Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007

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Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 Inter-agency Mission to Birao (CAR) 16 to 23 January 2007 1. This preliminary short report will cover the first leg of this mission, which left Bangui on 16 January and arrived in Birao on 23 January. A second leg covers the return from Birao to Bangui and is still ongoing. The list of the participating Agencies to the first leg included BONUCA (Human Rights Section), FAO (Food security), HCR (Protection), UNFPA (SGBV), WHO (Health) and were accompanied by DSS, IRIN and OCHA, which organized and led the mission. Although several sectors were represented, the mission paid specific attention to protection issues in order to develop a stronger strategy in this specific sector. A sectoral report will be produced by each participating agency. This report was prepared by an OCHA staff member on mission to CAR. I Route of the mission 2. The following route was used: Bangui, Sibut, Kaga Bandoro (day 1), Ouandago and return to Kaga Bandoro (day 2), Ndele (day 3), Gunda (day 4), Gordil (day 5), Tiringula, Boromata (day 6) and Birao (day 7). The itinerary crossed areas beyond the control of the government and required specific contacts to ensure the safety of the members of the mission. Local authorities were kept fully informed of our movement (Ordre de mission signed by Gendarmerie) and even advised the mission on the most suitable routes for vehicles in areas they no longer controlled. OCHA Central African Republic 1 Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 II Objectives of the inter-agency mission 3. The objectives of the mission were two-fold: assess the humanitarian needs of the civilian population in the frontline zones and secure an access through rebel held territories in the North East to assist the civilian population if required. This second objective also carried a strong message for the population living in Bamingui Bangoran and Vakaga “prefectures”, neglected over the past years on the basis of being sparsely populated. III Security 4. For safety reasons, the mission had to establish contact with several interlocutors who would be on the road prior to departure. From Gordil to Boromata, the mission was accompanied by one car in order to show the way (routes were often non existent). Reportedly, roads had to be “opened” for the mission, although no mines or mine injuries were ever reported in the region. UFDR has accompanied the mission on this stretch of the trip. However they stressed that after this first mission, forces would be used to the presence of UN humanitarians in this area and their accompanying movements would not be required any longer. The use of “pisteur” will however be highly recommended for missions in this area in the future (tracks being often washed away), unless our drivers will feel sufficiently comfortable to find their ways. 5. Fuel is not available on the way and the necessary arrangements must be made to cover the distance from Bangui. During the whole trip, no radio contact could be established with Bangui and this issue is now being resolved. OCHA Dakar has followed the mission part of the way and Thurayas were our means of communication with Bangui. Iridium system used by DSS was not functional part of the way. IV Context 6. The country suffers from three layers of violence. A tradition of “coupeurs de routes” (highway men) threatens the movement of persons and goods in governmental held areas in the west, an insurgency based around Paoua area (APRD) destabilizes the North and a more structured armed group (UFDR) attacked several cities in the east before being stopped by military intervention. The mission essentially witnessed the dire consequences of the violence in the east of the country. More scarcely populated than the rest of the country, this eastern part has, according to several civilians interviewed, been neglected since the end of Bokassa’s era. The grievances expressed referred to a lack of public services going back to several years. In Boromata for instance, schools and health posts had been closed 5 years ago. In several of the villages crossed during the trip between Boromata and Birao, schools had only their structures remaining, walls were removed. Not a single sign of a UN project has been seen over 680 km between Kaga Bandoro and Birao, including in more populated areas such as Ndele. 7. Resentment was expressed by both combatants and civilians against the French presence in the area. The civilians were particularly scared by alleged low altitude village over flights of Jaguar fighter planes. This was repeated in several interviews held without any military presence in several villages along the stretch between Gordil and Boromata. The villagers also informed the mission that it was one of the reasons OCHA Central African Republic 2 Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 why they did not dare to return to their homes and preferred to stay in the bush. It is important to underline that the mission witnessed no such flights. 8. In Ndele, the mayor ad interim and the Gendarmerie Commander were very cooperative and helpful in advising the mission on distances and routes to follow to Birao. The open discussions we had with these authorities, corroborated by those with the priest of the Mission, led the team to believe that a successful crossing to Birao would strongly contribute to diffuse the tension within the population in Ndele. Those remaining in town did not actually know whether to flee or stay. The return of our convoy through Ndele would have carried a disastrous message. V Route narrative 5.1 Kaga Bandoro-Ouandago 9. The situation continues to be as bad as ever. In town, the inter-agency mission had a meeting with the préfet who alleged he could not maintain law and order, especially over what appears to be FACA and GP. He confirmed the summary execution on 5th January of two youngsters suspected to be insurgents in the centre of the market of Kaga Bandoro. The summary execution took place in front of the population and the FACA paraded over the bodies, taking pictures. The bodies remained on the ground until the Red Cross came to retrieve them several hours later. Kids on their way back from school saw the bodies and were shocked. According to the préfet, no judiciary action has bee initiated for fear of being threatened or killed. The two victims were aged 27 and 22, were from Kaga Bandoro and the prefet recognized that their affiliation with the rebellion was not established. A FOMUC officer reportedly witnessed the execution on his way to the airport and had a tense discussion with the FACA officer in charge of the shooting squad. Insurgents (incl. child soldiers) guarding the entrance to their territory. 10. Elements wearing FACA uniforms walk in town armed, often in civilian clothes and without control, a behaviour, which led to another tragedy the evening of our arrival (16 January) when a drunken soldier unintentionally discharged his gun and wounded a OCHA Central African Republic 3 Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 young student, who died from his wounds later in the night. The soldier was arrested and reportedly transferred to Bangui. Destroyed settlement north of Kaga-Bandoro. 11. According to civilians and village chiefs interviewed on the way between Kaga Bandoro and Ouandago on 17 January, some 2,000 houses have been burnt since the insurgency started, leaving an estimated number of 10,000 civilians without shelter and essentially depending on distribution made by humanitarians. Usually, the forces shoot in the air to scare the population, houses once empty are looted, and the forces then set the village ablaze. All burnt houses are visibly empty and no charred items can be found. The loot is loaded in trucks and brought back to the base according to several interviews conducted with victims. This pattern is similar to Darfur although it could be argued that the intentions are different. Villagers who abandoned their houses and took refuge in the bush. OCHA Central African Republic 4 Inter-Agency Mission to Birao (CAR), 12 to 23 January 2007 12. When asked how to rate their needs, the persons we discussed with mentioned as primary concern the lack of security, the lack medical care, difficult conditions in the bush because of the cold, lack of education and danger to access the town for economic exchange. In the near future, insufficient reserves of seeds and limited supplies of tools will become a serious issue since many crops were destroyed during the fighting and granaries set afire. In terms of conflict mitigation, village chiefs declared they tried to convince the rebels to avoid coming to their villages for fear of reprisal by FACA, with limited success. Villagers who abandoned their houses and took refuge in the bush. 5.2 Ndele (200 km from Kaga Bandoro, 5,223 before the events) 13. A third of the residents are reportedly back in town. The first discussion held by the inter-agency mission in Ndele took place with the acting préfet and the Sultan’s senior adviser, in the absence of the Sultan himself. Other authorities were also briefed on our mission (CC, FACA Commander who just escaped from a mutiny and Police judiciaire). The city is beyond the last frontier. The hospital is not functional (no consultation on 19 January), the market is open a couple of hours only and the evident signs of the attack still remain visible. Soldiers wearing civilian clothes walk around in the streets without any purpose, drinking what is left or available in town.
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