Architecture in the Era of Terror: the Security Dilemma

Safety and Security Engineering 805

Architecture in the era of terror: the security dilemma

G. Zilbershtein Department of Architecture, Texas A&M University, U.S.A.

Abstract

The growing public concern over the proliferation of terrorism has made protection of the physical environment of potential targets and terror interdiction a salient issue. The objective to secure the built environment against terrorism introduces a complex dilemma. At one level, the extent of investments in security in terms of cost-effectiveness is not proportional to the relatively rare threat of terrorism. Another level of the dilemma is rooted in the complex psychological implications of using security measures, that is, how to physically secure a building, while psychologically deter potential terrorists; more importantly is the question of how to accomplish those and yet not scare the users, i.e., the public. The latter part of the dilemma has been relatively ignored in the analysis of architectural measures against terrorism. And since catering to the psychological comfort of the users of the built environment has always been one of the greatest challenges of architecture, this paper focuses on that portion of the security dilemma of terrorism. Specifically, the study examines the threat characteristics and analyzes design recommendations that address the threat of terror for their contribution to the psychological comfort of the end users. Keywords: architecture, built environment, terrorism, risk assessment, security perception, security measures, design recommendations.

1 Introduction

The post–cold war, as defined by John Lewis Gaddis [1], began with the collapse of one structure, the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, and ended with the collapse of another, the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Paul Bracken [2] describes this new age as the era of “think the unthinkable”, as it has become a common term in thinking of our life in a terror stricken environment.

How far should society, and designers of environments, take this slogan? How do we assess the risks and accommodate our design approach to it, when the entire concept of buildings as our shelters is questioned? How can design deal/work against the physical and the psychological threats of terror? Launching the discussion, we need to consider what terrorism is, and what measures are taken to counter this threat. While there is no single, universally accepted, definition to terrorism and whether it is perceived as a righteous fight for a higher cause, or as an unlawful horrible act, according to all, it is associated with the “use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof” [3]. Counter-terrorism includes operations on different levels. Central to this paper that focuses on the built environment as it relates to the threat of terror, are efforts to secure potential targets and threat interdiction. These correspond to one of the greatest challenges of the design realm: to provide the users of the built environment with physically and psychologically comfortable designs [6, 7, 8]. The two aspects of comfort are inherently associated with security [8]. Consequently, this paper provides a first step towards a better understanding of the nexus: terrorism threat - physical environment - users of the environment. This is accomplished through a rational assessment of risks; and a review of existing counter-terrorism design policies/measures to physically secure a place, while analysing their relevance to the psychological comfort of the end users.

2 Assessing the risk

2.1 General

Fulfilling the architecture profession’s objective to protect people and property from various offenses requires a development of an introspective definition of specific security needs. Many sources refer to the analysis by which security needs are defined as a risk assessment. Risk assessment examines the consequences of hostile actions for a building and its occupants. It consists of: (1) threat analysis which defines the level of threat to a facility by evaluating the intent, motivation, and possible tactics of potential offenders; (2) asset analysis that identifies and prioritizes the asset to be protected according to its nature, value, location and how, when, and by whom it is accessed and used; (3) vulnerability analysis which defines the weaknesses of a facility in its design, construction, operation and location [9]. Over the years, computer applications have been integrated into the risk assessment analysis (e.g., CAPIndex). Such applications calculate probability assessment as related to statistics of specific categories of crime, based on location and use of the architectural item [10].

2.2 The risk of terrorism

In the case of terrorism, assessment of risk is an intricate matter. While it seems that the media covers terror attacks around the globe on a daily basis, the actual number of occurrences is too limited to reach a significant numerical probability

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) Safety and Security Engineering 807 for a place [10]. Inevitably, current statistics of terrorism patterns are only supporters to theoretical risk assessment endeavors. A theoretical testing of the three basic components of terrorism risk assessment is presented.

2.2.1 Threat analysis Many sources present different views on terrorists’ motivation. It is not for this paper to speculate or judge whether terrorism is means to an end, utilized for achieving other political, social or religious goals [5], or whether it has become “the end in itself” [3]. The discussion however, does point out two main issues. First, as recognized by many around the world, terrorism is associated with fear or instigation of it. Empirical evidence attests that terrorism is one of the most dreaded man-made hazards [11]. Second, the lethality of terrorism attacks has grown. Statistics from the last 20 years show that while the number of attacks decreased over the years, they have become more lethal [4, 12]. Terrorism can be manifested in different forms: assassination, armed assault, hijacking, hostage-taking, bombings, product or air contamination and cyber- terrorism [5, 12]. Many of these involve the incursion of armed terrorists into a target. Most common terrorism acts are bombings [13]. These involve the use of explosives that are relatively easy to obtain, or by utilizing whatever destructive means are available as incendiary devices (e.g., using airplanes as missiles in September 11) [13, 14]. Besides being destructive, and relatively easy to carry through, bombing events also appeal to terrorists due to their theatrical nature. The extensive media coverage of events with bleeding casualties and severely damaged environments serves two interrelated purposes: demonstrating power over authorities and inducing fear in the population [14]. Despite of past tendencies to use conventional weapons [12], the risks of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attacks are not to be dismissed [4, 14]. Multiple simultaneous attacks or sequential attacks in a concentrated area also need to be addressed. Another factor to consider is the growing number of suicide missions [12, 14]. This may have an impact on tactics of defense in the built environment. Theories such as defensible space, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, CPTED [15, 16, 17], were developed to address threats of conventional crime. These theories, which rely on deterrence by raising the probability of perpetrator to be caught in action, need to be re-evaluated as terrorists may not fear death. Moreover, even if terrorists are prevented from reaching their ultimate target, the space where they are stopped may suffer the hit.

2.2.2 Asset analysis It is almost impossible to develop a comprehensive list of potential terrorism targets, as in today’s urban environment target selection is nearly unlimited. Yet, the presumed intention of terrorism to maximize destruction suggests traits of possible targets: facilities which possess symbolic value, those that if damaged would provoke anxiety/fear among the population, would disturb the economy, or infrastructure; and those which offer the possibility of a Mass Casualty Incident – MCI [5, 18, 19]. Using September 11 terrorist attacks in the US as a case study, we find that the target fits most of these traits: devastating damage to the physical environment and to human lives in a place of symbolic and

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 808 Safety and Security Engineering economic significance. However, sources contend that despite that attack fear does not dominate Americans’ lives -- people feel comfortable and safe enough to continue everyday activities without much consideration of possible terrorist attacks [20]. The terrorists’ failure in that respect may suggest that in the future, terrorist organizations will attempt to hit places where every American may happen to be during daily activities. The latter assumption is supported by what has been the case in other parts of the world (e.g., in Europe, in the Middle East). Consequently, most probable future targets are places which present opportunity of MCI and great destruction and harm, and those that inhabit daily activities, which when hit can provoke anxiety/fear all over the country, e.g., sports venues, transportation facilities, concert halls, shopping centers, amusement parks.

2.2.3 Vulnerability analysis A recent report elaborates on the estimation of a building’s vulnerabilities to a terror attack [19]. According to this report, such estimation should include operational, structural and contextual considerations. While the latter relates to the general level of alert in a certain area or country, as well as to a facility’s proximity to other likely targets, the first two considerations relate to aspects of the physical design of a space that can hinder or assist penetration of terrorists, explosives or other hazardous materials into the heart of a facility. Operational vulnerabilities address the function of a building and “operational conditions, such as fire drills, emergency response training, building entry procedures and practices” [19]. In facilities that provide services to the general public, probable targets of terrorism, all operational procedures are problematic, particularly secured entries. Some facilities offer opportunities to develop meticulous check points, as they require a permit to enter (e.g., performing/movie theatres, museums, sports venues). Those which do not (e.g., government facilities, healthcare facilities, some transportation terminals, stores/shopping malls) “cannot be hardened easily, since hardening them would be against their primary users - the public” [18]. Structural vulnerabilities consist of “anything intrinsic” to the structure that “could be exploited by a potential terrorist to produce damage to the building and/or its occupants”, such as limitations of the “structure to withstand the blast of bombs of different sizes placed in different locations in and around the building”; fire suppression capabilities based on hardware and practices (e.g., fire doors, movement restrictions); air ducts design [19].

3 Addressing the threat

3.1 General

In the US, the main objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” [21, 22]. In spite of the relative simplicity of this statement, addressing the threat of terrorism encompasses variety of operations on different

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) Safety and Security Engineering 809 levels. In order to deal with the complexity of the matter, the US strategy for countering terrorism is based on establishment of priorities [22]. In the same light, the use of physical measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, including elements of structural hardening, operational protection, intelligence and even deception [14], requires rational prioritization. The salience of this requirement is highlighted when we consider questions of cost, i.e., the level of investment vs. the probable consequences. Relevant sources take upon mostly the points of view of the potential adversary (assessing tactics and goals) and of the building owner or permanent occupants (addressing issues such as insurance premium, life cycle costs, potential losses) [14, 23]. Yet, a third side to this problem needs to be considered, especially when it comes to facilities of public nature: the perspective of the users of the facilities. When we consider the architectural environment as a caterer for the physical and physiological comfort of its users, issues as image and functioning of a facility become very relevant. The following sections review current literature on reduction of the risk of terrorism and the strategies to accomplish this goal via the built environment.

3.2 Reduction of risk

Literature suggests a security survey based on all aspects of vulnerability analysis: the facility’s physical features, operating policies/procedures, and the contextual threat [5]. This type of survey should result in realistic assessment of a facility’s present security status; identification of existing security deficiencies; and suggestions for improvements [5]. A risk reduction matrix can also be used to help building owners/managers evaluate what measures can diminish the risk [19]. The matrix is used based on compilation of two scales: facility’s level of vulnerability and probable severity level of consequences.

3.3 Reduction of vulnerability: referring to the past

Since terrorism is considered by many as the new war of our era, it is reasonable to evaluate the current physical protection of facilities in a historical context [24]. Throughout history, protection provided by physical controls was based on two, interrelated strategies -- impediment and deterrence [25]. Impediment means physically holding back an attack, while deterrence relies on projecting an image that would psychologically discourage potential adversaries from attacking. The main requirements for impediment are: clear borders definition of controlled and uncontrolled spaces; hardening of the controlled zones; and securing access (the transition zones between the uncontrolled and the controlled spaces). Deterrence, provoked by rigid appearance of fortifications has been deliberately reinforced over the centuries with other symbolic elements, concurrent with the faiths/symbols of the time. Modern times have adopted both impediment and deterrence as mechanisms for crime prevention in communities. The link between previous theories/methods of protection to the threat of terrorism requires several considerations. One concern that was raised as a criticism of crime prevention theories is crime displacement. According to the displacement premise, while the crime shifts (in method, location, or timeframe),

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 810 Safety and Security Engineering the overall rate of crime is not reduced [17]. In terrorism terms, this means that terrorists are likely to come up with a different tactic or look for a softer target to hit, but they will not be discouraged entirely. Another point of concern relates to the effectiveness of deterrence on terrorists. It seems that the chances of being captured or killed presumably do not deter terrorists. One can also argue that excessive security measures can attract acts of terror instead of discourage them, as these extreme measures may indicate that there is something important to protect [27]. In addition, it is of significance to realize that deterrence relies on perception. A certain image may also affect potential/actual users of the facility [6, 9, 27]. Following this notion, the paradox inherent in the concept of security needs to be further clarified. The paradox of security holds that a complicated relation exists between the salience of security in a place and how secure a person actually feels in that built environment, “Where security systems assert themselves most forcefully, fear, discomfort, and danger often flourish. Conversely, the absence of visible protection can promote the feeling of well-being” [29]. According to psychologist Farson [29], even if security measures may protect people, elaborate security measures may induce fear in the users. This dilemma concerning visibility of security measures, perceived image and consequential responses is an area that demands much more research. The following section of this paper reviews existing policies, recommendations, and descriptions of actual physical controls currently used to reduce the vulnerability of a facility and to impede potential terrorists.

3.4 Impeding attacks: current design solutions and security measures

Numerous recommendations have been made over the years on how to create reliable, safe, convenient and secure structures. Many of them, based on scientific evidence, have been incorporated into local building standards and codes, while the most crucial ones also appear in nationally adopted documents, such as the International Building Code, A117 for Accessibility, NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code [30]. In light of the recent proliferation of terrorism, different aspects of security have been reconsidered. As evident in a document by a US advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, “tougher building safety codes offer another avenue of protection, especially in new commercial buildings. These should focus on structural integrity, minimizing the probability of collapse even after an explosive attack, and making the building more resistant to fire…Given the costs associated with ‘hardening’ new buildings and the trade-off between risk and cost, any such ‘anti-terrorism’ building codes should probably apply only to the largest new structures, those that would hold thousands of people” [31]. Current goals of incorporating security into design are specified in the literature as: protection of people and prevention of attacks, and in the case of such - prevention of building collapse; limiting injuries caused by flying debris or by a direct effect of air blast; and facilitating building evacuation/rescue efforts through effective building design [14].

The following review of design recommendations and security measures consists of available private publications [13, 25, 26, 33], institutional recommendations [5, 9, 23, 26], regulated standards established by the General Services Administration (GSA) for the Public Buildings Service (PBS) [32], and recently published Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) manual [14]. The review focuses on the integration of security measures in the architectural design. It is structured according to the three basics of the tactic of impediment while referring to the complexity of the generated image.

3.4.1 Provision of clear borders definition and hardening of controlled zones Sources recommend a clear differentiation between the structure, its perimeter and the outer, uncontrolled zone [5, 13, 25, 32]. Once this distinction is made, further steps, which are intended to prevent, delay and mitigate the effects of an attack, can be taken [14]. These steps follow the “layering” concept -- from the outer periphery, working inward, where each ring has a uniform level of security provided along its entire length [9, 23, 14]. This includes providing and reinforcing external borders; defining and securing the structure’s entire exterior - sides, top and bottom; and structurally increasing its resistance to explosives [25, 32]. Intrusion detection and surveillance devices support the control over the structure and over its periphery. All border solutions should be chosen, located and maintained to stop or delay an intruder (especially large scale carrier of weapon), not provide any concealing cover for surprise attacks or possible bombs, and be impossible to use as a natural ladder to gain entry to upper levels of the structure [5, 13, 14, 26, 32]. Security fencing [5] is the bluntest measure for convening to the general public the efforts put into securing the enclosed territory. Other architectural solutions, i.e., decorative fences, walls, various types and designs of buffers and barriers [14, 33], are less obvious but still associate closely with intentional enclosure for security. This type of solutions may induce stress/fear among end users. The use of less obvious measures of enclosure, such as change of topography, trenches, ponds and water basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and street furniture [14, 33], may be better, friendlier solutions as they decrease the perceived salience of the security dimension. An important recommendation deals with the position of the facility on the site as means of protection. Placing the building as far away from property lines as possible - from streets as well as from adjacent facilities - minimizes the risk to which the facility is exposed [14]. Other recommendations focus on the significance of structural strength. It is advised to use building shapes that better resist blast shock waves [9, 23]. Specifically, it implies the use of simple geometries layouts (circular and cubic); avoidance of re-entrant corners and over-hangs that may trap and accentuate the effect of possible air blasts; and minimization of heavyweight ornamentation [14]. For air blast resistance it is also recommended to use massive constructive elements which provide flexure capacity that would help avoid brittle shear failure and raise the capacity for reversing loads (upward pressure) [14]. To reduce the risk of progressive

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 812 Safety and Security Engineering collapse, some sources recommend the use of a broad foundation to lessen the stress and strain on the load bearing soil; the use of right-angled connections of load bearing walls [5, 14]; and the introduction of structural redundancy while limiting column spacing [9, 13, 14]. All exterior cover of the building should be of sufficient strength to stand in an attempt of forced entry [13, 32]. FEMA's manual [14] advises to limit the number and size of windows on lower floors; to use clearstory windows if possible (above human height); and to aim for designs that facilitate internal atriums with windows facing inward. While some of the above recommendations do not necessarily affect the projected image of a building, others are imperative to it. For example, one can argue that the relative proportion of mass vs. glazing can influence how fortified a building may appear to be. However, in many cases, freedom of design can be achieved by using better, more resistant materials and supporting systems, which are in constant development (e.g., exterior windows systems specified in GSA standards [32]). Electronic/mechanical devices are used for surveillance in outside areas, i.e., the perimeter; in defined volumes, i.e., interior spaces; as well as for monitoring specific objects or points in a space [25, 26]. Different measures are based on different concepts: break of an electric circuit, interruption of a light beam, variation in electrical or magnetic field, detection of sound, of vibration, of motion or heat, and observation/recording of pictures with cameras or closed circuit television [13, 25, 32]. Such devices have various designs, some more distinct and others that blend in the surroundings. Evident use of such measures may coincide with the natural surveillance premise where the users of the environment feel safer under a watchful protective eye [15, 16, 17]. Yet, conspicuous measures may also indicate that the place needs protection and consequently induce fear among people. Another aspect, contributing to the complexity of the matter, is the delicate issue of privacy rights. The provision of emergency communication measures is also imperative for controlling a secured space as well as for emergency response incidents. Sources recommend placing brightly marked emergency intercoms, duress buttons or assistance stations on columns, fences, and other posts [32].

3.4.2 Securing all access The risk of an undesired intrusion to a facility, whether it is a walking terrorist, a suspicious car, a thrown explosive, or some kind of a CBRN weapon, mandates the need to secure all possible openings in the borders between the zones (perimeter border and building envelope) [14, 32]. The frequent use of car bombs as an effective terrorist tactic highlights the importance to control all vehicle access routes (parking garage, lobby entrance, loading docks, shipping and receiving areas). This control is first initiated by periphery bordering. Then, site circulation should be designed to prevent high- speed approaches by vehicles. In order to force a reduction in speed, vehicle entrance is recommended to be a diversion of the road from which the vehicles approach the site [14, 32]. Other sources contend that vehicles should not be allowed into the inner perimeter of the building [25]. Accordingly, it is recommended to maximize the distance between parking and buildings [5, 9, 14].

In most parking garages, parking should be restricted only for tenants and known visitors. In under-building-garages or subterranean garages, visitor vehicles should not be permitted to park [5]. In some cases, perimeter vehicle inspection should be implemented and the design should provide space to facilitate this procedure. The area needs to include design features that stop vehicles, prevent them from leaving the vehicular inspection area, and prevent tailgating [14, 32]. Access control systems form part of a much greater security system industry that extends from intrusion detection, surveillance by CCTV, to lighting and fire extinguisher systems. Outputs can be taken from one system to activate another, e.g., intrusion detection can ultimately activate systems as vehicle barriers, gates, electronic locked doors or electromagnetic holding devices [32, 33]. Access control for office buildings may consist solely of a lock/key system or of a security staff member trained to observe both incoming and outgoing pedestrian traffic [13]. Other, public facilities may require x-ray machines to screen incoming parcels and packages, as well as walk-through metal detectors [13, 32]. Most access control measures are obvious and blunt to a building’s user. While the lock/key system or a security staff member may give a sense of control to the building’s occupants, access control measures for public buildings may seem to the general public intrusive to some extent. The entrance through such blunt machinery elevates the saliency of security in the facility. Further study should be made on people’s reactions to such entry procedures, and to the possible effect of embedding scanning machinery in the architecture, and making them less noticeable. An example to this proposition could be in the design of revolving doors. Literature already identifies such doors as a relatively safe mechanism which regulates the flow of pedestrians without exposing the building to out-side elements [13, 14]. According to the GSA standards [32], entrances to public facilities need to balance aesthetics, security, risk, and operational considerations. The standards suggest that entrances should be designed to avoid significant queuing. If queuing does occur within the building footprint, the area should be enclosed in blast resistant construction. If queuing is expected outside the building, a rain cover should be provided (historic buildings generally require alternative design schemes that do not alter the exterior or lobby configuration). To reduce the potential for concealment of explosive devices before the screening points, it is suggested to avoid installing features as trash receptacles and mailboxes [32]. Protection from CBRN threats is focused on strengthening the control over utility pipes and restricting access to them; investing in HVAC/ventilation systems, and controlling pressure differentials [5]. All of which do not influence the users or their impression of the building. In the case of released hazardous airborne substances, e.g., industrial chemicals, toxic fumes or biochemical warfare agents, strategies for protection depend on whether a release occurs outside or inside the building [9,23]. The location of the building air intakes need to be considered as well as securing the access to them. Analogous to fire doors system, dividing the facility into different zones operated by different HVAC systems could be helpful in isolating incidents [9, 23]. In large

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 814 Safety and Security Engineering commercial spaces where it is impossible to isolate different zones, negative zone pressurization and smoke evacuation methods are critically important [14]. 4 Conclusion The review in this paper clearly emphasizes the ongoing concern for security in the face of today’s proliferation of terrorism. An exploration of the threat and its relation to the built environment was undertaken to obtain some insight on the efforts to counter terrorism in the design realm. While acknowledging the intricacy in any attempt to predict the unthinkable, it is recognized that future targets of terrorism will include facilities that combine two main characteristics. The first consists of facilities that serve daily activities, which when attacked would have the potential to provoke anxiety and fear within the general community. The second characteristic attends to the volume and the significance of facilities -- ones that may present opportunities of Mass Casualty Incidents (MCIs) and great destruction and harm to infrastructure. Whereas terrorism seems to present the dangers of the battlefield, massive casualties and destruction, it occurs within a community and usually involves penetration of hostile forces into local surroundings. Hence, examination of current design recommendations and actual security measures link the struggle against terrorism with former historical strategies of defense against enemies, as well as with modern theories of crime prevention. The historical basics for impeding potential offenders through physical controls have proven extremely relevant to the current defense against terrorism threats. Defining the controlled /uncontrolled zones, reinforcing controlled spaces while securing all access are all fundamental for the impediment of a terrorist attack. The concept of deterrence, another historical strategy for defense and a main crime preventing strategy, takes a new turn. We find ourselves facing offenders with different agenda than regular criminals. Terrorists, as opposed to criminals, do not fear getting caught or killed in action, and sometimes seek conditions that are considered as deterring in the context of crime (e.g., presence of crowds). Further investigation of this notion is therefore imperative for reaching a better understanding of how to counter terrorism threat with conditions provided by the built environment. In addition, it must be noted that issues of image and perception of the physical conditions of environment, affect not only potential offenders and terrorists, but the overall population as well. In reference to people’s perceptions, some official sources hold a policy in which innovation and technology are used “to make security enhancements as ‘transparent’ to the general public as possible”, while still meeting established security standards [34]. Other sources feel that educating the public also educates the potential terrorists, and thus reduces the actual level of security [14]. This discussion highlights the paradox bounded in the concept of security – the complicated relationship which exists between the objective security level, the saliency of the security measures in a place, and how secure people (terrorists or users) perceive the environment to be. The review in this paper is based on relevant sources, which contend that the assessment of risk and the measures sought to counter or reduce risk must take

WIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 82, © 2005 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) Safety and Security Engineering 815 into account both the adversaries' perspective, as well as the point of view of the buildings' owners or permanent occupants. Referring to the issues of image and perception in relation to public buildings, this paper argues for the need to incorporate another perspective to the process, the point of view of those who use the facilities - the public. In a reality in which complete physical protection from terrorism is practically unfeasible, the need to incorporate the public's perspective is further strengthened. It becomes imperative not just to try and protect people from terrorism, but also to attend to their psychological needs. The consideration of the public's perspective requires further investigation of issues such as human perception, cognition and behaviour as affected by threats of terrorism and by security efforts within the design realm. Such investigation will hopefully produce insights into how to effectively incorporate necessary security measures in the environment without frightening the public, and consequently, gaining the upper hand against those who wish to terrorize us. References [1] Gaddis, J.L., And now this: Lessons from the old era for the new one (Chapter 1). The Age of Terror - America and the world after September 11, eds. S. Talbott & N. Chanda, Basic Books & Yale Center for the Study of Globalization: New York, pp. 1-23, 2001. [2] Bracken, P., Rethinking the unthinkable: New priorities for new national security (Chapter 7). The Age of Terror - America and the world after September 11, eds. S. Talbott & N. Chanda, Basic Books & Yale Center for the Study of Globalization: New York, pp. 171-192, 2001. [3] FBI, 28 Code of Federal Regulations (Section 0.85). Terrorism in the United States, Department of Justice, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit: Washington DC, 1999. [4] Pillar, P.R., Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2001. [5] Kozlow, C. & Sullivan, S., Jane’s facility security handbook. Jane’s Information Group: US, 2000. [6] Holahan, C.J., Environmental Psychology. Random House: New York, 1982. [7] Stamps, A.E., A paradigm for distinguishing significant from nonsignificant visual impacts: Theory, implementation, case histories. Environ Impact Assess Rev, 17, pp. 249-293, 1997. [8] Saarinen, T.F., Environmental planning: Perception and behaviour, Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1976. [9] AIA, Building Security through Design, AIA: Washington, DC., 2001. [10] Linn, C., Building for a secure future. Engineering News-Record & Architectural Record, A special report, pp. 7-10, 2002. [11] Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S., Facts and fears: Understanding perceived risk (Chapter 8). The perceptions of risk, ed. P. Slovic, EarthScan Publications: London, 2000.

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[32] General Services Administration (GSA), P100-2003: Facilities standards for the public buildings service (PBS) (Chapter 3) Architectural and interior design, (Chapter 8) Security design, GSA: US, 2003. [33] Honey, G., Electronic Access Control, Newnes: UK, 2000. [34] Nadel, B.A., Security and technology: 21st century trends, The Construction Specifier, 4, pp. 17-22, 2001.