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On Music's Subtle Expressiveness AVANT, Vol. VII, No. 1/2016 ISSN: 2082-6710 avant.edu.pl/en DOI: 10.26913/70102016.0111.0002 On Music’s Subtle Expressiveness Myriam Albor Institute for Philosophical Research, UNAM Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [email protected] Abstract I suggest that emotions are not the primary affective attitude towards music. If we are to explain music’s expressiveness according to the Resemblance Theory, that theory should be extended to include feelings. Because of the lack of intentionality in music and the dearth of universal emotional gestures to explain the subtlety of music’s expressive power, explaining this expressiveness by making recourse to music’s relationships with emotions is bound to face challenges. I will argue that, even though the movements in music asso- ciated with musical expressiveness might not necessarily be associated with emotions, they might very well be associated with certain feelings of the movement itself. Keywords: emotions; expressive qualities; feelings; music’s subtle gestures; musical ex⁠pressiveness; musical gestures; Resemblance Theory. In his seminal book On the Musically Beautiful, Eduard Hanslick claimed that emotions1 are not the content of music. Even though I want to argue in favor of musical expressive- ness, I consider that the grounds Hanslick used to argue against the relationship between emotions and music are quite accurate. Letus start by reviewing them. Hanslick considered that emotions are not only dependent upon physiological conditions, but also upon ideas, judgments, and rational thought. Emotions are thus intelligible. His account is consistent with what became known as a “cognitive approach” to the analysis of emotions, and what is highlighted by such an account is the fact that emotions are in- tentional. Contrastingly, music does not seem to be able to embrace intentionality. One of the theories of musical expressiveness that has successfully dealt with the challenges that 1 The term Hanslick actually used is “feelings,” but he used it as I use the term “emotions.” As I will explain further on, I take “emotions” to be complex processes that include various other processes such as intentionality, appraisals, action tendencies, physiological changes, monitoring, and feelings. I interpret “feelings” in turn as phenomenological readouts of bodily and/or cognitive states of the individual. It should be clear that feelings are elements of emotions, but that not everything an individual feels (e.g., a pain in the foot) is necessarily a part of an emotional process. 37 AVANT Vol. VII, No. 1/2016 the lack of intentionality poses is the Resemblance Theory, versions of which have been set forth by Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies. However, this theory has the serious limitation of providing an explanation for very general expressive properties that do not cover the scope of music’s subtle expressiveness. The aim of this paper is to suggest broadening the scope of the Resemblance Theory in order to include the resemblance to feelings as a significant source of music’s subtle expressiveness. I will begin by exposing Hanslick’s arguments against the possible theories that could account for a relationship between music and emotions; i.e., the arousal approach, the expression approach, and the expressive qualities approach (a.k.a. the Resemblance The- ory). I will then present the Resemblance Theory, along with some historical examples that will shed light upon the different kinds of resemblances with affective phenomena to be found in music. It will then become evident that in order to continue the debate we must clarify and agree upon what emotions are. Thus, next I will briefly review the arguments in favor of emotion theories. Finally, I will present my own suggestion, which, again, is to extend the Resemblance Theory to include a resemblance to feelings related to movement. Hanslick’s rejection The main argument Hanslick poses against the idea of music being expressive of emotions is that music does not seem to be able to embrace intentionality. Music cannot express emotions, according to Hanslick, because it cannot represent the emotion’s object or its cognitive elements. In other words, emotions are about something, and that “aboutness” usually cannot be found in music.2 According to the cognitive approach, in an emotional process there are some beliefs that are directed toward an object—the object of the emotion; and these beliefs are what makes any emotion specific. So Hanslick considered that it is impossible to have an emotion of, say, love without the representation of a beloved person, and so forth. The feeling of hope cannot be separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with the present; melancholy compares past happiness with the present. These are entirely specific representations or concepts. Without them, without this cogni- tive apparatus, we cannot call the actual feeling “hope” or “melancholy”; it produces them for this purpose. If we take this away, all that remains is an unspecific stirring, perhaps the awareness of a general state of well-being or distress. (Hanslick 1891: 9) Now then, we can survey our options for characterizing music’s relationship with emo- tions as follows: Either a direct relationship (as if the emotion belonged to the music itself) or an indirect relationship (when it is not the music that has an emotion, for music rather represents it). A direct relationship between music and emotions as possession is obviously not the best way to explain musical expressiveness. For indeed, if emotions strongly de- pend on cognitive activity and physiological responses, they have to be held by a sentient 2 I will be referring strictly to non-programmatic instrumental music. 38 After the Rite / Po obrzędzie (and possibly even rational being). Since music is not a sentient or rational being, music cannot have emotions, nor express them as if it were the emotion’s subject. To attribute emotions to the music itself would be to commit the pathetic fallacy.3 On the other hand, characterizing the relationship as indirect comes with its own chal- lenges. If the relationship between music and emotions that we are supposing is indirect, this would mean that it is either someone else that is experiencing the emotion, or that music represents the emotion. And so in the attempt to understand the relationship between music and emotions, we should begin by wondering whose emotions we care about, whether the composer’s, the performer’s, the listener’s, or none. Thus there are mainly three perspectives to explain musical expressiveness from an indirect approach: an expres- sion account (for which music would be expressive insofar as the composer or the per- former expresses her emotions through the music she makes); an arousal account (according to which music is expressive in that it arouses the listeners with emotions); and the expressive qualities approach (for which music itself possesses expressive features that are related to emotions in such a way that it can represent emotions).4 Hanslick argued against these three ways of music’s indirect relationship with emotions, and his arguments also focus on the lack of intentionality in the musical experiences, com- bined with a cognitive account of emotions, according to which emotions are necessarily intentional. This is a reconstruction of Hanslick’s arguments: 1. Against arousal: There is no intentional object in pure music. Therefore, the lis- teners’ emotional response is not about the music. Thus, their emotional arousal cannot constitute an account about the expressiveness of music. 2. Against expressive qualities: There is no strong connection between the musical formal characteristics, and the emotions and therefore the “expressive qualities” are irrelevant. That is because Hanslick considers that intentionality is absolutely nec- essary in order to constitute an emotion, and that the “expressive qualities” that music presents can be related to emotions only in a vague fashion if they are exhib- ited without the relevant belief that defines any emotion. Thus, since emotions are definite due to their intentionality and a relevant belief which music does not present, it follows that music’s expressive qualities cannot refer to any particular emotion. 3 However, if we do attribute emotions to the music anyway, that might be because there is another sense in which we say a musical piece is, say, sad, which does not commit us to the claim that the musical piece (as a non-sentient being) is undergoing an emotional episode. Rather, as Stephen Davies suggests (1994), we may say a musical piece is sad in the same way we say a mask is sad because it possesses certain features that we find characteristic of sadness. Nevertheless, I consider that this other sense would be better explained as an indirect relationship. 4 There are more recent and presumably stronger versions of the expression and arousal theories. The “persona theory,” defended by Jenefer Robinson (2005) and Jerrold Levinson (1990, 2005), stands as a contemporary version of the expression theory, of which we will get to talk further on. On the other hand, Matravers (1998) has put forth a stronger version of the arousal theory than the traditional one. According to Matravers, music arouses the listener with a feeling, which she then categorizes as an emotion. For the sake of the clarity of the argument, however, I will for now merely sketch the traditional versions of the expression and the arousal theories. 39 AVANT Vol. VII, No. 1/2016 3. Against expression: From the claim that there is no intentional object in music and, hence, no relevant object-directed belief, plus the claim that there is not a strong connection between music and expressive qualities, it also follows that the composer cannot really express a definite emotion through the manipulation of the matter. Indeed, one of the most challenging problems to explain musical expressiveness in terms of emotions is the lack of intentionality in musical “emotional” experiences, and that seems to be a necessary condition for emotions to happen.
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