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NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations Ii TABLE of CONTENTS

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NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations Ii TABLE of CONTENTS ABOUT THE NIAC The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) provides the President of the United States with advice on the security and resilience of the critical infrastructure sectors and their functional systems, physical assets, and cyber networks. These critical infrastructure sectors span the U.S. economy and include the Water; Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; and Transportation Systems Sectors. The NIAC also advises the lead Federal agencies that have critical infrastructure responsibilities. Specifically, the Council has been charged with making recommendations to: • Enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in securing and enhancing the security and resilience of critical infrastructure and their functional systems, physical assets, and cyber networks, and provide reports on this issue to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate. • Propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform periodic risk assessments and implement risk-reduction programs. • Monitor the development and operations of critical infrastructure sector coordinating councils and their information-sharing mechanisms, and provide recommendations to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security on how these organizations can best foster improved cooperation among the sectors, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal Government entities. • Report to the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security, who shall ensure appropriate coordination with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. • Advise Sector-Specific agencies with critical infrastructure responsibilities, to include issues pertaining to sector and government coordinating councils and their information-sharing mechanisms. NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1 I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 7 A. Framing the Study ...................................................................................................................... 8 B. Study Resources and Activities ................................................................................................... 8 II. Water Sector Operational Snapshot ..................................................................................... 10 A. Key Aspects of the Water Sector .............................................................................................. 10 B. Federal and State Partners Ensure Water Quality and Support Restoration ........................... 14 C. Industry Partners Operate with a Strong History of Collaboration .......................................... 16 III. Water Sector Risks and Critical Interdependencies ................................................................ 18 A. Tight Interdependencies Create High Consequences of Water Service Degradation and Loss 18 B. Aging Infrastructure, Cyber Dependency, and Severe Weather Create High-Priority Risks .... 21 IV. Water infrastructure Resilience Today .................................................................................. 28 A. Current Practice ........................................................................................................................ 28 B. Challenges ................................................................................................................................. 32 C. Indicators of Progress ............................................................................................................... 32 V. Findings and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 35 A. Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 35 B. Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 38 C. Next Steps ................................................................................................................................. 44 Appendix A. Acknowledgements............................................................................................... 46 Appendix B. Compendium of Information from Subject Matter Experts ..................................... 51 Appendix C. Disruption Scenario Case Study ............................................................................. 80 Appendix D. Study Group Findings and Conclusions ................................................................... 92 Appendix E. Compendium of Prior Recommendations .............................................................. 99 Appendix F. Federal Policies, Agencies, and Activities ............................................................. 122 Appendix G. Baseline Resilience in the Water Sector ............................................................... 138 Appendix H. The Flint Water Crisis .......................................................................................... 162 Appendix I. Collaborative Tools and Practices ........................................................................ 166 Appendix J. References and Resources ................................................................................... 172 Appendix K. Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 203 NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations iii Page Intentionally Blank NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Water is often called our most precious resource, and with good reason— clean drinking water and wastewater treatment services1 sustain core functions of critical infrastructure, communities, and human life itself. Without water services, factories shut down, hospitals close, communities are disrupted, and most hotels, restaurants, and businesses cease operations. Water is a lifeline sector that serves businesses and communities on a daily basis and brings them back to normal after a disaster, which makes maintaining water services and quickly restoring them a priority. Because the sector has a track record of reliable service with few major disruptions, the infrastructure that delivers water often goes unnoticed and undervalued by decision-makers and the public-at-large. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) was asked to 1) assess security and resilience in the Water Sector, 2) uncover key water resilience issues, and 3) identify potential opportunities to address these issues. The Council formed a NIAC Working Group to examine water resilience using the framework developed in the NIAC’s 2010 study on establishing resilience goals. This six-member group of NIAC members examined national-level issues related to water infrastructure systems based upon each of their own unique experience from across a myriad of sectors, numerous specific interviews with subject matter experts, and valuable input from the Study Group, support the findings and recommendations in the report. The crisis in Flint, Michigan reveals how a loss of safe drinking water in a compromised water infrastructure can devastate a community. Yet this tragedy belies another critical risk: the loss of water services can cripple other critical infrastructures and trigger additional disruptions. An analysis of vulnerability assessments conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) revealed that among surveyed critical infrastructure that depend upon water for core operations, services are degraded 50 percent or more within eight hours of losing drinking water services (Exhibit ES-1).2 The same holds true for a loss of wastewater treatment services. For example, the OCIA analysis noted that nearly all hospital functions could be degraded within two hours due to a loss of external wastewater discharge services. Yet, many infrastructure owners and operators do not have alternative sources of water or wastewater services. As a result, the full consequences of cascading failures from extended water service disruptions in critical sectors are not well understood. 1 “Water services” are used throughout this report to refer to both drinking water and wastewater treatment services. It does not include upstream water resources and separate storm water systems. Chapter I. Introduction, Section A. Framing the Study describes the scope of this study in detail. 2 DHS OCIA, Sector Resilience Report, 2014. NIAC Water Sector Resilience Final Report and Recommendations 1 Exhibit ES-1. Critical Infrastructure Dependence on Water and Potential Function Degradation Following Loss of Water Services3 3 The information provided in the graphic is based on a limited sample of 2,661 voluntary facility assessments conducted between January 2011 and April 2014
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