A Primer for Today's Secondary Private Equity Market
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Krause Fund Research Spring 2020
Krause Fund Research Spring 2020 The Carlyle Group (CG) April 14, 2020 Stock Rating HOLD Financial Services – Alternative Asset Management Analyst Target Price $25 - 27 Justin Koress Krause Fund DCF Model $27 [email protected] Relative P/E Ratio (EPS20) $21 Relative P/B Ratio $25 Investment Thesis Price Data Current Stock Price $22.68 We recommend a HOLD rating for The Carlyle Group because of its diversified 52Wk RanGe $15.21 - $34.98 investments within key drivers in the Asset Management industry, such as Key Statistics corporate private equity, with an emphasis to capitalize on the ESG investment Market Cap (B) $7.90 trend. However, CG’s use of leverage will expose them to extreme risks associated Shares OutstandinG (M) 348.23 with COVID-19. Five Year Beta 1.77 Current Dividend Yield 4.17% Drivers of Thesis Price/EarninGs (TTM) 8.04x Price/EarninGs (FY1) 13.98x • With private capital dry powder at a record $2.3 trillion dollars, Profitability alternative managers will be able to create high-quality investments at Profit MarGin 35.07% distressed valuations in response to COVID-19. Return on Equity (TTM) 39.88% Return on Assets (TTM) 17.15% • CGs management team has a proven track record in locating Debt to Equity Ratio 365.01% companies that weather economic downturns, providing tremendous investment opportunities in a destabilized market. 25.00 • The alternative asset management business is intensely competitive, with competition based on a variety of factors, including investment 20.00 performance, a record number of private investment funds, and lack of 19.00 20.28 investor liquidity due to COVID-19. -
Initial Public Offerings
November 2017 Initial Public Offerings An Issuer’s Guide (US Edition) Contents INTRODUCTION 1 What Are the Potential Benefits of Conducting an IPO? 1 What Are the Potential Costs and Other Potential Downsides of Conducting an IPO? 1 Is Your Company Ready for an IPO? 2 GETTING READY 3 Are Changes Needed in the Company’s Capital Structure or Relationships with Its Key Stockholders or Other Related Parties? 3 What Is the Right Corporate Governance Structure for the Company Post-IPO? 5 Are the Company’s Existing Financial Statements Suitable? 6 Are the Company’s Pre-IPO Equity Awards Problematic? 6 How Should Investor Relations Be Handled? 7 Which Securities Exchange to List On? 8 OFFER STRUCTURE 9 Offer Size 9 Primary vs. Secondary Shares 9 Allocation—Institutional vs. Retail 9 KEY DOCUMENTS 11 Registration Statement 11 Form 8-A – Exchange Act Registration Statement 19 Underwriting Agreement 20 Lock-Up Agreements 21 Legal Opinions and Negative Assurance Letters 22 Comfort Letters 22 Engagement Letter with the Underwriters 23 KEY PARTIES 24 Issuer 24 Selling Stockholders 24 Management of the Issuer 24 Auditors 24 Underwriters 24 Legal Advisers 25 Other Parties 25 i Initial Public Offerings THE IPO PROCESS 26 Organizational or “Kick-Off” Meeting 26 The Due Diligence Review 26 Drafting Responsibility and Drafting Sessions 27 Filing with the SEC, FINRA, a Securities Exchange and the State Securities Commissions 27 SEC Review 29 Book-Building and Roadshow 30 Price Determination 30 Allocation and Settlement or Closing 31 Publicity Considerations -
Secondary Market Trading Infrastructure of Government Securities
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Balogh, Csaba; Kóczán, Gergely Working Paper Secondary market trading infrastructure of government securities MNB Occasional Papers, No. 74 Provided in Cooperation with: Magyar Nemzeti Bank, The Central Bank of Hungary, Budapest Suggested Citation: Balogh, Csaba; Kóczán, Gergely (2009) : Secondary market trading infrastructure of government securities, MNB Occasional Papers, No. 74, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83554 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu MNB Occasional Papers 74. 2009 CSABA BALOGH–GERGELY KÓCZÁN Secondary market trading infrastructure of government securities Secondary market trading infrastructure of government securities June 2009 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the central bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank). -
Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange
CAN THE MARKET FIX A WRONG ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION? MASSIVE DELISTING ON THE PRAGUE STOCK EXCHANGE Zuzana Fungáčová CERGE-EI Charles University Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Economics Institute WORKING PAPER SERIES (ISSN 1211-3298) Electronic Version 335 Working Paper Series 335 (ISSN 1211-3298) Can the Market Fix a Wrong Administrative Decision? Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange Zuzana Fungáčová CERGE-EI Prague, August 2007 ISBN 978-80-7343-134-1 (Univerzita Karlova. Centrum pro ekonomický výzkum a doktorské studium) ISBN 978-80-7344-123-4 (Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v.v.i.) Can the Market Fix a Wrong Administrative Decision? Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange Zuzana Fungáčová* CERGE-EI† Abstract This research contributes to the investigation of the emerging stock markets in transition economies, namely in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the various determinants of shares delisting e.g. exclusion from public trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) during the period 1993 – 2004. Unlike its counterparts in Poland or Hungary, exceptionally large amounts of shares were delisted from the PSE. Using the data on listed and delisted companies we show that the pre-privatization and privatization characteristics of the companies were decisive for delisting. This further indicates that it would have been possible to prevent massive delisting if these factors had been taken into account when deciding which companies to place on the stock exchange for public trading. Moreover, therefore companies that were not suitable for public trading were also not suitable for voucher privatization. -
TRS Contracted Investment Managers
TRS INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS AS OF DECEMBER 2020 Global Public Equity (Global Income continued) Acadian Asset Management NXT Capital Management AQR Capital Management Oaktree Capital Management Arrowstreet Capital Pacific Investment Management Company Axiom International Investors Pemberton Capital Advisors Dimensional Fund Advisors PGIM Emerald Advisers Proterra Investment Partners Grandeur Peak Global Advisors Riverstone Credit Partners JP Morgan Asset Management Solar Capital Partners LSV Asset Management Taplin, Canida & Habacht/BMO Northern Trust Investments Taurus Funds Management RhumbLine Advisers TCW Asset Management Company Strategic Global Advisors TerraCotta T. Rowe Price Associates Varde Partners Wasatch Advisors Real Assets Transition Managers Barings Real Estate Advisers The Blackstone Group Citigroup Global Markets Brookfield Asset Management Loop Capital The Carlyle Group Macquarie Capital CB Richard Ellis Northern Trust Investments Dyal Capital Penserra Exeter Property Group Fortress Investment Group Global Income Gaw Capital Partners AllianceBernstein Heitman Real Estate Investment Management Apollo Global Management INVESCO Real Estate Beach Point Capital Management LaSalle Investment Management Blantyre Capital Ltd. Lion Industrial Trust Cerberus Capital Management Lone Star Dignari Capital Partners LPC Realty Advisors Dolan McEniry Capital Management Macquarie Group Limited DoubleLine Capital Madison International Realty Edelweiss Niam Franklin Advisers Oak Street Real Estate Capital Garcia Hamilton & Associates -
Secondary Market Trading and the Cost of New Debt Issuance
Secondary Market Trading and the Cost of New Debt Issuance Ryan L. Davis, David A. Maslar, and Brian S. Roseman* November 29, 2016 ABSTRACT We show that secondary market activity impacts the cost of issuing new debt in the primary market. Specifically, firms with existing illiquid debt have higher costs when issuing new debt. We also find that with the improvement in the price discovery process brought about by introduction of TRACE reporting, firms that became TRACE listed subsequently had a lower cost of debt. The results indicate that the secondary market functions of liquidity and price discovery are important to the primary market. The results offer important implications for regulators and managers who are in a position to impact secondary market liquidity and price discovery. The results are also important for understanding the connection between the secondary market and the real economy. *Ryan L. Davis is at The Collat School of Business, University of Alabama at Birmingham; David A. Maslar is at The Haslam College of Business, University of Tennessee; Brian S. Roseman is at The Mihaylo College of Business and Economics, California State University, Fullerton. Understanding how financial market activity impacts the real economy is one of the most important topics studied by financial economists. Since firms only raise capital in the primary market it is easy to conclude that trading in the secondary market does not directly affect firm activity. This potential disconnect leads some to view secondary markets as merely a sideshow to the real economy, an idea that has been debated in the academic literature since at least Bosworth (1975). -
LAZARD GROUP LLC (Exact Name of Registrant As Specified in Its Charter)
Table of Contents UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-K (Mark One) ☒ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 OR ☐ TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to 333-126751 (Commission File Number) LAZARD GROUP LLC (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) Delaware 51-0278097 (State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) or Organization) 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10020 (Address of principal executive offices) Registrant’s telephone number: (212) 632-6000 Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: None Securities Registered Pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act: None Indicate by check mark if the Registrant is a well-known seasoned issuer, as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Yes ☒ No ☐ Indicate by check mark if the Registrant is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Act. Yes ☐ No ☒ Indicate by check mark whether the Registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the Registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. Yes ☒ No ☐ Indicate by check mark if disclosure of delinquent filers pursuant to Item 405 of Regulation S-K is not contained herein, and will not be contained, to the best of Registrant’s knowledge, in definitive proxy or information statements incorporated by reference in Part III of this Form 10-K or any amendment to this Form 10-K. -
Secondary Mortgage Market
8-6 Legal Considerations - Real Estate Contracts - Financing Basic Appraisal Principles Other Sources of Funds Pension Funds and Insurance Companies Pension funds and insurance companies have recently had such growth that they have been looking for new outlets for their investments. They manage huge sums of money, and traditionally have invested in ultra-conservative instruments, such as government bonds. However, the booming economy of the 1990s, and corresponding budget surpluses for the federal government, left a shortage of treasury securities for these companies to buy. They had to find other secure investments, such as mortgages, to invest their assets. The higher yields available with Mortgage Backed Securities were also a plus. The typical mortgage- backed security will carry an interest rate of 1.00% or more above a government security. Pension funds and insurance companies will also provide direct funding for larger commercial and development loans, but will rarely loan for individual home mortgages. Pension funds are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974). Secondary Mortgage Market The secondary mortgage market buys and sells mortgages created in the primary mortgage market (the link to Wall Street). A valid mortgage is always assignable by the mortgagee, allowing assignment or sale of the rights in the mortgage to another. The mortgage company can sell the loan, the servicing, or both. If just the loan is sold without the servicing, the original lender will continue to collect payments, and the borrower will never know the loan was sold. If the lender sells the servicing, the company collecting the payments will change, but the terms of the loan will stay the same. -
Meet Our Speakers
MEET OUR SPEAKERS DEBRA ABRAMOVITZ Morgan Stanley Debra Abramovitz is an Executive Director of Morgan Stanley and serves as Chief Operating Officer of Morgan Stanley Expansion Capital. Debra oversees all financial, administrative, investor relations and operational activities for Morgan Stanley Expansion Capital, and its predecessor Morgan Stanley Venture Partners funds. Debra also serves as COO of Morgan Stanley Credit Partners. Debra joined Morgan Stanley’s Finance Department in 1983 and joined Morgan Stanley Private Equity in 1988, with responsibility for monitoring portfolio companies. Previously, Debra was with Ernst & Young. Debra is a graduate of American University in Paris and the Columbia Business School. JOHN ALLAN-SMITH Barclays Americas John Allan-Smith leads the US Funds team for Corporate Banking at Barclays and is responsible for coordinating the delivery of products and services from our global businesses; ranging from debt, FX solutions, cash management and trade finance, to working capital lending and liquidity structures. John joined Barclays in 2014 and has 20 years of experience in the funds sector. Prior to joining Barclays, John worked at The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in London, Stockholm and New York, spending 10 years in the RBS Leveraged Finance team. Subsequently, John had responsibility for the portfolios and banking sector of the Non-Core division of RBS in the Americas. John holds an ACA qualification from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales and is a qualified accountant. He also has a BSc (Hons) in Chemistry from The University of Nottingham. ROBERT ANDREWS Ashurst LLP Robert is a partner in the banking group at Ashurst and is one of the most experienced funds finance specialists in Europe. -
Initial Public Offering Allocations, Price Support, and Secondary Investors
Working Paper No. 2/2011 Initial Public Offering Allocations, January 2011 Price Support, and Secondary Revised March 2015 Investors Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme © Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme 2015. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the CCGR website http://www.bi.edu/ccgr INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING ALLOCATIONS, PRICE SUPPORT, AND SECONDARY INVESTORS Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme* The University of Melbourne, 198 Berkeley Street, Melbourne, 3010, Victoria, Australia, Telephone: +61-3-9035-6354, Fax: +61-3-8344-6914, Email: [email protected] March 2015 Forthcoming, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Abstract Tying Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocations to after-listing purchases of other IPO shares, as a form of price support, has generated much theoretical interest and media attention. Price support is price manipulation and can reduce secondary investor return. Obtaining data to investigate price support has in the past proven to be difficult. We document that price support is harming secondary investor return using new data from the Oslo Stock Exchange. We also show that investors who engage in price support are allocated more future oversubscribed allocations while harmed secondary investors significantly reduce their future participation in the secondary market. JEL classification: G24; G28 Keywords: IPO allocations; Laddering; Price -
The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond SOX
Michigan Law Review Volume 105 Issue 8 2007 The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond SOX Dana M. Muir University of Michigan Cindy A. Schipani University of Michigan Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond SOX, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1941 (2007). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol105/iss8/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE USE OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS: BEYOND SOX Dana M. Muir* Cindy A. Schipani** This Article focuses on the regulatory use offinance theory, particularly the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"), in two areas where securities pricing is at issue: shareholder appraisal cases and the use of employer stock in benefit plans. Regarding shareholderappraisal cases, the Article finds that the Delaware courts seem to implicitly respect the principles of EMH when ascertaining the fair value of stock, but recognize that markets cannot operate efficiently if information is withheld. Regarding employer stock in benefit plans, it concentrates on the explicit adoption of EMH by the Department of Labor to exempt directed trustees from traditional duties of inquiry regarding the prudence of investment directions. -
Reverse Convertible Notes Linked to Blackstone Group
Structured Products Research Report Report Prepared On: 12/14/12 Structured Product Details Reverse Convertible Notes linked to Blackstone Group Name Reverse Convertible Notes linked to Blackstone Group Description HSBC issued $784,000 of Reverse Convertible Notes linked to Blackstone Group on Issue Size $784,000 October 31, 2007 at $1,000 per note. Issue Price $1,000 Term 6 Months These notes are HSBC-branded reverse convertibles. Reverse convertibles pay periodic Annualized Coupon 11.50% interest coupons and at maturity convert into shares of the reference security if the price of the reference stock at the notes’ maturity is below its price when the notes were issued Pricing Date October 26, 2007 and had closed below a specified “trigger” during the term of the notes. Issue Date October 31, 2007 Valuation Date April 25, 2008 April 30, 2008 These 6-month notes pay monthly coupons at an annualized rate of 11.50%. In addition Maturity Date to the monthly coupons, at maturity on April 30, 2008 investors will receive the mar- Issuer HSBC ket value of 39.08 shares of Blackstone Group’s stock if on April 25, 2008 Blackstone CDS Rate 43.4 bps Group’s stock price closes below $25.59 (Blackstone Group’s stock price on October 26, Swap Rate 4.78% 2007) and had ever closed at or below $17.91 during the term of the notes. Otherwise, investors will receive the $1,000 face value per note. Reference Asset Blackstone Group’s stock Initial Level $25.59 Valuation Trigger Price $17.91 This HSBC reverse convertible linked to Blackstone Group’s stock can be valued as a Conversion Price $19.20 combination of a note from HSBC and a short down-and-in, at-the-money put option on Dividend Rate 0.00% Blackstone Group’s stock.