288 Political and security questions

Chapter IV Political and security questions Asia and the Pacific

The year 2003 was a challenging one for the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for United Nations in the Asia and Pacific region as Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, continued to co- the war in Iraq severely tested the principle of ordinate UN activities in the country. collective security and the resilience of the Or- The war in Iraq, which began on 20 March, se- ganization. verely tested the cohesiveness and purpose of In Afghanistan, the security situation contin- the United Nations. Rarely in its 58-year history ued to endanger the peace process. Increased had such dire forecasts been made about the Or- terrorist activity, factional fighting and activities ganization. On 19 August, the UN headquarters associated with the illegal narcotics trade posed in Baghdad was subjected to a deliberate and vi- the greatest challenges to stability and socio- cious terrorist attack. The Secretary-General’s economic development. Lack of security in cer- Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de tain parts of the country forced the United Mello, and 21other persons were killed and many Nations to suspend its mission support in four others were wounded. The attack dealt a severe southern provinces. Despite those setbacks, pro- blow to the ability of the United Nations to assist gress continued to be made in implementing the Iraq in the post-war phase. Prior to the com- 2001 Bonn Agreement. Constructive events in- mencement of military action, the United cluded the beginning of the demobilization, dis- Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection armament and reintegration programme, the Commission and the International Atomic En- drafting of a constitution, the commencement of ergy Agency carried out extensive inspection ac- the electoral registration process and the conven- tivities in Iraq and provided the Security Council ing of a nationwide constitutional assembly, or with periodic updates on their findings. The Loya Jirga. In May, the Afghan Transitional Council convened repeatedly at the ministerial Authority (TA ), led by President Hamid Karzai, level to discuss the situation in Iraq. Three secured an agreement with provincial governors permanent members of the Council strongly and commanders that prohibited provincial opposed the use of force. On 17 March, the leaders from simultaneously holding civil and Secretary-General suspended UN activities in military positions and called for the centraliza- Iraq and the following day withdrew all UN tion of customs revenues; however, those com- system personnel. As at 19 March, UN inspectors mitments were only partially implemented by the reported that they had not found any evidence of end of the year. The United Nations Assistance proscribed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) continued to though the time available to them was considered assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agree- insufficient to complete an overall assessment. ment and in reconstruction. The Security Coun- UN personnel started returning to Iraq in April, cil established an electoral unit within UNAMA to following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s re- assist the TA with preparations for the holding of gime by coalition forces, led by the United States. national elections, scheduled to take place in The Coalition Provisional Authority was estab- 2004. UNAMA’s mandate was extended for an ad- lished by the occupying forces to provide for the ditional period of one year. A Council mission provisional administration of Iraq. In July, the visited Afghanistan from 31October to 7 Novem- Authority established the Governing Council of ber to reaffirm its support for the peace process. Iraq, the principal body of the Iraqi interim The Security Council expanded the mandate of administration. An escalation of attacks against the International Security Assistance Force, the United Nations and other foreign organiza- which continued to assist the TA in the mainte- tions, which started in August 2003, led the nance of security in the capital, Kabul, to allow it Secretary-General to temporarily relocate all UN to operate in areas outside Kabul and its envi- international staff outside the country. Although rons. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq assumed leadership of the Force in August. The was established in August, its core was set up in Council also adopted new sanctions against Nicosia, Cyprus, due to the deteriorating security Osama bin Laden, the terrorist organization Al- situation. In November, the Authority and the Qaida, the Taliban and their associates. The Governing Council signed an agreement setting

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 289 out a political process for the restoration of sover- bodian law and international law committed dur- eignty by 30 June 2004, and for the drafting of a ing the period of Democratic Kampuchea. Those new constitution and the holding of national negotiations resulted in the preparation of a draft elections. Following the end of major military agreement between the United Nations and Cam- hostilities, the Security Council lifted civilian bodia, which the General Assembly approved in sanctions on Iraq. Consequently, the Council’s May, and which was signed on 6 June. Sanctions Committee and the humanitarian oil- Particular attention was paid to developments for-food programme were phased out over a pe- in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as riod of six months and terminated on 21 Novem- the country informed the Security Council in ber 2003 after 13 years of a comprehensive sanc- January that it was putting into effect its 1993 de- tions regime. The Council established the cision to withdraw from the 1968 Treaty on the international Advisory and Monitoring Board, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The an independent oversight body, to monitor oil activities of the United Nations Tajikistan Office sales in Iraq, and established a new committee of Peace-building were extended for another to continue identifying individuals and entities year, until 1 June 2004, in order to continue to affiliated with the former Iraqi regime for the support Tajikistan in its post-conflict peace- purpose of freezing their funds, financial assets building efforts. Among other concerns in the re- and economic resources. The fall of the Hussein gion that were brought to the attention of the regime led to the discovery of mass graves in Iraq United Nations were the deterioration of law and and the identification of remains, including order in Solomon Islands and the situation in those of Kuwaiti missing persons. In March, the Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. mandate of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Ob- servation Mission was suspended and most of its staff evacuated. The Mission maintained a small peacekeeping force in Kuwait City to sup- Afghanistan port, among other things, UN humanitarian as- sistance programmes for Iraq. In July, the Coun- cil extended the Mission’s mandate for a final During 2003, further progress was made in im- three-month period, until 6 October. On 13 De- plementing the 2001 Bonn Agreement [YUN 2001, cember, Saddam Hussein was captured by Coali- p. 263], which had set in motion Afghanistan’s tion forces. transition from war and instability to peace and During the year, Timor-Leste continued to es- democracy. Major steps included the pilot phase tablish and strengthen its national institutions of the demobilization, disarmament and reinte- with assistance from the United Nations Mission gration programme, the drafting of a constitu- of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and UN tion, the beginning of electoral registration and agencies. The Timorese civil administration and the convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga police force progressively assumed greater re- (grand council), which was still in session as at sponsibility in their respective areas. However, in 31 December. However, the deterioration in response to violent attacks by armed elements in security, brought about by increased terrorist ac- January and February, the Security Council de- tivity, factional fighting, activities associated with cided to slow down the downsizing schedule for the narcotics trade and unchecked criminality, the military and police components of UNMISET. impeded the peace process. The absence of a se- The Mission’s mandate was extended for a fur- cure environment led the United Nations to sus- ther year, until 20 May 2004. Relations between pend its mission support in four southern prov- Indonesia and Timor-Leste continued to im- inces. The Afghan Transitional Authority (TA ), prove, although the two countries did not reach a led by President Hamid Karzai, enacted security final agreement on a provisional border line by reform measures and, in May, through the the target date of 30 November. The ratification Afghan National Security Council, forbade the of the Timor Sea Treaty between Timor-Leste use of private militias and called for the transfer and Australia paved the way for the exploitation of provincial revenues to the TA . of mineral resources in the Timor Sea and the The United Nations Assistance Mission in sharing of revenues, with 90 per cent being Afghanistan (UNAMA), under the leadership of awarded to Timor-Leste. the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, In 2003, the United Nations resumed negotia- Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), continued its efforts tions with the Government of Cambodia on on behalf of Afghanistan throughout the year, the establishment of extraordinary chambers together with its partner organizations. In within the existing court structure of Cambodia March, the Security Council extended UNAMA’s for the prosecution of serious violations of Cam- mandate to provide support for the implementa-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 290 Political and security questions tion of the Bonn Agreement for an additional S/2003/333], 23 July [A/57/850-S/2003/754 & Corr.1] period of one year. The Council also established and 30 December [S/2003/1212]. The reports de- an electoral unit within UNAMA to assist the TA scribed the status of implementation of the 2001 with preparations for the national elections, Bonn Agreement, in particular the work of scheduled for 2004. Noting the link between the TA ; political and security issues; humanitar- drug trafficking and terrorism, the Council fur- ian relief, recovery and reconstruction; develop- ther called for coordinated efforts to combat ments regarding UN deployment in Afghani- the drug trade in Afghanistan. stan; and UNAMA’s activities and mandate. In a A Security Council mission visited Afghani- 3 December report to the Assembly [A/58/616], stan in October/November with the primary which focused on international assistance for purpose of reaffirming the international com- the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the Secretary- munity’s support for the peace process and to General described key political and humanita- send a strong signal to the Afghan people that rian developments from July 2002 to November their plight remained high on the Council’s 2003. agenda. The mission, among other things, called Security Council consideration (January and for an end to factional fighting. February). The Security Council discussed the In January, the Council also adopted new sanc- situation in Afghanistan on 31 January [meeting tions measures against Osama bin Laden, Al- 4699] and 24 February [meeting 4711]. Qaida, the Talibanand their associates, including On 31 January, the Council was briefed by the a freeze of financial and economic assets, a travel Special Representative of the Secretary-General ban and an arms embargo. In order to clarify its for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, who said that identity and mandate, the Afghanistan Sanctions in 2003 Afghanistan would have to strengthen Committee changed its name to the Security and rebuild the foundations of the State, address Council Committee established pursuant to reso- the political and security uncertainties and meet lution 1267(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 265] concerning Al- the rising expectations of its people. To that end, Qaida and the Talibanand associated individuals President Hamid Karzai had been discussing and entities. Although the Committee’s consoli- with the United Nations and other partners the dated list remained a critical tool for implement- need for the Afghan Government to articulate a ing all sanctions measures, it was felt that there clear plan of action setting out the main goals for was a need to further upgrade the list’s informa- 2003. Broadly, there was a need to focus on three tion quality. The Monitoring Group was reap- main areas: strengthening the key State institu- pointed to monitor the implementation of the tions; national reconciliation; and reconstruction sanctions measures for a further period of one projects throughout the country. With respect to year. State institutions, progress had to be made on The International Security Assistance Force building the army and training and reform of the (ISAF), a multinational force established by police. The drafting and ratification of the new Security Council resolution 1386(2001) [YUN 2001, constitution would also be a fundamental State- p. 267], continued to assist the Afghan Govern- building exercise. With respect to national recon- ment in the maintenance of security in Kabul ciliation, the political base supporting the peace and its surrounding areas. The North Atlantic process had to be broadened as too many Af- Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed lead com- ghans felt excluded from the Government and mand for ISAF in August, replacing Germany and the political transformation that Afghanistan was the Netherlands. Those two countries had as- undergoing. As to reconstruction, Afghans had sumed lead command in February 2003 from to be presented with clearly identified projects Turkey. In October, the Council expanded ISAF’s that could build the economy and increase confi- mandate to allow it to support the TA in the main- dence in the Government. Some reports sug- tenance of security in areas outside of Kabul and gested that support for the Taliban was growing its environs. in some parts of Afghanistan, a reminder that the The Economic and Social Council, in July, peace process was far from secure. adopted resolution 2003/43 on the situation of The security situation on the ground during women and girls in Afghanistan (see p. 1175). January had been relatively calm, with no out- break of major, sustained fighting. However, security incidents continued to occur as a result Situation in Afghanistan of inter-factional tension and sporadic terrorist The situation in Afghanistan in 2003 was de- activity. Although tensions had been reduced in scribed by the Secretary-General in three pro- parts of the country through mediation, the high gress reports to the Security Council and the rate of criminal activity by armed groups in and General Assembly dated 18 March [A/57/762- around the city of Mazar-e-Sharif and attacks

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 291 against the United States–led coalition forces ing in the fields of investigations and monitor- continued. The Afghan TA continued to imple- ing, human rights education, promotion of the ment its agenda for security sector reform. In rights of women and transitional justice. January,subcommissions for the recruitment of a The United Nations Transitional Assistance new national army and for the demobilization Programme for Afghanistan (TA PA ) [YUN 2002, and disarmament of former combatants were p. 900] reflected an agreement between the TA and established. France and the United States, which the UN assistance agencies on relief, recovery were providing training for the new army, and reconstruction programmes and their link- estimated that by the end of 2003 approximately age to national priorities identified by the 7,000 soldiers would have completed the basic Afghan Government itself. TAPA aimed to ame- training course. Japan had committed signifi- liorate the underlying causes of humanitarian cant funding to the Afghan New Beginnings Pro- needs and to establish the foundation for rehabil- gramme, aimed at registering soldiers and, itation and long-term development. TAPA’s aims through a series of benefits and training pack- included the Mine Action Programme’s target to ages, assisting them in their reintegration into clear high-impact areas of mines and unex- civilian life. The German-led national police ploded ordnance within five years and prepara- training project was providing training for some tions for the national census. 1,450 police officers. However, the TA continued Illegal drug production and trafficking in to face difficulties in paying police salaries. Afghanistan remained a critical concern, with In the justice sector, the Afghan Judicial Com- significant poppy cultivation resuming in 2002 mission’s draft plan for legislative and constitu- after several years of reduced production. Certain tional reform and the rebuilding of the judicial aspects of the drug economy—such as the refining system was being finalized in consultation with and transportation of drug products—were driven Italy, the lead nation in support of that sector, the by the opportunity for massive and illicit profit, UN and its agencies and donors. Progress in es- which, in the past, had been used to nurture a war tablishing the rule of law would continue to be economy. The TA had launched a poppy eradica- constrained by the depleted pool of experienced tion programme in conjunction with the governors lawyers and the limited capacity of the penal ofthefivemaindrug-producingprovinces.Al- system. On 27 January, the Constitutional Draft- though it was too early to evaluate the effectiveness ing Commission, together with UNAMA and of that campaign, it was clear that alternative liveli- the United Nations Development Programme hoods in drug-producing areas were needed for the (UNDP), met with donors and interested Member eradication programme to be sustainable over the States represented in Kabul to discuss the consti- long term. tutional process. The Commission was expected On 24 February, the Council was briefed on to finalize a preliminary draft by March. That the latest developments in Afghanistan by Jean- draft would be reviewed by the full Constitu- Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General (USG) tional Commission, whose 30 or so members were for Peacekeeping Operations. Also participating being selected. From April through early June, in the meeting were Harald Braun, Special Rep- the Constitutional Commission was to conduct resentative of the German Government for the countrywide public consultations to discern the training of the Afghan police force, at the request public’s view on key constitutional issues. Taking of Germany [S/2003/200], and Mutsuyoshi Ni- into account the results of those consultations, shimura, Ambassador of Japan in charge of the Commission would finalize a draft by late Au- Afghan Aid Coordination, at the request of gust. The final step would be the convening of a Japan [S/2003/209]. Loya Jirga (grand council), tentatively scheduled The USG said that progress had been made for October, to review and adopt the constitution. with respect to the implementation of the politi- As for the elections scheduled to take place in cal transition outlined in the 2001 Bonn Agree- June 2004, UNAMA, assisted by the Electoral ment [YUN 2001, p. 263], especially in the drafting of Assistance Division of the UN Department of a new constitution. President Karzai’s office was Political Affairs, was in the process of assembling preparing a decree that would establish the Con- an electoral team in Kabul to assist the TA on elec- stitutional Commission and detail the main ele- toral matters and to help build electoral capacity ments of the constitutional process. The nine inside that Government. The Afghan Independ- members of the functioning Constitutional ent Human Rights Commission had been imple- Drafting Commission would be made part of the menting its work programme with the support larger Constitutional Commission, to be estab- of UNAMA, the Office of the United Nations lished in March. A list of almost 80 candidates High Commissioner for Human Rights and for possible selection to the Commission had UNDP. That programme covered capacity-build- been compiled by President Karzai’s office. Pub-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 292 Political and security questions lic consultations on the constitutional process reformed. Security sector reform was all the would take place between April and June more urgent because of the need to provide mini- throughout the country and among the Afghan mal conditions of stability to ensure that the Con- diaspora in Iran and Pakistan. Technical assist- stitutional Loya Jirga and the national elections ance from UNAMA, UNDP, bilateral donors and were meaningful and credible. The United academic sources had been made available to the Nations had established four trust funds for con- Drafting Commission and its secretariat. Pro- tributions to the police, the justice sector, disarm- gress had also been made in the preparations for ament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) the elections, scheduled for June 2004. On of former combatants and the payment of sala- 15 February, President Karzai sent the Secretary- ries, and the provision of non-lethal equipment General a letter formally requesting UNAMA’s as- to the Afghan national army. While support from sistance in organizing the electoral process and the international community was necessary, the coordinating international electoral assistance. political underpinnings of security sector reform The head of UNAMA’s electoral section, who had had to be strengthened by the deeds and words of arrived in Kabul, had begun to work on prepara- the TA . tions for the elections. A core team of electoral Mr. Nishimura said that Afghanistan was still experts was in the process of being deployed to replete with weapons and armaments and, de- UNAMA. On the Afghan side, President Karzai spite some notable progress, there was a high had identified a number of candidates for mem- level of tension between the armed formations. bership in the electoral commission, which was Nation-building could not succeed under those expected to be formed in March. Once the com- conditions, nor could national reconciliation be mission was established, it would work with achieved. For the people of Afghanistan, the res- UNAMA to create an Afghan electoral authority to toration of peace and the rule of law was their manage the electoral process. At the same time, greatest aspiration. There was unanimous agree- the TA was finalizing its budget for the next fi- ment among all parties that DDR of soldiers and nancial year, which would begin on 21March. Af- officers was of the highest priority. However, a ghans were optimistic that the international com- new national army and national police force also munity would fulfil the commitments it had had to be created to allow the State to exercise the already made for 2003. The TA looked forward to sole enforcement capacity. Counter-narcotics ac- receiving between $1.7 billion and $2 billion in tions and an independent judiciary were likewise aid for 2003. However, it was concerned about necessary. Mindful of those considerations, Pres- the slow pace of allocations. ident Karzai, on 1 December 2002 [YUN 2002, While the Bonn process had averted full-scale p. 271], had issued a decree outlining principles fighting between major rival factions, Afghans and conditions with respect to security, the mili- continued to suffer on a human level from the tary and DDR. The decree stated that a new Af- insecurity created by the conjunction of weak na- ghanistan National Army (ANA) would be created tional security institutions and strong local com- of not more than 70,000 soldiers. More impor- manders. In eastern Afghanistan, the Govern- tantly, the decree stipulated that military forma- ment’s poppy-eradication campaign continued to tions, armed groups and any other military or face strong opposition from local tribes who did paramilitary units that were not a part of ANA not feel they had been offered sufficient compen- would be prohibited. On 11 January 2003, Pres- sation. UN activities had been suspended in four ident Karzai took further steps to move ahead districts in Nargarhar as a result of that tension. with DDR by issuing decrees establishing four Despite a general sense of concern about security government commissions. Nevertheless, it was conditions across the country, the handover of anticipated that DDR in Afghanistan would be ISAF command from Turkey to Germany and the difficult in view of the heavy legacy of factional Netherlands proceeded smoothly (see p. 308). rivalries. The fact that a new army had to be built The challenges of reforming the Afghan in parallel with DDR added to the complexity of security sector were significant: the national the undertaking. Japan had pledged a contribu- army needed to be built, factional armies had to tion of $35 million to jump-start the Partnership be dissolved, and assistance had to be provided to for Peace Programme, a basic component of help ex-combatants reintegrate into civilian life. the DDR process. Ultimately, the success of DDR There was also a need for the creation of a na- would depend on the economic capacity of the tional police force, the re-establishment of the country itself and on its ability to generate rule of law, the rehabilitation of the justice sector enough job opportunities to absorb former and the countering of the cultivation of and traf- combatants. ficking in illicit drugs. Finally,the bloated and in- Mr. Braun said that Germany had assumed the trusive intelligence structures also needed to be lead role in rebuilding the Afghan police force.

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Based on an assessment carried out in 2002 by of State or Government expressed concern that German and Afghan experts and in coordination terrorist groups in Afghanistan, including for- with other lead nations in the security sector, a mer Taliban cadres, were regrouping in the three-stage timetable was established. In the first southern and eastern parts of the country. stage, starting with the Bonn process in late 2001 On 18 March [S/2003/335], Portugal, Spain, the [YUN 2001, p. 263] and running to the Emergency United Kingdom and the United States trans- Loya Jirga in June 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 266], the basic mitted to the Security Council President the text structures of the new national police were created of a statement entitled “Commitment to transat- in Kabul. The second stage, which was under lantic solidarity” adopted at the Atlantic Summit way and set to last until the 2004 parliamentary (Azores, Portugal, 16 March). The four countries elections, comprised the consolidation and ex- said, among other things, that they were working pansion of central structures in Kabul and the to bring security to Afghanistan and to root out gradual extension of those structures into the the terrorists that remained inside Afghan terri- provinces. The third stage would ensure the tory. (For further details on the Summit, see functionality of federal and provincial police p. 332.) forces and their interlinking with other security Report of Secretary-General (March). In his structures, in addition to the gradual withdrawal 18 March report on the situation in Afghanistan of Germany as a lead nation by the end of 2005. and its implications for international peace and The implementation of the timetable faced some security [A/57/762-S/2003/333], submitted in re- difficulties: the security situation had not signifi- sponse to Security Council resolution 1401(2002) cantly improved, with the exception of Kabul, [YUN 2002, p. 264] and General Assembly resolu- where ISAF guaranteed a reasonably secure envi- tions 57/113 A [ibid., p. 273] and 57/113 B [ibid., ronment; regional cooperation in the effort to in- p. 900], the Secretary-General summarized the key clude all provinces in police training had not developments in Afghanistan since his 21 Octo- been uniformly satisfactory; progress had been ber 2002 report [ibid., p. 269]. He said that progress difficult in the reconstruction of other security had been made by the Afghan TA , supported by sectors, such as the army and in the fight against UNAMA, in implementing the Bonn Agreement. illicit drugs; and financing had also been a prob- The consolidation of government authority by lem. Notwithstanding those restraining factors, the TA , in particular through the adoption of a the timetable remained on course. Among other national development budget, the successful things, the groundwork had been laid for a func- completion of a currency reform operation, and tioning police force in Kabul; training courses for the implementation of national programmes to police officers had begun; the reorganization of provide clear, tangible economic benefits to the the police and of the Ministry of the Interior was Afghan population had advanced. Progress was making good progress; and the integration of the also made in key political processes to further provinces into the police rebuilding programme the transition towards a multi-ethnic, gender- had commenced. A strategy for national police sensitive and fully representative Afghan Gov- reconstruction through 2005 that was synchro- ernment. They included the Afghan-led consti- nized with advances in demobilization and tutional process, by which a draft constitution armed forces build-up was being fine-tuned by was to be prepared by March 2003, followed by the Ministry of the Interior. However, much public consultations and a Constitutional Loya remained to be done before the Bonn process Jirga. Another key process was the preparation of became irreversible and before the Afghan national elections to be held in June 2004. The Government could acquire the structures and Electoral Assistance Division of the UN Depart- gain the experience necessary for carrying for- ment of Political Affairs was working with ward the building process on its own. UNAMA to define the modalities for assistance. Following the open meeting, the Council held Security remained the most serious challenge a constructive exchange of views [S/PV.4712] with facing the peace process. Afghans in many parts Mr. Braun and the USG for Peacekeeping Opera- of the country remained unprotected by legiti- tions. mate State security structures. Criminal activity Communications (March). On 4 March [A/57/ by armed groups was particularly evident in the 759-S/2003/332], Malaysia, as Chairman of the Co- north, east and south, and in many areas confron- ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Move- tation between local commanders continued to ment, transmitted to the Secretary-General the contribute to instability, while sporadic acts of documents adopted at the Thirteenth Confer- terror continued to occur all too frequently. Re- ence of Heads of State or Government of the ports from several sources in the first months of Non-Aligned Countries (Kuala Lumpur, 20- 2003 pointed to increased activity by elements 25 February). In the Final Document, the heads hostile to the Government and to the interna-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 294 Political and security questions tional community in Afghanistan. It appeared often by forces under the control of regional fac- that remnant Taliban groups were trying to reor- tions or local commanders. The internally ganize in the south-eastern and eastern border displaced persons situation had stabilized some- areas. However, some progress was made in what, though families were still moving from security sector reform in January with the cre- the north in search of assistance. The return of ation of four commissions to coordinate the re- the approximately 480,000 internally displaced lated processes of DDR and the building of the na- persons to their home communities would de- tional army. The reorganization and training of pend on an improvement in the drought-affected ANA troops by France and the United States con- areas, the resolution of land disputes and tinued; six ANA battalions had been created with political developments in the north. newly trained troops and some ANA units had UNAMA had completed the task of assimilating been deployed on limited operations outside the personnel and equipment of the United Kabul where they conducted patrols and sup- Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan and the ported local disarmament efforts. Those deploy- United Nations Office for the Coordination of ments, which had been generally well received by Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. The local populations, had demonstrated that the Secretary-General proposed adjustments to new army was developing as a professional and UNAMA’s structure in a few key areas, the most disciplined force. The creation of an effective important of which concerned small additions to national army and police depended on the suc- the military and police adviser’s units, and the es- cessful reintegration into civilian life of members tablishment of an electoral section headed by a of non-official military formations. On 22 Feb- senior expert and supported by an appropriately ruary, Japan, as lead nation for DDR,hosteda sized team. conference in Tokyo to mobilize international The Secretary-General observed that the TA support for the process. Contributions and and the international community, along with pledges totalling $50.7 million were made. Japan UNAMA, could draw satisfaction from a number pledged $35 million to UNDP for DDR. Progress of significant accomplishments: the timetable of was also made in rebuilding the national police the Bonn Agreement had largely been kept; some force. Discussions were under way on the reor- 1.5 million refugees and 500,000 internally dis- ganization of the Ministry of the Interior; the placed persons had returned to their homes; a German-led police training programme contin- comprehensive national budget had been de- ued; and the Government had taken steps to en- veloped; and no major outbreak of fighting had sure the accountability of its police force. The Ju- occurred. At the same time, Afghanistan’s peace dicial Commission, entrusted with reforming the process remained fragile. Insecurity and the lack justice sector, had identified a set of priorities, of law and order continued to impact negatively which included rehabilitation of court premises on the lives of Afghans, whittling away at the and short training programmes for judges and support for the transitional process. Too many other law officers. Afghans remained dissatisfied at the pace of Poppy cultivation and the production of and reconstruction and economic development and trafficking in drugs remained a major concern, far too many remained uncertain as to whether both nationally and internationally. Afghanistan, the transitional process was truly national, pro- once again, was expected to be the largest pro- viding political space and equal opportunities to ducer of opium in 2003. Crop eradication, based all Afghans regardless of their political or ethnic on a presidential decree, was reportedly taking affiliation. After 23 years of war, the progress place in many parts of the country, though verifi- made in 2002 had begun to shore up the fragile cation remained problematic. The success of the foundations of peace, but stability and national eradication campaign would depend upon credi- reconciliation were by no means firmly consoli- ble police enforcement and the availability of al- dated. That goal required progress on a number ternative sources of livelihoods to farmers. The of fronts in 2003. Key State institutions had to be United Kingdom, the lead nation in that sector, entrenched and more control over the continuing was working closely with a core group of govern- problem of security and lawlessness had to be ment ministries, donors and the United Nations achieved. The army and police would be key to integrate anti-drug activities and identify institutions in that respect and progress in the alternative livelihood projects. overall DDR reform effort would help to promote In Afghanistan in general, the lack of ade- an improved human rights environment, eco- quate national security and law enforcement nomic development and the Government’s abil- capacity and the weakness of the justice system ity to enhance its authority and legitimacy. Suc- exacerbated human rights violations. Abuses cess in the constitution-drafting process would were committed in all parts of the country, most provide the legal foundations for the institutions

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 295 of a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. Specific and the fight against illicit drugs were para- preparations for elections in 2004 would also mount. Meetings were taking place in Kabul on a have to be advanced in 2003. regular basis to allow the heads of national com- Security Council consideration (27 March). missions, the various lead nations and UNAMA to On 27 March [meeting 4727], the Security Council come together to supervise cooperation among discussed the situation in Afghanistan. Assistant themselves on security sector reforms and to Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations push various programmes and processes for- Hédi Annabi said that UNAMA’s focus over the ward. The reforms had to be coupled with a pol- next year would be to continue to assist the TA to itical transformation process, of which the draft- consolidate its authority throughout the country ing of a new constitution and preparations for and implement national policies that reached the general elections in 2004 were key components. entire nation. That effort would require enhanc- In order to support the elections, and following ing administrative capacity, carrying out security a February request by President Karzai, the sector reform and furthering the political trans- Secretary-General had proposed the establish- formation towards representative government. ment of an electoral section within UNAMA. Elec- The determination of the Afghan Government toral consultants, who had already been deployed to take the leading role in rebuilding its State and to UNAMA to assist the Government with the the economy was demonstrated during prepara- election preparation process, had confirmed that tions for the 2003 national budget, which was the holding of a registration and election would presented to donors at the Afghanistan Develop- be a very complex exercise. The United Nations ment Forum (Kabul, 13-14 March) and at the Af- envisioned an electoral section within UNAMA ghanistan High-level Strategic Forum (Brussels, that would be able to provide expert advice and Belgium, 17 March). The budget set the role of technical assistance to the Afghan electoral man- the State as regulator and guarantor of social agement body on such issues as voter registration, well-being and enshrined the principles of geo- voter education, the development of political graphic equity in the allocation of resources. party laws and the development of the electoral It provided for some $2.26 billion in expendi- system itself. A certain amount of institutional ture. The TA estimated that it would collect inter- development had to occur and an adequate level nal revenues of $200 million and donors had of security had to be in place if the elections were pledged $1.87 billion to date, leaving a funding to be meaningful and credible. The Afghan gap of around $191 million in the 2003 budget. At Government had to continue to establish the the heart of the budget process was the issue of framework for future elections and UNAMA’s government ownership and leadership in setting electoral section had to be established and national priorities for the overall reconstruction provided with adequate resources. agenda—in other words, of transforming an ad hoc system that developed during the years of SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (March) civil war, when non-governmental organizations On 28 March [meeting 4730], the Security Coun- (NGOs), the United Nations and other interna- cil unanimously adopted resolution 1471(2003). tional organizations gradually assumed some The draft [S/2003/380] was prepared in consulta- State functions related to the delivery of services, tions among Council members. into one where the State itself had the capacity to The Security Council, exercise its responsibility for national develop- Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, ment. The United Nations had supported that in particular resolution 1401(2002) of 28 March 2002 transformation, working with and within minis- establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in tries to build their capacity and coordinating UN Afghanistan, programme priorities with national programme Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity priorities. The TA had already taken steps to of Afghanistan, as well as its endorsement of the Dec- effect that transformation, in particular through laration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, signed by the a currency exchange exercise; through staffing Transitional Administration of Afghanistan and the changes that better reflected the ethnic composi- Governments of the People’s Republic of China, the tion of the population; and through the establish- Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Paki- ment of a number of commissions. Despite that stan, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the progress, a number of challenges remained, in Republic of Uzbekistan, the States neighbouring Af- ghanistan, in Kabul on 22 December 2002 and its call particular the need to strengthen the links be- upon all States to respect and support the implementa- tween Kabul and the provinces and to augment tion of the provisions thereof, the capacity of the provincial and local govern- Recognizing the Transitional Administration as the ments. Since the lack of security threatened the sole legitimate Government of Afghanistan pending peace process at all levels, security sector reform democratic elections to be held by June 2004, and reit-

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erating its strong support for the full implementation Communication (May). On 1 May [A/57/805- of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Af- S/2003/523], Tajikistan, as chair of the Collective ghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Perma- Security Treaty Organization, transmitted to the nent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn, Ger- many, on 5 December 2001 (the Bonn Agreement), in Secretary-General the 28 April statement of the particular annex II regarding the role of the United heads of State of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Nations during the interim period, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Ta- Recognizing also that the United Nations must con- jikistan issued at a meeting in Dushanbe. The tinue to play its central and impartial role in the inter- participants said that there was a need to coordi- national efforts to assist the Afghan people in consoli- nate and harmonize action by the international dating peace in Afghanistan and rebuilding their community to find a final solution to the Afghan country, crisis and to bring about post-conflict develop- 1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan for an ad- ment in Afghanistan. ditional period of twelve months from the date of Security Council consideration (May). On adoption of the present resolution; 6May[meeting 4750], the Security Council dis- 2. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of cussed the situation in Afghanistan and heard a 18 March 2003 and the recommendations contained briefing on the latest developments by the Spe- therein, endorses the proposal of the Secretary- cial Representative of the Secretary-General for General that an electoral unit be established within the Mission, and encourages Member States to support the Afghanistan, Mr. Brahimi. United Nations electoral activities in Afghanistan; Mr. Brahimi said that although specific aspects 3. Stresses that the continued provision of focused of the Bonn Agreement were proceeding, the recovery and reconstruction assistance can contribute process as a whole was challenged by the deterio- significantly to the implementation of the Bonn ration in the security environment: daily harass- Agreement and, to this end, urges bilateral and multi- ment and intimidation; inter-ethnic and inter- lateral donors to coordinate closely with the Special factional strife; greater activity on the part of Representative of the Secretary-General and with the Transitional Administration, in particular through the elements linked to the Talibanand to the warlord Afghan Consultative Group process; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic 4. Stresses also, in the context of paragraph 3 above, fundamentalist group Hizb-I-Islami; and the that while humanitarian assistance should be provided drug economy. The process was also challenged wherever there is a need, recovery or reconstruction by the fact that national security institutions were assistance ought to be provided, through the Transi- perceived by many Afghans, perhaps the major- tional Administration, and implemented effectively, ity, as not serving the broad national interests of where local authorities demonstrate a commitment to maintaining a secure environment, respecting human all the people of Afghanistan. rights and countering narcotics; In an important step forward towards meeting 5. Reaffirms its strong support for the Special Repre- the time frame set out in Bonn for convening the sentative of the Secretary-General and the concept of a Constitutional Loya Jirga, the Constitutional fully integrated Mission, and endorses the full author- Commission was inaugurated on 26 April. Com- ity of the Special Representative, in accordance with its posed of 35 members, including seven women, relevant resolutions, over all United Nations activities the Commission represented the full ethnic, in Afghanistan; 6. Requests the Mission, with the support of the regional and religious diversity of the Afghan Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for people. The previously established Drafting Human Rights, to continue to assist the Afghan Inde- Committee had prepared a preliminary draft pendent Human Rights Commission in the full imple- constitution; over the summer months, the Com- mentation of the human rights provisions of the Bonn mission was to consult the public on their views Agreement and the National Human Rights Pro- and aspirations related to the constitution. That gramme for Afghanistan, in order to support the pro- would require the members of the Commission tection and development of human rights in Afghani- to break up into subcommittees that would visit stan; 7. Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate with all parts of the country and hold scores of meet- the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and ings with elders, religious and community lead- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its ers, women, intellectuals, traders and ordinary staff throughout the country; people. The United Nations would support and 8. Requests the International Security Assistance participate in those activities. On the basis of its Force, in implementing its mandate in accordance findings, the Commission would finalize a draft with resolution 1444(2002) of 27 November 2002, to constitution and present it to the Constitutional continue to work in close consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative; Loya Jirga, scheduled for October, for its consid- 9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the eration and ratification. In reference to the elec- Council every four months on the implementation of tions, the United Nations was in the process of the present resolution; establishing UNAMA’s electoral unit, and early 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. planning for national voter registration had be-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 297 gun. In order to plan and effectively fulfil bours played a crucial role in helping to ensure UNAMA’s assistance in all phases of the electoral the country’s security,especially since hostile ele- process, the electoral unit would require an ele- ments were reported crossing into Afghanistan ment of assured funding through the assessed over the eastern and southern borders. Pakistan budget. A complementary budget for voluntary had expressed its readiness to address the prob- funding had also been prepared. The registra- lem and had deployed armed forces in the border tion exercise would require the recruitment and areas. Insecurity was also exacerbated by continu- training of some 3,000 Afghans who would have ing factional clashes. The ultimate solution to to spend time in each of the nearly 400 districts such problems was the creation of an Afghan and visit thousands of villages. As in the case with security force capable of ensuring peace. Pres- the consultations of the Constitutional Commis- ident Karzai announced the start date of 22 June sion, that exercise could be conducted only for a DDR programme to be carried out by the within a secure environment. Afghan New Beginnings Programme, supported With regard to the drug economy,the TA was in by the international community, with Japan and the final stage of completing a 10-year national the United Nations in the lead. The planned DDR drug control strategy in an effort to control poppy programme would include those officers and sol- cultivation. diers who were in military formations under the The rate of assisted refugee returns to Af- umbrella of the Ministry of Defence, up to a max- ghanistan increased significantly during April. imum of 100,000 persons. However, before the It was estimated that in 2003, approximately DDR programme could start, there was a need to 600,000 Afghans would return from Pakistan, reform the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 500,000 from Iran and 100,000 from other coun- the Interior and the intelligence structures. En- tries. In the judicial sector, the Judicial Reform couraging progress had been made in the build- Commission had completed a survey of the state ing of a new national army and a national police of the judiciary in 10 provinces and major urban service, but those efforts and the nationwide DDR centres in the country. With respect to the reform programme would be successful only if there was of the public administration, progress, although confidence among all Afghans that the new secu- slow, was picking up, owing in part to the grow- rity structures would serve the interests of the ing role of the Civil Service Commission. whole nation. The senior leaders of the Afghan As to the human rights situation, UNAMA was military met in Kabul on 19 and 20 April to dis- investigating alleged cases of summary execu- cuss the building of the new army. Their verbal tions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, expressions of support for a new multi-ethnic and continuing political intimidation, including army had to be matched by actions to demobilize against women. Fighting and insecurity had led their own forces to ensure that the new army to renewed displacement of Pashtun families. Se- would be under civilian control and the only in- curity remained the central issue. Rivalries strument of force remaining in the country. The among factions and local commanders, impunity Special Representative asked the Security Coun- with regard to human rights violations and daily cil to consider what international measures were harassment of ordinary Afghan citizens by both available to help ensure the security needed for commanders and local security forces were all the Bonn process to proceed effectively. The ex- too common. Forces believed to be associated pansion of ISAF beyond Kabul and a strength- with the Taliban, with Al-Qaida and with the ened Afghan police presence remained part of a warlordHekmatyarhadsteppedupoperations potential response to the question of security. against the coalition as well as against Afghan mil- However, the United Nations Law and Order itary and non-military targets in the south, the Trust Fund for Afghanistan was insufficient to south-east and the east. The threat posed by those allow the Ministry of the Interior to strengthen elements was driven home by the murder of an the Afghan police. Of the $120 million the Trust International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Fund expected to cover needs until June 2004, worker in late March—the first such killing of a only $11 million had been paid into the Fund foreigner since 1998. As the attacks on NGOsand and a further $35 million to $40 million had international organizations became more threat- been pledged. ening, the pressure to suspend or withdraw opera- Communications (June). On 3 June [A/57/824- tions increased. ICRC and a number of NGOs S/2003/619], Iran transmitted to the Secretary- were reducing their operations in the south, with General the documents adopted by the Islamic immediate consequences for key programmes Conference of Foreign Ministers at its thirtieth that provided support to local populations. The session (Tehran, 28-30 May). The Conference, United Nations was also reviewing its operations among other things, called on the international and its security measures. Afghanistan’s neigh- community to assist the Afghan TA to curb the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 298 Political and security questions planting of opium poppies and the production things, to forbid the recruitment of private mili- and trafficking of narcotics and to strengthen the tias and military action unauthorized by the crop substitution programme in Afghanistan. central Government, to reaffirm the ban on any By a 9 June letter to the Council President individual holding both military and civilian [S/2003/641], France transmitted the text of the posts and to dissolve some extragovernmental Paris Statement, issued at the end of the Confer- bodies. The National Security Council decision ence on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Eu- also required that all governors transfer provin- rope (Paris, 21-22 May). The Conference took cial income to the central Government. However, note of the fight against drugs undertaken by the signs that written agreements did not necessarily TA and the international community in Afghani- translate into tangible action were already visible. stan. It called on the international community to For example, the governor of Herat province, support the Afghan National Drug Commission Ismael Khan, had already signalled his unwill- and to encourage action aimed at promoting sus- ingness to yield any authority to Kabul and had tainable alternative development. refused to resign one of his posts. On 10 June [A/58/94-S/2003/642], the Russian On 7 June, a suicide car bomber detonated a Federation transmitted to the Secretary-General large explosive alongside a German ISAF bus, kill- the text of the Declaration of the heads of State of ing four personnel and one bystander and injur- the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Or- ing 29 personnel in the most deadly attack on the ganization (Moscow, 29 May). The members international security force in its 18 months of (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajik- operation. The incident underscored that Kabul istan, Uzbekistan) said that there was a need for was not immune to the security problems of the the elaboration, under UN auspices, of an inter- hinterland. In response to a series of attacks and national strategy for comprehensive action threats to demining teams, the UN Mine Action to counter the threat of illegal drugs from Centre was forced to suspend all activities in 10 Afghanistan. provinces and along the Kabul-Kandahar road. Security Council consideration (June). On 17 In effect, one third of the country was inaccessi- June [meeting 4774], the Security Council discussed ble to the United Nations, which seriously hin- the situation in Afghanistan and was briefed on the dered the ability of the Organization and others latest developments by the USG for Peacekeeping to carry out reconstruction efforts and to lay the Operations, Mr. Guéhenno, and by the Director- groundwork for the Constitutional Loya Jirga, General of the United Nations Office at Vienna for the elections and for DDR. Ultimately,national and Executive Director of the United Nations security structures would have to assume respon- Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa. sibility for domestic security, backed by a func- Mr. Guéhenno said that some positive progress tioning justice system. Satisfactory progress had was made over the preceding month. Most nota- been made in the training of the national army bly, President Karzai took resolute action towards and police forces by the lead nations—the United establishing and affirming the Government’s au- States and Germany, respectively. However, the thority in the provinces. Also, public consulta- funding for the forces’ salaries was inadequate. tions on the constitution commenced and plan- The establishment and deployment of three ning for the electoral process was in its final international civilian-military provincial recon- stages. However, the security situation remained struction teams, with 185 personnel, were assist- a serious impediment to progress and was a ing in improving security in the provinces. Those major risk to the entire process, and the TA ’s au- teams could provide a platform for supporting thority beyond Kabul was still too limited. The security sector reforms and for assisting in the majority of provincial authorities continued to provincial training of police. They could also act with an autonomy that denied the TA the carry out infrastructure work to support govern- means to implement its national development ment authority, such as renovating police sta- plan. Yet the population expected the TA to im- tions, rebuilding courthouses and constructing prove the economic situation and the security barracks for the new Afghan National Army. environment. In a determined effort to assert The commencement of DDR had been made the authority of his Government, President contingent on the implementation of a series of Karzai summoned 12 of the country’s most pow- confidence-building measures, signalling that erful governors and regional commanders to reform of the Ministry of Defence was irrever- Kabul on 20 May and threatened to resign if he sible. failed to secure their full cooperation. The per- Mr. Costa said that less than 1 per cent of the sons brought together committed themselves to land in Afghanistan was devoted to opium poppy implementing a 13-pointdecision of the National cultivation and no more than 6 per cent of its Security Council, which sought, among other families benefited from the resulting illicit in-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 299 come. The slow progress in re-establishing the the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghani- rule of law was hurting the TA ’s ability to reduce stan’s social and economic infrastructure. The the drug economy. In 2003, according to a pre- success of the DDR process, due to commence by liminary survey, opium cultivation appeared to the end of June, was dependent on economic have spread to new areas, while a perceptible de- growth and the creation of employment. With re- crease had taken place in the traditional prov- spect to narcotics, the Afghan Government had inces. On balance, neither the total surface under issued two decrees banning the cultivation, pro- cultivation nor the volume of output was likely to duction, trafficking and consumption of narcotic change significantly from 2002 levels. However, drugs. However, the practical success of the im- in the coming years, Afghanistan would continue plementation of those decrees rested on credible to be the world’s largest opium producer, due to law enforcement and the availability of alterna- the fact that over the past 20 years, the entire tive sources of livelihood for farmers. Supporting Afghan infrastructure in the countryside had the central institutions of Afghanistan in estab- been destroyed, resulting in a war economy in lishing and consolidating effective government which arms, drugs, smuggling and opium had control over the opium-producing areas was provided the means of livelihood, savings, credit essential for any drug control strategy. Likewise, and the means of exchange for almost one fifth other initiatives should focus on re-establishing a of the economy. About 20 per cent of Afghani- sustainable rural economy not only for landown- stan’s gross domestic product was derived from ers but also for seasonal labourers and labour that activity. The drug dealers, among them the forces involved in the opium economy. The TA ’s remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida, had a drug strategy encompassed programmes for al- vested interest in ensuring that the Afghan State ternative livelihoods, the enhancement of the remained weak. In pursuing their goals, they capacity of law enforcement agencies and the im- were fomenting regional strife and nourishing provement of national legislation. The Afghan separatist ambitions and armed conflicts to de- Government was committed to eliminating stabilize the Government. Corruption among opium production through the implementation State officials was also both a cause and a conse- of the national long-term drug control strategy by quence of narco-trafficking in Afghanistan. the year 2013. However, perhaps the greatest threat had come from the spread of HIV/AIDS because of drug in- SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (June) jection. In some of the countries neighbouring On 17 June [meeting 4774], following consulta- Afghanistan, four out of every five new cases of tions among Security Council members, the Pres- HIV infection had been caused in that way. Unless ident made statement S/PRST/2003/7 on be- the problem was brought under control, the risk half of the Council: of a pandemic in the region could not be ex- cluded. In addition, the massive drug trafficking The Security Council reaffirms its strong commit- from Afghanistan endangered economic and ment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial social stability in the countries located along integrity and national unity of Afghanistan. the trafficking routes, thereby fuelling crime, The Council stresses that security remains a seri- money-laundering and terrorist activities beyond ous challenge facing Afghanistan. In particular, the Council expresses its concern over the increased the Afghan border. The Afghan drug economy number of attacks against international and local could be reconverted to one of peace and growth humanitarian personnel, coalition forces, the Inter- if the TA was assisted by neighbouring and consu- national Security Assistance Force and Afghan Tran- mer countries to address the roots of the matter. sitional Administration targets carried out by the The United States said that it was contributing Talibanand other rebel elements. In this regard, the to alternative development, drug treatment and Council condemns in the strongest terms the attack againsttheForceinKabulon7June2003.TheCoun- drug reduction programmes and, in addition, cil also expresses its concern over other security was helping to build Afghan national capacities threats, including from illicit drug trafficking. The for drug policy-making and enforcement. It ex- Council stresses the need to improve the security sit- pressed concern at the upswing in violence in uation in the provinces and further to extend the both Kabul and the provinces. Taliban and Al- authority of the Administration throughout the Qaida elements appeared to be targeting foreign- country. Against this backdrop, the Council under- ers, military and civilian, rather than engaging lines the importance of accelerating the comprehen- sive reform of the security sector of Afghanistan, in- coalition forces. cluding the disarmament, demobilization and Afghanistan said that the consolidation of reintegration of former combatants. peace, security and stability largely depended on The Council welcomes the establishment and de- the international community’s sustained engage- ployment of international civilian-military Provin- ment in providing the necessary assistance for cial Reconstruction Teams in the provinces and en-

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courages States to support further efforts to assist in the elimination of illicit cultivation in Afghanistan. improving security in the regions. The Council welcomes the comprehensive drug The Council believes that constructive and mutu- strategy for Afghanistan as set out in the drugs strat- ally supportive bilateral and regional relations be- egy of the Transitional Administration and calls for tween Afghanistan and all States, and in particular help to be provided within the framework of that its neighbours, based on the principles of mutual re- strategy. The Council also welcomes the Paris Pact, spect and non-interference in each other’s affairs, introduced at the International Conference on Drug are important for stability in Afghanistan. The Routes from Central Asia to Europe, held in Paris on Council calls upon all States to respect the Declara- 21 and 22 May 2003, and thanks the Government of tion on Good-Neighbourly Relations, signed by the France for convening the Conference. Transitional Administration of Afghanistan and the The Council expresses its support for the commit- Governments of the People’s Republic of China, the ment by the Transitional Administration to elimi- Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pa- nate drug production by the year 2013 and its efforts kistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan to implement the decrees prohibiting the cultivation, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, the States neigh- production and processing of the opium poppy, in- bouring Afghanistan, in Kabul on 22 December cluding illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse. 2002 and to support the implementation of the pro- The Council welcomes the significant contribu- visions thereof. tion by the Office on Drugs and Crime and notes that The Council reaffirms the principles established the work of the Office in Afghanistan is restrained in the Political Declaration adopted by the General by the lack, in the opium-growing areas of that Assembly at its twentieth special session, inter alia, country, of general stability and security which the that action against the world drug problem is a com- international community as a whole should endeav- mon and shared responsibility requiring an inte- our to ensure. The Council also welcomes projects grated and balanced approach in full conformity under way by individual States to counter the threat with the purposes and principles of the Charter of of drugs in Afghanistan. Most of these projects are the United Nations and international law. long-term, which is vital to eliminate drugs on a sus- The Council recognizes the links between illicit tainable basis. The Council underscores the pressing drug trafficking and terrorism as well as other forms need to achieve as soon as possible a significant and of crime, and the challenges posed by these activities sustainable decrease in opium production in Af- inside Afghanistan as well as to transit and neigh- ghanistan. bouring States and other States affected by the traf- The Council acknowledges the necessity of coor- ficking in drugs from Afghanistan. dination through the lead nation on this and all other The Council expresses its concern at the increas- issues in Afghanistan and, in this regard, expresses ing risk of the spread of HIV/AIDS associated with its gratitude to the United Kingdom of Great Britain drug abuse in the region and beyond. and Northern Ireland and Germany for their work The Council stresses that security will be en- on counter-narcotics and police issues, respectively. hanced by continued coordinated efforts to combat The Council recognizes the problems caused to the production of illicit drugs in Afghanistan as well neighbouring countries by the increase in Afghan as to interdict narco-trafficking beyond its borders. opium production, as well as the efforts made by The Council recognizes that the effort to counter the them and other countries to interdict illicit drugs. problem of drugs originating in Afghanistan will be The Council stresses the need to promote the effective only when it is integrated into the wider effective realization of anti-drug projects for Af- context of reconstruction and development pro- ghanistan. These efforts can be reinforced through grammes in the country. promulgation of a comprehensive programme of The Council expresses its concern that despite the action in the region and in the States of transit and efforts pursued, the volume of illegal opium produc- destination. The Council notes in this regard a tion inside Afghanistan in 2002 has returned to for- major coordinating capacity available through the mer high levels. The Council notes with concern the Office on Drugs and Crime, and calls upon all those assessment contained in the Opium Rapid Assess- concerned to cooperate with the Office in order to ment Survey of the United Nations Office on Drugs adopt harmonized measures in this area. The Coun- and Crime that opium poppy cultivation has been re- cil notes the call for all those concerned to adopt ported in several districts of Afghanistan for the first compatible and harmonized measures for law en- time. The Council stresses the need to promote the forcement and counter-narcotics efforts through comprehensive international approach, carried out, support for implementation of the drugs strategy of inter alia, under the auspices of the United Nations the Transitional Administration and the Paris Pact, and through other international forums, in support supported by the G-8 Summit held in Evian, France, of the drugs strategy of the Transitional Adminis- on 3 June 2003. The Council urges donor States to tration to eliminate the illicit cultivation of opium work within such a consultative process to maximize poppy. The Council also supports the fight against the effects of their bilateral and multilateral assist- illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors within Af- ance programmes. ghanistan and in neighbouring States and countries The Council urges the international community, along trafficking routes, including increased co- in collaboration with the Office on Drugs and Crime operation among them to strengthen anti-narcotic and in accordance with the drugs strategy of the controls to curb the flow of drugs. Extensive efforts Transitional Administration, to provide assistance to have also to be made to reduce the demand for drugs the Administration that addresses, inter alia, certain globally in order to contribute to the sustainability of key areas, including development of alternative live-

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lihoods and markets, improving national institu- sion of Administrative and Civil Services. The tional capacities, enforcing prohibitions on illicit constitutional process had progressed with the cultivation and manufacturing and trafficking in establishment of the Constitutional Commission, drugs, encouraging demand reduction and building up the effective use of intelligence, including aero- which conducted public consultations through- space monitoring. out the country in June and July. A draft consti- The Council urges the international community, tution would be made public in September and in collaboration with the United Nations Assistance would be discussed at the Constitutional Loya Mission in Afghanistan and the Office on Drugs and Jirga, scheduled for October. Preparations for Crime, to encourage cooperation among affected national elections continued. The TA had de- countries, specifically in strengthening border con- cided to establish an Interim Afghan Election trols, in assisting the flow of information between Commission, which would allow for greater and among appropriate security and law enforce- ment agencies, in combating groups involved in il- Afghan involvement in the electoral process. The licit drug trafficking and related crimes, particularly furthering of the political process, together with money-laundering, in carrying out operational in- reconstruction programmes, the improvement in terdiction activities and controlled deliveries, in en- the human rights situation, counter-narcotics couraging demand reduction and in coordinating programmes, and other aspects of the Bonn pro- information and intelligence to maximize the effec- cess, all depended to a great extent on the tiveness of all measures taken inside Afghanistan security situation. It was noted that security con- and beyond its borders. The Council invites the Secretary-General to in- ditions had deteriorated in many parts of the clude in his next report to the Security Council and country. Despite progress made in rebuilding the the General Assembly on the situation in Afghani- national army and police, much more needed to stan a summary of proposals made during its 4774th be done to reform the security sector, and there meeting, held on 17June 2003, and any commentary remained a need for international security assist- and response to those proposals by any Member State ance beyond Kabul. In view of continuing threats and to submit his relevant recommendations to the against journalists, the importance of reforming Council for its consideration. the press law was emphasized. The report also The Council decides to remain seized of the mat- ter. highlighted efforts by the TA and the United Nations to address women’s rights, the status of Communication (July). On 9 July [A/58/131- refugee returns, health care and the reconstruc- S/2003/703], Kazakhstan transmitted to the tion of transportation infrastructure. Secretary-General the text of the Joint Statement The Secretary-General reported that, on 16 by the heads of State of the members of the April, NATO had stated that it would assume con- Central Asian Cooperation Organization (Almaty, trol of ISAF following the completion of the lead 5 July). The heads of State said that strengthen- command by Germany and the Netherlands in ing peace and stability in Afghanistan and estab- August. NATO command should provide more lishing good-neighbourly relations with that stability to the Force, particularly by eliminating country were in keeping with the basic interests the need to find a new lead country every six of the countries of Central Asia. Joint efforts to months. restore Afghanistan’s economy and infrastruc- On 17 June, in response to cross-border infil- ture would make a substantial contribution to tration of forces opposed to the TA , Afghanistan, ensuring regional security and stability. Pakistan and the United States established a com- Report of Secretary-General (July). In a 23 mission to determine the origin of cross-border July report [A/57/850-S/2003/754 & Corr.1], the attacks and to find mutually agreeable solutions. Secretary-General described the continuing efforts UNAMA activities included the establishment by the Afghan TA to implement the Bonn Agree- of the United Nations Operations Centre in ment [YUN 2001, p. 263]. The deteriorating security Kabul to assist in the co-location of staff and the situation was identified as the main challenge bringing together of UN constituent agencies. facing the Afghan peace process and the interna- UNAMA was also conducting a review of its man- tional community was called on to continue its en- agement structure, part of its efforts to enhance gagement in Afghanistan. The report drew at- the integration of policy coordination between tention to measures taken by the TA to expand its the various components of the Mission and authority throughout the country, the most sig- among the members of the UN country team. nificant of which was the 20 May decision by the The Secretary-General proposed that the Mili- Afghan National Security Council to ban private tary Advisory Unit be enlarged by a further four military personnel and to enforce the collection military liaison officers, bringing the total of provincial revenues. The TA had also made strength to 12 officers. That would make possible progress in civil service reform through the estab- the permanent deployment of one officer to each lishment of the Independent Reforms Commis- of the eight regional field offices, and the involve-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 302 Political and security questions ment of the Unit in monitoring DDR at locations had to be viewed as a potential target. As a result, across the country in order to build confidence. the United Nations and the humanitarian com- The Secretary-General observed that, in spite munity had taken further security precautions, of considerable obstacles, the implementation of particularly in the south. All UN missions were the Bonn Agreement continued to be largely on temporarily suspended in four southern prov- track. However, the consequences of the civil war inces. In Kandahar, armed escorts were required were still apparent and strong factional interests in four districts, and the missions were sus- were attempting to entrench themselves in the pended in another five. Those precautions were wake of the Taliban’s collapse. Therefore, the restricting reconstruction and the political pro- creation of an environment where the standards cess, including UNAMA’s ability to ensure effec- of freedom and fairness enunciated in Bonn pre- tive monitoring of the registration of electors for vailed remained a major challenge. the Constitutional Loya Jirga in the south of the On 30 September [S/2003/922], the Council took country. Despite serious challenges, the TA had note of the Secretary-General’s intention to in- made some progress in addressing the causes of crease the Military Advisory Unit to a total insecurity. In fact, reform of the senior level of strength of 12 officers. the Ministry of Defence had been completed. Communication (October). On 3 October Although the reform was less sweeping than [A/58/415-S/2003/952], Iran transmitted to the expected, it marked a step in the right direction Secretary-General the final communiqué of the to permit the pilot DDR programme to com- Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers for mence. In September, President Karzai post- Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Or- poned the Constitutional Loya Jirga until the ganization of the Islamic Countries (New York, end of Ramadan, which fell between the end of 30 September). In accordance with the Kabul November and early December. The revised Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations of schedule had provided the Constitutional Com- 22 December 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 274], Afghani- mission more time for finalizing the draft consti- stan’s neighbouring countries reaffirmed their tution. The legal and institutional structures nec- commitment to constructive and supportive bilat- essary for the national election were gradually eral relations based on the principles of territo- being put in place. The registration decree, rial integrity, cooperation and non-interference establishing the guidelines for voter eligibility, in each other’s internal affairs. was finalized on 9 September and the political Security Council consideration (October). On parties law, laying out the legal framework for the 24 October [meeting 4848], the Security Council formation of political parties, was ratified on discussed the situation in Afghanistan. The USG 12 October. for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Guéhenno, The Security Council’s unanimous adoption said that as the final and most important stages of on 13 October of resolution 1510(2003) (see the peace process moved ahead, many of the fun- p. 310), by which it expanded ISAF beyond Kabul, damental and structural causes of insecurity re- was a welcome and much needed development. mained unresolved. That was demonstrated in Also, Germany’s decision to deploy a Provincial the northern part of the country when, on 9 Oc- Reconstruction Team to Kunduz was a welcome tober, after months of relative calm, the arrest of first step, which, it was hoped, would encourage elements affiliated with Jamiat (an Islamic politi- other countries to contribute. The international cal party) sparked factional tensions that flared community had taken steps to improve the over- into the worst fighting in the region since the all security situation in Afghanistan with avail- signing of the Bonn Agreement. Sporadic tribal able assets on the ground. A joint coordination and inter-factional conflicts also contributed to cell had been established to improve coordina- insecurity in the provinces of the south, south- tion between the TA , the United Nations, NATO east and east, but the primary source of insecu- and the coalition in support of the Bonn process. rity remained the risk of terrorist attacks and There was also a need for greater donor commit- continued and sizeable cross-border infiltrations ment in order to allow Afghanistan to recover by suspected Taliban, Al-Qaida and Hizb-I- from the near total devastation of its infrastruc- Islami elements. In several border districts, the ture and social capital after years of war. Taliban had been able to establish de facto control over district administration. Attacks by terrorists against government, military and hu- Security Council mission manitarian personnel were steadily increasing. On 1 October [S/2003/930], the Council Pres- The trend towards the targeting of civilians who ident informed the Secretary-General that the supported the central Government and the peace Council had decided to send a mission to Af- process indicated that the United Nations itself ghanistan from 31 October to 7 November 2003,

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 303 which would be led by Gunter Pleuger (Ger- provided in the Bonn Agreement. In that regard, many). The mission’s objectives would be, among the mission noted the transitional provisions of other things, to review the progress achieved so the draft constitution, in particular the defini- far and to encourage the TA to further strengthen tion of a transitional period contained in it, the implementation of the Bonn Agreement; to which would include presidential elections fol- observe UNAMA’s operations, including its role in lowed by parliamentary elections as soon as possi- assisting the TA in preparing for the elections, im- ble. In order to ensure the necessary financial plementing the constitution and coordinating all support and political momentum for peace and UN activities; to observe ISAF’s operations; to re- stability in Afghanistan, the mission noted with view the humanitarian and human rights situa- interest President Karzai’s wish to convene a fol- tion; to review the implementation of the Kabul low-up conference to the Bonn process early in Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations of 2004, following the conclusion of the Constitu- 22 December 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 274] ; and to convey tional Loya Jirga. The Secretary-General was a message to regional and factional leaders about invited to study the possibilities for such a confer- the need to reject all violence and to condemn ence. The mission called on all Afghanistan’s extremist, terrorist and illegal drug activities. neighbours to fully implement the Kabul Declara- Report of Security Council mission. The re- tion on Good-Neighbourly Relations and to re- port of the Security Council mission to Afghani- double their efforts to help preserve peace and stan (31 October–7 November) was issued on security in Afghanistan, especially in the southern 11 November [S/2003/1074]. The mission, which and south-eastern areas. In order to strengthen the was based in Kabul, visited Herat and Mazar-e- central Government and the basic institutions of Sharif and held extensive discussions on the im- the State, the mission recommended that the TA plementation of the Bonn Agreement [YUN 2001, initiate a process of national reconciliation directed p. 263] and the implications of Council resolution to all Afghans willing to help rebuild the country 1510(2003) (see p. 310) with the TA , regional lead- irrespective of past events. ers, UNAMA, UN agencies, ISAF, the coalition Security Council consideration (November). forces, the diplomatic community, NGOs and civil On 11 November [meeting 4855], the Security society. Council discussed the report of the its mission In its recommendations, the mission reminded to Afghanistan. The head of the mission, Mr. all Afghan parties that had made a commitment Pleuger, reviewed the report’s main findings and to participate in the DDR process that the new na- recommendations, noting that the primary pur- tional army, police and border police forces were pose of the mission was to send a signal to the to be responsible for security and law and order Afghan people that Afghanistan remained high in Afghanistan, and all other armed units were to on the Council’s agenda and that the interna- be dissolved. As a first step towards dissolution, tional community continued to support the peace the mission recommended that all factional process. The mission had also sent a clear mes- forces be withdrawn from Kabul urgently. The sage to the local and provincial authorities that it mission drew the international community’s at- was imperative that they stop factional fighting tention to the need for enhanced assistance activ- and cooperate with the central Government. The ities in the security sector, particularly with re- mission was impressed by the eagerness of the gard to the accelerated training and further Afghans to stand together and rebuild their deployment of the national police and Afghan country. In particular, and in contrast to other national army, and called for further funds for crisis areas, there was, despite the continuing eth- the Law and Order Trust Fund. The TA was nic divisions and factional fighting, an Afghan urged to take all possible measures to strengthen national identity and there appeared to be no national unity and reconciliation and to ensure separatist tendencies. universal participation in the peace process, par- Communication (November). On 21 Novem- ticularly with regard to the role of women. As a ber [A/58/611-S/2003/1134], India and the Russian concrete measure, the mission recommended Federation transmitted to the Secretary-General that the TA follow through with the reform of the the Declaration of the Russian Federation and Ministry of Defence; such reform should be the Republic of India on Global Challenges and extended to other key institutions. The mission Threats to International Security and Stability, recognized the difficulty of organizing general which was adopted during the visit of the Prime elections because of insecurity and the risk of Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to the disenfranchising a large segment of the popula- Russian Federation on 12 November. With re- tion from the political process. It stressed the gard to Afghanistan, both countries expressed importance of tackling those issues so that the support for the TA ’s work on national reconstruc- elections could be held within the time frame tion and for the international community’s

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efforts to bring peace, national reconciliation and vember 2001, 1383(2001) of 6 December 2001, 1390 economic revival to Afghanistan. (2002) of 16 January 2002, 1401(2002) of 28 March 2002, 1453(2002) of 24 December 2002 and 1510(2003) Report of Secretary-General (December). In of 13 October 2003, response to General Assembly resolutions 57/113A Reaffirming its continued strong commitment to the sov- [YUN 2002, p. 273] and 57/113 B [ibid., p. 900], the ereignty, independence, territorial integrity and na- Secretary-General submitted a 3 December re- tional unity of Afghanistan, and respecting its multi- port on the situation in Afghanistan and its im- cultural, multi-ethnic and historical heritage, plications for international peace and security Reaffirming its condemnation of all use of Afghan ter- [A/58/616], covering the period from July 2002 to ritory for terrorist activities, and welcoming the on- November 2003. He also reported on emergency going successful efforts of the Afghan people and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition to combat ter- international assistance for peace, normalcy and rorism on their territory, reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan (see Convinced that the main responsibility for finding a p. 934). Highlighting the deteriorating security political solution lies with the Afghan people them- situation throughout the country, the report selves, expressing in this regard its full support for stated that unchecked criminality, outbreaks of President Karzai and the Afghan Transitional Admin- factional fighting and activities surrounding the istration, and reaffirming its continued support for the narcotics trade had all had a negative impact on implementation of the provisions of the agreement reached among various Afghan groups in Bonn, Ger- the Bonn process. During the reporting period, many, on 5 December 2001, including the holding of attacks on international and national staff of the free and fair elections in 2004, assistance community had intensified. The main Convinced also that a political consolidation aimed at security threats continued to be terrorist attacks the adoption of a pluralistic and democratic constitu- by suspected supporters of Al-Qaida, the Taliban tion and the establishment of a broad-based, multi- and the warlord Hekmatyar against government ethnic, fully representative and gender-sensitive gov- forces, the United Nations and the humanitarian ernment, which respects the rule of law, the human community. The attacks had occurred mostly in rights of all Afghans and the international obligations of Afghanistan and is committed to peace with all areas along the border in the south and south- countries, can lead to durable peace and reconcilia- east. It remained essential to create a secure envi- tion, ronment in the south of Afghanistan so that re- Recognizing the urgent need for the creation of an construction activities could take place. Equally effective and ethnically balanced Afghan national crucial were the TA ’s efforts to extend its author- army, Ministry of Defence and national police force, ity, enhance its administrative capacity and de- and acknowledging the importance of the first steps liver socio-economic benefits on a nationwide taken in this regard by the Transitional Adminis- tration, scale. Important achievements included the re- Reiterating that a fair and effective justice system that habilitation of the national primary education respects international norms and standards, including system and one of the largest UN-assisted refu- by ensuring the accountability of perpetrators of viola- gee repatriation efforts in history. The report tions of human rights, remains of high importance, concluded that the international community had Encouraging the Transitional Administration to con- to decide whether to increase its level of involve- sider initiating a process of national reconciliation, ment in Afghanistan or risk failure. The man- Taking note of the positive developments in Afghani- date set in Bonn could be accomplished only if stan in the past two years, in particular the return of a large number of refugees and internally displaced per- the security situation improved, allowing ade- sons, the increased Afghan ownership as illustrated by quate protection to UN programmes and staff, the progress in implementing education and health NGOs and others assisting the Afghan popula- programmes, the development of a comprehensive na- tion. tional budget, the introduction of the new currency, the publication of a draft text for a constitution, the be- GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION ginning of the disarmament, demobilization and rein- tegration process and the reforms thus far in the On 5 December [meeting 70], the General As- security sector, and stressing that these processes sembly adopted resolution 58/27 A [draft: A/58/ should be expedited and carried through to comple- L.32 & Add.1] without vote [agenda item 28]. tion, Expressing its appreciation and strong support for the The situation in Afghanistan and its implications ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special for international peace and security Representative for Afghanistan and the staff of the The General Assembly, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to Recalling its resolution 57/113 A of 6 December 2002 promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, stressing and all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular in this regard the highly valuable role that Recalling also all relevant Security Council resolu- the current Special Representative of the Secretary- tions and statements by the President of the Council on General has played throughout the ongoing process, the situation in Afghanistan, in particular resolutions Reiterating that the United Nations must continue to 1267(1999) of 15 October 1999, 1378(2001) of 14 No- play its central and impartial role in the international

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 305 efforts to assist the Afghan people in consolidating and looking forward in this regard to the international peace in Afghanistan and rebuilding their country counter-narcotics conference in Kabul in 2004, to be and its institutions, as well as in efforts to provide hu- hosted by the Transitional Administration, the United manitarian assistance, provide for rehabilitation and Nations and the United Kingdom, reconstruction and national capacity-building and 1. Takesnote of the report of the Secretary-General; facilitate the orderly return of refugees, 2. Welcomes the recent Security Council mission to Recognizing the need for continued strong interna- Afghanistan and its report, which contains several pos- tional commitment to humanitarian assistance and for itive recommendations; programmes, under the ownership of the Transitional 3. Stresses that the fragile situation in Afghanistan Administration, of rehabilitation and reconstruction, poses a continuing risk to peace and stability in the re- and noting that visible progress in this regard can fur- gion, and expresses its determination to further assist ther enhance the authority of the Transitional Ad- the efforts of the Transitional Administration to pre- ministration and greatly contribute to the peace pro- vent the use of Afghan territory for terrorism; cess, 4. Reiterates its strong support for the Transitional Commending the international efforts to help the Administration in the full implementation of the Bonn Transitional Administration to provide a secure envi- Agreement, endorses its priorities, as presented in the ronment in Afghanistan, and stressing the need for a National Development Framework and national bud- coordinated approach across all parts of the security get, which are the restoration of the economic infra- sector and the importance of a national army and po- structure, the strengthening of the central govern- lice force that are ethnically balanced, professional and ment, the constitutional process, the building of a accountable to legitimate civilian authorities, national army and police force under civilian control, Welcoming, in this regard, the important role played the verified and fair implementation of disarmament, by both the International Security Assistance Force demobilization and reintegration, demining activities, and its respective lead nations in improving security the rebuilding of the justice system, respect for human conditions in and around Kabul and other parts of rights, and combating illicit drug production and traf- Afghanistan, ficking, and urges the international community to Recognizing the need for Afghanistan and its neigh- support the efforts in these areas; bours to work closely together to promote peace, 5. Stresses the importance of strengthening the au- security, stability and mutually beneficial relations, in- thority of the Transitional Administration, facilitating cluding through trade and investment, and welcoming security sector reform and reconstruction efforts therefore the signature of the Kabul Declaration on throughout the country and providing a secure envi- Good-neighbourly Relations on 22 December 2002 ronment for the constitutional process and the prepa- and the Declaration on Encouraging Closer Trade, rations for the general elections, and in this regard wel- Transit and Investment Cooperation on 22 September comes the recent expansion of the International 2003, Security Assistance Force mandate in accordance with Noting that, despite improvements in the security the Bonn Agreement, as well as the progressive estab- sector, the lack of security still remains the most seri- lishment of provincial reconstruction teams in various ous challenge facing Afghanistan and Afghans today, parts of Afghanistan; expressing its deep concern over a number of recent 6. Calls upon all Afghan groups to renounce the security incidents in Afghanistan, including the ter- use of violence, respect human rights and interna- rorist attacks against United Nations staff, national tional humanitarian law, respect the authority of the and international humanitarian personnel and the In- Transitional Administration and implement fully the ternational Security Assistance Force, noting the provisions of the Bonn Agreement; necessity of further enhancing the capacity of the 7. Welcomes the role of the Afghan Independent Transitional Administration to exercise its authority Human Rights Commission in the promotion and pro- nationwide, and commending the steps already taken tection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in that regard, in Afghanistan, including through the provision of Deeply concerned about the continued increase in the expert advice to the Constitutional Commission, and cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic encourages the Transitional Administration and the drugs in Afghanistan, which is undermining stability international community to continue to provide appro- and security, as well as the political and economic re- priate assistance and support to allow the Afghan In- construction of Afghanistan, and has dangerous re- dependent Human Rights Commission to fulfil its percussions in the region and far beyond, and welcom- mandate; ing in this context the commitment of the Transitional 8. Stresses the fundamental importance for a peace- Administration to rid Afghanistan of this pernicious ful, democratic Afghanistan of the upcoming consti- production and trade, tutional Loya Jirga and elections in 2004, in accord- Recognizing that the social and economic develop- ance with the time frame set out in the Bonn ment of Afghanistan, specifically the development of Agreement for the creation of a representative govern- gainful and sustainable livelihoods in the formal pro- ment, and underscores the need for the broad and ductive sector, is an important condition for the suc- open participation of all Afghans, including women, cessful implementation of the comprehensive national in the political process in a secure environment; drug control strategy of the Transitional Adminis- 9. Reiterates the importance of the full and equal tration, participation of and representation by women in polit- Recognizing also the need for enhanced international ical, civil, economic, cultural and social life throughout cooperation and support to accelerate the implemen- the country, calls upon the Transitional Adminis- tation of the Afghan national drug control strategy, tration to protect and promote the equal rights of men

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and women, and notes in this respect the ratification by alternative livelihood and development programmes Afghanistan of the Convention on the Elimination of and capacity-building for drug control institutions; All Forms of Discrimination against Women on 19 . Supports the fight against the illicit trafficking 5 March 2003; of drugs and precursors within Afghanistan and in 10. Commends and strongly supports the important neighbouring States and countries along trafficking role of the Special Representative of the Secretary- routes, including increased cooperation among them General for Afghanistan and the staff of the United to strengthen anti-narcotic controls to curb the drug Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in support flow, and welcomes the presentation in Moscow on 29 of efforts of the Transitional Administration to fully October 2003 of the latest report of the United implement the Bonn Agreement, and endorses the Nations International Drug Control Programme on concept of the Assistance Mission as a fully integrated drugs in Afghanistan; Mission under the authority of the Special Representa- 20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the tive and with a light international footprint; General Assembly every four months during its fifty- 11. Calls upon donor countries to fulfil promptly eighth session on the progress of the United Nations their assumed commitments made at the International and the efforts of his Special Representative to pro- Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghani- mote peace in Afghanistan, and to report to the As- stan, held in Tokyo on 21 and 22 January 2002, and sembly at its fifty-ninth session on the progress made reiterated in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Sep- in the implementation of the present resolution; tember 2003, invites them to provide additional 21. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of resources beyond those pledged so far, and also calls its fifty-ninth session the item entitled “The situation upon all Member States to provide humanitarian in Afghanistan and its implications for international assistance and to support the Transitional Adminis- peace and security”. tration through measures in accordance with the na- tional development budget published by the Transi- On the same day, the Assembly adopted reso- tional Administration; lution 58/27 B on emergency international as- 12. Calls upon the international community to support the efforts of the Transitional Administration sistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction to coordinate assistance, to formulate a strategy for the of war-stricken Afghanistan (see p. 934). long-term development of Afghanistan and to allocate On 23 December, the Assembly decided that sufficient funds to the Afghanistan Reconstruction the item on the situation in Afghanistan and its Trust Fund; implications for international peace and security 13 . Calls upon the signatories of the Kabul Declara- would remain for consideration at its resumed tion on Good-neighbourly Relations to respect their commitments under the Declaration, and calls upon fifty-eighth (2004) session (decision 58/565). all other States to respect and support the implementa- Communications (December). On 16 Decem- tion of its provisions and to promote regional stability; ber [A/58/755-S/2004/277], Liechtenstein trans- 14 . Welcomes, in this regard, the signing of the Dec- mitted to the Secretary-General the report of an laration on Encouraging Closer Trade, Transit and In- international meeting of experts on the theme vestment Cooperation as a further sign of the commit- “Building security and State in Afghanistan—a ment of Afghanistan and its neighbours to closer critical assessment” (Princeton University, United regional cooperation; States, 17-19 October). Participants agreed that in 15. Calls upon the members of the Tripartite Com- mission to redouble their efforts to support peace and Afghanistan the needs for establishing security security in the southern and south-eastern border and building of State and society were urgent and areas of Afghanistan; closely interconnected and that solutions had to 16. Calls for continued international assistance to be holistic. They urged delivery of immediate in- the vast number of Afghan refugees and internally dis- ternational financial assistance to both security placed persons to facilitate their safe and orderly re- and State-building endeavours. turn and sustainable reintegration into society so as to On 22 December [A/58/663], Tajikistan trans- contribute to the stability of the entire country; mitted to the Secretary-General the text of the 17. Welcomes the efforts of the Transitional Adminis- statement on Afghanistan issued by the Ministers tration to respect fully the international obligations of Afghanistan with regard to narcotic drugs, and calls for Foreign Affairs of the member States of the upon it to strengthen further its efforts to eliminate Collective Security Treaty Organization (Bishkek, the annual poppy crop, as well as to efficiently enforce Kyrgyzstan, 19 November). The Ministers noted relevant national laws and regulations against narcotic the progress achieved by the TA with respect to drugs; State-building and the efforts made to combat ex- 18. Calls upon the international community to as- tremist forces, but noted with concern the grow- sist the Transitional Administration in the implemen- ing threat of narcotic drugs emanating from Af- tation of its comprehensive national drug control ghanistan and the unceasing activity of extremist strategy, aimed at eliminating illicit poppy cultiva- tion, which continues to constitute a serious threat to groups. Alongside the need to boost efforts to the successful political and economic reconstruction eradicate terrorism, it was also important to elim- of Afghanistan, including through support for in- inate the social base of terrorism and to revive creased law enforcement, crop substitution and other and rebuild the country’s economy.

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Report of Secretary-General (December). In tional training and job placement, and demining response to Security Council resolution 1471 training. With the aim of establishing a 70,000- (2003) (see p. 295), the Secretary-General sub- strong national army under a 10-year plan, 12 bat- mitted a 30 December report on the situation in talions had been trained under the lead of the Afghanistan and its implications for interna- United States, representing a total force of 6,500. tional peace and security [S/2003/1212]. He stated The Ministry of the Interior had begun imple- that the peace process in Afghanistan had menting reforms geared towards the implemen- reached a critical juncture, two years since the tation of a five-year plan to develop a national beginning of the implementation of the Bonn police service of some 50,000 members and a Agreement [YUN 2001, p. 263]. A great deal had force of 12,000 border guards. It was projected been accomplished, including the establishment that some 213 higher-ranking and 2,000 lower- of the TA itself, the return of some 4.2 million ranking officers would be trained by mid-2004. children to school, one third of them girls, and The deployment of newly recruited police offi- the beginning of security sector reform. During cers in three provinces had contributed to stabil- the reporting period, the most sensitive and po- ity and public confidence. Yet, at such an early tentially divisive steps of the Bonn process began: stage of the process, the number of trained police the pilot phase of the DDR programme on 24 Oc- remained too low and ill equipped to provide the tober, the electoral registration on 1 December full support needed by the central Government and the Constitutional Loya Jirga on 14 Decem- in its efforts to establish itself in the provinces. In ber, which was still ongoing. However, funda- the justice sector, the civil and criminal codes and mental challenges needed to be overcome if the other legal frameworks were being reviewed and peace process was to become irreversible, in par- updated. As part of the efforts to strengthen gov- ticular the problem of insecurity. The reporting ernance at the provincial level, the justice sector period saw an increase in terrorist activity, fac- was developing an integrated model of interven- tional fighting, activities associated with narcot- tion in Paktia province, which combined recon- ics trade and unchecked criminality. Attacks on struction, rehabilitation and refurbishing of ju- international and national staff of the assistance dicial and corrections buildings, and training for community and TA officials had been concen- magistrates, administrative justice personnel, po- trated in the south and south-east regions. A car- lice, corrections staff and defence counsels. The bomb attack on UN offices in Kandahar on absence of an international commitment to de- 13 November was followed three days later by the velop a penitentiary system was a significant ob- assassination of an international staff member of stacle to the establishment of institutions for the the Office of the United Nations High Commis- provision of law and order. The countering of sioner for Refugees in Ghazni. In the absence of narcotics activities in Afghanistan would con- sufficient forces to provide security, much of the tinue to face numerous internal obstacles: an en- south and south-east of the country had become vironment of rural underdevelopment, the ab- effectively off limits to UN and TA officials. Lack sence of rule of law, the limitations on financial of access to assistance or State structures risked resources for law enforcement and the paucity of further alienating the population, which was alternative livelihoods. Efforts to counter poppy predominantly Pashtun. In response to the in- production continued to meet with violent creased threats against the UN and the aid com- opposition in a number of areas. munity, President Karzai, on 26 November, es- On 11 August, control of ISAF was transferred tablished two national task forces, bringing from Germany and the Netherlands to NATO (see together the Afghan security ministries, ISAF, the p. 308). In addition, three new provincial recon- coalition forces and the United Nations. One task struction teams were established under coalition force was working on short-term measures to en- command. Communication links had been estab- sure the necessary security for the Bonn process lished between provincial centres and Kabul, and and for aid and reconstruction efforts, while the between provincial police stations and the Minis- second would work on responses to security try of the Interior, in an effort to expand the TA ’s threats over the longer term. authority across the country. Nevertheless, inse- Under the Afghan New Beginnings Pro- curity continued to be a significant constraint gramme and with financing from Japan and as, beyond Kabul, some factional leaders contin- UNDP assistance, the pilot phase of the DDR pro- ued to resist the Government’s efforts to install gramme began on 24 October in Kunduz prov- national appointees in the provinces and dis- ince; it was later extended to Paktia province and tricts. The TA was working closely with UNAMA, Kabul. Hundreds of ex-soldiers and officers had the coalition forces, ISAF and donor Governments been disarmed and had selected reintegration to formulate a nationwide stabilization plan options, such as agricultural assistance, voca- aimed at bringing together security improve-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 308 Political and security questions ments, better local governance and reconstruc- gional centres in time for the start of the tion activities. 1 December electoral registration campaign. The draft constitution was made public on The Secretary-General observed that the prob- 3 November by the Constitutional Review Com- lem of insecurity remained the main challenge to mission, the culmination of a drafting process the successful implementation of the Bonn pro- that included a significant national consultation. cess. The political elements of that process had The draft provided for a strong presidential been carried forward by concentrating activities system of government and a bicameral legisla- in city and regional centres, thereby mitigating ture, codified respect for fundamental rights and threats that predominated in rural areas. The called for the nation’s laws not to be in contradic- time had come for the international community tion with the religion of Islam. The draft also and the Afghan Government to make the neces- outlined transitional measures, including those sary commitments to complete the transition in for elections. The Constitutional Loya Jirga, Afghanistan. President Karzai had discussed which commenced its deliberations on 14Decem- with the Security Council mission the possibility ber and was still ongoing as at 30 December, com- of a second international conference and the prised 502 participants. Ten working committees Special Representative for Afghanistan, Mr. had been established to review the draft constitu- Brahimi, had circulated a non-paper to the TA tion and propose amendments. While debate had and diplomatic corps in Kabul. The non-paper been vigorous, delegates had expressed concerns acknowledged gains made under the Bonn pro- about domineering attitudes expressed by jihadi cess, but pointed out that to ensure success fur- groups. ther reforms were needed to broaden the repre- sentativeness of government, improvements in The TA had established the institutional the security situation had to be made to end the framework necessary for the voter registration misrule of factions and counter the terrorist process; in July it created the Joint Electoral threat, and more progress in reconstruction had Management Body and the Interim Afghan Elec- to be made. The non-paper further argued that toral Commission to oversee the registration pro- donor commitments were needed, beyond the cess. Lack of early donor funding caused the start timelines of the Bonn Agreement, to consolidate of the electoral registration to be delayed from government authority, entrench the rule of law, 15 October to 1 December. In addition, lack of counter the threat of the narcotics economy and security in certain areas of the country was delay- carry Afghanistan’s peace process to the point of ing the deployment of registration teams to irreversibility. The Secretary-General said that remote rural areas. one way of addressing the issues raised in that Some progress had been achieved in regional non-paper might be the convening of a new relations. On 22 September (Dubai, United Arab donor conference, in the first months of 2004, to Emirates), Afghanistan and its neighbours chart the way forward. signed the Declaration on Encouraging Closer Trade, Transit and Investment Cooperation Be- International Security Assistance Force tween the Signatory Governments of the Kabul The International Security Assistance Force, a Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations multinational force established by Security [YUN 2002, p. 274], to respect and build on their Council resolution 1386(2001) [YUN 2001, p. 267], commitments to support regional political stabil- was mandated, among other things, to assist the ity and mutual economic well-being. Pakistan Afghan Government in the maintenance of had deployed and maintained troops along its security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Tur- border with Afghanistan, in order to deter cross- key, which had assumed lead nation status for border infiltration of elements hostile to the ISAF from the United Kingdom in June 2002, Afghan Government. However, there were handed over that responsibility to Germany and persistent reports of Taliban leaders operating the Netherlands on 10 February. Those two coun- from inside Pakistan. The tripartite commission tries, in turn, handed over ISAF’s lead command formed by Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United to NATO on 11August. The event represented the States was working to address the issue of cross- first operation to be commanded by NATO out- border security. side the territory of NATO member States and In response to the increased threat of attacks it brought with it the benefit of continuity of against UN staff and premises, UNAMA and the command. UN agencies had been reviewing and, where nec- Communications (January/February). Dur- essary, upgrading security measures at all office ing January and February, the Secretary-General compounds and residences. New UNAMA elec- received a number of communications from toral offices were constructed in the eight re- Member States, pledging military personnel,

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 309 equipment and other resources to ISAF: Hungary Reports of ISAF (May and August). On 19May [S/2003/78], Belgium [S/2003/159] and Azerbaijan [S/2003/555], Germany and the Netherlands sub- [S/2003/248]. mitted to the Secretary-General a report on ISAF Report of ISAF (February). In response to activities from 10 February to 10 May. The joint Security Council resolutions 1386(2001) [YUN Germany-Netherlands command said that the 2001, p. 267], 1413(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 276] and 1444 security situation in Kabul had remained by and (2002) [ibid., p. 278], Turkey submitted to the large stable and virtually similar to that in the Secretary-General a February report [S/2003/210] preceding period. It seemed clear, however, that on ISAF’s activities, covering the period from the increasing instability and rising number of 1 November 2002 to 10 February 2003. incidents in the southern and south-eastern parts of Afghanistan could converge on the larger Security circumstances in Kabul continued to Kabul area and pose a threat to ISAF’s area of re- improve during the reporting period. The calm sponsibility. Although the TA was in charge of and peaceful atmosphere in the capital had con- security structures, the international community solidated further and no major incident had oc- had assumed specific responsibilities with regard curred since the night curfew was lifted, for the to security sector reform. Key issues in that con- first time since 1979, on 3 November 2002. Tak- text were DDR of factional armies, build-up of ing advantage of the improved security in the the Afghan National Army (ANA) and re- city, President Karzai asked ISAF to help the local establishment of a functional national police. security entities in tackling ordinary crime in ISAF was contributing to the training of ANA and some parts of Kabul. ISAF continued to assist the the national police on a limited scale and stood local community through the Civil-Military Co- ready to assist with the DDR process in Kabul if re- operation programme, which channelled assist- quested by the TA . To achieve safe and secure air ance in the fields of education, health and urban lines of communications for its mission, ISAF as- infrastructure through selected quick-impact sisted the TA in the development of Kabul Inter- projects. Arrangements for a smooth transfer of national Airport. In close consultation with the ISAF command from Turkey to the joint German-Dutch leadership had been completed. UNAMA, ISAF was also monitoring the constitu- tion and election processes as the TA prepared for Communication of Secretary-General (April). the convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga. On 16 April [S/2003/503], the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council President a On 11 August [S/2003/807], Germany and the 16 April letter from NATO, which stated that the Netherlands submitted to the Secretary-General North Atlantic Council had decided to continue their final report on ISAF, covering the period and enhance NATO support to ISAF, beginning in from 11 May to 11 August, up to the handover of August. As 14 NATO nations already contributed ISAF’s command to NATO. The overall security approximately 95 per cent of ISAF’s troops, that situation remained a point of concern through- enhanced support was a logical continuation of out the period. However, although ISAF suffered NATO efforts to date. The additional support casualties due to attacks and other incidents, it would consist of the following: an in-theatre de- managed to improve security in and around ployed composite headquarters, including the Kabul. ISAF continued to contribute to the devel- required communications and logistics support; opment of Afghan security structures by provid- a force commander from a troop-contributing al- ing training support to ANA, the police and the lied nation; and strategic coordination, com- border police. Regular contacts with Afghan au- mand and control exercised by the supreme thorities, the UN Special Representative and the headquarters of the allied Powers in Europe, United States military had ensured permanent with an ISAF operations coordination cell to in- ISAF input into all major processes related to volve participating nations. The political direc- security. tion and coordination responsibilities would be Communications of Secretary-General (Octo- undertaken by the North Atlantic Council in ber). On 7 October [S/2003/970], the Secretary- close consultation with non-NATO contributors to General transmitted to the Security Council ISAF. Increased involvement by NATO would be President two communications, dated 2 and 6 Oc- within the context of ISAF’s UN mandate and tober, from NATO’s Secretary-General, which NATO would operate according to Security Coun- stated that on 1 October the North Atlantic cil resolutions. ISAF would therefore continue to Council had agreed on a longer-term strategy for operate distinct from Operation Enduring NATO in its ISAF role in Afghanistan. The ele- Freedom. ments of the strategy comprised the political On 23 April [S/2003/504], the Council took note objective of supporting the Bonn process, the of the Secretary-General’s communication. desired end state of a self-sustaining, moderate

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and democratic Afghan government, and bench- Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, marks for a handover strategy. independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, On 6 October, the NATO Secretary-General Reaffirming its resolutions 1368(2001) of 12 Septem- transmitted to the Secretary-General informa- ber 2001 and 1373(2001) of 28 September 2001, and re- tion on key issues concerning NATO’s possible ex- iterating its support for international efforts to root pansion of the ISAF mission, which had been out terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the agreed to by the North Atlantic Council. It was United Nations, agreed that the expansion of the ISAF mission Recognizing that the responsibility for providing would strengthen the TA ’s ability to provide a se- security and law and order throughout the country re- cure environment for the Afghan population; sides with the Afghans themselves, and welcoming the continuing cooperation of the Afghan Transitional such expansion would be subject to the adoption Authority with the International Security Assistance of a Security Council resolution providing ap- Force, propriate authority and the identification and Reaffirming the importance of the Agreement on provision of appropriate assets; the Provincial Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Konduz, which Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institu- Germany had offered to mount, would operate as tions, signed in Bonn, Germany, on 5 December 2001 a pilot project under a new, expanded ISAF (the Bonn Agreement), and recalling in particular Security Council mandate; ISAF, in principle, annex I thereto, which, inter alia, provides for the progressive expansion of the Force to other urban cen- could expand in a progressive, flexible manner, tres and other areas beyond Kabul, taking into account the political context, to in- Stressing the importance of extending central gov- clude other PRTs under an expanded mandate; ernment authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of com- ISAF, also in principle, could undertake tempo- prehensive disarmament, demobilization and reinte- rary deployment outside Kabul, in support of gration of all armed factions, and of security sector specific events or processes, such as electoral or reform, including reconstitution of the new Afghan DDR-related events; and it was imperative that National Army and Afghan National Police, there be clear command and control arrange- Recognizing the constraints upon the full implemen- ments between ISAF, Operation Enduring Free- tation of the Bonn Agreement resulting from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan, dom and PRTs. Noting the letter dated 10 October 2003 from the On 13 October [S/2003/986], the Secretary- Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan request- General transmitted to the Council President a ing the assistance of the Force outside Kabul, 10 October communication he had received from Noting also the letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Afghanistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic TreatyOrgan- Minister said that, notwithstanding the consider- ization to the Secretary-General regarding a possible able progress made in providing security in expansion of the mission of the Force, Kabul and the surrounding areas thanks to the Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security, assistance of ISAF, the security situation in vari- Determined to ensure the full implementation of the ous parts of the country remained relatively un- mandate of the Force, in consultation with the Afghan stable and was an impediment to further pro- Transitional Authority and its successors, gress in reconstruction and development overall. Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Afghan authorities welcomed NATO’s intention Charter, to deploy a pilot project in Kunduz and to under- 1. Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the Inter- take deployments outside Kabul in support of national Security Assistance Force to allow it, as re- specific events or processes subject to a new sources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Security Council mandate. The Afghan Govern- Authority and its successors in the maintenance of ment therefore requested the Council to consider security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan authorities as well as expanding ISAF’s mandate. the personnel of the United Nations and other inter- national civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in Expansion of ISAF mandate reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assist- On 13 October [meeting 4840], the Security ance for the performance of other tasks in support of Council unanimously adopted resolution 1510 the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Af- (2003). The draft [S/2003/984] was prepared in ghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Perma- consultations among Council members. nent Government Institutions (the Bonn Agreement); 2. Calls upon the Force to continue to work in close The Security Council, consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, and its successors and the Special Representative of the in particular resolutions 1386(2001) of 20 December Secretary-General as well as with the Operation En- 2001, 1413(2002) of 23 May 2002 and 1444(2002) of 27 during Freedom Coalition in the implementation of November 2002, the mandate of the Force, and to report to the Security

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Council on the implementation of the measures set Al-Qaida, and any individuals, groups, undertakings out in paragraph 1 above; and entities associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida, 3. Decides to extend the authorization of the Force, who have participated in the financing, planning, fa- as defined in resolution 1386(2001) and the present cilitating and preparation or perpetration of terrorist resolution, for a period of twelve months; acts or in supporting terrorist acts, as well as to facili- 4. Authorizes the Member States participating in the tate the implementation of counter-terrorism obliga- Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its man- tions in accordance with relevant Security Council res- date; olutions, 5. Requests the leadership of the Force to provide Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in ac- quarterly reports on the implementation of its man- cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and date to the Security Council through the Secretary- international law, threats to international peace and General; security caused by terrorist acts, 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. Noting that, in giving effect to the measures in para- graph 4 (b) of resolution 1267(1999), paragraph 8 (c) of Speaking after the vote, France said it consid- resolution 1333(2000) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of reso- ered that ISAF’s extension did not entail a com- lution 1390(2002), full account is to be taken of the mitment of its forces outside Kabul. France did provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), not plan to involve itself in missions beyond those Reiterating its condemnation of the Al-Qaida network it was already fulfilling. and other associated terrorist groups for ongoing and Later developments. In a later report [S/2004/ multiple criminal terrorist acts, aimed at causing the 222] covering ISAF activities in November and De- deaths of innocent civilians, and other victims, and the cember, NATO said that the security situation in destruction of property, Kabul and its environs remained generally calm, Reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of all forms but not stable. On 30 December, ISAF took the of terrorism and terrorist acts as noted in resolutions first step in expanding its supporting role to the 1368(2001) of 12 September 2001, 1438(2002) of 14 Oc- tober 2002, 1440(2002) of 24 October 2002 and 1450 TA by taking responsibility for the operations of (2002) of 13 December 2002, the German PRT in Konduz. Five attacks on ISAF, Reaffirming that acts of international terrorism con- which included rockets and improvised explosive stitute a threat to international peace and security, devices, took place in December with no fatali- Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, ties. 1. Decides to improve the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1267(1999), paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333(2000) Sanctions and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390(2002); The Security Council adopted new measures 2. Also decides that the measures referred to in para- against Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, the Taliban, graph 1 above will be further improved in twelve their associates and associated entities. Those months, or sooner if necessary; measures included a freeze on financial and eco- 3. Stresses the need for improved coordination and increased exchange of information between the nomic assets, a travel ban and an arms embargo. Security Council Committee established pursuant to They were to be applied by all countries against resolution 1267(1999) (hereinafter referred to as “the individuals and entities designated by the Sanc- Committee”) and the Security Council Committee es- tions Committee. The Council also requested the tablished pursuant to resolution 1373(2001); Secretary-General to reappoint five experts to the 4. Requests the Committee to communicate to Mem- Monitoring Group to monitor, for a further pe- ber States the list referred to in paragraph 2 of resolu- riod of 12 months, the implementation of the tion 1390(2002) at least every three months, and sanctions measures. stresses to all Member States the importance of sub- mitting to the Committee the names of and identify- ing information, to the extent possible, about members SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and other individuals, On 17 January [meeting 4686], the Security groups, undertakings and entities associated with Council unanimously adopted resolution 1455 them so that the Committee can consider adding new (2003). The draft [S/2003/48] was prepared in con- names and details to its list, unless to do so would com- sultations among Council members. promise investigations or enforcement actions; 5. Calls upon all States to continue to take urgent The Security Council, steps to enforce and strengthen through legislative en- Recalling its resolutions 1267(1999) of 15 October actments or administrative measures, where appropri- 1999, 1333(2000) of 19 December 2000, 1363(2001) of ate, the measures imposed under domestic laws or reg- 30 July 2001, 1373(2001) of 28 September 2001, 1390 ulations against their nationals and other individuals (2002) of 16 January 2002 and 1452(2002) of 20 Decem- or entities operating in their territory to prevent and ber 2002, punish violations of the measures referred to in para- Underlining the obligation placed upon all Member graph 1 above, and to inform the Committee of the States to implement, in full, resolution 1373(2001), in- adoption of such measures, and invites States to report cluding with regard to any member of the Taliban and the results of all related investigations or enforcement

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actions to the Committee, unless to do so would com- to in paragraph 1 above based on reports by Member promise the investigations or enforcement actions; States referred to in paragraph 6 above, paragraph 6 of 6. Also calls upon all States to submit an updated resolution 1390(2002) and all pertinent parts of re- report to the Committee no later than ninety days ports submitted by Member States under resolution from the adoption of the present resolution on all 1373(2001), and in line with transparent criteria to be steps taken to implement the measures referred to in determined by the Committee and communicated to paragraph 1 above and all related investigations and all Member States, in addition to considering supple- enforcement actions, including a comprehensive sum- mentary recommendations by the Monitoring Group, mary of frozen assets of listed individuals and entities with a view to recommending further measures for within the territories of Member States, unless to do consideration by the Council to improve the measures so would compromise investigations or enforcement referred to in paragraph 1 above; actions; 15. Also requests the Committee, based on its oral as- 7. Calls upon all States, relevant United Nations sessments, through its Chairman, to the Council re- bodies, and, as appropriate, other organizations and ferred to in paragraph 14 above, to prepare and circu- interested parties to cooperate fully with the Commit- late a written assessment to the Council of actions tee and with the Monitoring Group referred to in para- taken by States to implement the measures referred to graph 8 below, including by supplying such informa- in paragraph 1 above; tion as may be sought by the Committee pursuant to all 16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. pertinent resolutions and by providing all relevant in- formation, to the extent possible, to facilitate proper Sanctions Committee activities identification of all listed individuals and entities; 8. Requests the Secretary-General, upon adoption The Security Council Committee established of the present resolution and acting in consultation pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) [YUN 1999,p. 265] with the Committee, to reappoint five experts, draw- (the Afghanistan Sanctions Committee) sub- ing, as much as possible and as appropriate, on the ex- mitted a report [S/2004/281] covering its activities pertise of the members of the Monitoring Group es- from 1 January to 31December 2003. During that tablished pursuant to paragraph 4 (a) of resolution period, the Committee held 4 formal meetings 1363(2001), to monitor for a further period of twelve months the implementation of the measures referred and 36 informal consultations at the expert level. to in paragraph 1 above and to follow up relevant leads On 2 September, the Committee agreed to relating to any incomplete implementation of those change its name, in order to clarify its identity measures; and mandate, to the Security Council Committee 9. Requests the Chairman of the Committee to re- established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) port orally at least every ninety days to the Council in concerning Al-Qaida and the Talibanand associ- detail on the overall work of the Committee and the ated individuals and entities (the Al-Qaida and Monitoring Group, and stipulates that these updates shall include a summary of progress in submitting the Taliban Sanctions Committee). reports referred to in paragraph 6 of resolution On 7 January [S/2003/10], the Security Council, 1390(2002) and paragraph 6 above; following consultations among its members, 10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that elected the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the the Monitoring Group and the Committee and its Committee for a term ending 31 December 2003. Chairman have access to sufficient expertise and re- On 19 June [S/2003/660], the Council agreed to sources as and when required to assist in the discharge elect Heraldo Muñoz (Chile) as the new Chair- of their responsibilities; man of the Committee, following the departure 11. Requests the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, a visit to selected countries by the of his predecessor, Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile). Chairman of the Committee and/or Committee mem- The main task before the Committee in 2003 bers to enhance the full and effective implementation was the objective assessment and evaluation of of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, with implementation by States of the arms embargo, a view to encouraging States to implement all relevant the travel ban and the assets freeze imposed by Council resolutions; the Council on the individuals and entities on the 12. Requests the Monitoring Group to submit a de- Committee’s consolidated list. Among the Com- tailed work programme within thirty days of the adop- tion of the present resolution and to assist the Commit- mittee’s achievements in 2003 were the issuance tee in providing guidance for Member States on the of a reformatted version of the consolidated list format of the reports referred to in paragraph 6 above; and its approval of the names of 77 individuals 13 . Also requests the Monitoring Group to submit and entities for addition to the list. The list repre- two written reports to the Committee, the first by 15 sented the Committee’s key instrument for the June 2003 and the second by 1 November 2003, on im- implementation of its mandate and served as plementation of the measures referred to in para- the fundamental tool available to States in imple- graph 1 above and to brief the Committee when the menting the sanctions measures. Both the Al- Committee so requests; 14 . Requests the Committee, through its Chairman, Qaida and the Taliban sections of the list were to provide the Council by 1 August 2003 and by 15 De- improved as a result of amendments proposed by cember 2003 with detailed oral assessments of imple- Member States. Despite those improvements, mentation by Member States of the measures referred further upgrades of the quality of information

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 313 on the list remained high on the Committee’s the Al-Qaida network and in the efforts to find agenda. Despite the unsatisfactory number of re- and detain key Al-Qaida leaders. The arrest of ports submitted by States to the Committee, the members of Osama bin Laden’s original com- reports received did, nevertheless, provide some mand team dented the organization’s opera- indication of trends in State compliance. An- tional capability and provided intelligence con- other avenue available to the Committee was the cerning the network. That had led to the break- direct monitoring, in situ, of State implementa- up of cells in a number of countries and the de- tion. In that regard, the Committee benefited tention of substantial numbers of the network’s from the two reports submitted by the Monitor- supporters and operatives. However, Al-Qaida ing Group (see below). The Committee also and groups associated with it still posed a threat gained improved insight of the implementation to international peace and security. They re- by States of the sanctions measures through two tained strong appeal among Islamic extremist el- visits that the Committee’s Chairman undertook ements around the world and were able to draw to selected countries. The task before the Com- on a substantial number of cadres trained in Af- mittee remained to evaluate whether States col- ghanistan or at training centres elsewhere associ- lectively were doing enough to neutralize the Al- ated with the Al-Qaida network. There were also Qaida network and the Taliban and to prevent indications that the network had been able to re- the supporters of those organizations from constitute its level of support. The international launching terrorist attacks. community had created new cooperative means and measures to deal with the Al-Qaida financial Monitoring Group support network. Numerous countries had adopted new laws, regulations and procedures The Monitoring Group on Afghanistan, enabling them to better identify and deter terror- which was established by Security Council reso- ism financing and to take action against those re- lution 1363(2001) [YUN 2001, p. 270] and reported to sponsible. Despite those successes, the fight the Sanctions Committee, had the mandate of against terrorist financing was far from over. Al- monitoring the implementation of the measures Qaida was still able to exploit loopholes and had imposed by resolutions 1287(1999) [YUN 1999, developed new techniques to acquire, utilize and p. 265] and 1333(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 273]. To that distribute funds and logistical resources. Sub- end, the Group would collate, assess, verify, re- stantial funds were still available from the illicit port and make recommendations on information drug trade, through charities and from deep- regarding violations of the measures imposed. pocket donors for indoctrination, recruitment Resolution 1363(2001) also called for the estab- and training. Progress against Al-Qaida in those lishment of a Sanctions Enforcement Support areas would require increased political and eco- Team, under the coordination of the Monitoring nomic pressure and the provision of substantial Group and specialized in customs, border technical assistance and financial aid. Charities security and counter-terrorism, to be deployed and the use of informal transfer mechanisms in the States bordering Afghanistan. such as hawala continued to pose challenges in the Communication of Secretary-General (Febru- war against terrorist financing. Some steps had ary). On 3 February [S/2003/143], the Secretary- been taken in that regard, but a greater effort was General informed the Security Council Pres- still necessary to identify and designate Al-Qaida ident that he had reappointed the Monitoring contributors and those handling their assets. Group to monitor for a further period of Further success in bringing down Al-Qaida 12 months, until 17January 2004, the implemen- financial networks would require a sustained tation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 international effort, along with increased of Council resolution 1455(2003) (see p. 311) international cooperation, information sharing and to follow up relevant leads relating to any and coordination. incomplete implementation of those measures. The Sanctions Committee’s consolidated list, Reports of Monitoring Group (July and which was established by the Security Council to December). In response to Security Council res- define the individuals and entities that were olution 1455(2003) (see p. 311), the Sanctions subject to Council measures, only included a Committee Chairman transmitted to the Council small subset of known Al-Qaida operatives and President two reports, on 7 July [S/2003/669 & others associated with the network, including Corr.1] and 1 December [S/2003/1070], on the Moni- persons trained in terrorism techniques. That toring Group’s activities. had seriously reduced the overall effectiveness of The July report noted that during the report- the measures contained in Council resolutions ing period (18 January–31 May 2003) there 1390 (2002) [YUN 2002, p. 281] and 1455(2003). The had been marked successes in the fight against principal value of the travel ban was to serve as a

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“political statement”, intended to make it clear to been spared from such terrorist activities. Iraq countries that they should not permit members had become a fertile ground for Al-Qaida, as it of the Taliban, Al-Qaida or associated groups to was readily accessible to Al-Qaida followers anx- gather or seek refuge in or transit their terri- ious to take up the battle against the coalition tories. As a practical matter, few, if any,of the des- forces. Progress was being made, worldwide, by ignated Al-Qaida members were likely to seek law enforcement agencies and military and open entry or transit using their own name and security forces in dealing with Al-Qaida and in legitimate documents. No instances had been re- neutralizing its operatives and supporters. While ported to the Committee by countries of desig- the UN consolidated list had grown in numbers, nated individuals being stopped or turned back. it had not kept pace with the actions taken, or the There had been some reports, however, of coun- increased intelligence and other information tries locating, detaining and extraditing persons available, concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban and suspected of supporting or participating in Al- associated individuals and entities. The list Qaida terrorist actions. Despite the travel ban, contained a total of 371 names of individuals and members of Al-Qaida had retained a high degree entities. That was a small subset of individuals of mobility and had been able to carry out and and entities associated with the terrorist network contribute to terrorist attacks in several countries and it reflected a continuing reluctance on the around the world. Ostensibly unlisted Al-Qaida part of many States to provide such names to members remained free to move from country to the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. country. To date, no attempts by the individuals In many cases, States had preferred to communi- or entities designated on the comprehensive list cate such information only through bilateral to breach or circumvent the arms embargo meas- channels. ures had been discovered or reported by any Important progress had been made towards States to the Committee or the Group. Nonethe- cutting off Al-Qaida financing. A large part of its less, Al-Qaida, the Talibanand groups associated funds had been located and frozen, and many key with them were still able to acquire adequate financial managers had been incarcerated. Yet, quantities of weapons and explosives where and many Al-Qaida sources of funding had not been when they needed them. That situation was rein- uncovered and the network continued to receive forced by reports of a marked increase in the funds from charities, deep-pocket donors and number and the intensity of attacks against coali- business and criminal activities, including the tion forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the activi- drug trade. Extensive use was still being made of ties of groups associated with Al-Qaida in Alge- alternative remittance systems, and Al-Qaida ria, Chechnya, Kenya, the Philippines and Saudi had shifted much of its financial activity to areas Arabia demonstrated that the network was able to in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia acquire all the arms and ammunition it needed where the authorities lacked the resources to reg- for its operations. That fact emphasized the need ulate such activity. Controlling charities used for for greater efforts on the part of all States to inter- purposes that supported terrorism was proving dict the movement of illegal weapons to the Al- extremely difficult as the close association of such Qaida network, particularly those States border- charities with both religious and humanitarian ing the above-mentioned areas. The reports sub- relief purposes had made government regula- mitted to the Group by 51 countries concerning tion and oversight very sensitive. Even when implementation of the sanctions measures charities had been designated, it had proved dif- demonstrated a wide degree of compliance in ficult to shut them down. The use of shell compa- adopting and applying the measures imposed nies and offshore trusts to hide the identity of in- under resolution 1455(2003) and previous related dividuals or entities engaged in the financing of resolutions. However, almost half of the report- terrorism was also a difficult problem. The issue ing States indicated that they had encountered was complicated further by a reluctance on the problems with regard to incorporating the part of States to freeze tangible assets such as comprehensive list within their own regulatory business or property. Another problem pertained framework. That was due, in large measure, to to the fact that almost a third of the countries that the absence of required minimum identification had submitted the required reports to the Com- data associated with the names. mittee had indicated that they had not yet incor- In the December report, the Group said that porated all the names on the UN consolidated list Al-Qaida ideology had continued to spread, rais- in their national lists. Only about a half of the ing the spectre of further terrorist attacks and States reported that they regularly transmitted further threats to international peace and updated lists to their border services. security. More of those attacks were being perpe- The arms embargo was another area of con- trated by suicide bombers and no region had cern. The Group continued to encounter diffi-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 315 culties in monitoring and reporting on the imple- ried out inspection activities in Iraq with regard mentation of the arms embargo as countries were to its compliance with weapons-related obliga- reluctant to provide information concerning the tions and provided the Security Council with pe- seizure of illegal weapons and explosives believed riodic updates on their findings. The Secretary- destined for Al-Qaida, the Talibanand their asso- General suspended UN activities in Iraq on ciates. Several countries in the Middle East were 17March and withdrew all remaining UN system aware that weapons were crossing their borders, personnel on the following day. As at 19 March, but indicated that they had great difficulties in UN inspectors reported that they had not found controlling such illegal traffic. The international any evidence of proscribed weapons of mass de- community had to remain alert also to the in- struction in Iraq, although the time available to creasing availability of man-portable air-defence the inspectors was not sufficient to complete an systems to non-State actors. The scope of Council overall review and assessment. UN personnel resolutions and their incomplete implementa- started to return to Iraq in April, following the tion appeared unable to stop Al-Qaida, the end of major hostilities. In May, the Secretary- Taliban and their networks from obtaining what- General appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello as his ever weapons they needed. The risk of Al-Qaida’s Special Representative for Iraq, whose responsi- acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction bilities included coordinating all UN activities in also continued to grow. The terrorist network had Iraq and working with the occupying forces in already taken the decision to use chemical and rebuilding the country. biological weapons; the only restraint it faced was On 19 August, the UN headquarters in Bagh- the technical complexity of operating them prop- dad was subjected to a terrorist attack, which erly and effectively. The possible use of a dirty killed 22 persons, including the Secretary- bomb was also of great concern. The Group con- General’s Special Representative, and wounded cluded that without a tougher and more compre- more than 150 others. The attack dealt a severe hensive resolution—a resolution that would obli- blow to the Organization’s efforts to assist Iraq to gate States to take the mandated measures—the return to normality. role played by the United Nations in that impor- tant battle risked becoming marginalized. In view of the escalation in hostile attacks Communication (December). On 22 Decem- against the United Nations and other foreign or- ganizations and in the light of the overall serious ber [S/2003/1200], Italy transmitted to the Council President an aide-memoire concerning the reac- deterioration of the security environment in tions of the competent Italian authorities to the Iraq, the Secretary-General decided, on 4 No- Monitoring Group’s December report. vember, to temporarily relocate all UN interna- tional staff outside the country. However, the UN system continued to manage a broad range of es- sential assistance activities in all parts of the Iraq country, from both within and outside Iraq. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq was established in August. However, due to In 2003, the issue of Iraq tested the unity and deteriorating security conditions, the Secretary- resilience of the United Nations, and the Organi- General decided to set up the Mission’s core in zation’s staff in Baghdad were the target of a de- Nicosia, Cyprus; additional staff were deployed liberate terrorist bombing. On 20 March, coali- to a small office in Amman, Jordan, and other lo- tion forces, led by the United States, launched a cations in the region. military attack against Iraq without the endorse- The Security Council, in resolution 1511(2003) ment of the United Nations and despite a con- of 16 October, invited the Governing Council to certed effort at the international level to avert the provide, by 15 December 2003, a timetable and a armed conflict. Following the fall of the Iraqi re- programme for the drafting of a new constitution gime, the Coalition Provisional Authority (the for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elec- Authority) was established by the occupying tions. It also resolved that the United Nations forces to provide for, among other things, the in- should strengthen and pursue its vital role in terim administration of Iraq. In July, the Author- Iraq as circumstances permitted and authorized ity established the Governing Council of Iraq as a multinational force to take all necessary meas- its principal body. ures to contribute to the maintenance of security Prior to the launching of military action on and stability in Iraq. On 15 November, the Au- 20 March, the United Nations Monitoring, Veri- thority and the Governing Council signed an fication and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) agreement setting out a political process for the and the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) car- restoration of sovereignty by 30 June 2004, and

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 316 Political and security questions for the drafting of a new constitution and the 17March, Iraq transmitted to the Secretary-Gen- holding of elections under that constitution. eral and the Security Council President daily On 22 May,the Council lifted civilian sanctions reports on the activities of UNMOVIC and IAEA against Iraq with the adoption of resolution inspection teams [S/2003/2, S/2003/4, S/2003/13, 1483(2003). Among other things, the resolution’s S/2003/31, S/2003/32, S/2003/33, S/2003/34, S/2003/35, adoption opened the way for the resumption of S/2003/37, S/2003/41, S/2003/42, S/2003/43, S/2003/47, oil exports, with revenues deposited in a Develop- S/2003/50, S/2003/56, S/2003/65, S/2003/68, S/2003/69, ment Fund for Iraq held by Iraq’s Central Bank, S/2003/76, S/2003/86, S/2003/87, S/2003/92, S/2003/100, and provided for the termination of the Sanc- S/2003/104, S/2003/105, S/2003/106, S/2003/121, S/2003/ tions Committee and the oil-for-food pro- 122, S/2003/133, S/2003/137, S/2003/138, S/2003/139, gramme by 21 November 2003, transferring S/2003/144, S/2003/150, S/2003/155, S/2003/160, S/2003/ responsibility for the administration of any re- 165, S/2003/166, S/2003/167, S/2003/174, S/2003/175, maining programme activities to the Authority. S/2003/181, S/2003/186, S/2003/187, S/2003/188, S/2003/ By resolution 1518(2003) of 24 November, the 189, S/2003/190, S/2003/205, S/2003/206, S/2003/218, Council established a new committee to continue S/2003/219, S/2003/220, S/2003/221, S/2003/228, S/2003/ identifying individuals and entities affiliated 229, S/2003/234, S/2003/236, S/2003/237, S/2003/244, with the former Iraqi regime for the purpose of S/2003/245, S/2003/250, S/2003/256, S/2003/286, S/2003/ freezing their funds, financial assets and eco- 293, S/2003/294, S/2003/295, S/2003/304, S/2003/309, nomic resources. S/2003/315, S/2003/317, S/2003/322, S/2003/323, S/2003/ Work continued on the repatriation or return 324, S/2003/339]. of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals from Iraq, and on the return of all Kuwaiti property UNMOVIC seized by Iraq during the 1990invasion and occu- On 18 March, UNMOVIC suspended its pation of Kuwait. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s weapons inspection activities following the regime led to the discovery of mass graves in Iraq Secretary-General’s decision to withdraw all UN and the identification of remains, including staff from Iraq in the light of the imminent out- those of Kuwaiti missing persons. The Security break of military conflict. UNMOVIC’s Executive Council extended the mandate of the Secretary- Chairman, Hans Blix, and IAEA’s Director Gen- General’s High-level Coordinator, especially in eral, Mohamed ElBaradei, kept the Security view of the fact that Kuwaiti property, including Council informed on inspection activities carried its national archives, had yet to be returned to out in Iraq until that time. The Commission car- Kuwait. ried out biological, chemical, missile and multi- The mandate of the United Nations Iraq- disciplinary inspections. On 30 June 2003, Mr. Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was ter- Blix ended his assignment. After the 19 August minated on 6 October when the Council also de- terrorist attack against the UN headquarters in cided to end the demilitarized zone area along Baghdad, UNMOVIC’s inspection-specific equip- the Iraq-Kuwait border. ment was transferred to the Cyprus field office, On 13 December, Coalition forces captured which assumed the responsibility of the manage- Saddam Hussein, who was hiding at a farmhouse ment of the remaining UNMOVIC local staff in 10 miles south of his hometown of Tikrit. Iraq. UNMOVIC had resumed weapons inspection By decision 58/514 of 5 December and deci- activities in Iraq on 27 November 2002, after a sion 58/527 of 17December, the General Assem- four-year absence. bly deferred consideration of, respectively, the By a 14 November letter [S/2003/1108], the consequences of the Iraqi occupation of and ag- Secretary-General proposed to the Security gression against Kuwait, and armed Israeli ag- Council that Chen Weixiong (China) be ap- gression against the Iraqi nuclear installations pointed to the UNMOVIC College of Commission- and its grave consequences for the established in- ers, replacing Li Junhua (China). On 18 Novem- ternational system on the peaceful uses of ber [S/2003/1110], he proposed that Susan F. Burk nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear (United States) be appointed to the College, re- weapons and international peace and security. It placing John Wolf (United States). In two sepa- included both items in the provisional agenda of rate replies of 20 November [S/2003/1109], [S/2003/ its fifty-ninth (2004) session. 1111 ] , the Council agreed with the Secretary- General’s proposals. Reports of UNMOVIC (February, May, Aug- UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection ust, November). As called for in Security Council Commission and IAEA activities resolution 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 230], UNMOVIC Iraqi communications (January-March). In submitted to the Council, through the Secretary- communications dated between 1 January and General, four quarterly reports on its activities.

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 317

Throughout the year, the Executive Chairman 8 and 9 February, the UNMOVIC Executive Chair- continued his practice of providing monthly man and the IAEA Director General, visited briefings to the Council President and kept the Baghdad to discuss relevant inspection and Secretary-General informed about UNMOVIC’s cooperation issues with Iraqi officials. The Janu- activities. UNMOVIC staff training courses were ary meetings were devoted to stocktaking of the held throughout the year. inspections that had taken place so far and to The February report [S/2003/232] said that the resolving certain operational issues. A joint state- period under review, from 1 December 2002 to ment, issued upon conclusion of the talks, 28 February 2003, had been one of intense activ- recorded a number of matters that had been ity in Iraq due to the resumption of inspections solved and some that remained unsolved, such as and monitoring in November 2002 [YUN 2002, flights by U-2 surveillance planes, the conduct of p. 288]. Since the arrival of the first inspectors in interviews and the enactment of national legisla- Iraq on 27 November 2002, UNMOVIC had con- tion. At the February meetings, the Iraqi side ducted more than 550 inspections covering ap- handed over a number of papers regarding unre- proximately 350 sites, including 44 new sites. solved disarmament issues. However, the papers All inspections were performed without notice did not contain any new evidence, nor did they and access was in virtually all cases provided resolve any of the open issues. Following the Feb- promptly; in no case had the inspectors seen con- ruary meetings, Iraq formally accepted vincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in ad- UNMOVIC’s use of aerial surveillance platforms vance of their impending arrival. The inspec- and undertook to take the necessary measures to tions took place throughout Iraq at industrial ensure their safety. The first such flight was con- sites, ammunition depots, research centres, uni- ducted by a high-altitude U-2 surveillance air- versities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, craft on 17 February. During the reporting pe- private houses, missile production facilities, mili- riod, UNMOVIC requested 28 individuals to tary camps and agricultural sites. At all sites that present themselves for interviews in Baghdad had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining without the presence of observers. At first, none activities were performed. Those included iden- of them agreed. At the January meetings, the tification of the function and contents of each Iraqi side committed itself to encouraging building, new or old, at the site. Also included persons to accept interviews in private and were verification of previously tagged equip- UNMOVIC started examining the practical modal- ment, application of seals and tags, evaluation of ities for conducting interviews outside Iraq. In locations for the future installation of cameras February, UNMOVIC directed Iraq to destroy a and other monitors, and the taking of samples proscribed missile system and some reconsti- and interviews with site personnel. At certain tuted casting chambers that could be used to pro- sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look duce motors for missiles capable of surpassing the for underground structures or buried equip- 150-kilometre range limit imposed on Iraq by ment. Inspections were effectively helping to Council resolution 687(1991) [YUN 1991, p. 172].The bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the destruction process was to commence on 1 March. absence of inspections between December 1998 The twelfth session of the UNMOVIC College and November 2002. of Commissioners (New York, 24-25 February) More than 200 chemical and more than 100 discussed, among other things, a draft paper biological samples had been collected at different prepared by UNMOVIC outlining clusters of unre- sites. Three quarters of those had been screened solved disarmament issues. UNMOVIC’s Execu- using UNMOVIC’s own analytical laboratory capa- tive Chairman observed that, during the report- bilities at the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, ing period, Iraq could have made greater efforts Verification and Inspection Centre. The results to find any remaining proscribed items or pro- to date had been consistent with Iraq’s 7 Decem- vide credible evidence showing the absence of ber 2002 declaration [YUN 2002, p. 288], submitted such items. The results in terms of disarmament in response to Security Council resolution had been very limited and it was hard to under- 1441(2002) [ibid., p. 292].UNMOVIC had identified stand why a number of measures, which were im- and started the destruction of approximately 50 plemented only in mid-January, could not have litres of mustard declared by Iraq that had been been initiated earlier. placed under United Nations Special Commis- The May report [S/2003/580] covered the period sion (UNSCOM) supervision in 1998. Towards the from 1 March to 31May and also provided a wider end of February 2003, when the rotation of in- perspective on UNMOVIC’s activities since the spectors took place, the number of UNMOVIC per- resumption of inspections in November 2002. sonnel in Iraq reached a total of 202 staff, includ- The report noted that on 18 March, UNMOVIC ing 84 inspectors. On 19 and 20 January and on suspended its inspection activities following the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 318 Political and security questions

Secretary-General’s 17 March decision to with- aerial vehicles, notably to establish whether any draw all UN staff from Iraq. Following the armed of them were designed for the dissemination of action against Iraq, which started on 20 March, chemical or biological weapons or had a longer the Coalition Provisional Authority (the Author- range than was permitted. UNMOVIC remained ity) organized units to identify any Iraqi weapons ready to resume its inspection activities; the reso- of mass destruction (WMD) and other proscribed lutions that guided its work until the armed items and to engage in the task of disarming Iraq, action would continue to be implemented to the which was formerly pursued by UNMOVIC and extent that they were still relevant and had not IAEA. The findings of the relevant units estab- been rendered obsolete by resolution 1483(2003) lished by the Authority had not been made avail- (see p. 338). It was clear that most of the work per- able to UNMOVIC except through public media re- formed by the Commission to date relating to the ports, nor had the Commission been approached oil-for-food programme would be phased out. by the Coalition for information or assistance. From the day of the first resumed inspection on Between November 2002 and March 2003, 27 November 2002 until the day of the with- UNMOVIC did not find evidence of the continua- drawal of all UN personnel on 18 March 2003, tion or resumption of programmes of WMD or UNMOVIC conducted 731 inspections, covering significant quantities of proscribed items from 411 sites, 88 of which had not been inspected be- before the adoption of Council resolution fore. During the first phase of inspections, the fo- 687(1991). A small number of undeclared empty cus was on assessing activities and equipment at chemical warheads that appeared to have been the sites, determining the changes made since produced prior to 1990 were uncovered and, to- 1998and identifying existing key personnel. The gether with a few other proscribed items, were early inspections provided knowledge about destroyed. Some 70 missiles that were deter- Iraq’s programmes and about State companies mined to exceed the range limits set by the Secu- involved in such activities. The second period, rity Council and associated equipment were de- from mid-January to March, was characterized stroyed under UNMOVIC supervision before by reinspection of some of the sites with a more its operations were suspended. Inspections and investigative approach. The largest effort was ex- declarations and documents submitted by Iraq, pended on industrial and research and develop- not least during the period under review, contrib- ment sites, followed by military sites. During the uted to a better understanding of previous weap- period 1 to 17March, UNMOVIC made 15requests ons programmes. However, the long list of pro- for interviews with Iraqi scientists, bringing the scribed items unaccounted for was not shortened total number of requests since January 2003 to either by the inspections or by Iraqi declarations 54. During that short period, nine interviews and documentation. From the end of January were actually conducted, bringing the total num- 2003, the Iraqi side, which until then had been ber of interviews in all disciplines to 14. All inter- cooperative in terms of process but not equally views were conducted under UNMOVIC proce- cooperative in terms of substance, devoted much dures and format: no witnesses, recording or effort to providing explanations and proposing videotaping were allowed and interviews were methods of inquiry into such issues as the pro- conducted in locations selected by UNMOVIC.In- duction and destruction of anthrax, the VX nerve formation obtained during interviews was found agent and long-range missiles. Despite those ef- useful and led in some cases to an updating of the forts, little progress was made in the solution of assessments contained in UNMOVIC’s list of outstanding issues during the time of UNMOVIC unresolved disarmament issues. operations in Iraq. In addition to the portable chemical and bio- By the time inspections were suspended, logical detectors for in situ direct determination UNMOVIC had performed a number of inspec- of traces of chemical and biological agents, tions in order to verify intelligence information UNMOVIC had at its disposal advanced geophysi- that Iraq had mobile units for the production of cal equipment for the search of hidden structures biological weapons. The Iraqi side denied that and storage spaces, including ground-penetrating any such units existed and provided the Commis- radar; electromagnetic induction soil change sion with pictures of legitimate vehicles, which mapping; computer and server forensics; and re- they suggested could have been mistaken for mo- mote drilling and sampling systems for muni- bile units. However, none of the vehicles in those tions. At the thirteenth session of the College of pictures resembled the trucks described by the Commissioners (New York,28 May), it was agreed Coalition. Furthermore, the Commission was not that a compendium encompassing the know- able, before the suspension of inspections, to ledge and experience gained by UNMOVIC and its complete its inquiry into the Iraqi programmes predecessor over the years would be useful as an of remotely piloted vehicles and unmanned objective record. The Executive Chairman ob-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 319 served that even though some of its mandated Council in the context of revisiting UNMOVIC’s functions were no longer operable, UNMOVIC mandate. continued to be a subsidiary organ of the Security A later report [S/2004/160] noted that UNMOVIC Council until the Council decided otherwise. was continuing to assess material that was in the public domain on the issues pertaining to Iraq’s The August report [S/2003/844] covered the pe- riod from 1 June to 31 August. On 30 June, the WMD and to compare it against what was known by UNMOVIC about Iraq’s various weapons pro- UNMOVIC Executive Chairman, Mr. Blix, ended grammes. his assignment. The Secretary-General appointed the Deputy Executive Chairman, Demetrius Perricos, as Acting Executive Chairman effective IAEA 1 July. Resolution 1483(2003) of 22 May (see IAEA report (January). In accordance with p. 338) underlined the intention of the Council to Security Council resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, revisit the mandates of UNMOVIC and IAEA as set p. 292], IAEA submitted to the Council, through forth in earlier resolutions. Since that had yet to the Secretary-General, a 27 January update transpire, UNMOVIC had continued with those [S/2003/95] on its verification activities in Iraq. parts of its mandate that remained operable, Since the resumption of inspections on 27 No- such as developing monitoring and verification vember 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 289], IAEA had con- projects to adapt to the altered environment in ducted 139 inspections at 106 sites, including two Iraq following the war. The 19 August terrorist presidential sites. The focus of the first phase of attack against the UN headquarters in Baghdad inspections was reconnaissance: re-establishment (see p. 346), which included UNMOVIC offices, of IAEA’s knowledge of Iraq’s remaining nuclear caused numerous deaths and injuries among in- capabilities, including confirmation of the loca- ternational and Iraqi staff. Two UNMOVIC local tions of major equipment, of nuclear material staff lost their lives in the attack. Given the rou- and significant non-nuclear materials, and of key tine nature of UNMOVIC’s activity during the re- technical personnel. The first step of the recon- porting period, the College of Commissioners naissance phase was to inspect facilities that were was not convened in August. known to have been of significance in the past programme and to confirm that no nuclear activ- The November report [S/2003/1135], which cov- ities had been revived at those locations. IAEA ered the period from 1 September to 30 Novem- also re-inspected several dozen facilities that had ber, also provided a historical review of the de- been deemed, prior to 1998, capable of support- struction, removal or rendering harmless of ing the resumption of a nuclear programme. The items and materials in connection with Iraq’s Agency reported no signs of nuclear activities at proscribed biological programme. During the re- any of those facilities. porting period, no information was available to While IAEA was still continuing with its recon- UNMOVIC on the results of the investigations of naissance, the inspectors had initiated the investi- the United States–led Iraq Survey Group, other gative phase, with particular emphasis on Iraq’s than the statement released to the public on the activities since 1998, focusing on those areas of interim progress report made by the Group to the concern identified by States and by IAEA. Eight United States Senate Select Committee on Intel- sites, all of which had been associated with Iraq’s ligence. The general impression from that state- past nuclear activities, were inspected to ascertain ment was that most of the findings outlined re- whether there had been developments in techni- lated to complex subjects familiar to UNMOVIC. cal capabilities, organization, structure, facility However, in the absence of access to the full re- boundaries or personnel. IAEA observed that, at port, UNMOVIC was not in a position to properly the majority of those sites, the equipment and assess the information contained in the state- laboratories had deteriorated to such a degree ment. After the 19 August attack against the that the resumption of nuclear activities would UN headquarters in Baghdad, all of UNMOVIC’s require substantial renovation and no signs of inspection-specific equipment was transferred to nuclear activity had been found. Several other the Cyprus field office, which assumed the facilities that had never been inspected by IAEA responsibility of the management of the remain- or by UNSCOM in the past were inspected in re- ing UNMOVIC local staff in Baghdad. The four- sponse to information that indicated the pres- teenth session of the College of Commissioners ence of large industrial capabilities at those loca- (New York, 21 November) recognized the consid- tions. None of those facilities had proved to be erable verification experience and expertise of nuclear-related or to require their declaration by UNMOVIC, as well as its multidisciplinary ap- Iraq. proach, which it hoped would be given due recog- Prior to the withdrawal of IAEA from Iraq in nition in any future discussions in the Security 1998, the Agency had removed from Iraq all

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 320 Political and security questions nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material. The IAEA work programme remaining stocks of nuclear material were stored In response to Security Council resolution under IAEA seal in a storage facility referred to as 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 230], the IAEA Director Location C, just outside the Tuwaitha complex. General, on 19 March [S/2003/342], submitted to An inspection of Location C in December 2002 the Council, though the Secretary-General, the confirmed that the IAEA seals and the inventory IAEA work programme for the discharge of its of nuclear material remained intact. IAEA had mandate. The nature and content of the work conducted many interviews with Iraqi scientists programme were based on an understanding of since the resumption of inspections, some in the Iraq’s past achievements and of its capability to form of group interviews. States had expressed support nuclear or nuclear-related activities. For concerns about attempts by Iraq to procure high- IAEA to resolve the key issue of whether Iraq had strength aluminium tubes. Those concerns arose revived or attempted to revive its nuclear weapons from the fact that high-strength aluminium tubes programme between 1998and 2002, a number of with appropriate characteristics could be used as key tasks needed to be implemented by Iraq. components of equipment for the enrichment of Although Iraq had initiated work on many of uranium. Iraqi officials indicated to IAEA that the those tasks, it still needed to provide: a complete tubes had been intended for use in connection description of all technical activities related to with a programme aimed at reverse engineering nuclear weapons components research and devel- opment and production, and uranium conver- 81-millimetre rockets. The Agency conducted a sion and enrichment developments; access to all series of inspections at sites involved in the pro- documents; the names and whereabouts of all duction and storage of reverse engineered rock- individuals requested by IAEA, and full access to ets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraq Iraqi officials for purposes of interviewing; a personnel, took samples of aluminium tubes and complete description of the evolution of its in- had begun a review of the documentation pro- dustrial infrastructure since 1998; explanations vided by Iraq relating to contracts with private of and documentation on procurement attempts traders. As a result of those efforts, it had been and offers related to the possible development of possible to confirm the existence of a pro- Iraq’s nuclear-related capabilities; and a full de- gramme for producing 81-millimetre rockets. scription of its post-1998 procurement system. While it would be possible to modify such tubes Iraq was also required to enact comprehensive for the manufacture of centrifuges, they were not legislation that would secure the enforcement of directly suitable for such use. In support of the all prohibitions associated with relevant Council IAEA inspections, Iraqi authorities had provided resolutions. Assuming that Iraq would complete access to all facilities visited without conditions those tasks, and barring unforeseen circum- and without delay. They had also been coopera- stances, IAEA could, within two to three months, tive in making available additional original docu- provide the Council with an objective assessment mentation. However, those documents did not of whether Iraq had revived or attempted to include any information relevant to questions revive its nuclear weapons programme. The and concerns outstanding since 1998. The IAEA Agency emphasized that the verification process Director General and the UNMOVIC Executive always had some degree of uncertainty and could Chairman visited Baghdad on 19 and 20 January not provide absolute guarantees regarding the 2003, with a view to encouraging greater trans- absence of small-scale nuclear activities. Never- parency and more proactive cooperation on the theless, an intrusive inspection system, such as the one that IAEA was implementing in Iraq, part of Iraq. IAEA observed that in the first eight could minimize the risk of prohibited activities weeks of inspections, it had visited all sites identi- going undetected, and deter the revival of a nu- fied by it or by States as significant. Although not clear weapons programme. IAEA monitoring and all of the laboratory results of sample analysis verification would entail: comprehensive and were yet available, no evidence of ongoing pro- regular reporting by Iraq on its activities and on hibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities at its imports and exports; unconditional and im- those locations had been detected, nor had the in- mediate access for unannounced inspections at spections revealed signs of new nuclear facilities any site deemed necessary by IAEA; the conduct or direct support to any nuclear activity. However, of location-specific and wide-area environmental further verification activities would be necessary monitoring; real-time monitoring for the detec- before IAEA would be able to provide credible tion of radiation signatures; and the introduction assurance that Iraq had no nuclear weapons of new technologies and methods of verification. programme. Technical meetings with and interviews of Iraqi

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 321 personnel would remain a key element of the two individuals accepted to be interviewed in pri- monitoring and verification regime. vate but without being taped. Most of those IAEA reports (April and October). In accord- interviews proved to be of help in improving ance with Security Council resolution 1051(1996) IAEA’s understanding of Iraq’s nuclear-related [YUN 1996, p. 218], IAEA submitted to the Council, capabilities. through the Secretary-General, two consolidated As at 17 March 2003, IAEA had not found in six-monthly reports, on 11 April [S/2003/422] and Iraq any evidence of the revival of a nuclear pro- 10 October [S/2003/993], on the Agency’s verifica- gramme prohibited under resolutions 687(1991) tion activities in Iraq. [YUN 1991, p. 172] and 707(1991) [ibid., p. 188].How- In April, IAEA said that the meetings between ever, the time available before inspections were its Director General and the UNMOVIC Executive suspended on 17March was not sufficient to per- Chairman with Iraqi officials (19-20 January and mit IAEA to complete its overall review and as- 9 February) (see also p. 317)permitted the refine- sessment. That review would have required fur- ment and extension of the practical arrange- ther investigation of various types of assets ments for resuming inspections that had been en- needed for Iraq to develop a nuclear programme dorsed in resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 292]. and investigation of all the possible processes of Since the first group of inspectors arrived in Iraq nuclear weapon development. The industrial on 25 November 2002, IAEA had carried out 237 capacity in Iraq had deteriorated substantially inspections at some 148 locations, including 27 over the preceding decade, mainly due to the lack new locations. More than 1,600 different build- of equipment and of consistent maintenance by ings were inspected. Inspections were under- Iraq of sophisticated equipment. All previously taken at State-run and private industrial facili- inspected and tagged critical machine tools were ties, research centres and universities, either at accounted for. At a few inspection sites, new ma- locations where Iraq’s technical capabilities were chine tools had been installed, and at a few others known to have existed in the past or at new loca- machine tools that had been inoperative in 1998 tions suggested by remote monitoring and analy- were retrofitted. Many areas of Iraqi expertise sis or identified by other States. IAEA sought to seemed to have gone through significant deple- determine what, if anything, had occurred in tion through the years, particularly as a result of Iraq since 1998 relevant to the establishment of the departure of many qualified staff. Less than a nuclear capabilities. The vast majority of the third of the group that conducted Iraq’s centri- inspections were carried out with no prior fuge enrichment research and development work announcement and a number of them were from 1987 to 1991 remained in the company that carried out in cooperation with UNMOVIC.IAEA’s succeeded that group. All known procured, in- activities included a radiometric survey of Iraq’s digenously produced and practically recoverable main watercourses, the reinstatement of aerosol uranium compounds that had not been removed sampling and land- and vehicle-based radio- by 1994 had remained in IAEA custody and were metric surveys. The Agency also implemented a stored under IAEA seal. The inspection and veri- programme aimed at understanding Iraq’s pro- fication of the nuclear material subject to IAEA curement pattern. Between November 2002 and safeguards stored at Location C at Tuwaitha did 17March 2003, Iraqi authorities provided access not uncover any discrepancies. The Agency sys- to all facilities requested by IAEA, including pres- tematically explored Iraq’s nuclear material pro- idential compounds, private residences and new duction capabilities and found no indication of sites, without conditions or delay. A large num- the revival of any facilities destroyed in 1991 that ber of documents that detailed Iraq’s pre-1991 had been related to uranium concentration or laser enrichment programme were found in the conversion. IAEA investigated reports centring home of a former Iraqi scientist. Iraq provided on documents provided to it by a number of an updated list of 430 technical staff involved in States that pointed to an agreement between the the Iraqi nuclear programme in the past. IAEA Niger and Iraq on the sale of uranium to Iraq be- conducted some interviews with individuals and tween 1999 and 2001. Based on its analysis, IAEA groups in their workplaces, while others were concluded, with the concurrence of outside ex- conducted during pre-arranged meetings with perts, that those documents were in fact forged scientists and others known to have been involved and the allegations were thus unfounded. in the past with the nuclear programme. The The Agency noted that on 17March, in consul- Agency was able to interview 17 individuals at tation with the Security Council President and locations chosen by it. Some restrictions were the Secretary-General, it had withdrawn its staff imposed on IAEA at the beginning, when inter- from Iraq, as part of the decision to withdraw all viewees first refused to be interviewed without UN staff, out of concern for their safety and fol- the presence of an Iraqi observer. Subsequently, lowing an advisory of upcoming military action.

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 322 Political and security questions

As at that date, IAEA found no evidence or plausi- to verify the nuclear material subject to safe- ble indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons guards stored at Location C Nuclear Material programme in Iraq. Nevertheless, that did not Storage Facility near the Tuwaitha complex mean that IAEA had completed its investigations south of Baghdad. The report on the inspection on whether Iraq had attempted to revive its mission (7-23 June 2003) was submitted to the nuclear programme between 1998 and 2002. Security Council on 15 July [S/2003/711]. Provided that Iraq’s cooperation had remained The nuclear material inspected was in two active, and barring unforeseen circumstances, buildings: building 1 contained a large variety of IAEA would have been able to provide the Council uranium compounds, while building 2 contained with credible assurance regarding the absence of only yellowcake and ammonium diuranate waste. such revival within two to three months of contin- The inspection team found that some safeguards uing verification activities. However, any such seals applied to the two buildings after the De- assurance, as with any verification process, would cember 2002 inventory verification had been re- have had a degree of uncertainty. It was for that moved, as the team had been informed by the Au- reason that IAEA would have moved to the imple- thority prior to the start of the mission. The mentation of its reinforced ongoing monitoring inspection team estimated that at least 10 kilo- and verification plan, which was designed to act grams of uranium compounds could have been as an effective deterrent to and insurance against dispersed, but that the quantity and type of ura- resumption by Iraq of its nuclear weapons pro- nium dispersed were not sensitive from a prolif- gramme, while permitting IAEA to continue to eration point of view. look for possible past activities. Though inspec- tions had been halted due to the military action, IAEA’s mandate remained valid, and the Agency, WMD allegations as the sole legal authority to verify Iraq’s nuclear activities, remained ready to resume its verifica- Communications (2-24 January). On 2 Janu- tion activities as soon as conditions permitted. ary [S/2003/7], South Africa, on behalf of the Non- Aligned Movement, called on the Security Coun- In October, IAEA reported that it had not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq cil to allow the UNMOVIC Executive Chairman since 17 March. In June, however, following and the IAEA Director General to present their media reports of looting of nuclear and radioac- views in an open meeting, thus allowing the rest tive material at the Tuwaitha complex, the Direc- of the UN membership to receive a first-hand tor General requested that the Agency inspect account of their reports. the nuclear material storage facility near the On 22 January [S/2003/88], Iraq informed the Tuwaitha complex (see below). Since April, IAEA Secretary-General and the Council President had analysed the wealth of additional informa- that, pursuant to resolution 715(1991) [YUN 1991, tion collected during inspections; consolidated p. 194], it had sent its biannual declarations on the its overall information assets and analysed a sites, equipment and materials subject to moni- variety of new information, including satellite toring, for the period from July 2002 to January imagery,to update its knowledge of the relevant 2003, to the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Veri- facilities in Iraq; refined its plan for resumed fication and Inspection Centre. verification activities; and evaluated lessons On 24 January [S/2003/93], Iraq said that Iraqi learned through its past experience in Iraq. IAEA scientists who had been contacted to cooperate had also been able, with the support of member with UNMOVIC and IAEA requests for private in- States, to continue with some of its investigations terviews had agreed to do so, but had requested a outside Iraq, following up inspections and subse- witness to be present during the interviews. quent analysis. Those post-inspections activities On the same day [S/2003/94], Iraq said that the had revealed no evidence of the revival of a declaration submitted by it on 7 December 2002 nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. [YUN 2002, p. 289] to the United Nations, together In a later report [S/2004/285], the Agency stated with the cooperation displayed by Iraqi agencies that it still had not been in a position to implement with the inspection teams since the resumption of its mandate in Iraq during the last months of 2003. inspections in November 2002, proved that Iraq was acting in good faith and was resolved to fulfil IAEA mission in Tuwaitha its obligations, with the aim of proving that it was Following extensive media reports of looting not concealing any activity or weapons proscribed of nuclear and radioactive material at the by relevant Security Council resolutions. Attesta- Tuwaitha complex in Iraq, the IAEA Director tion of those facts should lead the Council to re- General requested, and the Authority agreed, ject American and British threats of aggression that IAEA should conduct an inspection, in order directed against Iraq.

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On 24 January [S/2003/97], Turkey transmitted anthrax; and whether Iraq had retained SCUD- to the Secretary-General and the Council Pres- type missiles after the 1991 Gulf War [YUN 1991, ident the Joint Declaration of the Regional Initia- p. 167]. Though Iraq continued to state that there tive on Iraq (Istanbul, 23 January), with the par- were no proscribed items in its territory,informa- ticipation of Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, tion provided by Member States indicated the the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. The par- movement and concealment of missiles and ticipants expressed their common resolve to at- chemical weapons and mobile units for biological tain a peaceful solution to the Iraqi issue and weapons production. UNMOVIC would follow up stressed that the countries of the region did not any credible leads. It was concerned that Iraq wish to live through yet another war and all its was placing documents in the homes of private devastating consequences. They called on the individuals, as inspectors had discovered 3,000 Iraqi leadership to move irreversibly and sin- pages of documents pertaining to the laser cerely towards assuming its responsibilities in re- enrichment of uranium inside the private home storing peace and in cooperating with UNMOVIC of a scientist. and IAEA. Mr. ElBaradei said that IAEA had been en- Security Council consideration (27 January). gaged since 27 November 2002 in the process of On 27 January [meeting 4692], the Security Council verifying the existence or absence of a nuclear invited the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, weapon programme in Iraq. An updated pro- Mr. Blix, and the Director General of IAEA, gress report on IAEA activities during that period Mr. ElBaradei, to brief it on the latest develop- was submitted to the Security Council on 27 Jan- ments in Iraq. uary (see p. 319).IAEA had made good progress in Mr. Blix, in reviewing the inspections regime its knowledge of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. The since 1991, said that Iraq appeared not to have investigative inspections focused on areas of come to a genuine acceptance of the disarma- concern identified by Member States; facilities ment that was demanded of it and that it needed identified through satellite images as having to carry out to win the confidence of the world. been modified or constructed since 1998; and However, Iraq had, on the whole, cooperated other inspection leads identified independently rather well so far with UNMOVIC on issues per- by IAEA. Iraq’s December 2002 declaration was taining to procedures, mechanisms, infrastruc- consistent with IAEA’s existing understanding of ture and practical arrangements. Previewing in- Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear programme. However, it formation contained in his February report (see did not provide any new information relevant to p. 317), Mr. Blix said that access had been pro- certain questions that had been outstanding vided to all those sites that UNMOVIC had re- since 1998, in particular regarding Iraq’s pro- quested to inspect. Nevertheless, there had been gress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and some problems. While UNMOVIC had a U-2 plane centrifuge development. While those questions at its disposal for aerial surveillance purposes, did not constitute unresolved disarmament Iraq had refused to guarantee its safety unless a issues, they nevertheless needed further clarifi- number of conditions were fulfilled. There had cation. The inspectors, among other things, had also been a number of incidents and instances of conducted a number of interviews of Iraqi scien- harassment, such as demonstrations in front of tists, managers and technicians as a valuable UNMOVIC offices and at inspection sites, which source of information about past and ongoing were unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative programmes and activities. IAEA was also investi- or encouragement from the authorities. In addi- gating reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium tion, the December 2002 declaration that Iraq since 1991. IAEA had emphasized to Iraqi officials had submitted to the United Nations, which con- the need to shift from passive support—responding tained a good deal of welcome new material and as needed to inspectors’ requests—to proactive information, could also have provided support- support—voluntarily assisting inspectors by pro- ing evidence regarding the many open disarma- viding documentation, people and other evi- ment issues. Reports prepared by UNMOVIC ex- dence that would assist in filling the remaining perts did not contend that WMD remained in gaps in IAEA’s information. IAEA noted that in- Iraq, nor did they exclude the possibility. They spections were time-consuming, but, if success- did, however, point to a lack of evidence and to ful, they could ensure disarmament through inconsistencies. Regrettably, the declaration did peaceful means. It was worth recalling that in not contain any new evidence that would elimi- past experience with Iraq, the elimination of its nate unresolved questions. Some of those unre- nuclear weapons programme was accomplished solved questions pertained to whether Iraq had mostly through intrusive inspections. The pres- weaponized the nerve agent VX; evidence of the ence of international inspectors in Iraq served as destruction of the biological warfare agent an effective deterrent to, and insurance against,

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 324 Political and security questions resumption of programmes to develop WMD. security consequences for all countries of the IAEA had found no evidence that Iraq had re- world, and, particularly, for those of Africa. vived its nuclear weapons programme since its Security Council consideration (5 February). elimination in the 1990s. However, IAEA’s work On 5 February [meeting 4701], the Security Council was steadily progressing and should be allowed to considered the situation between Iraq and Ku- run its natural course. Barring exceptional cir- wait and heard a presentation by the Secretary of cumstances and provided there was sustained, State of the United States, Mr. Powell, who said proactive cooperation by Iraq, IAEA should be he had asked for the meeting for two purposes: to able within the next few months to provide credi- support the core assessments made by Mr. Blix ble assurance that Iraq had no nuclear pro- and Mr. ElBaradei in their 27 January reports to gramme. the Council; and to provide the Council with in- Communications (31 January–4 February). formation that the United States had obtained On 31 January [S/2003/131], Iraq responded to about Iraq’s WMD and involvement in terrorism. some of the comments made by Mr. Blix during The material came from a number of sources, in- his 27 January briefing to the Security Council. cluding technical, such as intercepted telephone Iraq had made every effort to implement Council conversations and satellite photos, and from testi- resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 292] and had mony from individuals. The evidence and con- supported its December 2002 declaration con- clusions pointed to the fact that Saddam Hussein cerning the unilateral destruction of biological and his regime had made no effort to disarm and weapons with irrefutable evidence. Iraq empha- were actually concealing their efforts to produce sized that it had provided unlimited cooperation more WMD. According to the Secretary of State, to both UNMOVIC and IAEA, and had declared all intercepted telephone conversations among Iraqi its proscribed programmes and taken the neces- officials (two tapes of which were played for the sary steps to eliminate them. What remained Council) and satellite photos (several of which were not WMD programmes, but rather questions were projected on a screen) proved that Iraq had about earlier programmes. The allegation that carried out a policy of evasion and deception that Iraq still had a WMD programme was a politically went back 12 years—a policy set at the highest lev- motivated lie by the United States and its vassals els of the Iraqi Government. The voluminous for the purpose of keeping the disarmament file December 2002 declaration submitted by Iraq open-ended and providing cover for aggression was but an attempt to overwhelm the Security against Iraq. If the United States had any real, Council with useless information in order to give convincing evidence to contradict the Iraqi decla- the false impression that the inspection process rations, it would have presented it. The inspec- was working. According to sources, documents tions carried out since November 2002 did not were being moved to avoid detection and hard find anything that contradicted Iraq’s declara- drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities tions. were being replaced. However, WMD were also Also on 31 January [S/2003/132], Iraq said that being moved to keep them from being found by the United States had called for a Security Coun- inspectors. cil meeting on 5 February at which its Secretary The Secretary of State stressed that his state- of State, Colin Powell, would present what had ment was backed by solid sources based on solid been dubbed evidence of Iraq’s possession of intelligence. Iraq was also trying to hide people, WMD. Iraq requested the United States, through as it had not complied with its obligation to allow the Secretary-General, to submit its alleged evi- immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private dence to UNMOVIC or IAEA, so as to enable the access to all officials and other persons associated two organizations to begin their investigations with the weapons programme, and it had been immediately and inform the Council of the ex- reported that Saddam Hussein had directly parti- tent to which those allegations were correct. cipated in the effort to prevent interviews by On 4 February [S/2003/142], South Africa trans- threatening Iraqi scientists with serious conse- mitted to the Council President the text of the quences. In addition, the Iraqis had never ac- communiqué issued by the seventh ordinary ses- counted for all the biological agents they ad- sion of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for mitted they had and, in addition, had never Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolu- accounted for all the organic material used to tion of the African Union, held at the level of make them. They also had not accounted for heads of State and Government (Addis Ababa, many of the weapons filled with those agents, Ethiopia, 3 February). The Central Organ was of such as their R-400 bombs. The United States the view that a military confrontation in Iraq had first-hand descriptions of biological weapons would be a destabilizing factor for the whole re- factories on wheels and on rails. The trucks and gion and would have far-reaching economic and train cars were easily moved and were designed to

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 325 evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of an associate and collaborator of Osama bin months, they could produce a quantity of biologi- Laden, which operated from a camp located in cal poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq north-eastern Iraq. Although Iraqi officials de- claimed to have produced in the years prior to the nied accusations of ties with Al-Qaida, those de- 1991 Gulf War. The United States knew that Iraq nials were simply not credible. In 2002, said the had at least seven mobile biological agent facto- Secretary of State, Al-Qaida associates had ries and the truck-mounted ones had at least two bragged that the situation in Iraq was “good”— or three trucks each; that meant that the mobile that Baghdad could be transited quickly. Ties be- production facilities were very few—perhaps 18 tween Iraq and Al-Qaida went back to the early trucks. It had taken the inspectors four years to and mid-1990s, when President Hussein and bin find out that Iraq was making biological weap- Laden reached an understanding that Al-Qaida ons; Mr. Powell asked how long would it take would no longer support activities against Bagh- them to find even one of those 18 trucks, without dad. From the late 1990suntil 2001, the Iraqi Em- Iraq coming forward as it was supposed to do bassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the with information about those kinds of capabili- Al-Qaida organization. Although some claimed ties. The Iraqi regime had also developed ways to that those contacts did not amount to much, the disperse lethal biological agents into the water Secretary of State said that hatred and ambition supply and air. Iraq, in fact, had a programme to were enough to bring Iraq and Al-Qaida to- modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets, allowing gether—enough for Al-Qaida to turn to Iraq for the aircraft to spray anthrax. As to chemical help in acquiring expertise on WMD. Saddam weapons, Iraq had embedded key portions of its Hussein was determined to keep his WMD and de- illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its termined to make more. The United States legitimate civilian industry. That dual-use infra- would not and could not run the risk that Iraq structure could turn from clandestine to com- someday would use those weapons. Leaving mercial and then back again. Inspections would Saddam Hussein in possession of those weapons be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited, espe- for a few months or years was not an option—not cially if there was any warning that the inspec- in a post–11September world. Iraq posed a threat tions were coming. The United States estimated and remained in material breach of Council reso- that Iraq had a stockpile of between 100 and 500 lutions. By its failure to seize its one last opportu- tons of chemical weapons agent, enough to fill nity to come clean and disarm, Iraq had put itself 16,000 battlefield rockets. Saddam Hussein had in deeper material breach and closer to the day used chemical weapons against his neighbours when it would face serious consequences for its and his own people and had recently authorized continued defiance of the Council. The United his field commanders to use them again; he States Government had an obligation to its citi- would not be giving out those orders if he did not zens—and to the Security Council—to see that res- have the weapons or the intent to use them. Iraq olutions were complied with. The United States also had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons wrote resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 292] to programme that covered several different tech- try to preserve the peace and to give Iraq one last niques to enrich uranium, including electromag- chance. Iraq was not taking that one last chance. netic isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas The Council, therefore, could not shrink from its diffusion. Saddam Hussein was so determined to duty and responsibility. obtain a nuclear bomb that he had made repeated France said that by adopting resolution attempts to acquire high-specification alu- 1441(2002), the Council had chosen to act minium tubes from 11 different countries—even through the path of inspections. That policy after inspection resumed. United States experts rested on three fundamental points: a clear ob- thought that those tubes were intended to serve as jective on which there could be no compromise— rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. the disarmament of Iraq; a method—a rigorous Iraq was also developing systems to deliver WMD, system of inspections that required Iraq’s active in particular ballistic missiles and unmanned ae- cooperation and that affirmed the Council’s rial vehicles (UAVs). UAV s were well suited for dis- central role at each stage; and finally, a require- pensing chemical and biological weapons and ment—that of the Council’s unity. Important re- there was ample intelligence that Iraq had sults had already been achieved through the in- dedicated much effort to developing and testing spections regime, which had enabled UNMOVIC spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. and IAEA to progress in their knowledge of Iraq’s The Secretary of State also said that there ex- capacity. There remained some grey areas in isted a nexus between Iraq and the Al-Qaida ter- Iraq’s cooperation, particularly unresolved ques- rorist network. In fact, Iraq was harbouring a ter- tions in the ballistic, chemical and biological do- rorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, mains. Those uncertainties were not acceptable.

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There was evidence that Iraq could produce the not support any of the scenarios alleged by Mr. chemical agents vx and yperite and that it possi- Powell and he had recently said that UNMOVIC bly possessed significant stocks of anthrax and had found no proof of the presence of the mobile botulism toxin. The absence of long-range deliv- laboratories whose existence Mr. Powell alleged. ery systems reduced the potential threat of those Iraq reminded the Council that WMD pro- weapons, but there was disturbing evidence of grammes could not be easily hidden like an aspi- Iraq’s continued determination to acquire ballis- rin pill; inspectors had criss-crossed all of Iraq tic missiles beyond the authorized 150-kilometre and found no evidence of them. It further re- range. In the nuclear domain, there was a need to ferred to a recent statement by a United States of- clarify in particular any attempt by Iraq to ac- ficial who reported complaints that United States quire aluminium tubes. It was a demanding Administration officials had exaggerated reports démarche, anchored in resolution 1441(2002), of WMD in Iraq and of Iraq’s presumed relation- that the Council had to take together. If that path ship with Al-Qaida in order to bolster their case was to fail and lead into a dead end, France ruled for war. out no option, including the recourse to force. Communications (10 February). On 10 Febru- For the time being, however, the inspections re- ary [S/2003/164], France, Germany and the gime had to be strengthened, since it had not Russian Federation transmitted to the Security been explored to the end. Use of force could only Council President the text of a joint declaration be a final recourse. With the choice between mili- issued by the three countries on the situation in tary intervention and an inspections regime that Iraq, appealing to other Council members to was inadequate for lack of cooperation on Iraq’s support the declaration. The declaration stated part, the Council had to choose to strengthen the that the common aim of the international com- means of the inspection. To do that, the Council munity was to disarm Iraq. There was a debate had to define the requisite tools for increasing over the means to achieve that. That debate had the operational capabilities of UNMOVIC and to continue in the spirit of friendship and respect IAEA. France proposed doubling or tripling the that characterized the relations of the three coun- number of inspectors, opening up more regional tries with the United States. The inspections offices, establishing a specialized body to keep conducted by UNMOVIC and IAEA had already under surveillance the sites and areas already in- yielded results. Germany, France and Russia spected, increasing the capabilities for monitor- favoured the continuation of inspections and the ing and collecting information on Iraqi territory substantial strengthening of their human and and establishing a coordination and informa- technical capabilities. There was still an alter- tion-processing centre that would supply Mr. Blix native to war; the use of force could only be the and Mr. ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordi- last resort. It was up to Iraq to face up to its nated way, with all the intelligence resources they responsibilities in full and to cooperate actively might need. With the consent of the inspection with the inspections regime. teams’ leaders, the Council could define a de- On the same day [S/2003/161], Iraq transmitted manding and realistic time frame for moving to the Secretary-General the text of a television forward in the assessment and elimination of interview with President Hussein by a British for- outstanding issues. That enhanced regime of mer Labour Member of Parliament, Tony Benn, inspections and monitoring could be comple- which contained Iraq’s position with respect to mented by having a permanent UN coordinator the elimination of WMD. Among other things, for disarmament stationed in Iraq and working President Hussein said that Iraq had no relation- under the authority of Mr. Blix and Mr. ship with Al-Qaida. He also said that if the pur- ElBaradei. Iraq had to cooperate actively, how- pose of the inspectors was to make sure that Iraq ever; it had to comply immediately with the de- was free of nuclear, chemical and biological mands of UNMOVIC and IAEA. Before the weapons, then they could do that, for those inspectors’ next report, due on 14 February, Iraq weapons were not aspirin tablets that a person would have to promote new elements. It was the could hide in his pocket. He repeated that Iraq Council’s moral and political duty first to devote was free of such weapons. all its energies to Iraq’s disarmament in peace Security Council consideration (14 and 18-19 and in compliance with the rule of law and February). On 14 February [meeting 4707], the justice. Security Council heard briefings from the Iraq stated that Mr. Powell’s pronouncements UNMOVIC Executive Chairman, Mr. Blix, and the on Iraq’s possession of WMD were utterly un- IAEA Director General, Mr. ElBaradei. related to the reality on the ground. It noted that, Mr. Blix said that through more than 400 in- in a 30 January statement to The New York Times, spections covering over 300 sites, UNMOVIC had Mr. Blix had confirmed that the inspections did obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 327 scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its mis- UNMOVIC and IAEA pointed out that the inspec- sile capabilities. However, as before, it did not tions were producing results. There were those know every cave and corner. Access to sites had who believed that continuing the inspection pro- been without problems, including to presidential cess would be a kind of delaying tactic aimed at sites and private residences. UNMOVIC had preventing military intervention. That raised the found no WMD nor any related proscribed items, question of the time allotted to Iraq, which was only a small number of empty chemical muni- the centre of the debate. According to France, tions that should have been declared and de- two options were available. The option of war stroyed. However, many proscribed weapons and could be seen, on the face of it, to be the swifter, items were not accounted for. UNMOVIC was though, after winning the war, peace had to be aware that many governmental intelligence or- built. That process would be long and difficult, ganizations were convinced that proscribed because it would be necessary to preserve Iraq’s weapons continued to exist in Iraq. Governments unity and to restore stability in a lasting way in a had many sources of information that were not country and a region harshly affected by the in- available to inspectors. For their part, inspectors trusion of force. In the light of that perspective, had to base their reports only on evidence that there was the alternative offered by inspections, they could themselves examine. The December which enabled the international community to 2002 declaration submitted by Iraq missed the move forward on the path of the peaceful dis- opportunity to provide the fresh material and ev- armament of Iraq. As to the alleged links be- idence needed to respond to the unresolved dis- tween Al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime, France’s armament questions. That was perhaps the most research and information, gathered with other important problem that the international com- allies, could not establish those links. Moreover, munity faced. there was a need to assess the impact that a dis- Mr. ElBaradei said that IAEA had conducted a puted military action would have on that level. total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq had Such an intervention could deepen divisions continued to provide immediate access to all loca- among societies, among cultures, among peoples— tions. IAEA had carried out, among other things, divisions that could nurture terrorism. environmental sampling and radiation detection The United States said that it was pleased that surveys. In addition, it continued to interview key there had been improvements with respect to the Iraqi personnel. Iraq had provided further docu- inspection process, but noted that the inspectors mentation on such issues as the importation of still did not have the freedom of access around uranium and the attempted procurement of alu- Iraq that they needed in order to do their job minium tubes, which IAEA continued to pursue. well. What was needed was not more inspections, In the course of an inspection conducted in con- nor more immediate access, but, instead, imme- nection with the aluminium tube investigation, diate, active, unconditional, full cooperation on IAEA inspectors found a number of documents the part of Iraq. What was needed was for Iraq to relevant to transactions aimed at the procure- disarm. The United States had not seen the level ment of carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by of cooperation on the part of Iraq that was ex- Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment pected, anticipated and hoped for when resolu- programme for the manufacture of gas centri- tion 1441(2002) was adopted. More inspections fuge rotors. A review of those documents sug- and a longer inspection period would not solve gested that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was the central problem that the international com- not intended for enrichment purposes, as the munity was facing. That central problem was that specifications of the material appeared not to be Iraq had failed to comply with resolution consistent with those needed for manufacturing 1441(2002). The threat of force had to remain. rotor tubes. To date, IAEA had found no evidence Force should always be the last resort, but the in- of ongoing prohibited nuclear or non-nuclear ac- ternational community could not allow the pro- tivities in Iraq. However, a number of issues were cess to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq was trying still under investigation and the Agency was not to do. yet in a position to reach a conclusion about them. Iraq stressed that it had chosen the path of France said the option of inspections had not peace and opted for solutions that would satisfy been exhausted and it could provide an effective the international community. It was prepared to response to the imperative of disarming Iraq. assist in making clear the true picture in order to The use of force would have such heavy conse- avoid the objections of those who wished to start a quences for the people, the region and interna- war in Iraq. tional stability that it should be envisaged only The Security Council, in a closed meeting on as the last resort. The reports presented by the same day [meeting 4708], had a constructive ex-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 328 Political and security questions change of views with the UNMOVIC Executive and scientific one into a political one. The Chairman and the IAEA Director General. United States had requested Iraq to prove that it At the request of South Africa, on behalf of the was free of the alleged WMD, although what had Non-Aligned Movement [S/2003/153], the Security been originally requested was active cooperation Council, on 18 and 19February, held an open de- with the inspectors. The launching of an attack bate on the situation in Iraq [meeting 4709]. The by the United States and the United Kingdom representative of the League of Arab States (LAS), against Iraq would be proof of the failure of the at the request of the Syrian Arab Republic entire international system. Iraq reaffirmed its [S/2003/184], participated in the discussion with- commitment to continuing full and active co- out the right to vote. The Council had before it a operation with UNMOVIC and IAEA. 14 February letter from South Africa [S/2003/183], LAS said that in order to preserve the peace in which informed the Council President that Iraq the Arab region and throughout the world, the had accepted South Africa’s offer to send to international community should reject the op- Baghdad a team of government representatives, tion of war and give the inspectors sufficient time scientists, engineers and technicians who would to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Iraqi share with Iraq their experience in disarmament question. and in how to eradicate WMD under international Greece, speaking on behalf of the European supervision based on the South African disarma- Union (EU), said that full and effective disarma- ment programme of the early 1990s. ment in Iraq should be achieved peacefully. Addressing the Council, South Africa said that Force should be used only as a last resort. It was the message that had emanated from the 14 Feb- for the Iraqi regime to end the crisis by comply- ruary Council debate was that the inspection pro- ing with the Council’s demands. The EU added cess in Iraq was working and that Iraq was show- that although the UN inspectors should be given ing clear signs of cooperating more proactively the time and resources that the Council believed with the inspectors. Significantly, the inspectors they needed, inspections could not continue in- had also had the opportunity to verify the accu- definitely in the absence of full Iraqi coopera- racy of the information that had been provided tion. The EU recognized that the unity of the by several countries. None of that information international community, as expressed in resolu- seemed to justify the abandonment of the inspec- tion 1441(2002), and the military build-up had tion process and resorting to serious conse- been essential in obtaining the return of the in- quences. The Council had yet to utilize fully the spectors. The EU would work with Arab countries inspection mechanisms of resolution 1441(2002) and LAS to bring home to Saddam Hussein the [YUN 2002, p. 292] that would make for more robust extreme danger of miscalculation of the situation and intrusive inspections. South Africa urged the and the need for full compliance with resolution Council to explore fully practical options to en- 1441(2002). hance the inspection regime, such as the deploy- Communications (19 February–6 March). On ment of additional inspectors, surveillance air- 19 February [S/2003/203], Iraq replied to the alle- craft and mobile customs teams. Although gations made in the 5 February statement by the questions had been raised about how long the in- United States Secretary of State to the Security spections should be allowed to continue in Iraq, Council. Among other things, Iraq refuted alle- South Africa recalled that there were no time gations that it had biological weapons factories on limitations stipulated for inspections in resolu- wheels and on rails, stating that if the United tion 1441(2002). As Mr. Blix had stated, the time States had such evidence, it would have sub- frame would depend on which task one had in mitted it to the inspectors and that UNMOVIC and mind: the elimination of WMD and related items IAEA were inspecting and monitoring all over or monitoring to verify that no new proscribed Iraq but had found no evidence to confirm the activities occurred. Mr. Blix pointed out that authenticity of those allegations. As to the Jorda- monitoring was essential and that it would re- nian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there was no evi- main an open-ended and ongoing process until dence that he had entered Iraq over any border the Council should decide otherwise. South Af- crossing either under his real name or using the rica believed that the Council had to redouble its aliases that the Jordanian side had indicated to efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Iraq. According to available information, it ap- situation in Iraq. The United Nations was an peared that he was in the Al-Bayara region in the organization founded on the need to preserve north of Iraq, which had not been under central peace and security. Its credibility and legitimacy authority since 1991. Terrorist elements were ca- could not be undermined by the Iraq issue. pable of entering and exiting many countries as Iraq said that the United States had trans- they used false passports and names; no country formed the issue of inspections from a technical could claim itself immune from their infiltration.

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On 20 February [S/2003/207], the Libyan Arab Iraq interfered with inspections activities; and, at Jamahiriya said that the Security Council or the any time, additional Council meetings could be United States should issue a text stating that if decided, including at a high level. The three Iraq was in possession of WMD and turned them countries stressed that to render possible a over to the inspectors, there would no longer be peaceful solution, inspections should be given any grounds for military preparations. The the necessary time and resources. However, Iraq Council should also adopt a resolution that called had to disarm and cooperate actively with the for the continuation of the inspectors’ work. inspections. Also on 20 February [S/2003/208], El Salvador On 28 February [S/2003/238], China and the expressed concern at the failure of Iraq to comply Russian Federation transmitted to the Secretary- with its clear disarmament obligations. It called General the texts of the joint communiqués of on Iraq to cooperate with the inspectors without the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two coun- further delay. tries (Beijing, 27 February) on the situation on On 24 February [S/2003/214], France, Germany the Korean peninsula and on the Iraq question. and the Russian Federation transmitted to the The sides favoured a resolution of the Iraqi crisis Council President a joint memorandum on the by political and diplomatic means within the situation in Iraq. The three countries said that, framework of resolution 1441(2002). They stated while suspicions remained, no evidence had been that the UN inspections had achieved definitive given that Iraq still possessed WMD or capabilities progress and should proceed further. in that field. Inspections had just reached their On 3 March [A/57/743-S/2003/247], Bahrain full pace and were functioning without hin- transmitted to the Secretary-General the Final drance; they had already produced results. While Declaration of the summit-level fifteenth regular not yet fully satisfactory, Iraqi cooperation was session of the LAS Council (Sharm el-Sheikh, improving. The Council had to step up its efforts Egypt, 1 March). LAS, among other things, em- to give a real chance to the peaceful settlement phasized its categorical rejection of a strike of the crisis. In that context, the unity of the against Iraq or a threat to the security and integ- Council had to be preserved and the pressure rity of any Arab country and underscored the on Iraq had to be increased. Those conditions need to resolve the Iraqi crisis peacefully, within could be reached through the implementation of the framework of international legitimacy. It also the following proposals: a clear programme of requested that the UN inspection teams be given action for the inspections; reinforced inspections; sufficient time to complete their mission in Iraq. and timelines for inspections and assessment. On the same day [S/2003/254], LAS transmitted to UNMOVIC and IAEA had to submit their pro- the Council President the texts of the resolutions gramme of work for approval by the Council in of the fifteenth session of the LAS Council, accordance with resolution 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, including that on the Iraq crisis. p. 230]. The key remaining tasks had to be defined On 4 March [A/57/757-S/2003/329], Malaysia, as according to their degree of priority. What was Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the required of Iraq for implementation of each task Non-Aligned Movement, transmitted to the had to be clearly defined and precise. Further Secretary-General the statement concerning Iraq measures to strengthen inspections could in- adopted at the Thirteenth Conference of Heads clude an increase in and diversification of staff of State or Government of Non-Aligned Coun- and expertise; establishment of mobile units de- tries (Kuala Lumpur, 20-25 February). The signed in particular to check on trucks; comple- heads of State or Government said that war tion of the new system of aerial surveillance; and against Iraq would be devastating for the whole systematic processing of data provided by that region and that it would have far-reaching politi- system. The implementation of the inspections cal, economic and humanitarian consequences programme should be sequenced according to a for all countries of the world, particularly the realistic and rigorous timeline. The inspectors States in the region. They reaffirmed their com- should be asked to submit the programme of mitment to the principle of non-use of force and work outlining the key substantive tasks for Iraq called on Iraq to continue to comply with Council to accomplish; Chief Inspectors should report to resolution 1441(2002). the Council on the implementation of the pro- On 5 March [S/2003/253], France, Germany and gramme of work every three weeks; a report of the Russian Federation transmitted to the Coun- UNMOVIC and IAEA assessing the progress made cil President the joint statement by the Ministers in completing the tasks should be submitted by for Foreign Affairs of the three countries the inspectors 120 days after the adoption of the adopted in Paris that day. They reaffirmed that programme of work; UNMOVIC and IAEA should the disarmament of Iraq could be achieved by report immediately to the Council if and when peaceful means and that the inspections were

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 330 Political and security questions producing encouraging results. They empha- issues could be seen as active or even proactive, sized that the inspections should be speeded up, those initiatives, three or four months since the in keeping with the proposals set forth in their adoption of resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, 24 February memorandum to the Council (see p. 292], could not be said to constitute immediate p. 329). Using that method, the inspectors should cooperation, nor did they necessarily cover all submit their work programme without delay, areas of relevance. They were nevertheless wel- accompanied by regular progress reports to come, and UNMOVIC was responding to them in the Council. In those circumstances, the three the hope of solving outstanding disarmament countries noted that they would not allow a pro- issues. UNMOVIC was in the process of drafting its posed resolution to be adopted that authorized work programme (see p. 333), which, among the use of force. other things, contained a list of key remaining On 6 March [A/57/748-S/2003/288], Qatar trans- disarmament tasks. Mr. Blix said that the verifi- mitted to the Secretary-General the text of a com- cation and inspection process could not be in- muniqué on Iraq, adopted at the second emer- stant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, it gency session of the Islamic Summit (Doha, would still take some time to verify sites and Qatar, 5 March). The Conference categorically items, analyse documents, interview relevant rejected any strike against Iraq and emphasized persons and draw conclusions. It would not take the need to settle the Iraqi question by peaceful years, or weeks, but months. means within the framework of the United Nations. Also on 6 March [A/57/749-S/2003/289], Mr. ElBaradei said that Iraq’s industrial Qatar transmitted to the Secretary-General the capacity had deteriorated substantially since text of the statement made by the Emir of Qatar, 1998,a fact of direct relevance to Iraq’s capability Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, at that for resuming a nuclear weapons programme. In session. recent weeks, Iraq had provided a considerable Security Council consideration (7 and 11-12 amount of documentation pertaining to out- March). At the request of Malaysia, on behalf of standing issues, including Iraq’s efforts to pro- cure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement the Non-Aligned Movement [S/2003/246], the Security Council held an open meeting on of magnets and magnet-production capabilities 7 March, at which it heard briefings by UNMOVIC and its reported attempt to import uranium. Executive Chairman Mr. Blix and by IAEA Direc- IAEA had concluded that Iraq’s efforts to import tor General Mr. ElBaradei [meeting 4714]. aluminium tubes were not likely to have been re- lated to the manufacture of centrifuges and, Presenting UNMOVIC’s February quarterly re- moreover, it was highly unlikely that Iraq could port [S/2003/232] (see p. 317), which described three months of inspections, Mr. Blix said that have achieved the considerable redesign needed Iraq, which had a highly developed administra- to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. tive system, should be able to provide more docu- IAEA experts had also verified that none of the mentary evidence about its proscribed weapons magnets that Iraq had declared could be used di- programme. UNMOVIC had not found under- rectly for centrifuge magnetic bearings. IAEA ground facilities for chemical or biological pro- would continue to monitor and inspect equip- duction or storage. However, it needed to in- ment and material that could be used to make crease its staff in Iraq both for the monitoring of magnets for enrichment centrifuges. With re- ground transportation and for the inspection of gard to allegations that Iraq had sought to buy underground facilities. Iraq had started to de- uranium from the Niger in recent years, IAEA stroy missiles that were not within the permissible concluded, after a thorough investigation, that range set by the Council. That process consti- the documents provided by a number of States, tuted a substantial measure of disarmament, which pointed to an agreement between Iraq and the first since the middle of the 1990s. As at the Niger for the sale of uranium, were not au- 7 March, 34 missiles, including two combat war- thentic and thus the allegations were unfounded. heads and one launcher, had been destroyed In the area of nuclear weapons, there was no indi- under UNMOVIC supervision. There was also a cation of resumed nuclear activities in those significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a buildings that were identified through the use of major source of uncertainty as to the quantities satellite imagery as having been reconstructed or of biological and chemical weapons that were newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of unilaterally destroyed in 1991. The Iraqi side had nuclear-related prohibited activities at any in- not persisted in attaching conditions to the in- spected sites. Also, there was no indication that spections. However, while the numerous initia- Iraq had attempted to import uranium since tives that were being taken by Iraq with a view to 1990.After three months of intrusive inspections, resolving some long-standing open disarmament IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indi-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 331 cation of the revival of a nuclear-related pro- but could not accept an ultimatum as long as the gramme in Iraq. inspectors were reporting progress in terms of The United States said that, despite the pro- cooperation; as that would mean war. To those gress that had been mentioned by Mr. Blix and who believed that war would be the quickest way Mr. ElBaradei, Iraq was still not cooperating. If to disarm Iraq, France replied that it would cre- Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, the interna- ate divisions and cause wounds that would be tional community would not need to look for mo- long in healing. As a permanent member of the bile biological units or require an extensive pro- Security Council, France would not allow a gramme to search for underground facilities that resolution to be adopted that authorized the were known to exist, nor should the inspectors automatic use of force. have to search for evidence and proof. UNMOVIC China believed that the Council should pro- and IAEA reports noted an acceleration of Iraqi vide strong support and guidance to the two in- initiatives. However, Iraq’s small steps were cer- spection bodies. It also urged Iraq to strengthen tainly not initiatives as they were not provided its cooperation. It was not in favour of a new reso- willingly and freely by the Iraqis, but had been lution, particularly one authorizing the use of pulled out by the possibility of military force. force. The United States expressed pleasure that some The United Kingdom observed that no Coun- missiles were being destroyed but added that evi- cil member had stated that Iraq was fully in com- dence showed that the infrastructure to make pliance with resolution 1441(2002). Iraq had more missiles remained within Iraq and had not dragged its feet on as many elements of proce- been identified and destroyed. Iraq’s intention to dural and substantive cooperation as possible. It keep from turning over all of its WMD had not defied experience to believe that continuing in- changed and, thus, it was not cooperating with spections with no firm end date would achieve the international community in the manner in- complete disarmament. The United Kingdom, tended by resolution 1441(2002). Iraq still had on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution the capability to manufacture chemical and bio- on Iraq (Spain, United Kingdom, United States), logical weapons and still had tens of thousands of would ask the Secretariat to circulate an amend- delivery systems, including UAV s. The United ment, specifying a further period beyond the States believed that the draft resolution that had adoption of a resolution for Iraq to take the final been circulated was appropriate and that the opportunity to disarm and bring itself into Council should soon vote on it. compliance. The Russian Federation said that it had consis- Iraq stated that a possible war of aggression tently sought to solve the Iraq problem on the against Iraq had become imminent, regardless of basis of international law and of Council resolu- any decision by the Council. The United States tions, which was the proper and reliable way. Pro- and the United Kingdom continued to fabricate gress had been achieved in implementing resolu- facts and evidence suggesting Iraq’s possession tion 1441(2002) and Iraq’s level of cooperation of WMD; however, they had not managed to con- with the inspectors was very different from the vince the international community. Their claims practice under UNSCOM. Russia was firmly in fa- were an attempt to mask their real agenda, which vour of continuing and strengthening inspection was a complete takeover of Iraq’s oil and the pol- activities and of making them more focused. itical and economic domination of the entire France said that it was clear that the interna- Arab region. The new draft resolution and the tional community was moving towards the com- most recent amendment did not relate to disarm- plete elimination of WMD programmes in Iraq. ament; the aim was to drag the Council into However, Iraq still had to provide information in taking action that would have detrimental conse- a timely fashion, so that the inspectors could ob- quences, not only for Iraq, but for the very credi- tain the most precise knowledge possible about bility of the United Nations. War against Iraq any existing inventories or programmes. There would wreak destruction, but would not unearth was a need to keep the pressure on Baghdad, any WMD as there were no such weapons. while the American and British military pres- At the request of Malaysia, on behalf of the ence in the region supported the collective re- Non-Aligned Movement [S/2003/283], the Coun- solve of the international community. That pres- cil, on 11 and 12 March, held an open debate on sure had to be used to achieve the objective of the situation in Iraq [meeting 4717].LAS, at the re- disarmament through inspections. Those inspec- quest of the Syrian Arab Republic [S/2003/292], tions could not go on indefinitely and the pace and the Organization of the Islamic Conference had to be stepped up. However, the military (OIC), at the request of the Sudan [S/2003/298], agenda could not dictate the calendar of inspec- participated in the discussion without the right to tions. France agreed to accelerated timetables, vote.

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 332 Political and security questions

Iraq said that Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei had the Council. Iraq, for its part, had to cooperate confirmed that inspections had not found any actively and unconditionally. The three coun- WMD or programmes to produce such weapons tries, supported by China, had submitted propo- inside Iraqi territory. The allegations made by sals for achieving disarmament in Iraq by defin- the United States Secretary of State on 5 Febru- ing key disarmament tasks and establishing a ary were refuted by the facts in the possession of rigorous timetable. UNMOVIC’s programme of the inspectors following four months of rein- work was soon to be submitted to the Council (see forced monitoring. Therefore, none of those al- p. 333). The three countries proposed that the legations had proved to be true. Iraq recon- Council meet at the ministerial level to approve firmed its decision to rid itself of WMD and its key disarmament tasks and establish an imple- readiness to cooperate with UNMOVIC. mentation timetable that was both demanding Malaysia welcomed and supported all efforts and realistic. A peaceful approach was preferred exerted to avert war against Iraq and called for by the Council and supported by the vast the persistent continuation of such efforts based majority of the international community. on multilateral diplomacy, as opposed to unilat- On 17 March [S/2003/347], the Russian Federa- eral actions. tion informed the Secretary-General that in con- Canada said that the division within the nection with the meeting of the leaders of Portu- Security Council had drawn the focus of the gal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United world away from the issue of disarming Iraq and States held in the Azores, Portugal, on the situa- shifted it, instead, onto diplomatic competition, tion relating to Iraq (see below), it deemed it ap- which served no one’s interests but Saddam propriate to confirm its support for a political Hussein’s. On 18 February, Canada had pro- settlement of the Iraq problem. The use of force posed a set of ideas to bridge that very destructive against Iraq was without legal foundation. divide. It suggested that the key remaining dis- By an 18 March letter to the Secretary-General armament tasks be established and prioritized and the Council President [S/2003/325], Iraq noted by the weapons inspectors and that a deadline be that the decision by the UN Secretariat to with- established for Iraq to implement them. As draw all UN staff from Iraq, such as in the case of Mr. Blix had noted, while cooperation by Iraq UNIKOM, would make it easier for the United had to be immediate and proactive, disarmament States to wage its aggression against Iraq. and verification could not be instantaneous. OIC said that the position opposed to war Azores meeting against Iraq enjoyed overwhelming popular On 18 March [S/2003/335], Portugal, Spain, the support, as highlighted by the many rallies and United Kingdom and the United States transmit- demonstrations held in hundreds of cities ted to the Council President the texts of two state- throughout the world and as expressed in many ments adopted by the Atlantic Summit (Azores, recommendations made by governmental and 16 March) entitled “A vision for Iraq and the intergovernmental organizations in many coun- Iraqi people” and “Commitment to transatlantic tries. OIC added that the use of military force solidarity”. The first statement said that for against Iraq, at that particular moment, when 12 years, Saddam Hussein had defied the inter- Iraq was cooperating with the Council’s de- national community. If he refused to cooperate mands, was unjustified and represented an fully with the United Nations, he brought on assault on the pan-Arab and Islamic world. himself the serious consequences foreseen in res- Communications (13-18 March). On 13 March olution 1441(2002). In those circumstances, the [S/2003/311], South Africa said that the delibera- four countries would undertake a solemn obliga- tions on Iraq would be enhanced if the Security tion to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at Council received a draft work programme con- peace with itself and its neighbours. The Iraqi taining the key remaining disarmament tasks people deserved to be lifted from insecurity and from the weapons inspectors. tyranny and freed to determine for themselves On 15 March [S/2003/320], Germany trans- the future of their country. The statement also mitted to the Council President the joint declara- said that the four countries would work to prevent tion by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of and repair damage done by Hussein’s regime to France, Germany and the Russian Federation, the natural resources of Iraq and pledged to pro- adopted on that day. The three countries reaf- tect them. All Iraqis should share the wealth gen- firmed that nothing justified abandoning the in- erated by their national economy. The four coun- spections process or resorting to force. Iraq’s dis- tries would seek a swift end to international armament had begun, and there was every sanctions and support an international recon- reason to believe that it could be completed rap- struction programme. They would also fight idly and in accordance with the rules set out by terrorism in all its forms and Iraq should never

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 333 again be a haven for terrorists of any kind. In served that UNMOVIC had withdrawn all its staff achieving that vision, the four countries planned from Iraq on the previous day. Mr. Blix noted to work in close partnership with international that the work programme prepared by UNMOVIC institutions, including the United Nations. If inspectors and other resources deployed in Iraq, conflict occurred, the four countries planned to and submitted to the Council in accordance with seek the adoption of new Council resolutions that resolution 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 230], seemed to would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure have only limited practical relevance considering rapid delivery of humanitarian relief and en- the situation on the ground. UNMOVIC was a dorse an appropriate post-conflict administra- subsidiary organ of the Council. Until the adop- tion for Iraq. They would also propose that the tion of a new decision by the Council on the role Secretary-General be given authority, on an in- and functions of the Commission, the previous terim basis, to ensure that the humanitarian resolutions remained valid to the extent that was needs of the Iraqi people continued to be met practicable. It was evidently for the Council to through the oil-for-food programme. Any mili- consider the next steps. tary presence, should it be necessary, would be An IAEA representative informed the Council temporary and intended to promote security and that the IAEA Director General had also trans- the elimination of WMD, the delivery of humani- mitted the Agency’s work programme, which was tarian aid and the conditions for the reconstruc- self-explanatory. tion of Iraq. Germany said that the world was facing an im- The statement on the commitment to trans- minent war in Iraq and the Security Council atlantic solidarity stressed that the four countries could not remain silent in that situation. The de- would face and overcome terrorism and the velopments of the last few hours had brought the spread of WMD. They would not allow differ- work of the United Nations on the ground to a ences of the moment to be exploited in ways that standstill and those developments were cause for brought no solutions. the deepest concern. Mr. Blix’s work programme provided clear and convincing guidelines on how to disarm Iraq peacefully within a short space of Military conflict and occupation time and showed that peaceful means had not On 20 March, coalition forces, led by the been exhausted. Germany emphatically rejected United States, commenced military action the impending war. against Iraq. France said the Council was meeting just a few Earlier, on 18 March [S/2003/337], the Security hours before the commencement of hostilities. Council, taking note of the Secretary-General’s The choice before the Council was between two decision to suspend, for security reasons, the visions of the world: on one side stood those who work of the UN humanitarian personnel in Iraq, thought that they could resolve the world’s com- stood ready to consider as soon as possible the plexity through swift preventive action, while on proposals being prepared by the Secretary- the other side stood those who chose resolute General on how to meet the humanitarian needs action and a long-term approach. In order to en- of the people of Iraq, taking into account the ur- sure collective security, there was a need to take gency of the humanitarian situation there. into account the manifold crises and their dimen- Security Council consideration (19 March). sions, including the cultural and religious ones. On 19 March [meeting 4721], the Council was France said that the Iraqi problem had allowed briefed by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, the Council to craft an instrument, through the Mr. Blix. inspection regime, that was unprecedented and Mr. Blix presented UNMOVIC’s draft work could serve as an example. On that basis, an inno- programme. He said that during the three and a vative, permanent disarmament body could be half months of resumed inspections in Iraq, established under UN aegis. It also said that an UNMOVIC had learned a great deal that had been outbreak of force in an unstable area, such as useful for the drafting of its work programme Iraq, could only exacerbate the tensions and frac- and for the selection of key remaining disarma- tures on which terrorism fed. However, over and ment tasks. It would have been difficult to draft above the differences among countries, there was the work programme without that knowledge a need to restore the unity of the international and practical experience. Mr. Blix expressed sad- community and to start preparing for the ness that the inspection work carried out in Iraq required humanitarian assistance in Iraq. The did not bring the assurances needed about the Secretary-General had already started to mobil- absence of WMD or other proscribed items, that ize the various UN agencies. France would take no more time was available for inspections and part in the collective effort to assist the Iraqi peo- that armed action seemed imminent. He ob- ple. Next, it would be necessary to build peace; no

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 334 Political and security questions single country had the means to build Iraq’s fu- been through two major wars, internal uprisings ture and, above all, no State could claim the nec- and conflict, and more than a decade of debilitat- essary legitimacy. The legal and moral authority ing sanctions. In the short term, the conflict that for such an undertaking could stem only from was clearly about to start could make the situation the United Nations. Two principles had to guide much worse. Under international law, the re- the Council’s action: respect for the unity and sponsibility for protecting civilians in conflict fell territorial integrity of Iraq and the preservation on the belligerents. In any area under military of its sovereignty. Similarly, it would be up to the occupation, responsibility for the welfare of the United Nations to establish a framework for population fell on the occupying Power. Without Iraq’s economic reconstruction. in any way assuming or diminishing that ultimate The United States said that, regrettably, the responsibility, the United Nations would do Council’s discussion on UNMOVIC’s work pro- whatever it could to help. The UN humanitarian gramme was incompatible with Iraq’s non- agencies had for some time been engaged in pre- compliance with resolution 1441(2002) [YUN 2002, paring for that contingency. The United Nations p. 292] and the current reality on the ground. had done its best to assess the possible effects of No realistic programme of work or outline of key war, in terms of population displacement and unresolved issues could be developed pursuant to human need, and to position its personnel and resolution 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 230] while Iraq equipment accordingly. Of the $123.5 million failed to cooperate fully, actively and uncondi- requested by the United Nations for those pre- tionally, nor could it be developed in the absence parations, only $45 million had been pledged of sound information on Iraqi programmes since and only $34 million had been received. The 1998.Considering a work programme at that par- United Nations had also examined the situa- ticular time was out of touch with the reality that tion caused by the suspension of the activities of was confronting the international community, as the oil-for-food programme and ways that the the situation on the ground would change and so programme could be adjusted to enable the would the nature of the remaining disarmament United Nations to continue providing humani- tasks. That said, however, the United States did tarian assistance to the Iraqi people during and not exclude the possibility that it may prove use- after hostilities. Such adjustments would re- ful to return to those documents at some time in quire decisions by the Security Council. The the future. In the meantime, the Council would Secretary-General expressed the hope that the face new challenges related to the future of Iraq. effort to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi The United States shared the concern for meet- people and to rehabilitate their society after ing the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. so much destruction might prove to be the Towards that end, it was fielding the Disaster task around which the unity of the Council Assistance Response Team, composed of United could be rebuilt. States civilian humanitarian experts, to the Communications (19-26 March). By a 19 region to assess needs, to liaise with partners and March letter [S/2003/343], the Emir of Qatar, as to provide in-field grant-making capacity. It had Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Confer- also pre-positioned millions of dollars worth of ence, reaffirmed that the diplomatic and peace- food rationing and relief supplies. In addition, ful efforts being made with a view to the elimina- the United States had contributed over $60 tion of WMD had to be given a chance and rejected million to more than a dozen different UN agen- the principle of war against Iraq. cies. In recognizing the importance of the oil-for- Also on 19March [A/58/68-S/2003/357], Malaysia food programme in order to meet the humanita- transmitted to the Secretary-General the state- rian needs of the Iraqi people, the United States ment made that day by the Troika of the Non- was prepared to present in the near future a draft Aligned Movement (Cuba, Malaysia, South Af- humanitarian resolution that would ensure the rica) on the developments concerning Iraq. The continuity of the programme. Troika viewed the imminent unilateral military The Secretary-General expressed regret that it action by the United States and its allies as an ille- had not been possible to reach a common posi- gitimate act of aggression. tion. Whatever the differing views on the Iraqi On 20 March, in three similar letters to the issue, it was a sad day for the United Nations and Council President, Australia [S/2003/352], the the international community; millions of people United Kingdom [S/2003/350] and the United around the world shared that sense of disap- States [S/2003/351] said that their respective armed pointment and were deeply alarmed by the pros- forces had engaged in military action in Iraq on pect of imminent war. The plight of the Iraqi that day. The action followed a long history of people was the Secretary-General’s immediate non-cooperation by Iraq with the United Nations concern. Over the preceding 20 years, Iraqis had and numerous findings by the Security Council

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 335 that Iraq had failed to comply with its disarma- Also on 24 March [S/2003/366], Costa Rica trans- ment obligations. In its resolution 1441(2002) mitted to the Secretary-General a position paper [YUN 2002, p. 292], the Council recognized that concerning the reconstruction of Iraq following Iraq’s possession of WMD constituted a threat to the armed conflict. international peace and security, that Iraq had In another 24 March letter [S/2003/373], Uganda failed to disarm and that in consequence Iraq was informed the Council President that it had de- in material breach of the conditions for the cease- cided to support the United States–led coalition fire at the end of hostilities in 1991 laid down by to disarm Iraq by force and was ready to assist in the Council in resolution 687(1991) [YUN 1991, any way possible. p. 172]. Military action was undertaken only when On 26 March [S/2003/376], Qatar transmitted to it became apparent that there was no other way of the Secretary-General the text of a communiqué achieving compliance by Iraq. issued by the General Secretariat of the Gulf Co- On 20 March [S/2003/348], Russia said that the operation Council (GCC) relating to the situation military action against Iraq was taking place in in the Middle East region owing to the confronta- defiance of world public opinion and in violation tion in Iraq. GCC expressed the hope that mili- of the principles and norms of the UN Charter tary operations would be halted as soon as possi- and international law. Nothing could justify that ble and stressed its rejection of any violation of military action—neither accusations that Iraq was Iraq’s territorial integrity. supporting international terrorism, nor the de- Security Council consideration (26-27 March). sire to change the political regime in that At the request of Iraq, on behalf of LAS, with the country, which was in direct contradiction of in- reservation of Kuwait [S/2003/362], and Malaysia, ternational law. Political regimes could be deter- on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement [S/2003/ mined only by the citizens of the State in ques- 363], the Council, on 26 and 27 March, held an tion. Iraq posed no threat either to neighbouring open meeting on the situation in Iraq [meeting States or to other countries or regions of the 4726].LAS, at the request of the Syrian Arab Re- world, because, especially after a 10-year block- public [S/2003/370], OIC, at the request of the ade, it was a weak country, both militarily and Sudan [S/2003/371], and the Permanent Observer economically. It was even less of a danger because of Palestine, at his own request [S/2003/372], par- international inspectors were working there. ticipated in the discussion without the right to Russia called for the early termination of military vote. action and expressed its conviction that the The Secretary-General said that the Council, central role in resolving crises around the world, which had had Iraq on its agenda for 12 years, including the situation in Iraq, belonged to the had to rediscover its unity of purpose. The war Security Council. had to be brought to an end as soon as possible, but, while it continued, it was essential to protect On 24 March [S/2003/364], the Syrian Arab Re- the civilian population, the wounded and the public informed the Council President that, on prisoners of war, on both sides, and to bring re- 23 March, British and United States planes bom- lief to the victims. That obligation was binding on barded a Syrian civilian bus carrying Syrian all the belligerents. The Geneva Conventions and workers on their way back to Syria from Iraq. Five all other instruments of international humani- Syrian nationals were killed and many others tarian law had to be respected. In particular, the wounded. Syria condemned that action and re- 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, under which served the right to demand compensation ac- those in effective control of any territory were re- cording to relevant international laws. sponsible for meeting the humanitarian needs of On the same day [S/2003/365], LAS transmitted its population and were required to maintain to the Council President the text of a resolution dialogue and cooperation with international or- entitled “The American/British aggression against ganizations engaged in humanitarian relief, had fraternal Iraq and its implications for the security to be scrupulously respected. The oil-for-food and safety of neighbouring Arab States and Arab programme had been halted, with a value of national security”, adopted by the LAS Council some $2.4 billion in supplies, mainly food, in the during its one hundred and nineteenth regular pipeline. The Council needed to determine how session (Cairo, Egypt, 22-25 March). LAS, among it would adjust the programme to make it possi- other things, condemned the American/British ble for those supplies to reach the Iraqi people aggression against Iraq and called for an immedi- and to ensure that food, medicine and other ate and unconditional withdrawal of the invad- essential life- sustaining supplies continued to be ing forces. It affirmed that Arab States had to re- provided. The humanitarian effort required in frain from joining in any military action against the coming weeks and months was going to be the territorial integrity of Iraq. very costly. The United Nations was about to

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 336 Political and security questions launch a flash appeal to donors, and he urged Coalition action was therefore under way to en- Member States to respond swiftly and generously. force Council decisions on complete Iraqi The Council had to determine how it would ad- disarmament. Military action was both legitimate dress the many needs of the Iraqi people, what- and multilateral, as it was authorized under reso- ever the outcome of the war, and what the United lutions 678(1990) [YUN 1990,p. 204], 687(1991) [YUN Nations itself might be asked to undertake. A 19 91, p . 172 ] and 1441(2002). A broad coalition of Council mandate was needed for anything be- well over 40 States was supporting the action ma- yond strictly humanitarian relief. The Secretary- terially or politically. The United Kingdom re- General said that in the last few months the peo- gretted the differences within the Council that ples of the world had showed how much they ex- had marked the past few months of discussions pected of the United Nations, and of the Security on that subject. The time had come to put those Council in particular. Many of them were bitterly aside and to unite to ensure that the United disappointed. Their faith in the United Nations Nations and the international community could could be restored only if the Council was able to act quickly to meet the needs of the Iraqi people identify and work constructively towards specific during and after military action. The first prior- goals. He urged the five permanent members, in ity was to ensure that the changing realities on particular, to show leadership by making a con- the ground were reflected in the operation of the certed effort to overcome their differences. For oil-for-food programme, on which 60 per cent of his part, the Secretary-General emphasized two Iraqis remained dependent. Progress had been guiding principles on which he believed there made within the Council on a draft resolution was no disagreement, and which should guide all that would amend the programme. It was hoped the Council’s efforts and future decisions on that the outstanding issues could be resolved rap- Iraq. The first principle was respect for Iraq’s idly so that the Secretary-General could have the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independ- necessary authority to maximize the UN role in ence, and the second was respect for the right of delivering humanitarian relief. Looking further the Iraqi people to determine their own political ahead, there was a need to consider the role that future and control their own natural resources. the United Nations could play in building a sta- The Secretary-General appealed to all Member ble and prosperous Iraq. The United Kingdom States to begin healing divisions so that the was convinced that the United Nations had to Council could recover its rightful role as the body take a central role in the future of that country. with primary responsibility for the maintenance Communication (28 March). On 28 March of international peace and security. [S/2003/391], Iran informed the Secretary-General Iraq said that the American-British full-scale that its airspace had been violated and that its ter- military aggression commenced at dawn on ritory had been hit by the belligerents in the war 20 March. The goal of the aggression was the oc- against Iraq. cupation of Iraq and the change of its political re- gime. The Iraqi armed forces and armed civilian Special Adviser units were fighting fierce battles against that ag- gression. The international community was well On 7 April [SG/SM/8660-IK/343], the Secretary- aware that the Council had not authorized the General met with members of the Security Coun- use of force. Both the United States and the cil to inform them that he had appointed United Kingdom confirmed, when resolution Rafeeuddin Ahmed as his Special Adviser on 1441(2002) was adopted [YUN 2002, p. 292], that it Iraq. Mr. Ahmed would consider possible UN did not contain a hidden agenda, trigger or auto- roles in post-war Iraq and their legal, political, matic use of force. Nevertheless, despite the op- operational and resource implications. Any role position to war of the majority of Council mem- beyond the coordination of humanitarian activi- bers, those two countries launched a war against ties in Iraq, and other activities mandated by Iraq. existing resolutions, would first require a new mandate from the Council. The Council The United Kingdom said that it was aware members welcomed Mr. Ahmed’s appointment. that Member States, perhaps without exception, found the situation in Iraq deeply disappointing and distasteful, but they could not set aside Iraqi initiatives the universally available evidence that Iraq was On 15 April, near the town of Nasiriyah, up to repeatedly defying the United Nations in refus- 100 Iraqis representing every part of the country ing to complete disarmament of its WMD under met to discuss Iraq’s future and how best to chart the terms of successive resolutions. Resolution a course towards a democratic representative 1441(2002) was adopted unanimously but not im- government. United States officials and coalition plemented with any rigour by a united Council. representatives also attended. At the end of the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 337 session, the Iraqi participants approved a final promoting accountability for crimes committed statement proposing 13 principles for a future by the previous Iraqi regime; and assuming im- Iraqi government. The principles, among other mediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible things, stressed that Iraq had to be democratic; for military and security matters. The Coalition the future government should not be based on was facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to communal identity; a future government had to take the first steps towards forming a representa- be organized as a democratic federal system, but tive government, based on the rule of law, that on the basis of countrywide consultation; the rule afforded fundamental freedoms and equal pro- of law had to be paramount; the Baath party had tection and justice to the Iraqi people without to be dissolved; and political violence had to be regard to ethnicity,religion or gender. According rejected. to the Coalition, the United Nations had a vital On 28 April, over 250 Iraqi representatives, role to play in providing humanitarian relief, in from inside Iraq and from the expatriate and op- supporting the reconstruction of Iraq and in position communities, convened in Baghdad to helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim advance the national dialogue among Iraqis authority. regarding composition of an Iraqi interim Security Council consideration (22 May). On authority. 22 May [meeting 4762], the Council discussed the re- Security Council note (5 May). On 5 May sponse to the humanitarian situation in Iraq (see [S/2003/524], the Council President circulated a also p. 936) and heard briefings by the Deputy note from the Holy See containing a Statement Secretary-General (DSG), Louise Fréchette, and of Patriarchs and Bishops of Iraq, issued on other UN and intergovernmental organization 29 April. The Statement, among other things, officials. asked that the new Iraqi constitution recognize The DSG said that the breakdown of essential Christians’ religious, social and political rights services and law and order in Iraq had resulted and envision a legal statute in which each person in a range of urgent humanitarian needs. A would be considered according to his or her ca- major humanitarian crisis had been averted, pacities, without discrimination. but the civilian population, and children in particular, remained at risk, especially if the se- Coalition Provisional Authority curity situation did not improve substantially On 8 May [S/2003/538], the United Kingdom in the near future. UN agencies were at work and the United States informed the Council Pres- throughout the country, providing food, water, ident that they continued to act together to ensure medicine and other emergency assistance. the complete disarmament of Iraq of WMD and They had helped repair water and sanitation means of delivery. The Coalition States would facilities, assisted in the restoration of electric- abide by their obligations under international ity and provided relief to internally displaced law and would ensure that Iraq’s oil was pro- persons and malnourished children. Interna- tected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi peo- tional UN staff had begun to return to Iraq in ple. In order to meet those objectives and obliga- April, and more than 300 of them were now tions in the post-conflict period, the Coalition, deployed, in addition to 3,400 national staff. acting under existing command and control ar- The overarching priority of virtually all UN as- rangements through the Commander of Coali- sistance efforts was the reactivation of essential tion Forces, had created the Coalition Provisional public services, including the public distribu- Authority (the Authority), which included the tion system for food. However, the delivery of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian As- assistancewasmadeallthemoredifficult,if sistance, to exercise powers of government tem- not impossible, by the general lack of law and porarily and, as necessary, to provide security, to order. Many looted facilities were repaired and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and to restocked only to be looted again. Also, staff eliminate WMD. The Coalition partners, working movements were limited in many urban areas through the Authority, would, among other and people in need could not be reached. The things, provide for security in and for the provi- Organization’s ability to respond to the urgent sional administration of Iraq by deterring hostil- needs in Iraq depended greatly on whether the ities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and necessary resources would be available. As at securing its borders; eliminating all of Iraq’s 22 May, more than $700 million had been re- WMD; facilitating the orderly and voluntary re- ceived in response to the UN flash appeal. turn of refugees and displaced persons; main- Moreover, as implementation of resolution taining civil law and order; eliminating all terror- 1472(2003) of 28 March on the use of oil-for- ist infrastructure and resources within Iraq; food funds to provide aid (see p. 363) continued, supporting and coordinating demining activities; the Office of the Iraq Programme and UN agen-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 338 Political and security questions

cies had confirmed that nearly $1 billion worth Welcoming also the appointment by the Secretary- of priority humanitarian supplies could be General of his Special Adviser on Iraq, shipped by 3 June. As UN agencies continued to Affirming the need for accountability for crimes and expand their presence in Iraq, they were conduct- atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime, Stressing the need for respect for the archaeological, ing comprehensive assessments that would historical, cultural and religious heritage of Iraq and enable the UN system to re-prioritize its response for the continued protection of archaeological, histori- plans. Based on those new assessments, the cal, cultural and religious sites, as well as museums, United Nations would be launching a revised libraries and monuments, humanitarian appeal in the second half of June. Noting the letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Perma- nent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of Lifting of economic sanctions America to the United Nations addressed to the Pres- On 22 May [meeting 4761], the Security Council ident of the Security Council, and recognizing the spe- adopted resolution 1483(2003) by vote (14-0). cific authorities, responsibilities and obligations under The draft [S/2003/556] was submitted by Spain, the applicable international law of these States as occupy- United Kingdom and the United States. The ing Powers under unified command (“the Authority”), Syrian Arab Republic, which did not participate Noting also that other States that are not occupying Powers are working now, or in the future may work, in the voting, later explained that it would have under the Authority, voted in favour of the resolution had it been Welcoming the willingness of Member States to con- granted additional time before the vote, as it had tribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing requested on more than one occasion. Syria pro- personnel, equipment and other resources under the vided a further explanation to the Council Pres- Authority, ident in writing [S/2003/567]. Concerned that many Kuwaitis and third-State nation- als have not been accounted for since 2 August 1990, The Security Council, Determining that the situation in Iraq, although im- Recalling all its relevant resolutions, proved, continues to constitute a threat to interna- Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity tional peace and security, of Iraq, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament United Nations, of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual 1. Appeals to Member States and concerned organi- confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq, zations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to re- Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to deter- form their institutions and rebuild their country, and mine their own political future and to control their to contribute to conditions of stability and security in own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of Iraq in accordance with the present resolution; all parties concerned to support the creation of an en- 2. Calls upon all Member States in a position to do vironment in which they may do so as soon as possible, so to respond immediately to the humanitarian ap- and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern peals of the United Nations and other international themselves must come quickly, organizations for Iraq and to help to meet the humani- Encouraging efforts by the people of Iraq to form a tarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by provid- representative Government based on the rule of law ing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s eco- without regard to ethnicity, religion or gender, and, nomic infrastructure; in this connection, recalling resolution 1325(2000) of 3. Appeals to Member States to deny safe haven to 31 October 2000, those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are Welcoming the first steps of the Iraqi people in this alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and regard, and noting in this connection the Nasiriyah to support actions to bring them to justice; statement of 15 April 2003 and the Baghdad statement 4. Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the of 28 April 2003, Charter of the United Nations and other relevant in- Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital ternational law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi role in humanitarian relief, in the reconstruction of people through the effective administration of the ter- Iraq and in the restoration and establishment of na- ritory, in particular working towards the restoration of tional and local institutions for representative govern- conditions of security and stability and the creation of ance, conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely deter- Taking note of the statement made on 12 April 2003 mine their own political future; by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 5. Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations in which their obligations under international law, in particular they recognized the need for a multilateral effort to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Regulations help to rebuild and develop Iraq and the need for as- concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, sistance from the International Monetary Fund and adopted at The Hague on 18 October 1907; the World Bank in these efforts, 6. Calls upon the Authority and relevant organiza- Welcoming the resumption of humanitarian assist- tions and individuals to continue efforts to locate, iden- ance and the continuing efforts of the Secretary- tify and repatriate all Kuwaiti and third-State nationals General and the specialized agencies to provide food or the remains of those present in Iraq on or after and medicine to the people of Iraq, 2 August 1990, as well as the Kuwaiti archives, that the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 339 previous Iraqi regime failed to undertake, and in this people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the regard directs the High-Level Coordinator, in consul- Authority; tation with the International Committee of the Red 10. Decides that, with the exception of prohibitions Cross and the Tripartite Commission, and with the ap- related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related propriate support of the people of Iraq and in coordi- materiel other than those arms and related materiel re- nation with the Authority, to take steps to fulfil his quired by the Authority to serve the purposes of the mandate with respect to the fate of Kuwaiti and third- present and other related resolutions, all prohibitions State national missing persons and property; related to trade with Iraq and the provision of finan- 7. Decides that all Member States shall take appro- cial or economic resources to Iraq established pursu- priate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institu- ant to resolution 661(1990) and subsequent relevant tions of Iraqi cultural property and other items of ar- resolutions, including resolution 778(1992) of 2 Octo- chaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific and ber 1992, shall no longer apply; religious importance, illegally removed from the Iraq 11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament National Museum, the National Library and other obligations, encourages the United Kingdom of Great locations in Iraq since the adoption of resolution Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 661(1990)of 6 August 1990,including by establishing a America to keep the Council informed of their activi- prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and ties in this regard, and underlines the intention of the items with respect to which reasonable suspicion exists Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations that they have been illegally removed, and calls upon Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set tural Organization, Interpol and other international forth in resolutions 687(1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the imple- (1999) of 17 December 1999 and 1441(2002) of 8 No- mentation of the present paragraph; vember 2002; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Spe- 12. Notes the establishment of a Development Fund cial Representative for Iraq, whose independent re- for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq and to sponsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the be audited by independent public accountants ap- Council on his activities pursuant to the present reso- proved by the International Advisory and Monitoring lution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in Board of the Development Fund for Iraq, and looks post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among forward to the early meeting of that Board, whose United Nations and international agencies engaged in members shall include duly qualified representatives humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities of the Secretary-General, of the Managing Director of in Iraq and, in coordination with the Authority, assist- the International Monetary Fund, of the Director- ing the people of Iraq through: General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic De- (a) Coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction velopment and of the President of the World Bank; assistance by United Nations agencies and between 13 . Notes also that the funds in the Development United Nations agencies and non-governmental or- Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the ganizations; Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim (b) Promoting the safe, orderly and voluntary re- administration, for the purposes set out in paragraph turn of refugees and displaced persons; 14 below; (c) Working intensively with the Authority, the peo- 14 . Underlines the fact that the Development Fund ple of Iraq and others concerned to advance efforts to for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner to meet restore and establish national and local institutions for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for representative governance, including by working to- economic reconstruction and the repair of Iraq’s infra- gether to facilitate a process leading to an internation- structure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for ally recognized, representative Government of Iraq; the costs of Iraqi civilian administration and for other (d) Facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastruc- purposes benefiting the people of Iraq; ture, in cooperation with other international organiza- 15. Calls upon the international financial institu- tions; tions to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction (e) Promoting economic reconstruction and the and development of their economy and to facilitate as- conditions for sustainable development, including sistance by the broader donor community, and wel- through coordination with national and regional or- comes the readiness of creditors, including those of ganizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors and the Paris Club, to seek a solution to the sovereign debt the international financial institutions; problems of Iraq; (f) Encouraging international efforts to contribute 16. Requests that the Secretary-General, in coordi- to basic civilian administration functions; nation with the Authority, continue the exercise of his (g) Promoting the protection of human rights; responsibilities pursuant to Council resolutions 1472 (h) Encouraging international efforts to rebuild the (2003) of 28 March 2003 and 1476(2003) of 24 April capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; 2003, for a period of six months following the adop- (i) Encouraging international efforts to promote tion of the present resolution, and terminate within legal and judicial reform; this time period, in the most cost-effective manner, the 9. Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq ongoing operations of the “Oil-for-Food” Programme with the help of the Authority and working with the (the Programme), both at Headquarters level and in Special Representative of the Secretary-General, of an the field, transferring responsibility for the adminis- Iraqi interim administration as a transitional adminis- tration of any remaining activity under the Pro- tration run by Iraqis until an internationally recog- gramme to the Authority, including by taking the fol- nized, representative Government is established by the lowing necessary measures:

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 340 Political and security questions

(a) To facilitate as soon as possible the shipment agencies under the accounts established pursuant to and authenticated delivery of priority civilian goods as paragraphs 8 (b) and (d) of resolution 986(1995); identified by the Secretary-General and representa- (f) To provide the Council, 30 days prior to the ter- tives designated by him, in coordination with the Au- mination of the Programme, with a comprehensive thority and the Iraqi interim administration, under ap- strategy developed in close coordination with the Au- proved and funded contracts previously concluded by thority and the Iraqi interim administration that the previous Government of Iraq, for the humanita- would lead to the delivery of all relevant documenta- rian relief of the people of Iraq, including, as neces- tion and the transfer of all operational responsibility sary, negotiating adjustments in the terms or condi- of the Programme to the Authority; tions of these contracts and respective letters of credit 17. Requests also that the Secretary-General transfer as set forth in paragraph 4 (d) of resolution 1472(2003); as soon as possible to the Development Fund for Iraq (b) To review, in the light of changed circum- one billion United States dollars from unencumbered stances, in coordination with the Authority and the funds in the accounts established pursuant to para- Iraqi interim administration, the relative utility of graphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 986(1995), restore each approved and funded contract with a view to de- Government of Iraq funds that were provided by termining whether such contracts contain items re- Member States to the Secretary-General as requested quired to meet the needs of the people of Iraq both in paragraph 1 of resolution 778(1992), and decides now and during reconstruction, and to postpone that, after deducting all relevant United Nations ex- action on those contracts determined to be of question- penses associated with the shipment of authorized able utility and the respective letters of credit until an contracts and costs to the Programme outlined in para- internationally recognized, representative Govern- graph 16 (c) above, including residual obligations, all ment of Iraq is in a position to make its own determi- surplus funds in the escrow accounts established pur- nation as to whether such contracts shall be fulfilled; suant to paragraphs 8 (a), (b), (d) and (f) of resolution (c) To provide to the Council within 21 days follow- 986(1995) shall be transferred at the earliest possible ing the adoption of the present resolution, for the re- time to the Development Fund for Iraq; view and consideration of the Council, an estimated 18. Decides to terminate, effective on the adoption operating budget based on funds already set aside in of the present resolution, the functions related to the the account established pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of observation and monitoring activities undertaken by resolution 986(1995) of 14 April 1995, identifying: the Secretary-General under the Programme, includ- (i) All known and projected costs to the United ing the monitoring of the export of petroleum and pe- Nations required to ensure the continued func- troleum products from Iraq; tioning of the activities associated with imple- 19 . Decides also to terminate the Security Council mentation of the present resolution, including Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of res- operating and administrative expenses associ- olution 661(1990) at the conclusion of the six-month ated with the relevant United Nations agencies period called for in paragraph 16 above, and decides and programmes responsible for the implemen- further that the Committee shall identify individuals tation of the Programme both at Headquarters and entities referred to in paragraph 23 below; and in the field; 20. Decides further that all export sales of petroleum, (ii) All known and projected costs associated with petroleum products and natural gas from Iraq follow- termination of the Programme; ing the date of adoption of the present resolution shall (iii) All known and projected costs associated with be made consistent with prevailing international mar- restoring funds of the Government of Iraq ket best practices, to be audited by independent public that were provided by Member States to the accountants reporting to the International Advisory Secretary-General as requested in paragraph 1 and Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 778(1992); above in order to ensure transparency, and decides (iv) All known and projected costs associated with that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all pro- the Special Representative and the qualified ceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Devel- representative of the Secretary-General identi- opment Fund for Iraq until such time as an inter- fied to serve on the International Advisory and nationally recognized, representative Government of Monitoring Board, for the six-month time pe- Iraq is properly constituted; riod defined above, following which these costs 21. Decides that 5 per cent of the proceeds referred shall be borne by the United Nations; to in paragraph 20 above shall be deposited into the (d) To consolidate into a single fund the accounts Compensation Fund established pursuant to resolu- established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of res- tion 687(1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions and olution 986(1995); that, unless an internationally recognized, representa- (e) To fulfil all remaining obligations related to the tive Government of Iraq and the Governing Council of termination of the Programme, including negotiating, the United Nations Compensation Commission, in the in the most cost-effective manner, any necessary settle- exercise of its authority over methods of ensuring that ment payments, which shall be made from the escrow payments are made into the Compensation Fund, de- accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and cide otherwise, this requirement shall be binding upon (b) of resolution 986(1995), with those parties that have a properly constituted, internationally recognized, previously entered into contractual obligations with representative Government of Iraq and any successor the Secretary-General under the Programme, and to thereto; determine, in coordination with the Authority and the 22. Notes the relevance of the establishment of an Iraqi interim administration, the future status of con- internationally recognized, representative Government tracts undertaken by the United Nations and related of Iraq and the desirability of prompt completion of

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 341 the restructuring of Iraq’s debt as referred to in para- VOTE ON RESOLUTION 1483(2003): graph 15 above, decides that, until 31 December 2007, In favour: Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, France, Germany, unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum, pe- Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom, troleum products and natural gas originating in Iraq United States. shall be immune, until title passes to the initial pur- Against: None. chaser, from legal proceedings against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or Speaking after the vote, the United States said execution, and that all States shall take any steps that that the lifting of sanctions marked a momentous may be necessary under their respective domestic legal event for the people of Iraq. The United Nations systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds wastoplayavitalroleinrebuildingIraq.Byrecog- and obligations arising from sales thereof, as well as nizing the fluidity of the political situation and the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges that decisions would be made on the ground, the and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the above-mentioned privi- Councilhadprovidedaflexibleframeworkunder leges and immunities will not apply with respect to any Chapter VII for the Authority,Member States,the legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or United Nations and others in the international obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages community to participate in the administration assessed in connection with an ecological accident, in- and reconstruction of Iraq. The resolution af- cluding an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adop- firmed the commitment to the development of an tion of the present resolution; internationally recognized representative Iraqi 23. Decides thatallMemberStatesinwhichthereare: Governmentandcreatedarobustmandateforthe (a) Funds or other financial assets or economic re- Secretary-General’s Special Representative. The sources of the previous Government of Iraq or its state resolution also established a framework for an or- bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq derly phase-out of the oil-for-food programme, as of the date of adoption of the present resolution; or therebypreserving,foratransitionalperiod,what (b) Funds or other financial assets or economic re- hadbecomeasafetynetfortheIraqipeople.Inad- sources that have been removed from Iraq or acquired by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the for- dition, it established transparency in all processes mer Iraqi regime and their immediate family mem- and UN participation in monitoring the sale of bers, including entities owned or controlled, directly Iraqi oil resources and expenditures of oil pro- or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their be- ceeds. In that context, the United States was half or at their direction, pleased to announce the creation of the Develop- shall freeze without delay those funds or other finan- ment Fund for Iraq in the Central Bank of Iraq. cial assets or economic resources and, unless these The Authority would disburse funds only for the funds or other financial assets or economic resources purposes it determined to benefit the Iraqi peo- are themselves the subject of a prior judicial, adminis- ple. The resolution lifted export restrictions to trative or arbitral lien or judgement, immediately shall Iraq, with the exception of trade in arms and re- cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq, it being understood that, unless otherwise addressed, lated materiel not required by the Authority.Avia- claims made by private individuals or non-government tionrestrictionswerealsolifted,butIraq’sdisarm- entities on those transferred funds or other financial ament obligations remained, and Member States assets may be presented to the internationally recog- were still barred from assisting Iraq in acquiring nized, representative Government of Iraq; and decides WMD and proscribed missile systems or proceed- also that all such funds or other financial assets or eco- ing with civil nuclear activities so long as those re- nomic resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immu- strictions remained in effect. The resolution pro- nities, and protections as provided under paragraph 22 above; vided Iraq with adequate time to recover capacity eroded during the sanctions years, yet it preserved 24. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of his Special its obligations to Kuwait and others who suffered Representative with respect to the implementation of from Saddam Hussein’s aggression dating from the present resolution and on the work of the Interna- 1990.It addressed Iraq’s sovereign debt, the viola- tional Advisory and Monitoring Board, and encour- tions of human rights and international humani- ages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- tarian law by the previous regime. It also directed ern Ireland and the United States of America to Member States to act quickly to seize and return to inform the Council at regular intervals of their efforts the Iraqi people money stolen by the Hussein re- pursuant to the present resolution; gime. 25. Decides to review the implementation of the present resolution within twelve months of the adop- The Secretary-General said that the interna- tion thereof and to consider further steps that might tional community should be gratified that the be necessary; Council had come together to chart the way for- 26. Calls upon Member States and international and ward in Iraq. The Council had adopted a resolu- regional organizations to contribute to the implemen- tion that spelled out the assistance it expected the tation of the present resolution; United Nations to give to the people of Iraq in co- 27. Decides to remain seized of this matter. ordination with the occupying Powers, which had

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 342 Political and security questions the responsibility for the effective administration knew, it should be possible to establish the truth of the territory. The most important task would about those weapons. In resolution 1483(2003) be to ensure that the Iraqi people were able as (see p. 338), the Council declared its intention to soon as possible, through a transparent and im- revisit the mandate of UNMOVIC, and it was aware partially managed political process, to form a that UNMOVIC remained ready to resume work in free and representative Government of their own Iraq as an independent verifier or to conduct choice. The Secretary-General would nominate long-term monitoring, should the Council so de- his Special Representative without delay (see cide. Mr. Blix said that his briefing was likely to below). be his last one and he thanked the Secretary- General and the UN Secretariat for the coopera- Special Representative tion they had provided since the creation of On 23 May [S/2003/570], the Secretary-General UNMOVIC. informed the Security Council President of his The Council President took note of Mr. Blix’s intention to appoint as his Special Representative intention to retire from his post at the end of June for Iraq, for a period of four months, Sergio and expressed the Council’s gratitude to him for Vieira de Mello (Brazil), the UN High Commis- his service. sioner for Human Rights. Communication (10 June). On 10 June [A/58/94- On 27 May [S/2003/571], the Council took note S/2003/642], the Russian Federation transmitted to of the Secretary-General’s intention. the Secretary-General the text of the Declaration Communication (3 June). On 3 June [S/2003/ by the heads of State of the members of the 612 ], Iran transmitted to the Secretary-General Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Moscow, the Joint Declaration on the regional initiative re- 29 May) (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the garding Iraq, issued by Iraq’s neighbouring Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). The countries during the thirtieth session of the Declaration, among other things, noted that the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Teh- United Nations should have an important role to ran, 28-30 May). The Foreign Ministers of Bah- play in the reconstruction of Iraq. A precondition rain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, for that country’s transition to peace and the the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey reiterated building of a democratic society was respect for the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine the national interests and sovereign rights of the their political future and to establish a fully rep- Iraqi people and concrete and effective aid on the resentative and broad-based Government in a part of the international community. safe and peaceful environment. They also em- Report of Secretary-General (July). In re- phasized the inalienable right of the Iraqi people sponse to resolution 1483(2003), the Secretary- to enjoy a decent and comfortable life based on General submitted a 17July report [S/2003/715] on the rule of law, equality and respect for funda- the work of his Special Representative with re- mental human rights and freedoms. They under- spect to the implementation of that resolution, lined the central role of the United Nations in provided an initial assessment of the scope of the post-war Iraq, especially with regard to the estab- challenges involved in implementing the man- lishment of a representative Government, reha- date conferred by the resolution and recom- bilitation of local institutions, provision of hu- mended an overall approach and structure for manitarian relief and reconstruction, and called the UN presence in Iraq for the remainder of for the speedy restoration of full Iraqi sover- 2003, taking into account the Council’s request eignty through the establishment of a legitimate to terminate the oil-for-food programme in No- Government and an end to occupation. vember 2003. Security Council consideration (5 June). On The Secretary-General’s Special Representa- 5 June [meeting 4768], the Council was briefed by tive, Sergio Vieira de Mello, arrived in Baghdad the UNMOVIC Executive Chairman, Mr. Blix, on on 2 June and embarked on broad consultations UNMOVIC’s report covering 1 March to 31 May to define the UN role. He had brought Iraqi and [S/2003/580] (see p. 317). He said that for many Authority representatives together with the years neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC made sig- United Nations to discuss issues such as the rule nificant finds of proscribed weapons, proba- of law, past human rights violations and the con- bly because the items were unilaterally de- stitutional process. Contacts had also been initi- stroyed by the Iraqi authorities or else because ated with representatives of the diplomatic com- they were effectively concealed by them. He munity in Baghdad and visiting parliamentary trusted that in the new environment in Iraq, in delegations. Several common themes ran through which there was full access and cooperation, and the discussions that the Special Representative in which knowledgeable witnesses should no had with Iraqis of different backgrounds. There longer be inhibited from revealing what they was an overwhelming demand for the early resto-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 343 ration of sovereignty and the message was con- parts the various possible modalities for electoral veyed that democracy could not be imposed from registration and the electoral process. The outside. Serious concern was expressed about the Secretary-General said that the United Nations process of de-Ba’athification and the dissolution could make a significant contribution in the of the Iraqi army. Above all, the Special Repre- constitutional and electoral processes, as its sentative’s contacts expressed deep concern about involvement would confer legitimacy and place at the precarious, some believed deteriorating, the disposal of the Iraqi people the wealth of security situation, particularly in Baghdad. Many experience accrued by the United Nations in Iraqis lodged criticism about aspects of the past those fields over the years. UN record in Iraq, but they also expressed appre- Lack of security and restricted freedom of ciation for UN humanitarian efforts and stressed movement had affected UN activities, particu- the need for the Organization to play an active larly humanitarian work, and had the potential to role, not least in facilitating and supporting the impair reconstruction planning. The work of the political transition process. UN humanitarian agencies was further impeded The Special Representative had made efforts by the massive presence of explosive ordnance, to meet with many Iraqi political groups, both the mines and unexploded ordnance. So far, UN newly emerging and those well established. personnel had seldom been the target of deliber- Their unanimous concern was the urgent need to ate hostility,with the exception of one incident in establish an Iraqi provisional government that the city of Basra on 17 June when a crowd could help address some of the immediate practi- trapped two UN vehicles, apparently not distin- cal challenges faced in the country. Iraqis empha- guishing the United Nations from the Authority. sized that they themselves had to conduct the con- Both vehicles were eventually released. Shots stitutional process and that an Iraqi interim were fired outside the UN compound at the authority should be in place before such a process Canal Hotel in Baghdad on 29 June, causing began. The Special Representative strongly advo- Coalition forces to go into high alert. On 6 July, a cated that the Authority devolve real executive World Food Programme (WFP) office in Mosul authority to a broadly representative and self- and later an empty WFP vehicle were attacked by selecting Iraqi leadership, including in policy- armed individuals; no WFP staff were hurt in and decision-making, and in the preparation and those incidents. However, the international staff execution of a budget. That advice was favourably presence in Mosul was reduced from 27 to 4. UN received by the Authority and, on 13July,it estab- contractors and facilities remained vulnerable to lished the Governing Council, the principal body criminal activity, both random and organized. of the interim administration of Iraq, a move that For ordinary Iraqis and UN personnel, the prin- was welcomed by the Secretary-General. The 25- cipal security threat came from violent crime. member Council, which included three women, Criminals, some of whom were organized and had a slight Shi’ah majority and an equal repre- most of whom were armed, continued to take ad- sentation of Kurds and Sunnis, with additional vantage of the easy availability of weapons and Christian and Turkmen representation. The the vacuum in rule-of-law institutions. The prin- Council would name an interim minister for each cipal concerns of Iraqis included the lack of per- ministry and would have the right to set policies sonal security and of basic services such as water, and take decisions, in cooperation with the Au- electricity and fuel. Some concern had been ex- thority, and to designate international represen- pressed at the potentially serious implications of tation during the interim period. The Council the recent dissolution by the Authority of the would also consider appointing a preparatory Iraqi army, which numbered half a million per- constitutional commission to recommend a pro- sonnel. The United Nations had made available cess by which a new constitution would be pre- to the Authority its experience and body of best pared and approved. According to the Authority, practice in disarmament, demobilization and re- the full restoration of sovereignty would come integration. At the Authority’s request, a small after the drafting of a new constitution and the team of UN experts flew to Baghdad for a week to holding of national elections. The Special Repre- provide information on lessons learned from sentative had proposed that voter registration previous disarmament programmes run by the should begin in the near future to demonstrate Organization. that tangible steps were being taken to pave the The Special Representative had also been en- way for elections. To that end, the Secretary- gaged in a preliminary process of identifying the General had instructed the Electoral Assistance human rights challenges in Iraq and assessing Division of the UN Department of Political Af- the resources needed to address them. On fairs to send an assessment mission to Iraq to dis- 30 June and 1 July, the Special Representative cuss with relevant Iraqi and Authority counter- and his team convened the first human rights

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 344 Political and security questions conference under UN auspices in Baghdad. Or- UN experience in fostering reform of the judicial ganized jointly with the Office of the High Com- system and to provide a forum for promoting missioner for Human Rights, the conference dialogue among Iraqis on the issue. brought together Iraqi and international experts, Under international humanitarian law, the in addition to the Authority, to share perspec- Authority bore the primary responsibility for the tives, identify practical measures and develop welfare of the Iraqi people, including the provi- policy options on justice for past crimes. A cen- sion of public services. UN agencies had been tral concern raised at the conference was the Au- assisting and would continue to assist the Iraqi thority’s actions, especially the treatment and people under their standing humanitarian man- conditions of detention of Iraqi prisoners. The dates. The UN revised humanitarian appeal for Special Representative had urged the Authority Iraq was launched on 23 June (see also p. 936), to ensure better treatment of detainees and specifying requirements for an additional $259 urged a continued dialogue with the Interna- million for the UN system to ensure that it could tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on that carry out its activities until the end of 2003. The issue. Vital to the promotion of human rights and Special Representative would work to ensure as respect for the rule of law was the development of smooth and integrated a transition as possible civil society, in particular effective and independ- from humanitarian and emergency rehabilita- ent human rights and women’s rights groups, tion work to economic recovery and reconstruc- and free and independent media. To that end, tion. To that end, the Secretary-General had des- the Special Representative had placed emphasis ignated the Humanitarian Coordinator, Ramiro on training. The United Nations had already Lopes da Silva (Portugal), as his Deputy Special been called upon by various sources to train pub- Representative and as Resident Coordinator to lic officials, particularly those involved in the oversee that process, which entailed, among administration of justice. The Special Represen- other things, supervising the winding down, tative intended to examine the possibility of pro- completion and transfer to the Authority of the viding such training, and the possibility of spe- oil-for-food programme, as prescribed in Coun- cific programmes to ensure access to justice by cil resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338). The United vulnerable groups. He also emphasized to all pol- Nations, in concert with the Authority, had itical parties and movements the need to promote begun to review the applications that had been the full participation of Iraqi women in the prioritized and was seeking to verify that the transitional political and constitutional processes. requisite procedures established by the Office of A number of Governments had informally ap- the Iraq Programme had been fully respected proached the Special Representative to explore and that the process was transparent. All parties the possibility of deploying international police were confident that the review of approved and under UN auspices. Currently, executive law en- funded applications would be completed prior to forcement responsibilities in Iraq were the sole the cessation of the programme in November responsibility of the Authority, under resolution 2003. 1483(2003). Discussions on that issue between the UN agencies were in transition from activities Special Representative and the Authority had led launched under the humanitarian appeal on the Secretary-General to believe that establishing 23 June and progressively moving into recon- an international police force, under UN auspices, struction, recovery and development activities. could create a parallel system of law enforce- An informal meeting on reconstruction in Iraq, ment, which would not be effective for improving held in New York on 24 June, helped to further law and order. There was scope for UN involve- define the framework for the coordination of ment in the area of civilian policing, in terms of reconstruction and development efforts. making available its experience in aspects of local The Secretary-General said that the focus of police training and development. The UN initial UN action in Iraq for the remainder of 2003 focus would be to provide input into the human would include the following: delivering humani- rights provisions of the training curricula for the tarian assistance, promoting the safe, orderly and newly recruited Iraqi police, and to provide ad- voluntary return of refugees and displaced per- vice to the Authority and the relevant Iraqi law sons, and conducting emergency rehabilitation; enforcement institutions, once established, on engaging in the facilitation of national dialogue the development and implementation of inde- and consensus-building on the political transi- pendent law enforcement oversight mechanisms. tion process; assisting in the establishment of Justice was the focus of the first trilateral meeting electoral processes; promoting the protection of (25 June) convened by the United Nations with human rights; implementing, through UNDP,two representatives of the Iraqi judicial community concrete projects relating to the emergency reha- and the Authority. The purpose was to share the bilitation of the courts and support for the Judi-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 345 cial Training Centre in Baghdad; establishing Amman in June, where they had held talks on an Iraqi media centre; ensuring the orderly phas- Iraq and resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338). He ing out of the oil-for-food programme by 21 No- reported that all the regional officials and lead- vember 2003; contributing, through UNDP and ers he met with expressed their desire to see a international financial institutions, to assessing new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours potential needs for economic reconstruction and and wished the United Nations to take the lead in sustainable development; sharing UN experi- achieving that vision. ences and lessons learned with Iraqis and the Au- Security in Iraq remained tenuous. It was im- thority on post-conflict processes in general, as perative that law and order be restored through- requested; and assisting the Iraqi interim out the country as soon as possible as, without administration to gradually rejoin the interna- them, every area of activity would be impacted tional community. for the worse. Iraqis cooperating with the Au- The Secretary-General outlined the structure thority, as well as Iraqi policemen, had been the for the proposed United Nations Assistance Mis- subject of attacks. In parallel, common law crimi- sion for Iraq (UNAMI). In view of the broad range nality was a major problem. The potential impact of responsibilities entrusted to the Special Repre- of the violence could not be underestimated as it sentative, it was envisaged that the staff strength threatened to undermine confidence in the tran- should consist of over 300 civilian staff com- sition and to shake the resolve of Iraqis com- bined. That figure was inclusive of both substan- mitted to leading their country though a very del- tive and support international and local person- icate period in its history. The UN presence in nel in Baghdad and each of the regions. The Iraq remained vulnerable; UN security in Iraq number of international staff would be less than relied significantly on the reputation of the half the total figure, as UNAMI would rely on a United Nations and its ability to demonstrate its skilled Iraqi force. UNAMI’s structure envisaged independence. The United Nations was in Iraq maximum reliance on the existing capacity and to assist the people. structure of the Office of the Humanitarian Co- Iraq found itself in a difficult position: a post- ordinator and on the Humanitarian Coordinator conflict situation, but with hostilities occurring himself, whom the Secretary-General concur- every day, awash with weapons and under mili- rently appointed as the Resident Coordinator of tary occupation. In that context, the protection of the UN country team (of agencies, funds and human rights was a major concern. The Special programmes) and as his Deputy Special Repre- Representative had raised with the Authority sentative for Iraq. concerns regarding searches, arrests, the treat- The Secretary-General observed that Iraq ment of detainees and the duration of preventive could not be treated in isolation from the region. detention. He had also visited the main Iraqi de- He believed that an inclusive way of working with tention complex at Abu Ghraib. The Authority Iraq’s neighbours would need to be found. The had provided him with responses on action taken Special Representative intended to continue the to address and resolve those questions. contacts that the Secretary-General had initiated The Special Representative concluded that, in in Amman, Jordan, during a visit from 21 to order to succeed, the Governing Council would 23 June and before long would visit all of Iraq’s need the full support of the international com- neighbours. munity and of the Iraqi people, whose trust it Security Council consideration (July). On 22 would need to earn anew each day. It had to be July [meeting 4791], the Council discussed the situa- empowered to deliver tangible improvements to tion in Iraq and heard a briefing by the Special the welfare of the population while not becoming Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, the object of criticism. There was also a need for Mr. Vieira de Mello. At the request of Spain a clear timetable for the earliest restoration of [S/2003/750], members of the Governing Council Iraqi sovereignty. Resolution 1483(2003) pro- of Iraq participated in the discussion without vided considerable scope for the United Nations the right to vote. The Council had before it the to play an effective role in Iraq. It was not a clear Secretary-General’s 17 July report. mandate, but at the same time the situation in Introducing the Secretary-General’s report, Iraq was exceptional and therefore it required an Mr. Vieira de Mello said that the formation in exceptional approach. The lack of clarity allowed July of Iraq’s Governing Council was a signifi- the UN role in Iraq to emerge and develop as the cant step forward and a new stage that succeeded situation on the ground evolved. What the the disorienting power vacuum left from the fall United Nations could not do was replace the Au- of the previous regime. He had visited Iran, thority, nor should it ever replace the rightful Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic and role that Iraqis had to play in shaping the future had accompanied the Secretary-General to of their country. What the United Nations could

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 346 Political and security questions do was to help build consensus among Iraqis and The Security Council, between Iraqis and the Authority. Recalling all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003, The head of the delegation of the Governing Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity Council of Iraq, Adnan Pachachi, said that Iraq of Iraq, had rid itself of the tyrannical regime that op- Reaffirming also the vital role for the United Nations pressed the Iraqi people for three decades. A in Iraq which was set out in relevant paragraphs of res- State marked by the intelligence services, manda- olution 1483(2003), Having considered the report of the Secretary- tory arrests and random executions had ended, General of 17 July 2003, never to return. The primary goal of the Govern- 1. Welcomes the establishment of the broadly repre- ing Council was to shorten the duration of the in- sentative Governing Council of Iraq on 13 July 2003, as terim administration period and put together an an important step towards the formation by the people elected Government under a constitution to be of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representa- endorsed by the population in free elections. The tive government that will exercise the sovereignty of Iraq; Governing Council would need to ensure se- 2. Decides to establish the United Nations Assist- curity and stability and to establish institutions ance Mission for Iraq to support the Secretary-General that could rebuild the national police and the na- in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution tional army. There was also a need to appoint 1483(2003), in accordance with the structure and re- ministers and to reopen Iraqi embassies abroad. sponsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003, for Iraq would require assistance in all areas in order an initial period of twelve months; 3. Decides to remain seized of this matter. to rebuild its economy, modernize its industrial VOTE ON RESOLUTION 1500(2003): sector, reform its educational system, improve its In favour: Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, France, Germany, sanitation services and provide basic necessities Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom, United States. to all its citizens. The United Nations would have Against: None. a vital role to play in all those areas. In addition, Abstaining: Syrian Arab Republic. there was a need to re-examine the legislation en- acted by the previous regime and to constitute Speaking after the vote, the United States said special tribunals in order to bring to justice those the adopted resolution sent a clear signal to those who committed criminal acts under that regime. who opposed the political transformation under way in Iraq that they were out of step with world Communication (31 July). On 31 July [S/2003/ opinion. The resolution endorsed the vital role 782], the United States transmitted to the Council that the United Nations was playing in Iraq. The President a letter from the Acting Governor of United States supported the Secretary-General’s the Central Bank of Iraq, who said that resolu- request to create UNAMI. tion 1483(2003) (see p. 338) created an obligation The Syrian Arab Republic said that it had ab- for all Member States to identify, freeze and stained in the vote in keeping with its responsibil- transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq all ity as the Arab representative on the Council. All funds, financial assets or economic resources in Arab States supported the need to end the occu- their jurisdictions that were established or held pation of Iraq and to form a legitimate national by the previous Iraqi Government. Those funds Iraqi Government, as soon as possible and within and resources included not only those of the pre- a clear time frame. Syria regretted that consulta- vious Government, but also those of its State tions on the draft resolution did not include the bodies, corporations, agencies and entities that input of rotating members of the Council, had been removed from Iraq or acquired by including Syria. Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate family Attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad members. Those funds were urgently needed for On 19 August, at approximately 1630 hours humanitarian, reconstruction, civilian adminis- local time, a flatbed truck carrying an estimated tration and other purposes benefiting the people 1,000 kilograms of high explosives was detonated of Iraq. on the service road adjacent to the south-west corner of the Canal Hotel, UN headquarters in Baghdad. The attack was carefully planned and Establishment of UNAMI deliberately targeted the compound’s weakest On 14August [meeting 4808], the Security Coun- point, with devastating effect. It resulted in the cil adopted resolution 1500(2003) by vote (14-0-1). death of 22 persons (15 of them UN staff mem- The draft [S/2003/812] was submitted by Angola, bers) and the wounding of more than 150. The Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Spain, the Special Representative for Iraq and UN High United Kingdom and the United States. Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Vieira de

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Mello, was among those killed. The attack repre- Security Council consideration (21 August). sented the most deliberate and devastating attack On 21 August [meeting 4812], the Council heard against the United Nations in its history. briefings from the representatives of the United In a 19 August press statement [SG/SM/8822- States and the United Kingdom on Iraq. Both IK/375], the Secretary-General denounced the at- countries expressed outrage at the attack against tack as an inexcusable act of unprovoked and the United Nations and extended their deepest murderous violence against men and women sympathies to the victims and their families. who went to Iraq to help the Iraqi people. In a The United States said that the timing of the second press statement [SG/SM/8823-IK/376], issued attack was no accident; it occurred at a critical after the death of Mr. Vieira de Mello was con- juncture, when the impact of initial plans and firmed, he said that the loss of his top envoy for efforts had begun to take positive effect. A secure, Iraq was a bitter blow for the United Nations and democratic and stable Iraq was a threat and a tar- for him personally. get for those who wished to turn the clock back to Communications (19-20 August). On 19 Au- the days of tyranny. As a response, the Security gust [S/2003/822], the Russian Federation ex- Council had to stand together and invigorate its pressed shock at the terrorist act against the UN struggle against terrorism. The United States compound in Baghdad. highlighted some markers of progress since the adoption of resolution 1483(2003), the most sig- On 20 August [S/2003/827], Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, condemning the nificant of which was the formation of the Gov- attack, said that such attacks could not break the erning Council. The Authority was working to will of the international community to continue improve economic and security conditions. It to extend all possible assistance to the Iraqi peo- had initiated programmes to enable Iraqis to de- ple to regain their national sovereignty. velop a capacity to foil saboteurs who targeted their electrical infrastructure, oil industry and other sectors critical to Iraq’s renewal. Tens of SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (20 August) thousands of Iraqi police had answered the call On 20 August [meeting 4811], following consulta- to return to work, and recruitment and training tions among Security Council members, the Pres- were under way to put thousands more on ident made statement S/PRST/2003/13 on be- the streets. Nearly 38,000 police officers were half of the Council: deployed throughout the country, some 6,000 in The Security Council unequivocally condemns Baghdad. The ultimate goal was to have approxi- the terrorist attack that took place on 19August 2003 mately 65,000 police countrywide. The Author- against the United Nations headquarters in Bagh- ity had also started training a new Iraqi army. dad and thereby against the international com- The United Kingdom highlighted progress in munity as a whole, causing numerous deaths and injuries among international personnel and Iraqi the humanitarian, education and health sectors. people. It also reported on efforts to establish representa- The Council condemns in the strongest terms the tive governance, especially at the local level, and perpetrators of that attack and underlines the need on human rights reforms. to bring them to justice. Appointment of acting Special Representative. The Council pays tribute to and expresses its On 22 August [S/2003/830], the Secretary-General deepest admiration for all those among the United informed the Council President that, owing to Nations personnel who have lost their lives or have the untimely death of Mr. Vieira de Mello, he been injured in the service of the United Nations had appointed, on an interim basis, Ramiro and of the Iraqi people, including the Special Repre- Lopes da Silva as his acting Special Representa- sentative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello. tive for Iraq. The Council expresses its deepest sympathy and On the same day [S/2003/831], the Council took condolences to the victims and their families. note of the Secretary-General’s appointment. The Council reaffirms the imperative to respect, Communications (22 August–8 September). On in all circumstances, the safety and security of 22 August [A/58/315-S/2003/845], Mali, on behalf of United Nations personnel and the need for adequate the Human Security Network (Austria, Canada, security measures to be taken in this regard. Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Nether- The Council reaffirms its determination to assist lands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzer- the Iraqi people to build peace and justice in their land, Thailand), condemned the 19 August country and to determine their own political future terrorist attacks committed against the United by themselves. It welcomes in this regard the deter- mination of the United Nations to continue its oper- Nations in Baghdad and expressed concern ation in Iraq to fulfil its mandate in the service of about the increasing number of attacks against the Iraqi people, and will not be intimidated by such the personnel of international organizations in attacks. conflict areas.

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On 8 September [S/2003/867], Poland informed on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming contri- the Council President that it had decided to butions by Member States in this regard under dispatch stability forces (both military and an resolution 1483(2003), Welcoming the decision of the Governing Council adequate civilian component) and lead a multi- of Iraq to form a preparatory constitutional commit- national division of stability forces in the central- tee to prepare for a constitutional conference that will south sector of Iraq. draft a constitution to embody the aspirations of the General Assembly action. On 15 September, Iraqi people, and urging it to complete this process the General Assembly condemned the attack on quickly, UN personnel and premises in Baghdad (resolu- Affirming that the terrorist bombings of the Em- tion 57/338) (see p. 1452). bassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003 Downsizing of UN staff in Iraq and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14October 2003, and On 25 September [SG/SM/8899-IK/395], the the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003 Secretary-General ordered the temporary rede- are attacks on the people of Iraq, the United Nations ployment of UN international staff in Iraq. In- and the international community, and deploring the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi, who died on 25 ternational staff members remaining in the September 2003, as an attack directed against the fu- country totalled 86, and that number could be ex- ture of Iraq, pected to diminish even further. Essential hu- Recalling and reaffirming, in that context, the state- manitarian activities in Iraq would continue, ment by its President of 20 August 2003 and its resolu- thanks to the efforts of more than 4,000 national tion 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003, staff. Determining that the situation in Iraq, although im- Communication (3 October). On 3 October proved, continues to constitute a threat to interna- tional peace and security, [A/58/415-S/2003/952], Iran transmitted to the Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the Secretary-General the final communiqué of the United Nations, Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers for 1. Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity Foreign Affairs of the member States of OIC (New of Iraq, and underscores, in that context, the tempo- York, 30 September). The Ministers, among rary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional other things, emphasized the responsibility of Authority (“the Authority”) of the specific responsibil- the occupying Powers to safeguard the civil and ities, authorities and obligations under applicable religious liberties of the Iraqi people. They also international law recognized and set forth in resolu- took note of resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338) tion 1483(2003), which will cease when an inter- nationally recognized, representative government and called on member States to support and established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assist Iraq in its efforts to reactivate economic assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter institutions and infrastructure. alia, through steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 to 7 and 10 below; SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (October) 2. Welcomes the positive response of the interna- On 16October [meeting 4844], the Council unani- tional community, in forums such as the League of mously adopted resolution 1511(2003). The draft Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Confer- ence, the United Nations General Assembly and the [S/2003/992] was submitted by Cameroon, Spain, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural the United Kingdom and the United States. Organization, to the establishment of the broadly rep- The Security Council, resentative Governing Council of Iraq as an important Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Iraq, includ- step towards an internationally recognized, represen- ing resolutions 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003 and 1500 tative government; (2003) of 14August 2003, and its resolutions on threats 3. Supports the efforts of the Governing Council to to international peace and security caused by terrorist mobilize the people of Iraq, including by the appoint- acts, including resolution 1373(2001) of 28 September ment of a cabinet of ministers and a preparatory con- 2001, and other relevant resolutions, stitutional committee to lead a process in which the Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in Iraqi people will progressively take control of their the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi own affairs; people freely to determine their own political future 4. Determines that the Governing Council and its and control their own natural resources, reiterating its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves administration, which, without prejudice to its further must come quickly, and recognizing the importance of evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of international support, particularly that of countries in Iraq during the transitional period until an interna- the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organiza- tionally recognized, representative government is es- tions, in taking forward this process expeditiously, tablished and assumes the responsibilities of the Au- Recognizing that international support for the thority; restoration of conditions of stability and security is es- 5. Affirms that the administration of Iraq will be sential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as progressively undertaken by the evolving structures of to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work the Iraqi interim administration;

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6. Calls upon the Authority, in this context, to return 14 . Urges Member States to contribute assistance governing responsibilities and authorities to the peo- under this United Nations mandate, including mili- ple of Iraq as soon as practicable, and requests the Au- tary forces, to the multinational force referred to in thority, in cooperation, as appropriate, with the Gov- paragraph 13 above; erning Council and the Secretary-General, to report 15. Decides that it shall review the requirements and to the Security Council on the progress being made; mission of the multinational force referred to in para- 7. Invites the Governing Council to provide to the graph 13 above not later than one year from the date of Security Council for its review, no later than 15 Decem- adoption of the present resolution, and that in any case ber 2003, in cooperation with the Authority and, as cir- the mandate of the force shall expire upon the comple- cumstances permit, the Special Representative of the tion of the political process as described in paragraphs Secretary-General, a timetable and a programme for the 4 to 7 and 10 above, and expresses its readiness to con- drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and for the hold- sider on that occasion any future need for the continu- ing of democratic elections under that constitution; ation of the multinational force, taking into account 8. Resolves that the United Nations, acting the views of an internationally recognized, representa- through the Secretary-General, his Special Represen- tive government of Iraq; tative and the United Nations Assistance Mission for 16. Emphasizes the importance of establishing Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including effective Iraqi police and security forces in maintain- by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the ing law, order and security and combating terrorism economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustain- consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 1483(2003), able development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to and calls upon Member States and international and restore and establish national and local institutions for regional organizations to contribute to the training representative government; and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces; 9. Requests that, as circumstances permit, the 17. Expresses its deep sympathy and condolences for the Secretary-General pursue the course of action out- personal losses suffered by the Iraqi people and by the lined in paragraphs 98 and 99 of his report of 17 July United Nations and the families of those United 2003; Nations personnel and other innocent victims who 10. Takes note of the intention of the Governing were killed or injured in recent tragic attacks; Council to hold a constitutional conference and, rec- 18. Unequivocally condemns the terrorist bombings ognizing that the convening of the conference will be a of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, of the milestone in the movement to the full exercise of sov- United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 Au- ereignty, calls for its preparation through national dia- gust 2003, of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 Au- logue and consensus-building as soon as practicable, gust 2003 and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14October and requests the Special Representative of the 2003, the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October Secretary-General, at the time of the convening of the 2003 and the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi, conference or as circumstances permit, to lend the who died on 25 September 2003, and emphasizes that unique expertise of the United Nations to the Iraqi those responsible must be brought to justice; people in this process of political transition, including the establishment of electoral processes; 19 . Calls upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq, arms for terrorists and financing 11. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that that would support terrorists, and emphasizes the im- the resources of the United Nations and associated or- portance of strengthening the cooperation of the ganizations are available if requested by the Governing countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Council and, as circumstances permit, to assist in the Iraq, in this regard; furtherance of the programme provided by the Gov- erning Council under paragraph 7 above, and encour- 20. Appeals to Member States and the interna- ages other organizations with expertise in this area to tional financial institutions to strengthen their efforts support the Governing Council if requested; to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and 12. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to development of their economy, and urges those insti- the Security Council on his responsibilities under the tutions to take immediate steps to provide their full present resolution and the development and imple- range of loans and other financial assistance to Iraq, mentation of a timetable and programme under para- working with the Governing Council and appropriate graph 7 above; Iraqi ministries; 13 . Determines that the provision of security and sta- 21. Urges Member States and international and re- bility is essential to the successful completion of the gional organizations to support the Iraq reconstruc- political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and tion effort initiated at the United Nations technical to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effec- consultations of 24 June 2003, including through sub- tively to that process and the implementation of resolu- stantial pledges at the international donors conference tion 1483(2003), and authorizes a multinational force to be held in Madrid on 23 and 24 October 2003; under unified command to take all necessary meas- 22. Calls upon Member States and concerned ures to contribute to the maintenance of security and organizations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring people by providing resources necessary for the re- necessary conditions for the implementation of the habilitation and reconstruction of Iraq’s economic timetable and programme, as well as to contribute to infrastructure; the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission 23. Emphasizes that the International Advisory and for Iraq, the Governing Council and other institutions Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 of reso- of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humani- lution 1483(2003) should be established as a priority, tarian and economic infrastructure; and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 350 Political and security questions shall be used in a transparent manner as set out in Communications (4-21 November). On 4 No- paragraph 14 of resolution 1483(2003); vember [S/2003/1073], Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Ku- 24. Reminds all Member States of their obligations wait, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and under paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483(2003), in particular the obligation to immediately cause the Turkey transmitted to the Secretary-General and transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic the Council President the text of the final state- resources to the Development Fund for Iraq for the ment of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of benefit of the Iraqi people; Iraq’s neighbouring countries (Damascus, Syria, 25. Requests that the United States of America, on 1-2 November). The Ministers, among other behalf of the multinational force as outlined in para- things, rejected any measure that could lead to graph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the the disintegration of Iraq and emphasized the efforts and progress of this force, as appropriate and not less than every six months; importance of enhancing the UN role in that 26. Decides to remain seized of the matter. country. They also expressed their concern about the existence of terrorist groups in Iraq and the Speaking after the vote, the Secretary-General threat they represented for neighbouring coun- commended Council members for having tries. reached a significant agreement on what was a On 21 November [A/58/611-S/2003/1134], India particularly important resolution to address the and the Russian Federation transmitted to the complex situation in Iraq. It was critical to the Secretary-General the text of the Declaration of Iraqi people, the region and the entire interna- the Russian Federation and the Republic of India tional community that the goal of an Iraq at on Global Challenges and Threats to Interna- peace with itself and with its neighbours be tional Security and Stability (Moscow, 12 Novem- reached. The Secretary-General said he would ber). The two countries said that a specific time do his utmost to implement the mandate estab- plan of action should be adopted under the aegis lished by the Council, bearing in mind the con- of the United Nations for the speediest restora- straints on building up the required capacity and tion of the State sovereignty of Iraq, for the stabi- his obligation to care for the safety and security of lization of the political and humanitarian situa- UN staff. He was grateful to the Council for the tion and for ensuring Iraq’s economic growth flexibility that the new resolution gave him in with broad international participation. that respect. Although the United Nations had Security Council consideration (21 Novem- only a skeletal presence on the ground, the Or- ber). On 21 November [meeting 4869], the Council ganization was determined to continue helping heard briefings by the United States and the the Iraqi people from both inside and outside the United Kingdom on the latest developments in country, primarily by providing humanitarian Iraq. assistance. The United States said that violence continued to be directed against the Iraqi people and all International Advisory and Monitoring Board those who were trying to assist them in creating a On 22 October [S/2003/1030], the Secretary- new Iraq. Iraqis were taking on increasing re- General informed the Council President that he, sponsibilities for their security every day and together with the executive heads of the Arab were working to rebuild a strong police force and Fund for Economic and Social Development, the a new army. They also continued to take over ad- International Monetary Fund and the World ministrative responsibilities and to provide for Bank, had approved the terms of reference for the delivery of basic services. Iraq’s ministries the establishment of the International Advisory were run by Iraqi ministers, appointed by and re- and Monitoring Board (IAMB), as emphasized in porting to the Iraqi Governing Council. The resolution 1511(2003) (above). A copy of the 15 November announcement by the Governing Board’s terms of reference was attached to the Council of a political process to establish a repre- letter. The purpose of IAMB was to promote the sentative transitional national assembly to as- objectives set out in Council resolution 1483 sume full sovereign powers in 2004 was a step (2003) (see p. 338) of ensuring that the Develop- forward in Iraq’s political transition. Under that ment Fund for Iraq was used in a transparent process, a transitional national assembly would manner for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 be formed to elect an executive branch, select of that resolution and that the export sales of pe- ministers and serve as a legislative body. By troleum, petroleum products and natural gas 30 June 2004, that new transitional administra- from Iraq were made consistent with prevailing tion would assume full responsibility for govern- international market best practices. The execu- ing Iraq. The Authority would then dissolve, as tive heads intended to make the appointment of would the Iraqi Governing Council. The Transi- their representatives to IAMB forthwith and tional National Assembly would be formed looked forward to an early IAMB meeting. through caucuses at the provincial level. The se-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 351 lection and structure and powers of the Assembly throughout Iraq. The focus would be on increas- would be established by a fundamental law, with ing financial transparency and accountability basic principles of openness and transparency. and on strengthening the capacity of local ad- The delegates to the Assembly should be selected ministrations to provide municipal services. In no later than 31 May 2004. The fundamental law June, the Iraqi Survey Group assumed responsi- would protect freedom of speech and religion bility for searching for and eliminating Iraqi and would include a statement of equal rights for WMD, prohibited missile-delivery systems and re- all Iraqis. The law would define the relationship lated infrastructure. In October, an interim re- between the central Government and provincial port on the Group’s activities detailed numerous authorities and would have an expiration date, by violations by Saddam Hussein’s regime of its which time a permanent constitution for Iraq was mandated obligations under Council resolutions, to be drafted and a new Government of Iraq including deliberate efforts to conceal from the elected. The agreement signed between the Gov- United Nations equipment and programme ac- erning Council and the Authority on 15 November tivities related to WMD during inspections from established a time line for the direct election of a November 2002 to March 2003. constitutional convention, no later than 15 March The United Kingdom briefed the Council on 2005, to draft a permanent constitution for Iraq. the main points relating to the provision of basic The constitution would be ratified through a services, economic and reconstruction issues and popular referendum, and a new Iraqi Government human rights and justice. would be elected under the terms of the ratified constitution no later than 31 December 2005. Constitutional and electoral timetable Three basic steps—increased assumption by Iraqis On 2 December [S/2003/1169], the Council Pres- for security, creation of the Governing Council, ident acknowledged the receipt of a 24 Novem- appointment of effective ministers to run Iraqi ber letter from the interim President of the Iraqi ministries and continuing transfer of political Governing Council, Jalal Talabani,regarding the authority to Iraqis—were part of the Authority’s timetable agreed upon with the Authority in ac- planning for post-Saddam Iraq. cordance with paragraph 7 of Council resolution The continued support of the international 1511(2003) (see p. 348). The contents of the letter community in reconstruction efforts was also had been brought to the attention of Council critical. At a donors conference (Madrid, 23-24 members. October), the international community pledged On 11 December [S/2003/1170], Iraq requested over $33 billion in support to Iraq. The Coalition that its 24 November letter be circulated as a stressed that the United Nations had a vital role Security Council document. The letter stated to play in Iraq and stood ready to discuss with UN that the Governing Council had decided to hold officials appropriate security support, as envi- general elections for the establishment of a con- sioned under resolution 1511(2003) (see p. 348). stitutional convention no later than 15 March Security and stability underpinned all other 2005. The constitution would then be submitted efforts on the ground. Despite the killings, bomb- to the Iraqi people for approval in a referendum. ings and other attacks, much of Iraq remained By the end of 2005, elections would be held calm. The reality that could not be captured by a to elect a new government in accordance with the television camera was that Iraqis were coming to- provisions of the constitution. The Governing gether to expand conditions of security and sta- Council and the transitional government, to be bility,adding more than 130,000 personnel to the elected by the end of June 2004, would make the security effort. Over 60,000 police officers were necessary preparations for those elections, which back on the streets and over 12,000 Iraqi border would include conducting a population census, personnel were on duty. The first battalion of the drafting a law containing electoral regulations new Iraqi army was formed in October 2003, and and adopting laws concerning political parties, by the autumn of 2004 the Iraqi army would have the press and meetings. Prior to commencing the expanded to about 35,000 troops. Notwithstand- constitutional process, the transitional governing ing those efforts, the United States acknow- council would draft, no later than the end of Feb- ledged that security conditions in Iraq remained ruary 2004, a law concerning the administration a major preoccupation and that there was a need of the Iraqi State in accordance with the follow- to deliver a sustainable, improved security situa- ing principles: respect for human rights and fun- tion, particularly in the centre of the country. damental freedoms, including freedom of reli- Over the coming months, the Authority would gion and equality of all citizens; separation of the continue to work with the Governing Council three branches of government; introduction of to promote diverse and representative citizen some degree of decentralization in the adminis- participation within, and among, communities tration of the governorates, taking into consider-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 352 Political and security questions ation the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan; establish- from that envisaged less than a month earlier, ment of the principle of civilian control of the when the Secretary-General outlined the pro- Iraqi armed and security forces; and establish- posed concept of operations for the Mission in his ment of a unified federal, democratic and multi- July report. lateral system that would respect the Islamic Responsibility for the 19 August attack against identity of the majority of the Iraqi people while UN headquarters in Baghdad (see p. 346) re- ensuring the rights of other religions. The afore- mained uncertain. Although the Abu-Hafs al- mentioned law would also provide for the estab- Masri Brigades, a group affiliated with Al-Qaida, lishment of a provisional legislative body in ac- among others, claimed responsibility in a mes- cordance with procedures that would guarantee sage published on the Internet and in Arabic broad representation of all segments of Iraqi so- newspapers, the authenticity of the message had ciety. That body, to be established no later than not been established. On 21 August, the Secre- the end of May 2004, would elect a provisional tary-General dispatched to Iraq an investigation Iraqi government no later than the end of June team led by the senior security officer of the Of- 2004, at which point the Authority and the fice of the United Nations High Commissioner Governing Council would be dissolved. for Human Rights and comprising members of Report of Secretary-General (December). In the Office of the United Nations Security Coor- response to resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338), the dinator, the International Tribunal for the For- Secretary-General submitted a December report mer Yugoslavia and the Office of Internal Over- [S/2003/1149] on UN activities and key develop- sight Services. They were tasked with ments in Iraq since his July report (see p. 342). determining and recording the events leading up The Secretary-General said that, at the begin- to the explosion and immediately thereafter, as- ning of August, the United Nations stood at a sessing the adequacy of preventive measures and critical point with respect to its role and engage- making recommendations on required adjust- ment in Iraq. On the one hand, UN agencies, ments to enable UN personnel to operate in funds and programmes were playing a key role in greater safety in the future. He also instructed a variety of sectors, including food and nutrition the UN Security Coordinator, Tun Myat, to visit assistance, the delivery of medical supplies, edu- Iraq from 23 to 30 August to review the security cational materials and drinking water, and emer- situation and to make recommendations on what gency repairs of essential facilities. Thanks in reductions in the number of UN personnel in the part to UN support for the efforts of the Author- country might be required on security grounds. ity and Iraqi ministries, improvements in the The Security Coordinator, in a 2 September provision of basic services were becoming notice- report to the Secretary-General, noted that the able. The Authority’s efforts to restore Iraqi ca- overall security situation in Iraq had deteriorated pacities in the field of law and order were begin- dramatically in August. Iraq had entered a new ning to bear fruit and the formation of the Iraqi phase in which all foreign organizations and Governing Council on 13 July offered the poten- Iraqis who cooperated with the Authority were tial to provide a credible and representative Iraqi potential targets of deliberate and hostile attacks. interlocutor with which the United Nations That type of security threat had not been antici- could develop a comprehensive programme of pated. The United Nations had chosen offices in action. However, major uncertainties remained locations that would facilitate contact with and about the future role of the United Nations. accessibility to Iraqi partners and beneficiaries. First, the Governing Council and the Authority Themorethan800internationalUNpersonnel had not expressed any clear or shared vision on deployed throughout the country were thus ex- the role to be played by the United Nations in the tremely vulnerable to further attacks. Coalition remainder of the political transition process and forces were not in a position to provide dedicated other key areas suggested in his 17 July report. protection to all of them. Hence, the reduction of Second, on that and other issues, divisions be- international personnel, well under way before came apparent among Iraqis within and outside 2 September, continued after the submission of the the Governing Council. Third, armed attacks Security Coordinator’s report. On 5 September, against the Coalition forces, Iraqi institutions the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and other civilian and international targets inten- Affairs informed the Security Council in informal sified in sophistication, scale and breadth, pre- consultations of the Secretary-General’s decision to cipitating a sharp downturn in the overall withdraw from Iraq all international personnel security situation. By the time the Security Coun- other than those required for essential humani- cil, in resolution 1500(2003) of 14 August (see tarian assistance activities and security and p. 346), authorized the establishment of UNAMI, logistics support. On the basis of those criteria, the situation was already considerably different the Secretary-General had decided to reduce the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 353 number of international staff in Baghdad from Despite the 19 August attack and the subse- 400 to approximately 50 and in the three north- quent relocation of UN staff, a substantial num- ern governorates from 400 to approximately 30, ber of planned UN activities had continued. That and to vacate the UN offices in Basra, Hilla and was particularly true with respect to humanita- Mosul. rian relief and emergency rehabilitation efforts, On 22 September, the Secretary-General ap- the reconstruction needs assessment process and pointed an Independent Panel on the Safety and the termination of the oil-for-food programme. Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq. On 23 October, the Secretary-General attended Led by the former President of Finland, Martti the opening of the international donors confer- Ahtisaari, the Panel was tasked with, among ence for the reconstruction of Iraq in Madrid. At other things, examining the adequacy of UN the end of the conference, participants an- security, management and practices prior to the nounced pledges amounting to more than attack, the circumstances of the attack itself and $33 billion in grants and loans until the end of the actions taken by various parties in the imme- 2007. In order to help coordinate and channel diate aftermath. The Panel’s report, submitted contributions towards reconstruction and devel- on 20 October, concluded that there was no place opment in Iraq, the United Nations and the in Iraq without risk and that a new security ap- World Bank were requested to present terms of proach was needed in order to ensure staff reference for an international reconstruction security in such a high-risk environment. It also trust fund facility for Iraq. To build on the re- argued that the UN security management system spective strengths and comparative advantages of was in need of drastic reform, especially in the both the United Nations and the World Bank, light of the new type of threat faced in Iraq and the proposed facility comprised two trust funds. potentially elsewhere. It recommended a sepa- The World Bank trust fund would concentrate rate and independent audit and accountability mainly on technical assistance and infrastructure procedure to review the responsibilities of key in- support, while the UN-managed trust fund would dividuals in the decision-making processes on focus on technical assistance, quick-impact proj- security matters prior to the 19August attack. Ac- ects and transition activities. cordingly, the Secretary-General established a There were significant political developments team on 4 November, headed by Gerald Walzer, in Iraq post–19 August, especially with respect to former Deputy High Commissioner for Refu- the provisions of resolution 1483(2003). They in- gees, to determine accountability at all mana- cluded the 1 September appointment of interim gerial levels at UN Headquarters and in the field ministers by the Governing Council and the com- with respect to relevant decisions taken prior to pletion of the preparatory constitutional com- the attack. The team was asked to present its mittee’s report; the adoption of resolution 1511 findings to the Secretary-General with the least (2003) (see p. 348); and the 15 November agree- possible delay. ment reached between the Governing Council Meanwhile, on 22 September, a second suicide and the Authority on the political transition pro- attack was launched against UN headquarters at cess. With regard to resolution 1511(2003), the the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, resulting in the Secretary-General was particularly grateful to death of one Iraqi policeman and the wounding the sponsors for inserting the caveat “as circum- of others, including two UN national staff. Other stances permit” with respect to the implementa- attacks directed against civilian foreign organiza- tion of the original plans of UNAMI, and in tions, and against Iraqi civilians, coupled with support of the implementation of a timetable and the findings of the Panel led by President programme for the drafting of a new constitution Ahtisaari, led the Secretary-General to draw and the holding of elections, with support from down further the international UN presence in the United Nations “if requested by the Govern- Iraq during the months of September and Octo- ing Council”. In doing so, the Council took into ber; that included the relocation of international consideration his concerns that the United programme staff from Baghdad after the 22 Sep- Nations should not take on responsibilities it tember attack. That period of retrenchment cul- could not successfully carry out. For UN engage- minated with the Secretary-General’s decision, ment to be successful, adequate measures for on 4 November, to relocate temporarily all inter- staff security needed to be in place first. Further- national UN staff from Baghdad, pending a com- more, the Secretary-General said that in order prehensive review of UN operations in Iraq and for the UN role in the political process to be effec- their security implications, leaving only a small tive, it needed to be supported by all members of core presence of international personnel in the Governing Council, key Iraqi figures outside Erbil. the process, the Coalition, key States in the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 354 Political and security questions region, a united Security Council and major meeting held in Nicosia, Cyprus, from 11 to donor countries. 15 November. Representatives of 20 UN depart- The 15 November agreement on the political ments, agencies, funds and programmes, includ- process set out a timetable and programme ing the UN agency country team for Iraq, and for drafting a new constitution and holding UNAMI personnel participated. The Nicosia elections under that constitution (see above). meeting and subsequent meetings at UN Head- Though the agreement made no specific men- quarters had resulted in a plan for future UN ac- tion of any role for the United Nations, both the tivities in Iraq in the immediate to medium term, Governing Council and the Authority expressed with respect to security, the deployment of their desire for the Organization to play an active UNAMI and criteria for revisions to the UN part in its implementation. country strategy for relief, recovery and recon- The fact that a sovereign transitional Iraqi struction for 2004. Government was envisaged to be established by The substantive programmatic review high- 30 June 2004 required the United Nations to fo- lighted the fact that the security environment was cus immediately on humanitarian assistance, unlikely to improve and could deteriorate even emergency rehabilitation, technical assistance further; the United Nations would remain a for ministries related thereto and the initiation of high-value, high-impact target for terrorist activ- reconstruction programmes. On the political ity in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The acting front, it had yet to be established what role, if any, UN Security Coordinator assessed the risk to UN Iraqis and the Authority would like the United personnel in Iraq as falling in the high to critical Nations to play in the formation of the national category, but considered that, over time, gradual assembly by 31 May 2004, how substantive that improvements in the security environment, cou- role might be in relation to the security risks and pled with the full implementation of a range of whether circumstances would permit the Organ- protective measures, had the potential to reduce ization to play any such role effectively. The the risk to medium to high. Those measures in- Secretary-General welcomed the holding of re- cluded protection by a highly mobile, responsive gional meetings to encourage and support the armed force on a countrywide basis; preparation political process in Iraq. He established an advi- and implementation of enhanced Minimum Op- sory group on Iraq, composed of neighbouring erating Safety Standards to include security countries, Egypt and Security Council members. plans and procedures and significant office and His aim in doing so was to initiate an informal di- residential building upgrades; the establishment alogue and to develop a common basis for ap- of an effective, well-trained and well-equipped proaching the situation in Iraq. He also intended security management and coordination struc- to enhance contacts between the United Nations ture; training on security matters for staff at all and regional countries and regional organiza- levels; a highly capable and responsive emer- tions with a view to building confidence at three gency medical support element; protected vehi- levels: between Iraq and its neighbours, within cles; and a comprehensive, far-reaching public the region itself and between the region and the information strategy that could effectively ex- larger international community. In the longer plain the role and tasks of the United Nations. In term, if the Iraqis requested and as circum- summary, establishing the necessary security stances permitted, the United Nations would conditions would be a time-consuming and ex- make available to the Iraqi people its expertise on pensive process. Under those circumstances, it the constitutional and electoral processes. How- was difficult to envisage the United Nations oper- ever, no determination of electoral assistance by ating with a large number of international staff the United Nations could be made without a inside Iraq in the near future, unless there was an specific request of the Member States and the unexpected and significant improvement in the launching of a needs assessment mission, as per overall security situation. standard UN practices. It was impossible to forecast if and when cir- Irrespective of whatever direct contribution cumstances would permit the full deployment of the United Nations might make to the political UNAMI in Iraq. The operation would need to process in the immediate or long term, there was build up incrementally, at a pace and scope that ample potential for it to continue to play an im- could not yet be defined. At the same time, pru- portant role in Iraq. The key task was to develop a dent contingency planning was required to en- detailed plan of action that took into consider- able the United Nations to respond as quickly as ation the conditions and circumstances required possible to requests for assistance from the Iraqi if the United Nations was to play that role effec- people. Therefore, the Secretary-General de- tively both inside and outside the country. Tothat cided to commence the incremental process of end, a detailed planning process was initiated at a establishing UNAMI by setting up the core of the

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Mission outside Iraq, in Nicosia. Additional Third, intensified efforts by Coalition forces to UNAMI staff would be deployed to a small office demonstrate that they were adhering to interna- in Amman and other locations in the region. He tional humanitarian law and human rights in- envisaged an integrated core team of approxi- struments would make it much more difficult for mately 40 international UNAMI staff in total to be the insurgents to rally support for their cause. in place by early 2004; that number would be ex- Fourth, it was essential that all those in the inter- pected to increase to up to 60 international staff national community who were in a position to once a new Special Representative had been ap- support the implementation of an Iraqi agenda pointed. That core UNAMI team would initially be should do so. The UN would not disengage from managed by Ross Mountain, who would serve as Iraq, even though most UN international staff acting Special Representative, until such time as a had been temporarily relocated outside the new Special Representative was appointed. The country. core UNAMI team would lead operational plan- In a later report [S/2004/625], the Secretary- ning efforts for the eventual deployment of General said that the security environment in UNAMI in Iraq, and also coordinate the activities Iraq had not improved. On 30 December, the and provide guidance to UN agencies. The polit- President of the Iraqi Governing Council re- ical and human rights officers would meet with quested the United Nations to help determine Iraqis travelling in the region to discuss with whether elections were feasible by 30 June 2004 them the political and human rights situation in and, if not, to identify alternative means of form- the country. The UNAMI core team would also ing an interim Iraqi Government to which sover- lead the articulation and subsequent implemen- eignty could be restored. The Secretary-General tation of a public information strategy through planned to convene a meeting in January 2004 media outlets based in the region and national with representatives of the Governing Council staff in Iraq. and the Authority to deal with that request. IAMB During the Nicosia consultations, progress was was constituted in October 2003 and held an or- made in working out modalities to implement an ganizational session on 5 December in New York integrated approach to the UN relief, recovery when it was agreed that the Secretary-General’s and reconstruction activities. The basis for the representative on the Board, Jean-Pierre Halb- UN assistance efforts would be a fully integrated wachs, would chair it for a term of no more than UN country team strategy for 2004, which would one year. The Board oversaw the audits con- be finalized by January 2004 and reviewed on a ducted by international accounting firms to en- quarterly basis to reflect emerging needs and sure that the Development Fund for Iraq was changing circumstances. The implementation of used in a transparent manner for the purposes set UN programmes on the ground would be led by out in resolution 1483(2003) and that oil export an integrated implementation team. sales were made consistent with prevailing The Secretary-General observed that in order international market best practices. to mitigate the possibility that the insurgency in Security Council consideration (16 Decem- Iraq would grow over time, various steps had to ber). On 16 December [meeting 4883], the Council be taken. First and foremost, there was a need to was briefed by the Secretary-General on his De- act on the recognition that the mounting insecu- cember report. rity problem could not be solved through military Noting that the Council was meeting three means alone. A political solution was required, days after the capture by Coalition forces of one that would entail making the political transi- Saddam Hussein, the Secretary-General said that tion process more inclusive. That also meant em- the capture was not just a symbol of the downfall powering Iraqi institutions to take the decisions of the former Iraqi regime, but also an opportu- that would shape the political and economic fu- nity for a new beginning in the vital task of help- ture of their country. In order to command wide- ing Iraqis to take control of their destiny. The task spread support, those institutions needed to of restoring the effective exercise of sovereignty function effectively and transparently. Political to Iraqis, in the form of a provisional Govern- steps of that kind would make it clearer that the ment, was urgent. It was essential that the process foreign occupation of Iraq was to be short-lived leading to the formation of a provisional Govern- and that it would soon give way to a fully fledged ment be fully inclusive and transparent. It was Iraqi Government, hence making it more diffi- also right that Saddam Hussein should be held cult for insurgents to rally support. Second, the accountable for past deeds, through a procedure articulation of a national agenda that was seen to that met the highest international standards of be truly representative of all segments of Iraqi due process. Accounting for the past would be society required national reconciliation and an important part of bringing about national unity, not revenge and/or collective punishment. reconciliation. Owing to the persistent security

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 356 Political and security questions concerns and the temporary relocation of staff Secretary-General submitted reports in April outside Iraq, the Organization would need to [S/2003/419], June [S/2003/614], August [S/2003/813] find creative ways of intensifying its engagement and December [S/2003/1161] on compliance by despite diminished capacity on the ground, as Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatria- explained in the December report. Iraq was likely tion or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country to remain a difficult environment and the inter- nationals or their remains, and on the return of national community should not expect that the all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized end of the occupation and formation of a provi- by Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait, which sional Government would automatically bring began in August 1990 [YUN 1990,p. 189]. The High- about an end to insecurity, even though that level Coordinator for compliance by Iraq with its should bring some improvement. There was no obligations regarding the return of Kuwaiti panacea; only a credible and inclusive transition nationals and property, Yuli M. Vorontsov offered the best hope of stability and of political (Russian Federation), regularly briefed the mobilization by Iraqis against the violence. Security Council throughout the year. Iraq presented to the Council the timetable set In April, the Secretary-General observed that out in the 15 November agreement on political some progress had been achieved with the re- process signed between the Iraqi Governing sumption of the meetings of the Technical Sub- Council and the Coalition Authority (see p. 354). committee of the Tripartite Commission, with Iraq stated that Saddam Hussein had to answer to five being held since the beginning of 2003. How- the Iraqi people for his crimes against humanity. ever, no concrete results had been achieved. The At last Iraq could begin the long-overdue healing meetings were interrupted owing to the outbreak process of seeking unity and national reconcilia- of the conflict in Iraq on 20 March. The Subcom- tion. mittee was established in 1994 to expedite the The Security Council, in a closed meeting held search for all persons for whom inquiry files had on the same day [meeting 4884], held a constructive been opened. The Commission, established in exchange of views with the Minister for Foreign 1991 under ICRC auspices, dealt with the ques- Affairs of Iraq, Hoshya Zebari. tions of persons still unaccounted for, and was Communication (17December).On 17Decem- made up of representatives of France, Iraq, Ku- ber [S/2003/1190], the EU informed the Secretary- wait, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the General that it welcomed the capture of Saddam United States. However, at the end of 1998, Iraq Hussein as a crucial further step towards peace, decided not to participate in the Commission’s stability and democracy in Iraq and in the region. work, arguing that it no longer held captive Ku- In a later communication [A/58/673-S/2004/7], waiti prisoners in its territory and, thus, the issue Kuwait transmitted to the Secretary-General the had become one of missing persons, not prison- texts of the closing statement and of the Kuwait ers of war (POWs). In December 2002, Iraq had Declaration that were adopted by the Supreme expressed its willingness to resume participation Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its in the Technical Subcommittee, and an Iraqi del- twenty-fourth session (Kuwait, 21-22 December). egation, for the first time since 1998,participated The Supreme Council rejected any attempt to on the sidelines of the Tripartite Commission’s dismember Iraq and stressed the importance of a meeting. vital role for the United Nations in the country. It In his June report, the Secretary-General said also expressed satisfaction with the new direction that prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, in United States policy aimed at accelerating the the then Government of Iraq demonstrated some handover of power to Iraqis. limited cooperation on the return of Kuwaiti property. However, while some property and some documents were handed over, the Kuwaiti Iraq-Kuwait archives, along with Kuwaiti military equipment seized by Iraq, remained largely unreturned. Council resolution 1483(2003) of 22 May (see p. 338) directed the High-level Coordinator to POWs, Kuwaiti property and missing persons proceed with his duties in fulfilment of his man- Communication (February). On 10 February date. Lists of Kuwaiti property returned on [S/2003/162], Iraq informed the Secretary-General 22 December 2002 and 3 February 2003 were that on 3 February it had handed over Kuwaiti ar- attached to the report. chives and property to Kuwait. In August, the Secretary-General said that the Reports of Secretary-General (April, June, Coalition’s discovery of mass graves in Iraq and August, December). Pursuant to Security Coun- the subsequent identification of remains, includ- cil resolution 1284(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 230], the ing those ofKuwaiti missing persons, had brought

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 357 to light the atrocities perpetrated by the previous SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION Iraqi regime. The Tripartite Commission had On 18 December [meeting 4887], the Security formulated procedures to exhume and identify Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s themortalremainsofmissingKuwaitisatitsTech- High-level Coordinator. Following consultations nical Subcommittee meetings. The Secretary- among Council members, the President made General encouraged continuing collaboration statement S/PRST/2003/28 on behalf of the between Iraq and Kuwait within the framework of Council: the Tripartite Commission and ICRC. He said that The Security Council today heard a briefing from in the light of the ongoing progress, the Council Mr. Yuli Vorontsov, the Secretary-General’s High- might wish to consider bringing the High-level level Coordinator, on the fourteenth report of the Coordinator’s mandate to a close with the submis- Secretary-General submitted in accordance with sion of the December 2003 report on the repatria- paragraph 14 of Council resolution 1284(1999). tion and return of all Kuwaitis and third-country The Council expressed its full support towards nationals or their remains. Mr. Vorontsov and for his tireless efforts on the is- sues of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the In December, the Secretary-General said that return of all Kuwaiti property. The Council agreed after many years of manoeuvring and denial by that his mandate should continue in accordance with the previous Iraqi Government, a grim truth was paragraph 14 of resolution 1284(1999) of 17Decem- unveiling itself. The discovery of mass graves in ber 1999. Iraq containing the mortal remains of Kuwaitis The Council shared the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report. The Council has was a gruesome and devastating development. strongly condemned the killing of Kuwaiti and third- While hope had not faded that some of the 605 country nationals by the previous Iraqi regime in persons in question would be found alive, the violation of international law, especially the re- prospects for that to happen were diminishing. moval from Kuwait of civilian men and women, There was also the possibility that the fate of their execution in cold blood in remote sites in Iraq many individuals would remain unknown for and a decade-long cover-up of the truth. The Coun- many years to come, if it was ever to emerge. The cil expressed its strong hope that those responsible for these horrendous crimes would be brought to Secretary-General said that the removal from Ku- justice. wait of civilians, their execution in cold blood in The Council expressed its deep condolences to all remote sites in Iraq, and a decade-long cover-up of the families of the Kuwaiti and third-country na- of the truth constituted a grave violation of hu- tionals and expressed its continuing concern for the man rights and international humanitarian law. plight of the families of those persons whose where- Those responsible for the crimes, particularly abouts were still unknown. those who ordered the executions, had to be The Council stressed the importance of the work brought to justice. He regretted that the Kuwaiti of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Inter- national Committee of the Red Cross, the Tripar- archives and military equipment had not been re- tite Commission and its Technical Subcommittee turned to the country. However, the fall of and called upon all parties concerned to continue Saddam Hussein’s regime and the opening of av- to work towards a satisfactory solution to all of enues for direct contact between the parties con- the outstanding humanitarian aspects covered by cerned inspired hope for an early resolution of Mr. Vorontsov’s mandate. all outstanding questions. There was room for The Council expressed its deep regret that Ku- further progress towards a satisfactory solution waiti property, including its national archives, had not yet been returned to Kuwait and encouraged the of the remaining humanitarian concerns of the Coalition Provisional Authority and other parties State and people of Kuwait, and more time would concerned to continue their commitment to the be needed and more efforts required before search for and return of all Kuwaiti properties and those concerns could be settled. Given the fact archives, in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolu- that not all files relating to the issues of Kuwaiti tion 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003. The Council agreed prisoners and third-country nationals and Ku- to continue to keep Mr. Vorontsov’s mandate under waiti properties had been completely closed, Ku- review and looked forward to receiving his next wait had called on the United Nations to pursue report. and resolve those issues and was in favour of ex- Later communication. Kuwait transmitted to tending the High-level Coordinator’s mandate. the Secretary-General the texts of the closing The Secretary-General said that the Council statement and of the Kuwait Declaration that would have to determine whether it would wish were adopted by the Supreme Council of the the mandate to continue. Gulf Cooperation Council at its twenty-fourth In presidential statement S/PRST/2003/28 of session (Kuwait, 21-22 December). The Supreme 18December (see below), the Council agreed that Council applauded the statement made by the the High-level Coordinator’s mandate should Security Council President on 18 December, continue. praised the efforts of ICRC and the Technical

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Subcommittee, and appealed to all parties con- ducted patrols within the sectors and manned cerned to continue their joint efforts to resolve checkpoints at border-crossing sites, making ran- the outstanding problems related to the repatria- dom checks in cooperation with Iraqi and Ku- tion or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country waiti liaison officers. It also provided security for nationals or their remains. UNIKOM personnel and installations. UNIKOM maintained headquarters at Umm UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Qasr in Iraq, liaison offices in Baghdad and Ku- In March, just before the United States–led in- wait City and a support centre at Camp Khor. vasion of Iraq from Kuwait, the mandate of the By a 6 January letter to the Council President United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mis- [S/2003/27], the Secretary-General proposed to ap- sion (UNIKOM) was suspended and most of its point Brigadier General Franciszek Gagor (Po- staff evacuated. UNIKOM maintained a small rear land) as UNIKOM’s Force Commander, replacing headquarters in Kuwait City to provide a peace- Major General Miguel Angel Moreno (Argen- keeping presence, undertake political and mili- tina). tary liaison functions, and support UN humani- On 9 January [S/2003/28], the Council took note tarian assistance programmes for Iraq. On 25 of the Secretary-General’s proposal. March [S/2003/367], Kuwait informed the Security Major General Gagor left the Mission area on Council President that between 20 and 24 March, 7 July and the Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Iraq had launched 11 missiles, including a Scud Upinder Singh Klair (India), was appointed missile, against Kuwait. While much of UNIKOM Head of Mission. headquarters at Umm Qasr and other infrastruc- Reports of Secretary-General (March, June, ture were destroyed in the conflict, Camp Khor, October). UNIKOM’s activities were described in on the Kuwaiti side of the border, reopened in three reports of the Secretary-General, covering May to support humanitarian operations. On the periods 16 September 2002 to 21 March 2003 3 July, the Security Council, in resolution 1490 [S/2003/393 & Add.1], 22 March to 15 June [S/2003/ (2003) (see p. 359), noted that UNIKOM had suc- 656] and 16 June to 1 October [S/2003/933]. cessfully fulfilled its mandate from 1991 to 2003 In the March report, the Secretary-General and extended it for a final period of three said that during the period under review, the sit- months, up to 6 October 2003. Also, on 6 Octo- uation along the border between Iraq and Kuwait ber, the Council decided to end the demilitarized became increasingly tense owing to the massive zone (DMZ), an area about 200 to 240 kilometres military build-up on the Kuwaiti side of the long and extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and border. UNIKOM continued to carry out its re- 5 kilometres into Kuwait from the Iraq-Kuwait sponsibilities and contributed to the mainte- border. nance of stability in the border region until UNIKOM, established by Security Council reso- 17 March, when conditions on the ground dic- lution 687(1991) [YUN 1991, p. 172], discharged its tated withdrawal of most of the Mission for functions until October in accordance with its security reasons. A small headquarters, consist- terms of reference, as expanded by resolution ing of 12 military officers, 20 essential civilian 806(1993) [YUN 1993, p. 406]. Until March 2003, staff and some local staff, remained in Kuwait UNIKOM operations involved surveillance, con- City. UNIKOM’s personnel had been dispersed trol, investigation and liaison. Surveillance of the temporarily and the timing of their return to DMZ was based on ground and air patrols and ob- their assignments would be decided in consulta- servation points. Control operations included tion with the Council. The Secretary-General static checkpoints, random checks and mainte- recommended that the residual peacekeeping nance of a mobile reserve force. For operational presence in Kuwait City be maintained at an purposes, the DMZ was divided into northern, appropriate level for a further three months, southern and maritime sectors, with seven, six until 6 July 2003. and three patrol and observation bases, respect- In June, the Secretary-General said that the ively. Investigation teams were stationed in those Mission continued to maintain its rear headquar- sectors and at UNIKOM headquarters. Continued ters in Kuwait City to ensure a peacekeeping liaison was maintained with Iraqi and Kuwaiti presence in the UNIKOM area of operations. It authorities at all levels. undertook high-level military and political liai- The military observers were responsible for son duties, retained a capacity to conduct contin- patrol, observation, investigation and liaison ac- gency planning for a continued or modified op- tivities. The infantry battalion was deployed at eration, undertook residual tasks for the Mission, Camp Khor, with two companies deployed in such as recovery, reconciliation and disposal of Camp Abdally and Camp Sierra in the northern assets, and provided support to other entities of and southern DMZ sectors. The battalion con- the UN system in the region. Most of UNIKOM’s

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 359 property and premises on the Iraqi side of the responsibility to maintain peace and security and DMZ were totally destroyed or stolen during or a violation of relevant Council resolutions. soon after the military conflict. The Secretary- Security Council consideration (2-3 April). General said that since the conflict in Iraq had On 2 April, in a closed meeting [meeting 4733], the subsided, and following the adoption of Council Council heard a briefing by the UN Assistant resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338), the Council Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations might wish to consider whether the continued and had a constructive exchange of views with presence of UNIKOM in Kuwait with a suspended representatives of the troop-contributing coun- mandate and in changed circumstances was still tries to UNIKOM. desirable. In those altered conditions, he recom- On 3 April [S/2003/400], the Council concurred mended that the residual peacekeeping presence with the Secretary-General’s recommendation, of UNIKOM be maintained for a final three expressed in his March report (see above), that a months, until 6 October 2003, when the Mission peacekeeping presence be retained at an appro- would be closed. During that period, UNIKOM priate level for a further three months, until would scale down its military presence to a min- 6 July 2003. imum, continue to provide support from both the Kheitan Support Centre and Camp Khor to hu- SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION manitarian assistance operations in Iraq, main- On 3 July [meeting 4783], the Security Council tain liaison with Kuwaiti authorities, undertake unanimouslyadoptedresolution1490(2003).The the reconciliation and liquidation of UNIKOM draft [S/2003/684] was prepared in consultations assets and, most importantly, make appropriate among Council members. arrangements for handing over its activities in as- sistance to humanitarian operations to other en- The Security Council, tities in the area. That would also allow more time Recalling all its relevant resolutions, including reso- lutions 687(1991) of 3 April 1991, 689(1991) of 9 April for the assessment of the security situation in the 1991, 806(1993) of 5 February 1993, 833(1993) of 27 Mission’s former area of operations, as requested May 1993 and 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003, by Kuwait. Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General In his October report, the Secretary-General of 17 June 2003 on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, said that UNIKOM continued to reduce its staff Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States and finalized preparations for the liquidation of to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and its assets as part of its final mandate period Kuwait, authorized in Council resolution 1490(2003) (see Recognizing that the continued operation of the Mis- below). It also provided support to humanitarian sion and of a demilitarized zone established pursuant assistance operations in Iraq and made arrange- to resolution 687(1991) is no longer necessary to pro- ments for the handover of its facilities to the host tect against threats to international security posed by country and UN agencies in Kuwait. UNIKOM Iraqi actions against Kuwait, expected that the technical liquidation of its ac- Expressing its appreciation for the substantial volun- tivities would be completed one month after the tary contributions made to the Mission by the Govern- ment of Kuwait, closure of the Mission. After the 19August attack Commending the superior role played by personnel against the UN headquarters in Baghdad, of the Mission and the Department of Peacekeeping UNIKOM provided urgently needed assets, such Operations of the Secretariat, and noting that the Mis- as prefabricated accommodations, supplies, water sion successfully fulfilled its mandate from 1991 to tanks and communications equipment, for the 2003, continuation of UN operations in Baghdad. The Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the Secretary-General said that in its last phase, as a United Nations, residual peacekeeping presence operating in a 1. Decides to continue the mandate of the United difficult environment affected by the conflict in Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission for a final period, until 6 October 2003; Iraq from mid-March until the completion of its 2. Directs the Secretary-General to negotiate the mandate on 6 October, UNIKOM proved to be a transfer of non-removable property of the Mission and significant source of support for humanitarian of those assets that cannot be disposed of otherwise to agencies deployed in Iraq and Kuwait. the States of Kuwait and Iraq, as appropriate; Communications. In two separate letters ad- 3. Decides to end the demilitarized zone extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait dressed to the Secretary-General dated 14 March from the Iraq-Kuwait border at the end of mandate of [S/2003/319] and 16 March [S/2003/327], Iraq said the Mission on 6 October 2003; that the UN decision to withdraw UNIKOM ob- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the servers from their posts along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Security Council on the completion of the mandate of border was inconsistent with the Organization’s the Mission;

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5. Expresses its appreciation of the decision of the contributions, notes with concern that only thirty-six Government of Kuwait to defray, since 1 November Member States have paid their assessed contributions 1993, two thirds of the cost of the Mission; in full, and urges all other Member States, in particu- 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. lar those in arrears, to ensure payment of their out- standing assessed contributions; Financing 2. Expresses its continued appreciation of the decision of the Government of Kuwait to defray two thirds of On 18 June [meeting 90], the General Assembly the cost of the Observation Mission, effective 1 Novem- considered the Secretary-General’s reports on ber 1993; UNIKOM’s budget for the period from 1 July 2003 3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States to 30 June 2004 [A/57/664 & Corr.1], the perform- which have paid their assessed contributions in full, ance report on the budget for the period from and urges all other Member States to make every possi- 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 [A/57/665], the over- ble effort to ensure payment of their assessed contribu- view of the financing of UN peacekeeping opera- tions to the Observation Mission in full; 4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with tions: budget performance for the period from regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as re- 1 July 2001to 30 June 2002 and budget for the pe- gards the reimbursements to troop contributors that riod from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 [A/57/723], bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments and the financing of UNIKOM for the period from by Member States of their assessments; 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 [A/57/811], together 5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced with the related reports of the Advisory Commit- by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing tee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping mis- sions, in particular those in Africa; (ACABQ) on the administrative and budgetary as- 6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peace- pects of the financing of UN peacekeeping oper- keeping missions shall be given equal and non- ations [A/57/772] and on the financing of UNIKOM discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and [A/57/813]. On the recommendation of the Fifth administrative arrangements; (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee [A/57/ 7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions 833], the Assembly adopted resolution 57/330 shall be provided with adequate resources for the without vote [agenda item 132 (a)]. effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates; Financing of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to Observation Mission make the fullest possible use of facilities and equip- The General Assembly, ment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Having considered the reports of the Secretary- Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for General on the financing of the United Nations Iraq- the Observation Mission; Kuwait Observation Mission and the related reports of 9. Endorses the recommendation contained in para- the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Bud- graph 5 of the report of the Advisory Committee on getary Questions, Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests Recalling Security Council resolutions 687(1991) of the Secretary-General to ensure its full implementa- 3 April 1991 and 689(1991) of 9 April 1991, by which the tion; Council decided to establish the United Nations Iraq- 10. Requests the Secretary-General to take all nec- Kuwait Observation Mission and to review the question essary action to ensure that the Observation Mission is of its termination or continuation every six months, administered with maximum efficiency and economy; Recalling also its resolution 45/260 of 3 May 1991 on 11. Also requests the Secretary-General, in order to the financing of the Observation Mission and its subse- reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to quent resolutions and decisions thereon, the latest of continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Observa- which was resolution 56/297 of 27 June 2002, tion Mission against General Service posts, commen- Reaffirming the general principles underlying the surate with the requirements of the Observation Mis- financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, sion; as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) Financial performance report for the of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000, 12. Decides to continue its consideration of the re- Expressing its appreciation for the substantial volun- port of the Secretary-General on the financial per- tary contributions made to the Observation Mission by formance of the Observation Mission for the period the Government of Kuwait and the contributions of from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002, and of the treatment other Governments, of the unencumbered balance and other income in the of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mindful total amount of 6,443,300 dollars in respect of the fi- Observation Mission with the necessary financial re- nancial period ended 30 June 2002, at the main part of sources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under its fifty-eighth session; the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, 1. Takes note of the status of contributions to the Budget estimates for the period United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission as at from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 31 March 2003, including the contributions outstand- 13 . Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General ing in the amount of 10.2 million United States dol- on the budget of the Observation Mission and the note lars, representing some 3 per cent of the total assessed by the Secretary-General on the financing of the Ob-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 361 servation Mission for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 [S/2003/507], 14 July [S/2003/714] and 10 October June 2004; [S/2003/1032]. All of the reports noted that no State 14 . Authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into or international organization had consulted the commitments in an amount not exceeding 12 million dollars for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2003, Committee on whether certain items fell within to be financed from the accumulated fund balance in the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 the Special Account for the United Nations Iraq- (1991) and no international organization had re- Kuwait Observation Mission; ported any relevant information requested under 15. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall the guidelines. The October report noted that be financed by borrowing funds from other active since April 2003, the situation concerning Iraq peacekeeping missions; had undergone fundamental changes and the 16. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to Council had lifted all prohibitions related to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the trade with Iraq. However, prohibitions related to United Nations participating in the Observation Mis- the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related ma- sion; teriel were still in place; hence the Committee 17. Invites voluntary contributions to the Observa- had continued to submit its reports and would tion Mission in cash and in the form of services and continued to fulfil its mandate until the termina- supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be ad- tion of its work on 21 November. ministered, as appropriate, in accordance with the pro- cedure and practices established by the General As- Security Council consideration (22 Decem- sembly; ber). On 22 December [meeting 4888], the Security 18. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of Council heard a presentation by the Chairman of its fifty-eighth session, under the item entitled “Fi- the Sanctions Committee for Iraq who noted that nancing of the activities arising from Security Council the Committee had been terminated on 21 No- resolution 687(1991)”, the sub-item entitled “Financ- ing of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation vember, in accordance with Council resolution Mission”. 1483(2003), after 13 years of a comprehensive sanctions regime. As a subsidiary organ of the On 23 December, the Assembly took note of Council, the Committee had executed the politi- the Secretary-General’s note on the financing of cal decisions of the Council as manifested in rele- UNIKOM for the period from 1 July 2003 to vant Council resolutions. The Committee’s mandate 30 June 2004 [A/58/386] and the related report of comprised two major elements: the implementa- ACABQ [A/58/441], and decided to keep under re- tion and supervision of the sanctions regime view, during its fifty-eighth (2004) session, the against Iraq and the humanitarian oil-for-food sub-item entitled “Financing of the activities aris- programme. Confronted with the interruption of ing from Security Council resolution 687(1991): the programme in March due to the military con- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mis- flict, the Council adopted resolution 1472(2003) sion” (decision 58/559). (see p. 363), which allowed humanitarian emer- Also on 23 December, the Assembly decided gency deliveries out of the existing pipeline of that the item on the financing of activities arising approved contracts. The adoption of the resolu- from resolution 687(1991) remained for consider- tion on 28 March was the first time that the Coun- ation at the fifty-eighth session (decision 58/565). cil achieved consensus on an issue related to Iraq after months of division. After the war and adop- tion of resolution 1483(2003) on 22 May,the Com- Arms and related sanctions mittee was tasked to supervise the transitional process leading to the termination of the oil-for- Sanctions Committee activities food programme on 21 November and the trans- The Security Council Committee established fer of all responsibilities from the Office of the by resolution 661(1990) [YUN 1990, p. 192] (Sanc- Iraq Programme to the Coalition Provisional Au- tions Committee for Iraq) was terminated on thority. The Committee also fulfilled its addi- 21 November 2003 in accordance with resolution tional new task pursuant to paragraphs 19 and 23 1483(2003) (see p. 338). of resolution 1483(2003) relating to funds or During the year, the Committee issued four re- other assets or resources that had been removed ports on the implementation of the arms and re- from Iraq or acquired by Saddam Hussein or lated sanctions against Iraq, in accordance with other officials of the former regime (see also the guidelines approved by Council resolution p. 362). On 11 June, the Committee adopted 700(1991) [YUN 1991, p. 198] for facilitating full in- guidelines to identify individuals and entities ternational implementation of resolution 687 whose financial assets should be transferred to (1991) [ibid., p. 172]. The reports were transmitted the Development Fund for Iraq; on 26 June, a to the Council on 16 January [S/2003/61], 25 April first list of such individuals was adopted by the

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Committee and a list of respective entities fol- and of high officials of his regime, as provided lowed on 21 November. for in resolution 1483(2003). It was important to ensure, from a practical and technical stand- Establishment of Security Council point, the continuity of the monitoring of the im- Committee pursuant to resolution 1483(2003) plementation of those financial sanctions. France On 24 November [meeting 4872], the Council stressed that for reasons of principle related to unanimously adopted resolution 1518(2003). the coherence of the Council’s practice in moni- The draft [S/2003/1107] was submitted by Bulgaria, toring the implementation of sanctions, and Chile, Guinea, Spain, the United Kingdom and bearing in mind the situation in Iraq, it would the United States. Council members had before seem particularly desirable to broaden the man- them two press releases from the Sanctions Com- date of the new committee as soon as possible to mittee, dated 12 June [SC/7791-IK/365] and 29 July include monitoring the arms embargo. [SC/7831-IK/372], which set the guidelines and defi- nitions for the application of paragraphs 19 and Oil-for-food programme 23 of resolution 1483(2003) (see p. 338). In accordance with Security Council resolution The Security Council, 1483(2003) (see p. 338), the oil-for-food programme Recalling all of its relevant resolutions, was phased out over a six-month period and termi- Recalling further its earlier decision in resolution nated on 21 November 2003. Responsibility for 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003 to terminate the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 the administration of any remaining programme (1990), activities was transferred to the Coalition Provi- Stressing the importance of all Member States ful- sional Authority. The programme, established by filling their obligations under paragraph 10 of resolu- Council resolution 986(1995) [YUN 1995, p. 475], tion 1483(2003), authorized States to import Iraqi petroleum and Determining that the situation in Iraq, although im- petroleum products as a temporary measure to proved, continues to constitute a threat to interna- finance humanitarian assistance, thereby alleviat- tional peace and security, ing the adverse consequences of the sanctions Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, regime on the Iraqi people. 1. Decides to establish, with immediate effect, in ac- cordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of proce- Phase XII dure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting Sanctions Committee report. The Sanctions of all the members of the Council, to continue to iden- Committee report for phase XII, 30 May to 4 De- tify pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1483(2003) individuals and entities referred to in paragraph 19 of cember 2002, of the oil-for-food programme was that resolution, including by updating the list of indi- transmitted to the Council President on 3 March viduals and entities that have already been identified [S/2003/331]. Issues considered by the Committee by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 included the sale of petroleum and petroleum of resolution 661(1990),and to report on its work to the products, humanitarian supplies to Iraq, and Council; matters relating to oil-indsutry spare parts and 2. Decides also to adopt the guidelines and defini- equipment for Iraq. The Committee also held tions previously agreed by the Committee established formal and informal meetings to discuss various pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 661(1990) to im- plement the provisions of paragraphs 19 and 23 of res- issues related to the humanitarian situation in olution 1483(2003), and decides that the guidelines Iraq and implementation of the oil-for-food pro- and definitions can be amended by the Committee in gramme. The oil overseers continued to advise the light of further considerations; the Committee on oil-pricing mechanisms, oil 3. Decides further that the mandate of the Commit- contract approvals and amendments, manage- tee referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be kept ment of revenue objectives and other pertinent under review, and decides to consider the possible au- questions related to export and monitoring. thorization of the additional task of observing fulfil- ment by Member States of their obligations under As at 31 October 2002, the oil overseers, on be- paragraph 10 of resolution 1483(2003); half of the Committee, had approved 192 oil con- 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter. tracts involving purchasers from 41 countries. The total quantity of oil approved for export Speaking after the vote, France said that the under those contracts corresponded to 475 mil- adopted resolution created a new committee in lion barrels, with an estimated value of 11.5 bil- charge of taking over from the Sanctions Com- lion euros. The contracted amount exceeded the mittee pursuant to Council resolution 661(1990), Iraqi export capacity during the phase and the in order to ensure the follow-up of the imple- actual volume of oil lifted was expected to be sub- mentation of freezes and transfers of the finan- stantially lower. The average rate of Iraqi crude cial assets of the Government of Saddam Hussein oil exports from the start of the phase until 31Oc-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 363 tober was only 1.14 million barrels per day, repre- Council resolution 986(1995) and brooked no senting about half of the assumed achievable and justification whatsoever. sustainable export level of 2.1 million barrels per day. Applications received as at 31October for ex- SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (March) ports of humanitarian supplies to Iraq under On 28 March [meeting 4732], the Security Coun- phase XI totalled 1,897, of which 1,418 were ap- cil unanimously adopted resolution 1472(2003). proved by the Committee. From the beginning of The draft [S/2003/381] was submitted by Angola, phase XII until 31October, 716 applications were Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, France, Ger- received, of which 502 were approved. From the many, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, the Russian beginning of the programme up to 31 October Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 2002, 10,063 applications had been approved, United States. with a total value of $22.34 billion. The work of The Security Council, confirmation of goods arrival by the indepen- Noting that under the provisions of article 55 of the dent inspection agents (Cotecna) continued at fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of five entry points to Iraq. From the beginning Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to of the process to 31 October, the total allocation the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occu- for oil-industry spare parts and equipment pying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and amounted to $4.8 billion. Although the Multina- medical supplies of the population, and should, in tional Interception Force reported a significant particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occu- reduction in illegal oil exports from Iraq by sea pied territory are inadequate, in 2002, oil smuggling continued on a decreasing Convinced of the urgent need to continue to provide scale in the Gulf area. humanitarian relief to the people of Iraq throughout the country on an equitable basis, and of the need to Phase XIII extend such humanitarian relief measures to the peo- ple of Iraq who leave the country as a result of hostili- In accordance with paragraph 1 of Security ties, Council resolution 1447(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 313], Recalling its relevant resolutions, in particular reso- the new 180-day extension (phase XIII) of the hu- lutions 661(1990) of 6 August 1990, 986(1995) of 14 manitarian programme established by resolution April 1995, 1409(2002) of 14 May 2002 and 1454(2002) 986(1995) [YUN 1995, p. 475] began on 5 December of 30 December 2002, as they provide for humanita- 2002. The distribution plan for the new phase rian relief to the people of Iraq, was approved by the Secretary-General on 3 Jan- Noting the decision taken by the Secretary-General on 17 March 2003 to withdraw all United Nations and uary [S/2003/6], on the understanding that its im- international staff tasked with the implementation of plementation would be governed by resolutions the “Oil-for-Food” Programme (hereinafter “the Pro- 986(1995), 1281(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 250],1284 gramme”) established pursuant to resolution 986 (1999) [ibid., p. 230], 1302(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 307], (1995), 1330(2000) [ibid., p. 310], 1360(2001) [YUN 2001, Stressing the necessity to make every effort to sustain p. 305], 1382(2001) [ibid., p. 308], 1409(2002) [YUN the operation of the present national food basket dis- 2002, p. 304], 1447(2002) and 1454(2002) [ibid., p. 307] tribution network, and by the 1996 Memorandum of Understand- Stressing also the need for consideration of a further reassessment of the Programme during and after the ing between the UN Secretariat and Iraq [YUN emergency phase, 1996, p. 226], without prejudice to Sanctions Com- Reaffirming the respect for the right of the people of mittee procedures. The categorized lists of goods Iraq to determine their own political future and to received and amended for the phase XII distri- control their own natural resources, bution plan [YUN 2002, p. 313] would constitute the Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States basis for the categorized list for phase XIII. to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, UNMOVIC and IAEA technical experts would Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the provide further assessment following the United Nations, 1. Requests all parties concerned to abide strictly submission of applications. by their obligations under international law, in particu- Communications (21-28 March). On 21 March lar the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Regula- [S/2003/358], Iraq condemned the submission by tions concerning the Laws and Customs of War on the UN Secretariat of a draft resolution contain- Land, adopted at The Hague on 18 October 1907, in- ing changes to be made in the oil-for-food cluding those relating to the essential civilian needs of programme. the people of Iraq, both inside and outside Iraq; 2. Calls upon the international community also to On 28 March [S/2003/389], Iraq informed the provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the Council President that any discussion of an people of Iraq, both inside and outside Iraq in consul- amendment to the 1996Memorandum of Under- tation with relevant States, and in particular to respond standing between Iraq and the UN Secretariat immediately to any future humanitarian appeal of the without Iraq’s participation was a violation of United Nations, and supports the activities of the In-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 364 Political and security questions

ternational Committee of the Red Cross and other in- paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 986(1995), as ternational humanitarian organizations; necessary and appropriate, to compensate suppliers 3. Recognizes that additionally, in view of the ex- and shippers for agreed additional shipping, trans- ceptional circumstances prevailing currently in Iraq, portation and storage costs incurred as a result of on an interim and exceptional basis, technical and tem- diverting and delaying shipments as directed by him porary adjustments should be made to the Programme according to the provisions of paragraphs 4 (a), (b) so as to ensure the implementation of the approved and (c) in order to perform his functions set out in funded and non-funded contracts concluded by the paragraph 4(d); Government of Iraq for the humanitarian relief of the (h) To meet additional operational and administra- people of Iraq, including to meet the needs of refu- tive costs resulting from the implementation of the gees and internally displaced persons, in accordance temporarily modified Programme by the funds in the with the present resolution; escrow account established pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) 4. Authorizes the Secretary-General and representa- of resolution 986(1995) in the same manner as costs tives designated by him to undertake as an urgent first arising from those activities set forth in paragraph 8(d) step, and with the necessary coordination, the follow- of resolution 986(1995) in order to perform his func- ing measures: tions set out in paragraph 4 (d); (a) To establish alternative locations, both inside (i) To use funds deposited in the escrow accounts and outside Iraq, in consultation with the respective established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of res- Governments, for the delivery, inspection and authen- olution 986(1995) for the purchase of locally produced ticated confirmation of humanitarian supplies and goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian equipment provided under the Programme, as well as needs which have been funded in accordance with the to redirect shipments of goods to those locations, as provisions of resolution 986(1995) and related resolu- necessary; tions, including, where appropriate, the costs of mill- (b) To review, as a matter of urgency, the approved ing, transportation and other costs necessary to facili- funded and non-funded contracts concluded by the tate the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies to Government of Iraq to determine the relative priori- the people of Iraq; ties of the need for adequate medicine, health sup- 5. Expresses its readiness as a second step to authorize plies, foodstuffs and other materials and supplies for the Secretary-General to perform additional functions essential civilian needs represented in these contracts, with the necessary coordination, as soon as the situa- which can be shipped within the period of the present tion permits, as activities of the Programme in Iraq re- mandate, to proceed with these contracts in accord- sume; ance with such priorities; 6. Expresses its readiness also to consider making ad- (c) To contact suppliers of these contracts to deter- ditional funds available, including from the account mine the precise location of contracted goods and, created pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution when necessary, to require suppliers to delay, acceler- 986(1995), on an exceptional and reimbursable basis, ate or divert shipments; to meet further the humanitarian needs of the people (d) To negotiate and agree upon necessary adjust- of Iraq; ments in the terms or conditions of these contracts and 7. Decides that, notwithstanding the provisions of their respective letters of credit and to implement the resolution 661(1990) and resolution 687(1991) of measures referred to in paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c), 3 April 1991 and for the duration of the present resolu- notwithstanding distribution plans approved under tion, all applications outside the Programme sub- the Programme; mitted by the United Nations agencies, programmes (e) To negotiate and execute new contracts for es- and funds, other international organizations and non- sential medical items under the Programme and to governmental organizations for distribution or use in authorize issuance of the relevant letters of credit, not- Iraq of emergency humanitarian supplies and equip- withstanding approved distribution plans, provided ment, other than medicines, health supplies and that such items cannot be delivered in execution of foodstuffs, shall be reviewed by the Committee, under contracts pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) and subject to the a 24-hour no-objection procedure; approval of the Security Council Committee estab- 8. Urges all parties concerned, consistent with the lished by resolution 661(1990); Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, to al- (f) To transfer unencumbered funds between the low full, unimpeded access by international humani- accounts created pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) tarian organizations to all people of Iraq in need of as- of resolution 986(1995) on an exceptional and reim- sistance, to make available all necessary facilities for bursable basis as necessary to ensure the delivery of es- their operations and to promote the safety, security sential humanitarian supplies to the people of Iraq and freedom of movement of United Nations and as- and to use the funds in the escrow accounts referred to sociated personnel and their assets, as well as person- in paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 986(1995) to nel of humanitarian organizations in Iraq in meeting implement the Programme as provided for in the pres- such needs; ent resolution, irrespective of the phase in which such 9. Directs the Committee to monitor closely the funds entered the escrow accounts or the phase to implementation of the provisions of paragraph 4 which those funds may have been allocated; above and, in that regard, requests the Secretary- (g) To use, subject to procedures to be decided by General to update the Committee on the measures as the Committee prior to the end of the period set out in they are being taken and to consult with the Commit- paragraph 10 below and based on recommendations tee on prioritization of contracts for shipments of provided by the Office of the Iraq Programme, goods, other than foodstuffs, medicines, health and funds deposited in the accounts created pursuant to water sanitation related supplies;

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10. Decides that the provisions contained in para- until 3 June 2003 and may be subject to further re- graph 4 above shall remain in force for a period of 45 newal by the Council; days following the date of adoption of the present res- 2. Decides to remain seized of the matter. olution and may be subject to further renewal by the Council; Communication. On 24 April [S/2003/499], 11. Requests the Secretary-General to take all meas- South Africa, on behalf of South African compa- ures required for the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council prior to the ter- nies that held contracts under the oil-for-food mination of the period defined in paragraph 10 above; programme, requested the Council President to 12. Decides to remain seized of the matter. provide more information regarding the tempo- rary adjustments that were made to the pro- Speaking after the vote, the United States said gramme pursuant to resolution 1472(2003) (see it had full confidence that the Secretary-General p. 363). The request related mainly to goods that and the UN Office of the Iraq Programme would were not identified as priority goods, but were al- effectively carry out the task of resuming the oil- ready deemed eligible for payment. for-food programme. The United States would Report of Secretary-General (May). In re- facilitate the necessary coordination on the sponse to resolution 1447(2002), the Secretary- ground in Iraq between coalition authorities and General submitted a 28 May progress report on the United Nations and associated relief agency phase XIII of the oil-for-food programme staff, as oil-for-food supplies and other humani- [S/2003/576]. The report provided information tarian assistance arrived and were distributed as on all implementation aspects up to 23 May circumstances on the ground permitted. It also 2003. added that it was gratified that the Council had The Secretary-General observed that since its been able to come together to take that step to inception in 1996, the programme had been im- meet the immediate humanitarian needs of the plemented within the context of a rigorous sanc- Iraqi people. tions regime. It had made a major difference in Communication (31 March). On 31 March the daily lives of the Iraqi people, serving as a life- [S/2003/396], the Russian Federation said that the line to a large segment of the population. As at adoption of resolution 1472(2003) did not alter 20 May, oil proceeds since the start of the pro- the essence of the humanitarian programme, gramme’s implementation totalled approximately which had been operating for seven years on the $65 billion, of which more than $46 billion had basis of Council resolutions and the 1996 Memo- been allocated to the humanitarian programme. randum of Understanding. It merely involved A total of $38 billion had been apportioned to the some procedural specifications pertaining to the 15governorates of the centre and south and $8.11 operation of the programme for the purpose of billion to the three northern governorates. More promptly solving humanitarian problems caused than $28 billion worth of goods had been deliv- by the war in Iraq. The adoption of the resolution ered to Iraq as a whole, including $13 billion did not mean a legitimization of the military for foodstuffs, $2.2 billion for food handling, action by the members of the coalition. Under in- $2.21 billion for medicines, $1.17billion for water ternational humanitarian law, the members of and sanitation, $2.01 billion for electricity, $2.29 the coalition bore responsibility for solving hu- billion for agriculture and irrigation, $1.66 bil- manitarian problems in the occupied territories. lion for housing, $1.19 billion for transportation and telecommunications, $586 million for educa- SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (April) tion and $1.6 billion for oil-industry spare parts On 24 April [meeting 4743], the Council unani- and equipment. In addition, goods to the value mously adopted resolution 1476(2003). The draft of $9.4 billion were in the pipeline for the [S/2003/465] was prepared in consultations among centre/south and $1.55 million for the three Council members. northern governorates. The implementation of programme activities during phase XIII was sus- The Security Council, pended temporarily due to the military conflict, Recalling its relevant resolutions, in particular reso- which necessitated the withdrawal of UN inter- lutions 661(1990) of 6 August 1990, 986(1995) of 14 national personnel from Iraq on 17March. How- April 1995, 1409(2002) of 14 May 2002, 1454(2002) of 30 December 2002 and 1472(2003) of 28 March 2003, ever, some activities continued to be undertaken as they provide for humanitarian relief to the people by the UN national staff, especially with regard to of Iraq, the distribution of food and medical supplies. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the Despite precarious security conditions, an in- United Nations, creasing number of UN international staff began 1. Decides that the provisions contained in para- returning to Iraq as of 4 April and resumed im- graph 4 of resolution 1472(2003) shall remain in force plementation of programme activities.

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On 22 May, the Security Council, in resolution quarters, it was anticipated that they would be 1483(2003) (see p. 338), decided that, with the completed by the end of March 2004. A limited exception of prohibitions related to the sale or number of staff would be required in New York supply of arms and related materiel, all prohibi- until the end of June 2004. tions related to trade with Iraq and the provision With regard to letters of credit issued for the of financial or economic resources to Iraq would purchase of humanitarian supplies for the no longer apply. By the same resolution, the south/centre of Iraq, since they were irrevocable Council also decided to phase out the oil-for-food and non-transferable they would continue to be programme over a period of six months. The handled by the United Nations beyond 21 No- Secretary-General would continue to fulfil the vember and would therefore not be transferred to responsibilities entrusted to him under resolu- the Authority. As at 11June, some 3,000 such let- tions 1472(2003) (see p. 363) and 1476(2003) (see ters of credit were outstanding, with a value of p. 365), in coordination with the Authority, and some $8 billion. The United Nations would re- would terminate within that time period the tain responsibility for their administration until programme’s operations and transfer responsi- they were executed or they expired. Collateral for bility for the administration of the remaining the full value of the letters of credit would be kept activities to the Authority. by the United Nations. Any balance left after the Report of Secretary-General (June). Pursuant execution or expiration of such letters of credit to paragraph 16 (c) of resolution 1483(2003), the would be transferred to the Development Fund Secretary-General submitted to the Security for Iraq. For the period after 21 November, the Council on 11 June a report [S/2003/640] on the Secretary-General would be making arrange- estimated operating budget needed to ensure ments with the Authority to have the Authority the continued functioning of activities associated designated as the entity authorized to give au- with the implementation of that resolution, thenticated confirmation of the delivery of including the termination of the oil-for-food goods. Assuming that all deliveries were com- programme; the projected costs associated with pleted by 21November under outstanding letters restoring Iraqi government funds that were of credit, it was anticipated that all letters of provided by Member States to the Secretary- credit would have been submitted, authenticated General as requested in resolution 778(1992) and processed by the end of June 2004; that [YUN 1992, p. 320]; and the projected costs associ- would allow all financial transactions to be regis- ated with the Secretary-General’s Special Repre- tered in 2004, a final financial statement for the sentative and the qualified representative to serve whole operation to be prepared by December on the International Advisory and Monitoring 2004 and a final external audit report to be Board (IAMB). prepared by April 2005. The Secretary-General said that, since the Given its complexity,it was difficult to evaluate adoption of the resolution, the monitoring and fully, within the time given, the precise costs of observation tasks deriving from resolution effectively terminating the programme and 986(1995) [YUN 1995, p. 475] and the management handing over residual activities in an orderly of letters of credit in respect of oil sales had been manner. The best estimate for all known and discontinued. All substantive operations would projected costs to ensure the continued function- be phased out within the six months following ing of activities associated with the implementa- the adoption of resolution 1483(2003), including tion of resolution 1483(2003), both at Headquar- the handover of operational responsibilities and ters and in the field, including the termination of relevant documentation to the Authority/Iraqi the oil-for-food programme, were estimated at interim administration. All UN agencies that $106.6 million. Of that amount, $81 million re- supported the implementation of resolution lated to the period ending 21 November; the re- 986(1995) would cease their activities by the end maining $25.6 million related to liquidation of November 2003. During that period, there tasks. In addition, there was a need to have a con- would be a need to continue to provide adminis- tingency reserve to meet any potential costs that trative, financial, personnel, information tech- might arise but could not be identified in prepar- nology, transport, technical, procurement, logis- ing the estimates. Such a contingency would be tical and warehousing support. After 21November, established at 15 per cent of the total estimated a limited number of administrative personnel costs. The known and projected costs associated would remain in Iraq to complete the necessary with restoring the Iraqi government funds that administrative tasks and close down at the field were provided by Member States to the Secretary- level; that phase was scheduled to be completed General as requested in resolution 778(1992) by the end of December 2003. With regard to the [YUN 1992, p. 320] were minimal. The restoration of administrative tasks at respective agencies’ head- funds to Member States as per paragraph 17 of

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 367 resolution 1483(2003) was under way. An amount calculations concerning ongoing costs of projects of $404.9 million would be restored, $65.8 mil- after their handover to the Authority. Some lion of which would be refunded from balances $8.1 billion had been allocated to the three remaining in the account and the remainder of northern governorates since the start of the $339.1 million would be funded from unencum- programme’s implementation in December 1996 bered funds in the accounts established pursuant [YUN 1996, p. 225]. to resolution 986(1995). With regard to the 15 governorates in the cen- The costs associated with the Secretary- tre and south of Iraq, prior to the war the UN role General’s Special Representative and his quali- was limited primarily to monitoring and observ- fied representative to serve on IAMB should con- ing the distribution and utilization of humanita- stitute expenses of the Organization rather than rian supplies provided under the programme. be funded from the account established pursuant Handover arrangements for the centre and to resolution 986(1995). No provision had there- south involved a tripartite review by the United fore been made in that connection. The balance Nations, the Authority and relevant Iraqi author- at the end of May 2003 in that account was esti- ities of all remaining contracts for humanitarian mated at $400 million. After deduction of the es- supplies and equipment submitted under the timated operating budget ($106.6 million) and programme. The review had covered approved the contingency reserve ($16 million), the surplus and fully-funded contracts, and also those ap- available for transfer to the Development Fund proved but not funded. Adjustments had been for Iraq amounted to $277.4 million. Upon the fi- made for alternative delivery and authentication nal closing of the accounts and subsequent to sites to enable the delivery of supplies and equip- their final audit, any balance remaining from the ment to Iraq. It was envisaged from the outset operational budget and/or the contingency fund that those activities would take place inside Iraq. would be transferred to the Development Fund However, that scenario was undermined by for Iraq. chronic insecurity and, in particular, the 19 Au- Security Council consideration (28 October). gust terrorist attack on the UN headquarters in On 28 October [meeting 4851], the Council was Baghdad. Given the reduction in UN personnel briefed by the Executive Director of the Office of and the late deployment of a handover team by the Iraq Programme (OIP), Benon Sevan. the Authority, the intended joint physical review Mr. Sevan said that the United Nations would of all programme assets by the United Nations, terminate the oil-for-food programme on 21 No- the Authority and the local authorities had not vember and would continue to facilitate a smooth been possible. Accordingly, completed and on- handover to the Authority, in close cooperation going projects and activities would be transferred with the relevant Iraqi authorities. In view of the to the Authority through dossiers prepared for common position taken by the United Nations each project and activity. and the Authority, he saw no alternative to the As at 27 October, 3,154 approved and funded transfer of assets, ongoing operations and re- contracts worth some $6.36 billion had been clas- sponsibility for the administration of and re- sified to have relative utility. The number of ap- maining activity under the programme to the proved and funded contracts that had not been Authority “as is”, together with the relevant doc- included in the final review was estimated to be umentation. Handing over a multi-billion-dollar 1,621, with a total value of $1.5 billion. Also, 273 programme of such complexity and magnitude approved but unfunded contracts worth some in a six-month period, as mandated by resolution $700 million had been funded following deter- 1483(2003), would have been difficult even under mination of their relative utility and urgent need. the best of circumstances. Doing so under condi- There remained 3,319 approved but unfunded tions of insecurity and reduced on-site staffing contracts, with a total value of $6.5 billion. Based capacity required a degree of realism, under- on the essential needs of the Iraqi people, as standing and pragmatism. Most of the phase- identified by the United Nations, the Authority down activities had been undertaken in the three and relevant Iraqi authorities, and following the Iraqi northern governorates, where the United OIP Executive Director’s recommendation, the Nations was responsible for the implementation Sanctions Committee approved, on an excep- of the programme on behalf of the former Gov- tional basis, 13 projects for the procurement of ernment of Iraq. In the north, the handover in- items, with a total value of $459 million, not cov- volved the transfer of projects, assets, inventories ered by approved and funded or unfunded con- and relevant documentation, contracts signed by tracts. As at October, UN agencies and pro- the United Nations and its agencies with interna- grammes had arranged the delivery of goods tional and national contractors, in addition to an worth $1 billion. Some of the goods were still at agreement with the Authority on liabilities and locations outside Iraq and if they could not be

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 368 Political and security questions delivered to Iraq by 21 November, arrangements pleted after 21 November. Special arrangements would be made for their transfer to the Authority would need to be made for goods held or ware- outside Iraq. A total of $398 million worth of housed outside Iraq, largely in neighbouring goods was established to be in transit to Iraq States. Since the start of the programme in 1996, when the UN independent inspection agents approximately $65 billion worth of oil was ex- were withdrawn in mid-March 2003 due to ported; more than $46 billion of that amount was security conditions. A total value of $315 million allocated to the programme after deductions for for such goods had been prioritized and arrange- other accounts pursuant to relevant resolutions. ments had been made for the suppliers of the re- Under the programme, more than $30 billion maining goods to be compensated. The indepen- worth of goods had been delivered to Iraq as a dent inspection agent, Cotecna, was stationed at whole, including foodstuffs worth $12 billion; inspection sites outside Iraq and was authenticat- food handling worth $2.2 billion; agriculture ing the arrival of goods consistent with arrange- worth $2.4 billion; medicines worth $2.3 billion; ments agreed upon between the United Nations, water and sanitation worth $1.3billion; electricity the Authority and the relevant Iraqi authorities. sector goods worth $2.2 billion; housing worth However, due to the fact that Cotecna personnel $1.7 billion; and, for the oil sector, goods worth were not permitted to operate at the port of $1.9 billion. Umm Qasr, the issuance of authenticated confir- The United Kingdom said that the Authority mation for goods destined for that port would and Iraqi ministry officials were engaged in de- need to be halted, unless the Authority provided veloping an effective transition strategy to ensure appropriate indemnifications. The Authority the efficient delivery of goods as well as adequate had not provided OIP with information regard- warehousing and inventory management. The ing contact points within the port or an update Authority would continue to honour its exist- concerning any arrangements made to confirm ing commitments to support the fulfilment of the arrival of goods. Since 10 October, Cotecna all prioritized contracts and was focused on de- had inspected 25 consignments under the revised signing a sustainable and predictable goods- authentication procedures, with no confirmation authentication system that would pose no of receipt. If that matter was not urgently ad- problems to suppliers. dressed, the confidence of suppliers in the au- Security Council consideration (20 Novem- thentication process could erode, which, in turn, ber). On 20 November [meeting 4868], the could adversely affect the delivery pipeline. Fur- Secretary-General addressed the Council, stating thermore, in July, the Authority was provided that it was meeting to mark the completion of one with details of 21 contracts in connection with of the largest, most complex and unusual tasks which suppliers claimed to have provided that was ever entrusted to the UN Secretariat—the services prior to the war, which could not be only humanitarian programme ever to have been authenticated due to the withdrawal of Cotecna. funded entirely from resources belonging to the Despite repeated reminders, the Authority had nation it was designed to help. In its nearly seven only been able to produce a negative response in years of operation, the oil-for-food programme connection with two of the contracts concerned. had been required to meet an almost impossible The entire oil-for-food database would be series of challenges, using some $46 billion of transferred to the Authority on 21 November. Iraqi export earnings on behalf of the Iraqi peo- The Authority needed to ensure that appropriate ple. During those years, the programme deliv- arrangements were in place, effective 22 Novem- ered food rations sufficient to feed all 27 million ber, for the management of the billions of dol- residents of Iraq. As a result, the malnutrition lars’ worth of supplies and equipment to Iraq rate among Iraqi children was reduced by 50 per from the programme’s delivery pipeline and for cent, national vaccination campaigns reduced authenticating the arrival of those goods in order child mortality from preventable diseases and to facilitate payment to suppliers—perhaps there had been no reported cases of polio in Iraq through retention of Cotecna’s services by the for almost three years. Electricity blackouts in Authority for a limited period after the termina- Baghdad were reduced under peak summer tion of the programme. Each UN agency and loads and clean water became more available for programme had devised individual exit strate- personal use. The programme also enabled the gies, based on the levels of project implementa- overcrowded schools throughout the country to tion and the possible future humanitarian in- operate in two shifts instead of three. At mid- volvement of the organizations concerned under night on 21November, the United Nations would their respective regular programme activities. An hand over all the programme’s responsibilities, agreement had been reached with the Authority together with the remaining funds and assets— for the funding of ongoing projects to be com- assets ranging from schools to electrical power

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 369 stations and some $8.2 billion worth of food, tion 661(1990) for their dedicated efforts to medicines and other essential supplies—to the implement the Programme since its inception, and Authority. The actual delivery of those items in implementing resolution 1483(2003). The Council emphasizes the need for continued would continue well into 2004. Any unspent or international efforts aimed at the reconstruction of undisbursed amounts would be transferred to Iraq and, in this context, takes note with satisfaction the Development Fund for Iraq after the pro- of the statements made by the representatives of the gramme’s closure. The Authority was making ar- United States of America and the United Kingdom rangements to transfer most of the 2,500 Iraqis of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the meas- who had been working for the United Nations in ures which the Coalition Provisional Authority in- the three northern governorates to posts in the tends to take in order to continue the payment mech- local government. The Secretary-General hoped anisms and the deliveries under the Programme. The Council recognizes the important role of the that their colleagues serving in the centre and United Nations in coordinating the termination of south of Iraq, over 800 of them in all, would re- the Programme, including the transfer at the earliest ceive similar consideration. He also said that the possible time of all surplus funds in the escrow ac- United Nations took pride in the fact that it had counts to the Development Fund for Iraq. achieved an orderly handover of such a large and The Council recalls the vital role foreseen for the expensive programme on time and in spite of the United Nations in resolutions 1483(2003), 1500 insecurity in Iraq and the disruptive bomb attack (2003) of 14 August 2003 and 1511(2003) of 16 Octo- ber 2003, as circumstances permit, inter alia, in the on its headquarters in Baghdad. As the United areas of humanitarian assistance, facilitation of Nations was closing the oil-for-food programme, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. it remained determined to continue helping Iraq’s long-suffering people. UN Compensation Commission and Fund SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (November) The United Nations Compensation Commis- On 20 November [meeting 4868], following con- sion, established in 1991 [YUN 1991, p. 195] for the sultations among Security Council members, the resolution and payment of claims against Iraq for President made statement S/PRST/2003/24 on losses and damage resulting from its 1990 inva- behalf of the Council: sion and occupation of Kuwait [YUN 1990, p. 189], The Security Council has heard the statement by continued in 2003 to expedite the prompt settle- the Secretary-General and has considered the brief- ment of claims through the United Nations Com- ing by the Executive Director of the Office of the pensation Fund, which was established at the Iraq Programme on the termination on 21 Novem- same time as the Commission. ber 2003 of the United Nations humanitarian pro- gramme for Iraq (“the Programme”) and the transfer Governing Council. The Commission’s Gov- of the responsibility for the administration of any re- erning Council held four sessions in Geneva dur- maining activity under the Programme to the Coali- ing the year—the forty-seventh (11-13 March) tion Provisional Authority in Iraq in accordance with [S/2003/195], the forty-eighth (24-26 June) [S/2003/ Council resolution 1483(2003) of 22 May 2003. 755], the forty-ninth (16-18 September) [S/2003/914] The Council underlines the exceptionally impor- and the fiftieth (16-18 December) [S/2003/1205]—at tant role of the Programme in providing humanita- which it considered the reports and recommen- rian assistance to the people of Iraq under the dations of the Panels of Commissioners ap- regime of sanctions imposed by the Council on the previous Government of Iraq. Under this unique pointed to review specific instalments of various programme the value of humanitarian goods deliv- categories of claims. The Governing Council also ered to Iraq during the period from December 1996 acted on the Executive Secretary’s report sub- to March 2003 amounted to about 30 billion United mitted at each session, which, in addition to pro- States dollars. Those deliveries made it possible to viding a summary of the previous period’s activi- provide to the Iraqi people essential foods and medi- ties, covered the processing, withdrawal and cines, as well as to supply various equipment and ma- payment of claims. terials for the key sectors of the Iraqi economy. Pur- chases under the Programme will in the next few Other matters considered by the Council dur- months play a key role in the economic reconstruc- ing the year included Iraq’s contribution to the tion of Iraq by providing vital goods in the amount Compensation Fund and arrangements for en- of more than 6 billion United States dollars. suring that payments were made into the Fund; The Council expresses its deep gratitude to the the distribution of payments and transparency; Secretary-General, to the Office of the Iraq Pro- and requests for late filings of claims. gramme, to United Nations personnel who worked Communication. In a 15 January letter to the on the ground in Iraq and to all other United Nations agencies and structures involved, and ap- Secretary-General [S/2003/57], Iraq drew attention plauds their commitment and professionalism. It to the fact that the Compensation Commission’s also thanks the chairmen and members of the practices deprived Iraq of the exercise of its right Security Council Committee established by resolu- of self-defence, due to the fact that it was not

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 370 Political and security questions given adequate time to answer claims submitted wards nationhood, Timor-Leste would continue to it. to need international assistance in certain key areas after the end of UNMISET’s mandate. Other issues Relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia continued to develop and there was significant Iraqi complaints progress towards determining their joint border and making sustainable arrangements for its Iraq submitted several letters to the Secretary- management, although the target date of 30 No- General and the Security Council President on vember for finalizing a provisional line for the the military build-up and exercises carried out by border was not met. The two countries were also United States and British armed forces from Jan- working towards, among other things, resolving uary to March 2003 near the DMZ between Iraq residual refugee issues. The ratification of the and Kuwait that was controlled by UNIKOM Timor Sea Treatybetween Timor-Leste and Aus- [S/2003/14, S/2003/107, S/2003/296]. tralia, which would enable the exploitation of an Reaffirming its absolute rejection of the north- offshore oil and gas field, was an important de- ern and southern air exclusion (no-fly) zones im- posed by the United Kingdom and the United velopment for Timor-Leste’s financial recovery. States, Iraq reported wanton military attacks by The Secretary-General’s Special Represen- British and United States aircraft against Iraqi ci- tative for Timor-Leste and UNMISET’s Head, vilians and property, and condemned countries Kamalesh Sharma, briefed the Security Council that provided the logistic support for those at- on UNMISET’s activities throughout the year. tacks, namely Kuwait and Turkey [S/2003/108]. In a series of letters to the Secretary-General, UN Mission of Support in East Timor Iraq detailed violations of its international UNMISET, established under Security Council boundaries committed by British and United resolution 1410(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 321], continued States warplanes flying across the DMZ [S/2003/58, to carry out its mandate in Timor-Leste, which S/2003/222]; violations of its territorial waters and included providing assistance to the administra- provocation by United States naval forces [S/2003/ tive, law enforcement and public security struc- 89, S/2003/109, S/2003/123]; and violations of its air- tures critical to the viability and political stability space and international borders [S/2003/230, of Timor-Leste, in addition to contributing to S/2003/310]. It also reported that during the period the maintenance of its external and internal from 1 to 31 January 2003, it had found and dis- security. In the light of the rioting and violent at- posed of 459 items of unexploded ordnance left tacks that took place in late 2002 and early 2003, behind during the 1991 conflict [S/2003/297]. the Security Council decided to slow the down- sizing schedule for the military and police com- ponents of UNMISET. The Mission’s mandate was Timor-Leste extended for a further year, until 20 May 2004. On 14 July [S/2003/716], the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to appoint Lieutenant General Khairuddin Mat Yusof (Ma- During 2003, the United Nations worked to laysia) as Force Commander of UNMISET effec- strengthen the newly established democratic in- tive 31 August, replacing Major General Huck stitutions in Timor-Leste, which became an inde- Gim Tan (Singapore). On 17July [S/2003/717], the pendent sovereign State in 2002. The United Council took note of the Secretary-General’s Nations Mission of Support in East Timor intention. (UNMISET) assisted in developing the Timorese Report of Secretary-General (March). Pursu- civil administration and police force, which grad- ant to Security Council resolution 1410(2002), the ually assumed greater responsibility for the man- Secretary-General submitted a 3 March special agement of day-to-day affairs in their respective report [S/2003/243] on significant changes that areas. It also aided Timorese authorities with the had taken place in Timor-Leste since his 6 No- investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. vember 2002 report [YUN 2002, p. 325]. The events Violent attacks by armed elements in January suggested the need for a review of the UNMISET and February 2003 led the Security Council to downsizing schedule, as envisioned in resolution slow down UNMISET’s downsizing, in order to 1410(2002). Accordingly, he made specific propo- provide greater stability and allow for further de- sals for adjustments to the downsizing plan to al- velopment of Timorese police and military insti- low UNMISET to accomplish its mandated tasks by tutions. The Council extended UNMISET’s man- June 2004 within that changed environment. date for a further year, until 20 May 2004. The Secretary-General said that since Novem- Despite the remarkable progress achieved to- ber 2002, there had been a sharp increase in the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 371 frequency and magnitude of security-related in- for police and civilian authorities to assume cidents, which demonstrated the scope of prob- responsibility for border management. lems that could still emerge and the inadequacy The deterioration in the security situation sug- of the means to address them, and they also sug- gested that serious deficiencies in Timorese and gested the need to adjust UNMISET’s downsizing international capabilities existed and that those plan. The potential for grave civil disturbance be- deficiencies would be exacerbated if UNMISET came clear when riots erupted in the capital, Dili, continued to follow its downsizing plan. At least a on 4 December 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 327]. Further year of further development was required before armed attacks took place in January and Febru- the Timorese police were in a position to address ary 2003. In addition, credible evidence sug- the more demanding kinds of problems that had gested that former militias and armed groups emerged since November 2002. Their premature were establishing bases within the country in engagement in such activities ran the risk of order to undermine stability. Those who sought weakening them and of lowering their public to generate unrest could draw upon a largely standing. UNMISET’s downsizing plans, if fol- youthful and unskilled population, which suf- lowed without change, would further weaken the fered a very high rate of unemployment and had Mission’s real and perceived ability to respond to extensive exposure to violence in the past. That security challenges. Adjustments were necessary situation was exacerbated by elements within the if UNMISET was to maintain security effectively in former refugee population located in Indonesia the short term and prepare the Timorese agen- close to the Tactical Coordination Line (TCL)— cies to assume their full responsibility in the fu- the informal boundary agreed to by the United ture. At the request of the UN Department of Nations Transitional Administration in East Peacekeeping Operations, former Military Ad- Timor (UNTAET) and the Indonesian authorities viser Maurice Baril (Canada) led a review and as- pending formal demarcation of the border. For- sessment mission to UNMISET from 15 to 23 Janu- mer militia elements retained a degree of influ- ary, as the Department’s first Inspector-General. ence among the approximately 28,000 former The mission’s aim was to review UNMISET’s capa- refugees remaining in Indonesia and were ac- bility to implement its mandate and to meet fu- tively involved in cross-border trade. That threat ture challenges. The recommendations in the was likely to remain extant throughout the re- Secretary-General’s special report were sup- mainder of the UNMISET mandate and beyond, ported by and drew upon General Baril’s find- although supportive actions by the Indonesian ings regarding key areas where sustained or in- military could contribute to containing and miti- creased capacity was crucial for UNMISET to gating it. The Indonesian Government had indi- achieve its mandate. cated that it intended to resettle former East Timorese refugees; voluntary migration to other UNMISET’s original downsizing plan was pred- provinces could significantly improve the icated on the assumption that the threat from for- security environment. While Indonesia had be- mer militia elements would gradually diminish, gun the process, it had been unable to implement that new threats of a similar scale would not it fully due to financial and other constraints. emerge and that major civil disturbances would not occur, so that challenges on the ground The 30 June 2003 target date for a finalized would be on a scale for which Timor-Leste agreement on a line that constituted the border security agencies could assume an increasing remained in effect, but the accomplishment of level of responsibility. However, in the evolving that objective was not assured. A meeting of a security situation, those earlier assumptions were technical group on border demarcation and reg- no longer valid. The military component lacked ulation was scheduled to take place in March. the necessary capacity and mobility to address Border delineation, and subsequent demarca- the threats and had inadequate ability to obtain tion, if decided, were of great importance in and process information. If downsizing contin- terms of removing a potential irritant to future ued, significantly reduced troop density would relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. At not deter the security threat posed by armed the same time, that issue was not a panacea for all bands in rural areas, while the diminished mili- security problems and even a well-defined tary presence in the westernmost districts would border would remain porous. Indonesian mili- ease the task of criminals or other elements intent tary authorities had indicated that their policy on moving illegally across the TCL. At the same was not to demilitarize their side of the border, time, UNMISET would face still greater obstacles where they would maintain a troop and not a in assisting in the event of large-scale civil border police presence. The Timor-Leste Gov- disturbance. While planning for Timor-Leste ernment was nonetheless proceeding with plans police was being adjusted, the measures pro-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 372 Political and security questions posed to enhance their capacity could produce agencies had attained adequate operational capa- results only by January 2004 at the earliest. bility to respond to threats to internal security, Adjustments to UNMISET’s military strategy particularly within the border area, and to re- and configuration in a number of areas could spond to armed threats elsewhere. The Timor- promote stability and provide the time required Leste Government was reviewing plans to en- for the Timorese security agencies to become op- hance the capability of the Timor-Leste police in erationally ready to assume their tasks. Those ad- both areas, while their ability to respond to civil justments included: establishment within an ex- disturbance was also being developed. tended zone adjacent to the TCL of a sufficient In phase two (December 2003 to May 2004), military presence to deter and respond to incur- UNMISET’s military component would be recon- sions and incidents until such time as the threat figured to act as a deterrent and to respond pre- was effectively contained and the necessary ventively to threats to the security environment. Timorese capability to meet the threat was opera- Other efforts would include operations to retain tional; maintenance of a security presence in the trust and confidence of the people of Timor- other parts of Timor-Leste to assist the police in Leste, in addition to close cooperation and infor- ensuring stability; improved ability to use infor- mation-sharing with Timor-Leste agencies. The mation to assist in the tactical employment of the military component would include 1,750 troops infantry forces available, in addition to greater organized in two response battalions, one of coordination and exchange of information with which would be located in the west and the other UNMISET police and with Timor-Leste security centred in Dili. During that phase, final prepara- agencies to improve effectiveness; improved air tions would be made for the conclusion of and land mobility to enable more effective use of the handover of defence responsibility to the forces available and timely response in the event Timor-Leste defence force (Falintil-FDTL)on of incidents requiring employment of peace- 20 May 2004. On completion of the mandate, the keeping forces; and promotion of relations with peacekeeping force would cease operations and the public and improved public information concentrate on the orderly extraction of remain- capability to enhance understanding of the mili- ing forces in the most expeditious manner possi- tary component’s role and to counter potential ble. misinformation campaigns. Those adjustments The Timor-Leste Government was reviewing would be adopted within the context of a sim- plans to strengthen the capability of its police plified, two-phase plan for the military com- force, which would offer a means for the Govern- ponent’s deployment until the conclusion of ment to respond to major threats to public order UNMISET’s mandate. without resorting to the use of the military. In During the first phase (March to December that context, the composition and strength of 2003), UNMISET would retain primary responsi- UNMISET’s police component and the schedule bility for ensuring security, addressing problems for its downsizing would be adjusted to enhance that surpassed the capability of Timor-Leste its operational capability to address civil disturb- security agencies. A larger military presence ances. UNMISET’s adjustments would include: would be maintained in an expanded area adja- inclusion of an international formed police unit cent to the TCL. A sector headquarters would be for one year, in order to deal with emergencies maintained in the area to unify the command of that exceeded the capacity of the Rapid Interven- forces deployed to limit incursions. Satisfactory tion Unit; additional training capacity to provide progress was being made towards the planned further training to the Timor-Leste police in handover of border crossing points in mid-2003 crowd-control skills and other critical areas, such and a specialized Timor-Leste police border pa- as forensics, tactical operations and border trol unit would be deployed to its positions along security; and further emphasis on human rights the border by the end of June 2003. Those tasks and the rule of law in UNMISET’s development would entail the maintenance of the military de- and certification process. UNMISET’s downsizing ployment at the March 2003 level of 3,870 troops, plan should also allow for the retention of a although the component would be reconfigured greater monitoring and advisory presence within to emphasize the proposed adjustments. To en- districts that had been handed over to Timorese sure that a force of that limited size was capable authorities. In downsizing, UNMISET would en- of timely response, it would be essential for troop- sure that the handover would take place at a pace contributing countries to provide the Force Com- that did not jeopardize stability while showing mander with the flexibility required to employ sensitivity to the Government’s desire to assume the portion of his force best placed and equipped responsibility for security issues as soon as it was to undertake the tasks at hand. That phase would feasible. Planning for the gradual transfer of po- be concluded once the relevant Timor-Leste licing authority to Timor-Leste would be ad-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 373 justed to include safeguards and arrangements tion of mineral resources in the Timor Sea and for command and control that would allow the the sharing of revenues, 90 per cent being military component to play an active role during awarded to Timor-Leste. The development of the final phase of UNMISET’s mandate. those resources was of cardinal importance for The Secretary-General observed that the pro- Timor-Leste’s economic future. posed adjustments to UNMISET’s downsizing did Timor-Leste said it was not surprising that var- not represent a change in the broad concept of ious pro-militia groups from across the border operations of UNMISET, in its planned date of continued to agitate and provoke strife and withdrawal or in its ultimate goal, which was the violence, since the independence struggle was a creation of a viable Timor-Leste State with an ad- difficult one that had lasted for decades. The at- equate and appropriate security capability. The tacks in the border area in January and February impact of the adjustments would depend on the reflected a coordinated plan to destroy a nation full commitment of the Timor-Leste leader- created with the help of the Security Council ship, collaboration with Indonesia and bilateral and the international community. Timor-Leste support. It was likely that further assistance wholeheartedly endorsed and supported the would be required once UNMISET’s mandate was reassessment, recommendations and proposals terminated. A number of options could be ex- contained in the Secretary-General’s March re- plored by Member States, including the deploy- port, as it believed that the adjustments in down- ment of qualified international police to key ad- sizing would maximize UNMISET’s effectiveness. visory positions within the Timor-Leste police UNMISET’s contribution towards the objective of through multilateral, regional or bilateral work- providing a secure and stable environment was ing arrangements with the Government. The significant and had to continue at the required Secretary-General said that the initial successful levels while Timorese security forces developed progress that was achieved in Timor-Leste may to their full capacities. have led to the development of unrealistic expec- tations. It was preferable that the international Communication (April). On 3 April [S/2003/379], community be reminded, before downsizing pro- the United Kingdom transmitted to the Council gressed beyond a point of no return, of the fragil- President a 28 March letter from the USG for ity of what had been achieved so far, despite the Peacekeeping Operations addressed to individ- fact that Timor-Leste’s development towards ual members of the Council in connection with statehood remained extraordinarily rapid. UNMISET. The USG said that, at the 10 March Security Council consideration (March). On Council meeting (see above), Member States had endorsed the broad objective of the recommen- 10 March [meeting 4715], the Security Council dis- cussed the situation in Timor-Leste, with partic- dations in the Secretary-General’s report, ular reference to the Secretary-General’s March namely, to reinforce UNMISET’s capability to de- report. The UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) velop Timor-Leste’s police force, while taking for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Gué- the necessary measures to ensure the short-term henno, introduced the report. security and stability that were required for that training to succeed. At the same time, several The USG said that the special report was an States sought to review further possible adjust- effort to sound an alarm at a critical time, to ments to UNMISET’s military component. indicate to the Council a number of worrisome Through informal discussions, interested Mem- developments and to recommend, in good time, ber States subsequently explored with the UN realistic and prudent adjustments of UNMISET’s Secretariat the kind of option that would address troop-reduction plans so as to reflect a situation some concerns over the security situation in on the ground that had changed and to protect Timor-Leste and that could meet with the sup- the considerable investments that the interna- port of the Council. Those discussions suggested tional community had made in Timor-Leste. The that such an option would include the retention Secretary-General’s recommendations were pre- of two battalions within regions adjoining the sented on the premise that it was easier and less TCL, and a more gradual downsizing to 1,750 mil- expensive to pre-empt a problem than to try to fix itary peacekeepers in December 2003, and not one after it had occurred. The cost that was im- the full retention of 3,870 military peacekeepers plied would be modest compared to the $1 billion up to that period as was reflected in the Secre- to $2 billion that the international community tary-General’s report. had spent in Timor-Leste since 2000. The USG also drew attention to a positive development, which was the conclusion of the agreements SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (April) and legislative processes in Timor-Leste and in On 4 April [meeting 4735], the Security Council Australia that should pave the way for exploita- unanimously adopted resolution 1473(2003). The

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 374 Political and security questions

draft [S/2003/401] was prepared in consultations implementation of the revised police and military among Council members. strategies; 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. The Security Council, Reaffirming its previous resolutions on the situation in Timor-Leste, in particular resolution 1410(2002) of Report of Secretary-General (April). In re- 17 May 2002, sponse to resolution 1410(2002) [YUN 2002, p. 321], Reiterating its full support for the Special Representa- the Secretary-General submitted to the Security tive of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Council a 21 April report [S/2003/449] on Mission of Support in East Timor, UNMISET’s activities since his November 2002 re- Welcoming the progress that Timor-Leste has port [YUN 2002, p. 325]. He also presented a de- achieved with the assistance of the Mission since inde- tailed military strategy for UNMISET’s revised pendence, Noting the continued existence of challenges to the schedule, as requested in resolution 1473(2003) security and stability of Timor-Leste, (above). Stressing that improving the overall capabilities of He said that the most striking development the Timor-Leste police force is a key priority, over the reporting period was the change in the Having considered the special report of the Secretary- security environment that had taken place in De- General on the Mission of 3 March 2003, cember and January. The search for a solution to Having considered also the letter dated 28 March 2003 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping those security problems should, however, be Operations addressed to the members of the Security viewed in the context of the long-term process of Council, establishing a viable independent State. The 1. Decides that the composition and strength of the strengthening of Timor-Leste’s political institu- police component of the United Nations Mission of tions and a non-political administration, together Support in East Timor and the schedule for its down- with the progressive development of a culture sizing shall be adjusted in line with paragraphs 33 and of responsible governance and a tradition of plu- 35 of the special report of the Secretary-General and shall include the following specific measures: ralistic, democratic debate, were essential for (a) The inclusion of an internationally formed unit the country’s stability and social and economic for one year; progress. During the reporting period, the Gov- (b) The provision of additional training capacity in ernment of Timor-Leste had emphasized the key areas specified in the special report of the importance of more open, participatory and ac- Secretary-General; countable governance. Progress had been made (c) Greater emphasis on human rights and rule of in the development of the relationship between law elements; Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The new Ambassa- (d) The retention of a greater monitoring and advi- dor of Timor-Leste had assumed his duties in Ja- sory presence in districts where policing authority has been handed over to the Timor-Leste police force; karta in February, and Indonesia had indicated (e) Follow-up to the recommendations outlined in that it would soon establish a formal embassy in the report of the joint assessment mission on policing Dili. The technical group for demarcation and of November 2002; regulation of the border between Indonesia and (f) Adjustment of planning for the gradual transfer Timor-Leste (Dili, 18-20 March) suggested that of policing authority to the Timor-Leste police force; approximately 80 per cent of the boundary be- 2. Also decides that the schedule for the downsizing tween the countries could be agreed relatively of the military component of the Mission for the pe- easily after joint field verification. It nonetheless riod until December 2003 shall be adjusted in line with the letter dated 28 March 2003 from the Under- remained uncertain that the two countries would Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations ad- reach agreement by 30 June 2003 on a line that dressed to the members of the Security Council; and, constituted a border, despite their formal com- accordingly, that two battalions shall be retained within mitment to that objective. Timor-Leste had also regions adjoining the Tactical Coordination Line dur- continued to develop its relationship with other ing this period, together with associated force ele- States in the region and beyond. On 6 March, ments, including mobility; and that the number of mil- Timor-Leste and Australia concluded the Inter- itary peacekeepers shall be reduced to 1,750 more gradually than was foreseen in resolution 1410(2002); national Unitisation Agreement on the Greater 3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide by 20 Sunrise field, straddling the Joint Petroleum De- May 2003 for the approval of the Council a detailed velopment Area in the Timor Gap, on the under- military strategy for the revised schedule for the down- standing that the Agreement did not prejudice sizing of the military component of the Mission; their positions in the maritime boundary negoti- 4. Also requests the Secretary-General to keep the ations. On 2 April, the two countries ratified the Council closely and regularly informed of develop- Timor Sea Treaty (see p. 373). ments on the ground and the implementation of the revised military and police strategies; During the reporting period, it became appar- 5. Requests the Government of Timor-Leste to con- ent that further assistance, especially bilateral tinue to work closely with the Mission, including in the contributions, would be required to complete the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 375 tasks undertaken by UNMISET. The advisers in Timor-Leste’s 13 districts. However, further UNMISET’s Civilian Support Group continued to efforts were required for PNTL to play the role in play a crucial role by transferring knowledge and internal security that was envisaged by the coun- skills to Timor-Leste counterparts, in addition try’s leadership. PNTL had to be ready to meet the to supporting the functioning of the adminis- evolving operational challenges posed by civil un- tration. The Government had filled nearly rest and an apparent resurgence of activity by 15,000 of 16,000 budgeted posts within the armed groups. Resource constraints remained administration, which was showing increasing significant but, more fundamentally, manage- readiness to assume its full responsibilities. ment and human resource policies for the force UNMISET, in consultation with the Government had yet to be developed. As provided for in reso- of Timor-Leste and UNDP, was elaborating a stra- lution 1473(2003) (see p. 374), the adjustment of tegic plan that identified areas of need where bi- UNMISET’s capacity for police training in key lateral support could be required following the areas, greater emphasis on human-rights and withdrawal of the Civilian Support Group. The rule of law elements, and the retention of a plan’s main purpose was to facilitate the progres- greater monitoring and advisory presence in dis- sive replacement of civilian advisers with bilater- tricts where policing authority had been handed ally funded counterparts as required, in order to over to PNTL were expected to contribute to en- maintain continuity of training. hancing the effectiveness, professionalism, ac- The functioning of Timor-Leste’s judicial countability and responsiveness of PNTL. The system continued to be hampered by severe operational responsibilities of civilian police shortages of skilled and experienced professional would be reduced as responsibility for routine personnel and limited physical infrastructure. policing was handed over; that, in turn, would That had resulted in delays in the administration permit a gradual downsizing of UNMISET’s po- of justice, leading to prolonged pre-trial deten- lice component, from approximately 625 at the tion and detention without the necessary legal beginning of June 2003 to 325 at the beginning of foundation, in addition to overcrowding in the 2004. Following the attacks of January 2003, the prisons. A comprehensive justice sector support Government had encouraged the formation of programme was being finalized and the five- village-based security groups to assist the police member Superior Council of the Magistracy, re- and military peacekeepers in addressing the sponsible for the appointment, promotion, disci- threat posed by armed groups. pline and dismissal of judges, was constituted in The military component of UNMISET contin- February. However, that body was not yet opera- ued to provide support for the external security tional, since the President of the Court of Appeal and territorial integrity of Timor-Leste, while had not been sworn in. The Office of the ensuring the timely handover of responsibilities Provedor for Human Rights and Justice, an inde- to Falintil-FDTL and to relevant public adminis- pendent institution provided for in the Constitu- tration departments. International military capa- tion, was in the process of being established. bility remained essential to promote security in UNMISET, through its Serious Crimes Unit, the border area, and to provide a short-term re- which was set up under UNTAET for the handling sponse to the threats posed by armed groups, of cases of egregious crimes, assisted in the con- whose tactics, weapons and training exceeded the duct of investigations of serious crimes, though capacity of any other security force, while the its work had been slower than expected owing to Timorese forces obtained the necessary capabil- constraints in the justice system. Continuing ex- ity to assume that task. The Secretary-General ternal assistance would be required after June said that within the capacity provided by 2004 to complete investigations, especially since UNMISET’s revised downsizing schedule, the mil- the majority of those accused remained outside itary component would adopt the following strat- of Timor-Leste, including 90 per cent of those egy: improve its ability to use information to as- accused of crimes against humanity. Through its sist in the tactical employment of the infantry Human Rights Unit, UNMISET provided support forces available; assist in greater coordination and advice to the Commission for Reception, and exchange of information with UNMISET po- Truth and Reconciliation, which was conducting lice and with Timor-Leste security agencies to community reconciliation procedures and hold- improve effectiveness; promote relations with the ing community discussions. public and enhance public understanding of the Over the reporting period, UNMISET contin- military component’s role; and make more effec- ued to undertake executive policing while sup- tive use of the forces available and seek a more porting the development of the National Police timely response in the event of incidents requir- of Timor-Leste (PNTL), which had effectively un- ing employment of peacekeeping forces. The dertaken the task of routine patrolling in 7 of planned configuration of the military component

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 376 Political and security questions would be adapted in several respects to facilitate The Secretary-General observed that much that strategy. Rather than withdrawing from had been achieved since the establishment of the Cova Lima district, forces in Sector West UNMISET in May 2002. Building on the founda- would remain in place as deployed. The tactical tions laid during UNTAET, the Timorese public headquarters in Sector West would continue to administration and police force were assuming manage day-to-day operations in that sector. increasing levels of responsibility, with growing Additional flexibility would be facilitated by the confidence. Much remained to be done, however, assumption of responsibilities at the TCL by and continued assistance by the international the agencies of the Government of Timor-Leste. community would be crucial to enable Timor- The military component’s public and military Leste to confront the political, practical and information capabilities would be somewhat security challenges that lay ahead. Further bilat- enhanced through the addition of a number of eral efforts would be necessary alongside and specialist personnel. The force levels deployed in after the contribution of UNMISET, in the civilian the central region would remain unchanged un- administration, justice, police force, and defence til the end of 2003. The implementation of ele- and security sectors. The Secretary-General rec- ments of that strategy had already enabled the ommended extending UNMISET’s mandate for a military component to make some progress in further year, until 20 May 2004. addressing the threat posed by armed groups, as Security Council consideration (April). On 28 cooperation between the military component April [meeting 4744], the Security Council had be- and the UN police had led to joint searches for fore it the Secretary-General’s April report suspected weapons caches, armed groups and (above) and heard a briefing on UNMISET by the suspect individuals. The military component Special Representative of the Secretary-General would aim to reach a total of 1,750 by the end of for Timor-Leste and Head of Mission, Kamalesh 2003; in the interim, it would be reduced to a Sharma. total strength of 3,500 by July and to 3,300 by Mr. Sharma said that the strengthening of the October. When the military component reached police force through a recast strategy involving a strength of 1,750, it would be structured around accretion of capacity and mobility, reinforced two infantry battalions, with responsibility for training and augmentation of professionalism ac- the western and eastern parts of the country cording to the highest policing standards, on the respectively. Development of Falintil-FDTL was one hand, and a more gradual drawdown of the making steady progress, with the second of the peacekeeping forces, on the other, were of criti- two planned infantry battalions expected to be- cal importance. They would be of enormous as- come operational by the end of 2003. No further sistance in dealing with the risk of civil disorder handover of defence responsibility for districts and the criminal and politically motivated vio- was planned until 2004. Border services compris- lence in rural areas. A renewed surge of violence ing PNTL border patrol and immigration officers could potentially generate a demoralizing psy- had been trained and were deployed at border chological apprehension in the population; the crossing points. UNMISET’s military component initial years of the State were critical in firmly would continue its programme of active patrol- entrenching the confidence both of the Govern- ling behind the border to deter and resist incur- ment and of the people that the political, admin- istrative and security order in the State could not sions, while retaining its ability to support PNTL. be shaken or challenged. The slower drawdown The ratification of the Timor Sea Treaty had of UNMISET’s military component would contrib- led to hopes of significant gas and oil revenues in ute to reducing the threat posed by armed the near future. Timor-Leste remained the poor- groups. UNMISET had been mindful to learn the est country in South-East Asia, with more than appropriate lessons from the civil riots in Dili and 60 per cent of the people living on less than $1 a other violence. Those first instances of security day. The Government’s immediate and longer- threats to the State had provided additional im- term development efforts drew on support pro- petus for recasting, planning and augmenting vided by UNMISET and by UN agencies, funds readiness to make such challenges difficult to and programmes, the World Bank and Member mount in the future. States, in cooperation with civil society and The task of developing a professional, dedi- the private sector. Among other things, the UN cated and responsive public administration from system was supporting the Transition Support ground level was no less a challenge for the new Programme, which focused on poverty reduc- State. The Council had mandated UNMISET to tion, governance, capacity-building, expendi- prepare the groundwork for the structure of a ture and policy management, and private sector national administration over two years, and development. halfway through that process the progress was

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 377 satisfactory. It was clear, however, that assistance UNMISET’s mission had been and continued to be would be needed in some of the administrative effective. Much progress had been made in the sectors following UNMISET’s departure. UNDP’s capacity-building of the Timorese police and role, which was crucial in advocating the need for military. Timor-Leste fully endorsed the Secretary- further capacity-building support and filling, in General’s recommendation that UNMISET’s man- parallel, more than 200 development posts, date be extended for a further year, until 20 May would continue to be central. UNMISET was keep- 2004. ing the civilian support programme under con- stant review for lessons that were progressively SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (May) learned and improvements that could be On 19 May [meeting 4758], the Security Council effected. Despite many challenges, the Serious unanimously adopted resolution 1480(2003). Crimes Unit continued to facilitate the work of The draft [S/2003/545] was prepared in consulta- the Special Panels for Serious Crimes at the Dili tions among Council members. District Court. As at 30 April, investigations had been completed in 9 out of the 10priority cases of The Security Council, crimes against humanity. Trials were proceeding Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Timor-Leste, in those cases where the accused were in Timor- in particular resolutions 1410(2002) of 17May 2002 and 1473(2003) of 4 April 2003, Leste; in many other cases the trials might not Commending the efforts of the people and Govern- commence due to the absence of defendants, a ment of Timor-Leste and the progress achieved in de- large proportion of whom remained outside veloping the institutions of an independent State and Timor-Leste. in promoting a stable, equitable society based on dem- The economic situation of the country was slow ocratic values and respect for human rights, to improve given the comprehensive legacy of un- Commending also the work of the United Nations derdevelopment inherited by the new independent Mission of Support in East Timor, under the leader- State. The path of development and fulfilment of ship of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, in assisting the Government of Timor-Leste economic and social needs would be long and in developing the nation’s infrastructure, public arduous, and in the foreseeable future the country administration, law enforcement and defence capaci- wouldhavetomanagethepoliticalandeconomic ties, and in planning for the completion of the man- pressures created by depressed economic and date of the Mission, including through the creation of social indicators and, in particular, joblessness. a mission liquidation task force, The majority of people still practised subsistence Stressing that improving the overall capabilities of agriculture, with extremely rudimentary means the Timor-Leste police force is a key priority, of production. The economy needed to focus on Welcoming the continuing progress in developing a greater agricultural diversity and quantity of positive bilateral relationship between the Govern- production, creation of professional services and ments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, which is crucial for the future stability of Timor-Leste, and encourag- opportunitiesforself-employmentasthebasisof ing continued efforts by both Governments to secure the Timorese economy. The ratification of the agreement on the issue of border demarcation, to pro- Timor Sea Treaty between Timor-Leste and mote security in the border area, to facilitate the reset- Australia, enabling the exploitation of an offshore tlement of East Timorese remaining in West Timor, oil and gas field, was an important development for and to bring to justice those responsible for serious the public finances of Timor-Leste. Prospects for crimes committed in 1999, further revenues would be enhanced through Recognizing the importance of continued efforts cooperation between the two countries on another to transfer skills and authority from the Mission to the Government of Timor-Leste in a coordinated identified field. The role played by other UN and structured manner in the run-up to the with- agencies, funds and programmes would contribute drawal of the Mission, with the aim of helping to en- to a smooth transition to a traditional development sure the long-term security and stability of Timor- assistance framework after completion of Leste, UNMISET’s mandate. Mr. Sharma said that the Noting the planned end-date for the Mission of 20 engagement of the international community in May 2004, as indicated in the mandate implementation peace-building and institution-building would plan set out in the report of the Secretary-General of need to continue. 17 April 2002, and in the special report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 2003, Timor-Leste said that the violence of Decem- Stressing the need for continued international ber 2002 and the terrorist activities in the border support for Timor-Leste, and encouraging continued area in January 2003 created some fears about fu- bilateral and multilateral development assistance, ture security. However, the firm and transparent Having considered the report of the Secretary- response by the United Nations and the Govern- General of 21 April 2003, ment of Timor-Leste had provided reassurance Taking note of the military strategy outlined in para- and had reasserted confidence and stability. graphs 38 to 51 of that report,

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 378 Political and security questions

1. Decides to extend the current mandate of the pointed to the Court, permitting it to resume United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor un- operations in June after a one-and-a-half-year hi- til 20 May 2004; atus. At the Joint Ministerial Commission (Dili, 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 4-6 September), Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to finalize agreement on the international Communication (August).On 6 August [S/2003/ land boundary by 30 November, with negotia- 802], Italy transmitted to the Secretary-General a tions on maritime border delimitation to follow statement on Indonesia’s Ad Hoc Human Rights thereafter; that new timetable replaced the origi- Tribunal for Crimes Committed in East Timor nal deadline of 30 June. The countries also reit- issued on that day by the EU Presidency. The EU erated their intention to encourage resettlement said that the recently completed trials by the Ad of the Timorese who were still in West Timor Hoc Tribunal, with the last verdict delivered on away from the area of the border, and to facilitate 5 August, had failed to deliver justice and did not the return of those refugees who chose to go back result in a substantiated account of the violence to Timor-Leste. Efforts by both countries would committed in East Timor in 1999 [YUN 1999, also be required to address other aspects of border p. 288]. The EU was disappointed that the prosecu- management, including speedy implementation tors did not submit all the evidence, especially of the arrangement on traditional border cross- that referred to by UN investigators and the In- ings and regulated markets. Timor-Leste was donesian National Commission on Human pursuing discussions on maritime boundary de- Rights in their reports, suggesting that elements limitation with Australia, which had been identi- of the military, police and civil government had fied as the next step subsequent to the entry into allegedly funded, trained and abetted local mili- force of the Timor Sea Treaty on 2 April. tia groups. In addition, no officials from the During the reporting period, significant pro- United Nations Mission in East Timor gress was made towards the major milestones (UNAMET), or members of independent observer identified in UNMISET’s mandate implementa- missions, and only a few victim witnesses from tion plan. No major security incidents had taken Timor-Leste, were called to testify by the prose- place, though it was clear that it would not be pos- cutors. Those deficiencies in the process had sible for Timor-Leste to achieve self-sufficiency jeopardized the credibility of the verdicts, which in certain key areas of the mandate by 20 May were disproportionate to the seriousness of the 2004. Recruitment and training in the area of crimes committed. It was of paramount impor- public administration continued to advance; how- tance that the Indonesian judicial authorities ever, in several areas, including finance, justice, ensure that the appeal process was conducted in internal administration, infrastructure, the Na- a manner consistent with international legal tional Parliament and the Office of the President, standards and that the appeal judgements were international assistance would continue to be re- set out in accordance with the principle of trans- quired for some time to assure that crucial tasks parency. were discharged. The civilian advisers deployed Report of Secretary-General (October). Pur- through UNMISET were working to transfer skills, suant to Security Council resolution 1410(2002) both through on-the-job training and through [YUN 2002, p. 321], the Secretary-General submitted more formal in-country training programmes. an October report [S/2003/944] on UNMISET’s ac- However, progress in preparing the civil ad- tivities, covering developments since his April re- ministration continued to be undermined by port (see p. 374). delays in the provision of advisers deployed He said that on 28 April, President Xanana through bilateral funding. Shortages of qualified Gusmão initiated his “open presidency” pro- personnel and infrastructure had affected the gramme, which entailed visits to mainly isolated justice sector in particular and generated chronic villages to discuss local matters, with a particular delays, so that as much as 22 per cent of the prison focus on security issues. A number of options for population comprised individuals in detention local government were under review by the under expired warrants. The legislation estab- Council of Ministers, any of which would lead to lishing the Office of the Provedor for Human greater decentralization and would bring aspects Rights and Justice was under consideration by of government decision-making and resource the National Parliament. That independent in- management closer to communities. The Na- stitution, which could be functional by March tional Parliament concluded its first year of regu- 2004, could play a key role in supporting good lar legislative activity, including adoption of the governance and civil rights within Timor-Leste national budget. Following assumption of office through its advocacy and oversight activities. in May by the President of the Court of Appeal, Prosecution of serious crimes continued to an additional international judge had been ap- progress; five additional indictments were filed

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 379 during the reporting period, including an indict- to the Government of Timor-Leste, which was ment in the tenth “priority case” of serious planned for 20 May 2004. Development of crimes, and four convictions were handed down the Timorese armed forces would continue to by the Special Panels on Serious Crimes in Dili. depend on donor support through the provision UNMISET continued to play a key role in support- of equipment, training and facilities. UNMISET’s ing that process through its serious crimes unit, military component, which comprised over which would be focusing in particular on trials 3,300 troops as at September 2003, would rapidly and appeals during the remaining months of the reduce in numbers over the coming months, mandate. A number of outstanding questions beginning with the withdrawal in October of a and issues remained, some of which would not be battalion currently based in the Oecussi enclave. solved or completed by June 2004. By the end of 2003, the military component Over the reporting period, the internal situa- would be reduced to 1,750, with the closure of tion in Timor-Leste had been relatively calm de- the tactical headquarters for Sector West. spite occasional reports of armed groups and The area of the TCL remained porous, and ille- criminal elements in rural areas, smuggling, ex- gal hunting, trade and crossings continued, in ad- tortion and robberies and, within urban areas, dition to other criminal activity. Approximately sporadic violence among martial arts groups and 26,000 former refugees from Timor-Leste re- youth gangs. PNTL had continued to develop mained in West Timor, most of them in the with UNMISET assistance, although its capacity border areas. President Gusmão was engaged in and resources in a number of key areas remained border reconciliation meetings to promote long- limited. PNTL assumed responsibility for the term reconciliation among the Timorese. The management of routine policing in a further six Indonesian Government was exploring addi- of Timor-Leste’s 13 districts, in addition to the tional means to encourage return and resettle- six districts where handover had already oc- ment of the refugees in West Timor, while con- curred. UNMISET would retain management re- tinuing to assist and encourage voluntary return sponsibility for the Dili district until December to Timor-Leste through the provision of registra- 2003. Despite those signs of progress, by the end tion and transport facilities. UNMISET’s military of UNMISET’s mandate, PNTL would continue to component had supplemented the basic police lack skills in a number of specialized areas, in- training of the border patrol unit with additional cluding investigation, intelligence-gathering and formal on-the-job training. Some initial progress special police operations. More fundamentally, had been made towards establishing a rapid de- there had been reports of police misconduct, in- ployment service, but further steps by the volvement in criminal activities, bribery,excessive Timorese authorities were needed urgently, in- use of force and physical assaults of citizens. cluding the selection of officers and the provi- PNTL’s ability to win public confidence would de- sion of necessary equipment. UNMISET contin- pend on further efforts to strengthen discipline ued to foster close and professional ties between and compliance with internationally accepted Indonesian security agencies and Timorese standards of policing. counterparts to strengthen the foundations for There was no repetition during the reporting future cooperation and security. period of the kinds of armed attacks that took A significant step towards greater prosperity place in January and February 2003, and overall was made in June, with the finalization by the the situation had remained generally calm. That Government of commercial arrangements with had been supported by the regular reconnais- Conoco Phillips on Bayu-Undan gas develop- sance and surveillance activities by UNMISET’s ment and the enactment of relevant tax legisla- military component, drawing on the resources tion by the Parliament. That development was made available through the revised downsizing expected to bring as much as $3 billion to Timor- schedule authorized in Council resolution 1473 Leste over approximately 17years. As a means to (2003) (see p. 374). UNMISET had sought to fur- address immediate needs for job creation and ther institutionalize cooperation on security issues promote stability, the Government continued to with and among Timorese agencies. Invitations pursue the recovery, employment and stability had been extended to PNTL officers and the programme for ex-combatants and communities Timorese armed forces to work together in a joint in Timor-Leste, which was supported by UNDP. information centre with international military The Secretary-General observed that, since and police in order to gain further experience in May 2002, when Timor-Leste celebrated its inde- information analysis and planning. The Timor- pendence, the country had made remarkable ese armed forces would not take on areas of re- progress in laying the foundations for a function- sponsibility in addition to the district of Lautem ing civil service and police force. However, it was prior to the handover of defence responsibilities also clear that crucial work remained to be done

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 380 Political and security questions and that, in a number of areas, requirements fully operational at required professional stand- would remain outstanding after the conclusion ards at the battalion level until around 2005- of UNMISET’s mandate. It would be essential for 2006. the country’s stability and development that the UNMISET’s military component continued to leaders of Timor-Leste continue to nurture re- downsize according to the revised schedule that spect for the rule of law, reach out to civil society was approved in Council resolution 1473(2003) (see and promote political dialogue and discussion, p. 374). As they withdrew from border areas, the while giving full support to key institutions of Timorese agencies, particularly the border patrol democracy—a non-political civil service, a free unit of PNTL, assumed greater responsibilities for press and an independent judiciary. In other border management. The members of the unit areas, however, international assistance would had performed commendably in the preceding continue to be indispensable; it was likely to few months at all border crossing points that they include further guidance and advice in the areas had taken over from UNMISET, despite the handi- of civil administration, justice and policing, and caps they faced in terms of logistics, availability human rights training. In that context, the inter- of facilities in the remote border areas and equip- national community should take stock of what ment. UNMISET was working with the Govern- had been achieved and consider the best means ment of Timor-Leste to address those shortcom- through which the country’s needs could be met ings so that the unit could be self-sustaining. The after UNMISET’s withdrawal. rapid deployment of PNTL, once trained and In the tragic context of the attack that took functional, would provide a response capability place in Baghdad, Iraq, on 19 August 2003 (see to deal with armed criminal groups in rural and p. 346), the Secretary-General recalled the re- border districts. Despite best efforts, however, markable contribution that was made to Timor- those units would continue to need advice and Leste by his former Special Representative, support following the end of UNMISET’s mandate. Sergio Vieira de Mello. Timor-Leste mourned Post-UNMISET, international assistance would also his loss through national ceremonies that offered be needed to advise and mentor the Timorese an eloquent testimony to the depth of admiration security agencies in the various tasks of monitor- and affection in which he was held as the coun- ing and managing the border, including assisting try’s transitional administrator. in liaison and thus enhancing cooperation with In- Security Council consideration (October). On donesian security agencies at the border and pro- 15October [meeting 4843], the Security Council dis- viding psychological support to a population not cussed the Secretary-General’s October report yet prepared for the complete withdrawal of the on UNMISET (above) and was briefed by the Spe- reassuring international presence. cial Representative of the Secretary-General for The evolving relationship between Timor- Timor-Leste, Mr. Sharma. Leste and Indonesia was a primary asset in the Mr. Sharma said that while there had been no rapid evolution of Timorese nationhood. Both major security challenges since April 2003, re- sides were cooperating in the settlement of the ports persisted of alleged sightings of armed border negotiations, residual refugee issues and groups by residents in rural areas and of the pres- the continuation of pension payments to former ence of criminal elements in those areas, particu- Indonesian civil servants. UNMISET had contin- larly in the border districts. There was a risk that ued to provide support to the core administrative such reports might increase as UNMISET’s down- and judicial structures of the Government and sizing progressed. Although PNTL had made further international support would be required great progress, it was still a young and inexperi- in the post-UNMISET period. The Government, enced police service, and it was doubtful that it UNMISET and UNDP had completed reviews of would be able to respond effectively if tested by the justice and administrative sectors and de- major internal security challenges following veloped a comprehensive support programme, UNMISET’s closure. Operational support and identifying areas most in need of support from further mentoring and training in specialized the international community. UNMISET also con- and professional police skills would be required tinued to work closely with the wider UN system on a longer-term basis. Ensuring that police offi- of agencies, funds and programmes and interna- cers maintained human rights standards re- tional financial institutions, in support of na- mained a priority. Timor-Leste’s defence force tional programmes. It had also contributed, was currently responsible for only one district, though its Human Rights Unit, to the promotion thus allowing it to continue to focus on capability of human rights by training and advising and development and individual and collective train- through capacity-building in the major institu- ing activities. Given the programme of capability tions of the State. With seven months of its man- development, the force was not likely to become date remaining, UNMISET would continue to

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 381 work with the Government of Timor-Leste to 2003, the military component comprised 1,750 realize all the objectives in the mandate imple- personnel, including 78 military observers and mentation plan. Nevertheless, it was important two infantry battalions. The fourth Timor-Leste that the progress that had been achieved so far development partners meeting, which focused should not be jeopardized by the absence of ade- on economic recovery issues, was held in Dili quate support mechanisms, based on assured from 3 to 5 December 2003. funding, after the completion of UNMISET’s General Assembly action. By resolution 58/112 mandate. of 17December, the General Assembly endorsed Timor-Leste said that the international com- the recommendation of the Economic and Social munity had invested huge financial and human Council that Timor-Leste be added to the list of resources and know-how in UNMISET, though least developed countries (see p. 868). some resources had not arrived on time. The ju- By resolution 58/121 of the same date, the As- dicial system, law and order, finance and plan- sembly urged assistance for humanitarian relief, ning, and defence and security would require rehabilitation and development for Timor-Leste substantial assistance and support for some time. (see p. 953). It was clear, as the Secretary-General had stated in his October report, that it would not be possi- ble for Timor-Leste to achieve self-sufficiency in Financing of UN operations certain key areas of the mandate by 20 May 2004. During 2003, the General Assembly consid- Timor-Leste recommended a credible, strong ered the financing of three UN missions in UN presence in key areas in order to help consoli- Timor-Leste—UNTAET, UNMISET and UNAMET. date stability and security. The President of the UNTAET was established by Security Council res- General Assembly,Jan Kavan, had visited Timor- olution 1272(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 293] to administer Leste in July. Given the fundamental contribu- East Timor during its transition to indepen- tion and the crucial role played by the Security dence; its mandate was extended until 20 May Council in the liberation of the country, Timor- 2002, Timor-Leste’s date of independence, in ac- Leste invited the Council to send a delegation to cordance with resolution 1392(2002) [YUN 2002, visit also. p. 318].UNMISET was established by Council reso- Later developments. In a later report [S/2004/ lution 1410(2002) [ibid., p. 321] to provide assistance 117 ] , the Secretary-General said that during the to the administrative, law enforcement and pub- last months of 2003, Timor-Leste’s National Par- lic security structures critical to the viability and liament approved, among other things, a bill on political stability of Timor-Leste, in addition to immigration and asylum and one on local gov- contributing to the maintenance of its external ernance. The security situation remained gener- and internal security. UNAMET was established ally calm, with occasional demonstrations that by Council resolution 1246(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 283] did not pose a threat to law and order. Indonesia to conduct the 1999 popular consultation on East and Timor-Leste did not meet their target date of Timor’s autonomy [ibid., p. 288]; its mandate 30 November 2003 for the finalization of agree- ended on 30 November 1999, in accordance with ment on a provisional line for the border. The resolution 1262(1999) [ibid., p. 287]. first round of negotiations on the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia UNTAET and UNMISET concluded on 14 November. Further talks were In December 2002 [A/57/666], the Secretary- scheduled for April 2004. The development of General submitted to the General Assembly a Timor-Leste’s public administration had con- performance report on the budget of UNTAET tinued to progress. As foreseen, 30 of UNMISET’s 100 and UNMISET for the period from 1 July 2001 to civil adviser positions were phased out by the end 30 June 2002. Expenditures for the two missions of November 2003. The remaining advisers, who for the period totalled $454,118,000, resulting in were serving largely in the financial, central an unencumbered balance of $942,000. The As- management and justice sectors, continued to sembly was requested to decide on the treatment play a key role in mentoring Timorese counter- of that unencumbered balance and on the treat- parts. PNTL assumed responsibility for routine ment of other income and adjustments for the policing throughout the country with the hand- period ended 30 June 2002, amounting to over of responsibility in Dili district on 10 De- $20,680,000 from interest income ($7,625,000), cember. In October, the Border Police Unit as- other/miscellaneous income ($1,642,000) and sumed responsibility for all junction points along savings on or cancellation of prior period obliga- the 259-kilometre TCL. Following the downsizing tions ($11,413,000). and restructuring of UNMISET, which was carried In February 2003 [A/57/689], the Secretary- out as foreseen in November and December General submitted to the Assembly UNMISET’s

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budget for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, and the 2004, which amounted to $188,229,200, inclusive related reports of the Advisory Committee on Admin- of budgeted voluntary contributions in kind in istrative and Budgetary Questions, Recalling Security Council resolution 1272(1999) of the amount of $60,000. The budget provided for 25 October 1999 regarding the establishment of the the maximum monthly average deployment of United Nations Transitional Administration in East 106 military observers, 3,764 military contingent Timor and the subsequent resolutions by which the members, 650 civilian police, 389 international Council extended the mandate of the Transitional staff, 732 national staff and 200 UN Volunteers. Administration, the latest of which was resolution The Assembly was requested to appropriate 1392(2002) of 31 January 2002, by which the mandate $188,169,200 for the maintenance of the Mission was extended until 20 May 2002, from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 and to assess Recalling also its resolution 54/246 A of 23 Decem- ber 1999on the financing of the Transitional Adminis- that amount at a monthly rate of $15,680,766, tration and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the lat- should the Security Council decide to continue est of which was resolution 56/296 of 27 June 2002, the Mission’s mandate. Recalling further Security Council resolution 1410 Also in February [A/57/723], the Secretary- (2002) of 17 May 2002, by which the Council estab- General submitted to the Assembly the overview lished the United Nations Mission of Support in East of the financing of UN peacekeeping operations: Timor as of 20 May 2002 for an initial period of twelve months, and its subsequent resolution 1480(2003) of 19 budget performance for the period from 1 July May 2003, by which the Council extended the mandate 2001 to 30 June 2002 and budget for the period of the Mission until 20 May 2004, from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. Reaffirming the general principles underlying the In April [A/57/772/Add.11], ACABQ reviewed the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, Secretary-General’s reports on the budgets of as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) UNTAET and UNMISET for the period from 1 July of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 2001 to 30 June 2002 and the proposed budget and 55/235 of 23 December 2000, Noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions for UNMISET for the period from 1 July 2003 to have been made to the Trust Fund for the United 30 June 2004 (see above). In connection with the Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, first report on the financing of UNTAET and Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the UNMISET, ACABQ recommended that the unen- Mission with the necessary financial resources to en- cumbered balance of $942,000 and interest and able it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant other income in the amount of $20,680,000 be resolutions of the Security Council, credited to Member States in a manner to be de- 1. Takes note of the status of contributions to the termined by the Assembly. In connection with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor and the United Nations Mission of Support in second report on the financing of UNMISET, East Timor as at 31 March 2003, including the contri- ACABQ recommended that the estimated budget butions outstanding in the amount of 86.1 million requirement of $188,169,200 gross be reduced by United States dollars, representing some 5 per cent of $3,169,200, or approximately 2 per cent. Accord- the total assessed contributions, notes with concern ingly, ACABQ recommended that the Assembly that only thirty Member States have paid their assessed appropriate an amount of $185 million gross contributions in full, and urges all other Member ($178,985,600 net), and that the amount be as- States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure pay- ment of their outstanding assessed contributions; sessed at a monthly rate of $15,416,667 gross 2. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States ($14,915,467 net) should the Security Council de- which have paid their assessed contributions in full, cide to continue the Mission’s mandate. However, and urges all other Member States to make every possi- the reduction did not take into account any fu- ble effort to ensure payment of their assessed contribu- ture changes in the overall strategy being tions to the Transitional Administration and the Mis- considered by the Council. sion in full; 3. Expresses concern at the financial situation with GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION (June) regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as re- gards the reimbursements to troop contributors that On 18 June [meeting 90], the General Assembly, bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee by Member States of their assessments; [A/57/832], adopted resolution 57/327 without 4. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced vote [agenda item 129]. by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping mis- Financing of the United Nations Transitional sions, in particular those in Africa; Administration in East Timor and the 5. Emphasizes that all future and existing peace- United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor keeping missions shall be given equal and non- The General Assembly, discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and Having considered the reports of the Secretary- administrative arrangements; General on the financing of the United Nations Tran- 6. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions sitional Administration in East Timor and the United shall be provided with adequate resources for the

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 Asia and the Pacific 383 effective and efficient discharge of their respective of 21,622,000 dollars in respect of the financial period mandates; ended 30 June 2002, in accordance with the levels set 7. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to out in resolution 55/235, as adjusted by the General make the fullest possible use of facilities and equip- Assembly in its resolutions 55/236 and 57/290 A, and ment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, taking into account the scale of assessments for 2002 as Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for set out in its resolutions 55/5 B and 57/4 B; the Mission; 15. Decides also that, for Member States that have 8. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Transi- contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on tional Administration and the Mission, there shall be Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests set off against their outstanding obligations their re- the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementa- spective share of the unencumbered balance and other tion; income in the total amount of 21,622,000 dollars in re- 9. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that spect of the financial period ended 30 June 2002, in ac- the additional resources referred to in paragraph 20 of cordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 14 the report of the Advisory Committee are used to above; strengthen national judicial capacity consistent with 16. Decides further that the increase of 529,000 dol- the needs of the people of Timor-Leste and the man- lars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect date of the Mission; of the financial period ended 30 June 2002 shall be Financial performance report for the added to the credits from the amount referred to in period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 paragraphs 14 and 15 above, and that the respective 10. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General shares of Member States therein shall be applied in ac- on the financial performance of the Transitional cordance with the provisions of those paragraphs as Administration and the Mission for the period from appropriate; 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002; 17. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active Budget estimates for the period peacekeeping missions; from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 18. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue 11. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account to take additional measures to ensure the safety and for the United Nations Mission of Support in East security of all personnel under the auspices of the Timor the amount of 193,337,100 dollars for the period United Nations participating in the Mission; from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, inclusive of 185 mil- 19 . Invites voluntary contributions to the Mission lion dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, in cash and in the form of services and supplies accept- 6,384,000 dollars for the support account for peace- able to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as keeping operations, and 1,953,100 dollars for the appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and United Nations Logistics Base; practices established by the General Assembly; Financing of the appropriation 20. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of 12. Decides also to apportion among Member States its fifty-eighth session the item entitled “Financing of the amount of 193,337,100 dollars at a monthly rate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in 16,111,425 dollars, in accordance with the levels set out East Timor and the United Nations Mission of in resolution 55/235, as adjusted by the General As- Support in East Timor”. sembly in its resolutions 55/236 of 23 December 2000 and 57/290 A of 20 December 2002, and taking into In July, the Secretary-General presented to the account the scale of assessments for 2003 as set out in Assembly the revised budget for UNMISET for the its resolutions 55/5 B of 23 December 2000, 57/4 B of period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 [A/58/ 20 December 2002 and for 2004, subject to the decision 192 ] . The revised budget incorporated additional of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission; requirements for the delay in downsizing the 13 . Decides further that, in accordance with the Mission and amounted to $208,887,500 gross provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December ($202,333,200 net), inclusive of budgeted volun- 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment tary contributions in kind of $60,000. The revi- among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 12 sion represented an increase of $23,827,500 gross above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization from the initial approved budget of $185,000,000 Fund of 7,568,200 dollars at a monthly rate of 630,683 and provided for the deployment of a maximum dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment in- come of 6,014,400 dollars approved for the Mission, of 3,405 troops, 95 military observers, 550 the prorated share of 1,438,300 dollars of the esti- civilian police, 125 civilian police in formed mated staff assessment income approved for the units, 399 international staff and 928 local staff. support account, and the prorated share of 115,500 In a September report [A/58/192/Add.1], the dollars of the estimated staff assessment income ap- Secretary-General provided information on the proved for the United Nations Logistics Base; proposed donation of UNMISET assets to the 14 . Decides that for Member States that have ful- Government of Timor-Leste, the inventory value filled their financial obligations to the Transitional Administration and the Mission, there shall be set off of which amounted to some $35.3 million as at against their apportionment, as provided for in para- 30 June 2003. graph 12 above, their respective share of the unencum- In October [A/58/409], ACABQ, having consid- bered balance and of other income in the total amount ered the revised budget for UNMISET, recom-

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mended that the Assembly appropriate the that only forty-three Member States have paid their as- additional amount of $23,827,500 gross for the sessed contributions in full, and urges all other period 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. It further Member States, in particular those in arrears, to en- sure payment of their outstanding assessed contribu- recommended that the Assembly approve the tions; donation of assets with an inventory value of 2. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States $35,262,900 and a corresponding residual value which have paid their assessed contributions in full, of $15,879,900 to Timor-Leste on a free-of- and urges all other Member States to make every possi- charge basis. ble effort to ensure payment of their assessed contribu- tions to the Transitional Administration and the Mis- GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION (December) sion in full; 3. Expresses concern at the financial situation with On 23 December [meeting 79], the General As- regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as re- sembly,on the recommendation of the Fifth Com- gards the reimbursements to troop contributors that mittee [A/58/584], adopted resolution 58/260 A bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments without vote [agenda item 140]. by Member States of their assessments; Financing of the United Nations Mission of 4. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced Support in East Timor by the Secretary-General in deploying some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa, The General Assembly, and in providing them with adequate resources; Having considered the reports of the Secretary- 5. Emphasizes that all future and existing peace- General on the financing of the United Nations Mis- keeping missions shall be given equal and non- sion of Support in East Timor, and the related report discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and administrative arrangements; Budgetary Questions, 6. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions Recalling Security Council resolution 1272(1999) of shall be provided with adequate resources for the 25 October 1999 regarding the establishment of the effective and efficient discharge of their respective United Nations Transitional Administration in East mandates; Timor and the subsequent resolutions by which the 7. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to Council extended the mandate of the Transitional make the fullest possible use of facilities and equip- Administration, the last of which was resolution ment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, 1392(2002) of 31 January 2002, by which the mandate Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for was extended until 20 May 2002, the Mission; Recalling also Security Council resolution 1410(2002) 8. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations of 17 May 2002, by which the Council established the contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor as Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests of 20 May 2002 for an initial period of twelve months, the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementa- and its subsequent resolution 1480(2003) of 19 May tion; 2003, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission until 20 May 2004, Revised budget estimates for the Recalling further its resolution 54/246 A of 23 De- period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 cember 1999 on the financing of the United Nations 9. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for Transitional Administration in East Timor and its sub- the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor sequent resolutions on the financing of the United the amount of 23,827,500 dollars for the maintenance Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, the latest of of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 which was resolution 57/327 of 18 June 2003, June 2004, in addition to the amount of 193,337,100 Reaffirming the general principles underlying the dollars already appropriated for the same period financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, under the terms of resolution 57/327; as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) Financing of the appropriation of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 10. Decides also, taking into account the amount of and 55/235 of 23 December 2000, 193,337,100 dollars previously apportioned under the Noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions terms of resolution 57/327, to apportion among Mem- have been made to the Mission and to the Trust Fund ber States the amount of 23,827,500 dollars at a for the United Nations Transitional Administration in monthly rate of 1,985,625 dollars, in accordance with East Timor, the levels set out in resolution 55/235, as adjusted by Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the the General Assembly in its resolutions 55/236 of 23 Mission with the necessary financial resources to en- December 2000 and 57/290 A of 20 December 2002, able it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant and taking into account the scale of assessments for resolutions of the Security Council, 2003 as set out in its resolutions 55/5 B of 23 Decem- 1. Takes note of the status of contributions to the ber 2000 and 57/4 B of 20 December 2002 and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East scale of assessments for 2004 as set out in its resolution Timor and the United Nations Mission of Support in 58/1 B of 23 December 2003, subject to the decision of East Timor as at 31 October 2003, including the contri- the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mis- butions outstanding in the amount of 65.5 million sion; United States dollars, representing some 4 per cent of 11. Decides further that, in accordance with the the total assessed contributions, notes with concern provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December

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1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment which was finalized as a result of the negotia- among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 10 tions. The Secretary-General said that, while the above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization text was an improvement over the previously dis- Fund of the amount of 539,900 dollars at a monthly rate of 44,991 dollars, representing the additional esti- cussed one, doubts might remain as to whether it mated staff assessment income approved for the Mis- would ensure the credibility of the Extraordinary sion; Chambers, given the precarious state of the judi- Donation of assets to the Government of Timor-Leste ciary in Cambodia. He said it would be essential 12. Approves the donation of the assets of the Mis- for the United Nations to assist in ensuring that sion, with a total inventory value of up to 35,262,900 the Chambers functioned in conformity with the dollars and corresponding residual value of up to agreement and complied with international 15,879,900 dollars, to the Government of Timor-Leste; standards of justice, fairness and due process of 13 . Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall law, as set out in the International Covenant on be financed by borrowing funds from other active Civil and Political Rights [YUN 1966, p. 423] (see peacekeeping missions; p. 669). The Secretary-General proposed that the 14 . Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and United Nations remain engaged in the process of security of all personnel under the auspices of the overseeing the implementation of the draft United Nations participating in the Mission; agreement. The report outlined the steps re- 15. Invites voluntary contributions to the Mission quired by the United Nations to conclude the in cash and in the form of services and supplies accept- agreement with the Government. Annexed to the able to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as report was the draft agreement. appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly; 16. Decides to keep under review during its fifty- GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION eighth session the item entitled “Financing of the On 13 May [meeting 85], the General Assembly, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor”. on the recommendation of the Third (Social, Hu- manitarian and Cultural) Committee [A/57/806], Also on 23 December, the Assembly decided adopted resolution 57/228 B without vote [agenda UNMISET that the agenda item on financing of item 109 (b)]. would remain for consideration at its resumed fifty-eighth (2004) session (decision 58/565). Khmer Rouge trials The General Assembly, UNAMET Recalling its resolution 57/228 A of 18 December On 15 September, the General Assembly de- 2002, cided to defer consideration of the item on the Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General and financing of UNAMET and to include it in the the Royal Government of Cambodia to conclude the negotiation of the draft Agreement between the draft agenda of its fifty-eighth session (decision United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambo- 57/599). dia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Dem- ocratic Kampuchea contained in the annex to the pres- ent resolution, Other matters Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 1. Approves the draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambo- Cambodia dia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Dem- In a 17 March letter [A/57/758], the Secretary- ocratic Kampuchea contained in the annex to the pres- General, referring to General Assembly resolu- ent resolution; tion 57/228 A [YUN 2002, p. 644], which requested 2. Urges the Secretary-General and the Royal Gov- him to resume negotiations to conclude an agree- ernment of Cambodia to take all the measures neces- ment with the Government of Cambodia on the sary to allow the draft Agreement referred to in para- establishment of Extraordinary Chambers with- graph 1 to enter into force, and to implement it fully in the court structure of Cambodia for the prose- after its entry into force; cution of crimes committed during the period of 3. Decides that the expenses of the Extraordinary Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), informed Chambers to be defrayed by the United Nations in ac- the Assembly President that his negotiating team cordance with the relevant provisions of the draft had established the text of a draft agreement. Agreement shall be borne by voluntary contributions from the international community as indicated in In a 31 March report [A/57/769], the Secretary- paragraph 9 of resolution 57/228 A, and appeals to the General described the steps that he had taken to international community to provide assistance, includ- resume negotiations with the Government of ing financial and personnel support to the Extraordi- Cambodia and described the draft agreement, nary Chambers;

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4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the mitted during the period from 17April 1975 to 6 Janu- General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the im- ary 1979. The Agreement provides, inter alia, the legal plementation of the present resolution. basis and the principles and modalities for such co- operation. Annex Article 2 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the TheLawontheEstablishmentof Extraordinary Chambers Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the 1. The present Agreement recognizes that the Ex- Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed traordinary Chambers have subject-matter jurisdiction during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea consistent with that set forth in “the Law on the Estab- Whereas the General Assembly of the United lishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts Nations, in its resolution 57/228 A of 18 December of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Com- 2002, recalled that the serious violations of Cambo- mitted During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea” dian and international humanitarian law during the (hereinafter: “the Law on the Establishment of the period of Democratic Kampuchea from 1975 to 1979 Extraordinary Chambers”), as adopted and amended continue to be matters of vitally important concern to by the Cambodian Legislature under the Constitution the international community as a whole, of Cambodia. The present Agreement further recog- Whereas in the same resolution the General Assem- nizes that the Extraordinary Chambers have personal bly recognized the legitimate concern of the Govern- jurisdiction over senior leaders of Democratic Kampu- ment and the people of Cambodia in the pursuit of chea and those who were most responsible for the justice and national reconciliation, stability, peace and crimes referred to in Article 1 of the Agreement. security, 2. The present Agreement shall be implemented Whereas the Cambodian authorities have requested in Cambodia through the Law on the Establishment assistance from the United Nations in bringing to trial of the Extraordinary Chambers as adopted and senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those amended. The Vienna Convention on the Law of who were most responsible for the crimes and serious Treaties, and in particular its Articles 26 and 27, ap- violations of Cambodian penal law, international hu- plies to the Agreement. manitarian law and custom, and international conven- 3. In case amendments to the Law on the Establish- tions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed ment of the Extraordinary Chambers are deemed nec- during the period from 17April 1975 to 6 January 1979, essary, such amendments shall always be preceded by Whereas prior to the negotiation of the present consultations between the parties. Agreement substantial progress had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (hereinafter, Article 3 “the Secretary-General”) and the Royal Government Judges of Cambodia towards the establishment, with interna- 1. Cambodian judges, on the one hand, and judges tional assistance, of Extraordinary Chambers within appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy the existing court structure of Cambodia for the prose- upon nomination by the Secretary-General of the cution of crimes committed during the period of Dem- United Nations (hereinafter: “international judges”), ocratic Kampuchea, on the other hand, shall serve in each of the two Ex- Whereas by its resolution 57/228 A, the General As- traordinary Chambers. sembly welcomed the promulgation of the Law on the 2. The composition of the Chambers shall be as Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the follows: Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes (a) The Trial Chamber: three Cambodian judges Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampu- and two international judges; chea and requested the Secretary-General to resume (b) The Supreme Court Chamber, which shall negotiations, without delay, to conclude an agreement serve as both appellate chamber and final instance: with the Government, based on previous negotiations four Cambodian judges and three international on the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers judges. consistent with the provisions of the said resolution, so 3. The judges shall be persons of high moral char- that the Extraordinary Chambers may begin to func- acter, impartiality and integrity who possess the quali- tion promptly, fications required in their respective countries for Whereas the Secretary-General and the Royal Gov- appointment to judicial offices. They shall be indepen- ernment of Cambodia have held negotiations on the dent in the performance of their functions and shall establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, not accept or seek instructions from any Government Now therefore the United Nations and the Royal Gov- or any other source. ernment of Cambodia have agreed as follows: 4. In the overall composition of the Chambers due account should be taken of the experience of the Article 1 judges in criminal law, international law, including in- Purpose ternational humanitarian law and human rights law. The purpose of the present Agreement is to regu- 5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations late the cooperation between the United Nations and undertakes to forward a list of not less than seven nom- the Royal Government of Cambodia in bringing to inees for international judges from which the Supreme trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and Council of the Magistracy shall appoint five to serve as those who were most responsible for the crimes and se- judges in the two Chambers. Appointment of interna- rious violations of Cambodian penal law, international tional judges by the Supreme Council of the Magis- humanitarian law and custom, and international con- tracy shall be made only from the list submitted by the ventions recognized by Cambodia, that were com- Secretary-General.

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6. In the event of a vacancy of an international 7. The co-investigating judges shall be appointed judge, the Supreme Council of the Magistracy shall for the duration of the proceedings. appoint another international judge from the same Article 6 list. Prosecutors 7. The judges shall be appointed for the duration 1. There shall be one Cambodian prosecutor and of the proceedings. one international prosecutor competent to appear in 8. In addition to the international judges sitting in both Chambers, serving as co-prosecutors. They shall the Chambers and present at every stage of the pro- be responsible for the conduct of the prosecutions. ceedings, the President of a Chamber may, on a case- 2. The co-prosecutors shall be of high moral char- by-case basis, designate from the list of nominees sub- acter, and possess a high level of professional compe- mitted by the Secretary-General, one or more alternate tence and extensive experience in the conduct of inves- judges to be present at each stage of the proceedings, tigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. and to replace an international judge if that judge is 3. The co-prosecutors shall be independent in the unable to continue sitting. performance of their functions and shall not accept or Article 4 seek instructions from any Government or any other Decision-making source. It is understood, however, that the scope of the 1. The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in prosecution is limited to senior leaders of Democratic their decisions. If this is not possible, the following Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for shall apply: the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal (a) A decision by the Trial Chamber shall require law, international humanitarian law and custom, and the affirmative vote of at least four judges; international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April (b) A decision by the Supreme Court Chamber 1975 to 6 January 1979. shall require the affirmative vote of at least five judges. 4. The co-prosecutors shall cooperate with a view 2. When there is no unanimity, the decision of the to arriving at a common approach to the prosecution. Chamber shall contain the views of the majority and In case the prosecutors are unable to agree whether to the minority. proceed with a prosecution, the prosecution shall pro- Article 5 ceed unless the prosecutors or one of them requests Investigating judges within thirty days that the difference shall be settled in 1. There shall be one Cambodian and one interna- accordance with Article 7. tional investigating judge serving as co-investigating 5. The Secretary-General undertakes to forward judges. They shall be responsible for the conduct of a list of two nominees from which the Supreme investigations. Council of the Magistracy shall select one interna- 2. The co-investigating judges shall be persons of tional co-prosecutor and one reserve international co- high moral character, impartiality and integrity who prosecutor. possess the qualifications required in their respective 6. In case there is a vacancy or a need to fill the post countries for appointment to such a judicial office. of the international co-prosecutor, the person ap- 3. The co-investigating judges shall be indepen- pointed to fill this post must be the reserve interna- dent in the performance of their functions and shall tional co-prosecutor. not accept or seek instructions from any Government 7. The co-prosecutors shall be appointed for the or any other source. It is understood, however, that the duration of the proceedings. scope of the investigation is limited to senior leaders of 8. Each co-prosecutor shall have one or more Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most re- deputy prosecutors to assist him or her with pros- sponsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cam- ecutions before the Chambers. Deputy international bodian penal law, international humanitarian law and prosecutors shall be appointed by the international co- custom, and international conventions recognized by prosecutor from a list provided by the Secretary- Cambodia, that were committed during the period General. from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. Article 7 4. The co-investigating judges shall cooperate with Settlement of differences between the a view to arriving at a common approach to the investi- co-investigating judges or the co-prosecutors gation. In case the co-investigating judges are unable 1. In case the co-investigating judges or the co- to agree whether to proceed with an investigation, the prosecutors have made a request in accordance with investigation shall proceed unless the judges or one of Article 5, paragraph 4, or Article 6, paragraph 4, as the them requests within thirty days that the difference case may be, they shall submit written statements of shall be settled in accordance with Article 7. facts and the reasons for their different positions to the 5. In addition to the list of nominees provided for Director of the Office of Administration. in Article 3, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General shall 2. The difference shall be settled forthwith by a submit a list of two nominees from which the Supreme Pre-Trial Chamber of five judges, three appointed by Council of the Magistracy shall appoint one to serve as the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, with one as an international co-investigating judge, and one as a President, and two appointed by the Supreme Council reserve international co-investigating judge. of the Magistracy upon nomination by the Secretary- 6. In case there is a vacancy or a need to fill the post General. Article 3, paragraph 3, shall apply to the of the international co-investigating judge, the person judges. appointed to fill this post must be the reserve interna- 3. Upon receipt of the statements referred to in tional co-investigating judge. paragraph 1, the Director of the Office of Adminis-

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tration shall immediately convene the Pre-Trial Cham- may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred ber and communicate the statements to its members. to in the present Agreement. 4. A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, against 2. This provision is based upon a declaration by the which there is no appeal, requires the affirmative vote Royal Government of Cambodia that until now, with of at least four judges. The decision shall be communi- regard to matters covered in the law, there has been cated to the Director of the Office of Administration, only one case, dated 14 September 1996, when a par- who shall publish it and communicate it to the co- don was granted to only one person with regard to a investigating judges or the co-prosecutors. They shall 1979 conviction on the charge of genocide. The United immediately proceed in accordance with the decision Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia of the Chamber. If there is no majority, as required for agree that the scope of this pardon is a matter to be de- a decision, the investigation or prosecution shall pro- cided by the Extraordinary Chambers. ceed. Article 12 Article 8 Procedure Office of Administration 1. The procedure shall be in accordance with Cam- 1. There shall be an Office of Administration to bodian law. Where Cambodian law does not deal with service the Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial a particular matter, or where there is uncertainty re- Chamber, the co-investigating judges and the Prosecu- garding the interpretation or application of a relevant tors’ Office. rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question 2. There shall be a Cambodian Director of this regarding the consistency of such a rule with interna- Office, who shall be appointed by the Royal Govern- tional standards, guidance may also be sought in pro- ment of Cambodia. The Director shall be responsible cedural rules established at the international level. for the overall management of the Office of Adminis- 2. The Extraordinary Chambers shall exercise tration, except in matters that are subject to United their jurisdiction in accordance with international Nations rules and procedures. standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as 3. There shall be an international Deputy Director set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International of the Office of Administration, who shall be ap- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Cam- pointed by the Secretary-General. The Deputy Direc- bodia is a party. In the interest of securing a fair and tor shall be responsible for the recruitment of all public hearing and credibility of the procedure, it international staff and all administration of the inter- is understood that representatives of Member States national components of the Extraordinary Chambers, of the United Nations, of the Secretary-General, of the Pre-TrialChamber, the co-investigating judges, the the media and of national and international non- Prosecutors’ Office and the Office of Administration. governmental organizations will at all times have ac- The United Nations and the Royal Government of cess to the proceedings before the Extraordinary Cambodia agree that, when an international Deputy Chambers. Any exclusion from such proceedings in ac- Director has been appointed by the Secretary-General, cordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Cove- the assignment of that person to that position by nant shall only be to the extent strictly necessary in the the Royal Government of Cambodia shall take place opinion of the Chamber concerned and where public- forthwith. ity would prejudice the interests of justice. 4. The Director and the Deputy Director shall co- Article 13 operate in order to ensure an effective and efficient Rights of the accused functioning of the administration. 1. The rights of the accused enshrined in Articles Article 9 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil Crimes falling within the jurisdiction and Political Rights shall be respected throughout the of the Extraordinary Chambers trial process. Such rights shall, in particular, include The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordi- the right: to a fair and public hearing; to be presumed nary Chambers shall be the crime of genocide as de- innocent until proved guilty; to engage a counsel of his fined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and or her choice; to have adequate time and facilities for Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, crimes against the preparation of his or her defence; to have counsel humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the provided if he or she does not have sufficient means International Criminal Court and grave breaches of to pay for it; and to examine or have examined the the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as witnesses against him or her. defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment 2. The United Nations and the Royal Government of the Extraordinary Chambers as promulgated on 10 of Cambodia agree that the provisions on the right to August 2001. defence counsel in the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers mean that the accused has Article 10 the right to engage counsel of his or her own choosing Penalties as guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil The maximum penalty for conviction for crimes fall- and Political Rights. ing within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Cham- bers shall be life imprisonment. Article 14 Premises Article 11 The Royal Government of Cambodia shall provide Amnesty at its expense the premises for the co-investigating 1. The Royal Government of Cambodia shall not judges, the Prosecutors’ Office, the Extraordinary request an amnesty or pardon for any persons who Chambers, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Office of

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Administration. It shall also provide for such utilities, (b) Immunity from criminal, civil and administra- facilities and other services necessary for their opera- tive jurisdiction in conformity with the Vienna Con- tion that may be mutually agreed upon by separate vention; agreement between the United Nations and the Gov- (c) Inviolability for all papers and documents; ernment. (d) Exemption from immigration restrictions and Article 15 alien registration; Cambodian personnel (e) The same immunities and facilities in respect of Salaries and emoluments of Cambodian judges and their personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic other Cambodian personnel shall be defrayed by the agents. Royal Government of Cambodia. 2. The international judges, the international co- investigating judge, the international co-prosecutor Article 16 and the Deputy Director of the Office of Adminis- International personnel tration shall enjoy exemption from taxation in Cambo- Salaries and emoluments of international judges, dia on their salaries, emoluments and allowances. the international co-investigating judge, the interna- tional co-prosecutor and other personnel recruited by Article 20 the United Nations shall be defrayed by the United Privileges and immunities of Nations. Cambodian and international personnel Article 17 1. Cambodian judges, the Cambodian co-investigating Financial and other assistance of the United Nations judge, the Cambodian co-prosecutor and other Cam- The United Nations shall be responsible for the fol- bodian personnel shall be accorded immunity from le- lowing: gal process in respect of words spoken or written and (a) Remuneration of the international judges, the all acts performed by them in their official capacity international co-investigating judge, the international under the present Agreement. Such immunity shall co-prosecutor, the Deputy Director of the Office of continue to be accorded after termination of employ- Administration and other international personnel; ment with the co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors, the Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial Chamber (b) Costs for utilities and services as agreed sepa- and the Office of Administration. rately between the United Nations and the Royal Gov- ernment of Cambodia; 2. International personnel shall be accorded: (c) Remuneration of defence counsel; (a) Immunity from legal process in respect of (d) Witnesses’ travel from within Cambodia and words spoken or written and all acts performed by from abroad; them in their official capacity under the present (e) Safety and security arrangements as agreed sep- Agreement. Such immunity shall continue to be ac- arately between the United Nations and the Govern- corded after termination of employment with the co- ment; investigating judges, the co-prosecutors, the Extraor- (f) Such other limited assistance as may be neces- dinary Chambers, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the sary to ensure the smooth functioning of the investiga- Office of Administration; tion, the prosecution and the Extraordinary Cham- (b) Immunity from taxation on salaries, allowances bers. and emoluments paid to them by the United Nations; (c) Immunity from immigration restrictions; Article 18 (d) The right to import free of duties and taxes, Inviolability of archives and documents except for payment for services, their furniture and The archives of the co-investigating judges, the co- effects at the time of first taking up their official duties prosecutors, the Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre- in Cambodia. Trial Chamber and the Office of Administration, and in general all documents and materials made available, 3. The United Nations and the Royal Government belonging to or used by them, wherever located in of Cambodia agree that the immunity granted by the Cambodia and by whomsoever held, shall be inviolable Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Cham- for the duration of the proceedings. bers in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity under the Article 19 present Agreement will apply also after the persons Privileges and immunities of international judges, have left the service of the co-investigating judges, the the international co-investigating judge, co-prosecutors, the Extraordinary Chambers, the Pre- the international co-prosecutor and the Trial Chamber and the Office of Administration. Deputy Director of the Office of Administration Article 21 1. The international judges, the international co- investigating judge, the international co-prosecutor Counsel and the Deputy Director of the Office of Adminis- 1. The counsel of a suspect or an accused who has tration, together with their families forming part of been admitted as such by the Extraordinary Chambers their household, shall enjoy the privileges and immu- shall not be subjected by the Royal Government of nities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplo- Cambodia to any measure which may affect the free matic agents in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Con- and independent exercise of his or her functions vention on Diplomatic Relations. They shall, in under the present Agreement. particular, enjoy: 2. In particular, the counsel shall be accorded: (a) Personal inviolability, including immunity from (a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention arrest or detention; and from seizure of personal baggage;

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(b) Inviolability of all documents relating to the ex- 2. The official working languages of the Extraordi- ercise of his or her functions as a counsel of a suspect nary Chambers and the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be or accused; Khmer, English and French. (c) Immunity from criminal or civil jurisdiction in 3. Translations of public documents and interpre- respect of words spoken or written and acts performed tation at public hearings into Russian may be provided by them in their official capacity as counsel. Such im- by the Royal Government of Cambodia at its discretion munity shall continue to be accorded to them after ter- and expense on condition that such services do not mination of their functions as a counsel of a suspect or hinder the proceedings before the Extraordinary accused. Chambers. 3. Any counsel, whether of Cambodian or non- Cambodian nationality, engaged by or assigned to a Article 27 suspect or an accused shall, in the defence of his or Practical arrangements her client, act in accordance with the present Agree- 1. With a view to achieving efficiency and cost- ment, the Cambodian Law on the Statutes of the Bar effectiveness in the operation of the Extraordinary and recognized standards and ethics of the legal pro- Chambers, a phased-in approach shall be adopted for fession. their establishment in accordance with the chronologi- cal order of the legal process. Article 22 2. In the first phase of the operation of the Ex- Witnesses and experts traordinary Chambers, the judges, the co-investigating Witnesses and experts appearing on a summons or a judges and the co-prosecutors will be appointed along request of the judges, the co-investigating judges, or with investigative and prosecutorial staff, and the pro- the co-prosecutors shall not be prosecuted, detained or cess of investigations and prosecutions shall be initi- subjected to any other restriction on their liberty by the ated. Cambodian authorities. They shall not be subjected by 3. The trial process of those already in custody the authorities to any measure which may affect the shall proceed simultaneously with the investigation of free and independent exercise of their functions. other persons responsible for crimes falling within the Article 23 jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers. Protection of victims and witnesses 4. With the completion of the investigation of per- The co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors and sons suspected of having committed the crimes falling the Extraordinary Chambers shall provide for the pro- within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Cham- tection of victims and witnesses. Such protection meas- bers, arrest warrants shall be issued and submitted to ures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the con- the Royal Government of Cambodia to effectuate the duct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the arrest. identity of a victim or witness. 5. With the arrest by the Royal Government of Cambodia of indicted persons situated in its territory, Article 24 the Extraordinary Chambers shall be fully opera- Security, safety and protection of tional, provided that the judges of the Supreme Court persons referred to in the present Agreement Chamber shall serve when seized with a matter. The The Royal Government of Cambodia shall take all judges of the Pre-TrialChamber shall serve only if and effective and adequate actions which may be required when their services are needed. to ensure the security, safety and protection of persons referred to in the present Agreement. The United Article 28 Nations and the Government agree that the Govern- Withdrawal of cooperation ment is responsible for the security of all accused, irre- Should the Royal Government of Cambodia change spective of whether they appear voluntarily before the the structure or organization of the Extraordinary Extraordinary Chambers or whether they are under Chambers or otherwise cause them to function in a arrest. manner that does not conform with the terms of the present Agreement, the United Nations reserves the Article 25 right to cease to provide assistance, financial or other- Obligation to assist the co-investigating judges, wise, pursuant to the present Agreement. the co-prosecutors and the Extraordinary Chambers The Royal Government of Cambodia shall comply Article 29 without undue delay with any request for assistance by Settlement of disputes the co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors and the Any dispute between the parties concerning the in- Extraordinary Chambers or an order issued by any of terpretation or application of the present Agreement them, including, but not limited to: shall be settled by negotiation, or by any other mutu- (a) Identification and location of persons; ally agreed upon mode of settlement. (b) Service of documents; (c) Arrest or detention of persons; Article 30 (d) Transfer of an indictee to the Extraordinary Approval Chambers. To be binding on the parties, the present Agreement must be approved by the General Assembly of the Article 26 United Nations and ratified by Cambodia. The Royal Languages Government of Cambodia will make its best 1. The official language of the Extraordinary endeavours to obtain this ratification by the earliest Chambers and the Pre-Trial Chamber is Khmer. possible date.

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Article 31 building measures with Pakistan to reduce the Application within Cambodia risk of accidental or deliberate conflict. The present Agreement shall apply as law within the The final communiqué of the annual coordi- Kingdom of Cambodia following its ratification in ac- nation meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Af- cordance with the relevant provisions of the internal fairs of the States members of the Organization law of the Kingdom of Cambodia regarding compe- of the Islamic Conference (New York, 30 Septem- tence to conclude treaties. ber) [A/58/415-S/2003/952] welcomed the measures Article 32 taken by India and Pakistan to normalize their bi- Entry into force lateral relations and urged India to enter into The present Agreement shall enter into force on the meaningful and result-oriented dialogue with day after both parties have notified each other in writ- Pakistan. ing that the legal requirements for entry into force have been complied with. Done at [place] on [day, month] 2003 in two copies in Korea question the English language. On 24 January [S/2003/91], the Democratic Peo- For the United Nations For the Royal Government ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) transmitted to the of Cambodia President of the Security Council three state- ments. A letter from the DPRK Foreign Minister In a 3 December report [A/58/617], the informed the Council of the Government’s deci- Secretary-General stated that the Agreement had sion to put into effect its withdrawal from the been signed by the United Nations and the Gov- 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear ernment of Cambodia and was awaiting ratifica- Weapons (NPT), adopted by the General Assem- tion through the Cambodian legislative process. bly in resolution 2373(XXII) [YUN 1968,p. 17], as the In the meantime, a UN technical team would visit Government had decided in 1993 [YUN 1993, Cambodia to prepare a draft concept of opera- p. 356]. The DPRK explained it would revoke the tion, gather more precise cost parameters for an “suspension” on the withdrawal, which would overall budget for the Chambers and ascertain come into effect. A statement issued by the Gov- the availability of facilities and utilities. A more ernment on 10 January said that the United substantive report would be submitted based on States had instigated the International Atomic the team’s findings. In conclusion, the Secretary- Energy Agency (IAEA) to adopt a 6 January reso- General expressed concern at the delays in the lution demanding that the DPRK scrap its nuclear implementation of the Agreement and called on programme. Although it had pulled out of NPT, the Government to ensure that its ratification was the DPRK had no intention of producing nuclear accorded priority. weapons. If the United States dropped its hostile policy towards it, the DPRK might allow a separate verification by the United States. The DPRK also India-Pakistan forwarded a report of 21 January by the Korean On 19August, Pakistan addressed identical let- Central News Agency on the circumstances and ters [A/58/298-S/2003/823] to the Presidents of the historical background of the DPRK’s withdrawal General Assembly and the Security Council, rais- from NPT. ing issues relating to peace and security in South On 26 June [S/2003/673], the DPRK transmitted Asia, in the context of India-Pakistan relations to the Council President a statement by its For- and the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Although eign Minister, which noted that one permanent earlier in the year the two countries had taken member of the Council had sought to bring be- steps to reduce tensions by restoring diplomatic fore it the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. relations at the level of High Commissioners The DPRK expressed its wish for bilateral, tripar- (Ambassadors) and resuming transportation tite or multilateral talks with concerned parties links, there had not been movement in resolving and attached priority to the DPRK–United States the outstanding differences between the two bilateral talks. It stated that the Council should countries, especially over Jammu and Kashmir. avoid giving any impression that it might apply Pakistan believed that the international com- double standards in the application of interna- munity should urgently call on India to respond tional instruments. positively to Pakistan’s proposals to revive the The DPRK, on 1 July [S/2003/681], forwarded to bilateral dialogue, install an effective ceasefire the Council a statement by the DPRK Chief of the along the Line of Control in Kashmir, halt Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People’s threatening statements and propaganda, stop its Army, in which he stated that the United States repression in Kashmir, reduce military deploy- was reinforcing its presence in the Republic of ments in the disputed State and evolve confidence- Korea. Its preparations for attack on the DPRK

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 392 Political and security questions were in their final stage under the new strategy of to the Papua New Guinea constitution, which would “pre-emptive strike” instead of the previous “de- lead to the drafting and presentation of a consti- terrence” strategy. tution for Bougainville, the delegation of police By a 28 July letter [S/2003/768], the DPRK trans- powers and expediting consultations on the mitted a memorandum of the Panmunjom Mis- functions of the interim provincial government sion of the DPRK Army on the occasion of the fifti- and arrangements for elections. However, signi- eth anniversary of the signing of the 1953 Korean ficant challenges remained, prompting the Armistice Agreement [YUN 1953, p. 136]. The mem- Secretary-General, in December, to accede to orandum reviewed events on the Korean penin- Papua New Guinea’s request to maintain a UN sula since the Agreement was signed, in particu- presence on the island. The new mission, the lar the “hostile” policy against the DPRK adopted United Nations Observer Mission in Papua New by the United States, and said that the United Guinea (UNOMB), would, among other functions, States had brought about nuclear threat and dan- monitor the constitutional process leading to ger of war on the peninsula by having violated the adoption of a Bougainville constitution and key provisions of the Agreement. verify and certify compliance by the parties with The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in a 20 February the weapons disposal plan. The Mission would letter to the Secretary-General and the Council work with UNDP, which would lead international [S/2003/224], transmitted an initiative of Colonel reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. Muammar Qaddafi on resolution of the Korean crisis through peaceful reunification on the UNPOB activities peninsula. Report of Secretary-General. In March India and the Russian Federation, on 21 No- [S/2003/345], the Secretary-General, as requested vember [A/58/611-S/2003/1134], transmitted to the by the Security Council in 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 332], Council and the General Assembly a joint decla- reported on the activities of UNPOB, including ration adopted during the visit of the Prime Min- the remaining challenges and UNPOB’s exit strat- ister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to the egy. He stated that, following the 17 February Russian Federation on 12 November. The two adoption of an Action Plan for the Completion of countries expressed support for efforts to pursue Weapons Collection by political and former com- a peaceful solution to the nuclear problem on batant leaders, 80.2 per cent of Bougainville had the Korean peninsula and to ensure its denuc- reached stage II of the weapons disposal plan learized status, including continuing six-way under the Bougainville Peace Agreement and talks in Beijing, finding a mutually acceptable two districts had completely disarmed. Some solution and further developing inter-Korean 7.4 per cent of weapons had been destroyed dialogue and cooperation. ahead of the formal launch of stage III. Since the start of the Action Plan, the parties had re- contained one trunk of stolen weapons, held one Papua New Guinea stage I containment ceremony and scheduled Significant progress was made in 2003 in UN more stage II containment ceremonies across the efforts to resolve the conflict in the Papua New island. The parties to the peace process, the Guinea province of Bougainville, as implementa- Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) and the tion of the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement, Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), had concluded between the Government of Papua scheduled separate discussions on the final fate New Guinea and the Bougainville parties, en- of the collected weapons and were expected to tered its final stage. That Agreement, which had reach a unified position on the matter. However, established the framework for a peace process, in- a major obstacle to completing weapons disposal cluding a permanent ceasefire, as provided for in was the continued non-involvement of Francis the 1998 Lincoln Agreement [YUN 1998, p. 319] and Ona and his Me’ekamui Defence Force (MDF)in its annex, the Arawa Agreement [ibid.], covered is- the peace process, despite appeals by the parties sues of autonomy, the holding of a referendum to the Bougainville Peace Agreement. In the and agreements on weapons disposal. The par- meantime, UNPOB was seeking ways to facilitate ties to the Peace Agreement completed phase II and expedite the completion of the stage II of the weapons disposal plan and reached agree- weapons collection in the shortest possible time. ment on the final disposal of the weapons col- On 1 February, the Bougainville Constitu- lected, which allowed the United Nations Politi- tional Commission released a draft constitution cal Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) to carry out for Bougainville for island-wide consultations. the necessary certification and verification. That On the basis of feedback, a second draft had been set the stage for the next steps to be taken, particularly prepared and would be examined by the Joint As- the entry into force of constitutional amendments sembly of the Bougainville Interim Provincial

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Government and the Bougainville People’s Con- ther solidify peace in Bougainville, the Secretary- gress. The draft would be returned to the Consti- General appealed to the donor community to tutional Commission following review by the bi- continue its assistance to the island following the partisan Ministerial Committee and the National expected departure of UNPOB at the end of 2003. Executive Council of the Government of Papua Security Council consideration (March). On New Guinea. The text was expected to be final- 28 March [S/PV.4728], the Assistant Secretary- ized by the end of April and submitted for adop- General for Political Affairs, Danilo Türk, up- tion to a Bougainville Constituent Assembly, dated the Security Council on developments in which would be established on completion of Bougainville. He informed the Council, which stage II of weapons disposal. It was hoped that had before it the Secretary-General’s report, that elections could then be held before the end of the implementation of the Plan of Action for the year. Completion of Weapons Collection seemed to be The Government of Papua New Guinea con- proceeding well. Additional weapons had been tinued to demonstrate its commitment to imple- retrieved and three new stage II containments menting the Bougainville Peace Agreement. Fol- had taken place. As a result of direct contacts lowing confidence-building cabinet-level visits to with persons responsible for previous break-ins the island, the Government and the Bougainville into the containers, it was expected that weapons parties signed a memorandum of understanding removed would soon be returned. In several establishing a mechanism for consultations other districts, former combatants, acting on between them on all aspects of the autonomy UNPOB’s behalf, had been promoting reconcilia- arrangements, including the transfer of powers, tion, settling issues and thus creating an atmos- functions and resources, and the settlement of phere conducive to the containment of more disputes. An indication of the growing confi- weapons. The Assistant Secretary-General said dence between the two sides was the national that, after a decade of suffering, the people of Government’s withdrawal on 26 March of its Bougainville were working diligently to achieve a Defence Force from Bougainville, well ahead of better future, giving confidence that, despite the schedule. remaining obstacles and political spoilers, partic- The regional Peace Monitoring Group, which ularly Mr. Ona, the Bougainville Peace Agree- had made a valuable contribution to the peace ment could be fully implemented before the end process since 1998 [YUN 1998, p. 319], including the of the year, allowing UNPOB to withdraw. provision of logistical support to weapons collec- The Papua New Guinea representative told the tion and meetings of the Peace Process Consulta- Council that, with the active cooperation of ex- tive Committee, informed the parties of its inten- combatants, the break-ins and removal of tion to cease all operations on 30 June and to weapons from containers that caused much con- withdraw thereafter. UNPOB was working to en- cern in 2002 appeared to have ended and the sure that, by that date, weapons disposal would be national Government was cooperating with the so far advanced that it would no longer require police in providing financial and other support that level of support. However, since the process for efforts to provide security. The process was was unlikely to be completed by that date, UNPOB slow but UNPOB and the Peace Monitoring was of the view that the parties should review the Group had been working hard to keep it moving weapons disposal process and, if necessary, re- ahead, as had the leaders of BRA and BRF. The place the Peace Monitoring Group with an Constitutional Commission had prepared a alternative arrangement. second draft of the proposed constitution, which The Secretary-General indicated that, in ac- was soon to be presented to the national Govern- cordance with its mandate, once UNPOB had veri- ment. The Government had also appointed a fied that stage II of the weapons disposal plan high-level bipartisan National Committee to ad- had been completed, the constitutional amend- vise on its response to the Commission’s propo- ments would enter into force, paving the way for sals. The Defence Force was expected to complete the election of an autonomous Bougainville gov- its withdrawal from Bougainville under the ernment by the end of 2003 and the closure of agreed weapons disposal plan at about the same UNPOB.UNPOB was looking to UNDP and other time. The establishment of the Interim Joint Su- UN agencies to take the lead in facilitating the re- pervisory Body was another initiative taken well integration and rehabilitation of former combat- before any legal requirement, and the two sides ants and the restoration of community services had already begun to cooperate in managing the and infrastructure. Consultations were being implementation of the agreed autonomy ar- held with UNDP aimed at ensuring its valuable rangements. The national Government was mak- contribution to post-conflict peace-building, in- ing some $1.5 million available in 2003 and 2004 cluding the improvement of governance. To fur- as an establishment grant to assist the autono-

YUN03—4ths proofs May 25 2005 394 Political and security questions mous Bougainville government in meeting start- ernment. Consultations were taking place on up expenses. Reform in the public sector was pro- those issues and a budget was being prepared for ceeding in readiness for the establishment of the the funding of constitutional and electoral activi- autonomous government, with the assistance of ties, including meetings of the Bougainville Con- the international community. As with the dead- stitutional Commission and of a constituent line set for the end of the UN mission [YUN 2002, assembly. p. 332], the challenge posed by the planned with- Meanwhile, the process of weapons collection drawal of the Peace Monitoring Group at the end continued, and UNPOB was pushing ahead with of June was how to make the utmost use of its its Operation Continuing Vigilance and Final presence and conclude weapons disposal before Phase programmes. As to the final fate of the col- the Group left. Its withdrawal would also leave a lected weapons, the national Government and void for UNPOB, especially as far as communica- BRF had indicated a preference for their destruc- tions, transport and technical support for tion, while BRA preferred secure storage. UNPOB weapons disposal were concerned. The Govern- had been requested to preside over a consultation ment believed that the stage III meeting to decide of the parties to seek a unified position on the on the final fate of weapons should be brought question at the end of August. In the remaining forward. months of its mandate, UNPOB would continue to The New Zealand representative said that it ensure that the peace process kept moving for- had noted UNPOB’s intention to certify substan- ward. It was happy to have the support of the tial compliance on the basis of affirmation from newly established Bougainville Transition Team, village and district communities in Bougainville the successor to the Peace Monitoring Group, that they were satisfied that the weapons in their which completed its mission on 30 June. As re- areas had been contained and that the communi- sponsibility for providing continuing interna- ties felt safe. UNPOB should formally declare that tional support for Bougainville peace consolida- criterion without further delay and move quickly tion efforts would devolve on UNDP, consultations to certify that former combatants were in sub- were going on with a view to developing a joint stantial compliance with stage II of weapons dis- approach for a smooth transition. posal as set out in the Bougainville Peace Agree- ment. There was currently a range of views on Mr. Sinclair observed that, with the comple- what the final fate of the weapons should be; New tion of stage II of the weapons disposal plan, the Zealand held the view that all weapons should be parties had begun to talk seriously among them- destroyed so that safety and security were not selves about stage III, for which a deadline of the compromised by the return of weapons into the middle of December had been set. The parties hands of those with criminal intent. were also working to advance the autonomy as- pects of the Peace Agreement, most importantly the finalization of a constitution and the holding Completion of weapons disposal phase of elections. Security Council consideration (August). The Head of UNPOB, Noel Sinclair, briefed the Security Council on 6 August [S/PV.4805]. He said End of UNPOB and establishment of UNOMB that some dramatic steps had been taken since Security Council consideration (December). the last briefing to the Council, the most signifi- The Security Council, on 15 December cant of which was the completion of stage II of [S/PV.4881], was briefed by the Assistant Secretary- weapons disposal, as required by the Bougain- General for Political Affairs on the situation in ville Peace Agreement. Following an island-wide Bougainville. He reported that, as a result of the process of consultations to determine how the completion of stage II of the weapons disposal people of Bougainville felt as a result of what had programme, BRA and BRF had put more than been achieved, UNPOB informed the Peace Pro- 1,900 pieces of weapons into 16 secured contain- cess Consultative Committee of its judgement ers and 68 trunks, with a key being held by the that stage II of weapons disposal had come to an relevant commander and UNPOB pending a end and that the weapons disposal plan had final decision on the fate of those weapons. served its purpose. On 30 July, UNPOB made that The achievement of that important benchmark verification and certification to the national Gov- allowed the national Government to enact the ernment, which so advised the Governor Gen- constitutional amendment and the Organic Law eral. It was expected that the Organic Law on on Peace-Building in Bougainville, which expe- Peace-Building in Bougainville would become dited consultations among the parties on the fully operational shortly, setting the stage for the constitution, the delegation of police powers, next steps to be taken, including the holding functions of the interim provincial government of elections for a Bougainville autonomous gov- and arrangements for elections.

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As to the constitutional process, the Papua ant Secretary-General said that the peace process New Guinea Attorney-General presented his would not be completed by 31 December 2003 comments on the second draft of the Bougain- and the United Nations shared the view of Papua ville constitution in October and differences re- New Guinea, as expressed in its letter of 11 De- lating to the consistency between the second draft cember to the Secretary-General, and of the and the Papua New Guinea constitution were be- Bougainville parties, that a UN presence in ing resolved. On 5 December, the Papua New Bougainville was still required, albeit a down- Guinea cabinet, the National Executive Council, sized presence, given the maturity of the peace reaffirmed its commitment to honour the Bougainville Peace Agreement and to implement process and the limited tasks remaining. More- corresponding laws. It was expected that the over, since the Bougainville Transitional Team Bougainville constitution would be adopted dur- was scheduled to withdraw by the end of the year ing the first quarter of 2004 and endorsed by the also, a continued UN political presence would national Government by midyear. contribute to building confidence among the Regarding phase III of weapons disposal, BRA parties in the peace process and give the autono- and BRF adopted a 30 November resolution de- mous government to be established a fair chance claring that the final fate of the contained of starting out in an environment that provided a weapons should be their destruction, to take reasonable prospect for the continued strength- place upon the finalization of the essential com- ening of peace, security and stability on the ponents of the peace process: the coming into island. The proposed successor mission, the force of the Bougainville constitution, the resolu- United Nations Observer Mission in Bougain- tion of outstanding issues with MDF and reconcil- ville (UNOMB), to be established for six months iation between MDF, and BRA and BRF. That starting in January 2004, would have as its func- unified position on weapons destruction would tions: chairing the Peace Process Consultative facilitate the meeting of the Peace Process Con- sultative Committee (16-17 December), at which Committee, reporting on security and the subse- the national Government and Bougainville lead- quent destruction of contained weapons, moni- ers were expected to meet or modify some of the toring the constitutional process leading to adop- conditions enunciated by the Bougainville fac- tion of the Bougainville constitution, verifying tions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the and certifying substantial compliance by the par- stage III decision on the final fate of the weapons. ties with the weapons disposal plan, and per- UNPOB had prepared a statement on the admin- forming other good offices as appropriate. Given istrative and technical issues that needed to be ad- that limited role, the UNPOB staff would be re- dressed before the process of destruction could duced from six to a head of mission, one political begin and was grateful for the offers of technical adviser and two support staff, and consultations support pledged by regional partners to facilitate were taking place on sharing office space with the process. UNDP in Buka and Arawa, which would result in On the issue of police powers, the National substantial savings in both instances. The new Executive Council decided to delegate police mission would continue to work with UNDP and powers and functions to the Bougainville interim provincial government, with the formal hand- other UN bodies on practical aspects of peace- over scheduled for 16 or 17 December. Mean- building in Bougainville. UNDP was working on while, arrangements were being finalized for the second phase of its rehabilitation programme further strengthening Bougainville’s law and for Bougainville, which would include assistance justice capacity through the deployment of 30 in agriculture and capacity-building. Bougainville police from the mainland and the Communication. The Secretary-General, on recruitment of the first 50 to 100 Bougainvillean 19 December [S/2003/1198], informed the Council cadets for training. No progress was made on the President of his intention to establish, with the so-called “no go zone”, the area controlled by Council’s concurrence, a small follow-on UN ob- Francis Ona, who continued to refuse to contain server mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) for a pe- MDF’s weapons—a decision that could affect im- plementation of the BRA/BRF decision on the de- riod of six months, with the functions as outlined struction of their weapons. Mr. Ona’s supporters by the Assistant Secretary-General (above). On also maintained roadblocks to prevent the deliv- 23 December [S/2003/1199], the Council President ery of government services and development informed the Secretary-General that Council assistance to the zone. members had taken note of his intention to estab- Recalling the deadline set by the Council for lish UNOMB, and of the functions and staffing the closure and withdrawal of UNPOB, the Assist- structure outlined.

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Solomon Islands economic reform, improvement of the electoral Fiji, on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum system, democratization of society and promo- Group, transmitted to the Security Council Pres- tion of human rights. UNTOP played an impor- ident the Outcomes Statement of the Pacific Fo- tant role in strengthening the rule of law in rum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting (Sydney, Tajikistan and continued its support for the social Australia, 30 June) [S/2003/753], which outlined integration of ex-combatants and demobilized the response of Forum members to a request contractual soldiers through assistance for from Solomon Islands for regional assistance in vocational training for 270 ex-combatants. restoring peace and security. The Ministers agreed that the deterioration of law and order UNMOT financing had undermined the country’s stability and the On 17 April [A/57/792], the Secretary-General situation called for a concerted regional re- issued the final performance report of the sponse. In that regard, they welcomed an United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajik- assistance package proposed by Australia. istan (UNMOT), whose mandate expired in 2000 On 31 July [S/2003/799], Solomon Islands for- [YUN 2000, p. 314]. As at 30 June 2002, the total fund warded documents relating to the Australia-led balance was $8,903,000. Uncollected assessments Regional Assistance Mission, which was deployed and other receivables totalled $1,552,000. The to Solomon Islands to restore law and order and Secretary-General recommended that the Gen- economic recovery: a Solomon Islands govern- eral Assembly suspend the return of cash avail- ment policy statement on Australia’s offer of able for credit to Member States in the light of the assistance; the Facilitation International Assis- Organization’s overall financial situation and the tance Act 2003, adopted by Solomon Islands on 17 fact that, as at 15 March 2003, assessed contribu- July to make provisions for assistance to restore tions to peacekeeping in the amount of $1.5 law and order; and an Agreement between billion remained unpaid. Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga regarding the operations and status of the police and armed Turkey forces and other personnel deployed to Solomon On 15 November, a suicide bomb attack Islands. against two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, killed 25 people. Five days later, double bomb at- tacks on the British consulate and the HSBC bank Tajikistan headquarters in Istanbul left many more dead The Secretary-General, on 8 May [S/2003/542], and injured. informed the Security Council of his intention to On 20 November, the Security Council, in res- continue the activities of the United Nations olution 1516(2003) (see p. 65), condemned the Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP)for bomb attacks in Istanbul and other terrorist acts another year, until 1 June 2004, in view of its role in various countries. and the country’s need for continuing support in its post-conflict peace-building efforts. The Council took note of his intention on 13 May United Arab Emirates–Iran [S/2003/543]. UNTOP was established in 2000 [YUN 2000, p. 315] Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa following the withdrawal of the United Nations The United Arab Emirates, in an 11March let- Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). The ter to the Secretary-General [S/2003/302],re- Office continued to focus its activities during the quested that the Security Council retain on its year on the consolidation of peace and national agenda for 2003 the item entitled “Letter dated reconciliation, promotion of the rule of law, 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Represen- strengthening of democratic institutions and tatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic support for national capacity-building in the area and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen of human rights. The Secretary-General re- to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- ported that during the preceding year, UNTOP General (S/10409)”, concerning Iran’s occupa- continued a series of Political Discussion Club tion of three islands belonging to the United meetings, attended by a number of national and Arab Emirates, namely Greater Tunb, Lesser local government and military officials, and rep- Tunb and Abu Musa, until a settlement of the resentatives of the business community, civil related conflict was achieved by peaceful means society and the media, which focused on issues through direct negotiation or through recourse of national reconciliation, good governance, to the International Court of Justice.

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