Chindia's Energy Curse
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COMMENTARY little can be done about rural indebtedness Now, on the other hand, corporate entities 3 There are nonetheless some dissenting voices which are heartening. For instance, see Kanitkar (2010). (except shedding tears) b ecause its eco- and groups have a wide range of economic 4 Apart from receiving the Padma Bhushan in 2010, nomic/political causes cannot be identi- interests and most of them are also Aamir Khan has also shared a platform on educa- tion with visiting US Secretary of State Hillary Clin- fied. The “public” acclaim for the film will i ncreasingly involved in the media. This ton, something which could not have happened perhaps reinforce the government’s5 faith means that capital presents a united front without the government’s tacit approval. The reason was apparently his film Taare Zameen Par (2007) in gestures – the same kind of gestures that against social and economic criticism, as it about educating a mentally disadvantaged child. Peepli Live blandly criticises it for making. were. If this is granted, there is perhaps a 5 Ronamai (2010) also notes that LK Advani was also all praise for Aamir Khan. The acceptance of the To conclude, it will be useful to specu- greater degree of censorship today – at the film by politicians of different ideological hues (the late briefly about why, despite its concern, level of ideation – although the censoring Congress as well as the BJP) confirms that Peepli Live is politically and economically non-committal. Peepli Live is more timid in its social criti- authority is not the State but the economy. cism than films like Mother India, Ganga References Jumna and Upkaar. The reason, I propose, Notes Kanitkar, Tejal (2010): “Images and Politics in Peepli is that the corporatisation of the economy 1 The term “Bollywood” came into use as late as in Live”, Pragoti: Progress and Struggle, 27 August, has lent versatility to capital that it did not the new millennium, and was resisted by doyens available at http://www.pragoti.org/node/4114 of the film industry in India because they took the MacFarquhar, Neil (2010): “Banks Making Big Profits possess in the 1950s and 1960s. To elabo- term to be pejorative, i.e. that mainstream Hindi from Tiny Loans”, New York Times, 13 April, available rate, it might have been possible for film cinema simply aped Hollywood. The indications at http://www/nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/ now are that the term “Bollywood” first became 14microfinance.html?r=1&ref=todayspaper production to be more independent earlier acceptable currency around 2002-03 not within Ronamai, Raymond (2010): “Indian Prime Minister because it was not reliant on other India but in the United Kingdom and the United Watches Peepli Live”, 30 August, available at States of America, in places like Bradford, Leices- http://entertainment.oneindia.in/bollywood/ s ections of the economy – moneylenders, ter and Birmingham, where Hindi films are mar- news/2010/manmohan-peepli-live-300810.html landowners and traders, for instance, who keted as a brand with “Bollywood” becoming a Vasudevan, Ravi (undated): “The Meanings of ‘Bolly- kind of handy label. See Vasudevan (undated). wood’”, Journal of the Moving Image, available at are attacked in the above three films. 2 For instance, see MacFarquhar (2010). http://www.jmionline.org/jmi7_8.htm and is courting supply agreements with Chindia’s Energy Curse Russia. It also spread its horizons to Latin America, tapping deep into Venezuelan and Brazilian reserves. Christian Brütsch, Matthew Hulbert Distracted by its nuclear ambitions and environmental chatter, India ended up in After mulling over whether he Chindia cracks have been show- China’s energy wake. According to some China and India should divide ing for some time now. The widely calculations, energy firms in India lost hydrocarbon reserves among Thailed 2006 memorandum of un- business worth more than $12.5 billion to derstandings on upstream exploration, oil their Chinese competitors in 2009 alone. themselves, the Government of refining and pipelines was a bold political There simply is too much China in Chindia, India has told its energy majors gesture invoking “South-South” coopera- and it is too close for comfort. A brief to sign up more contracts no tion to quell a long-standing regional glimpse on a map leaves no doubt that matter what. But Delhi is in a r ivalry. But it was not designed as a frame- I ndia ought to hold the geographical aces work to manage the political frictions that in the Bay of Bengal. But the generals in bind. To compete with China’s usually come with competitive upstream Naypyidaw thought it more expedient to oil giants, India’s energy firms resource acquisition. Without significant sign pipeline contracts that will fuel the will have to bulk up. If they do, follow-ups, it failed to gain operational development of China’s western regions. they risk triggering a new round traction and fell short of dividing substan- To say that Delhi must catch up would be tive reserves under a “gentleman’s agree- an u nderstatement. of resource contestation India ment”, let alone a common energy policy. cannot win – or can it? Discreet blocs in Sudan, Iran, Ecuador and Chasing the Dragon’s Tail Syria were the only assets that ever made Some analysts might object that we are it on the collective table. too harsh: Indian companies have been In the meantime, China has been busy trying to secure reserves, and they have expanding its presence in central Asia; had some success. Partnering with Mittal grasping new reserves in Australia and Investments, Oil and Natural Gas Corpo- south-east Asia; and cementing its position ration (ONGC) cleverly used infrastructure as the leading Asian energy player in west joint ventures to secure initial reserves Christian Brütsch ([email protected]) is at the Africa (including Nigeria, Angola and from Ashkhabad. ONGC’s overseas invest- University of Zurich and Matthew Hulbert Guinea). It is fast closing in on the largest ment arm – ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) – obtai- ([email protected]) is at the Center for producers in west Asia by building vertical ned a 20% stake in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 gas Security Studies, ETH Zurich. linkages across the energy “value chain”, project and opened negotiations with Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 25, 2010 vol xlv no 39 15 COMMENTARY Gazprom and Rosneft for more stakes. It Takes Two to Tango The snag for India is that China shows The purchase of London-listed Imperial So what is the problem? This surely does absolutely no sign of letting up. CNOOC is Energy for $2.1 billion added substantial not sound like Delhi has lost the energy chasing a massive 28% increase in output Russian assets to its holdings. plot? Well no, it does not, unless we put this year, which is about 290 million bar- Oil and gas imports from Africa, too, it in perspective. Once we compare it to rels of oil equivalent. PetroChina has also increased. Indian firms expanded pro- the more substantive steps China has earmarked overseas output to increase duction in Angola, Sudan and Nigeria, made, the record looks distinctly circum- from 10% to 50% by 2020. Money certainly increasing crude imports from the region spect. Last year Chinese companies spent will not be a problem should they decide by roughly 5%. Key initiatives include around $32 billion buying natural re- to aim higher still: China’s $2.4 trillion in OVL’s $750 million investment in the source assets abroad. The figure becomes foreign reserves literally beg for com- Greater Nile Oil Project in South Sudan, far larger if we take into account addi- modity hedges, and the Chinese majors the extension of exploration in the North tional sweeteners provided by the China are well aware that a strengthening Ramadan offshore concession in Egypt Investment C or poration (CIC) or the Chinese yuan will enhance their purchasing p ower and a new Exploration and Production Development Bank to tip the balance even further. Sharing Agreement for Contract Area 43 for future contracts in Beijing’s favour; In comparison, Delhi has asked its oil in Libya. Reliance Industries (RIL), India’s ONGC’s acquisition of I mperial Energy majors to make one “major” acquisition a largest private energy firm, upped its was India’s only large f oreign energy year. Admittedly, it has a smaller pool of game in N igeria by taking a $1.7 billion deal. The contrast is stark. foreign reserves ($282 billion, as on 27 Au- stake in natural gas assets. To prepare Like India, China has stepped up activity gust 2010) to play with, but only signing further inroads, Delhi even started to em- in Latin America, Africa, central Asia and off deals worth up to $1.1 billion before ulate B eijing’s “multilateral game” by west Asia. But its prizes have been far companies have to seek Delhi’s approval is holding India-Africa energy conferences larger both in terms of upstream equity not going to cut the mustard. Indeed, just from 2007 onwards, offering kudos to stakes and securing long-term contracts as India lost out to China when trying to over 25 countries. for reserves. Over the past year, Indian buy PetroKazakhstan in 2005, it now In the Americas, Indian firms acquired national oil companies (NOCs) have been looks set to lose out in Uganda where stakes from Canada to Colombia. RIL even running to standstill plugging growing CNOOC has outstripped ONGC’s bid for a succeeded where China National Offshore supply gaps, while Chinese NOCs have raised stake in the Lake Albert region.