Allowing Spontaneity: Practice, Theory, and Ethical Cultivation in Longchenpa's Great Perfection Philosophy of Action The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:40050138 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Allowing Spontaneity: Practice, Theory, and Ethical Cultivation in Longchenpa’s Great Perfection Philosophy of Action A dissertation presented by Adam S. Lobel to The Committee on the Study of Religion in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of The Study of Religion Harvard University Cambridge, MA April 2018! ! © 2018, Adam S. Lobel All rights reserved $$!! Advisor: Janet Gyatso Author: Adam S. Lobel Allowing Spontaneity: Practice, Theory, and Ethical Cultivation in Longchenpa’s Great Perfection Philosophy of Action Abstract This is a study of the philosophy of practical action in the Great Perfection poetry and spiritual exercises of the fourteenth century Tibetan author, Longchen Rabjampa Drime Ozer (klong chen rab 'byams pa dri med 'od zer 1308-1364). I inquire into his claim that practices may be completely spontaneous, uncaused, and effortless and what this claim might reveal about the conditions of possibility for action. Although I am interested in how Longchenpa understands spontaneous practices, I also question whether the very categories of practice and theory are useful for interpreting his writings. In taking up these questions, I maintain that Longchenpa’s texts can contribute to inquiries into the nature of human practices and action that is relevant today. It is my aspiration that this dissertation may facilitate engagement with Longchenpa’s reflections on the nature of liberative practice by thinkers in post-Heideggerian continental philosophy, especially in relation to conceptions of intentionality, causality, agency, ethics, and free will. The study begins with the historical context for issues of spontaneous practice relevant for Longchenpa’s Great Perfection tradition in fourteenth century Tibet. Following from this context, I then present four different interpretations of causal action, which I call the “four configurations.” Comprising the second part of the study, my $$$! ! examination of each of these configurations will consist in an exploration of what I argue are four primary ways to construe the nature of practice in terms of intentionality, theories, and causality. The first configuration addresses spiritual exercises that begin with theoretical views that are deliberately applied in actions. The second configuration focuses on methods that begin with embodied practices. The third configuration explores metaphysical foundations for actions. The fourth configuration looks to tacit social practices and networks of relationships as conditions for methods of ethical self-cultivation. Yet each of these characterizations fall short of what I will argue is Longchenpa’s understanding of practical action. Each of these configurations fail to provide the most satisfying, and in the end accurate, model of the process by which human beings perform freedom. The central chapters of the thesis bring together the history of Buddhist spiritual exercises, Longchenpa’s writings, and selected issues from contemporary philosophy and sociology of practice. I will show how Longchenpa’s spontaneous practice theory challenges some of the most basic assumptions about practices, and questions whether even well-meaning techniques or manipulations can lead to freedom. In the process of this critical reading, I will also be able to glean affirmative aspects of Longchenpa’s approach. Once we suspend the first configuration we can see Longchenpa’s phenomenology of knowledge. Going beyond the second configuration allows me to point to his conceptions of time and an effortlessness style in his instructions for spiritual exercises, which, I argue, is distinct from many interpretations of “sudden” conceptions of Buddhist practice. Going beyond the third configuration allows us to garner a sense of groundless potentiality in actions. And $%! ! finally, interrupting the fourth configuration provides an opportunity to discern Longchenpa’s spontaneous ontological ethics. My primary thesis is that if practices are preconceived to be causal, teleological, and intentional, they will be predetermined in terms of an imperative to produce effects. Some form of willfulness becomes necessary to mediate between theory, action, and agency. Therefore, to allow for spontaneous practices, there can be neither a theoretical nor a practical a priori foundation and they must be freed from causality and object-directedness. This observation calls into question the entire metaphysics in which the western apparatus of practice and ethics is thinkable. I would like to put the meanings of practice into the form of a question. Longchenpa will help us to reawaken a sense of wonder and uncertainty about the practical. %!! Table Of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………..iii Table Of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………………..vi Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………….viii Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 1 I. Longchenpa and Spontaneity in Buddhist Practice II. Spontaneous Practice in the History of Philosophy, Study of Religion, and Study of Tibetan Buddhism III. Conceptual and Methodological Issues: Is Practice Still a Question? IV. Four Configurations and Overview of the Chapters SECTION I: THE BACKGROUND OF GREAT PERFECTION PRACTICE Chapter 1: Causal Action, Great Perfection Practices, and Tibetan Historical Context………………………………………………….…………………………..46 I. Causal Action II. The First Dissemination of Teachings and the Imperial Period III. The Early Great Perfection as an Approach to Practice IV. From the Mind Series to the Seminal Essence: The Discovery of Treasures V. History of the Seminal Essence Through the Fourteenth Century Chapter 2: Longchenpa’s Life and Works…………………………………………………………..87 I. Longchenpa’s Biography II. Longchenpa’s Body of Writings SECTION II: BEYOND THE CAUSAL COMPLEX Chapter 3: Awakened Phenomenology: Beyond Configuration One…………………….121 Part 1: Configuration One I. Theory-Caused, Intentional Practice II. Examples of Configuration One: Pedagogy in the Causal Vehicles III. Learning Practices Part 2: Longchenpa’s Awakened Phenomenology IV. Phenomenological Practice V. Cutting Through as Phenomenological Practice %$! ! Chapter 4: Endless, Effortless Action: Beyond Configuration Two…………………..……160 Part 1: Configuration Two I. Practice-caused, Intentional Practice II. Examples of Configuration Two: Tantric Technologies of the Self III. Longchenpa’s Critique Part 2: Spontaneous Time and Teleology IV. Practices of Time and Timelessness V. Effortlessness Chapter 5: Beginningless, Anarchic Action: Beyond Configuration Three…………….201 Part 1: Configuration Three I. Theory-caused, Unintentional Practice II. Example of Configuration Three: The Ground III. The Ground in Practice: The Ground and its Presencing Part 2: The Anarchic Ground in Action IV. Philosophical Presentation: The Ground is not Spontaneous V. Impotentiality and the Anarchic Ground: Non-Action in Practice Chapter 6: Spontaneous Ethics: Beyond Configuration Four……………………………….253 Part 1: Configuration Four I. Practice-Caused, Unintentional Practice II. Examples of Configuration Four: The Teacher-Student Relationship and the Student’s Potential III. The Pedagogical Universe as Social Site Part 2: Spontaneous Ethics IV. From Social Practices to Ontology V. Spontaneous Ethical Commitments in the Way of Abiding VI. Everyday Spontaneous Conduct Conclusion: Spontaneous Practice in our Technological Age……………………………….320 Appendix: Does Longchenpa Reject Cause and Effect? The Great Perfection and the C!rv!ka School…………………………………………………………………………………………….334 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………….340 %$$! ! Acknowledgements This research and writing took the time, guidance, and kindness of so many others. My advisors, my teachers, colleagues, friends, and especially my family offered that time, guidance, and kindness and I am deeply thankful for all of them. I am remarkably grateful to have worked closely with my primary advisor, Janet Gyatso, whose support, inspiration, and rigor have defined much of my intellectual formation. Her courage in wading into cross-cultural territory as well as her ongoing fidelity to Tibetan culture and visionary authors created the unique conditions and freedom to support my own thinking. Her friendship coupled with her relentless editorial precision helped to sculpt a sprawling project into a workable dissertation. Our time together has been bkra shis rten ‘brel, indeed. Additionally, I am deeply appreciative for my extraordinary, brilliant, and unconventional committee. Charles Hallisey’s guidance on ethical thought and Buddhist sociological reflection, and his always-pointed questions, opened new directions for my research. Amy Hollywood seemed to anticipate many of my perspectives and her expertise in the philosophical and the mystical often revealed uncanny parallels. While at Harvard I also benefitted from Buddhist philosophy coursework with and personal direction from Leonard van der