Draft Gl Report

186 CDS 14 E bis Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

GENERAL REPORT*

Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany) General Rapporteur www.nato-pa.int 22 November 2014

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. GENERAL REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 2

III. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4

IV. BUILDING UP THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 7

V. THE PARLIAMENT 8

VI. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 9

VII. REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 10

VIII. FIGHTING CORRUPTION 11

IX. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES 12

X. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13

XI. WOMEN’S RIGHTS 15

XII. CONCLUSIONS 16

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"Afghanistan has already come a long way in the journey it started 12 years ago. There has been remarkable progress and positive momentum, but I emphasize that the gains are fragile." Jan Kubis, UN Special Representative for Afghanistan

I. INTRODUCTION

1.The first democratic changeover of power in Afghanistan’s history on 29 September 2014, marks the beginning of a new era for the country. After a tense and prolonged election process, the inauguration of Dr Ashraf Ghani as the new President of Afghanistan and the appointment of Dr Abdullah Abdullah as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) demonstrate the remarkable progress the country has achieved in the post-Taliban era. The signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan and of the Status of Forces Agreement between NATO and Afghanistan by the new President underpins the efforts to build a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan. With the full transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces at the end of the year, however, key hurdles still lie ahead for Afghanistan’s development. This report focuses on political/governance challenges, and tasks that still need to be addressed as Afghanistan moves forward.

2.It is obvious that security, governance and development are all pieces of the same puzzle. Without security, there can be no governance and no development, and vice versa. The international community has a direct stake in the consolidation of a stable, democratic and inclusive system of governance in Afghanistan. Without this, Afghanistan would run the risk of once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and a source of instability for the region and beyond. Unfortunately, in the first years of the intervention in Afghanistan, the international coalition has not been very successful at putting these pieces together and its efforts lacked strategic vision. However, these initial problems have been addressed and current strategies provide a sound basis for moving ahead.

3.By signing the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), the Afghan government and the international community reaffirmed their partnership up to and beyond 2014. Building on the 2010 Kabul Process and the 2011 Bonn Conference, the Framework established an approach based on mutual commitments, whereby the Afghan government pledged, inter alia, to strengthen governance and the rule of law, fight corruption and protect human rights, while the international community committed to providing over USD 16 billion through 2015, and sustaining support, through 2017. The sustained support to Afghanistan in the field of governance is a critical precondition for post-2014 stability in Afghanistan.

4.Needless to say, governance is first and foremost an Afghan responsibility and many of the governance challenges identified in the report can only be resolved by the Afghans themselves. President Karzai, who led the country for the entire 2001-2014 period, handed over the Presidency to successor Dr Ashraf Ghani in September. Under Karzai’s watch, the country has transformed remarkably. Coalition and Afghan troops have largely stabilised the country, creating opportunities for local business communities and new media outlets. Many urban Afghans believe that the international community’s civil efforts have offered incentives and room for the development of a more liberal and open society. In particular, an active and self-confident civil society has emerged in the cities of the country. Furthermore, the pacification of the urban centres has allowed for various educational opportunities, and, as a result, the best-educated generation in two decades has emerged – the first generation without direct war experience. Currently, 83% of Afghan children go to school, 1/3 of them are girls. Road infrastructure has been significantly upgraded; basic health services are provided in almost every village; and banks have been established. Women have dramatically improved their status in society. In the political domain, a democratic Constitution has been adopted and four major elections (two presidential and two legislative) were held. The international assistance projects are increasingly run by the

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Afghan institutions, and these institutions are taking over the functions of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). A 400,000-strong state security and law enforcement force has been created. According to a recent Asia Foundation survey, the number of Afghans who believe that their country is moving in the right direction now stands at 57%, up from 46% in 2011 and 52% in 2012.

5.At the same time, a number of daunting challenges remain: the country’s basic infrastructure continues to be very poor and Afghans have voiced criticism with regard to many building projects for roads and power stations that are on halt or have been cancelled due to a volatile security situation, especially in Pashtun areas. The 2006 London Conference target of 50 % of the population having access to drinking water and power supply has not been met nationwide. Afghanistan still lacks good governance and the judiciary is weak. Corruption is pervasive and permeates nearly all branches of government. The country is still very poor and many Afghans emigrate, some turn to the insurgency. A real alternative economic perspective has not been created to date. Protection of human rights has yet to be fully ensured. Warlords are still influential. Strategies for dealing with narcotics productions are flawed and the magnitude of this problem is staggering – according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2013 opium poppy cultivation had increased again and its area had grown to a record level of 209,000 ha. The previously "drug- free” provinces of Balkh and Faryab in the north have lost that status. And of course, the security situation remains highly precarious: according to UN figures, between January and July 2014, 1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 civilian injuries were documented, an increase of 24% compared to the same period in 2013. In some parts of the country the population continues to suffer from threat, intimidation, blackmailing, illegal taxation and forced recruitment. The number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) has increased to a new record level of 590,000 in 2013, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The latest developments with regard to an inner-Afghan peace and reconciliation process are not encouraging either: while President Ghani called on the Taliban to join the political process, the Taliban sent a different message by staging two suicide bombings in the capital on the day of inauguration.

6.This report provides an overview of some of the key governance 1 challenges that Afghanistan faces today and of the measures that Afghan authorities and the international community have taken to address them. Information provided in this report builds upon previous reports by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Committees on Afghanistan, as well as on the findings of a visit of a NATO PA delegation to Afghanistan in November 2013 and the Rapporteur’s visit outside of NATO PA framework in March 2014.

II. GENERAL REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

7.The democratic tradition in Afghanistan is weak. The country seemed to be on the right track when, back in 1964, it transformed into a constitutional monarchy and its first democratic parliament was elected. The King retained a disproportionate influence on national politics, but the democratic institutions and procedures had a favourable environment to develop. The process was unfortunately interrupted by the 1973 military coup, the subsequent Communist takeover, the Soviet intervention, the civil war and eventually the Taliban rule in 1996-2001. Currently, the country lives under the 2004 Constitution which established a presidential Republic. The President is the head of state and government, and is elected by popular vote for no more than two consecutive 5-year terms. The parliament consists of two chambers – the upper chamber Meshrano Jirga and the lower chamber Wolesi Jirga – the latter being elected directly every five years. The country is divided into 34 provinces and about 400 districts. As of early 2004, three presidential (2004, 2009 and 2014), two

1 For the analysis of the security situation, see the general report of the Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee [191 DSC 14 E].

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parliamentary (2005 and 2010) and three provincial elections (2005, 2009 and 2014) were held. The district council elections have not been held to date due to technical problems and local sensitivities. The Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority whose judges are appointed by the President with the endorsement of the Wolesi Jirga. Under the unity government, a new position of Chief Executive Officer has been created, which will have similar functions to the position of Prime Minister. Within two years’ time, a Loya Jirga will decide whether to make the position constitutionally permanent.

8.However, in reality, the political system in Afghanistan is more complicated than these formal institutions suggest. The traditional structures such as shuras (informal quasi-courts) and jirgas (tribal assemblies of elders) play a significant role in the country’s governance. The all-Afghanistan gathering of elders and other respected figures – Loya Jirga – has been involved (since the beginning of the 20th century) in some of the most important political decisions, such as the adoption of the Constitution, the process of reconciliation or the endorsement of the legal terms of continued US military presence in Afghanistan after 2014.

9.In addition, the political decision-making is heavily dependent on the interplay and coalition building among some tribal or regional strongmen. The official Kabul seeks co-operation with these local power brokers in order to control the country. In turn, they also influence national politics and may have important government positions. These local power brokers, such as the Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, Hazara commander, Mohammed Mohaqiq or Western (mostly Tajik) Afghanistan leader Ismail Khan, also ran in the 2014 elections as vice-presidential candidates.

10. The international coalition also had to take into account these informal power centres. It is an open question to what extent their involvement in regional development or security projects is fruitful, because it might be the most efficient way to get things done, but could also be counterproductive in the long run, as it could jeopardise the official power structure and encourage corruption, nepotism and separatism.

11. The complex nature of the Afghan society also influences political processes in Afghanistan. It is characterised by a complicated web of identities – local, tribal, regional, ethnic and sectarian – in addition to the emerging modern national discourse that transcends these traditional identities. Yet somehow this heterogeneity has not resulted in blatant separatism; there is little evidence of intra-ethnic clashes. All groups are, to some degree, represented in national structures. The co-existence of two official languages – Pashto (spoken by Pashtuns) and Dari (a Persian dialect spoken mostly by Tajiks, but used as a lingua franca across the country and popular among the educated elites and administration) – appears to be smooth.

12. However, there is ample evidence of ethnic voting. Electoral campaigns are less about offering a national agenda than about winning over as many tribes and ethnic groups as possible. It is therefore almost inevitable, that the highest position in the country – that of the President – will go the largest ethnic group – the Pashtuns (more than 40% of the population). President Karzai’s closest circle of advisors and confidantes were mostly Pashtuns, many of them Western-educated. One also has to bear in mind that the Taliban is predominantly a Pashtun movement. Tajiks, the leading force of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, with about 25% of the population, also expect high political positions. They (especially their leading political figure Dr Abdullah Abdullah) generally support a review of the Constitution and the introduction of the position of Prime Minister – Tajiks would naturally expect to assume this post. Hazaras (about 10% of the population) are a Shiite minority that has long been oppressed by larger ethnic and religious communities. Yet, the political importance of this historically marginalised community is growing; they are believed to favour a more civic agenda (the key human rights protection body is headed by

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a Hazara woman Sima Simar). The same could be said about the Uzbeks (also about 10% of the population), who speak a different language – Turkic – than the rest of the country. Uzbeks have a reputation of being ‘leftist’ (many of them co-operated with the Soviet rule). The current speaker of the Wolesi Jirga is an ethnic Uzbek. There are other, smaller minorities as well, including Turkmen and Hindu. The electoral tickets (one presidential and two vice-presidential candidates) usually try to reflect this complex inter-ethnic and inter- tribal composition of Afghanistan in order to win as many votes as possible. Ethnic factors certainly played a role in the 2014 presidential election: while electoral programmes of both leading candidates were comparable and both had some cross-ethnic appeal, Dr Ashraf Ghani had the clear support of Pashtuns from the south and east of the country, while Dr Abdullah Abdullah drew much support from Tajiks and Hazaras; these divisions were of much concern during the election crisis. To achieve long-term stability of the democratic political system, a discourse that focuses on a genuinely national agenda needs to be encouraged. However, one can also note positively, that the presidential candidates mostly run in ethnically balanced teams, demonstrating a new political culture allowing for inter- ethnic compromises.

III. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

13. Numerous concerns were raised within and outside Afghanistan in anticipation of the 2014 presidential election. Indeed, the country’s record in this area has been rather poor. The organisation of the first election in 2004 was largely administered by the United Nations because the then Afghan government lacked necessary capacities. The 2009 election was marred by widespread allegations of massive fraud in favour of the incumbent and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate Dr Abdullah Abdullah from the second round. The country also lacked proper electoral laws and elections in 2009 and 2010 were governed by presidential decrees. By now, however, the Afghan side has essentially taken over the responsibility for the electoral process. The adoption of electoral laws in July 2013 by the parliament of Afghanistan was a major achievement. These laws determine the role of the two main electoral bodies – the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) – and stipulate election procedures and policies. They ensure relative independence of the IEC and the ECC by introducing a certain level of transparency into the selection process of their members, depriving the President of sole discretion over IEC appointments and providing for two ECC officials to be non-nationals. Against the backdrop of the drawn-out process in 2010/2011, when the President created a ‘Special Tribunal’ to overturn the final results, the law specifically states that the final results are to be based on the ECC’s findings and that the final results are unchangeable.

14. An important electoral challenge is the creation of a viable voter registry. The flawed voter registry has been a problem for years, although the new national unity government has committed to forming a special commission for the reform of the electoral system and to completing the distribution of electronic/computerized identity cards to all citizens of the country as quickly as possible. Women's cards are particularly vulnerable as they do not have to contain photos due to cultural sensitivities in conservative communities. Other challenges include the adequate geographic distribution of polling centres, allocation of ballot materials, dealing with illiterate voters (only 28% of the population is literate) and, of course, the security situation (according to a recent opinion poll, 81% of Afghans say that election day security conditions are a key factor in their decision to go to vote). The Taliban have also derided the election and anyone who participates. Their targeted killings have even led to almost 50 prominent Afghan journalists publishing a joint statement in Kabul in reaction to the murder of one of their colleagues working for AFP and his family in March 2014. Using silence as a weapon, they continued to report on attacks in general, but would not publish references to the Taliban for 15 days. However, despite incidents of small-scale

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violence, security on both the first and second-round election days was assured by government forces.2

15. The first round of Afghanistan’s presidential election, held on 5 April 2014, was widely touted as a success – with reportedly much less voter fraud than the elections held in 2009. Turnout was estimated to be around 6.6 million compared to less than 5 million in the 2009 election. Of the 11 official candidates (each with two vice-presidential running mates) none obtained a majority. Dr Abdullah Abdullah3 received 45% of the vote, and Dr Ashraf Ghani4 received 31.5%. The electoral campaign appears to have been lively and intensive, including talk shows with political discussions and very well attended public events. Steps were taken to ensure that candidates had fair access to the media: Afghanistan’s Electoral Media Commission (EMC) adopted a set of rules to that end. To ensure a fair voting process and vote count, some 16,000 independent domestic observers alongside over 300,000 candidate agents were present on election day, demonstrating special commitment and courage in light of the Taliban’s threats.

16. The run-off presidential election, held on 14 June 2014, however, turned out to be much more challenging and controversial. Both candidates conducted responsible and civilised campaigns, but, according to the UN assessment, “there was noticeably less restraint from elements within the candidates’ supporters”. Preliminary results showed a victory for Dr Ghani, who received 56.44% of the vote, versus 43.56% for Dr Abdullah. However, the latter dismissed these results, alleging that widespread election fraud had occurred. He cited in particular the more than 7 million voter turnout number, as anecdotal evidence suggested that turnout was lower than in the first round of elections. Dr Ghani attributed the rise of over one million voters to his successful campaigning among clerics, the provision of free transportation to polling booths, and the approval by many Pashtun leaders for more women voters. Thousands of cases of ballot stuffing in support of Dr Ghani were submitted to the ECC for examination; the Ghani side also filed claims.

17. Amidst the allegations, the drawn-out election process prompted civil unrest and the concerns of the emergence of divisions along ethno-political and geographic fault lines. These trends were particularly worrisome with regard to the Afghan national Security Forces (ANSF). Although Dr Abdullah cautioned his supporters against the use of violence, concerns that Abdullah backers, for instance the powerful Governor of Balkh Atta Mohammad Noor, were encouraging him to form a parallel government, prompted the United States to warn that any attempts by politicians to seize power by extra-legal means would result in a cessation of international funding and support.

18. US Secretary of State John Kerry brokered a deal, announced on 8 August, for the two candidates to accept the outcome of a wholesale election audit, and a national unity government to be formed in a power-sharing arrangement. The audit was conducted by the IEC under the supervision of the UN, and other national and international observers. This election review, begun on 17 July 2014, was the most extensive the UN has ever undertaken: it included the physical audit of all 22,828 ballot boxes used in the election. Although it was originally set for only four weeks, the process was prolonged and fraught with tension with Dr Abdullah pulling out multiple times due to what he alleges was unfair conduct. Finally, on 21 September 2014, the IEC congratulated Dr Ashraf Ghani as the new president and Dr Abdullah Abdullah as the CEO at a press conference. IEC Chairman

2 The UN recorded 530 security incidents nationwide on the day of the run-off election, an increase of 11.3% over the first round. 3 Dr Abdullah Abdullah is a former foreign minister closely related to the former Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and is of mixed Tajik and Pashtun background. He lost the 2009 election to President Hamid Karzai, although he received about 1/3 of votes. 4 Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is a former finance minister, World Bank official and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General who recently chaired the Afghan Transition Coordination Commission.

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Ahmad Yusuf Nooristani added that the election results – figures and data – had been revealed to the two electoral camps only and would be released at “the next opportunity”. A few hours earlier on the same day, in a televised ceremony in the Presidential palace, Ghani and Abdullah had signed an agreement to form a government of national unity.

19. Under the agreement, both the President and the CEO will have ‘parity’ in appointing senior government, state and judicial officials “on the basis of the principles of national participation, fair representation, merit, honesty, and commitment to the reform programs of the national unity government”. The President will preside over the Cabinet of Ministers when strategic decisions are taken, but day-to-day activities of the Cabinet will be supervised by the CEO. The agreement was broadly hailed by the international community as an expression of political responsibility and statesmanship of both political leaders. However, the new arrangement will have to be translated into the Constitutional amendments by the Loya Jirga.

20. The presidential election results were not resolved in time for the President-elect to attend the NATO Wales Summit, but the two candidates issued a joint statement on 4 September that they were committed to forming a unity government, and reassured Allies of their intentions to sign the legal agreements required for NATO to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan. Incoming President Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated on 29 September and indeed signed the Bilateral (Afghan-US) Security Agreement on 30 September 2014. NATO-Allies and Partner Nations once more declared their readiness to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014 (“Resolute Support Mission”), ideally – in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan – supported by a United Nations Security Council Resolution. All nations also renewed their financial obligations for the support of sustainable ANSF until the end of 2017 at the Wales Summit.

21. The political effects of the power sharing arrangement are unclear. Some commentators say that it could have a positive effect on the governance structure of the country, by creating greater space and representation for the diverse political bases in such a multi- ethnic country. Political power is highly centralized under the current constitution, and under the Karzai administration in particular, the presidency and his patronage structure was seen as overly strong. However, there are also questions on whether these new structures could potentially lead to political deadlock. The emergence of two competing centres of power within the executive branch and subsequent in-fighting could result in people’s disillusionment with the democratic political process. Observers also note that the agreement is more ambiguous with regard to the CEO’s role in appointing lower level officials, which leaves a potential for some internal frictions within the national unity government.

22. Impacts of the prolonged election process were negative, both in terms of ethnic relations and political unity in Afghanistan, and in terms of functioning governance. The security situation saw a downturn, with some of the biggest Taliban attacks in years, even in Kabul centre. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon admitted that “insurgent groups, international terrorists and associated networks took advantage of the protracted political and electoral crisis and uncertainty to mount major assaults around the country.” According to the UN, between 1 June and 15 August, some 5,456 security-related incidents were recorded across the country, which represents an increase of 10.7% over the same period in 2013. The tense post-election environment and uncertainty also affected the pace of the reconciliation talks. Finally, there have also been economic consequences due to stalled bureaucratic administration; taxes and revenue collection is down a third this year. In an interview with the BBC, the Afghan Finance Minister also stated that the election had cost Afghanistan an estimated USD 5 billion in lost foreign revenue and investment. Real estate prices have dropped significantly.

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23. Despite these profound difficulties, it must be noted that there are significant achievements in this election cycle, and steps forward for democracy and stability in Afghanistan. Contrary to some expectations and to his credit, the incumbent President did not try to impose a specific person on the Afghan people as his successor and the transition of power has been achieved peacefully via elections, including the decision on who the new president and CEO is to be, which mirrors the result of the run-off presidential election. A particularly encouraging fact is that the level of Afghan ownership of this election has further increased. The international community only plays a supporting role — the international contributions are estimated to be about USD 220 million channelled through the United Nations electoral assistance program ELECT II. In both rounds of the presidential election, Afghans turned out in significantly greater numbers than in 2009, indicating their faith in the political system and process. The participation of women in the presidential and provincial council elections is an important indicator of the credibility and inclusiveness of the electoral process, but also of the growing social and political participation of women in general. Security incidents were numerous, but sporadic, small- scale, and mainly in fringe and rural voting areas; there were no large-scale attacks by the Taliban in crowded urban centres on election days. On the day of the second round of elections, of the 6,365 polling centres only 140 had been closed for security reasons. These elections also mark the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and police in providing basic security for the people of Afghanistan.

IV. BUILDING UP THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

24. The new President will inherit an administrative system whose capacity pales in comparison with the formidable challenges the country is facing. The depletion of human resources as a result of the three decade-long conflict is a major problem for the country’s administrative capacity, both on national and on sub-national levels. Some progress has nevertheless been achieved in recent years in training a new cadre of civil servants and also in setting new standards for reducing corruption and enhancing the quality of public administration. Yet, both the development of the security situation and the social development will co-determine if this tendency will be sustainable and can prevent a “brain- drain” of young professionals.

25. Since the fall of the Taliban, central ministries had to be built almost from scratch. Largely thanks to the international financial, material and expert assistance, government institutions now have necessary office equipment and have developed working procedures. The pool of employees has expanded considerably since 2001, both in terms of quantity and skills. Reforms were launched to encourage merit-based employment and promotion criteria. However, in order to be accepted by the population, any governance reforms must take into account Afghan traditions and customary decision-making processes.

26. Training of bureaucrats is conducted by the Afghan Civil Service Institute under the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), and the effort is significantly supported by international donors. In December 2012, the international community launched a USD 350 million five-year capacity building programme, designed to improve budget implementation capacities and train some 2,400 bureaucrats to work in key ministries. Some countries also specialise in helping the Afghans to develop specific governance skills: for instance, Germany, NATO and the United States support a mentoring programme in the field of civil aviation management. The international assistance will continue beyond 2014, in accordance with the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

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(TMAF)5 and is not only financial and material. International advisers have been employed in or consulted by Afghan state institutions extensively as well.

27. The progress report on the implementation of the TMAF in July 2013 acknowledged the improvements made by the Afghan institutions, particularly in areas such as the declaration of assets of senior government and judicial officials and budgetary transparency. The Co- Chairs of the Special Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Meeting held under the TMAF on 29 January 2014 also acknowledged that Afghanistan had made substantial progress over the past 13 years.

28. That said, the central government capacities are still far from adequate. In its recent report, the UN-backed Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) identified “significant vulnerabilities to corruption” in the IARCSC appointment process, the Ministry of Labour’s pension administration, the Ministry of Higher Education’s issuance of certificates and exam administration, and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation’s administration of land for repatriates. 29. The weakness of administrative capacity can significantly affect the security situation in Afghanistan. In his report, US Inspector General for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, John Sopko found that tens of thousands of weapons that the United States had delivered to the Afghan military and police could not be accounted for. “Given the Afghan government’s limited ability to account for or properly dispose of weapons, there is a real potential for these weapons to fall into the hands of insurgents,” the report said. Since 2004, the Afghan forces received more than 747,000 AK-47 rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and other weapons worth about USD 626 million.

30. Implementing structural reform in public administration and building up a competent, effective and appropriately staffed civil service will require a sustained long-term endeavour.

V. THE PARLIAMENT

31. Afghanistan’s parliamentary tradition is very young. Apart from a brief period between 1964 and 1973, the democratically elected Afghan parliament (National Assembly) has only been functioning since 2005. It consists of a 249-member directly elected Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and a selected 102-member upper house Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). The upper house is selected as follows: one-third appointed by the President (for a five- year term); one-third appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year term); and one- third appointed by elected district councils (for a three-year term). Since district councils have yet to be elected, the latter third of the Meshrano Jirga is also selected by provincial councils.

32. The 2004 Constitution gives the parliament substantial powers, similar to those held by parliaments in other democracies. The actual capacity of the parliament to exercise these powers fully was questionable, especially during the term of the first Wolesi Jirga in 2005- 2010. The parliament has been, and to some extent still is, overshadowed by the powerful Presidency. However, it has continuously gained self-confidence in its still young history. The Members, especially in the lower house, take their control function vis-à-vis President and government seriously. In addition, there are cases where deputies refused to endorse Karzai’s nominations for ministerial positions, to elect a Karzai-backed candidate as

5 Not all of TMAF’s USD 16 billion will be invested in the governance sector – the Framework also includes the development pillar. Japan and Australia, for instance, focus more on development assistance, while Germany, Canada and the European Commission support government reforms, the rule of law, education, and protection of human rights, especially women’s rights.

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speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, and voted non-confidence in ministers, forcing them to leave their positions. President Karzai had a traditionally much stronger backing in the upper house – Meshrano Jirga – but in the case of the debates on the electoral laws, Senators were also constructive and critical. Even during the political turmoil in mid-2014, the parliament continued working and adopted a number of important laws, including on combating the financing of terror and money laundering, on social welfare, on mining and on access to information.

33. The parliament’s capacity has been considerably aided by the international community. The parliament now has a research unit and a library, while a USAID programme called the Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) has been instrumental in building the parliament’s outreach efforts, communications, and information technology use. Several bilateral assistance programmes have also been conducted directly by other countries’ parliaments.

34. Due to the weakness of political parties and parliamentary factions, concepts such as parliamentary majority or opposition are elusive in Afghanistan’s political system. Out of approximately 2,500 candidates running for seats in parliament in 2010, only 31 ran for a particular party. The 2009 political party law introduced very tough requirements for parties to be registered. These requirements have been subsequently slightly relaxed, but, according to observers such as the International Crisis Group, still remain overly restrictive, especially the requirement to maintain party offices in at least 20 provinces. 6

35. Another important reason for the absence of strong parties is the fact that elections are conducted according to the single non-transferable vote system, in which voters have one vote to cast and the candidates with the highest numbers of votes fill the available seats. While simple and straightforward for voters, this system directly undermines political parties by not guaranteeing them a fair share of parliamentary seats. Furthermore, the reputation of political parties in Afghanistan has been damaged by the legacy of civil war associated with different ethic, Communist or Islamist parties or factions. It is also notable that a law on the funding of political parties has yet to be adopted.

VI. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

36. The key body in Afghanistan’s judiciary system is the Supreme Court, whose nine members are appointed by the President with the approval of the Wolesi Jirga. The Supreme Court selects judges at the provincial and district level. In terms of law enforcement, the main institution is the Office of the Attorney General, appointed by the President.

37. The country’s justice system is extremely weak; a large part of the population has little trust in and lacks access to legal institutions, especially in rural areas. These institutions remain dramatically understaffed and underequipped, and the low salary level contributes to high levels of corruption among the judiciary. According to the MEC, many prosecutors were hired “outside of legal requirements”, not on the basis of merit, and the level of their competence and education was very low. The progress on 2010 Kabul Conference and 2012 Tokyo Framework commitments in the justice area has been unsatisfactory. The Ministry of Justice managed to increase the number of legal aid offices across the country, but for instance, the Criminal Procedure Code has yet to be enacted. Due to the lack of progress, in 2012 the European Union decided to withhold about USD 26 million in EU aid for judiciary reform.

6 The requirement aimed at forcing parties to consider how to appeal to constituencies beyond their traditional supporters and help to address the ethnic bias of some parties.

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38. The most serious challenge in the justice sector is the existence of an extensive network of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, which represent a mixture of customary law and Sharia law. It is estimated, that local shuras and jirgas resolve as many as 80% of all cases, especially those relating to property rights and personal status. The informal justice system is so entrenched that the international community essentially accepts it as inevitability, at least for a foreseeable future. However, community trials (even those not necessarily connected to the Taliban) interfere into the process of building a formal judicial system. These trials are also conducted by male and usually very conservative community members. Thus, women, the poor, and individuals disadvantaged by family or tribal affiliation are known to be treated unequally. In the short run, while these mechanisms will inevitably continue to function, at least the application of the most extreme, Taliban-type version of Islamic law in these informal courts needs to be discouraged.

39. International assistance to the justice sector remains crucial. NATO and other international partners supported the Afghan government efforts to expand the network of courts and legal assistance across the country with money and advice. For instance, under USAID’s “Rule of Law Stabilization Program” over 700 Afghan judges were trained. Another example is the German Max Planck Endowment for International Peace and the Rule of Law which supports training courses for judges in the fields of constitutional, criminal and civil laws, human rights, court organisation and judicial ethics and the fight against judicial corruption. Germany, the Netherlands and Finland also conduct a programme to support training and education of young lawyers in northern Afghanistan. Thanks to this programme, the number of lawyers practicing today in four Northern provinces has reached about 2,000 lawyers, up from 180 in 2002. The number of registered lawyers in Kunduz has more than tripled since the opening of the office of the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association with a third of more than 100 lawyers being women. In addition, projects to support co-operation between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Religious Affairs aim at informing religious scholars about the legal system, so that they can bring their new knowledge into the villages.

40. However, some observers such as former UN Public Information Officer Dorn Townsend note that international projects are excessively focused on preparing as many Western- style lawyers as possible, neglecting the need to inform the public better about their civic rights and to promote a positive image of law enforcement. They argue that more could be achieved through investing more in increasingly popular TV shows: these investments to date have been modest but are yielding surprisingly positive results. For instance, the UN- supported Crime Scene Afghanistan, a weekly TV show, is a great example of professional investigative criminal journalism. It allows viewers to see clearly how their country’s new legal system functions. Crime Scene Afghanistan also raises expectations among its numerous viewers for a cleaner and more efficient justice system in their country. Another example is the EU-funded Commissar Amanullah TV series, which has been contributing substantially to the positive public perception of female police officers.

VII. REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

41. Historically and due to geographical reasons, Afghanistan has been a decentralised country where local leaders are often more influential than their official masters in Kabul. Nevertheless, the 2004 Constitution introduced a highly centralised system of governance. All 34 provincial governors and about 400 district governors and mayors are appointed by and report to the President. Almost all services are delivered by the central Ministries in Kabul through their line departments.

42. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) helps the President to select candidates for regional positions, usually taking into account local specificities. For

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instance, President Karzai had been keeping a powerful Tajik leader Atta Mohammad Noor as governor of the Balkh province – despite the fact that Noor was a renowned supporter of Karzai’s chief opponent Dr Abdullah Abdullah – in order to be able to maintain stability in this economically important province.

43. Since 2010, a process has been underway to increase the number of professional civil servants at the expense of political appointees. Currently, almost half of all district governors and almost all deputy provincial governors are appointed based on merit. However, many of the gubernatorial appointments continue to be based on political calculation rather than merit. The newly elected President Ghani has repeatedly announced his intention to accelerate the evolution towards a merit-based system of governance. IDLG receives substantial financial assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II as well as directly from several ISAF countries.

44. The only elected bodies on a sub-national level are 34 provincial councils. On 5 April 2014, some 420 provincial council members were elected again from 2,713 officially registered candidates. The final results of the elections were originally due to be released in June, but the consideration of complaints related to those elections was put on hold until the presidential election process was completed. In August 2014, the ECC resumed the consideration of 2,918 provincial council election complaints and requested the IEC to recount votes in Kabul, Nangarhar, Parwan and Baghlan provinces. Reportedly, the delay had a negative effect on daily functioning of province-level authorities and the services they provide to citizens.

45. The Constitution also provides for the direct election of district, village and municipal councils, but none of these have been held yet, due to voter registration problems, the lack of census as well as difficulties determining district boundaries in a way acceptable to respective tribes. To fill the gap left by the lack of local representation councils, some 28,000 Community Development Councils were established over the last few years on a local level to guide and advise on local implementation of national programmes. These councils could eventually evolve into elected official governance bodies. It is a promising step forward that the national unity government is committed to holding district council elections as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a forum for the Loya Jirga and to determining the boundaries and limits of local administration by legal means.

46. At all sub-national levels, governance requires additional support as most of local governors lack personnel and basic means and equipment to perform their duties effectively. International assistance is therefore critical and a number of initiatives have been launched to this end, such as the German Regional Capacity Development Fund (RCDF). The 5-year RCDF was launched in 2010 to improve the capacity of provincial and district-level administrations in northern areas in realising development projects independently. Projects like this are essential in implementing the 2010 Sub-National Governance Policy (SNGP), which envisions strengthening provincial councils' oversight and development planning powers.

47. At this stage, the budgetary powers of regional and local institutions are very restricted. All revenue goes directly to Kabul. The central government decides how much of the country’s financial resources are to be remitted back to the provinces. Observers believe the system is overly centralised and provincial and district administrations should be more involved in the budgetary planning process. The existing system forces some of the provincial governors, especially those in border areas where border customs duties and other levies are collected, to divert and retain some of the local revenues. Improvements in this area are one of the key recommendations of the TMAF review meeting in July 2013. Some projects, such as the Provincial Budget Pilot, have been launched to ensure greater involvement of

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provincial administration in the budgetary planning process. The government has circulated a draft provincial budgeting policy within its institutions and within the international community. The policy was developed by stakeholders including donors, line ministries, sub-national institutions and civil society. According to the Joint Report of the TMAF Special Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Meeting on 29 January 2014, the Government will continue to work on the provincial budgeting policy leading to its approval by the Cabinet and the subsequent development of guidelines and implementation of the policy, linked to a provincial planning process in which provincial councils take on a consultative role.

VIII. FIGHTING CORRUPTION

48. Corruption is without a doubt the most important challenge plaguing the governance system in Afghanistan. The country is routinely ranked among the world's most corrupt nations, along with Syria and North Korea. According to the Asia Foundation survey, 77% of Afghans consider corruption is “a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole". Some phenomena, such as clientelism, nepotism and ‘gift-giving’ are widely considered to be normal. There are also many cases of fraud, such as appointing 'ghost employees' or selling government property. A significant part of the problem is the fact that salaries in government service are very low (about 200 USD per month). It is estimated that in 2012 alone, Afghans paid some USD 3.9 billion in bribes, while the entire annual national budget is less than eight billion. Mr. Karzai has also made statements arguing that the high level of corruption in Afghanistan stems from the influx of donor money that often ends up in the wrong hands.

49. Mr. Karzai issued a number of decrees to tackle the corruption problem. In 2010, the Afghan government adopted a National Anti-Corruption Strategy and announced a list of 37 anti-corruption laws to be implemented. The most notable anti-corruption measure was the establishment of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), a body with approximately 220 employees, mandated to investigate among other things, “government officials’ suspicious wealth”. By the end of July 2012, it claimed to have handed over 127 cases of embezzlement and illegal land expropriation by government officials to the Attorney General. So far, however, virtually no convictions have followed.

50. In addition to the HOOAC, the Major Crimes Task Force (MSTF) and Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) were established with the support of the US, British and Australian law enforcement institutions as well as EUPOL (EU Police Mission in Afghanistan). MSTF and SIU are seen as quite independent and effective. Their achievements include the simplification of certain administrative procedures (such as car registration), that create preconditions for bribery, establishing a hotline to report corruption incidents, as well as conducting wide public awareness campaigns. Unfortunately, their efforts are not always supported on the highest political level in Kabul.

51. In general, observers assert that the Attorney General’s office has not been sufficiently effective in curbing corruption: according to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, in 2012, the United States suspended its co-operation programme with the Attorney General’s Anti-Corruption Unit due to “the lack of seriousness” on the part of the latter.

52. An important initiative was announced by President Karzai in 2009 requiring all senior officials to declare their income and assets. The President did so himself as well. This initiative was welcomed and commended by the international community. However, the process of verification of these asset declarations is still underdeveloped. According to the UN, in 2013 only 10% of these declarations had been verified by the HOOAC. No significant progress has been achieved in curbing the transfer of large sums of money out

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of Afghanistan by high-ranking officials, which is a serious problem, especially in the context of the largest corruption scandal in the country’s history – the Kabul Bank scandal.

53. The obstacles the President of Afghanistan is facing in the field of anti-corruption are immense, and one could not expect quick results. However, it is reasonable to expect greater progress from the Afghan institution in curbing corruption at least to the level where it stops fuelling the insurgency. There are also some legislative deficits. Some important bills such as the Anti-Corruption Law, the National Audit Law, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on the Campaign Against Major Crimes have been discussed for months in the Afghan cabinet between the Ministry of Justice and several inter-ministerial committees or are awaiting the adoption in parliament before they can enter into force.

54. According to the agreement between the two presidential election campaign teams regarding the structure of the national unity government, the CEO is to propose reforms in all government agencies and decisively combat official corruption. In addition, Afghanistan’s President-elect promised to end corruption in his first speech after signing the power- sharing agreement on 22 September 2014. President Ghani has long held anti-corruption as a major pillar of his political platform, and has a strong record and reputation for not relying on patronage networks. During his time as Minister of Finance, he implemented notable reforms regarding fiscal transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, the changes he and the government faces in implementing anti-corruption reform across all layers of government remain very difficult.

IX. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

55. While not directly within the remit of this Committee, the economic and development pillar of the Afghanistan stabilisation effort is affected by rampant corruption and the lack of good governance. For a more thorough analysis of the economic challenges, see the report by the Assembly’s Economics and Security Committee “Finding Workable Solutions In Afghanistan: The Work of The International Community In Building A Functioning Economy And Society” [180 ESCTER E Bis Final], adopted in 2011. Nevertheless, the Rapporteur would like to hereby briefly recall the key challenges in this field. 56. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Its GDP per capita is just over USD 1,000 (US$700 in 2002) and ranks 215th in the world out of 228 countries. The Human Development Index rank for Afghanistan is 175 out of 187. According to the World Bank, economic growth in Afghanistan slowed significantly to an estimated 3.6% in 2013, compared to 14.4% in 2012. Growth for 2014 is forecasted to be at 3.2%. The slowdown in growth is accompanied by revenue shortfalls that have been worsening since 2011 due to the economic downturn, declining imports and customs duties, weak budgeting capacity, as well as political uncertainty. For 2014, Afghanistan’s budget is USD 7.5 billion, and yet its revenue is expected to be well below even the USD 2.4 billion projected earlier in the year. Currently, international donors fund more than 60% of the Afghan national expenditures, not including a number of security and development programmes that are funded out of budget, including for ANSF. The sustainment of such projects is in question, as the Afghan government takes over their maintenance and operating costs.

57. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework presents a roadmap for Afghanistan to achieve economic self-reliance by the end of the Transformation Decade, but according to a World Bank report, the government is projected to still have a fiscal gap of around USD 4 billion by 2025. Afghanistan therefore will remain in need of international donor assistance in order to maintain the reconstruction and development gains made over the past 13 years. Unfortunately, donor funding and aid has been declining precipitously; U.S. funding to Afghanistan, for instance, fell by 41% between 2010 and 2013. Therefore, though the Wales Summit reaffirmed NATO members’ security commitments in Afghanistan,

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comparable commitments to Afghanistan’s economic development, including through government fiscal capacity-building and accountability programmes, also need to be sustained far beyond the end of the TMAF.

58. The efficiency of the economic aid is the key concern that discourages donors and investors. According to US Inspector General for the reconstruction of Afghanistan John Sopko, since 2004, the United States has spent more than USD 100 billion in Afghanistan, but the effect of this enormous assistance has been significantly diminished by the lack of clear priorities and the incompetence on the receiving end. Mistakes, inaction, mismanagement and corruption by Afghan officials was not discouraged by the prevailing attitude that "in the end, the Americans will always pay". This attitude needs to be changed, and payments should stop when there is clear evidence of misappropriation or corruption. Flooding the country with money also has a negative effect on the efforts to build a self- supporting economy. Greater attention should be paid to projects that increase the government’s own revenue stream, especially from sectors such as mining and agriculture. The IMF has laid out a plan that includes improving tax compliance, implementing a Value Added Tax (VAT) along with other new taxes, and developing the mining sector, but implementation remains slow. Augmenting competence and management skills among the ranks of relevant ministries and the central bank is an important priority.

59. President Ashraf Ghani, a developmental economist by training, has placed a high priority for the new government on developing Afghanistan’s economy and reducing the country’s dependence on foreign aid. He has highlighted in particular the need for policies which encourage the growth of Afghanistan’s own domestic industries, and which promote greater regional trade integration. These will be key to ensuring that Afghanistan’s stability can be sustained in the coming years.

X. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

60. Strong civil society and the protection of human rights are a necessary precondition for a functioning democracy. A lot has been achieved in this domain since 2001: the number of civil society organisations has mushroomed, the freedom of expression and media has been significantly expanded, and, most importantly, women have acquired rights and greater self-confidence. However, the NGO-scene remains by and large far away from rural areas. In addition, many are concerned that these achievements could come under threat in the coming years. In her recent report, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay noted the signs of past achievements being eroded, which could undermine “the fragile stability to which respect for human rights and the rule of law has contributed.”

61. Despite the demise of the Taliban, Afghanistan remains an extremely conservative Muslim country. The clerics enjoy an immense influence on the population. The Islamic religious leaders, represented by the 150-member National Ulema Council (NUC), are important decision-shapers on political, social and cultural issues. Members of NUC are calling on the government to promote more rigorously the Islamic values in the country’s cultural and media life, to ban alcohol and even to apply elements of Sharia law. Observers note that the influence of religious conservatives has grown in Afghanistan in recent years, which manifested itself in riots against the alleged disrespect of Islam by members of the international coalition.

62. Nevertheless, civil society is slowly emerging as an important centre of influence, in addition to the formal and informal power structures. According to CRS, the most active and outspoken civil society organisations include the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the Afghanistan Women’s Network, the Afghan Anti-Corruption

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Network, Integrity Watch, Equality for Peace and Democracy, Afghanistan 1400, and Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness (“A3”). Some prominent civil society and women activists are represented in parliament, for instance Fawzia Koofi, former deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga and a renowned women’s rights advocate, Rafiq Shahir, a civil-society activist, and Ramazan Bashardost, an anti-corruption campaigner.

63. The AIHRC is the central institution overseeing the protection of human rights in Afghanistan. Most of its budget comes from international donors. The AIHRC is not sufficiently independent and proactive, however, because the government appoints its members and can dismiss them. Some of the appointees are controversial and do not have a strong record in human rights protection. UN High Commissioner Pillay has expressed concerns that the government does not follow standard procedures when appointing new commissioners and thus undermined the “highly regarded, credible and effective work” of the AIHRC.

64. One of the key issues to be addressed is the fact that Afghan civil society organisations are overwhelmingly dependent on foreign funding. This situation prompted President Karzai to famously announce that “the three great evils Afghanistan has faced in its history are communism, terrorism, and NGOism.” Nevertheless, given the current state of the Afghan economy, complete financial independence of the Afghan NGO sector is not plausible in a foreseeable future.

65. Civil society organisations have been instrumental in revealing the numerous cases of abuse of power by law enforcement and state security agencies, cases of torture and intolerable prison conditions. Based on these revelations, the government of Afghanistan did take some steps to train officers to respect human rights while conducting their activities. The government has committed to redrafting of 173 prison-related operational directives. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF are working together on reviewing detention practices in select Afghan-run detention facilities.

66. Afghanistan enjoys a relatively vibrant media environment. The country rose 22 positions in the latest Reporters Without Borders press freedom index and is now ranked 128th out of 179 countries. Since 2001, dozens of TV and hundreds of radio channels, newspapers and Internet sites have been created. The media law is also relatively permissive and the Internet is essentially free. Criticism of the government is somewhat permitted and some outlets such as Tolo Television have been genuinely functioning as the “fourth estate”. However, cases of intimidation of anti-government or pro-secular journalists have not disappeared. NUC has reportedly been quite successful in banning some “un-Islamic” TV shows. Reporters claim their work is threatened, not only by the Taliban but also by regionally powerful warlords. According to the Afghan Journalists Safety Committee (AJSC), at least 35 journalists have been victims of violence or threat in the second half of 2013, with the figure slightly decreasing. However, women face a higher risk of intimidation also in the media, mainly due to cultural reservations, AJSC analysts claim. In August 2014, Afghan authorities banned New York Times reporter Matthew Rosenberg from leaving the country and then ordered him to leave Afghanistan within 24 hours, allegedly for a critical article he has written. These actions against a journalist were denounced by the UN chief representative in Afghanistan Jan Kubis who noted that "the attempts aimed at preventing a media representative from freely carrying out his duties demonstrate a disturbing regard for freedom of expression”.

67. The international community has been conducting projects designed to train investigative journalists. A notable project was launched by the Afghan service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: some 20,000 solar-powered radios were distributed to poorer Afghans across the country to improve their access to information.

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XI. WOMEN’S RIGHTS

68. The emancipation of women is perhaps the greatest achievement of the new Afghanistan. As former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, any “potential for peace will be subverted if women and ethnic minorities are marginalized or silenced.” Afghan women are also major contributors to peace in their country: in January-February 2014, the women’s committee of the High Peace Council (HPC) collected the signatures of more than 250,000 Afghan women and girls calling for peace and a cease-fire. This petition was presented to global and regional leaders as well as main stakeholders within Afghanistan.

69. The current Constitution of Afghanistan declares gender equality and a commitment to the rights of women. More than 27% of the Wolesi Jirga members are women. They work in state structures, law enforcement agencies, media, civil society and business institutions. More than 300 women registered as candidates at the 5 April 2014 provincial elections. School enrolment figures of girls have increased from an estimated 5,000 under the Taliban in 2000 to 2.4 million in 2009. About 40% of all schoolchildren are girls. The Taliban’s strictures on women working and studying are now confined to insurgent-plagued rural zones. The attitudes of the population have become surprisingly receptive towards gender equality: The Asia Foundation's July 2013 study shows that about 90% of Afghans believe in gender equality, and the clear majority rejects the practice of ba’ad7 and child marriage. Due to significant improvements in the health care sector, maternal and infant mortality rates have dropped significantly.

70. The government has created a Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) and has adopted a National Action Plan for Women, designed to mainstream the empowerment of women in all government policies. A landmark 2009 law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) is lauded by the international community: it criminalises rape and legally commits the State to protect women from violence.

71. Unfortunately, these achievements are not irreversible. The EVAW law has been enacted by Presidential decree and has yet to be endorsed by the parliament; it is criticised by orthodox forces as being un-Islamic. The law has not been very successful in stemming violence against women: according to the MoWA report, in the period between March 2012 and March 2013, 4,505 cases of violence against women were documented in 32 out of 35 provinces. The most prevalent forms of violence are beating and laceration (40.5%), murder (7.3%), abuse, humiliation and intimidation (5.4%), not feeding (5.4%), and forced marriage (5.1%). UN bodies note that while registration of reported incidents under EVAW provisions increased by 28%, the use of the law as a basis for indictment increased by only 2%, most of the cases being settled through mediation. The report clearly shows weaknesses of the Afghan judicial system and demonstrates that it is not yet fully accepted nationwide.

72. In general, the number of Afghan women and children killed and injured in the conflict increased again in 2013. The UNAMA report documented 746 women casualties (235 women killed and 511 injured), an increase of 36% from 2012.

73. Paternalistic attitudes are still strong in the society. For instance, almost half of Afghans surveyed by the Asia Foundation believe that women cannot themselves decide how to vote without consulting their husbands. The same survey also found that 76% of women had no education, compared with 44% of men. According to the Afghan Ministry for Education, girls can often not participate in class, especially at the higher levels of secondary education because teaching conditions do not meet social requirements (such as a lack of female teachers, the distance between school and village or building

7 A practice of giving away one’s daughter as ‘payment’ for one’s crime.

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conditions) and because of conservative values. 90% of all qualified female teachers work in urban centres. Girls who go to school or women who have jobs in positions of authority are regularly threatened, particularly in rural areas. Some are even murdered: for instance, the world-renowned author Sushmita Banerjee and the highest-ranking female police officer in Helmand Province Lt. Nigar. Female police officers make up only 1% of the total police force. In the labour market, women earn on average only 49% of the wages paid to men.

74. There are worrying signs that, as the international coalition is reducing its presence in Afghanistan, the policies towards women's rights are increasingly conservative. The latest electoral law reduced the quota-guaranteed seats for women in provincial councils from 25% to 20%. Some legislative initiatives have been submitted to change the Criminal Prosecution Code, barring relatives from testifying against each other in criminal proceedings, including in cases of domestic violence, child abuse and sexual assault (President Karzai had to issue a decree preventing the application of such clause). This backlash after more than a decade of relatively good results in strengthening women’s rights can, however, also be interpreted as a “healthy” part of a long-term social discourse. With the new generation of women, a process of questioning allegedly ultra-conservative traditions has started and is expected to continue. This will probably be more decisive for the emancipatory success in Afghanistan than the electoral quota for women, the issue of wearing burqas or the number of girls going to school.

75. Many women’s advocacy groups fear that recent actions on the part of the government might be related to their renewed efforts to reach out to the Taliban and seek reconciliation. The Rapporteur, however, firmly believes that protection of the constitutionally guaranteed human rights including women’s rights is a red-line that should not be crossed in the reconciliation talks.

XII. CONCLUSIONS

76. The presidential election on 5 April and 14 June 2014 was a milestone event in the development of the Afghan democracy, leading to the first electoral transfer of power in its history. That the Taliban did not succeed in derailing the election and the turnout of women voters was also particularly impressive. Despite the political turmoil in the months preceding, political elites nevertheless ultimately demonstrated statesmanship in forming a national unity government and thus helping Afghanistan to come out of the crisis stronger and more resilient. With the new government in power, the Afghan people expect the new President to preserve the achievements of the previous government, while tackling more resolutely the outstanding challenges which still remain. The competences of the CEO must be defined clearly, and the new arrangement should be reflected in the country’s Constitution as soon as possible. These actions could significantly strengthen the legitimacy and efficiency of the country’s constitutional system.

77. Strengthening the governance pillar (in parallel with security and economic development pillars) of the Afghanistan stabilisation effort continues to be of vital importance. There is a severe lack of adequately qualified, motivated and honest bureaucrats who could implement the State’s policies on the ground and provide leadership and initiative in local communities. Ultimately, the capacity to run their own country with a minimum amount of foreign assistance will determine the success of the State-building process in Afghanistan. Many challenges remain and some of the achievements of post-Taliban Afghanistan are currently under threat. It is, therefore, critically important for the international community to retain an adequate level of support for Afghanistan beyond 2014, with an even stronger focus on the rule of law and human rights protection, strengthening at the same time the Afghan institutions consistently, training the police forces and the judges and prosecutors in a well-coordinated manner.

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78. More specific short- and mid-term tasks include: a) ensuring the implementation of 21 September 2014 agreement and nurturing constructive collaboration between the new President and the Chief Executive; b) supporting the process of constitutional reform towards a less President-centric executive branch; c) further enhancing the independence and competence of the parliament (including using parliamentary networks and exchange programmes or NATO PA expertise) as well as bolstering political parties, passing a law on funding of political parties and reconsidering the voting system; building on lessons learned in past elections to ensure free and fair parliamentary elections in 2015; d) focusing more on strengthening sub-national institutions: further increasing the budgetary and oversight capacities of the councils; holding district and local council elections as soon as possible; e) redoubling anti-corruption efforts, including reinforcing independent anti-corruption agencies; investing more in raising public awareness of anti-corruption; empowering civil society watchdogs and media to perform the functions of the “fourth estate”; further encouraging Members of Parliament to fully assume their political control functions; clarifying the notion of corruption together with the Afghan civil society and the government and clearly defining an internationally harmonised and co-ordinated strategy; f) exploring further ways of gradually and prudently transferring the functions of the informal governance and justice sector to the official State institutions; g) clearly tying development assistance to transparency and accountability of receiving institutions; promoting development projects that aim at expanding the taxation base for the Afghan government; h) ensuring that the rights of women are not held hostage of the reconciliation process; passing the EVAW law in parliament and ensuring its full implementation; encouraging women participation in political and economic life, further enhancing their education opportunities; continuing to mainstream gender issues in the international community assistance projects and further supporting women organisations, fully implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in its approach; i) promoting local actors in the NGO sector; j) co-operating with Afghan professional associations and trade unions in promoting economic perspectives and addressing the massive social problems at the same time; k) encouraging regional co-operation and the development of regional solutions for problems such as poppy cultivation, water management, insecurity in rural areas, and refugees, including pragmatic approaches focussing on transport routes, water and energy management, commerce and a transparent management of the region along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan; l) successfully starting a reconciliation process with the insurgent groups, reviewing and – where necessary – readjusting the reintegration programme for the Taliban, with full Afghan responsibility, and continuing the international efforts to include the insurgent groups in the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan; m) assuring the legitimate representation of the Afghan people (parliament, civil society) in reconciliation talks that would lead to a compromise supported by the Afghan people; the

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support of neighbours, especially Pakistan and Iran, is essential for the success of reconciliation; n) enhancing the co-ordination of the international community’s efforts under the aegis of the United Nations, particularly strengthening the UN’s role in terms of developing a future security architecture for Afghanistan and allowing for a regional system with a substantial share of Afghan ownership and responsibility; o) investing in cultural diplomacy as a means for dialogue, exchange, networks and partnership and further promoting cultural identity in Afghanistan.

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