The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: a Public Interest Perspective

City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Publications and Research Queens College 2009 The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: A Public Interest Perspective Matthew Crain CUNY Queens College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/qc_pubs/171 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] International Journal of Communication 2 (2009), 208-239 1932-8036/20090208 The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: ▫ A Public Interest Perspective MATTHEW CRAIN University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign This article examines the logic, scope, and implications of the influx of private equity takeovers in the United States media sector in the last decade. The strategies and aims of private equity firms are explained in the context of the financial landscape that has allowed them to flourish; their aggressive expansion into media ownership is outlined in detail. Particular attention is paid to the public interest concerns raised by private equity media ownership relating to the frenzied nature of the buyout market, profit maximization strategies, and the heavy debt burdens imposed on acquired firms. The article concludes with discussion of the challenges posed by private equity to effective media regulation and comparison of private equity and corporate media ownership models. The media sector in the United States is deeply and historically rooted in the capitalist system of private ownership. The structures and demands of private ownership foundationally influence the management and operation of media firms, which must necessarily serve the ultimate end of profitability within such a system. The staggering levels of concentration and corporatization in media ownership in the United States are well documented and the resulting threats to media institutions’ conventional public interest obligations have been outlined in detail (Arsenault & Castells, 2008; Bagdikian, 1983, 2004; McChesney, 1999, 2004). Hypercommercialism, decreasing localism, lack of diversity, and disempowered and ineffectual journalism are among the most severe social symptoms of the corporate media system. Existing scholarship has largely focused on the extent and ramifications of corporate media ownership. Much less is known about large-scale media ownership by institutions outside of the corporate oligopoly, yet the last decade has been marked by an influx of investment in the U.S. media sector by non-corporate financial institutions. Specifically, elite private equity investment firms have ramped up ▫ The author wishes to thank John Nerone and the editors and reviewers of IJoC for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Matthew Crain: [email protected] Date submitted: 2008-07-21 Copyright © 2009 (Matthew Crain). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org. International Journal of Communication 2 (2009) Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership 209 acquisitions of publicly traded media companies via complex financial maneuvers known as leveraged buyouts (LBOs). The LBO strategy is to employ debt financing to assume control of undervalued firms, restructure them to maximize efficiency, and then exit the investments by selling the streamlined properties at high profit margins. Often, the firms targeted in these deals assume heavy debt burdens and undergo considerable organizational restructuring as part of the process. This trend in media ownership correlates with a larger rise of private equity activity in the economy as a whole since the turn of the century, which itself can be contextualized as a component of the increased prominence of organized finance capital within evolving neoliberal capitalism. The term “finance capital” is employed here, as characterized by Dumenil and Levy (2004), to indicate the elite class of investors and financial institutions that are “major owners . free from direct management but often still active in the institutions that come to embody ownership” (p. 208). Finance capital employs investment resources to maximize accumulation via instruments and markets that are detached from the actual production of goods and services. In basic terms, finance capital creates wealth by its own devices, making money from money rather than from direct investment in production. The principle focus of this article is to outline the implications of private equity ownership for a democratic media system already in crisis (McChesney, 2008, p. 117). If financial investment is a “substitute for real investment and is harmful to it” (Dumenil & Levy, 2004, p. 119), then private equity ownership exacerbates the ongoing evisceration of our media institutions. Much of the analysis presented here deals with economic and structural aspects of private equity firms and their ownership of media companies; however, the larger argument relates to normative considerations regarding the function of media within a democratic system of governance. As McChesney (2008) notes, critical examination of structures and institutions is only part of the task of political economic media analysis, which must also consider how “the media system as a whole interacts with broad social and economic relations in society” (p. 151). Baker (2002, p. 126) points out that any assessment of media’s service to a democratic system of governance first requires a theory of democracy itself. His concept of “complex democracy” incorporates both “pluralist” commitments to creating fair compromises among interest groups and “republican” devotion to the discursive formation of the common good. In order to forge public opinion and communicate public will to power, complex democracy requires a multitude of viable public spheres of which the media system is a core institutional component. The historic role of the press as the “fourth estate” encompasses providing checks against the abuse of governmental (and private) power and disseminating to the public informed opinions about the issues of the day, but it can only fulfill this role if it is incorporated into a larger media system that supports these democratic ideals. “For this reason,” writes Baker (2007), “a country is democratic only to the extent that the media . are structurally egalitarian and politically salient” (p. 7). This article examines, in four parts, the intersection of finance capital, media, and democracy through the lens of private equity takeovers in the media sector. The first section examines the structure and strategic initiatives of private equity firms, focusing on the leveraged buyout, public-to-private acquisitions, and the short-term investment cycle. The second provides a financial contextualization of the 210 Matthew Crain International Journal of Communication 2(2009) rise of private equity in the larger United States economy. The third section chronicles private equity’s incursion into the media sector, primarily focusing on the pervasive buyout activity in the broadcasting, newspaper and publishing, and cinema industries. Takeovers in music publishing, video game publishing, digital media, telecommunications, and cable are summarized. The final segment addresses public interest concerns raised by private equity media ownership, including problems associated with inflated acquisition prices and over-leveraging, qualitative changes to media firms resulting from profit maximization strategies, and regulatory issues related to the institutional composition of private equity firms and the Federal Communications Commission’s resistance to more closely examine private equity takeovers. Illuminating Private Equity The world of private equity investment is a specialized and fairly restricted realm of knowledge. While the term itself may bear a certain degree of familiarity, what these companies actually do is, to a considerable extent, obscured from public view. Fundamentally, private equity firms are exclusive high- stakes investment groups that manage and deploy massive amounts of private capital. Investment minimums are typically set in terms of millions of dollars, which has the dual effect of creating immense blocks of mobile capital while also limiting investment opportunities to elite groups of ultra-wealthy individuals and large institutional investors such as insurance groups, pension funds, and university endowments. Private equity funds are not openly traded in any public stock exchange system and therefore face considerably less regulatory oversight from institutions such as the Securities and Exchange Commission than their publicly traded counterparts. Bypassing Wall Street, private equity investors enter into limited partnerships in which their capital is managed by private equity firm executives (often investors themselves) for a fixed period, usually between five and 10 years. Once a fund has reached maturity, investors are repaid their investment principles, plus or minus any gains or losses. Commonly, investors and fund managers receive dividends throughout the investment phase. Additionally, general partners typically assess investment management fees, as would a brokerage firm managing investments on a public stock exchange. Private equity investment is characterized by high levels of both risk and profitability and, as in the stock market, there are no guaranteed returns

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