Ricœur's Narrative Theory Applied to Science

Chapter 4 The Universality of Hermeneutic and Narrative Experience: Ricœur’s Narrative Theory Applied to Science

1 Introduction

In this chapter, the significance of hermeneutics for both natural sciences and the humanities will be emphasized. Mary Hesse (1980) points to two reasons for placing hermeneutics as a more important factor in relation to natural sciences than it has previously seemed to be. First, it indicates that it is impos- sible to make a distinction between the mode of knowledge connected to one’s self-understanding in studying the theory of evolution, ecology, or genetics. This means that human values shall be included in the applications of such theories and also that the categories of these theories, such as functionality, selection, and survival, have been conditioned by a man’s comprehension of himself. Second, theories have always represented a part of the internal com- munication system in a particular society. In this case, even the comprehension of nature has been formulated by human meanings. The main distinction between natural sciences and the humanities in the history of science was based on the distinction between explanation (Erk- lären) and understanding (Verstehen). This relationship often reflected the relationship between the natural sciences and the humanities in the history of science. This distinction emphasizes the difference between natural and social phenomena and implies the existence of binary oppositions in science, such as natural/social, objective/subjective, fixed/constructed.

2 Explanation and Understanding in the History of Science and Philosophy

Three main approaches to the relation between the natural sciences and the humanities can be identified in the history of philosophy. The first approach is methodological monism, which is based on the idea that the method employed in natural sciences (mathematical exactitude) is an ideal that should be applied to all sciences, even the humanities. The proponents of methodological

62 Chapter 4 monism emphasize the unity of the scientific method. Those were the ideas of the proponents of positivism and logical positivism. Positivism was founded by Auguste Comte in the first half of the nineteenth century. Its main characteristic is methodological monism. The proponents of positivism discuss the universality of the method employed in the natural sciences and claim that this method should be applied to the humanities as well. The philosophers and historians who accept this idea argue for the unity of scientific method. This idea has been represented by John Stuart Mill, Henry Thomas Buckle, and others. They ignore the subjective experience and define scientific explanation as causal explanation. While the logical positivism of the 1920s and 1930s (analytic philosophy) advocates different ideas from those advocated by positivism, it has generally been developed within the spirit of positivism. Prominent proponents of ana- lytical philosophy include Alfred Jules Ayer, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgen- stein (in his earlier works), Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, and Peter Strawson. They argue that the whole human knowledge can be reduced to logical or scientific explanations. They also argue for the elimination of metaphysics and subjective experience and advocate methodological monism. The second approach to the relation between the natural sciences and the humanities is anti-positivism, founded on the idea that the natural and human sciences represent two spheres of reality, and, thus, employ different methods in exploring reality. This group includes Johann Gustav Droysen, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband. The proponents of this standpoint emphasize the difference between the natural and human sciences and reject the idea of methodological monism. Wilhelm Dilthey (1966) makes a distinction between the methods employed in the natural sciences and the humanities. He argues that explanation is the fundamen- tal method that is employed in the natural sciences, while understanding is the basic method employed in the human sciences.1 Dilthey argues that a scientist explains a particular event by causal relations, whereas a historian attempts to understand the meaning of the particular event. He states that human sciences are founded on human experience and understanding. Dilthey asserts that understanding transcends into familiar life expressions through a trans- position emerging from the fullness of one’s own experiences. On the other hand, the method employed in the natural sciences consists of hypothetical

1 Droysen was the first philosopher to introduce the difference between the methods employed in natural sciences, on the one hand, and in the humanities, on the other hand. In his 1868 Grundriss der Historik, he argues that the main goal of the natural sciences is to explain, while the aim of the humanities is to understand.