Chapter 2: Instrumentation What Concept to Choose for a Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions?
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Chapter 2: Instrumentation What concept to choose for a tax on foreign exchange transactions? Before posing the question of the feasibility of a tax on foreign exchange transactions it is necessary to clarify how the concept of the tax to be realized should look like. The Tobin tax as originally conceived is not the only option of a tax on foreign exchange transactions. Alternative proposals have been developed starting from points where the Tobin tax exhibits clear conceptual weaknesses. It is therefore necessary to clarify the question of the concept and its instrumentalization before posing the question of its operationalization and implementation. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop a basically functioning and politically feasible concept of a tax on foreign exchange transactions. This requires to first reduce the complexity that goes with the original proposal by Tobin. » Reduction of complexity. The alledged non-feasibility of the Tobin tax is often explicated by a number of economic, legal, administrative and political complexities. 1 For an analysis of these weaknesses see in particular Spahn (1995), Shome and Stotsky (1996), Nadal-De Simone (1997), or (in German) Buch, Heinrich and Pierdzioch (2001). » Under economic aspects, it is criti- equally to expect that there is cor- cized that the Tobin tax would responding interjurisdictional co- operation in this matter. Most of 1. produce similar inefficiencies the governments of OECD coun- as the multi-phase tax on gross tries (in particular the United transactions of commodities that States) reject the idea of a Tobin applied in the Federal Republic of tax at present. Germany before 1968. It was cen- sured to entail a cascading effect, » Under political aspects it is a to- which led to a varying tax burden tally open question who would be on final products in accordance entitled to collect the tax revenue. with the number of transactions. Tobin himself thought of interna- This must provoke organizational tional organization (IMF, World- reactions (such as the vertical in- bank, United Nations). But there tegration of processes), which un- could also be supranational or- doubtedly distorts economic deci- ganizations to be newly created, sion making; international public foundations and non-government organiza- 2. produce particularly heavy dis- tions (NGO). In principle it would tortions of this kind as long as it is also be possible to distribute the impossible to introduce the tax tax revenue onto national tax au- universally, since this would dislo- thorities, however the distribution cate parts of foreign exchange formula is likely to be highly con- markets to non-cooperating tax troversial. havens. Moreover the tax could be avoided by moving into trading Even if those questions would with other instruments such as have been resolved it is still open short-term foreign securities for which purpose such revenue (treasury bills etc.) or through for- should be used, who would be the ward and derivative trading. recipient, who would administer it, and how a legitimate democratic 3. put a one-sided burden onto and administrative mechanism for the competitiveness of the respec- controlling such institutions should tive financial centers and squeeze look like.2 If one thinks in particular worldwide liquidity trading, which of a transfer of resources toward would trigger unsolicited systemic developing countries, it is open in changes. which way these countries could » Under legal aspects it is often as- participate in the decision proc- serted (without further examina- ess.3 tion) that the tax would disagree As to legal questions, these do not fall with the idea of capital liberaliza- into the terms of reference of this tion in accordance with the Liber- study. It has to be emphasized how- alization of Capital Movements ever that the freedom of capital Code of the OECD or, in the case movements is not abolished or put in of the EU, the Maastricht Treaty. » Under administrative aspects it is 2 reckoned that the international Patomäki (2001) argues that a global tax on community of important financial foreign exchange transactions would also centers is unlikely to cede sover- strengthen national sovereignties, and he con- ceptualizes an institutional framework for its eignty in the area of taxation and administration that aims at the democratization consent to the creation of a world of the process of globalization. tax organization, which would be 3 This question is unsatisfactory even now as reasonable for operating a univer- to the development of international financial sal and multilateral tax on foreign markets. See for instance Griffith-Jones exchange transactions. It is (2001). Paul Bernd Spahn ® [email protected] On the feasibility of a tax on foreign exchange transactions ® Chapter 2 ® Page 13 jeopardy just because a tax is levied gitimate parliamentary institutions. on such transactions. Taxes are lev- The tax would therefore work uni- ied on various transactions of goods laterally and partially, not multilat- and services and are typically re- erally and universally. garded by economists as conforming » The same legislature that is ac- with the market. In most respects they countable for the tax will also de- are superior and to be preferred to cide on the apportionment and use other types of government interven- of the tax proceeds. It implies the tion such as capital controls, or mone- revenue to fall to a national gov- tary policy involvement of the ortho- ernment (respectively jointly to all dox type. The key question under le- governments that engage in a co- gal aspects is whether taxes are neu- ordinated effort), but under no cir- tral with regard to the competitiveness cumstances would it go to interna- of different actors in the market. 5 tional organizations. A tax on for- In the following I shall assume that eign exchange transactions to be legal problems would not emerge introduced unilaterally by the within the framework of the European European Union would be subject Union as long as certain preconditions to decisions of the European are fulfilled. This point of view is sup- Council and the European Parlia- ported by a study for the Parliamen- ment as well as national parlia- tarian Working Group “Tobin tax” of ments that would have to ratify the the European Parliament.4 law. This study asks in particular for a All proposals that go beyond such small rate of the tax on foreign ex- limitations must be considered unreal- change transactions, which „à la lu- istic, and be excluded as politically mière de ses objectifs, n’entrave pas “unfeasible” for the time being. les mouvements de paiements de In the following I shall call this limited manière déraisonnable ou dispropor- decision space “politically feasible”. In tionnée.“ This must have repercus- order to account for eventual legal sions on the fiscal objectives of the scruples, I shall also posit a much tax. They will be addressed later on. lower tax rate than was considered by Tobin and his supporters.6 » Limitations. In view of a multiplicity While I have been using the terms of unresolved political questions that „tax on foreign exchange transactions” relate to the universal and multilateral and “Tobin tax“ synonymously so far, I character of the Tobin tax, this report shall speak of a „politically feasible will confine itself to limited scenarios. Tobin tax (PFTT)“ from now on, In order to be realistic these scenarios which shuns the critical objections will have to acknowledge the follow- against a multilateral and universal ing: tax. » The tax on foreign exchange Before entering into examining eco- transactions cannot be introduced nomic and technical aspects that are universally. It is required that the important for the realization of a tax be planned by an existing au- PFTT, I shall first discuss a few vari- thority, a government or a coordi- ants of taxes on foreign exchange nating body such as the European Council, and be introduced by le- 5 This could eventually be achieved in a sec- 4 ond round via the explicit earmarking of tax The study has been prepared by Lieven A. proceeds or through budgetary decisions of Denys, professor for European tax law at the (the) parliament(s). Faculté de Droit of the Vrije Universiteit Brus- 6 sels. It dates of April 18, 2001. See also Clunies-Ross (2000). Paul Bernd Spahn ® [email protected] On the feasibility of a tax on foreign exchange transactions ® Chapter 2 ® Page 14 transactions that are politically feasi- PFTT. ble and are relevant in the context of a Chile has used NNR to fend off short- PFTT. term capital inflows and to avoid artifi- cial short-term appreciations of its » Relevant variants of taxes on for- currency. At the same time the device eign exchange transactions. The was expected to secure solvability in the case of a reversal of foreign capi- following concepts are related to taxes 7 tal flows, and to deal with the pressure on foreign exchange transactions: of depreciation. 1. “Non-remunerated reserve re- It is debatable whether this strategy quirements (NRR)” on short-term for- was successful, because nobody is in eign exchange deposits. a position to say whether speculative 2. The taxation of cross-border capi- capital inflows have been successfully tal transactions with a „cross-border suppressed by the measure. The capital tax (CBCT)“. mere indication that capital inflows 3. A two-tiers „Tobin-cum-Circuit- have endured and the Chilean peso has appreciated in spite of the meas- Breaker Tax (TCCBT)“. It consists of a PFTT as a base and an „exchange- ure is not sufficient for prove. The rate normalization duty (ERND)“ that fundamental data of the Chilean responds to exchange rate volatility. economy were extraordinarily positive during that period, and the country was therefore highly attractive for non- » „Non-remunerated reserve re- speculative foreign capital regardless quirements“ (NNR)—NNR have of the NNR.