19 GEO V 1928 No 58 British Nationality and Status Of
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The Evolution of Australian Citizenship*
One Hundred Years of (Almost) Solitude: the Evolution of Australian Citizenship* Helen Irving On 1 January 1901, six of the Australasian colonies joined together in one ‘indissoluble federal Commonwealth’, as the words of the Preamble to the Australian Constitution put it. Massive celebrations accompanied the inauguration of the Commonwealth. They were repeated for the opening of the First Federal Parliament four months later, and again, around the new nation, for the tour of the Duke and Duchess of York that followed. The celebrations stretched over the first six months of that year. There were parades, banquets, picnics, sporting competitions, exhibitions and historical re- enactments. Streets were decorated, poems were composed, songs were sung, medals were struck, prisoners were pardoned, and fireworks lit again and again. What was being celebrated? Among the many other achievements of that day, Australians who read their newspapers learned on 1 January 1901, that they had become Australian citizens. It was a rather curious claim to make. There had been an attempt in 1898 to write a definition of citizenship into the Australian Constitution, but it had failed. Although the delegates to the Federal Convention laboured long and hard in their effort to say just what it was to be a citizen—traversing legal and political rights, as well as cultural attributes—the Constitution’s framers could not settle on a definition. * This paper was presented as a lecture in the Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series at Parliament House on 22 June 2001. Legally, Australians were British subjects, not citizens. To use the term ‘citizen’ meant going beyond this simple fact. -
Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen
Fordham Law Review Volume 75 Issue 5 Article 10 2007 Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen Mae M. Ngai Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2521 (2007). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss5/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen Cover Page Footnote Professor of History, Columbia University. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss5/10 BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND THE ALIEN CITIZEN Mae M. Ngai* The alien citizen is an American citizen by virtue of her birth in the United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if not denied, on account of the racialized identity of her immigrant ancestry. In this construction, the foreignness of non-European peoples is deemed unalterable, making nationality a kind of racial trait. Alienage, then, becomes a permanent condition, passed from generation to generation, adhering even to the native-born citizen. Qualifiers like "accidental" citizen,1 "presumed" citizen,2 or even "terrorist" citizen3 have been used in political and legal arguments to denigrate, compromise, and nullify the U.S. citizenship of "unassimilable" Chinese, "enemy-race" Japanese, Mexican .aA X4 -1,;- otreit." "illegal aliens," 1.1 -U1 .-O-.. -
Alien Removals and Returns: Overview and Trends
Alien Removals and Returns: Overview and Trends Updated February 3, 2015 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R43892 Alien Removals and Returns: Overview and Trends Summary The ability to remove foreign nationals (aliens) who violate U.S. immigration law is central to the immigration enforcement system. Some lawful migrants violate the terms of their admittance, and some aliens enter the United States illegally, despite U.S. immigration laws and enforcement. In 2012, there were an estimated 11.4 million resident unauthorized aliens; estimates of other removable aliens, such as lawful permanent residents who commit crimes, are elusive. With total repatriations of over 600,000 people in FY2013—including about 440,000 formal removals—the removal and return of such aliens have become important policy issues for Congress, and key issues in recent debates about immigration reform. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides broad authority to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain foreign nationals from the United States, including unauthorized aliens (i.e., foreign nationals who enter without inspection, aliens who enter with fraudulent documents, and aliens who enter legally but overstay the terms of their temporary visas) and lawfully present foreign nationals who commit certain acts that make them removable. Any foreign national found to be inadmissible or deportable under the grounds specified in the INA may be ordered removed. The INA describes procedures for making and reviewing such a determination, and specifies conditions under which certain grounds of removal may be waived. DHS officials may exercise certain forms of discretion in pursuing removal orders, and certain removable aliens may be eligible for permanent or temporary relief from removal. -
Aliens (Consolidation) Act
K:\Flygtningeministeriet\2002\bekg\510103\510103.fm 31-10-02 10:7 k03 pz Consolidation Act No. 608 of 17 July 2002 of the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs Aliens (Consolidation) Act The following is a consolidation of the Aliens Act, cf. Consolidation Act No. 711 of 1 August 2001, with the amendments following from Act No. 134 of 20 March 20021), section 2 of Act No. 193 of 5 April 2002, Act No. 362 of 6 June 2002, section 1 of Act No. 365 of 6 June 2002 and Act No. 367 of 6 June 20022). Parts of the amendments following from Act No. 134 of 20 March 2002 and Act No. 367 of 6 June 2002 have not been incorporated into this Consolidation Act, as the amendments have not yet entered into force. The time of their entering into force will be determined by the Minister, cf. section 2 of the Acts. Part I EC rules only to the extent that these limitations are compatible with those rules. Aliens' entry into and stay in Denmark (4) The Minister for Refugee, Immigration and 1. Nationals of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Integration Affairs lays down more detailed pro- Sweden may enter and stay in Denmark without visions on the implementation of the rules of the special permission. European Community on visa exemption and on 2. (1) Aliens who are nationals of a country abolition of entry and residence restrictions in which is a member of the European Community connection with the free movement of workers, or comprised by the Agreement on the European freedom of establishment and freedom to pro- Economic Area may enter and stay in Denmark vide and receive services, etc. -
British Nationality Act 1981
Status: This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to legislation: There are outstanding changes not yet made by the legislation.gov.uk editorial team to British Nationality Act 1981. Any changes that have already been made by the team appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) British Nationality Act 1981 1981 CHAPTER 61 An Act to make fresh provision about citizenship and nationality, and to amend the Immigration Act 1971 as regards the right of abode in the United Kingdom. [30th October 1981] Annotations: Modifications etc. (not altering text) C1 Act extended by British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983 (c. 6, SIF 87), s. 3(1); restricted by British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983 (c. 6, SIF 87), s. 3(2); amended by S.I. 1983/1699, art. 2(1) and amended by British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990 (c. 34, SIF 87), s. 2(1) C2 Act modified: (18.7.1996) by 1996 c. 41, s. 2(1); (19.3.1997) by 1997 c. 20, s. 2(1) C3 Act applied (19.3.1997) by 1997 c. 20, s. 1(8) C4 Act amended (2.10.2000) by S.I. 2000/2326, art. 8 C5 Act modified (21.5.2002) by British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (c. 8), s. 3(3); S.I. 2002/1252, art. 2 C6 Act modified (21.5.2002) by British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (c. 8), s. 6(2); S.I. 2002/1252, art. 2 Act modified (21.5.2002) by British Overseas Territories Act 2002 (c. -
20190619135814870 18-725 Barton Opp.Pdf
No. 18-725 In the Supreme Court of the United States ANDRE MARTELLO BARTON, PETITIONER v. WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION NOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General Counsel of Record JOSEPH H. HUNT Assistant Attorney General DONALD E. KEENER JOHN W. BLAKELEY TIMOTHY G. HAYES Attorneys Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 [email protected] (202) 514-2217 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the stop-time rule, which governs the cal- culation of an alien’s period of continuous residence in the United States for purposes of eligibility for cancel- lation of removal, may be triggered by an offense that “renders the alien inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B), when the alien is a lawful permanent resident who is not seeking admission. (I) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Opinions below .............................................................................. 1 Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1 Statement ...................................................................................... 1 Argument ....................................................................................... 6 Conclusion ................................................................................... 14 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ardon v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 449 Fed. Appx. 116 (3d Cir. 2011) ...................................................................... -
Immigration Law and the Myth of Comprehensive Registration
Immigration Law and the Myth of Comprehensive Registration Nancy Morawetz†* and Natasha Fernández-Silber** This Article identifies an insidious misconception in immigration law and policy: the myth of comprehensive registration. According to this myth — proponents of which include members of the Supreme Court, federal and state officials, and commentators on both sides of the immigration federalism debate — there exists a comprehensive federal alien registration system; this scheme obligates all non-citizens in the United States to register and carry registration cards at all times, or else face criminal sanction. In truth, no such system exists today, nor has one ever existed in American history. Yet, federal agencies like U.S. Border Patrol refer to such a system to justify arrests and increase enforcement statistics; the Department of Justice points to the same mythic system to argue statutory preemption of state immigration laws (rather than confront the discriminatory purpose and effect of those laws); and, states trot it out in an attempt to turn civil immigration offenses into criminal infractions. Although this legal fiction is convenient for a variety of disparate political institutions, it is far from convenient for those who face wrongful arrest and detention based on nothing more than failure to carry proof of status. Individuals in states with aggressive “show me your papers” immigration laws or under the presence of U.S. Border Patrol are particularly at risk. In an effort to dispel this dangerous misconception, this Article reviews the history of America’s experimentation with registration laws and the † Copyright © 2014 Nancy Morawetz and Natasha Fernández-Silber. -
Alienage Jurisdiction and “Stateless” Persons and Corporations After Traffic Stream
PUTTING THE “ALIEN” BACK INTO ALIENAGE JURISDICTION: ALIENAGE JURISDICTION AND “STATELESS” PERSONS AND CORPORATIONS AFTER TRAFFIC STREAM Robert Bernheim∗ INTRODUCTION In 1994, the representatives for nine Palestinians killed by Israeli dispersion of CS gas (teargas) brought a wrongful death suit against the American manufacturer of the gas in a federal district court.1 However, Judge William L. Standish dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.2 The problem was that the case was based on alienage diversity jurisdiction, but the Palestinian plaintiffs were neither citizens nor subjects of any recognized state.3 This disturbing example is not an isolated jurisdictional fluke. Many companies have not been able to take advantage of U.S. federal courts because they are based out of foreign dependencies of other nations.4 Alternatively, American plaintiffs have occasionally been frustrated in their attempts to hold stateless parties accountable.5 The analysis of the law in this area is limited and unclear, and Abu-Zeineh was perfectly positioned to expose cracks in the system. Resolution of the ambiguities and contradictions in this area would streamline private international law practice, alleviate unfairness to often marginalized groups, and support the welfare and commerce of the United States. ∗ J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, 2006. I want to thank Michael Catlett, Roopali Desai, Joe Lin, Tom Raine, and Lindsay St. John for their valuable suggestions. Special thanks also go to Ann Redd and Emily Gust for understanding the madness. 1. Abu-Zeineh v. Fed. Labs., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. -
U.S. Naturalization Policy
U.S. Naturalization Policy Updated May 3, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R43366 U.S. Naturalization Policy Summary Naturalization is the process that grants U.S. citizenship to lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who fulfill requirements established by Congress and enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In general, U.S. immigration policy gives all LPRs the opportunity to naturalize, and doing so is voluntary. To qualify for citizenship, LPRs in most cases must have resided continuously in the United States for five years, show they possess good moral character, demonstrate English language ability, and pass a U.S. government and history examination, which is part of their naturalization interview. The INA waives some of these requirements for applicants over age 50 with 20 years of U.S. residency, those with mental or physical disabilities, and those who have served in the U.S. military. Naturalization is often viewed as a milestone for immigrants and a measure of their civic and socioeconomic integration to the United States. Naturalized immigrants gain important benefits, including the right to vote, security from deportation in most cases, access to certain public-sector jobs, and the ability to travel with a U.S. passport. U.S. citizens are also advantaged over LPRs for sponsoring relatives to immigrate to the United States. During the past three decades, the number of LPRs who submitted naturalization applications has varied over time, ranging from a low of about 207,000 applications in FY1991 to a high of 1.4 million in FY1997. In FY2020, 967,755 LPRs submitted naturalization applications. -
The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment
19471 The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment Edwin E. Ferguson* T HEPAST few years have seen a surge of, activity by California law-enforcement officers, aided by new state legislation and aug- mented appropriations, in the investigation of possible violations of the alien land law and the institution of escheat proceedings. By the summer of 1945 approximately thirty escheat actions had been begun, judgments in favor of the state had been entered in four of them, and out-of-court settlements of $100,000 and $25,000, respectively, had been effected in two others.' By the spring of 1946 some fifty actions were pending. All of these suits involved agricultural lands and were directed against persons of Japanese ancestry.2 Additional suits have since been filed.' The alien land law, first enacted in 1913, denies to aliens ineligi- ble for citizenship the right to own, lease, or otherwise enjoy land, except to the extent provided by treaty.4 Despite the manifest dis- crimination against one class of aliens and the deprivation of prop- erty rights involved, the United States Supreme Court in 1923 upheld the law, concluding that it did not violate the equal protection and due process guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The new wave of escheat actions has resulted in a new test of the law. Late in 1946, in an appeal from a judgment of escheat which again raised the equal protection and due process issues, the California supreme court re- affirmed the constitutionality of the law in People v. Oyama,6 relying upon the rationale provided by the 1923 decisions. -
UK and Colonies 1. General 1.1 Before 1 January 1949
UK and Colonies 1. General 1.1 Before 1 January 1949, the principal form of nationality was British subject status, which was obtained by virtue of a connection with a place within the Crown's dominions. On and after this date, the main form of nationality was citizenship of the UK and Colonies, which was obtained by virtue of a connection with a place within the UK and Colonies. 2. Meaning of the expression 2.1 On 1 January 1949, all the territories within the Crown's dominions came within the UK and Colonies except for the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan and Ceylon (see "DOMINIONS") and Southern Rhodesia, which were identified by s.1(3) of the BNA 1948 as independent Commonwealth countries. Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act defined "colony" as excluding any such country. Also excluded from the UK and Colonies was Southern Ireland, although it was not an independent Commonwealth country. 2.2 For the purposes of the BNA 1948, the UK included Northern Ireland and, as of 10 February 1972, the Island of Rockall, but excluded the Channel Islands and Isle of Man which, under s.32(1), were colonies. 2.3 The significance of a territory which came within the UK and Colonies was, of course, that by virtue of a connection with such a territory a person could become a CUKC. Persons who, prior to 1 January 1949, had become British subjects by birth, naturalisation, annexation or descent as a result of a connection with a territory which, on that date, came within the UK and Colonies were automatically re- classified as CUKCs (s.12(1)-(2)). -
120 Uth May, 1
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRIT ANISIC MAJESTY'3 GOVERNMENT) jLIJLJLJLI COPY NO. ^0 CP. (h.8) 120 Uth May, 1 9I48. CABINET BRITISH NATIONALITY BILL Memorandum by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth. Relations This Bill, which is awaiting Second Reading in the House of Lords, provides that all persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or citizens of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and Ceylon, shall, by virtue of their respective citizenships, be British subjects. It also provides that citizens of Eire, although not British subjects, shall, in the United Kingdom and Colonies, be in a position under existing legislation equivalent to that of British subjects. Inoha have asked that in place of the' term "British subjects1 ', which is in their view open to misunderstanding, there should be substituted some term such as "Commonwealth citizens" or "citizens of the Commonwealth". 2. The people of many countries of the Commonwealth are proud to be described as British subjects, and could not be asked to abandon this title. To the people, however, of certain other Commonwealth countries, the term "British subject" has an entirely different significance and seems to indicate the continued domination of them by the inhabitants of the British Isles. There are obvious objections to compelling the countries where the term "British subject" is unwelcome to accept this label as a condition of remaining within the Commonwealth. The Bill recognises the desire of the people of Eire to rid themselves of the label "British subject", and it seems right to give the people of other Commonwealth countries liberty to describe themselves, if they so wish, by some term other than "British subject".