the impacts of outages and disruptions, regardless of the cause. Ensuring the security and resilience of the electric grid is critical to both the owners and operators of infrastructure, as well as government authorities. Executive Summary This report supports the prioritization of next steps in line with the roles and responsibilities of each of the concerned parties: additional research and development of new cyber and physical technology solutions, upgrading of existing systems, and so forth. This report also helps identify and connect key partners in their efforts to manage and improve security and resilience, crossing national and jurisdictional boundaries, just as the grid itself does. This interconnectedness is part of what makes securing the grid so important. Content Section 1 – Overview outlines the purpose of the report and the importance of securing the grid, and provides background information on the evolution of the grid, as well as the trends and challenges that are shaping the security needs of the grid. The report then reviews some of the overall experience with both physical security and cybersecurity events, and the lessons learned from them in Section 2 – Analysis of Incidents. Section 3 – Physical Threats and Vulnerabilities and Section 4 – Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities both examine the range of threats to the grid, the sources of threats, current trends, vulnerabilities, and some of the mitigation measures and protection strategies that are being implemented to address threats and vulnerabilities. Physical 1 Electric Grid Security and Resilience | Establishing a Baseline for Adversarial Threats and cyber issues are addressed separately; just as physical and cyber threats and vulnerabilities are very different,