Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Sep 29 21:37:28 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. Christian Tomuschat, Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT'l & COMP. L. 157 (2002). ALWD 6th ed. Tomuschat, C. ., Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 157 (2002). APA 7th ed. Tomuschat, C. (2002). Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 10, 157-184. Chicago 17th ed. Christian Tomuschat, "Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations," Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 10 (2002): 157-184 McGill Guide 9th ed. Christian Tomuschat, "Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations" (2002) 10 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 157. AGLC 4th ed. Christian Tomuschat, 'Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations' (2002) 10 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 157. MLA 8th ed. Tomuschat, Christian. "Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations." Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 10, 2002, p. 157-184. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. Christian Tomuschat, 'Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations' (2002) 10 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 157 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Christian Tomuschaf I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 157 II. N Ew TRENDs .................................................................................... 158 11. THE BALANCE SHEET ....................................................................... 161 A. Intemationallnstruments ....................................................... 161 B. IntemationalCustomaryLaw ................................................ 173 IV THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THEAPPLICABLE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ....................................................................... 174 A. NecessaryDistnctios........................................................... 174 B. Intemal Con l t ..................................................................... 175 C IntemationalArmedConflict................................................. 176 D. A ssessment ............................................................................. 180 V CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST INDIVIDUAL PERPETRATORS? ............................................... ................................ 181 VI. GENERAL CONCLUSION ................................................................... 183 I. INTRODUCTION Few would argue that persons suffering a grave breach of their human rights should not have a right to full reparation. This rule would seem to belong to the body of natural justice. The law of torts was already highly developed in ancient times. Roman jurists had no doubt that, in principle, the person responsible for an act causing injury was under a duty to compensate his victim.' Therefore, why should individuals whose rights have been infringed by their government not have a reparation claim as well? Furthermore, because humankind has entered the international stage, why should such a claim not be rooted in international law? Because today states are obligated to comply with human rights and fundamental freedoms not only vis-A-vis their citizens, but vis-A-vis everyone under their jurisdiction or under their control (and perhaps even towards everyone affected by their conduct), it would appear logical that a further step must be taken. Under national domestic * Humboldt University, Berlin. 1. See MAX KASER, DAS ROMISCHE PRIATRECHT 129 (1959). 158 TULANE JI OFINT'L & COMP LA W [Vol. 10 systems, as well as under traditional international law, the breach of a primary substantive rule entails, automatically, the emergence of secondary rules. The damage caused by an unlawful act is generally deemed to require reparation. Little imagination is needed to extend this simple rule to the "new" international law, the human-being-oriented international law, which is still developing and has yet to be fully realized. In fact, the classical doctrines have long since been overcome. In 1905, Lassa Oppenheim stated in the first edition of his famous treatise: "Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only, and since States are the sole exclusive subjects of International Law, individuals are mere objects of International Law, and the latter is unable to confer directly rights and duties upon individuals."3 Similarly, in 1906, the well-known author Dionisio Anzilotti wrote: "la conduite d'un -ta4 toute contaire qu'elle soit au droit intenadonal, ne sauraitjamaisdonnernaissance j un droitdo l'Pnchdidtj la r6pamtion da dommage souffert' Such dogma has lost its foundation. If and when the existence of individual reparation claims under international law might be denied still today, other grounds would have to be adduced to justify such denial. Albeit to a limited extent, in the contemporary world the individual can derive many entitlements directly from international law. This is particularly true in the field of human rights. Because states are bound (by primary obligations) to respect and ensure basic rights of human beings, it seems to require only a small step to conclude that, in the case of a breach of such obligations, a (secondary) duty to make reparation arises from the same legal source. II. NEW TRENDS Those who wish to tread progressive paths can find considerable encouragement. To begin, one may refer to the now venerable opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Bernadotte case of 1949.' For the first time in international judicial practice, the ICJ acknowledged that, like a state seeking redress for damage inficted upon one of its nationals, an international organization may claim reparation if one of its 2. CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITy OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1928) ("Obligation, simply put, is the owing of a duty; and, behind it, claiming the performance of that duty, is responsibility."). 3. 1 LEONARD OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONALLAw § 149, at 200 (1905). 4. Dionisio Anzilotti, La responsabilit internatonaledes Etats j raisondes dommages souffertspardes A'mnger, 13 REvuE GtNRALE DE DROrr INT'L PuB. 5 (1906). 5. SeeAdvisory Opinion, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11). 2002] VICTIMS OF GRA VE HUMAN RIGHTS 159 agents becomes the victim of a wrongful act by a classic subject of international law, i.e., a state." Thus, the road seems to be well-paved. To the extent that new subjects of international law emerge, one might conclude that they will enjoy the same rights as traditional subjects, provided that the nature of the rights at issue permits the rights to be conferred upon the new subjects. The rules on international responsibility seem to embody the type of regulation that can be moved easily from its original scope of application mtone personae to other, noninter-state relationships. The United States has a strong propensity to argue in accordance with the intellectual framework just outlined. If international law had not provided a fitting background, U.S. tribunals would never have construed the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), with the boldness that has characterized their jurisprudence.! The statute grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' Instead of strictly construing the ATCA, it has been interpreted as providing a substantive cause of action This has stimulated further U.S. legislation. A 1996 amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, created a large opening through which claims may be brought against foreign states.' States officially certified by the United States as sponsors of terrorism were denied the traditional protection of state immunity. Furthermore, the amendment intended to create a cause of action." One of the most spectacular cases to arise under this framework is Flatow v Islamic Republic oflran, in which the District Court for the District of Columbia awarded financial compensation in the amount of US$247 million in a proceeding against Iran." Michelle Flatow, a U.S. student, had been killed by a suicide terrorist attack during her stay in Israel." The judgment was based on the assumption that the terrorist group 6. Id at 183-84. 7. SeeAlienTort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). 8. Id 9. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILTY FOR HUMtAN RirIrs ATRocrriEs iN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NURE.%MBERG LEGACY 242 (2d ed. 2001); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting the ATCA as providing a substantive cause of action); c£ DINAH SHELTON, REEDIES INITER TIOAL Hu.tA RIGHiTS LAw 87-89 (1999) (discussing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 866 E Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995)). 10. SeeAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(ag7) (1994 & Supp.2000). 11. See id 12. 999 E Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). 13. Id at7-8. TULANEJ OFINT'L & COMP.LA W [Vol. 10 perpetrating the fatal attack had been