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Just War and Human Rights Author(S): David Luban Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol Just War and Human Rights Author(s): David Luban Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter, 1980), pp. 160-181 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265110 . Accessed: 20/01/2014 03:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Princeton University Press and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy &Public Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.234.10.199 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 03:02:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DAVID LUBAN Just War and Human Rights Doctrines of just war have been formulated mainly by theologians and jurists in order to provide a canon applicable to a variety of prac- tical situations. No doubt these doctrines originate in a moral under- standing of violent conflict. The danger exists, however, that when the concepts of the theory are adopted into the usage of politics and diplo- macy their moral content is replaced by definitions which are merely convenient. If that is so, the concepts of the traditional theory of just war could be exactly the wrong starting point for an attempt to come to grips with the relevant moral issues. This is the case, I wish to argue, with the moral assessment of the justice of war (jus ad bellum). My argument is in four parts. First I show that the dominant definition in international law is insensitive to one morally crucial dimension of politics. Secondly, I connect this ar- gument with classical social contract theory. Thirdly, I propose an al- ternative definition which attempts to base itself more firmly on the moral theory of human rights. And finally, I apply this definition to two hard cases. I Unjust War as Aggression International law does not speak of just or unjust war as such, but rather of legal or illegal war. For the purpose of the present discussion i. I follow the traditional distinction between the justice of war, that is, which side is in the right with respect to the issues over which they are fighting, and justice in war (jus in bello), which pertains to the way the war is fought. ?D I980 by Princeton University Press Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 2 0048-39I 5 /80/020160-22$OI . 10/I This content downloaded from 130.234.10.199 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 03:02:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions i6i Just War and Human Rights I shall assume that the latter distinction expresses a theory of just war and treat the two distinctions as equivalent. The alternative would be to claim that international law is simply irrelevant to the theory of just war, a claim which is both implausible and question-begging. Several characterizations of illegal war exist in international law. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of I928, for example, condemns any use of war as an instrument of national policy except in the case of self-de- fense; and Brierly maintained that it did not lapse among it signers.2 It is a very wide criterion for unjust war-wider, it may at first appear, than the United Nations Charter, which reads: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political in- dependence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.3 Presumably an act of war could exist which violated neither the po- litical independence nor the territorial integrity of any state-say, a limited sea war. Or, to take another example, two states could agree to settle an issue by fighting a series of prearranged battles with prior agreements protecting their political independence and territorial in- tegrity. Such acts would be barred by the Kellogg-Briand Pact; whether they are prohibited by Article 2(4) depends on how one reads the phrase "inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." I be- lieve that on the most plausible reading, they would be prohibited.4 Moreover, they would most likely constitute violations of the jus co- gens, the overriding principles of general international law.5 Thus, Article 2(4) is in fact roughly equivalent to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In any case, the provisions of Article 2(4) are subsumed under the definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in I974. It includes the clause: Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover- eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 2. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed., ed. Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i963), p. 409. 3. Article 2(4), quoted in Brierly, p. 4I5. 4. This is Brierly's claim, p. 409. The relevant Article of the Charter is i (i). 5. This point was suggested to me by Professor Boleslaw Boczek. This content downloaded from 130.234.10.199 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 03:02:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I62 Philosophy & Public Affairs State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.6 That this is a characterization of unjust war may be seen from the fact that it terms aggression "the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force."7 The definition of aggression differs from Article 2(4) in that it includes a reference to sovereignty not present in the latter. This does not, however, mean that it is a wider charac- terization of unjust war than Article 2(4), for an armed attack on a state's sovereignty would be barred by the latter's catchall phrase "in- consistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Thus, the defini- tion of aggression is not really an emendation of Article 2(4). Rather, it should be viewed as an attempt to conceptualize and label the of- fense at issue in Article 2(4). It attempts to give a sharp statement of principle. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the General As- sembly in I946 adopted the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal as UN policy. Article 6 of this Charter includes among the crimes against peace "waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of interna- tional treaties, agreements, or assurances. 8 This appears to be wider in scope than the definition of aggression, in that a war of aggression is only one type of criminal war. However, an argument similar to the one just given can be made here. Wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances are without question "inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations," and hence fall under the definition of aggression; the Nuremberg Charter and the definition of aggression are thus extensionally equivalent. It appears, then, that the definition of aggression captures what is essential in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the relevant clause in the Nuremberg Charter. Thus, we may say that the UN position boils down to this: ( i ) A war is unjust if and only if it is aggressive. 6. Quoted in Yehuda Melzer, Concepts of Just War (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1975), pp. 28-29. 7. Ibid. 8. Quoted in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 545. This content downloaded from 130.234.10.199 on Mon, 20 Jan 2014 03:02:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions i63 Just War and Human Rights This gives us a characterization of unjust war, which is half of what we want. The other half emerges from Article 51 of the UN Charter: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations....9 This tells us, at least in part, what a just war is. Thus, we have (2) A war is just if it is a war of self-defense (against aggression). We note that "just" and "unjust" do not, logically speaking, exhaust the possibilities, since it is (just barely) possible that a war which is not fought in self-defense also does not threaten the sovereignty, terri- torial integrity, or political independence of any state, nor violate in- ternational treaties, agreements, or assurances. Now the expression "just war" suggests "permissible war" rather than "righteous war"; if so, then any war which is not specifically proscribed should be just. It is perhaps better, then, to make the two characterizations exhaustive of the possibilities. This can be done in two ways. Either (i) can be expanded to (i') A war is unjust if and only if it is not just, used in conjunction with (2), or (2) can be relaxed to (2') A war is just if and only if it is not unjust, used in conjunction with ( i ). Overall, it appears that the conjunction of (I') and (2), which makes every war except a war of self-defense unjust, is more in the spirit of the UN Charter than the more permis- sive conjunction of (i) and (2').
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