Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education

Global Perspectives

Edited by Maria Yudkevich Philip G. Altbach Laura E. Rumbley Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education Palgrave Studies in Global Higher Education

Series Editors: Roger King, School of Management, University of Bath, UK; Jenny Lee, Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of Arizona, USA; Simon Marginson, Institute of Education, University of London, UK; Rajani Naidoo, School of Management, University of Bath, UK This series aims to explore the globalization of higher education and the impact this has had on education systems around the world including East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and the US. Analyzing HE systems and policy, this series will provide a comprehensive overview of how HE within different nations and/or regions is responding to the new age of universal mass higher education.

Titles include:

Michael Dobbins and Christoph Knill HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE International Challenges to Historical Institutions Forthcoming:

Christof Van Mol INTRA-EUROPEAN STUDENT MOBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CIRCUITS Europe on the Move Lý Trân,` Simon Marginson, Hoàng Đô,˜ Quyên Đô,˜ Trúc Lê, Nhài Nguyên,˜ Thao ơư ˜ Vu,˜ Tha.ch Pha.m and H ng Nguyên HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIETNAM Flexibility, Mobility and Practicality in the Global Knowledge Economy Zinaida Fadeeva, Laima Galkute, Clemens Mader and Geoff Scott (editors) SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION Transformation of Learning and Society Maria Yudkevich, Philip G. Altbach and Laura E. Rumbley (editors) ACADEMIC INBREEDING AND MOBILITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION Global Perspectives

Palgrave Studies in Global Higher Education Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–137–34814–2 Hardback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difﬁculty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education Global Perspectives

Edited by

Maria Yudkevich National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia Philip G. Altbach Boston College, USA Laura E. Rumbley Boston College, USA Selection and editorial matter © Maria Yudkevich, Philip G. Altbach, and Laura E. Rumbley 2015 Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-46124-7

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-49887-1 ISBN 978-1-137-46125-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137461254 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Contents

List of Tables and Figures vi

Acknowledgments: The Inbreeding Project ix

Notes on Contributors xi

1 Academic Inbreeding: Local Challenge, Global Problem 1 Philip G. Altbach, Maria Yudkevich, and Laura E. Rumbley

2 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature 17 Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich

3 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University: A Systemic and Organizational Analysis 45 Marcelo Rabossi

4 Faculty Inbreeding in China: Status, Causes, and Results 73 Hong Shen, Zhiping Xu, and Bingbing Zhang

5 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education: Inching Toward Openness in a Globalized Context 99 Akiyoshi Yonezawa

6 Academic Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities 130 Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich

7 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding 156 Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga

8 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case 182 Saleem Badat

9 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities: Perverse Effects in a Global Context 206 José-Ginés Mora

10 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine 228 Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé

Index 259

v Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1 National higher education experts’ opinions on formal procedures versus real practices 11 3.1 Degrees held by academic staff at UBA, by percentage (2004) 60 3.2 Number and percentage of graduates by level at national and private universities in Buenos Aires city and Greater Buenos Aires (2009) 61 3.3 UBA professors according to the academic degree currently pursuing, by percentage (2004) 63 3.4 UBA professors according to where they teach, if they engage in research, and extent of external research collaboration, by percentage (2004) 65 5.1 Full-time faculty at universities in Japan (2013) 103 5.2 Percentage of faculty members who acquired their final degrees at the university where they are currently working (2012) 109 5.3 Percentage of alumni among faculty, by age and institutional type (2010) 112 5.4 Percentage of faculty who completed PhD programs, by field/discipline and institutional type (2010) 112 6.1 Faculty who have additional employment because of low salary levels (presented as a percentage of all those who have additional employment) 135 6.2 Inbred and single-university faculty, by percentage and absolute number 136 6.3 Percent of inbred faculty in different disciplines 138 6.4 Chair head and faculty opinions toward employment policy 140 6.5 Faculty pathways to employment 141 6.6 Competitiveness of faculty salaries according to university administrators 143 6.7 Importance of affiliation with academic discipline/department/ university 147

vi List of Tables and Figures vii

6.8 Faculty participation in research projects, by percentage (2010, 2012) 148 9.1 Percentage of academic staff by university answering YES to the following questions 215 10.1 Share of inbred faculty by ﬁeld 250

Figures

1.1 National higher education experts’ opinions on the degree of academic immobility in their respective country 5 1.2 National higher education experts’ opinions on the level of inbreeding in the higher education system in their respective country, on average versus within the most prestigious (top-quality) universities 6 1.3 National higher education experts’ opinions on the level of inbreeding in the higher education system in their respective country, on average versus within low-quality universities 7 1.4 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: uncompetitive earnings in academia 8 1.5 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: importance of social ties 9 1.6 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: preference is shown to inbred candidates only when they are more competent than other candidates 9 1.7 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: inbred candidates are hired only if a university is forced to use this hiring policy 10 1.8 National higher education experts’ opinions on the ease of ﬁnding academic employment 12 1.9 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: professional output (such as published papers) 13 1.10 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: previous work experience in academic institutions 13 viii List of Tables and Figures

1.11 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: the job applicant is a graduate of the hiring university 14 3.1 Proportions of UBA graduates by degree type in relation to national and private universities within commuting distance from the UBA (2009), and UBA inbreeding rates (2004) 62 4.1 Inbreeding rates in research universities, 2006–2007 and 2013 80 4.2 Average numbers of publications of inbred and noninbred faculty in recent three years by academic rank 82 4.3 All numbers of published articles in SCI/SSCI and CNKI of inbred and noninbred faculty by discipline 84 4.4 Time span (in years) from receiving the highest degree to reaching rank of full professor, by university 86 5.1 Percentage of faculty members who earned their final degrees at the university where they are currently working, schools of law and engineering (1994–2010) 111 5.2 Percentage of inbred faculty among selected comprehensive research universities (2009) 120 5.3 Percentage of inbred faculty at selected comprehensive research universities in Japan, by age and status (2009) 121 5.4 Percentage of inbred faculty at selected comprehensive research universities in Japan, by nationality and academic field (2009) 123 5.5 Frequency of information exchange concerning research and teaching among Japanese faculty in STEM fields (2009) 125 5.6 Average number of published international-refereed journal articles in English over an entire career among Japanese faculty in STEM fields (2009) 126 6.1 Distribution of faculty at public universities, by academic rank 133 6.2 Distribution of faculty at public institutions, by type of employment 134 6.3 Distribution of faculty in public institutions, by age 135 10.1 Distribution of faculty by household income, by percentage (subjective estimates) 233 10.2 Distribution of faculty by monthly salary, by percentage 243 Acknowledgments: The Inbreeding Project

The concept for this research project stems from a concern about academic inbreeding at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow. An underlying objective of this research was to understand how inbreeding works in a selection of countries where it is a common characteristic of the academic landscape. We assumed that a consensus existed that inbreeding was a negative practice and that policies were in place to eliminate or diminish it. Our research shows that this is not the case – and inbreeding continues without much change in most of the countries included in this research. The project was coordinated by Maria Yudkevich at HSE and Philip Altbach and Laura Rumbley at the Boston College Center for Interna- tional Higher Education (CIHE). Our methodology was quite simple and straightforward. Our research team in Moscow and Boston developed a template of key questions concerning inbreeding, and we approached colleagues in eight countries to write essays on the topic using our basic research questions and template as a guide. Our research group met in December 2013 in Boston for a working conference to discuss draft chapters and then returned home to prepare final versions. The country chapters, which are included in this book, vary somewhat in specific methodology, but all provide analysis based on our template. Our contributing authors also completed a common questionnaire, the purpose of which was to allow us to gather similar kinds of information from all of the study countries, in order to attempt to make some comparative analyses. These findings are explored in the introductory chapter. We are indebted to our research team, who worked closely with us from the inception of this project. We are also indebted to Anna Panova and Elena Erlykova in Moscow for their assistance and participation. At Boston College, the CIHE team, including David Stanfield, Yukiko Shimmi, and Ariane de Gayaradon, helped to plan and implement our workshop. Georgiana Mihut created the index for the book. Salina Kopellas, CIHE administrative assistant, provided additional support.

ix x Acknowledgments: The Inbreeding Project

This project was funded by the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. The CIHE funded part of our working group conference in Boston. The Center for International Higher Educa- tion at Boston College cosponsored the research as part of continuing collaboration between CIHE and Laboratory of Institutional Analysis at HSE. Contributors

Philip G. Altbach is Research Professor and Director of the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College, USA. He was the 2004–2006 Distinguished Scholar Leader for the New Century Scholars initiative of the Fulbright program. He has been a senior associate of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He has written widely on the academic profession and is coeditor of American Higher Education in the 21st Century and many other books.

Saleem Badat is Program Director, International Higher Education and Strategic Projects, at the Andrew W Mellon Foundation, New York. He was previously vice chancellor (president) of Rhodes University in South Africa. In 1999, he became the ﬁrst CEO of the Council on Higher Edu- cation, which advises the Minister of Higher Education & Training on higher education policy issues. Badat is the author of Black Man, You Are on Your Own (2010) and Black Student Politics, Higher Education and Apartheid (2002); coauthor of National Policy and a Regional Response in South African Higher Education (2004); and coeditor of Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles in South Africa (1990).

Tom Coupé is Associate Professor at the Kyiv School of Economics. Tom obtained his PhD from the Free University of Brussels (ULB) in 2002. His research interests include economics of education, labor economics, and political economics. Tom has published his academic research in the Journal of the European Economic Association, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Research Policy, and elsewhere. He regularly writes columns and articles for newspapers and magazines and has been a consultant for the European Economic Association, Routledge, UNESCO, and the World Bank.

Olga Gorelova is Research Assistant at the International Research Lab- oratory for Institutional Analysis of Economic Reforms at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. She is a master’s student in the Applied Methods of Market Social Analysis program at the same institution. Olga’s professional interests lie in the sphere of sociology of education (the academic profession, in particular) and methodological problems of dealing with missing data. Her current

xi xii Notes on Contributors research activity is focused on reasons and consequences of faculty immobility in different countries.

Manja Klemenciˇ cˇ is a researcher at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies and the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, USA. She is also an associate researcher of the Centre of Educational Pol- icy Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Trained as a political scientist (and drawing from political sociology and social anthropology), she works in the area of higher education studies.

José-Ginés Mora is Visiting Professor at the Institute of Education, Uni- versity of London, UK. He is an expert in higher education. He has been a member of the Bologna Follow-Up Group, vice-president of the Governing Board of the IMHE program (OECD), president of the EAIR (the European Higher Education Society), and member of the Steering Committee of ENQA (The European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education). He has been advisor and consultant for higher education matters for several European and American governments and international organizations (European Commission, World Bank, OECD). He has published extensively on higher education and on labor market of graduates.

Marcelo Rabossi is Professor and Researcher at the School of Govern- ment, Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, Argentina, teaching in the areas of Education Finance, Economics of Education, and Higher Education Administration and Policy. His research interests focus on governance and ﬁnancing, private higher education, and academic labor markets. He obtained a PhD in Education from the State University of New York, Albany (SUNY, 2008), an MA in Education from the Univer- sity of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (UIUC, 2000), and a BS in Business Economics with a minor in Economics at Argentina’s Torcuato Di Tella University (UTDT, 1996).

Laura E. Rumbley is Associate Director of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education, where she also serves as Lecturer in the graduate program in Higher Education Administration. She was previously the Deputy Director of the Academic Cooperation Associ- ation (ACA), a Brussels-based think tank focused on issues of internationalization and innovation in European higher education. Laura has authored and coauthored a number of publications, including the foundational document for the 2009 UNESCO World Conference on Notes on Contributors xiii

Higher Education, Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Aca- demic Revolution. She is a coeditor of the Journal of Studies in International Education.

Hong Shen is Professor of Higher and Comparative Education and of Economics of Education and the Vice Dean of the School of Educa- tion, Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST, one of China’s designated “985” universities). She is also the Director of the Hubei Provincial Center for Regional Development of Higher Education. Her scholarship focuses principally on the academic profession and faculty development, higher education ﬁnance, and research universities. A former Fulbright Scholar (Pennsylvania State University) and visiting scholar (SUNY at Buffalo), she holds a PhD in management (1997), a master’s in education (1991) and bachelor’s in engineering (1982) from HUST China.

Elizaveta Sivak is a junior research fellow at the Laboratory for Insti- tutional Analysis of Economic Reforms, National Research University Higher School of Economics. She was a visiting scholar at the Center for Studies in Higher Education at UC Berkeley (2007). Her research interests include the Russian and international academic profession and higher education.

Ilona Sologoub is a research associate at the Kyiv Economics Institute (KEI) of the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), since 2011. Previously, she worked as a risk analyst at a commercial bank and at the Ukrainian Par- liament. She obtained her MA from KSE in 2002. Her research interests include labor economics, economics of education, and demographics. At KEI, Ilona has taken part in research projects on the impact of economic crisis on education and labor migration studies.

Zhiping Xu is a PhD student at the Graduate School of Education of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. He holds master’s and bachelor degrees in education from HUST and Northeast Normal University of China.

Akiyoshi Yonezawa is an associate professor at the Graduate School of International Development (GSID), Nagoya University, Japan. With sociological background, he is mainly researching on the comparative higher education policies, especially focusing on world-class universities, internationalization of higher education, and public–private xiv Notes on Contributors relationship of higher education. Before moving to Nagoya University in October 2010, he worked at the National Institution for Tohoku Univer- sity, Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-UE), Hiroshima University, OECD, and Tokyo University. He is currently serving as expert committee member of Central Council of Education, Ministry of Education (MEXT), Japan.

Maria Yudkevich is Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia (HSE), an associate professor in the Department of Economics and a director of the Center for Institutional Studies at HSE. Her interests and research focus on contract theory with a special reference to faculty contracts, universities, and markets for higher education. She has been a co-organizer (jointly with Professor Philip G. Altbach of the Boston College Center for Inter- national Higher Education) of several international projects related to the academic profession in comparative perspective.

Pavel Zgaga is Professor of Philosophy of Education and Education Pol- icy at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. In the 1990s, during the period of social and political transition in Slovenia, he was State Secre- tary for Higher Education and Minister of Education and Sport. After his return to academe, he served as a Dean of Education Faculty. In 2001, he cofounded the Centre for Educational Policy Studies (CEPS) at the University of Ljubljana and has been its director until today.

Bingbing Zhang is a PhD student at the Graduate School of Education of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. He holds bachelor’s degree in economics from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in China. 1 Academic Inbreeding: Local Challenge, Global Problem Philip G. Altbach, Maria Yudkevich, and Laura E. Rumbley

Why examine “academic inbreeding,” a seemingly small and peripheral aspect of the academic profession, involving the appointment of faculty members who graduated from the institution employing them? Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education: Global Perspectives had its origins in a concern at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics in Moscow that the common practice in Russia of hiring one’s own graduates for faculty jobs has profound implications for academic culture, productivity, and the essential nature of the university. This interest led to a research project collaboratively organized by the Higher School of Economics and the Boston College Center for International Higher Education and centered on an examination of academic inbreeding in eight different countries: Argentina, China, Japan, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, and Ukraine. We quickly discovered that faculty inbreeding is common worldwide – and not just a concern in Russia. Indeed, hiring one’s own graduates is not considered either unusual or problematic in many countries. The pattern has been in place for many years – often for centuries – and is quite often considered a point of pride for a higher education system, as clear evidence that the system is able to retain its best intellectual talent. Our perspective is that faculty inbreeding is problematic. It limits the scope of hiring the best possible candidates for academic appointments – both from within the country and internationally. Inbreeding tends to entrench the existing academic culture in the institution and make change and reform even more difficult than would normally be the case. It solidifies hierarchical relationships within departments and faculties and enhances the power of senior professors. Inbreeding may perpetuate unfair power dynamics reflected in society more broadly. New ideas, concerning the academic discipline as well as the organization of studies

1 2 Local Challenge, Global Problem and the curriculum, are more difficult to implement. This occurs because both faculty and administrators consider the status quo to be “natural” and beneficial, and their interests are squarely invested in established academic and administrative arrangements. In short, new perspectives and new relationships do not take hold as easily where inbreeding is prevalent, and departments, schools, and the entire university are less innovative and open. In the 21st century, where knowledge is rapidly changing and increasingly globalized, inbreeding engenders traditionalism, which limits excellence and innovation. Inbred faculty tend to be more “local” in their orientation. They exhibit more loyalty and commitment to their university rather than reflecting a “cosmopolitan” orientation, which is typified by a greater focus on their discipline and a broader identification with the academic profession at large (Gouldner 1957). In general, faculty with a local orientation are less focused on research and less involved with the wider academic community. They invest more in the types of activities that are visible and rewarded within the individual university – that is, teaching and administrative duties, which are less appreciated by the academic market. Indeed, while publications in peer-reviewed journals or a record of obtaining grants can easily be recognized on a CV and increase a professor’s “value” on the academic market, teaching efforts and administrative duties are quite often “sunk costs” for those seeking to move from one institution to another. Yet, our research revealed not only that a surprising number of institutions and countries have a long tradition of academic inbreeding but also that there are understandable – and in some cases quite pragmatic – reasons for adherence to such practices and policies. Many countries lack a labor market for academic jobs, and there is no tradition of mobility. In extreme cases, those academics who seek jobs at other universities could even be considered potentially problematic individuals, that is, those who have been pushed out by their home institutions. With these kinds of prejudices, it becomes difficult for academics to find a good position at another institution without informal connections. Indeed, in systems with significant levels of inbreeding, informal ties start to play an important role in recruitment and promotion decisions. The interests of senior faculty in hiring their own former students or assistants can be a critical factor influencing recruitment decisions. Ad hoc decision-making and approaches to hiring based on informal ties in many countries coexist with – and overshadow – formal systems of “open” recruitment and promotion. While formal procedures (like open calls for hiring and public competitions for promotion, etc.) are in place, Philip G. Altbach et al. 3 nobody believes they really work; such procedures are considered an artificial facade masking the real processes, which are based on personal relationships and “insider” knowledge. Thus, it is quite difficult, in very practical terms, for a graduate of one university to obtain an academic job at a different institution – and few ways of moving from one institution to another once appointed. In small countries, few universities produce doctoral graduates, and thus small national systems may often be staffed by graduates of a single research university. As our research shows, graduate schools, as a central place for the training of future academics, play a critical role in reproducing inbreeding practices. In those systems where PhD candidates are also employed as teaching assistants in their respective departments, inbreeding is often inevitable. Up until the moment of their doctoral defense, these individuals are deeply integrated into the department in terms of sharing values and informal ties with their colleagues. In this way, they naturally gain obvious preference over external candidates seeking employment in the department. Historical and cultural tradition is perhaps the greatest reason for academic inbreeding – universities often feel that since their own graduates are well trained and since they understand the culture and traditions of the institution, they will therefore “fit in” to the existing academic community. By taking in their own graduates, universities minimize efforts exerted in search and recruitment processes and also minimize the risks of poor hiring decisions. They are able to select the most loyal candidates who share the basic values of the organization and research community and will work toward further preservation of these values. Continuity and respect for the institution’s “academic heritage” is considered an important virtue in these contexts. In turn, the ability of a department to keep its best faculty for years is considered a sign of academic quality. In most countries where academic inbreeding exists, it is generally not considered a problem. The practice is so commonplace and long- standing in many systems that it is frequently not “considered” at all! The inbreeding arrangement is widely accepted, and universities are perceived to work well and produce appropriate quality in teaching and research. Indeed, research in a number of countries shows that inbred faculty are not notably less productive in terms of research output than professors who are not inbred. Importantly, however, this research does not take into account the quality or innovativeness of the research that is produced by inbred faculty. Indeed, inbred faculty may be more oriented toward local journals and publications than noninbred 4 Local Challenge, Global Problem academics who care about global recognition for what they are doing. That is, even if inbreed faculty are sometimes formally more productive than their noninbread colleagues, such comparisons should be undertaken with great caution and the results interpreted properly. As existing literature shows, countries with a higher level of inbreeding produce a smaller share of the world’s research output (measured by publications in leading peer-reviewed journals; see, for example, Soler 2001). Despite established traditions of inbreeding in a number of countries, there is a general perception in the academic community globally, when this topic is considered at all, that inbreeding is generally a negative characteristic and that world-class universities should not be inbred. Some leading universities even have put “anti-inbreeding” policies into place. For example, many of the top universities in China, including Peking University, no longer hire their own graduates for academic jobs – indeed, many Chinese universities favor hiring Chinese graduates of the best Western universities. Some institutions are increasingly hiring from an international talent pool. Other countries allow universities to hire their own graduates but only after they gain some considerable international academic experience. Policy-makers in these countries are well aware of potential negative consequences of inbreeding and believe that they are often correlated with little academic mobility. So, by assuring such an academic mobility, they try to cope with potential negative impact of limited outside experience and absence of external connections. When we started work on Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education: Global Perspectives, we assumed that academic inbreeding would be on the decline worldwide and that there would be a consensus that the practice should be promptly ended. The research reported in this book does not support this assumption. In most of the countries discussed here, inbreeding is not seen as a serious problem, even if there is a general recognition that reforms may be useful. Some data show that academic productivity of inbred faculty is not significantly different than for other faculty. However, we remain convinced that the best universities of the 21st century will be outward looking, internationally minded, and open to the best academic minds from their countries and the world. These characteristics do not favor hiring “from within.”

Comparative perspectives on inbreeding

To capture a comparative picture of inbreeding practices and policies across the eight countries included in this study, we asked each of Philip G. Altbach et al. 5 our country experts to complete a common questionnaire. Our experts gave their opinions (in some cases, based on in-depth interviews with policy-makers and university administrators) about the importance and prevalence of various phenomena related to inbreeding. The experts were also asked to consider how inbreeding plays out in different segments of the higher education systems in their country (e.g., in elite universities vs. “on average” in the system). This effort resulted in the collection of qualitative data that allow us (to some extent) to compare countries’ experiences with inbreeding and to see some common patterns. As will be discussed further, despite considerable differences among our study countries in terms of size and many other important characteristics, they share some commonalities in relation to the rationale, realities, and consequences of inbreeding.

Inbreeding and immobility As has already been mentioned, inbreeding and academic immobility (a single-university career) are often associated (see Figure 1.1). Indeed, inbreeding is commonly caused by the absence of a domestic academic market (especially for senior positions), housing anomalies that affect

0 South Africa China Slovenia Argentina Japan Ukraine Russia Spain

A single-university career (not necessarily at an institution where a person got the highest degree) Getting the first academic position at the university where the person received their highest degree

Figure 1.1 National higher education experts’ opinions on the degree of academic immobility in their respective country Note: Data reﬂect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – phenomenon doesn’t exist in the system” to “5 – phenomenon is very widespread within the system.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted speciﬁcally for this project. 6 Local Challenge, Global Problem the possibilities for mobility (such as limited options for apartment rental), as well as cultural values that view organizations like families and reward loyalty and longevity. All these factors contribute in different ways to limited employment mobility and single-university careers. In terms of consequences, inbreeding and single-university careers are also quite alike since both severely limit outside experience of faculty. They both force faculty to invest in competences, activities, and outputs that are more visible and rewarded within the employing university than outside it. This explains, for example, why inbred and nonmobile faculty usually teach more and spend more time on administrative and service duties. Limited external experience also induces faculty to accept existing academic routines and practices noncritically, as given, and often be neither interested nor able to contribute toward changing existing standards or models of academic governance.

Inbreeding and prestige In our comparative study, we included only countries with high levels of inbreeding, in general terms (Figure 1.2). However, inbreeding levels

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Japan China Spain Russia Ukraine SloveniaArgentina South Africa In the higher education sector in general In the most prestigious (top-quality) institutions

Figure 1.2 National higher education experts’ opinions on the level of inbreeding in the higher education system in their respective country, on average versus within the most prestigious (top-quality) universities Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – phenomenon doesn’t exist in the system” to “7 – phenomenon is very widespread within the system.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project. Philip G. Altbach et al. 7 can be different for different segments within a given national higher education system. Indeed, for the countries included in this study (and this is consistent with previous literature on inbreeding), inbreeding is more common among high-quality, elite institutions than in the system on average. There are several reasons for this. First, the best universities believe (in most cases, quite reasonably) that their graduates are the most well prepared and find it difficult to recruit outsiders with comparable skills and potential. Second, faculty in top universities actively cooperate with international colleagues and are well integrated into the international academic community. This makes the consequences of inbreeding less harmful in this environment. In contrast, low-quality institutions in many countries demonstrate lower levels of inbreeding than average (Figure 1.3). However, this is not due to their understanding of the harmful nature of this phenomenon, but is explained by the fact that low-quality institutions often do not have their own core faculty and must attract faculty from other institutions on part-time or pay-per-hour contracts. Such institutions also do not often have their own PhD programs, which are usually the main source of young faculty when hired from within.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Japan China Russia Spain Slovenia Ukraine Argentina South Africa In the higher education sector in general In the less prestigious (low-quality) institutions

Figure 1.3 National higher education experts’ opinions on the level of inbreeding in the higher education system in their respective country, on average versus within low-quality universities Note: Data reﬂect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – phenomenon doesn’t exist in the system” to “7 – phenomenon is very widespread within the system.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted speciﬁcally for this project. 8 Local Challenge, Global Problem

The causes of inbreeding As for the reasons why academic inbreeding occurs, there is no general consensus on the most important factors across the study countries. Thus, uncompetitive earnings for academics are mentioned as an important factor for Russia, Argentina, and Spain (see Figure 1.4), while in other countries, faculty income seems less important. Experts from most of the study counties, however, stress the general importance of social ties in this discussion (see Figure 1.5). China and South Africa are the only countries where social ties do not represent an important factor supporting inbreeding. Experts in these countries (and also in Japan and Slovenia) believe that preference for internal candidates is shown only when the internal candidate is genuinely perceived to be stronger than the external applicants (see Figure 1.6). In other words, in many countries experts believe that there is no prejudice toward external candidates and that inbreeding is in some sense the consequence of deep university beliefs that their own graduates are the most attractive for hiring purposes.

China Japan Spain Ukraine Russia Slovenia Argentina South Africa

Figure 1.4 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: uncompetitive earnings in academia Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – strongly disagree with the statement ‘On average, the main reason for academic inbreeding is that earnings in academia are uncompetitive compared to the non academic labor market (therefore, it is difficult to attract outside candidates and only those with a prior attachment to a specific university can be effectively recruited)’ ” to “5 – strongly agree with this statement.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project. Philip G. Altbach et al. 9

China Spain Japan Russia Ukraine Argentina Slovenia South Africa

Figure 1.5 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: importance of social ties Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – strongly disagree with the statement ‘On average, the main reason for academic inbreeding is that social ties in general have traditionally exerted a strong influence within the academic system’ ” to “5 – strongly agree with this statement.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project.

Spain China Japan Russia Ukraine Argentina Slovenia South Africa

Figure 1.6 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: preference is shown to inbred candidates only when they are more competent than other candidates Note: Data reﬂect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – strongly disagree with the statement ‘Preference is shown to inbred candidates only when they are more competent than other candidates’ ” to “5 – strongly agree with this statement.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted speciﬁcally for this project. 10 Local Challenge, Global Problem

China Japan Spain Ukraine Russia Argentina Slovenia South Africa

Figure 1.7 National higher education experts’ opinions on the reasons for academic inbreeding: inbred candidates are hired only if a university is forced to use this hiring policy Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – strongly disagree with the statement ‘Inbred candidates are hired only if a university is forced to use this hiring policy (e.g., where there is a lack of financial resources to compete for external academics; unfavorable geographic location of a university)’ ” to “5 – strongly agree with this statement.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project.

We think that these beliefs are critically important for reproducing and sustaining inbreeding over decades and even centuries. In some countries (including Argentina, Russia, and Ukraine), however, a strong bias in favor of insiders exists and is conﬁrmed by experts. In most of our study countries, experts believe that inbreeding is not caused by external factors and is explained by what is going on within the university itself. Most experts disagree with the notion that inbred candidates are hired only if a university is forced to use this hiring policy (Figure 1.7). The only exception is Slovenia.

Hiring practices and candidates’ prospects In many countries, hiring procedures are organized around “open calls” for positions, with clearly deﬁned job descriptions and candidate prerequisites. Positions also specify the obligations candidates should meet once hired. However, in many countries with high inbreeding, these “open and competitive” procedures are essentially pretense, as no one believes in the possibility of genuinely fair chances for outsiders to Philip G. Altbach et al. 11

Table 1.1 National higher education experts’ opinions on formal procedures versus real practices

How often an open competition is a “ﬁction” (1 – not at all often,5–veryoften)

Argetina China Japan Russia Slovenia South Africa Spain Ukraine

Please indicate 41355 1 44 how often an open competition is a “ﬁction”

succeed in these competitions (see Table 1.1). All parties in the recruitment process understand the “fictitious” nature of such formal procedures. Potential applicants do not feel they have a real chance to be selected and do not apply for positions at other universities. Univer- sity administrators do not really expect to receive external applications during “national” recruitment processes and may not even have any procedures to deal with external applications, in the event any were received. Finally, existing faculty facing contract renewal (which is often done through an open call for the position up for renewal) may not feel any competitive pressure, knowing that the “competition” is, in reality, quite limited. The existence of a huge gap between formal procedures for hiring and actual practices suggests that inbreeding could not be eliminated by the simple introduction of formal requirements to have open, nondiscrim- inatory policies toward outside candidates. While formal procedures may exist (and even be supported by such mechanisms as the publication of open calls in national newspapers), real practices are guided by entrenched informal conventions and routines that limit the hiring of outsiders. So, when asked why inbreeding is a prevailing reality in their institutions, university administrators often refer to the fact that no outside applications are received, which explains the semi-forced internal hiring that occurs. Overall, our study experts agree that it is relatively difficult to obtain a university position, especially one that offers long-term guarantees and job security (Figure 1.8). The only exception to this trend across the case study countries is Russia, but even here the field is becoming more competitive, as the Russian government launched in 2013 many important initiatives aimed at restructuring some Russian higher education institutions. More competition for academic positions is also due to the 12 Local Challenge, Global Problem

Japan Spain China Ukraine Russia Slovenia Argentina South Africa Entry level academic position An academic position with sufficient guarantees of job security

Figure 1.8 National higher education experts’ opinions on the ease of finding academic employment Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – very difficult to get an academic position” to “5 – very easy to get an academic position.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project. current demographic “dip”: the cohort of young people is shrinking, meaning fewer students are entering universities, so fewer teachers are needed to teach them. Almost all of our study experts agree on the importance of candidates’ professional qualifications for success in faculty recruitment and hiring processes (Figure 1.9). In this regard, they do not see much difference between the elite sector and all other higher education institutions in their respective countries. Work experience in academic institutions is somewhat less important (Figure 1.10), especially in Japan and Russia. Finally, in more than half of countries that were the focus of our study, experts report that being a graduate from the hiring institution per se is not an important factor for recruitment decisions (Figure 1.11).

The good, the bad ...the inevitable?

Our brief comparative analysis demonstrates that there are similarities as well as differences in the ways that inbreeding plays out in our study Philip G. Altbach et al. 13

Japan China Spain Russia Ukraine Slovenia Argentina South Africa In higher education in general In the most prestigious universities

Figure 1.9 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: professional output (such as published papers) Note: Data reﬂect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – not at all important” to “5 – very important.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted speciﬁcally for this project.

Japan China Spain Russia Ukraine Slovenia Argentina South Africa In higher education in general In the most prestigious universities

Figure 1.10 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: previous work experience in academic institutions Note: Data reﬂect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – not at all important” to “5 – very important.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted speciﬁcally for this project 14 Local Challenge, Global Problem

China Spain Japan Russia Ukraine Slovenia Argentina South Africa In higher education in general In the most prestigious universities

Figure 1.11 National higher education experts’ opinions on the importance of various factors in faculty hiring decisions: the job applicant is a graduate of the hiring university Note: Data reflect responses to the project survey with Likert Scale responses ranging from “1 – not at all important” to “5 – very important.” Source: The survey of national higher education experts conducted specifically for this project. countries – and, we suspect, elsewhere around the world. Importantly, there is no general consensus about what causes inbreeding. Through our project survey work, and also in light of the extensive country case studies included in this volume, we see that inbreeding is a complex phenomenon with many interrelated aspects. Inbreeding occurs in both big and small systems. It seems to take hold and be perpetuated for a broad range of reasons, including (but not limited to) nonexistent national academic labor markets, limited sources of employable PhD holders, traditions of immobility in both employment and society, lack of faith in candidate screening and hiring mechanisms that do not involve personal ties, and national language policies limiting possibilities to retain nonlocal hires. Our research also shows that inbreeding can occur even if universities believe they are hiring fairly and competitively. In these inbred contexts, we note a kind of vicious circle: inbreeding results in low outside experience of faculty members, which, in turn, limits their understanding of inefficiencies within the system in which they work and minimizes their awareness of possible alternatives for their institution’s organization and performance. In other words, while inbred faculty members Philip G. Altbach et al. 15 may, in some cases, be similarly productive in terms of research as their externally recruited peers, they are likely to be more locally oriented and tied to local norms and values and probably less interested in innovating within the university. Inbreeding frames the lifetime professional experience of a huge number of academics around the world. The fact that this practice is sustained in so many different contexts, in an era of enormous growth and new relevance of higher education to economic and social development, makes it exceedingly important to understand why inbreeding occurs and the consequences it yields. Our starting point for this exercise was that inbreeding is fundamentally problematic. We still feel this is the case, yet the deeper analysis afforded to us through this study has given us new perspectives on the very pragmatic reasons why inbreeding may occur and the practical difficulties associated with “undoing” this approach to hiring new faculty. In this sense, inbreeding is often a “symptom” of broader systemic issues and can be understood as a “lesser evil” approach in less-than-ideal environments for academic employment. This highlights a daunting reality: “Fixing” inbreeding would not necessarily solve the much more deeply entrenched difficulties inherent in national higher education systems that are structurally misaligned with the notions of “academic labor markets” (regionally or nationally), or social/professional mobility, or in small country contexts where language barriers make it hard to hire anyone but a local graduate. More- over, abandoning inbreeding without rethinking the broader system of contract relationships may decrease the incentives for new generations of prospective faculty, making them reluctant to choose an academic career under conditions of problematic and uncertain employment and promotion procedures. Universities worldwide are under unprecedented pressures. The research universities at the top of academic systems face challenges to improve their research profiles, boost their standings in the rankings, and internationalize their faculty and students. Other academic institutions face the challenges of massification, increasing privatization, massive open online courses and distance education, and increased diversification of student populations. These enormous challenges require an openness to new ideas and a broad perspective that an inbred faculty is unlikely to have. Although addressing these higher order challenges is beyond the scope of this study, what this analysis does contribute to the discussion is a clear call to higher education stakeholders around the world that inbreeding – often passively accepted as part of the inevitable 16 Local Challenge, Global Problem status quo – must be pulled out of the shadows and critically examined. Where detrimental effects are identified, these must be constructively addressed. In an era of heightened competition for resources and greatly expanded expectations from society, universities, the world over, face new challenges and opportunities. These new realities require institutions to undertake careful analyses of all manner of practices that affect their performance, not the least of which are attraction and retention of academic staff. Following established patterns without questioning their contemporary relevance and value is an unwise course of action for any university today. Making sense of academic inbreeding is a higher education agenda item whose time has come.

References

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1957. “Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles-I.” Administrative Science Quarterly 2: 281–303. Soler, Manuel. 2001. “How Inbreeding Affects Productivity in Europe.” Nature 411: 132. 2 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich

Introduction

The problem of faculty inbreeding has been studied by researchers around the world for nearly a century. This chapter presents a thorough summary of the main studies focused on this phenomenon, beginning with deﬁnitions of inbreeding and a short historical discussion of when and where the ﬁrst interest in inbreeding emerged. The chapter then presents what the literature has to say about possible reasons for inbreeding policies as well as the consequences of such practices. The possibilities for eliminating inbreeding are also considered. A brief summary of national cases of inbreeding concludes the chapter. The initial interest in inbreeding emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. Even at that early stage, it was already characterized as an unhealthy practice. Thus, Harvard President Charles Eliot in his famous book University Administration (1908) says,

It is natural, but not wise, for a college or university to recruit its faculties chieﬂy from its own graduates – natural, because these graduates are well known to the selecting authorities, since they have been under observation for years; unwise, because breeding in and in has grave dangers for a university, and also for technical schools and naval and military academies. (Eliot 1908, 90)

It is probably the most famous quotation cited in many later works (see, for example, Eells and Cleveland 1935b; McGee 1960; Hargens and Farr 1973; Wyer and Conrad 1984; Pan 1993; Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2010). Though Eliot did not specify what these “grave

17 18 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature dangers” were, it is still notable that even the ﬁrst mention of inbreeding characterizes it as a negative and undesirable (though widespread) phenomenon. Eliot’s statement generated great interest in the problem of inbreeding.

Deﬁnitions of inbreeding

Most commonly, academic inbreeding is defined as the practice of universities hiring their own graduates. The term itself was borrowed from the biological concept of “inbreeding,” which “refers to situations in which mating occurs among relatives (plant or animal)” (Sivak and Yudkevich 2012, 2; Smyth and Mishra 2013). “Inbreeding” is the most popular term for naming such a selection practice, but sometimes other terms may be found in literature, such as “endogamy” (Rocca 2007; Godechot and Louvet 2008), “academic nepotism” (Godechot and Louvet 2008), and “local circulation” (Bleiklie, Høstaker, and Vabø 2000). Different authors provide different definitions of the term “inbreeding.” In most of the literature, the definition is based on the fact that a faculty member studied in the same university where he or she subsequently works, but sometimes the importance of social connections in the selection process is emphasized. For instance, Godechot and Louvet (2008) defined inbreeding as “a selection process based on personal relationships rather than the standardised evaluation of applications or the thorough analysis of individual skills.” Rocca (2007) also noticed that inbreeding emerges in situations where there is a shift in the hiring process away from the importance of academic productivity and toward the importance of social ties. Among those authors who defined inbreeding as a function of hiring former students, some authors classified those faculty members as inbred “who had received all or any part of their training in the institution in which they are teaching” (McNeely 1932; Eells and Cleveland 1935a, 262; McGee 1960; Blau 1973; Hargens and Farr 1973; Dutton 1980; Pan 1993; Smyth and Mishra 2013). In most of the more recent studies on the subject, the importance in the selection process of new faculty of where the final degree (usually the PhD) was obtained is highlighted in the definition of inbreeding (Pan 1993). This means that these scholars define academics as inbred if they have obtained their PhD from the university at which they are now employed, but the prove- nance of all other degrees held by the academic are not taken into account (Berelson 1960; Wells, Hassler, and Sellinger 1979; Wyer and Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 19

Conrad 1984; Eisenberg and Wells 2000; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007; Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2010; Inanc and Tuncer 2011). In some of the literature, more specific definitions of inbreeding are applied. Thus, Navarro and Rivero (2001) distinguished inbred faculty as those who are employed by the university where they produced their first publication. Hollingshead (1938) defined inbreeding as “having membership in one of the in-groups: alumni, friendship or family” (Pan 1993, 14). Others identified inbreeding in cases where “academics spend their career in close geographical proximity to the university in which they received their initial scientific training” (Bleiklie, Høstaker, and Vabø 2000). This definition relates more to the notion of geographical immobility, but the authors still consider such situations as inbreeding. Sometimes, specific conditions of a given study may influence the operationalization of the term “inbreeding.” For instance, Clark and Larson (1972), who studied inbreeding in church-related colleges in the United States, defined inbreeding on the basis of being employed by a college with the same denominational affiliation as that where faculty members had received their bachelor’s degree or had attended at the undergraduate level. Many researchers draw a distinction between the concepts of “pure inbred” academics and those who are either “silver-corded” – that is, those academics whose first employment was not at the university from which they graduated, but later they returned to their alma mater (Caplow and McGee 1958; Berelson 1960; Hargens and Farr 1973; Dutton 1980; Horta 2013; Smyth and Mishra 2013) – or “mobile inbreds,” that is, those “who have either spent a research or teaching spell at another university during the doctoral degree or did a post- doc at another university (or did both) before taking the first academic appointment in their Alma Mater” (Horta 2013, 492). These scholars pointed out that it is very important to draw such distinctions because “silver-corded” and mobile inbred faculty members usually performed better in their academic roles due to the fact that they had broader experience. Some researchers of inbreeding also studied various degrees of academic mobility – for example, working in a university other than that from which the individual graduated (adherents) or working in several universities (mobile academics) (Dutton 1980; Cruz-Castro and Sanz- Menéndez 2010; Horta 2013). They found inbreeding to be the extreme form of immobility, and their findings supported this idea: it was found that inbreds and adherents often behaved in the same way (Dutton 1980; Horta 2013). 20 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature

So, to sum up, there are several definitions of inbreeding, and different researchers have provided definitions according to specific purposes and peculiarities of their studies. Nevertheless, the main idea at the heart of the phenomenon of inbreeding is that universities hire their former students who have received any (or the highest) degree at the hiring university.

Early interest in inbreeding

McNeely (1932), in his paper “Faculty Inbreeding in Land-Grant Col- leges and Universities,” which is considered the ﬁrst solid study of inbreeding, discusses the consequences of inbreeding only brieﬂy, but still notes the following:

It is generally recognized that employing large numbers of their own graduates as faculty members is detrimental to the efﬁciency and progress of institutions of higher education. Such members, having obtained their scholastic training in the institutions employing them, frequently become steeped in the traditions and practices of their own institutions. As a result, they lack the broad outlook necessary to academic achievement. (McNeely 1932, 1)

Nevertheless, the author found that the average salaries of inbred faculty were slightly higher compared to other faculty. Reeves et al. (1933) pointed out that recognition (economic and professional) may be slower for inbred faculty. Some other early studies of inbreeding also registered lower productivity levels for inbred faculty compared to those not inbred, as well as bias toward administrative work (Eells and Cleveland 1935b; Hollingshead 1938). Miller (1918), who also noted that inbreeding was a negative practice, nevertheless suggested that “this practice has fortunately been on the wane in our country for a number of years” (Miller 1918, 53–54). Nonetheless, inbreeding is still present in some segments of the US university system. Unlike early studies on the subject, where the authors tried to measure the extent of inbreeding, recent works focus more on the reasons for and consequences of inbreeding practices. The possible causes and effects of inbreeding will likewise be considered more closely in the following section. Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 21

Reasons for inbreeding

Where the reasons behind the phenomenon of inbreeding have been studied – by economists, sociologists, and higher education researchers – the focus of nearly all of these efforts has been on the institutional causes of inbreeding (i.e., why higher educational institutions hire their own graduates). One of the exceptions is the work undertaken by Horta, Sato and Yonezawa in 2011 that tries to explain why academics might become inbred, from the individual’s point of view. In their work on Japan, based on the qualitative analysis of interviews, they found that “completing both undergraduate and postgraduate education at one university and having all doctoral supervisors from the same university” (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011, 39) are possible reasons for inbreeding; that is to say, these factors enhance the possibility that an academic job candidate will be hired from within. In general, reasons for inbreeding may be divided into two main groups: internal factors (that relate to the university itself) and external factors (that do not depend on the university itself and are explained by the university’s environment). Among the external causes of inbreeding, researchers highlight several factors. The stage of development of the academic system in a country is an important predictor of inbreeding: “at the early stages of development of higher education systems (and universities), the practice of academic inbreeding is unavoidable and perhaps necessary or desirable” (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011, 37), because it helps universities develop their research and teaching potential quickly. At a certain point, inbreeding strategies may help universities to enter the elite sector, which may explain why both inbreeding and elite universities usually emerge during the early evolutionary stages of development of academic systems (Berelson 1960). This also explains why elite universities in many countries exhibit high rates of inbreeding (compared to other universities in the country). Many researchers report that inbreeding rates are, in general, higher at prestigious universities (Berelson 1960; Wells, Hassler, and Sellinger 1979; Im 1990; Eisenberg and Wells 2000; Horta, Sato, and Yozenawa 2011). Berelson (1960) notes that high inbreeding rate in elite universities is a “statistical consequence” of their dominant position within their respective systems, as they are the main producers of PhD holders and must hire from within, while newer universities appear later in the context of more developed academic systems and hire faculty members from elite universities (Horta, Sato, and Yozenawa 2011). The fact that 22 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature elite universities are the main producers of doctoral degree holders also explains the finding that top-ranked programs in the United States hire from among each other to maintain their elite status. This phenomenon is close to inbreeding and is also regarded by some researchers as a sign of unhealthiness of an academic system (DiRamio, Theroux, and Guarino 2009). The prevalence of inbreeding at elite universities leads to their isolation, as “the higher the prestige of a department, the greater the inbreeding of faculty and the more tightly closed is the door of opportunity to non alumni” (Massengale and Sage 1982, 310). Blackburn, Conrad, and Young in 1987 also found a correlation between the level of inbreeding and the quality of educational programs, but this result is limited to institutions with high educational quality only. The fact that departmental prestige may explain inbreeding rates was also illustrated by Yim (2011), who found a U-shaped relationship between these variables. The level of inbreeding is higher at high-status and low-status departments as units with these profiles feel more free not to follow the norms of hiring outsiders, while inbreeding is least common in middle-status departments, which feel they should conform to established hiring norms that do not favor inbreeding. Inbreeding may also be a function of a department’s stage of development, which can be “regressing” (when there are limited resources or severe uncertainty), “maintaining” (when a department is stable), or “actualizing” (when departments are growing in resources and image) (Bridgeland 1982). The author found that regressing departments tended to hire more inbred faculty compared to those in maintaining stages (due to scarce resources). Maintaining departments, in their turn, tended to hire more inbred faculty compared to actualizing departments, which “do not want to jeopardize their reputation by hiring from within,” as inbred faculty are “less marketable and contribute less to the prestige of an academic department” (Pan 1993, 47). One more external reason for inbreeding is geographic (location) handicap and lack of financing. In such situations, inbreeding is functional and aims to secure “outsiders” from environmental changes and financial problems the university experiences (McGee 1960). For example, McGee (1960) explained the rather high levels of inbreeding (29 percent) in the University of Texas (UT) by its remoteness from all other universities in the United States, which prevented professors from moving to other universities. McGee (1960) also noted the lack of financing as a key factor supporting the hiring of own graduates, as this required fewer resources. Indeed, inbred professors are usually Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 23 more dedicated to their university and fewer financial resources are needed to hire and retain them. This is why University of Texas chairs often preferred to hire their own graduates to release funds for the hiring of outsider professors (McGee 1960). The fact that inbreeding may derive from the a lack of financing was also proved by Camacho (2001), who claims that high inbreeding is associated with low investment in research and development (R&D). Using Eurostat Yearbook 2001 data, he shows that the percentage of GDP invested in R&D is negatively correlated with inbreeding (r = – 0.75, P = 0.0018) and concludes that inbreeding is a consequence of poor investment policies. Inbreeding may also be a consequence of closed recruitment processes, when vacancies are not announced publicly and outsiders do not even know about them and have no opportunity to apply for them. Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa stated that “having the hiring process regulated by non-transparent recruitment arrangements” was one of the main reasons for high inbreeding rates in Japan. The reform of the recruitment system, which forced Japanese universities to advertise vacancies nationally and internationally, helped to substantially decrease the level of inbreeding in the national higher education system (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011). Last but not the least, among external reasons for inbreeding is the attitude of the general population toward inbreeding and mobility in a given country. For example, previously in Japan inbreeding was often seen as a positive phenomenon, and only the modernization of the national labor market started to transform academics’ mentalities (Horta, Sato, and Yozenawa 2011). The fact that “academic inbreeding might be associated with cultural issues related to institutional and geographic mobility” was also illustrated by interviews with Mexican academics on how they have been prepared to assume their professional responsibilities (Padilla 2008). All other reasons for inbreeding may be conditionally termed “internal,” as they refer directly to the will of department chairs to hire their own graduates and are supported by key role of informal social connections in the recruitment process (Rocca 2007). McGee (1960), in his work on functional inbreeding, noted that the most

typical explanation of inbreeding expressed by Eliot, Hollingshead, Wilson and Cleveland – the authors who were the ﬁrst to deal with the phenomenon of inbreeding in the USA – is simply the administrative convenience of hiring men known or at hand, plus the advantage 24 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature

for bureaucratic administration of having men on the faculty with viewpoints similar to the administrators. (McGee 1960, 484)

Similar reasons for inbreeding were explained by Eisenberg and Wells in their work on inbreeding in American law schools; they explained that mentors may hire their own graduates if they write well in the same areas as they do and thus contribute to the faculty members’ own scholarly importance. The authors also concluded that the importance of social connections in the process of hiring may lead to hiring not only the best graduates but also other students, who, for instance, performed well in class but are not very successful in scholarly terms. This happens because sometimes faculty members fail to evaluate their own graduates “as objectively as they evaluate other schools’ graduates” as they may be “too close to their own school’s graduates to judge them well” (Eisenberg and Wells 2000, 387). Sometimes students may participate in projects with faculty members and thus become their protégés, which may also lead to nonobjective evaluation of their merits and credentials. Godechot and Louvet (2008) also notice that academic inbreeding results from an ethic of loyalty toward candidates who are graduates of the recruiting institution and have personal relationships with those hiring. Hiring alumni helps to reduce costs related to the selection process of “outsiders,” especially in terms of time spent on assessing the applications of unknown candidates and on the adaptation and evaluation of newly hired faculty members (Godechot and Louvet 2008). Also, administrators may prefer to hire their own graduates – candidates with whom they already have long relationships – because such a practice may help the hiring administrators to allocate resources in the institution in ways considered more beneficial to themselves (Rocca 2007). Universities may also prefer to hire their own graduates “to reduce the uncertainty and risk of failure linked to the recruitment of ‘strangers’ ” (Majcher 2004, 160). Small peripheral universities may choose to follow inbreeding practices as inbred faculty are usually “locals” (Gouldner 1957; Blau 1973) who show more dedication to their university and try to contribute more to their university’s prosperity in comparison with noninbred faculty. These inbred faculty usually devote more time to local university activities (including teaching and administrative services). They may also provide greater stability for the university by reducing risks of firing, especially in those countries where all academics are civil servants and have similar rights in all universities, and Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 25 institutions cannot influence faculty remuneration (Pezzoni, Sterzi, and Lissoni 2009). Finally, universities may prefer hiring inbred candidates if the teaching mission is important for them. In this case, inbred faculty may be hired not for their scholarly performance but for their “teaching potential” (Eisenberg and Wells 2000), including their ability to teach certain courses and to fit into existing university curricula. While it is relatively easy to assess the research qualities of external candidates (by reading candidates’ research papers and asking them to present at a seminar, etc.), evaluation of teaching qualities is more problematic and may be only assessable over the longer term. Inbred academics may contribute to the formation of specific, highly localized approaches to teaching, as they are “guided by the experience gained as former students of this university and, later, as teaching assistants there” in the design of their own courses (Sivak and Yudkevich 2012, 4). Such a practice allows teaching cultures and practices to be carefully preserved and reproduced through academic generations. This may lead teaching programs to set and maintain their own standards that are not compatible with those at other universities. Finally, inbreeding may be rather useful if “the university wants to increase its outreach mission through consulting contracts” as inbred faculty are usually more engaged in consulting activities (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 19).

Consequences of inbreeding

The consequences of inbreeding can be considered at different levels. Indeed, inbreeding can have an impact on the individual characteristics and strategies of departments. It can also influence institutional performance. Finally, it can have an impact on the academic system and its productivity in general, at the macro level. Most researchers of inbreeding are unanimous in their opinion that inbreeding is a phenomenon that has a negative influence on the overall academic system. Some studies specify that inbreeding rates and the effects of inbreeding may differ across different higher educational institutions (e.g., public vs. private and low prestige vs. high prestige), as well as across different programs, courses, disciplines, and so on (Eells and Cleveland 1935a; Clark and Larson 1972; Eisenberg and Wells 2000). The majority of works on the effects of inbreeding are devoted to the consequences of inbreeding on the individual performance of inbred academics, and practically all of them focus on the scholarly 26 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature productivity of inbred versus noninbred faculty as one the main indicators of academic performance. Such scholarly productivity is usually approximated by the number of publications produced by academics, but in some studies the quality of these publications (estimated by various citation indexes) is also taken into account. Some researchers (Dutton 1980; Horta 2013) have explored the difference in productivity not only between inbred and noninbred faculty members but also between academics whose careers are characterized by different degrees of mobility. Such studies usually show that immobility is an even more salient predictor of inferior productivity than inbreeding itself, as inbred academics and adherents (academics who have been immobile since taking up their first academic position after completing their degrees) demonstrated practically the same levels of productivity. Still, these studies support the thesis that inbreeding damages academics’ research productivity. Even the first studies of inbreeding showed that inbred faculty produced many fewer books compared to noninbred academics. If the total number of all publications was taken into account, the difference was not so impressive, but the early analyses still proved lower productivity levels of inbred faculty members (Eells and Cleveland 1935b). Moreover, Eells and Cleveland (1935a) stated that the more degrees a person held from the same institution where employed, the more significant were the inbreeding effects. In significant numbers, later researchers (Hargens and Farr 1973; Dutton 1980; Eisenberg and Wells 2000; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007; Inanc and Tuncer 2011; Sivak and Yudkevich 2012; Horta 2013) came to the same conclusions. For instance, Hargens and Farr (1973), based on multiple regression analysis of data (collected from such sources as the American Men of Science and Science Citation Index), proved that inbred academics were less productive in terms of both quantity and quality of publications. Even a department’s prestige did not change this correlation – inbred faculty showed inferior productivity compared to noninbred faculty even in prestigious departments, though the difference was smaller in prestigious departments. Control for the experience of faculty members still did not alter this finding, though the correlation between scholarly productivity and experience was rather small. Moreover, lower productivity was found not only for inbred faculty but also for silver-corded academics (those who returned to their doctoral department after having worked in another higher education institution), and this proved, one more time, that hiring from within damaged individual scholarly output (Hargens and Farr 1973). Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 27

Dutton found similar results with regard to article productivity of inbred and noninbred academics: regression analysis of responses by male academics from 301 higher educational institutions in the United States showed that the total number of articles during a scientist’s professional lifetime was negatively related to inbreeding and “adherence” (i.e., the phenomenon of immobility after taking up one’s first academic position following degree completion). On the other hand, though productivity in articles correlated with productivity in books, it was found that inbreeding was positively associated with book publication (though adherence was not). Based on this result, the author suggested that inbreeding “may aid the scientist in securing the time and resources to complete time-consuming tasks” (Dutton 1980, 15). Nevertheless, when the quality of faculty publications was measured, inbred academics and adherents again showed inferior results compared with mobile and noninbred academics, as their works were cited less frequently. However, a few years later, a large study of inbreeding in the United States came to the opposite conclusion that although the overall productivity of inbred and noninbred faculty did not differ significantly, noninbred academic published more books and inbred faculty, on the contrary, produced more articles and other publications (Wyer and Conrad 1984). The idea that the correlation between institutional origin and scientific productivity may be different for different types of publications was also explored by Horta (2013) in his analysis of inbreeding and mobility effects in Portugal. It was discovered that inbred faculty published fewer articles in international journals and more in national publications. After exploring scholarly productivity of academics with different degrees of mobility, the author concluded that “the less mobile the academics are, the less they publish in international venues, but the greater is their national scientific output” (Horta 2013, 501). Some patterns of correlation between inbreeding and productivity were also visible in Russia: the data from 28 St. Petersburg higher education institutions show that inbred faculty tended to publish more in “lower-ranked” local journals, while outsiders published more in “higher-ranked” national journals. Moreover, the authors reported that “insiders use methods of publication based on local social ties more often than outsiders” (Sivak and Yudkevich 2012, 14). The fact that inbred academics usually publish more in local or national journals was also found in Brazil: a study on the citation practices of Brazilian scientists found that practically all of their research results end up in domestic publications (Velho and Krige 1984). 28 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature

The fact that inbred faculty produce less frequently cited papers was also noticed by Eisenberg and Wells in their study of inbreeding in US law schools. The authors noticed that citation rates might depend on the school, specialty, and other factors, but, in general, when these factors were controlled, “inbred faculty members are cited between 7 and 13 percent less than other faculty members” (Eisenberg and Wells 2000, 382). Nevertheless, citation rates of scholars who were hired by a peer institution after initially holding inbred status elsewhere are higher than those of inbred faculty members. The same results were obtained for academics from four Turkish technical institutions: the Hirsh citation index is lower for academics hired from within and, moreover, inbred academics manage fewer scientific projects compared to outsiders (Inanc and Tuncer 2011). Horta (2013) also reported that inbred faculty in Portugal supervise fewer doctoral theses than noninbred peers, while Mexican data showed that academic inbreeding had no impact on teaching output (measured by number of theses supervised) (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007). All the findings cited above suggest that inbred academics, in general, show inferior productivity compared to noninbred faculty. This stands in opposition to the statement that inbreeding is often the practice of universities hiring their best students. Nevertheless, Marwell (1974) assumed that universities did hire their best graduates and that their productivity may be greater than that of outsiders at the early stages of their career. However, over time, inbreeding may serve to limit the inbred faculty member’s performance, as they lack independence from their mentors. For this reason, Marwell (1974) recommended to control for career stages when comparing inbred and noninbred academics. At the same time, some literature on inbreeding reports the opposite results. Inbred and noninbred academics do not differ in terms of scholarly productivity in US church-affiliated colleges (Clark and Larson 1972). In Spanish universities, Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez (2010) found that scientific productivity of inbred and noninbred faculty practically did not differ. A study of inbreeding in Australian law schools also showed that there was no statistically significant difference in research productivity of inbred versus noninbred academics, and this result held up under different methods of analysis (Smyth and Mishra 2013). Pan (1993) analyzed responses of 355 randomly selected academics from 11 American land grant universities and concluded that research productivity and teaching efficacy (measured through evaluation by their department heads, service efficacy, rate of academiñ advancement, and local/cosmopolitan orientation) were equal for both Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 29 inbred and noninbred faculty, or even that inbred academic performed better than their noninbred colleagues (McGee 1960; Wells, Hassler, and Sellinger 1979; Wyer and Conrad 1984; Dattilo 1986). Some literature on inbreeding notes different allocations of working time by inbred versus noninbred academics. Sivak and Yudkevich (2012) noticed that “insiders” (the term they use for inbred faculty) were more likely to devote time to activities that were visible inside their university only. For instance, insiders reported that they spent more time on teaching, service, and administrative activities. On the contrary, one of the numerous studies of inbreeding in the United States showed that “inbred faculty spend less time teaching than non-inbred faculty. Conjointly, inbred faculty also spend less time in preparation for teaching and have fewer hours of formal instruction” (Wyer and Conrad 1984, 220). At the same time, Dutton found no statistically significant difference between inbred academics and more mobile faculty members in time devoted to teaching and preparation for teaching. However, both of the works on inbreeding in the United States cited above found that noninbred academics spent more time on research than inbred faculty did (Dutton 1980; Wyer and Conrad 1984). More- over, Dutton specified that these results became especially striking as soon as inbred academics reached full-professor positions. Some research on inbreeding reports that inbred academics favor internal academic orientation and internal information exchange, unlike noninbred faculty, who are usually more externally focused (Pelz and Andrews 1966; Velho and Krige 1984; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007; Sivak and Yudkevich 2012; Horta 2013). This means that inbred academics usually discuss academic issues and exchange ideas only with faculty from the same department and collaborate less with academics from other departments or institutions. Velho and Krige (1984) found that such internal knowledge exchange might also become apparent through the high level of citations by academics of works of faculty members from the same university. A tendency toward internal knowledge exchange together with the lack of broader experience among inbred faculty may result in their narrower academic outlook (McNeely 1932). Pelz and Andrews (1966) noticed that inbreeding led to limited academic scope and flexibility, such that inbred faculty are less creative and innovative than their noninbred colleagues. This may result from the fact that inbred academics, as protégés, often reproduce their mentors’ ideas, and, thus, their academic outlook is narrower (Eisenberg and Wells 2000). Inbred faculty, therefore, have lower professional recognition in the academic 30 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature community – for instance, one of the first studies of inbreeding proved that inbred academics were more rarely included in national reference books (Eells and Cleveland 1935b). Inbreeding may affect faculty promotion. Eells and Cleveland (1935b) reported that at all stages of an individual career, no matter the position, it took inbred faculty several years longer to achieve promotion compared to their colleagues hired from outside. Moreover, it took them longer to gain professional and economic recognition from colleagues and authorities (Reeves et al. 1933). Hargens and Farr (1973) also witnessed slower promotion of inbred academics, even when levels of productivity were controlled, and pointed out that their results were in accordance with McGee’s (1960) findings that, despite the fact that inbred faculty perform practically on par as scholars with noninbred academics, they had slower rates of promotion and heavier teaching loads. McGee (1960) reported that such discrimination against inbred academics was a consequence of functional inbreeding, whereby a university’s own graduates were hired under unfavorable conditions in order to secure other resources for the employment of outsiders (McGee 1960). Discrimination against inbred faculty also may become apparent from their lower levels of remuneration, despite equal scholarly performance with noninbred academics (Wyer and Conrad 1984). Moreover, inbred faculty may feel discriminated against in terms of lack of support compared to that received by outsiders. This may happen if there is an expectation that insiders are inherently better acquainted with the university’s environment; therefore, insiders may experience more pressure as they are expected to “prove themselves” (Blanke 1999) and perform better than their colleagues from outside. Also, in some countries (such as Spain) male teams may feel reluctant to hire women into their so-called “old boys’ networks,” so inbreeding may lead to gender discrimination and slower promotion for women (Vázquez-Cupeiro and Elston 2006). However, not all literature on inbreeding supports the conclusion that inbred faculty are discriminated against in terms of slower promotion: in Spain inbred and immobile academics tend to obtain tenured contracts than earlier noninbred faculty; thus, it has been suggested that inbreeding can speed up an academic career at the early career stages (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2010). Inanc and Tuncer (2012) also found out that in Turkey inbred faculty had longer career paths than those hired from the outside. So, the analysis of the literature shows that the consequences of inbreeding on individual faculty members are numerous and sometimes Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 31 ambiguous. Some researchers of inbreeding consider inbreeding to be an exceptionally negative phenomenon, having detrimental effects on the academic performance of individuals. At the same time, others researchers prove that inbred academics perform no worse than outsiders, but that they are discriminated against in terms of workloads and professional requirements, promotion, and remuneration. As for the effects of inbreeding on a broader level – for instance, at the institutional level – here, researchers find many fewer consequences of inbreeding, and they are more consistent in their findings, although both positive and negative effects of inbreeding are still distinguished. One of the main negative consequences of inbreeding on the institutional level is knowledge atrophy (stagnation) and academic fossilization inside the institution. This happens because inbred faculty are usually internally oriented (as explained above); they communicate more regularly with their immediate colleagues from the same university, and, as a result, no renovation of ideas occurs (Pelz and Andrews 1966; Velho and Krige 1984; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007). Out- siders may bring new ideas to the organization, and their knowledge exchange with external sources helps to refresh ideas and stops such academic fossilization (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007). Inbred academics, in their turn, “add little or nothing to the growth of the college; rather they serve to keep it static and hold it back through their compla- cency” (Smythe and Smythe 1944, 432). Inbreeding, therefore, may lead to the rigidity of the university and even the establishment of so-called “mental prisons” in the extreme cases. Universities with high inbreeding rates, therefore, become inert; it becomes harder for them to adopt to changing environments, and, as a result, they may stop meeting their “associated social goals and place their social utility and perhaps even their legitimacy in jeopardy” (Scott 1995; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 21). Because of the consequences cited above, inbreeding may also lead to the deterioration of teaching quality and university research (Godechot and Louvet 2008). Inanc and Tuncer (2011) also found in their research on inbreeding in Turkey that the number of inbred faculty in a given department may have a negative impact on the academic performance of all members of that department – they determined that in departments with a large number of inbreds academics, even outsiders had lower scientific productivity. As inbred faculty are more oriented to internal knowledge exchange rather than to external engagement, they may be seen as “locals,” who are more committed to their institutions than to their academic 32 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature discipline (Gouldner 1957). Though inbred academics are more committed to their institutions and departments, they make these entities less attractive to outsiders and weaken the loyalty of their colleagues to the institution, as they lack national recognition and diminish the department’s prestige (Blau 1973). Bridgeland (1982) also warned that “hiring even a few of one’s own graduates was definitely detrimental to the reputation of a department that had any ambitions” (Pan 1993, 46). At the same time, some positive effects of inbreeding have also been recognized in the literature. For instance, some research suggests that inbreeding helps to preserve institutional traditions and reinforces institutional continuity and stability (Pan 1993; Padilla 2008). Others regard the fact that inbreeding is prevalent in the best universities as an indication of the higher productivity of inbred academics. It has been suggested that if inbreeding really had detrimental effects on scientific productivity, it would have been more prevalent in lower-prestige departments (Wells, Hassler, and Sellinger, 1979). Im (1990) provided the opposite point of view to the one expressed by Bridgeland (1982) – that inbreeding damaged the department’s prestige – and concluded that inbreeding positively contributed to the department’s prestige, as it is more prevalent in elite departments. The effects of inbreeding at the national level (i.e., for entire academic systems) has hardly been explored in the literature. Where it is addressed, only negative consequences of inbreeding are identified for a country’s academic system. Thus, Soler (2001) found a negative correlation between the average level of inbreeding in the country and the country’s overall scientific productivity, measured through the percentage of publications and citation rates in leading journals. Godechot and Louvet (2008) noticed that inbreeding “damaged equal opportunities on a labor market” as it is “a selection process based on personal relationships rather than the standardized evaluation of applications or the thorough analysis of individual skills.” Finally, Furman and MacGarvie (2007) mentioned that “a negative impact of academic inbreeding in university research output and quality, will also be playing a critical limiting role on scientific and economic outcomes of the region” and, therefore, on the overall competitiveness of the region (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 3, 20). The practice of universities hiring their own graduates has a wide range of consequences on individual academics, the hiring institutions, and even a country’s whole academic systems. Most of these consequences are negative, though a few researchers have reported positive effects of inbreeding. Some possible measures of dealing with inbreeding Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 33 mentioned in existing literature will be considered in the following section.

Proposals to eliminate inbreeding and its detrimental effects

In some countries where government and university administration consider inbreeding a negative practice, measures to eliminate its undesirable consequences, or even the practice itself, have been undertaken. Among the most effective ways to deal with inbreeding are institutionalized, formal barriers preventing inbreeding and immobility. Germany is one of the examples of a country where the enforcement of mobility of academics by official policies resulted in the almost total elimination of the practice of inbreeding from universities. Today, the level of inbreeding in Germany is only 1 percent (Soler 2001). The German regulation Hausberufungsverbot “excludes the possibility of moving up to a professorship from a middle-rank position or even from an associate to a full professorship within the same institution” (Jacob and Teichler 2009, 255). As inbreeding is the most extreme case of immobility, regulations that prohibit immobility prevent inbreeding, as well. As Christine Musselin (2004) points out, in Germany even the internal benefits of a faculty member inside the university are associated with his or her success on the external labor market (Musselin 2004). In the United States, there are also both written and nonwrit- ten policies, which forbid universities to hire their own graduates (Pan 1993; Horta, Veloso and Grediaga 2007). Godechot and Louvet (2008) proposed such institutionalized measures as establishing quotas for hiring inbred faculty or banning the practice, to eliminate inbreeding in French universities. Various ideas have been proposed by researchers as possible ways of eliminating inbreeding. Thus, Godechot and Louvet (2008) in France and Inanc and Tuncer (2011) in Turkey emphasized the importance of merit-based selection processes and insisted that the process of recruitment of faculty members should be transparent – for example, lists of applicants for a position should be openly published. Such measures, the authors suppose, would encourage a reduction in inbreeding practices in universities. In Spain and Japan, some reforms have already been implemented. For instance, in Japan, inbreeding emerged to some extent due to the chair system: a professor and his students were tightly connected, and this led to the fact that as soon as the professor retired, the associate professor took his position and his own ward was, in his turn, also 34 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature promoted to the level of associate professor (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011). In the early 1990s, this chair system was reformed, and in 1997 a nontenure-track system was introduced in Japan to encourage academics’ mobility. In 2004, the recruitment system in Japan also began to change and new, more transparent mechanisms of selection and hiring were introduced. Most vacancies are now advertised publicly and more competition between candidates has emerged. Such measures helped to decrease the level of inbreeding in Japan a bit, but in some universities closed recruitment practices still remain. Moreover, other reasons for inbreeding in Japan – including the practice of academics receiving all of their degrees from only one university and doctoral candidates working only with supervisors from the same university – remain salient, which is why the level of inbreeding is still rather high in Japanese universities (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011). In Spain, the attempt to reduce inbreeding simply by officially decree- ing that selection practices should be based only on merit (with the introduction of University Reform Law in 1984) has failed (Soler 2001). Soler noticed that to eliminate the prevalence of inbreeding in Spanish universities, a complex set of measures was necessary. He proposed that inbreeding practices would decrease if all the positions were advertised internationally, and local faculty members as well as academics with low levels of performance did not participate in the appointment committees (Soler 2001). Among other measures undertaken in Spain to reduce inbreeding levels, two mechanisms were introduced in 2001. The first is the Ley Orgaìnica de Universidades (LOU), which aimed to improve the quality of research and teaching in Spanish universities, enhance academics’ and students’ mobility, and, finally, to institute selection practices based on applicants’ merits (Vázquez-Cupeiro and Elston 2006). The second measure was the introduction of a new hiring program, “Ramoìn y Cajal,” also in 2001, that aimed to develop the “tenure-track” system in Spain and stimulate universities to hire better candidates after a competitive selection process (Figuera 2004). Figuera provides evidence that since the introduction of this hiring program the number of outsiders (sometimes even foreigners) among Spanish academics has increased. However, despite these reforms, the level of inbreeding is very high in Spain. Another way to eliminate inbreeding in Spanish universities was proposed by Camacho (2001). He found that low investments in research and development were predictors of high inbreeding rates and concluded that the easiest way to reduce inbreeding was to increase financing (Camacho 2001). Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 35

Uniquely, Horta (2013) suggested a way not to reduce inbreeding rates, but rather to eliminate inbreeding’s detrimental effects. Based on the results of his analysis that “mobile inbreds” (those faculty who had some experience outside the graduating-employing institution) performed better when compared to “pure inbreds,” he concluded that “it is possible to diminish the academic inbreeding detrimental effects by creating opportunities and incentives for inbreds to be more mobile” (Horta 2013, 506). So, sometimes measures dealing not with inbreeding itself, but with its consequences, may also be useful to consider. In this section, possible measures to eliminate inbreeding, as well as ways to deal with the problems it presents, have been discussed. In different countries, various strategies have been tested. Most of the literature on the topic shows that institutionalized measures that either forbid hiring one’s own graduates or make the selection and promotion mechanisms more transparent and competitive are rather useful, and can help to diminish the level of inbreeding in universities.

National cases

Case studies of particular countries or regions may be an interesting source of information to deepen our understanding of the reasons for and consequences of inbreeding. It may also clarify our thinking around the rationale for inbreeding’s stability and the resistance of universities to ending inbreeding practices. National case studies also allow us to consider how inbreeding is an intrinsic part of some academic cultures. As such, it may be particularly hard to reform the system toward greater openness and decreased levels of inbreeding. Until recently, research papers on inbreeding based on national statistics or case studies drew on US data. In the last two decades, a number of papers that discuss national experiences – in the United States and beyond – were published. Not surprisingly, these materials have tended to focus on those countries where inbreeding practices are widespread and where researchers ﬁnd it an important (usually negative) issue. In most cases, the authors of such case studies relate inbreeding to the problem of low academic mobility within the country, as well as in a broader international context. Numerous case studies cover the United States, Mexico, Spain and Portugal, Russia, Japan, and other countries. Most such studies explore the impact of inbreeding on individuals’ scientiﬁc productivity and academic communications. 36 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature

Hiring from within has been studied in the United States since the beginning of the 20th century, and today there are many papers on inbreeding in the US context (see, for instance, Miller 1918; Eells and Cleveland 1935a; McGee 1960; Hargens and Farr 1973; Dutton 1980; Pan 1993 and others). Most of these studies, except those of McGee (1960) and Wyer and Conrad (1984), proved the negative impact of inbreeding on the scientific performance of faculty. Among the most recent works on the United States, there are studies of inbreeding practices in law schools by Eisenberg and Wells (2000) and an investigation by Yim (Yim 2011) of inbreeding in departments with different prestige status. In 2000, Eisenberg and Wells compared the scholarly impact of 700 inbred and noninbred entry-level faculty members from 32 American law schools. The number of citations for the academics’ work was used as a measure of scholarly impact. The results of the regression analysis showed that noninbred academics and those who had been initially inbred but then moved to another law school produced more cited papers compared to inbred faculty. The possible explanation of the results is that inbred academics reproduce their mentors’ ideas and thus are less creative and innovative. However, the authors also demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between the number of citations per faculty and the proportion of entry-level inbred academics in the department. Harvard, Yale, and Columbia law schools are among the most productive and also have exceptionally high rates of entry-level inbreeding (Eisenberg and Wells 2000). Such a positive correlation is probably a specific feature of law schools. Research by Yim (2011), unlike most other studies devoted to inbreeding’s impact on faculty members, considers organizational factors of inbreeding. PhD-granting US sociology departments with different prestige status were compared, and it was found that the level of inbreeding was higher at high- and low-status departments and lowest in middle-status departments. This is explained by “middle-status conformity” theory, as high- and low-status people/institutions may excuse themselves from following certain norms. In Latin America, inbreeding practices have been studied in Mexico and Brazil. In Brazil, the study of publication and citation practices among agricultural scientists by Velho and Krige (1984) analyzed 41 publications of academics from two Brazilian universities and the references used in those publications. The authors found that Brazilian agricultural academics published mostly in domestic journals and predominantly cited their colleagues from the same Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 37 university. Most academic communications and knowledge exchange also happened internally in the institution, and the authors see inbreeding practices in Brazil as the reason for that (Velho and Krige 1984). In Mexico, studies of inbreeding are more up-to-date. In 2007, a study of academic inbreeding and scientific productivity in Mexico looked at a sample of 414 academics from 14 institutions, borrowed from a survey conducted to analyze the impact of public policies on processes of institutional change within Mexican higher education institutions. The results of the analysis showed that inbreeding had a negative impact on scientific productivity: inbred faculty produced fewer peer-reviewed publications and collaborated with external colleagues significantly less frequently when compared to noninbred academics, even in the elite institutions (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007). And as the level of inbreeding in Mexico is rather high, 53 percent (Padilla 2008), the detrimental effect of inbreeding on individuals may also damage universities as a whole. In Europe, studies of inbreeding refer mostly to the last couple of decades and have been undertaken predominantly in South- ern European countries – Spain and Portugal – where the level of inbreeding is the highest across Europe (Soler 2001). The problem of inbreeding in these contexts is often touched upon in papers devoted to national academic systems – for example, in collected articles on researchers’ mobility in Europe (Gabaldon, Horta, Meyer, and Pereira- Leal 2005; Pezzoni, Sterzi, and Lissoni 2009) – but there are relatively few detailed national studies of inbreeding and its consequences in Europe. In France, Godechot and Louvet made an attempt to evaluate the level of inbreeding in universities based on the DOCTHESE database, con- taining information on theses defended in France between 1972 and 2000 (Godechot and Louvet 2008). The authors considered a person to be an inbred faculty member if, sometime after defending his or her own thesis, he or she supervised another’s thesis in the same university. The authors found that about 30 percent of faculty members were inbred. Furthermore, when both inbred and noninbred graduates fig- ured among candidates for a faculty position, the graduates of the hiring university were 18 times more likely to be hired, compared to external candidates. Also, it was found that inbreeding is more widespread in computer sciences, chemistry, and engineering sciences, and in newer universities, and that the level of inbreeding has been growing over time (Godechot and Louvet 2008). 38 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature

In a recent paper by Horta (2013), data were examined from an online survey conducted of 1,420 academics from 18 Portuguese higher education institution; all of the respondents held a doctoral degree in 2008. Horta analyzed the influence of inbreeding and mobility on scientific productivity and academic information exchange among faculty. The author not only compares inbred and noninbred faculty but also dis- tinguishes between mobile and pure inbreds, silver-corded academics, adherents, and noninbred academics. The results of the analysis prove that pure inbreds supervised fewer theses and published less in international journals, but, at the same time, their national output was a bit higher compared to other, more mobile academics. The general conclusion the author comes to is, in Portugal, more mobile academics publish more in international journals and less in national ones and are less internally oriented. A very high level of inbreeding in Spain was observed by several researchers, even though they defined inbreeding differently and, therefore, measured the phenomenon differently (Camacho 2001; Navarro and Rivero 2001; Soler 2001). As was mentioned earlier, Camacho found a correlation between high levels of inbreeding and low investment in research and development in the country. He thus saw the extension of state expenditures on R&D as the simplest way to eliminate the high level of inbreeding in Spain (Camacho 2001). One of the studies of inbreeding in Spain considered the influence of inbreeding on gender career paths in the country. The analysis of 33 interviews with academics from 3 Madrid universities showed that the “sistemia endogamico” sometimes led to gender discrimination on the labor market: men are often connected by informal connections and spend time together, and these informal connections often stimulate promotion. Women are usually excluded from these ties and have problems being hired or promoted; thus, it is much more difficult for women in Spain to build an academic career compared to men (Vázquez-Cupeiro and Elston 2006). A recent study of inbreeding in Spain was published by Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez in 2010. The sample for the analysis of the relationship between mobility and scientific output included 1,538 Spanish academics from three scientific fields: biology and medical sciences, exact and natural sciences, and engineering and technological sciences. The results of the research showed that scientific productivity of inbred and immobile faculty members was practically the same as that of noninbred and mobile academics. Moreover, it was found that Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 39 inbreeding and immobility speed up academic careers in Spain (inbred academics, on average, obtained tenured contracts earlier) (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2010). The results of this study contradict the commonly accepted point of view that inbreeding is associated with lower scientific productivity. Another national case that showed that inbred academics may be equally or even more productive than non-inbred faculty is the study of inbreeding and research productivity in Australian law schools, undertaken by V. Mishra and R. Smyth in 2012. The study, based on an analysis of publications and citation rates of 429 academics from 21 Australian law schools, showed that scientific productivity and quality of publications (measured through citation rates) of inbred and noninbred academics practically did not differ, and these results remained robust in the face of different ways of measuring productivity and different methods of analysis. Silver-corded academics performed a bit better compared to inbred faculty, but this result was not robust (Smyth and Mishra 2014). The authors suggest that their results may be explained by relatively low inbreeding rates in Australia – although according to another study on the level of inbreeding in Australia, the inbreeding rate stood at 50.7 percent, which is rather high (Newman 1985). Several studies of inbreeding were also undertaken in some Asian countries. In Turkey, Inanc and Tuncer (2011) analyzed citation rates of publications and career paths of 236 inbred and noninbred academics from four Turkish technical institutions. The results of the study show that scientific effectiveness of inbred faculty members is worse compared to that of external academics. Inbred faculty publish significantly fewer cited papers and participate less in scientific project management. As a result, inbred academics are less successful in terms of promotion, as their career paths are five years longer than that of noninbreds (Inanc and Tuncer 2011). In Japan, the study by Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa in 2011 was devoted to the reasons for inbreeding. The authors explain that inbreeding is rather high in the early stages of development of academic systems because there are few universities and they have to hire their own alumni. But in Japan, the high level of inbreeding remains, despite several reforms that have been carried out to reduce its rate. The analysis of 36 in-depth interviews revealed three main factors of inbreeding in Japan (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011): closed recruitment processes (this problem is now being addressed under a current reform), 40 Academic Inbreeding: State of the Literature low student mobility (defined as completing both undergraduate and postgraduate education at one university), and having all doctoral supervisors from one university. Also, previously, inbreeding was often seen in Japan as a positive phenomenon, providing higher stability in universities, but now attitudes toward hiring from within are changing in the country (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011). In Korea, Im (1990) studied the relationship between inbreeding rates and departments’ prestige, based on the analysis of 101 departments in four Korean institutions. The main conclusion from his analysis is that inbreeding contributes to departmental prestige, as a positive correlation between the inbreeding levels and the prestige of the institutional departments was found (Im 1990). Recently, studies of inbreeding have also been undertaken in China – “An Analysis of Academic Inbreeding and Its Effect on Higher Education Institutions” (Guang-cai 2009) and Taiwan – “A Study of Relationship between Faculty Inbreeding and Academic Productivity in Taiwan” (Lin 2011). In Russia, the problem of inbreeding has not been studied seriously until recently. Until now, only one study of inbreeding in Russia has been produced (Sivak and Yudkevich 2012). It is based on the results of a survey of academics, which was conducted in St. Petersburg in 2007. The sample for the survey included 150 chairs in economics from 28 universities. The authors use the terms “insiders” and “outsiders,” which are equivalent to the more common terminology of “inbred” and “noninbred.” The results of the analysis show that insiders tend to publish less as a whole, their publications are more often printed in low-ranked local journals, and their publication activity is frequently based on local connections (for instance, promoted by heads of departments). Out- siders, on the contrary, publish more in national journals. Insiders are more internally oriented in their academic communications compared to outsiders, participate more in local university activities, and spend more time on administrative work than outsiders do. As for these and other national cases considered in comparative perspective, there are almost no papers that reflect such analysis. The only exception is perhaps (Horta and Yudkevich 2014) which compares the nature, causes, and consequences of inbreeding for Portugal and Russia. Inbreeding has been documented and studied in many countries all over the world. Most of the researchers involved in this work have explored the impact of inbreeding on individual academics’ productivity, and most of them found that this relationship is negative, that is, inbreeding damages faculty scholarly performance. Olga Gorelova and Maria Yudkevich 41

References

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Velho, Lea, and John Krige. 1984. “Publication and Citation Practices of Brazilian Agricultural Scientists.” Social Studies of Science 14 (1): 45–62. http://www.jstor. org/stable/284701. Wells, R., N. Hassler, and R. Sellinger. 1979. “ Inbreeding in Social Work Edu- cation: An Empirical Examination.” Journal of Education for Social Work 15 (2): 23–29. Wolter Eells, Austin Cleveland. 1935a. “Faculty Inbreeding.” The Journal of Higher Education 6 (5): 261–269. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2649231. Wolter Eells, Austin Cleveland. 1935b. “The Effects of Inbreeding.” The Journal of Higher Education 6 (6): 323–328. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1975595?origin= JSTOR-pdf. Wyer, Jean C., and Clifton F. Conrad. 1984. “Institutional Inbreeding Reexam- ined.” American Educational Research Journal 21 (1): 213–225. http://www.jstor. org/stable/1162362. Yim, M. 2011. “Status Competition or Middle-Status Conformity? Predict- ing the Incidence of Academic Inbreeding Among PhD-Granting Sociology Departments, 1997–2007.” In American Sociological Association. Annual Meeting, 1066. 3 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University: A Systemic and Organizational Analysis Marcelo Rabossi

Although academic inbreeding practices are a means to assure organizational stability and institutional identity, which is sometimes seen as a positive circumstance for universities, it is also a way for older and more prestigious faculty members to secure and perpetuate power. From this perspective, for some scholars, the practice of senior faculty to recruit their own graduates directly after completing their doctoral degrees can be seen as a mechanism to gain personal rather than organizational stability. This uncompetitive mechanism of recruiting perpetuates old and less innovative practices, leading to institutional inertia. Several studies have also shown that academic inbreeding has detrimental effects on scholarly practice (Berelson 1960; Velho and Krige 1984; Horta 2009). For example, a negative correlation between academic inbreeding and research output suggests that in order to be more productive, universities must seek candidates from a source outside their own pool of graduates (Hargens and Farr 1973; Soler 2001; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007). Other empirical studies show that inbred scholars tend to be less open to interacting with colleagues from other scientiﬁc institutions. Inbreeding behavior foments parochial practices leading to intellectual segregation and isolation (Pelz and Andrews 1976; Adams et al. 2005). According to Padilla (2008), inbred academics tend to be more loyal to their own institution than to their own discipline. This locally oriented intellectual focus can lead to a decrease in publication output. However, there is no universal agreement about the effects of inbreeding on research productivity. Although the dominant literature links academic inbreeding with a lower level scientiﬁc production, there are also some alternative views. For example, the lack of mobility among

45 46 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University faculty (apart from the practice of institutions recruiting their own graduates) has decisive effects on research output. According to Horta (2013), less mobile scholars tend to be less productive than academics that have previously worked at another university. Also, when substi- tuting research productivity with general academic effort, Wyer and Conrad (1984) found that inbred faculty members are actually more productive than noninbred scholars. This is because the inbred group spent more time on teaching and administrative activities. Before writing this chapter, I made an extensive review of the Argentine literature on higher education, and also consulted some leading research scholars to find out if some previous work has been done on inbreeding practices in Argentine universities. In all circumstances, the answer was negative. Also, the agency in charge of national statistics does not publish information about the institution where faculty members receive their last degree. However, there is one exception: the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). This huge public institution, the most prestigious of the system, conducts a census of the academic profile of its human resources every four years. The first such census was done in 1992. Even though the last one was conducted in 2011, the 2004 census is referenced in this chapter, given that the 2004 data provide extra and relevant information not present in the 2011 evaluation. Also, and given that there have been no major academic reforms within the UBA in recent years, one can speculate that there have been only marginal changes in the composition and profile of the faculty body. On the other hand, one main limitation is that information is only available at the faculty (school) level, and not at the level of individual faculty members. In other words, it is possible to know the percentage of inbred faculty in a given academic unit, but not specifically who the inbred individuals are. As such, it is not possible to link a faculty member’s research productivity with his or her condition as inbred or not. Given these restrictions, the main goal of this work is to see if Argentina presents structural conditions that may lead, or not, to inbreeding practices. Also, the UBA is used as an example (or case) to carry out a more in-depth exploration. The objective is to evaluate if there are some organizational, bureaucratic, or political conditions that may favor the development of inbreeding practices inside this enormous institution. It must be remembered that inbreeding behaviors may affect the development of scientific activities and also encourage detrimental practices for organizations seeking to fashion themselves as world-class institutions. Also, and central to exploring the inbreeding phenomenon Marcelo Rabossi 47 in Argentina, it will be worth asking if inbreeding practices are just the consequence of more profound institutional failures.

The university in Argentina

With an enrollment of more than 1.7 million students (80 percent in public institutions, compared to 55 percent for Latin America as a whole), Argentina’s university market is centrally regulated by the National Ministry of Education, through the Secretaría de Políticas Universitarias (Secretariat for Universities Policies, SPU). The public academic labor market offers 157,915 faculty positions (SPU 2010) across a total of 120 universities and university institutes (55 public and 65 private). Fewer than 20,000 academics are part of the private university market (del Bello et al. 2007). Before 1989, there were four national universities in the area surrounding the capital city of Argentina. However, in order to diversify the academic choice and cater for expansion, a total of nine national institutions opened their doors between 1989 and 1995, six of them in Greater Buenos Aires. This policy aimed to diversify academic choice in a country where almost 13 million people live in the Greater Buenos Aires area (INDEC 2010). Also, since 2005, nine new public institutions entered the market, some in places unattractive for private investors, with the objective of offering education to the less favored members of society. In principle, this proved to be beneficial for many faculty members, who would now be able to expand their professional opportunities. Because this process sidestepped certain labor rigidities characteristic of traditional institutions (e.g., related to the promotion and remuneration of faculty members), these universities were expected to provide a valid alternative for faculty members looking for new horizons.1 And although this new academic labor market remains limited in size, the demand for new faculty from this emerging group of institutions is increasing significantly. In Argentina, the private sector emerged late, not only in relation to its public counterpart but also in comparison to the emergence of nonpublic alternatives in neighboring countries. Indeed, at the end of the 1950s, a large majority of Latin American countries had already established a private sector, and only three of the 20 republics had done so by 1962. After much debate, a 1958 law was passed in Argentina authorizing the creation of a private market for university education. The Pontifical Catholic University (UCA) was the first recognized private institution of higher education in Argentina, opening its doors in 1959.2 48 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

In comparison to this late private development, the Catholic University of Chile (UCC) began to offer university education in 1888. Although the private sector consolidated its position, the state is still the main provider of higher education. Historically, public institutions have stood as the elite sector of the system, and to some extent, this is still the case. For this reason, from the very outset of private higher education provision until the early 1990s, the national university and mainly the UBA were the preferred models for some private institutions to imitate. Also, public policies in Argentina did not stimulate the development of private alternatives. Consequently, Argentina was unable to generate either an elite private subsector to challenge the public dominance at the top of the academic hierarchy or a mass-absorbing option to relieve the demand for public higher education. However, since the early 1990s, a handful of new private universities began to challenge this supremacy in terms of prestige. Although small in number and representing less than 5 percent of the private sector, these elite private institutions are unique in the system, and some of them are oriented to the American research university model. They privilege research over teaching, and around 30 percent of their faculty members are under full-time contracts – as compared to less than 15 percent in the public sector. In order to be legally recognized, private universities must be evaluated by the National Accreditation Agency (CONEAU). This public organism plays a decisive role during the long accreditation process all private universities must complete before receiving their definitive authorization, that is, recognition granted by the federal government through the National Ministry for Education. The agency has been tough with the private sector. From its creation in 1986 to 2009, out of 106 accreditation requests, only 12 institutions were authorized to operate as universities (CONEAU 2009). On the other hand, national universities are directly recognized through a decree by the federal government. From a financial perspective, and as not-for-profit entities, private universities in Argentina receive some financial benefits from the state.3 As such, they are exempted from several tax burdens – for example, the value added tax (VAT). This represents a benefit of 21 percent over the tuition price. And while many private institutions did receive financial support from their sponsors during the first years of development, tuition and fees count for no less than 80 percent of their total income. In many cases, an increasing demand for graduate education, particularly during the 1990s, cross-subsidizes many undergraduate programs (Caillon 2005). On the other hand, national universities do not charge Marcelo Rabossi 49 tuition fees for undergraduates and receive, on average, 90 percent of their total income directly from the federal government (SPU 2011).

The academic labor market in Argentina

Since the 1960s, a process of modernization has brought with it a push for research, for departmentalization within schools and faculties, and for the creation of full-time faculty positions (Balán 1993). Despite this, most public universities in Argentina still remain organized by the chair system (cátedras) and are dominated by part-time contracts.4 Indeed, 67 percent of academic posts are part-time, a figure that increases to 87 percent if we consider those positions that are covered by faculty members who work fewer than 44 hours per week in a single institution – the number of hours required to be considered part of the full-time faculty body.5 However, there are some differences between national institutions, and the variation can be significant. For example, in the Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento (UNGS), more than 76 percent of the faculty have full-time academic positions. On the other hand, only 3.3 percent of academic posts in the Universidad Nacional de Lomas de Zamora (UNLZ) are covered by full-timers (SPU 2010). Even though a policy aimed at creating full-time positions was promoted in the national system after a major reform took place in the early 1960s, the public academic market is still dominated by part-time posts. Moreover, the percentage of part-time positions has increased in recent years. On the other hand, private universities employ around 20,000 faculty members; this means that less than 20 percent of university professors work in nonpublic universities (Marquís 2002; García de Fanelli 2004). One particularity is that private institutions hire some of their personnel from among professors who work in public universities, a phenomenon that also occurs in much of the region and around the world. So, it should come as no surprise that around 95 percent of the faculty contracts in the private sector are part-time (del Bello et al. 2007). On the other hand, and to make this practice feasible, less than 15 percent of all academic positions at the national university are full-time contracts. While this has at times been described as a limitation in terms of academic seriousness, this dynamic can be also seen as a positive-sum game, in which both professors and institutions benefit from the collaboration. On the one hand, faculty members coming from the public sector receive extra funds by offering their services to private universities, complementing their salaries to try and achieve a middle-class 50 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University lifestyle. On the other hand, private institutions receive social recognition and legitimacy by hiring professors from public universities in a market where, with some exceptions, private institutions have not been academically innovative and are sometimes considered an inferior alternative to public institutions. Only a handful of elite private institutions play a different game, where remuneration for faculty is higher and the number of full-time contracts is considerably higher than the national average. However, this group of professors represents less than 5 percent of the whole private labor market. Meanwhile, salaries in the public sector have been growing steadily during the last 7 years and the wage gap between public universities and those private elite universities is not as significant as it used to be. When the Argentine economy recovered after the economic collapse of 2002, the federal government increased the amount of total appropriations to the national university system (which currently stands at 1 percent of GDP).6 Much of these extra funds went directly to professors’ pockets. The purchasing power of academics rose considerably. Although, monetarily speaking, an academic career is not highly attractive and competitive in relation to the nonacademic market, certainly the economic conditions of professors improved and now are far better than in the past. There was an across-the-board salary increase not tied to any productivity indicator instead of implementing a selective policy to expand the number of full-time contracts (e.g., in favor of specific institutions or disciplines). It must be remembered that the Ministry of Education had detected several structural deficiencies in the past, which were preventing institutions from aligning their organizational practices according to what was considered a “modern” university. One of them was the scarce proportion of full-time positions.

The internal labor market (hiring and promotion)

In the academic labor markets of Latin America, the number of faculty members has been growing steadily since the end of World War II. Between 1950 and 1990, the academic market grew from 25,000 to more than 600,000 academic staff. As expected, this phenomenal increase entailed a larger heterogeneity in academics’ profiles, which in turn led to a certain kind of job stratification. Following Schwartzman’s typology (1993), we find a first type, the “academic” faculty member, who is an individual characterized by a strong commitment to scientific knowledge and who is well trained in his or her professional field. Probably, no more than 10 percent of faculty members in the region, Argentina Marcelo Rabossi 51 included, fit into this category. The second type is also a professional with somewhat similar qualifications, but with a lower academic profile. This category is dominated by part-timers, more committed to teaching than research activities. This profile dominates the academic market in Argentina and certainly in the region. The third type is the “old secondary teacher,” absorbed by the expanding university.

The public sector The internal labor market at national universities is hierarchically organized in two categories: professors (full, associate and assistant) and those who are called auxiliaries. The latter are basically teaching assistants (TA’s). Like professors, auxiliaries are also ranked into three hierarchical levels: head of practical work, first-tier assistant, and second-tier assistant. Professors are responsible for theoretical seminars, while auxiliaries are in charge of the practical work connected to these. Yet, auxiliaries have been known to take almost full responsibility for courses and seminars, particularly during the first years in a program of study. Hiring practices in national universities follow competitive procedures and have done so for quite some time. Positions are publicly announced and candidates are evaluated by a board. Members of this board are selected by the university council. Some of the elements considered by the board include personal interviews, the research history of candidates, the presentation of a syllabus and a research plan – this last item only being necessary when a full-time position opens up. Once hired, the candidate gains a stable position.7 This kind of tenure-like contract is generally limited to seven years. Notably, it is not a position for life. After this period, the position opens up again. In agreement with the 1995 Higher Education Law (HEL), and also according to some internal academic statutes, no less than 70 percent of academic posts at public institutions must be held by candidates selected through the competitive mechanism described above. Regrettably, in practice, few national institutions are close to this percentage. Reality shows that a considerable number of faculty members are hired well outside such academically serious practices. Political and vested interests together with complicated bureaucratic procedures and financial constraints are some of the factors that conspire against the implementation of open and competitive hiring mechanisms (García de Fanelli 2004). For example, when an academic position becomes available, the whole hiring procedure can take up to one year or even two years to complete, which is time- and resource consuming. Consequently, many institutions try to avoid this process. Thus, on average, more than 50 percent 52 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University of all academic positions are covered through direct selection, that is, hiring processes that involve simply appointing a preferred individual without undertaking the longer, formalized competitive mechanisms mandated by law and statutes. And although many faculty members are selected under open and legal competition, when the tenure period expires, the incumbents are rehired without any kind of formal evaluation; in fact, the position is automatically renewed. This is not an uncommon practice in a country where breaking the law is generally not formally punished, and national universities justify themselves under the umbrella of autonomy. The HEL is loosely interpreted and weakly enforced.8 In other words, a considerable number of faculty members at public institutions are working outside the law. Not surprisingly, this opens the door for inbreeding practices, given that hiring rules are loosely established. In effect, nontenured professors, or “interims,” are hired under informal procedures, where personal contacts dominate. Generally, it is the director of the academic unit who decides which candidate should be hired, although the final decision is in the hands of the school and the university council. Candidates are informally evaluated in accordance with some of the rules that define hiring at the tenure-track level in a closed procedure. Nontenure-track faculty are hired for one or two semesters – a period after which the legal agreement is generally renewed. This recontracting mechanism offers job stability but also perpetuates the employment of those faculty members who have been chosen in a noncompetitive selection. Another practice that also perpetuates and makes inbreeding practices a cost-effective strategy is to recruit alumni, or advanced students, for free.9 This questionable practice helps institutions keep spending under control. For example, at the UBA, almost 35 percent of all academic positions are ad honorem, which means that those individuals in these positions obtain neither a salary for their work nor access to research monies or social benefits. This group of teachers are mainly undergraduates who aspire to get a paid position in the near future at the same institution where they received their academic degree (UBA 2011). In other words, this group of academics-to-be is aspiring to future prestige (and paid employment, of course).

The private sector Regarding the nonpublic sector, there are no formal tenure-track contracts in private universities. Although some institutions have developed something in the spirit of tenure, in Argentina contracts are governed Marcelo Rabossi 53 by private law, and dismissals are simpler than they are in places like the United States, where the law provides basic procedural safeguards against firing a tenured professor (Kaplin and Lee 1995). Different from the national university, where stability and labor conditions are determined by internal norms and rules, in the private sector hiring and termination are determined and regulated by private law (García de Fanelli 2004). In the case of nonfixed term private contracts, the relationship between the employer and employee is assumed to last for an indefinite term. However, the employer can terminate such contracts unilaterally without penalty if the employee has engaged in activities that are considered to be offensive or prejudicial to the institution. On the other hand, if the faculty member is fired without justification, the individual must be monetarily compensated with a termination indemnity equal to one of his or her highest monthly salaries for each year he spent in the university. The same legal mechanism applies to any noneducational institution (Slattery and Broadbent 2013). Hiring practices in nonpublic settings vary according to the type of contract that will establish the legal relationship and the academic profile of the institution. When it comes to elite private research universities, general advertisement in specialized newspapers or magazines is given lower priority than personal contacts. Attracting young talent from elite universities in the United States and Europe is not an uncommon practice. A doctoral degree from a well-renowned foreign research center is more than desirable. However, only a handful of private institutions have this orientation. On the other hand, faculty posts at nonelite private universities are generally filled through informal and noncompetitive mechanisms. In fact, for these nonresearch-oriented private institutions, neither graduate education nor research publications are prerequisites for professors who aspire to a position. In some cases, when the institution is large enough in terms of the number of students and faculty members and consequently has a significant pool of part-timers, the hiring process begins under the logic of an internal labor market, by promoting the institution’s own human resources. The search for a candidate starts inside the institution and involves selecting professors that already have a position in the university. In these cases, it is not an uncommon practice to hire those candidates who have completed their graduate and even undergraduate education in the same institution. Those with only undergraduate degrees generally began their academic career as teaching assistants and are then hired by some of their own professors. The chair system facilitates this process. Also, this practice is an effective way 54 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University to reduce costs, given that salaries for this group of academics are not competitive. However, it is an opportunity for these younger colleagues to begin an academic career. This practice, in fact, promotes inbreeding. When it comes to promotion, private institutions have different rules than their public counterparts. However, there is not a common pattern that all nonpublic universities follow. Some elite institutions mimic some procedures commonly found in US research universities. Once hired, faculty members remain assistants throughout the course of several semesters (six or more), at which point they are evaluated by a faculty council, in accordance with their research and teaching productivity. If the output does not meet expectations, assistant professors must resign from the position. A second evaluation is generally carried out at the end of the fifth or sixth year. If the candidate is evaluated positively, then the council will propose a promotion to the status of associate professor. If promotion is denied, the contract expires, a situation that is not so frequent. Associate professors remain at this rank until they are promoted to full professor. However, promotion to the highest rank is not always secured, and academics can continue as associate professors until they retire. When a tenure-track position opens up in a nonelite private university, the academic unit conducts an internal search in which professors under a transitory or nontenured status, who are already part of the university, can compete. In other words, it is not infrequent for demand- absorbing institutions to use an internal or closed competition to promote nontenured professors to tenured status. By avoiding external contenders, the institution is creating an internal labor market to promote their own academic personnel. Even though the process is not uniform for all nonelite private universities, in general tenure-track professors who aspire to higher ranks must pass through an evaluation process. Here, again, the competition for the post is restricted to internal candidates, where a board at each academic unit evaluates the candidate.

Systemic features and organizational practices that promote inbreeding behavior

Some characteristics of the market as well as certain organizational practices can enhance or deter inbreeding practices. For example, at the systemic level, inbreeding rates will be higher if the number of institutions is low and they are isolated from other sources of academic talent. This mainly takes place during the foundational period, or early Marcelo Rabossi 55 stages of development, when only a handful of universities are the only providers of certain kinds of human capital. Also, academic immobility explains higher inbreeding rates. Specifically, the lack of a real market where universities compete for their human resources fosters inbreeding behaviors. In relation to this, wage uniformity conspires against diversity. In other words, we expect academic mobility rates to be lower when there is not enough salary differentiation among institutions, or when universities are unable to provide different and better working conditions to attract faculty members from different places. If earnings in academia are uncompetitive in relation to other nonacademic markets, incentives will be insufficient to attract potential professors from a more diverse pool of candidates. The lack of a group of elite institutions that can attract professors from different places might be also a factor that conspires against a more dynamic academic labor market. Specifically, when there is not enough reputational differentiation among universities, it is possible to assume higher immobility rates. In other words, there are no reputational gains or incentives for academics to move from one to another university. In addition to this, if the number or proportion of adjunct professors is high, we might expect lower mobility rates. However, professors will tend to stay in a single institution if the academic labor market is only seen as a complementary source of income. On the other hand, some part-time faculty members are what Bernasconi (2009) calls “professors of the system.” These are academics unable to find a full-time position in a single institution but are committed to working in the academic market. They distribute their working hours across different universities in order to achieve a “full-time” job. This particularity impedes inbreeding practices. Governance mechanisms or institutional factors can also foster, or not, academic immobility. For example, we might expect social ties to exert stronger influence in the selection of candidates if a system is not accountable enough. When public appropriations are not distributed according to productivity, public institutions in the short term do not “suffer,” at least in financial terms, from the inclusion of human resources, which are not aligned with the needs of the enterprise. Then, professional competences are not necessarily taken into account at the moment of selecting a candidate. Competition and a thorough evaluation of the candidate for the job take second place. The set of structural elements and organizational practices mentioned in the paragraphs above constitute some basic and necessary features for an inbreeding-friendly environment. Many of them accurately describe 56 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University the higher education market in Argentina. For example, until the early 1990s, the number of institutions was relatively low. In some provinces, there was no public higher education on offer at all. The private market was also limited,10 and some provinces lacked both public and private universities. In the 1990s, there were only 52 institutions (29 public and 23 private). However, the vast majority of nonpublic schools were concentrated in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. At that time, academic mobility through a real and competitive academic labor market was very limited. Consequently, academic inbreeding was then not an uncommon practice. In the same way, academic immobility can be also explained through from cultural perspective. Argentines are extremely rooted to the place where they were born. In this sense, they are similar to their Spanish ancestors.11 As explained by Mora (2014) in his chapter in this same publication, something similar takes place in the Spanish academic world, were moving to another region within Spain is somewhat uncommon. And even though during the last two decades the Argentine market has witnessed an increase in the number of new institutions (currently there are 55 public and 65 private), competition among universities is more a question of students (i.e., which institution enrolls more) than which university has the best faculty body. Compet- ing for the best academics is just for a handful of elite institutions, which constitutes no more than 2 percent of the whole university market in Argentina. Although since the end of the 1990s public universities can define their own salary patterns, there is almost no wage differentiation among institutions, at least at the undergraduate level of education. Furthermore, public entities are not allowed to offer higher wages to new/incoming academics. All faculty members with similar academic positions earn the same salary. Only seniority defines wage differentiation (García de Fanelli 2004). It is therefore not strange to observe low mobility rates in a system that cannot provide better salaries to more productive workers. Salary differentiation is also limited in the private sector. Except for a handful of institutions – which constitute no more than 5 percent of the whole private market, the rest offer monetary compensation similar to what can be found in the national institutions. Under these conditions, mobility rates in the whole university market are limited. The lack of a strong reputational differentiation among institutions is also considered a factor that hampers mobility and thus promotes inbreeding practices (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 2009). Develop- ing a standardized and uniform model of higher education was the Marcelo Rabossi 57 consequence of the situations prevailing in Latin America in postcolonial times during the early 1800s. Consequently, Argentina followed the Napoleonic idea of building up a highly centralized system according to national standards (Balán 1993). From the very outset, there was scarce room for institutional differentiation or innovation. Although the system recognized some flagship public institutions – mainly the older and historic ones such as the UBA, the National Uni- versity of Córdoba (UNC), and the National University of La Plata (UNLP), for example – none of them can be considered or classified as truly elite or selective universities in its strictest meaning. All are part of a demand absorbing public market unable to exercise strict control over their enrollees. As such, attrition rates at UBA, for example, are above 60 percent and far from what can be considered an elite institution. Regarding the private sector, Argentina has a somewhat homogenous nonpublic system, where, in comparison to other private systems in the region, the quality gap between the top-ranked private universities and those at the bottom is smaller (Rabossi 2011). In addition to this, and although the 1990s saw the emergence of some new and innovative universities that could be considered the new elite of the system, this subsector is still small and has no real impact on the academic labor market. Overall, academic mobility from lower to higher ranked universities is limited. Another characteristic that was already mentioned as promoting academic immobility is the dominance of the part-time profile in the labor market. Some clarifications in regard to this are necessary, however, before proceeding. If academia is only a secondary labor market for adjunct professors, one can speculate that there is less mobility for this group of workers, given that the main source of their income comes from outside academia. Argentina is a part-time dominated system, as are most university systems in the world, with a very low percentage of professors dedicated full-time to the academic life. As a matter of fact, less than 15 percent of academics hold a full-time position in the public university in Argentina and the same is true for the private market (SPU 2010). Although one can speculate that this characteristic would tend to promote higher immobility rates, there are no reliable statistics to sort adjunct professors out into part-time employees and those who are full-time “professors of the system” (Bernasconi 2009). If the latter dominates, inbreeding rates will be, by definition, lower. This is because these full-timers of the system work across different universities in order to achieve a “full-time” job, but are adjunct professors in each 58 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University institution where they are employed. Thus, by definition, they are not inbred. Public universities in Argentina are not accountable enough. Although open competition is mandatory for all national institutions when there is a need to select a candidate, less than half of all new contracts are decided competitively. Social ties or friendship among coworkers is what mainly determines who will be hired to fill an open position. Public universities do not suffer from this process, given that federal funds are not distributed competitively. There is no direct association between more productive workers and getting additional public funds. Federal appropriations are mainly distributed under an incremental approach. Also, the absence of an institutional board of trustees, with no political ties to any academic unit, together with the lack of a professional administrative body that works independently from schools or the most renowned academics, makes public accountability difficult to ensure. These organizational characteristics can also enhance the discretionary application of rules when universities have to select a candidate to fill an academic position. In sum, one can say that the Argentine university system presents organizational and structural features that enhance immobility among professors and promote inbreeding practices.

The case of the university of Buenos Aires

Established in 1821, the UBA is the largest and historically the most prestigious university in Argentina. With an enrollment of more than 300,000 students (18 percent of the Argentine student population), according to its own internal census (2011), it has 28,526 academics (6,923 professors and 21,603 auxiliaries).12 In other words, almost 19 percent of professors in the public sector work at this mega institution (SUP 2010). Given its size, it is not strange to see that each of its 13 schools operates under very different dynamics. Sometimes these differences are stark. For example, when comparing the School of Economics and the School of Exact Science, one finds two absolutely different internal labor markets. Academic qualifications, funds available per faculty member, the percentage of adjunct professors in relation to tenure- track positions, and the number of students per faculty member at each school, for example, present contrasting realities. In this sense, one can hardly speak of an institution that as a whole fosters, or not, inbreeding practices. However, to conclude if UBA promotes the recruitment of its own graduates, I carried out a comparison among the 13 academic units, Marcelo Rabossi 59 using the 2004 human resources census previously mentioned, given that this has additional and useful information not available in the latest census (from 2011). Variability in terms of numbers of faculty members per school is large. For example, the largest, the School of Medicine, has a total of 5,234 scholars. From those, only 652 (12.5 percent) are professors – the rest are auxiliaries or teaching assistants. On the other hand, the School of Law has 3,054 faculty members, 1,210 of them professors (39.6 percent). At the other extreme, the Veterinary School has only 652 academics, and only 78 of those are professors. In terms of the percentage of full- time versus part-time positions, this also varies according to the school. On average, the proportion of full-timers is very low.13 In fact, only 8 percent of the faculty body at UBA has a full-time position, 9 percent are half-time academics, and the rest, 83 percent, work under part- time contracts. Many of this last group have two part-time contracts equivalent to half-time employment. On average, 73 percent of professors at UBA hold a graduate degree (53 percent of auxiliaries or teaching assistants). However, only 12.4 percent of professors have a doctoral degree. To have a better perspective about the proportion of inbred faculty members by school, I included not only PhDs but also all faculty members with other levels of graduate education: specialization and master degrees.14 Table 3.1 indicates that inbreeding practices in the UBA are not uncommon. Again, differences among schools are large and vary according to the academic degree. In aggregate terms, almost 73 percent of professors got their final graduate degree from the UBA. This high percentage of faculty members who are also alumni characterizes UBA as an inbred institution. However, when this figure is disaggregated according to the kind of degree, there are some differences. At the doctoral level, it is clear that UBA promotes academic inbreeding practices. Almost 85 percent of the PhD holders employed by the UBA are inbred. At the specialization level, the same behavior is clear. Almost 68 percent of academics received their degree from this institution. On the other hand, at the master’s level, the situation is different. Less than 36 percent of the UBA’s teachers with this credential are inbred. It is possible to speculate that these large differences are directly related to the country’s higher education supply. At a systemic- or macro-level analysis, I say that the academic supply in part defines inbreeding practices. When the academic offer for a given degree is more diversified than for other degrees, the institution tends to limit 60 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

Table 3.1 Degrees held by academic staff at UBA, by percentage (2004)

Degree Specialization Master Doctorate Total

Inbred Inbred Inbred Inbred

School Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Pharmacy 100 −−− 98.8 1.2 98.8 1.2 Natural Sciences 60.0 40.0 −− 92.8 7.2 92.1 7.9 Veterinary 100 − 33.3 66.7 100 − 90.0 10.0 Odontology 70.0 30.0 −− 89.9 10.1 83.8 16.2 Medicine 72.4 27.6 41.7 58.3 93.7 6.3 80.8 19.2 Philosophy 71.4 28.6 8.3 91.7 89.5 10.5 79.0 21.0 Agriculture − 100 80.0 20.0 85.7 14.3 76.6 23.4 Engineering 80.3 19.7 36.4 63.6 81.4 18.6 76.5 23.5 Law 69.0 31.0 14.8 85.2 66.2 33.8 62.6 37.4 Architecture 64.3 35.7 21.4 78.6 70.0 30.0 57.5 42.5 Economics 64.9 35.1 29.3 70.7 73.8 26.2 55.5 44.5 Social Sciences 50.0 50.0 36.0 64.0 58.6 41.4 48.8 51.3 Psychology 42.4 57.6 66.7 33.3 36.4 63.6 42.6 57.4 Total 67.9 32.1 35.6 64.4 84.7 15.3 72.7 27.3

Source: UBA (2004); own calculations. its inbreeding behaviors. In other words, when there is a larger pool of universities offering a specific degree and consequently the number of graduate increases, the rate of inbreeding, at least in the UBA case, decreases. Even more, when UBA faces more competition in the production of human capital in the geographical area where it is located – for example in social sciences, economics, and psychology – inbreeding rates tends to be lower (see Table 3.1). The opposite is also true. In pharmacy, natural sciences and veterinary medicine, for example, the academic supply from neighboring institutions is relatively limited (Rabossi 2010). It is then not surprising that in these fields of study, inbreeding rates are the highest, reaching 90 percent or more. Before 1989, there were three other national universities in the area surrounding the capital, in addition to the UBA. However, in order to diversify the academic offer, a total of new nine national institutions opened their doors between 1989 and 1995, six of them in Greater Buenos Aires (SPU 2010). If we take into account that to produce a graduate at the master’s level it takes on average 8 years (undergraduate + master education), the number of external or noninbred candidates available to fill an academic position at the UBA before 2004 was scarce. Even more, given that academic mobility between provinces Marcelo Rabossi 61

Table 3.2 Number and percentage of graduates by level at national and private universities in Buenos Aires city and Greater Buenos Aires (2009)

Name of university Graduates in 2009

Specialization Master Doctorate

Num. % Num. % Num. %

University of Buenos Aires 245 17.9 90 7.3 289 59.6 Rest of National Universities 308 22.5 171 13.8 108 22.3 Private Universities 815 59.6 978 78.9 88 18.1

Source: SPU (2010); Own calculations. in Argentina is limited, the likelihood of having a graduate coming from an institution outside the general area where the UBA is located is low. Table 3.2 shows the number of graduates in 2009 at the specialization, master’s, and doctoral levels at each of the nine national and private universities located within commuting distance of the UBA.15 In the case of the private sector, at the time of the sample there were a total of 27 universities. It becomes clear that the UBA is the most important institution when it comes to producing graduates at the doctoral level. More than half of all PhDs in Argentina received their degrees from this university. At the specialization level, the UBA presence is less dominant. It graduates less than 18 percent of all specialists in the geographical area under analysis. In relation to master’s graduates, its impact is relatively scarce (less than 8 percent). By comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.2, I found a direct relationship between inbreeding rates and the percentage of graduates produced by each of the three types of institutions. The percentage of inbred faculty members is higher when the proportion of graduates for a given degree (specialization, master’s, or doctorate) is larger. For example, at the PhD level, inbreeding rates are closer to 85 percent and the contribution of UBA to the production of doctoral degree holders is 59.6 percent (see Figure 3.1). On the opposite side (bottom left of the graph), a lower percentage of UBA graduates at the master’s level (7.3) has a counterpart lower inbreeding rate (35.6). In any case, rates of inbreeding are far larger than the proportion of graduates who received their degrees from this institution. It is then possible to speculate that inbreeding behaviors are also inﬂu- enced by market availability. Macro-structural factors, such as market 62 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

59.6 45 PhD

Master 17.9 15 7.3 Graduates from UBA (%) UBA Graduates from Specialization

0 35.6 67.9 84.7 Inbreeding rates at UBA (%)

Figure 3.1 Proportions of UBA graduates by degree type in relation to national and private universities within commuting distance from the UBA (2009), and UBA inbreeding rates (2004) Source: SPU (2010); SPU (2004); own calculations. supply, provide a complementary view beyond single organization reasons, arbitrary decisions, or mere whims, to explain higher inbreeding rates at the UBA. Of course, it is not possible to discard the big impact that institutional issues play in fostering inbreeding practices, and mainly at the master’s and specialization level. In fact, for a professor with a master’s degree from UBA, the likelihood of being hired by this institution, in comparison to a graduate from a neighboring university, is almost five times higher (35.6 percent vs. 7.3 percent likelihood), and almost four times for a specialist (67.9 percent vs. 17.9 percent likelihood). When it comes to the selection of candidates with a doctoral degree, although institutional factors such as “fictional” open competitions, kinship, or subjective personal preferences cannot be rejected, extremely high inbreeding rates are largely explained by the dominance exercised by UBA in the production of human capital at the PhD level. To confirm if the preference for hiring their own graduates is still a pattern of behavior at the UBA, I examined the percentage of academics who, during 2004, were members of the academic staff and also completing graduate degrees at UBA. A first impression from Table 3.3 is that inbreeding habits are or were still present. In comparison to the stock of inbred academics, or the percentage of faculty members who already received their final graduate degree from UBA, the flow of new inbreds-to-be increased by 1.6 percentage Marcelo Rabossi 63

Table 3.3 UBA professors according to the academic degree currently pursuing, by percentage (2004)

Degree Specialization Master Doctorate Total

Inbred Inbred Inbred Inbred

School Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

Veterinary 100 − 100 − 100 − 100 − Odontology 100 − 100 − 100 − 100 − Philosophy 100 − 71.4 28.6 95.0 5.0 92.0 8.0 Natural Sciences 100 −−100 100 − 87.5 12.5 Psychology 66.7 33.3 42.9 57.1 95.6 4.4 85.2 14.8 Architecture 83.3 16.7 50.0 50.0 94.1 5.9 82.9 17.1 Agriculture 50.0 50.0 77.8 22.2 100 − 78.6 21.4 Pharmacy −− 50.0 50.0 100 − 75.0 25.0 Law 82.5 17.5 53.3 46.7 71.8 28.2 74.2 25.8 Social Sciences 66.7 33.3 45.8 54.2 85.3 14.7 68.9 31.1 Engineer 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 78.9 21.1 67.7 32.3 Economics 75.0 25.0 47.1 52.9 65.5 34.5 59.3 40.7 Medicine 37.5 62.5 33.3 66.7 100 − 52.2 47.8 Total 77.9 22.1 50.3 49.7 84.2 15.8 74.3 25.7

Source: SPU (2004); own calculations. points. When percentages are analyzed according to the type of academic degree, there has been a significant growth in the proportion of inbred students in specialization and master careers. On the other hand, the percentage of inbred doctors-to-be remains stable in comparison to the percentage of inbred doctoral degree holders, but at very high rates (84.7 percent vs. 84.2 percent). This is not an unexpected trend, given that the UBA is the main producer of doctors in the country. However, there are some differences when patterns of inbreeding are sorted out and thus analyzed by schools. In comparison to the low proportion of academics working in the school of medicine that received their degree from an institution other than the UBA (19.2 percent), the proportion of professors who are now pursuing a graduate degree outside this institution has increased significantly (47.8 percent). This is particularly true at both the specialization and master levels. In the case of specialists, noninbred academics rose from 27.6 percent to 62.5 percent. At the master’s level, the growth went from 58.3 percent to 66.7 percent. Following the idea that an increment in the academic supply of a given field of study will reduce inbreeding rates, it is possible to speculate that the decrease in the 64 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University proportion of inbred professors in the school of medicine is the consequence of the opening of new health sciences schools that was taking place in Argentina since the mid-1990s. For example, almost 60 percent of those new private institutions (7 of 13) began to offer careers in health sciences, and five of them opened their doors as Health Univer- sity Institutes (Rabossi 2011). Many of these universities are located in the metropolitan area and are thus in direct competition with the UBA. It is then no surprise that the number of graduate students in health sciences who opted to follow a career in an institution other than UBA has increased (SPU 2010). While, for example, in basic and applied sciences 90 percent of all Buenos Aires graduate students are enrolled at the UBA, in health sciences 56 percent opted for a private university. In order to assess how open UBA academics are, or the degree to which they are disposed to engage in research with external colleagues, Table 3.4 shows the proportion of faculty members who teach only at UBA. Also, Table 3.4 shows the percentage of professors who are involved in research activity, and from these, those who, as part of their research activity, are associated with peers from other institutions. It is expected that inward-looking institutions will “result in a high degree of insularity and inbreeding” (OECD 2007, 146). Regarding the place, or places, where academics teach, almost 64 percent of the faculty work only at the UBA; however, there are major differences between schools. Pharmacy shows the highest percentage of professors exclusively affiliated with the UBA for teaching purposes, followed by agriculture, veterinary science, and natural sciences (93.9, 88.9, 88.5, and 87.5 percent, respectively). At the other extreme, economics, social sciences, and psychology present the lowest figures. The range between the highest and lowest values is 41.5 percent (93.9 percent for pharmacy vs. 52.4 percent for economics). These percentages are directly related to market availability. In effect, the UBA is surrounded by a significant number of private institutions, many of which offer careers in social sciences and economics. It is therefore not strange to find a direct association between the highest percentages of professors working at more than one institution and job availability outside the UBA. Not surprisingly, those schools that have the largest percentage of full-time academics are also the ones that have the largest proportion of faculty members working only at the UBA (the correlation is 0.78). Greater insularity is directly related to job availability. Teaching at other institutions is not an uncommon practice in a sector where the average salary is uncompetitive in relation to other markets. Marcelo Rabossi 65

Table 3.4 UBA professors according to where they teach, if they engage in research, and extent of external research collaboration, by percentage (2004)

School Teaching Research Activity∗

Only UBA and Yes No External UBA Elsewhere Collaboration

Agriculture 88.8 11.2 85.9 14.1 10.8 Architecture 64.4 35.6 33.5 66.5 20.6 Economics 52.4 47.6 23.6 76.4 37.8 Natural Sciences 87.5 12.5 89.6 10.4 15.2 Social Sciences 54.0 46.0 60.1 39.9 23.7 Veterinary 88.5 11.5 62.8 37.2 4.1 Law 54.0 46.0 18.9 81.1 39.0 Pharmacy 93.9 6.1 84.8 15.2 5.0 Philosophy 62.7 37.3 81.0 19.0 13.3 Engineer 63.5 36.5 33.3 66.7 23.5 Medicine 71.3 28.7 33.6 66.4 47.0 Odontology 79.9 20.1 47.4 52.6 6.1 Psychology 55.7 44.3 55.1 44.9 13.3 All Schools 63.4 36.6 42.5 57.5 22.2

Note: ∗In the school of agriculture, 85.9% of the faculty body is involved in research activity. Of this group, only 10.8% are associated with institutions outside the UBA as a part of this activity. Source: SPU (2004); own calculations.

Table 3.4 also shows the percentage of professors who are involved in research work. On average, less than half of the faculty body is doing research. Dispersion across schools is large. As expected, those schools with the largest proportion of full-time academics have the higher percentages of research involvement (correlation: 0.84). How- ever, overall, the UBA shows a high degree of insularity. There are few interuniversity partnerships, and the development of networks among academics is relatively scarce. Only 22 percent of those professors who are involved in research work share their knowledge with peers at other universities. This means that almost 80 percent of researchers favor internal information exchange to sharing scholarly knowledge with other educational institutions. Within this context, the UBA shows a more inwardly oriented culture, where communication with researchers at other institutions appears to be a rare behavior. It may be that this conduct is a direct consequence of an institution that has been favoring the recruitment of its own graduates. 66 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

Discussion and conclusion

The Argentine university market presents favorable conditions for the development of inbreeding practices. From a structural perspective, with the homogenous expansion of the public sector, where being equals is considered a strength more than a weakness, all national institutions look alike. Notably, there are no visible elite public institutions in Argentina. For example, students are not challenged to make their best intellectual effort to gain admission to the most prestigious national universities. Public institutions have no entrance examinations to select the potentially most talented students. All candidates who receive a secondary school diploma can gain admission to any of the 55 public universities. In addition, Argentina has no indisputable flagship institutions.16 In this sense, all could be considered equals. Furthermore, and from a financial perspective, all national universities are financed via the National Ministry for Education through incremental criteria. In other words, there are no performance formulas to distribute extra funds to the most productive institutions. All universities receive the same allocation, year after year, regardless of their academic performance. In short, the public sector, a market that comprises around 80 percent of the demand for professors and researchers, provides few, if any, conditions to foster competition among faculty members. There are no major gains from gaining employment from a “rival institution.” In such an environment, scholars have no major incentives for moving from one university to another. It is therefore possible to expect greater inbreeding behaviors when a system faces higher immobility rates. Also, from a structural perspective, Argentina can be characterized as a model dominated by part-time faculty, as is the case in many countries in the region and around the world. Based on this characteristic, it would be possible to infer that inbreeding rates will be lower if these part-timers are “professors of the system” and employed at multiple institutions. Interestingly, the UBA shows high inbreeding rates, even though it has a significant percentage of adjunct scholars (more than 80 percent of the whole faculty body). Thus, it is possible to infer that these part-timers are not “professors of the system.” In other words, they work exclusively for UBA. Thus, the UBA is a case where inbreeding behaviors are independent of the contractual situation of the faculty members (i.e., providing full vs. part-time employment). In the face of significant inbreeding rates, one question worth asking is, if inbreeding behavior inside the university is a problem or a solution? Certainly there is no single or conclusive answer to this query. Marcelo Rabossi 67

In fact, inbreeding situations are more a reaction to, a consequence of, more profound political and organizational issues. For example, in terms of recruiting, national universities in Argentina rely more on their own candidates than those coming from the private sector. Indeed, an academic practice that takes inbreeding to the extreme is the way public institutions choose their academic deans and rectors (presidents). In this respect, the UBA case is highly revealing. In order to be elected, candidates must already be part of the academic staff. No outsiders are allowed. Of course it can be also argued that a policy of hiring from within can be the consequence of lack of capacity on the part of the institution to effectively judge the potential skills of an outsider. In such a case, universities are reducing the possibility of poor (or adverse) selection results. From Akerlof’s theoretical explanation (1970), the problem of adverse selection always entails an inefficiency of market allocation. It is a condition in which organizations are forced to think that all applicants are average. Specifically, employers judge good or bad candidates for a job as equals, due to informational asymmetries. If national universities mainly select their candidates through direct recruiting, then choosing their own graduates may not cause surprise. By opting for their former students, institutions are reducing the possibility of a bad decision. At this point, it is worth remembering that universities in Argentina are not research intensive. Research is undertaken by research institutes, which mainly operate outside the higher education market. Given that outside perception or market perception depends on available information, research-oriented individuals have an edge over teaching faculty, given that there is a market for research or published articles. On the other hand, the evaluation of teaching duties is more elusive and, one may even go so far as to say, subjective, as well. In other words, there is not a well-defined market for teaching. Therefore, for a teaching- intensive university system, an inbred candidate has an edge in terms of available information about his or her potential performance over a candidate coming from a neighboring institution. Within a similar argumentative criterion, another lesson that must be taken into account is that inbreeding situations must not always be taken as a failure or a negative behavior. In many cases, hiring one’s own human resources could be part of the solution, where there is no competitive market that would allow for the identification of the best faculty members. It could be also positive if inbreeding generates a true internal labor market.17 For example, it is known that promotion fulfills two different roles in an organization. On the one hand, it assigns an 68 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University individual to a position in the institution where he or she is expected to be more productive. On the other, it acts as an incentive device. The latter explains why organizations prefer to promote their own workers, instead of hiring new ones, particularly to high-ranking positions. If an outsider is hired to fill an open position, instead of promoting from within, incentives decrease among current workers (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Last but not least, one question worth asking is, if the academic community in Argentina perceives inbreeding as a problem. After several interviews with administrators at both public and private universities, my first impression is that it is not at the top of their agendas. Even more, some of the interviewees had not even thought about the phenomenon, nor considered its consequences. Therefore, this work could be judged as a preliminary exploration of the significance of inbreeding practices inside the Argentine university. A conclusion derived from the analysis is that inbreeding situations have a more significant impact on the administrative side of institutions than on the research side. It must be remembered that a considerable body of research is done outside the university system in Argentina. On the other hand, the administration of the national university is in the hands of amateur managers elected for no other reason than that they are former or current faculty members of the institution. In this sense, the perpetuation of detrimental managerial practices could be even more harmful than having lower research output, if the objective is to build a world-class university. These and other preliminary findings open the door to carrying out a more in-depth analysis in the near future.

Notes

1. Since the Higher Education Law was passed in 1995, public institutions are allowed to remunerate their faculty members according to their own criteria, including competitive practices. However, on average, national universities are still behaving according to previous tradition, where promotion and compensation are still tied to bureaucratic norms. Union pressures and a structural inertia at the core of these organizations are two elements that prevent them from changing their behavior. On the other hand, in the nonpublic sector, before the onset of new and innovative institutions at the end of the 1980s, private universities resembled public ones, in terms of faculty careers. In general, faculty members were paid by the hour, with no incentives or performance funding (Caillon 2005). 2. In this work, the word higher education refers to university education. Argentina has a nonuniversity sector enrolling 691,000 students, which represents 30 percent of the whole demand for postsecondary education. Marcelo Rabossi 69

3. Since the legal recognition of private higher education institutions in 1958, the law does not allow the operation of universities that are legally constituted as for-profit institutions. 4. According to Clark (1983), authority in higher education is distributed across six levels, where the national government is at the top of the pyramid and the department, or the chair system, defines the bottom or first level of authority. In departments, power is collegially distributed; however, authority in the chair system is in the hands of the chaired professor, who exercises personal power over their assistants and students. However, in public institutions in Argentina, according to García de Fanelli (2005), a high proportion of part-timers weaken the authority of chairs. This is because part-time arrangements prevent adjuncts from fully identifying with the organization for which they work. 5. Although there is no single definition to categorize faculty members as part- timers or full-timers (some countries define full-timers as those faculty who work more than 20 hours per week), we identify a faculty member as a full- time academic when he or she theoretically works no less than 40 hours a week. We say theoretically because there is no evidence that full-timers actually work the number of hours specified by their contracts. In fact, there are many full-timers who work as part-timers in other organizations, even when there is a clear overlapping of hours between both jobs. 6. Public appropriations to the national system in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from 0.61 to 0.52 percent in just one year (2001 to 2002) (SPU 2011). 7. To advertise publicly, which is mandatory, the academic post must be announced in a national newspaper and on main billboards at the university. The call remains open for a ten-day period. 8. To understand how public universities in Argentina bypass the law, see Rabossi (2009). 9. These are mainly teaching assistant positions. 10. As a matter of fact, the opening of new private institution was banned in 1973 during the government of President Perón. This restriction was only lifted after 16 years, in 1989. 11. Argentina was part of the Spanish Empire until the declaration of independence in 1816 (Rock 1985). 12. When not specified, I always refer to the sum of part- and full-time faculty members. 13. There are three employment categories in the national university according to total weekly working hours: full-time, half-time and part-time positions. These are docents who work 44, 25, and 12 hours weekly, respectively. Here, we integrated half-time and part-time into one category: part-time. 14. Graduate education in Argentina has three levels. After completing their undergraduate studies, students can choose to pursue a specialization, a master’s degree or a doctoral degree. A specialization is a two-year degree in one area of study, mostly focused on professional practice. A master’s degree, also a two-year degree, encompasses some research activity. A doctorate is basically targeted to those who aspire to develop a life as a full-time professor in academia. 70 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

15. I used year 2006 because there are no ofﬁcial data for previous years. The number of graduates from 2006 is used as a proxy value to see the relative impact of the UBA and its neighboring universities in the production of human capital at the graduate level. 16. Even UBA, the most prestigious of the system, receives no special treatment when it comes to funds distribution from the central government. Facing ﬁnancial constraints, the institution is unable to build up a strong body of full-time professors, a necessary condition to be part the elite market. With more than 300,000 students and drop-out rates close to 75 percent, the elite reputation of the UBA rests more on its history than on real fact. 17. On a microorganizational level, career patterns are affected by internal labor markets that determine institutional procedures and rules for hiring, promotion, and allocation of assets, as well as rewards among agents (Doeringer and Piore 1971). It is also known that in internal labor markets, the pricing and allocation of labor are governed by administrative rules, standardized norms, and procedures.

References

Adams, James, Grant Black, J. Roger Clemmons, and Paula Stephan. 2005. “Scien- tiﬁc Teams and Institutional Collaborations: Evidence from U.S. Universities.” Research Policy 34 (3): 259–285. Akerlof, George. 1970. “The Market for ‘lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500. Balán, Jorge. 1993. “Governance and Finance of National Universities in Argentina: Current Proposal for Change.” Higher Education 25 (1): 45–59. Berelson, Bernard. 1960. Graduate Education in the United States. New York: McGraw-Hill. Bernasconi, Andrés. 2009. Gestión del cuerpo académico en las universidades chile- nas: La institucionalización de la profesión académica en un contexto de mercado (Paper Presented at the International Seminar: El Futuro de la Profesión Académica: Desafíos para los Países Emergentes, Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, 30–31 November 2009). Caillon, Adriana. 2005. La educación superior privada en Argentina. In Estudios Nacionales Realizados por IESALC. http://www.iesalc.unesco.org.ve /progra- mas/Privada (accessed 4 October 2005). Clark, Burton. 1983. The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross- National Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. Comisión Nacional de Evaluación y Acreditación Universitaria (CONEAU). 2009. Memorias Anuales. Buenos Aires: CONEAU. Cruz-Castro, Laura, and Luis Sanz-Menéndez. 2009. “Mobility versus Job Sta- bility: Assesing Tenure and Productivity Outcomes.” Research Policy 39 (1): 27–38. del Bello, Juan Carlos, Osvaldo Barsky, and Graciela Giménez. 2007. La universidad privada Argentina. Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal. Doeringer, Peter, and Michael Piore. 1971. Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington, MA: Health Lexington Books. Marcelo Rabossi 71

García de Fanelli, Ana. 2005. Universidad, Organización e Incentivos: Desafíos de la Política de Financiamiento Frente a la Complejidad Institucional. Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila. García de Fanelli, Ana. 2004. Academic Employment Structures in Higher Education: The Argentine Case and the Academic Profession in Latin America. Working Paper 222. Geneva: International Labour Office. Hargens, Lowell, and Grant Farr. 1973. “An Examination of Recent Hypotheses About Institutional Inbreeding.” The American Journal of Sociology 78 (6): 1381– 1402. Horta, Hugo. 2013. “Deepening Our Understanding of Academic Inbreeding Effects on Research Information Exchange and Scientific Output: New Insights for Academic Based Research.” Higher Education 65 (4): 487–410. Horta, Hugo. 2009. “Holding a Post-Doctoral Position Before Becoming a Faculty Member: Does It Bring Benefits for the Scholarly Enterprise?” Higher Education 58 (5): 689–721. Horta, Hugo, Francisco Veloso, and Rócio Grediaga. 2007. “Navel Gazing: Aca- demic Inbreeding and Scientific Productivity.” Management Science 56 (3): 414–429. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). 2010. Censo 2010. http:// www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/ (accessed 2 October 2013). Kaplin, William, and Barbara Lee. 1995. The Law of Higher Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Marquís, Carlos. 2002. “Universities and Professors in Argentina: Changes and Challenges.” In The Decline of the Guru: The Academic Profession in Developing and Middle-Income Countries, edited by Philip Altbach, 53–76. Boston: Center for International Higher Education. Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Mora, José G. 2014. Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities. The Name of the Book, etc ... Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2007. Reviews of National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Portugal. Paris: OECD Padilla, Laura. 2008. “How Have Mexican Faculty Been Trained? A National Perspective and a Case Study.” Higher Education 56 (2): 167–183. Pelz, Donald, and Frank Andrews. 1976. Scientists in Organizations: Productive Climates for Research and Development. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Rabossi, Marcelo. 2011. “Public Intervention in Argentina: The Homogenous Expansion of the Private University Market.” Comparative and International Higher Education 3 (2): 39–45. Rabossi, Marcelo. 2010. Universities and Fields of Study in Argentina: A Public-Private Comparison from the Supply and Demand Side. Working Paper 15. SUNY, Albany: Program for Research on Private Higher Education. Rabossi, Marcelo. 2009. “Two Different Organizational Reactions: The University Sector in Argentina and Colombia and the Neo-Liberal Proposal.” Policy Futures in Education 7 (5): 532–543. Rock, David. 1985. Argentina 1516–1987: Desde la colonización española hasta Alfonsín. Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial, S.A. 72 Academic Inbreeding in the Argentine University

Schwartzman, Simon. 1993. “La Profesión Académica en América Latina”. In Notas para el Debate 10, edited by GRADE, 41–58. Lima: GRADE. Slattery, Elizabeth, and Joanna Broadbent. 2013. The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Employment and Labour Law. London: Global Legal Group Ltd. Soler, Manuel. 2001. “How Inbreeding Affects Productivity in Europe.” Nature 411: 132. Secretaría de Políticas Universitarias (SPU). 2010. Anuario 2010 de Estadísticas Universitarias. Buenos Aires: SPU. http://portal.educacion.gov.ar/universidad/ universidad-en-cifras/estadisticas/. (accessed 28 November 2013). Secretaría de Políticas Universitarias (SPU). 2011. Anuario 2011 de Estadísticas Universitarias. Buenos Aires: SPU. http://portal.educacion.gov.ar/universidad/ universidad-en-cifras/estadisticas/. (accessed 28 November 2013). Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). 2004. Censo de docentes 2004. http: //www.uba.ar/institucional/censos/Docente2004/censo_docente.pdf. (accessed 18 September 2013). Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). 2011. Censo de docentes 2011: Resumen principales resultados: Buenos Aires: UBA. Velho, Lea, and John Krige. 1984. “Publication and Citation Practices of Brazilian Agricultural Scientists.” Social Studies of Science 14 (1): 45–62. Wyer, Jean, and Clifton Conrad. 1984. “Institutional Inbreeding Reexamined.” American Educational Research Journal 21 (1): 213–225. 4 Faculty Inbreeding in China: Status, Causes, and Results

Hong Shen, Zhiping Xu, and Bingbing Zhang1

Introduction

The dramatic scale of development of higher education in China assuredly impacts the world. There are 25.63 million students enrolled and 1.44 million faculty members among 2,442 regular higher education institutions (HEIs), based on the latest official statistics in 2012 (MOE 2013). The enormous higher education enterprise can be classified by function into four types/tiers: 39 research universities, 73 research and teaching universities, 1,033 “general 4-year institutions” that focus mainly on teaching, and 1,297 “short-circle 3-year colleges” (which are vocationally oriented). These institutions can also be grouped on the basis of how they are governed – 113 are supervised by the central government, 1,623 by local governments, and 706 by private institutions. The quality of institutions and the levels of prestige of the disciplines offered could be considered as key factors distinguishing these institutions. However, the characteristics of the faculty play an important role in this discussion because “the academic profession is at the heart of the academic enterprise” (Altbach 1996). What factors have an impact on the faculty? It is clear that the mission, reputation, and environment of institutions, as well as the academic ranking, income, and experience of the faculty are all crucial factors. “Inbreeding,” however, which relates mainly to the institutional environment and the faculty’s experience, is also an important concern. The degree of inbreeding may change the mission and reputation of an institution and is a significant underlying factor to be considered in faculty development. Thus, this chapter discusses the current realities, reasons, and results of inbreeding in Chinese higher education.

73 74 Faculty Inbreeding in China

Although “inbreeding” is a biological term, it is common to find evidence of inbreeding’s existence in academia. Here, we define academic inbreeding as the phenomenon of a faculty member being employed at the university where he or she received his or her highest degree, without any other significant outside work experience. Inbreeding in Chinese academia emerged as a function of the way doctoral studies were organized and in terms of patterns of employment in the various types of universities. Only research universities, plus a small number of research-teaching universities and a few general four-year institutions, are entitled to confer doctoral degrees, and these differ in the programs and degrees they offer. Nowadays, most faculty members in four-year higher education institutions hold doctoral degrees. Gone are the days when those with a bachelor degree were employed in these institutions. Accordingly, those universities qualified to confer doctoral degrees show a particular tendency contributing to an upward inbreeding rate. One study (Lin 2009) revealed the percentage of inbreeding was highest in research universities (57 percent), followed by general four-year universities (23 percent), and three-year vocational institutions (6 percent) (Lin 2009), which supports our findings in a sample of 39 research universities. Although the central government and some top-ranked research universities have been trying to reduce inbreeding since 1999 (MOE 1999), no minimally acceptable level of inbreeding has been proposed. Most higher education institutions still employ their own graduates, and there has been a lack of studies on this topic. Indeed, when we scan the environment, we see little discussion about inbreeding, and there are many unanswered questions. Is inbreeding really a problem globally? What is the current situation in China? With respect to the impact on faculty, disciplines, and universities, what type of “breeding” is most beneficial? Thus, an empirical study on academic inbreeding in China could be useful. Three other questions need to be posed. Why does academic inbreeding occur? What is the impact of inbreeding on universities, in general, and on the disciplines and faculty, specifically? Why do the Chinese people not manifest opposition to inbreeding in universities? In the early development of contemporary Chinese universities, perhaps inbreeding was needed, due to a lack of qualified faculty. This logic springs from the idea that the demand and supply of qualified faculty correlate with inbreeding, and it is conceivable that inbreeding would benefit immature institutions that are largely inwardly oriented. Con- sequently, there may be rational reasons for the existence of academic inbreeding in China, and its causes need to be analyzed. Hong Shen et al. 75

Research context

It is useful to examine relevant research on academic inbreeding. In the United States, there was some interest in inbreeding beginning in the early 20th century, but this research was not known within Chinese academia. The first US study, “Faculty Inbreeding,” was published in 1935 (Eells and Cleveland 1935). The authors surveyed 17,000 faculty members from 219 institutions of all types – including research and teaching, public and private, and in most states. The average rate of faculty inbreeding in the United States in the 1930s was 34 percent. The rates, however, varied according to geographic location, institutional size, private versus public status, religious affiliation, concentration of graduate education, and the age of the institution. The rates also varied in regard to gender, field or discipline, and the academic rank of faculty members (Eells and Cleveland 1935). The second notable study on inbreeding in the United States was a case study on the University of Texas (UT) in 1957 (McGee 1960). McGee (1960) looked at 354 full-time junior faculty members (instruc- tors and assistant professors), among whom 33 percent had received a degree from UT and 29 percent held their highest degree from UT. The author suggested that inbreeding did not always a represent a danger, and may – in certain circumstances, at least – be useful for an institution. He thought that the inbreeding at UT might be connected to three handicaps – geographic, financial, and regional. Compared to noninbred academics, the inbred junior faculty had a heavier teaching load, higher numbers of general publications, and lower numbers of peer-reviewed publications. McGee (1960) also found that there was systematic discrimination in this university against the inbred faculty members at that time. The third early US study of note examined the relationship between institutional origin and productivity of faculty by using the data of 345 inbred and 2,709 noninbred faculty members in all major disciplines in 160 institutions chosen from the “1977 survey of the American Professoriate.” There were no significant differences in scholarly productivity between inbred and non-inbred groups. When scholarly productivity was considered in relation to research effort, the inbred group appeared to exceed the noninbred faculty in productivity; but the inbred faculty were paid $426 less, on average, than the noninbred group with equivalent qualifications (Wyer and Conrad 1984). Over the years, only limited attention was given to faculty inbreeding issues in China, but in 2009 an article entitled “Faculty Inbreeding” (Lin 2009) was published. It originated from a survey on “faculty work 76 Faculty Inbreeding in China status” organized by Beijing Normal University, which generated 4,890 responses in 2007–2008. The average inbreeding rate was determined to be about 28 percent, but the rates varied largely according to different criteria, such as institutional type – research (57 percent), teaching (23 percent), vocational institutions (6 percent) – and fields of study: life sciences (42 percent), engineering (34 percent), humanities (32 percent), social sciences (25 percent), and education (20 percent). Differences were also apparent depending on the status of the faculty. For example, the inbreeding rate of full professors was 3.3 times that of the lowest ranked assistant teachers. The inbreeding rate of older faculty members (over age 57) was 3.2 times that of younger academics (below age 27). Gender was also a factor: the inbreeding rate of males was 25 percent higher than that of females. Thus, older, male faculty members at higher academic ranks were found to have higher inbreeding rates than younger, female academics at lower academic ranks (Lin 2009). In 2011, 4,900 faculty members from 55 institutions located in 20 provinces participated in a faculty survey organized by Tsinghua Univer- sity. These institutions fell into three categories: key four-year, general four-year, and vocational three-year institutions. Here, inbreeding was defined as the holding of at least one degree from the institution where a faculty member was currently employed. The average inbreeding rate was 23 percent, and the largest gap existed between key four-year universities (46 percent) and vocational three-year institutions (6 percent). Taking into consideration only these key four-year universities, the highest inbreeding rate was 55 percent in the combined areas of engineering, agronomy, and medicine while the lowest rate was 37 percent, in the humanities. There were also notable contrasts in terms of rank, where the inbreeding rate was 39 percent for professors versus 50 percent for assistant teachers; gender, where 48 percent of males were found to be inbred versus 43 percent of females; and age, given that inbreeding stood at 55 percent for those over age 60, but was 38 percent for those aged 46–50 (Liu and Yang 2012). A survey on “educational background and career paths of faculty in Beijing,” organized by Peking University in 2007, included little information on inbreeding. Information was collected from 3,220 faculty members from 22 public higher education institutions, all located in Beijing city (province level), and the total average inbreeding rate was 26 percent. But the average inbreeding rate in key universities was 2.7 times the rate in general four-year institutions. The inbreeding rates in the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences were 30 percent, 24 percent, and 16 percent, respectively. Rates by age varied, Hong Shen et al. 77 as well, with the highest incidence of inbreeding found in the mid-age range (Chen, Yan, and Wen 2008). Several common points emerge from the above three surveys in China. The average inbreeding rate was between 20 and 30 percent at the beginning of the 21st century. Institutional type was a major factor impacting on the rate. Specifically, the higher the institutional rank – which is greater for research institutions, in the case of China – the higher was the inbreeding rate. The inbreeding rates varied among disciplines, but in no particular pattern. As for the differences among faculty members, the inbreeding rate for males was certainly higher than that for females. The relationship between inbreeding rates for different academic ranks of faculty and different age groups was not clear. A study of the literature both at home and abroad might give evidence of the current status of inbreeding, the reasons for its occurrence – such as in the UT case (McGee 1960) – and what direction further examination of the phenomenon should take. Inbreeding in the United States had been a serious issue in the development of higher education during the first half of the 20th century. However, due to policies and reforms, the amount of inbreeding in the United States seems to have decreased sharply. In comparison, inbreeding in Chinese academia is still an issue. In view of international academic competition and national aspira- tions for higher education development, now may be the right time for intensive studies and policy changes in relation to inbreeding in China.

Research design

Data This chapter employs three sets of data: data from a survey from the Changing Academic Profession (CAP) – China 2007 project (Teichler, Arimoto, and Cummings 2013), data from a 2006 research study on institutional self-reporting of University Teaching Assessment (UTA),2 and data from an online search of faculty curricula vitae (FCV) 2013. Information on these data sets follows below. CAP: Changing Academic Profession International Project – China Case 2007. CAP is a cooperative international project originally undertaken in 26 countries, although only 18 countries (plus Hong Kong) completed the common questionnaire survey and submitted data sets from 2008 to 2010. More than 25,000 faculty members responded internationally. In China, 3,612 viable questionnaires were received from 68 higher education institutions located in 11 provinces. Within the total sample, 419 were from 10 prestigious public research universities 78 Faculty Inbreeding in China and the rest were from 58 public general four-year institutions. For this examination of academic inbreeding in China, the effort was made to extract relevant data from the responses coming out of the 10 research universities in the CAP-China database. UTA: Undergraduate Teaching Assessment 2006. The Undergraduate Teaching Assessment in China is “a national movement.” All regular four-year higher education institutions were required to participate and be assessed. After an institution submitted a self-assessment report, a team of experts conducted a campus site visit for several days. An assessment result was issued, based on a scale of four levels: excellent, good, qualified, and failed. For the purposes of this analysis, we consulted the 15 UTA institutional self-assessment reports available online that included inbreeding data, among which five came from research universities. FCV: Faculty Curricula Vitae Search 2013. For the purposes of this analysis, the authors of this chapter carried out an online search of faculty curricula vitae in the fall of 2013, with a special focus on inbreeding rates. Since online data were missing from two of the 39 core research universities in the country, we targeted the remaining 37 research universities in this group. We chose to focus on the fields of physics, engineering, economics, and medicine for disciplinary representativeness and made the “school or department” the focal unit. We identified 9,683 faculty CVs from 86 schools within the 37 universities (although not all 37 research universities have these four disciplinary “schools or departments”). Among these faculty CVs, 4,743 included inbreeding information; these CVs were therefore included in our analysis.

Hypothesis Does the rate of inbreeding relate to institutions, disciplines, and faculty members, and if so, how? Beyond this overarching question, some additional questions must be asked. At the institutional level, do top-ranked universities exhibit higher inbreeding rates because these institutions would not employ graduates from less prestigious institutions? With respect to academic disciplines, are there different inbreeding rates across disciplines? And do those universities with better performance in the “2012 National Disciplinary Evaluation” exhibit higher inbreeding rates because they would like to keep their own graduates as colleagues? In regard to individual faculty members, do those who are inbred produce more publications and receive faster promotion because they can devote all of their time to academic work, rather than spend time job hunting, and beneﬁt from more support within the institution? Hong Shen et al. 79

Status

Research universities and their inbreeding rates Decreasing inbreeding rates over time. The literature reveals that the average inbreeding rate in research universities in China was 57 percent in 2007–2008. Our work here integrates two sets of inbreeding data – from the ﬁve research universities from UTA 2006 and from the 10 research universities from CAP 2007. This created one data set without institutional overlap. We made two comparisons of the rates of inbreeding of the 15 cases in 2006–2007 – namely, the group average and the individual institutions – to those of the 37 research universities included in our FCV 2013 search. All data showed that the faculty’s inbreeding rates decreased over time in terms of both the group averages and the individual rates seen in each institution – except for three universities (South China University of Technology, Shanghai Jiaotong University, and Central South University), where inbreeding rates remained steady. The average inbreeding rate of the 15 cases was 55 percent in 2006– 2007, which decreased to 28 percent in 2013. Nanjing University, Wuhan University, and Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics had greater declines – from nearly 80 percent and 50 percent in 2006– 2007, to 0 percent and less than 6 percent in 2013, respectively. The lowest rate registered in 2006–2007 was 23 percent, in South China Uni- versity of Technology. However, the rates in 14 of 37 universities were lower than this percentage in 2013 (see Figure 4.1). We also detected that the inbreeding rates varied by institution within the research university group. The more prestigious the university, the higher the inbreeding rate? There is no ofﬁcially sanctioned “university ranking” in China. However, there are “985 project universities.” These institutions receive intensive funding for research activities and publications. The 39 “985 universities” are categorized into two tiers, as determined by the amount of funding they receive from the central and local governments. The top-tier 985 universities are the C9 group: USTC, NJU, PKU, HIT, SJTU, Tsinghua, Fudan, XJTU, and ZJU (see Figure 4.1); the second-tier universities are known as the C30 group. Due to the outlier values exhibited by two C9 universities, and missing data for two C30 universities,3 we focused on determining the average inbreeding rates of seven of the C9 group (which we term “C7”) and 28 of the C30 group (which we term “C28”) from our FCV search. We found that the average inbreeding rate for the more prestigious C7 group was 30 percent, slightly higher than that of the less prestigious

80 Faculty Inbreeding in China

LZU

JLU

NEU

XMU

RUC

CSU

SCU

HUST

ZJU

XJTU

Fudan

DLUT

Tsinghua

UESTC

SJTU

HIT

PKU

HNU

BNU

SYSU

CAU

SEU

NWSUAF

SCUT

ECNU

TongJi

OUC

BIT

CQU

NWPU

SDU

Nankai

BUAA

TJU CAP-2007 10 univ, Inbred rate, UTA-2006 5 univ, Inbred rate, FCV-2013 37 univ, Inbred rate,

WHU

NJU USTC % 0 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Inbreeding rates in research universities, 2006–2007 and 2013 : CAP-2007, UTA-2006; FCV-2013 (includes four disciplines only). : The university codes are from the ofﬁcial domain names of the universities’ websites: Figure 4.1 Note USTC: U of ScienceNankai: and Nankai Technology U; of SDU: China;TongJi: Shandong Tongji U; NJU: U; ECNU: NWPU: Nanjing East Northwestern China U;China Normal Polytechnic WHU: U; Agri. U; SCUT: Wuhan South U; CQU: U; China Chongqing SYSU: U TJU:Jiaotong U; of Sun Tianjin U; Tech; BIT: Yat-Sen NWSUAF: Beijing U; U; UESTC: Northwest Inst. Agricultural BUAA: BNU: UZhejiang and of Beijing Beijing Forestry of U; Tech; U; U Normal OUC: Electronic HUST: SEU: of U; Huazhong Ocean Southeast S&T U;JLU: Aeronautics HNU: U U of CAU: Jilin of of Hunan and U; China; China; S&T; U; Astronautic; LZU: Tsinghua: SCU: PKU: LanzhouSource Tsinghua Sichuan U. Peking U; U; U; CSU: DLUT: HIT: Central Dalian Harbin South U Institute U; of of RUC: Technology; Tech; Renmin SJTU: Fudan: U Shanghai Fudan of U; China; XJTU: XMU: Xi’an Xiamen U; Jiaotong NEU: U; Northeastern ZJU: U; Hong Shen et al. 81

C28 group, which stood at 27 percent. The gap between the two groups’ inbreeding rates was not large and, employing a regression analysis method, we found that the average inbreeding rates of C7 and C28 did not show a signiﬁcant difference (sig. = 0.162 > 0.05) in the regression model. This means that the assumption that “the more prestigious the university, the higher the inbreeding rate” has not been veriﬁed.

Four disciplines and their inbreeding rates The prestige of a university depends on the reputation of its schools or departments, or the excellence of its disciplines, which in turn depends upon the performance of the faculty members. Schools/departments and disciplines differ, at least in China. The school/department has administrative plus academic functions. The discipline is a loose academic grouping that includes scholars, their work, and achievements, and can be linked across multiple schools/departments. In 2012, an official ranking of universities by disciplinary performance was produced, as a result of the National Disciplinary Evaluation: the stronger the achievement in the discipline, the higher the position of the institution. This section focuses on the relationship between disciplinary performance and the faculty inbreeding rates in specific disciplines. The better the disciplinary performance, the higher the inbreeding rate? From the 2012 National Disciplinary Evaluation results and rankings, released by the Ministry of Education in January 2013 (CDGDC 2013), we chose to focus on four disciplines – physics, engineering, economics, and medicine4 – as representatives of the natural sciences, engineering, social and life sciences. We found that the relationship between inbreeding rates and disciplinary performance was different in the four disciplines, and that this relationship was both irregular and complex. For example, Peking University was top in physics, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Huazhong University of Science & Technology were at the top for engineering, Renmin Uni- versity of China was top in economics, and Southeast University was at the top in medicine. However, their inbreeding rates in these four disciplines differed from high to low. By use of a partial correlation analysis tool, which held the disciplinary ranking as a control variable, we found a weak positive correlation between disciplinary performance and inbreeding rates in economics and medicine. Namely, the better the performance (the lower in number on the ranking, for example, one being better than five on the ranking), the lower is the inbreeding rate in the two disciplines. By contrast, the relation of the performance on the ranking to the inbreeding rate was negatively correlated in engineering 82 Faculty Inbreeding in China and physics – that is, the better the performance on the ranking, the higher is the inbreeding rate in these two disciplines. However, the four pairs of relationships of discipline ranking to inbreeding rate did not show a statistical significance (all sig. > 0.05). In sum, the correlation of disciplinary performance to inbreeding rate within individual disciplines has not been verified. Different disciplines, different inbreeding rates. Another important question is, Do inbreeding rates vary by discipline? The 4,743 FCV-2013 samples we examined were distributed across the four disciplines of physics (1,057), engineering (1,157), economics (1,344), and medicine (1,185). The average inbreeding rate across this sample of 4,743 was 27.4 percent, but the rate varied by discipline. It was 21 percent in medicine, 24 percent in physics, 29 percent in economics, and 36 percent in engineering. Although these percentages seem to indicate different inbreeding rates by discipline, the results of the regression model (all sig. > 0.05) did not confirm the idea of “different disciplines, different inbreeding rates.”

Faculty publication and the status of inbreeding The number of publications by inbred and noninbred faculty. Which group, inbred or noninbred academics, excels in terms of number of publications and in academic productivity? Our analysis – using CAP survey from 2007 – showed that there are some differences between the two groups (see Figure 4.2).

0 Inbred Noninbred Inbred Noninbred Inbred Noninbred Inbred Noninbred

Prof Associate prof Lecturer Average in total

Book Article Others

Figure 4.2 Average numbers of publications of inbred and noninbred faculty in recent three years by academic rank Note: “Others” include publishing in newspapers, participating in conferences, obtaining patents, creating software, and so on. Source: CAP-2007. Hong Shen et al. 83

Noninbred full professors published more scholarly articles than their inbred peers; but noninbred associate professors published a slightly more books than inbred associate professors. In addition, both the inbred full professors and lecturers excelled in other academic areas (publishing in newspapers, participating in conferences, obtaining patents, creating software, etc.), although this was not the case of inbred associate professors. In regard to productivity, we found that average rate of productivity was higher for the noninbred faculty. Nevertheless, the T-test did not show a significant difference: (sig. > 0.05). The quality of publications of inbred and noninbred faculty. We used a different approach to analyze the quality of academic publications of inbred and noninbred faculty members in various disciplines through our FCV-2013 search. As indicated previously, the 4,743 samples covered four disciplines (engineering, economics, medicine, and physics) in 37 research universities. The FCV search not only allowed us to determine the status of faculty as either inbred or noninbred of faculty but was also able to obtain information about these academics’ publications, including article titles, journal names, and dates of article publication. However, we did not have the capacity to judge the quality of the publications. To make better sense of the issue of publication quality, we conducted further analysis with the help of the SCI (Science Citation Index) and the SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index), two well-known and influential international scientific indexes, as well as the CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure), a well-known scholarly journal database in China. Specifically, we first selected a subset of the larger FCV sample – 1,415, or one-third of the total 4,743 – from six research universities. We opted to focus on the samples coming out of these six specific institutions – namely, PKU, SJTU, WHU, SCU, LZU and ENU – due to the large number of FCVs in our FCV dataset from these universities. We searched the SCI/SSCI and CNKI databases for scholarly articles published at any point in the past (i.e., all articles) where the first author and his/her university of affiliation corresponded to the information contained in our FCV subset. Of the 1,415 FCVs in the subset, one-third corresponded to inbred faculty and two-third to noninbred academic; 28 percent of the subset represented the disciplines of physics and medicine, 30 percent engineering, and 14 percent economics. This approach provided insight into quantitative and qualitative aspects of the academic performance of the two groups (inbred and noninbred). We discovered some interesting phenomena, as shown in Figure 4.3. When compared to noninbred academics, inbred faculty 84 Faculty Inbreeding in China

30 25.56 25

15 13.79 9.49 10 7.23 7.6 7.53

5 3.89 3.47 2.63 2.37 1.74 1.48 1.941.17 1.441.94 0 SCI CNKI SCI CNKI SSCI CNKI SCI CNKI Physics Engineering Economics Medicine

Noninbred Inbred

Figure 4.3 All numbers of published articles in SCI/SSCI and CNKI of inbred and noninbred faculty by discipline Note: SCI is the Science Citation Index; SSCI is the Social Sciences Citation Index; and CNKI is the China National Knowledge Infrastructure. Source: FCV-2013 only from four disciplines. had many more domestic articles accepted by CNKI in all four disciplines. In regard to international articles, as accepted by SCI and SSCI, noninbred faculty’s contributions were greater in number than those of inbred academics in three disciplines, the exception being medicine. In the field of medicine, the number of SCI articles published by inbred faculty exceeded the number by noninbred by one-third. The discipline of economics stands out for a couple of reasons. First economics faculty members contributed the most articles to domestic journals. In addition, according to the SSCI data, the largest difference in the number of articles of international interest between inbred and noninbred faculty was also in the field of economics. Specifically, inbred faculty produced only 60 percent of what noninbred faculty were able to publish in terms of SSCI articles. Overall, the noninbred faculty ranked higher on the international index while the inbred faculty excelled in domestic publications. A T-test statistical tool was employed for checking the significance of variables. Regarding domestic articles as found in the CNKI, the relationship between inbred/noninbred status and the number of articles was not significant in engineering (sig. > 0.05), but the relationships were significant in the three other disciplines (sig. < 0.05). In regard to articles of international interest as indicated by SCI/SSCI information, no significant differences were found in any of the four disciplines (sig. > 0.05). The general conclusion, therefore, is that within Hong Shen et al. 85 a discipline no significant relationship exists between the number of published articles of a certain quality and inbreeding status.

Faculty promotion and inbreeding The pace of promotion of inbred and noninbred faculty. From our previous interviews of 15 faculty members (including five inbred academics and their five former supervisors, as well as five noninbred academics) in one of the research universities, we estimated that inbred faculty might enjoy a quicker pace of promotion because of their familiarity among all the colleagues. Moreover, we suspected that previous supervisors would be highly supportive of their inbred colleagues. Thus, obtaining votes for promotion could be expected to be easier. For sake of convenience, we designate the period from achieving one’s highest degree to appointment as an associate professor as the first stage and the movement from associate professor to full professor as the second stage. (In point of fact, the main steps in Chinese faculty advancement are assistant teacher, lecturer, associate professor, and full professor, although the steps are further subdivided so that there 13 steps altogether.) The descriptive analysis based on the data of 26 research universities from our FCV-2013 dataset revealed that, on average, noninbred faculty took longer (7.4 years) than inbred academics (6.5 years) to reach the rank of associate professor. Sig. = 0.001 < 0.05, here, means that inbred faculty experienced quicker promotion than their noninbred peers. In contrast, there was no statistical significance (sig. = 0.729 > 0.05, meaning a failure in the verification of the regression model) between noninbred faculty (5.4 years) and inbred faculty (5.5 years) in the movement to the rank of professor from that of associate professor. Institutional differences in the pace of promotion of inbred and noninbred faculty. Were there any institutional differences in the entire promotion process both for the inbred and noninbred across different universities? Data from 26 research universities revealed varied situations. There was almost no time difference in two universities (seen in the center of Figure 4.4). Meanwhile, Figure 4.4 also shows that the noninbred group was quicker and slower than the inbred group in 12 universities. In addition, Figure 4.4 highlights some extreme cases in places like Northeast University and East China Normal University. In these two institutions, on average, inbred faculty needed much more time (18.6 and 18 years, respectively) to attain final promotion to the rank of full professor, as compared to the noninbred faculty (10.4 and 11 years, respectively) at these institutions. The opposite case can be seen in Sun Yat-Sen Uni- versity where the four inbred faculty members included in our analysis

86 Faculty Inbreeding in China

SYSU

SJTU

PKU

Tsinghua

CSU

UESTC

SDU

HUST

HNU

Nankai

WHU

Tongji

XJTU

BNU

JLU

Fudan

RUC

NWSUAF SEU

Gap of inbred-noninbred Inbred Noninbred

ZJU

XMU

OUC

SCUT

SCU

ECNU NEU Time span (in years) from receiving the highest degree to reaching rank of full professor, by university Year 7 2 : FCV-2013 (includes four disciplines only). 22 17 12 –3 –8 –13 Figure 4.4 Source Hong Shen et al. 87 needed five years to reach full professor, but 15 noninbred samples spent almost 14 years, on average, to reach their final academic objectives. (Of course, our data may not be reliable as a sample distribution in any one university by online search.) Disciplinary differences and pace of promotion of inbred and noninbred faculty. Were there differences across disciplines in the promotion process for inbred and noninbred faculty? The answer is uncertain. From obtaining the highest academic degree to reaching the level of associate professor, the differences in the pace of promotion were significant (sig. < 0.05) between noninbred and inbred in medicine (1.9 years) and engineering (1.3 years). A T-test verified the significance for these two disciplines (sig. < 0.05), which meant that, on average, noninbred promotions took one to two years longer than those for inbred faculty. Very small gaps (0.2 and 0.3 years) were seen in physics and economics. When looking at movement from the rank of associate professor to full professor, the differences in the pace of promotion between noninbred and inbred academics lessened. The most interesting change took place in medicine, where noninbred faculty achieved promotion 0.7 years earlier than inbred academics. Considering the entire promotion process across all four disciplines, only engineering showed an obvious difference where inbred faculty achieved promotion 1.7 years sooner than noninbred faculty. In the other three disciplines, noninbred faculty were promoted sooner than those inbred (0.3 years earlier in both in medicine and economics, and 0.7 years earlier in physics). The general conclusion is that a difference across disciplines in the pace of promotion between inbred and noninbred faculty, depending on the discipline, was not verified.

Causes

The historical necessity of human resource self-sufﬁciency Higher education in China suffered from instability as a result of political and economic movements from 1949. During the 17 years from 1949 to early 1966, higher education developed greatly in the numbers of institutions, faculty and students; however, this process was inter- rupted by the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1978. The “revolution” basically closed the academic system for a decade. The most severe consequence of the Cultural Revolution to higher education, science and technology, was that an entire generation of the academic profession in China was lost. During those 12 years, there were not enough qualiﬁed higher education graduates. 88 Faculty Inbreeding in China

The reform and opening up of China from 1978 to the middle of 1980s witnessed the rehabilitation of the higher education system. In this period, the country was desperately in need of scientists and scholars. Their absence was evident in all higher education institutions, without exception. Universities and colleges had to train and hire their own graduates, in light of this crucial shortage of human resources. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, there was a first batch of graduates from formal higher education: bachelor’s degree holders (238,476) in 1982, master’s degree holders (8,665) in 1981, and doctoral degree holders (13) in 1982. These individuals graduated from reformed higher education institutions after the Cultural Revolution (MOE 1988). All of those with PhD degrees, the majority of those with master’s degrees, and some bachelors from the first wave of graduates were retained on the campuses where they studied; they became what we call as inbred faculty. In the two decades from 1982 to the beginning of the 21st century, the better universities sent their second-class or third-class graduates to other general institutions, which represented the “birth” of noninbred faculty birth. At the same time, these better universities kept their first- class graduates as their own academic employees, which caused the number of inbred faculty to grow. These better universities began to demonstrate high levels of internal self-sufficiency, when it came to the supply and demand of their human resources (i.e., academics). Although graduate education in China has made great progress and the country now grants the largest number of PhDs in the world each year, it is notable that only 56 universities (among a total of 2,442 institutions in China) have graduate schools with master’s and doctoral programs (although there are graduate programs in some institutions without graduate schools). From 1995 to 2012, the State Ministry of Edu- cation had to approve the establishment of all graduate schools. (The central government has loosened its authority since 2012.) The PhD programs of which we are aware are highly dominated by the 985 research universities. The unique circumstances of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath in China resulted in the necessity of inbreeding, at least for a time. The domination of PhD programs in the 985 research universities resulted in the feasibility of inbreeding and especially in some degree of “self-supply” of academic talent in research universities.

Supply and demand in the academic labor market: Top-down flow Until 1994, China lacked a free academic labor market. Before this time, institutions (through the government) arranged employment for all graduates. The planned economy determined how many students Hong Shen et al. 89 were needed for the labor market, including academia. Individuals, nevertheless, still needed to search out information in order to look for a better match, according to their discipline, interests, capacity, family background, academic requirements, geographic preference, climate, salary, and job requirements. The market for human resources was not as highly competitive as it is today. The gross enrollment ratio in higher education was only 3.45 percent in 1990 (MOE 1991). Expansion in higher education began in 1999 for undergraduates and spread to graduate education in 2000. There has been no shortage of PhDs since the beginning of the 21st century. Likewise, the threshold for entry to the academic profession has been raised, and PhDs or the highest degrees in different fields and disciplines have become the basis of academic employment opportunities. In highly ranked 985 universities, post- docs and/or a (study/visit) sojourn of at least six months overseas have become another requirement for academic employment. Greater competition has intensified qualification assessments, whereby receiving a PhD from one of the top universities in the world or having published articles in SCI or SSCI journals is a must. It is interesting to note that not only does the higher education system seek capable people to employ, but it also produces the same human resources it needs. In a way, the demand and supply of the academic job market converge in the education system, and the inner structure of the system may determine the manner in which demand and supply connect. The most prominent aspect of the structure of the Chinese higher education system is its organizational hierarchy. All institutions pertain to one of the four tiers mentioned at the start of this chapter. The phenomena of supply and demand in the academic labor market in China take the shape of irregular pyramids, as follows: Most of the PhD holders produced by the 985 project universities gain employment in institutions within the same tier as their alma mater institutions, or in universities of the next tier down, the 211 project universities. A small number of the top-tier graduates end up working in general four-year colleges. The PhD holders graduating from the 211 universities are usually employed in institutions in this same tier, to fill whatever places are not taken by those who move down from the 985 institutions. Most 211 institutions’ graduates and a small part of the 985 universities’ graduates are also employed in institutions one tier or even two tiers below, that is, the general four-year colleges. There are very few doctoral programs offered by general four-year colleges and none by three-year colleges. Therefore, it is very obvious that both supply and demand in the academic labor market are a top-down 90 Faculty Inbreeding in China

flow – academic employees have studied in a higher-tier institution but most are later employed in a lower-tier institution. This flow is supposed to be an assurance of faculty quality. For example, within the 39 research universities, the norm will be to have studied in a C9 university and be employed in a C30 university. However, in reality, this progression may not be so straightforward, as it is possible for an individual to hold a doctorate from one institution, but to have received the bachelor’s and the master’s degrees from two other universities. Which institution should be considered the priority institution – if a person holds degrees from three different universities? Almost all Chinese employers give priority to the bachelor degree, especially from a research university. Through this study we learned that the academic labor market also has a segment of the major and minor markets. Thus, academic inbreeding will decrease greatly if demands for faculty are met with supply that comes as a result of the top-down-flow described above. This is because this top-down flow process naturally implies a movement of graduates from one tier to another and, therefore, toward academic employment away from their alma mater. When considering education institutions in the United States, where a graduate with a doctoral degree may be employed in an institution that only grants bachelor or master degrees, it seems that “top-down flow” may be the normal practice in the US academic market. Yet, there are exceptions in the United States. For example, at one time the proportion of inbred entry-level faculty at Harvard Law School was 81 percent and at Yale Law School 73 percent (Eisenberg and Wells 2000). It should be noted also that, in recent years, all 985 and almost all 211 institutions employ faculty with PhDs; a master’s degree is no longer sufficient. In addition, foreign academics with advanced degrees from other countries, or Chinese who obtained a PhD abroad, search actively for academic employment opportunities, in particular at 985 universities. Consequently, the competition nowadays in the academic labor market in China is much greater.

A culture of exclusivity across institutions, disciplines, and scholarly communities Institutional hierarchy. The hierarchy in higher education institutions is also reflected in the state administrative system. Presidents of the higher education institutions within the four different tiers (as described at the start of this chapter) are given official administrative titles reflecting the state administrative hierarchy, with vice-minister being the highest. The titles represent the positions of institutions and signal how the Hong Shen et al. 91 resources allocated by governments and society to the higher education system will be directed: the higher the administrative position, the greater are the resources. Presidents have their own associations and avenues of communication within tiers. Almost all institutions in a given tier desire to climb to the next highest tier, due to the increased benefits (in resource, policy, finance, and other areas) available there. However, the 985 and 211 tiers have closed the doors for accepting new comers, as a result of the central government’s policy. Engagement among institutions across tiers is limited. Consequently, professors and their PhD students in the top 985 universities are usually only loosely coupled with scholars in institutions at lower tiers. This dynamic has a negative impact when it comes to job hunting for those who possess a PhD. As a result, recent PhD graduates must search for a position mainly within a reduced pool of possibilities. In this situation, the universities awarding the doctoral degree offer these job seekers their best opportunity, which fosters inbreeding. Such a system prevents mobility, and even communication, across the hierarchy of institutions. Disciplinary boundary. Disciplines have long been characterized by “boundaries of knowledge.” Modern scientific progress demands more interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research, and cross-disciplinary engagement has become more significant and feasible. However, in practice, each scholar has his/her own focus when it comes to research. Uni- versities seek an organizational logic and tend to establish schools, colleges, and faculties around the traditionally defined disciplines. This process contributes to academic inbreeding, which can be made more intense and narrow not only by hiring graduates to work in the same university where they studied but also by having these former students later work within the same school, department, or even project team. Although this present study focuses only on academic inbreeding at the institutional level, the consideration of inbreeding can be moved a step further, with examination of dynamics at the school or department level. Unless more comprehensive research on inbreeding is carried out and the results published, such inbreeding will not only continue but will also be strengthened. Scholar self-protection. The protection of intellectual property and innovative ideas – which may be the result of work done by faculty, project teams, research centers, or laboratories – is absolutely necessary. In most circumstances, we keep our findings and ideas secret to ourselves until they are published or patented. As a result, exchange of personnel, sharing of information, and cooperation with outsiders 92 Faculty Inbreeding in China may be curtailed. Scholars from outside are usually not welcomed to join or even observe a team at work. But “insider” members of the team are welcomed to remain for some time and the best members are invited to remain permanently, resulting in more serious inbreeding. In other words, although the intellectual property protection is important, it can result in increased academic inbreeding. To reduce academic inbreeding, related policies of governments and institutions should be implemented.

Results

Findings and further analyses on inbreeding in China Varied and decreasing inbreeding rates. On the basis of our research, the average inbreeding rates in 2013 and 2006–2007 were 28 percent and 55 percent, respectively, in the 15 research universities included in our analysis. The rate of inbreeding at individual universities also decreased, as can be seen in Figure 4.1. It is important that academic inbreeding in China has been decreasing. However, in the higher ranked group of universities (those that are more research intensive), the inbreeding rate is higher. This was clear from our descriptive analysis, although not supported by regression statistics. For the different tiers of institutions, the inbreeding rates were highest for the group of research universities, lower for the group of four-year institutions, and lowest for the group of three-year vocational colleges. There are encouraging signs that the academic labor market in China is changing. Universities no longer employ faculty without a PhD (or the highest degree relevant to the field of study), and those with no degree beyond the bachelor’s level are not promoted to full professors. This practice will enhance the standing of Chinese universities internationally. In addition, PhD programs are very concentrated in highly ranked research universities, which makes inbreeding in these universities convenient and acceptable. Evidence indicates that noninbred faculty may have higher academic productivity than inbred academics. Consequently, universities are motivated to adjust their recruitment practices in favor of hiring noninbred applicants. Also, scholars from other nations and Chinese nationals recently graduated with a PhD from abroad are attracted to the higher ranked research universities. The inflow of individuals with these kinds of profiles decreases the inbreeding rates in the top Chinese universities. Hong Shen et al. 93

Higher productivity of noninbred faculty. Academic productivity is not limited to scholarly articles. However, articles are representative of research productivity, with the quantity and quality of articles corre- lating, to some extent, with the signiﬁcance of research projects and the amount of research funds. This study mainly looked at the published articles accepted by the well-known SCI/SSCI and CNKI database. In regard to publication, noninbred faculty exceeded inbred faculty in general, particularly in international SCI/SSCI publications. However, within the domestic CNKI database, inbred faculty surpassed noninbred faculty in number of articles. Given the fact that SCI/SSCI has a higher standard than CNKI, noninbred faculty members reached a higher status of academic achievement. At this point, it may be useful to review some aspects of the recruiting process in regard to inbred versus noninbred candidates. The number of job applicants from within a university is usually small and more opportunities are available to internal candidates. Candidates from outside a university must complete an online application, and the number of external candidates would be expected to be large, making the competition greater for noninbred candidates. But, there is the possibility that the noninbred faculty member will possess greater intellectual capability and have a more promising future. These two notions may be supported by the number of published articles reviewed in SCI/SSCI. Faster promotion for inbred faculty, but only early in the career. The personal relationship between supervisors and their students can beneﬁt both, making academic appointment, retention, and promotion more accessible to the inbred. However, after a number of years, inbred and noninbred faculty would reach a point where the work conditions would be about the same for both. Moreover, the amount of time required for noninbred faculty to move from the rank of associate professor to full professor was less than that of the inbred. This could be perceived as having a balancing effect on the entire employment promotion process.

Consequences and reactions to inbreeding in China Sensitivity to inbreeding is imported from abroad. There is no evidence of domestic awareness of the negative effects of inbreeding when Chinese government policy on limiting inbreeding was announced in 1999. Neither scholarly journals nor policy documents showed findings in relation to employment of inbred or noninbred academics in the Chinese context. In fact, it was the process of constructing world-class and globally visible research universities in China that led to a focus on 94 Faculty Inbreeding in China decreasing inbreeding. Western references had shown that noninbred faculty members had a higher academic productivity (Eisenberg and Wells 2000). Given the high priority of research (and highly cited publications as a key output of high-quality research), a concern with inbreeding began to emerge within China’s top institutions. Before this time, very few findings indicated that China needed an academic labor market where scholars could move easily both in China and abroad, nor was there a sense that inbreeding would impact on the rate of China’s progress in the fields science, technology, and education (Lin 2009). During the Cultural Revolution, China’s academic growth was effectively halted. After this experience, there was a need to produce enough graduates to make the universities self-sufficient in academic human resource terms. This self-sufficiency lasted until the first decade of the 21st century (the average inbreeding rates were more than 50 percent in 2006–2007 but less than 30 percent in 2013). Constructing first-rate universities and attracting Chinese scholars from abroad had an impact on the academic market. The returning scholars have filled old vacancies and have created new positions in top research universities. And PhDs from these universities have moved into lower ranking institutions, with positive results for the system. The dilemma for bachelor’s + PhD 985 alumni. For a variety of reasons, high school graduates admitted by the 985 universities are considered the country’s top students. Indeed, given the quality of these 985 undergraduate students, and since the best bachelor’s students may go abroad for graduate study, it has often been said in China that “good students can be found with doctorates, better with master’s degrees, and the best with bachelor degrees” from top Chinese research universities. Bachelor’s students who receive their education at the top universities become the most sought after for employment and have the best opportunities for further study. For those top bachelor’s students who go on to pursue a PhD in China, the choice of the same (or another) 985 university is natural – particularly since the mark of a promising young scholar in China today is to have received the PhD from a 985 university. How- ever, when it comes to academic employment, the identification with a 985 institution for both the bachelor’s and doctoral degrees – while, on the one hand, clearly positive – also brings with it a negative association with inbreeding, in light of the higher inbreeding rate in these institutions, and the lack of experience of such candidates beyond the 985 realm. Further reactions to inbreeding based on China’s contemporary realities. It is important to consider the issues of competition and cooperation Hong Shen et al. 95 in China. Rising competition in Chinese academia, rather than cooperation, makes for a bright future in institutions where there is minimal inbreeding. By definition, inbreeding lends itself more to cooperation, but noninbreeding is more enhanced by competition. Efficiency in academia rests on competition, and opportunities are more available to noninbred faculty. Also important is the fact that inbreeding may be a function of faculty coming from one university, but it may also be a function of a cadre of faculty members sharing a limited set of experiences within the context of a small number of institutions where they have all been educated or previously employed. For example, a research team or a group of faculty may have been considered inbred in one institution but then moved to another university together, for somewhat different reasons, and consequently they become noninbred faculty at the new institution. Although not technically inbred in relation to the university where they are currently employed, these individuals may be understood to create something of a new kind of “inbred culture.” Dynamics of this nature may be seen in the 985 universities.

Conclusions

Inbreeding may not always be negative In this study, it is clear that inbred faculty have not excelled in some areas, such as publication, but inbreeding’s effects have not been totally negative. Most inbred faculty members have a sense of loyalty to the university and school, which is a strength for these organizations. In terms of remuneration, it is known through the literature that noninbred faculty may receive higher salaries than the inbred colleagues (Padilla 2008). However, in China, this is generally not an issue, as salaries and beneﬁts provided by universities depend on academic rank, regardless of whether the faculty member is a graduate of the university or of some other institutions. This study has not found discrimination against inbred faculty in Chinese universities. Even in some top institutions, those who have received their bachelor’s degree from the same institution are greatly valued. Inbreeding may have its merits, but our feeling is that there should be no attempts to raise the percentage of inbred faculty, nor do away with it all together. The best policies are those that seek to ﬁnd and recruit the best scholars, and it expected that “the best” will be open- minded and devoted to academia regardless of where they received their degrees. 96 Faculty Inbreeding in China

The ﬂaws of inbreeding can be remedied No matter how many years are spent in the pursuit of academic degrees, especially a PhD, they are few in comparison with the span of an entire academic career. Scholars in China mainly establish themselves academically in their doctoral studies over a period of three to ﬁve years. This period is important for their academic development, but their ideas and theories may change after becoming faculty members, in any institution, as they communicate with peers and outside academic organizations. For example, they may attend national or international conferences, be involved in cooperative projects and publications, be involved in seminars or deliver talks, and so on. The opportunities to engage with outside colleagues not only rely on physical mobility but may also take place online. As a result, the differences in potential achievement between inbred and noninbred faculty could be reduced or disappear. Also, it is important to understand the real effects of inbreeding and noninbreeding, in order to enhance the achievements of all institutions. The reform of Hunan University, a 985 research university, presents an interesting example (Tang and Qi 2014). In 2011, a regulation was introduced at Hunan University that prevents inbreeding; that is, Hunan’s own graduates are not to be employed by the institution. Neverthe- less, the university has continued to employ graduates and the issue became prominent in the news in May 2014. The number is small, less than 10 among 100 new faculty members annually. However, after con- tracting employment with these recent PhD graduates, these individuals must spend three years in postgraduate studies or other kinds of further training in other outstanding universities worldwide and then return to Hunan University to be faculty members. This policy achieves three things: control of inbreeding, reducing the number of inbred faculty to a small number, and ameliorating results from inbreeding, which are very same issues this chapter has sought to address.

Further studies on the influences of inbreeding are needed There remains a lack of empirical studies on the characteristics of inbreeding. Our analysis dealt with the relationships between universities and disciplines to inbreeding rates, the issue of time to promotion for faculty, and publication productivity of inbred versus noninbred faculty. Some differences were detected from simple descriptive statistics, but it was determined in the regression analysis that most differences were not significant. It is claimed that inbreeding would impact on Hong Shen et al. 97 academic mobility, exchange, productivity, equity, independence, and faculty teaching and student learning. However, there is no firm evidence of direct influences from inbreeding. Our study reveals that, in practice, a high inbreeding rate in (at least some) top universities or institutions that excel in various disciplines does not impact negatively on their academic excellence. Harvard Law School and Yale Law School offer other examples of this reality (Eisenberg and Wells 2000). Con- sequently, many more studies, especially empirical analyses, on the influences of inbreeding are definitely surely needed.

Notes

1. Many thanks to Dr. Joseph Jiang of Boston College and doctoral students Zhiyuan Liu and Jianhui Wang for their language polishing. 2. For speciﬁc information on the UTA data, please see: Beihang University, Undergraduate Teaching Assessment self-report, December 2006 (http://www. doc88.com/p-4174116548381.html); Central South University, Undergradu- ate Teaching Assessment self-report, November 2006 (http://www.docin.com/ p-314102751.html); East China Normal University, Undergraduate Teaching Assessment self-report, October 2006. (http://ypb.ecnu.edu.cn/news/manage/ upload/upﬁles/2006111318013.pdf); South China University of Technology, Undergraduate Teaching Assessment self-report, October 2007 (http://www. docin.com/p-288406669.html); and Wuhan University, Undergraduate Teach- ing Assessment self-report, 2006 (http://www.taodocs.com/p-807119.html). 3. The two C9 institutions not considered in the analysis were USTC and NJU, which showed inbreeding rates of 0 percent (see Figure 4.1), which were considered extreme values and not used in the regression model. The two C30 institutions not considered in the analysis were MUC-Minzu (Minority) Uni- versity of China and NUDT-National University of Defense Technology, as data for these institutions were not available online. 4. Although we refer throughout this analysis to “medicine,” there was no discipline listed as “medicine” in the National Disciplinary Evaluation 2012; for this reason, “biomedical science” data were used for this exercise.

References

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Eells, Walter Crosby, and Austin Carl Cleveland. 1935. “Faculty Inbreeding.” The Journal of Higher Education 6 (5): 261–269. Eisenberg, Theodore, and Martin T. Wells. 2000. “Inbreeding in Law School Hir- ing: Assessing the Performance of Faculty Hired from Within.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1): 369–388. Lin, Jie. 2009. “Comparison of Faculty Inbreeding Between American and Chinese Higher Education Institutions.” Journal of Higher Education 30 (12): 39–51. (only in Chinese) Liu, Fan, and Xi Yang. 2012. “Status, Effect and Function of Faculty Inbreeding.” Present at the 2nd Forum on Academic Profession. Beijing, China. 3 November 2012. (only in Chinese) McGee, Reece. 1960. “The Function of Institutional Inbreeding.” The American Journal of Sociology 65 (5): 483–488. MOE (Ministry of Education). 1988. Yearbook of China Education Statistics 1987. Beijing, China: People’s Education Press. (only in Chinese) MOE (Ministry of Education). 1991. Yearbook of China Education Statistics 1990. Beijing, China: People’s Education Press. (only in Chinese) MOE (Ministry of Education). 1999. Opinions on Strengthening Faculty Team Construction in New Era. http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/ moe/moe_1778/201209/141772.html (accessed 30 November 2013). (only in Chinese) MOE (Ministry of Education). 2013. Education Statistics 2012. http://www. moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s7567/index.html (accessed 29 November 2013). (only in Chinese) Padilla, Laura Elena. 2008. “How Have Mexican Faculty Been Trained? A National Perspective and a Case Study.” Higher Education 56: 167–183. Wyer, Jean C., and Conrad Clifton F. 1984. “Institutional Inbreeding Reexam- ined.” American Educational Research Journal 21 (1): 216–217. 5 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education: Inching Toward Openness in a Globalized Context Akiyoshi Yonezawa

Introduction

Japan was one of the ﬁrst countries in East Asia to develop a mass higher education system. However, in the last couple of decades, Japanese universities have experienced drastic reform (Amano and Poole 2005; Goodman, Kariya, and Taylor 2013). In the reformation process, the transformation of the Japanese academic labor market to a more open and competitive system has been a priority matter (Yamanoi 2007; Teichler, Arimoto, and Cummings 2013). Many academic leaders, policy makers, and higher education experts have been inﬂuenced by perspectives from the US academic world and have considered Japan’s inbreeding phenomenon to be a long-standing social “disease” or cultural convention. Yet, this academic inbreeding can also be understood as a rather modern phenomenon. In Japan, modern academic communities based on university education and research emerged as meritocratic networks replaced the premodern class-based academic regime in the latter half of the 19th century. At least at the initial stage of the development of the Japanese higher education system, the formation and domination of alumni networks of modern universities may have been inevitable in the process of establishing a new national academic system on the periphery of the world academic system. However, faced with harsh global competition in research and education based on the cross-border mobility of academics and graduate students, inbreeding and the domination of alumni networks

99 100 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education among prestigious Japanese universities are certainly becoming obstacles for further improvement (or even maintenance) of the international competitiveness of Japanese higher education system. Japan is one of a few countries that established an autonomous graduate education structure, fostering competitive researchers in the field of science and technology. Even in the humanities and social sciences, top Japanese universities gained regional and, to some degree, global reputations, although almost all of their academic works were developed and originated within the Japanese-language community. Here, the concentration of national talent and resources in a limited number of universities worked effectively in forming and developing a distinctive academic culture and tradition. In turn, the alumni networks of these research universities have supported a smooth dissemination of updated academic knowledge through highly developed mass higher education based discourse in the national language. On the other hand, active participation in the global research community became inevitable, especially after the 1980s, when Japan established its position as a global economic leader and began to face the rapidly developing global knowledge economy. Here, the national academic system based on a strong inbreeding tradition became a risk in two ways. First, the Japanese academic labor market began to realize the necessity of opening up to talent from all over the world. The custom of inbreeding became a strong barrier to the acceptance of such global talent. Second, in many cases, inbreeding worked as nepotism in the recruitment process. Nepotism is unattractive to talented youth who have a wide variety of career options outside of the academic field. Meanwhile, strong pressure for reform to improve efficiency has been imposed on the university sector, especially after policy ideologies such as neoliberalism and new public management became dominant in 1980s. The strong convention of inbreeding among top research universities in both the public and private sectors became a symbol of the lack of transparency and nepotism that must be changed to gain competitive-based public investment under stringent public budgets. This chapter introduces the primary feature of the Japanese higher education system as hierarchical and dominated by the alumni network of domestic research universities. The historical origin of this inbreeding is examined by reflecting on the historical development of Japan’s university system from the mid-19th century and explains how higher education researchers and social media began to identify inbreeding phenomena as characteristic of the Japanese academic labor market. The chapter analyzes the mechanism behind the occurrence Akiyoshi Yonezawa 101 of inbreeding, mainly through macro-level data available from government surveys and previous literature. We also examine the challenges faced by both the Japanese government and the country’s universities in the process of attempting to avoid inbreeding. Based on survey data, the chapter examines the impact of inbreeding on the networking and research performance of individual university faculty. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the continuing tendency toward inbreeding and the changes observed as a result of the increased requirement of transparency and cross-border academic mobility.

Japan’s higher education system

Japan’s higher education system, with its extensive hierarchical structure, is one of the most developed in East Asia – and the world. In 2013, Japan had 782 universities, including 86 national (public), 90 local public, and 606 private universities. The national university corporations, the independent administrative legal entities founded by the national government, operate the national universities. Most of the local public universities are the responsibility of local public university corporations, which are founded by municipal governments, although some are operated directly by the municipal governments. While these national and local public universities charge tuition fees (approximately 585,800 Japanese yen or US$ 5,862 per year in the case of Nagoya University in 2014), the largest income sources are national or municipal government funding. Private universities are operated by school corporations; the nonprofit organizations are authorized by the national government and receive public subsidies of approximately 10 percent of their annual income. In addition to the universities, 359 junior colleges and 57 colleges of technology are officially recognized as higher education institutions. The junior colleges typically offer two-year programs that lead to an associate’s degree, and most are private (19 local public and 340 private in 2013) and women’s colleges. The colleges of technology offer five-year programs as a combination of three-year senior secondary education and two-year college education, focusing on technology-focused professional education that leads to an associate’s degree. Most colleges of technology are national (51 national, three local public, and three private) and include very small student and faculty populations. In 2013, 2,218 out of 2,812 special training colleges also provided two- or three- year vocational education programs leading to a postsecondary diploma. Most special training colleges are private (10 national, 196 local public, 102 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education and 3,012 private), and part-time lecturers typically teach the classes. Graduates of these schools, however, are recognized to be of almost equal status as junior college graduates. The gross enrollment ratio of tertiary education in Japan was 60 percent in 2011. This figure does not include students in special training colleges. If they were included, the gross enrollment ratio would well exceed 70 percent. Almost all national and local public universities are selective, based on their relatively low tuition fees and quality learning environments. Some private universities are highly selective, but half of all private universities now operate with almost open enrollment policies. This chapter deals only with full-time faculty members who are affiliated with universities. The number of full-time faculty members in Japanese universities is summarized in Table 5.1 and is gradually increasing. There is wide variation as to tenure and fixed-term contracts among positions, even within an individual university. In general, junior positions such as research associates and assistants tend to be fixed-term contract jobs, and senior positions such as professors and associate professors tend to be tenured positions. The percentage of professors among university faculty, excluding presidents and vice presidents, is rather high. At the same time, the age distribution of academics has also shifted upward. It is clear that the aging of Japanese society as a whole is significantly influencing the increased share of full professors, because the shrinking higher education market has decreased opportunities for young academics to enter the academic labor market. At the same time, the majority of academics who entered tenure-track positions, such as associate professors, believe they will be promoted to full professors by the end of their academic careers. While the promotion systems vary from institution to institution, most associate professors expect to be promoted internally to full professors, based on academic performance and seniority. The number of regular academic positions is fixed, based on budgeting, at national universities and most local public universities, while there is no such restriction in private universities. After the incorporation of all national universities and most local public universities around 2004, a more flexible operation of academic human resource management became possible. For example, University of Tsukuba, a leading comprehensive national university, provides full professor positions with the salary scale of an associate professor; that is, this category of professors can hold the title of full professor without the upgraded salary scale. Akiyoshi Yonezawa 103 non-Japanese faculty Total % of Private universities Local public universities National universities Full-time faculty at universities in Japan (2013) : School basic survey (MEXT). Table 5.1 PresidentsAssociate professorsLecturersResearch associatesResearch assistantsSource 18,010 86 17,637 633 3,624 4,908 2,692 84 20,948 1,709 364 19,201 42,582 579 13,674 4,790 39,530 4.9 20,291 749 5,787 2.8 7.7 0.8 2.8 Vice presidentsProfessorsTotal(% of full professors)(% engaged in graduate-level education) 83.8 347 21,597 64.2 34.4 101 4,438 63,218 42.3 34.6 42,786 602 13,012 58.6 68,821 1,050 42.2 102,580 3.2 1.6 178,810 38.9 4.0 104 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

It is also becoming more common to hire faculty members based on project funds, including endowed chairs, in many cases with special titles such as “specially appointed professors.” Some faculty members are hired mainly for service functions, such as international student exchange and faculty development. As shown in Table 5.1, the percentage of professors who are engaged in graduate-level education is high, especially in national universities. However, the number of universities that produce large numbers of researchers is limited. Mitsuda (2004) once tried to categorize the universities in Japan following the Carnegie Classification (2000 edition) in the United States. In his classification, out of 1,219 universities (109 national, 124 local public, and 986 private) and junior colleges in 2003, Mitsuda identified 17 doctoral/research-intensive universities (15 national, one local public, and one private) that grant 70 or more doctoral degrees in four or more fields annually and four national doctoral/research-intensive universities that grant 40 or more doctoral degrees in certain fields (Mitsuda 2004). At these doctoral/research-intensive universities in the national university sector, faculty members are affiliated with the graduate schools, in principle (Ogawa 2002). At the same time, most of these faculty members also have a duty to teach in the undergraduate programs. In other national universities, faculty members are affiliated with the undergraduate schools, in principle. They may also teach graduate students, especially in national universities, but are mainly limited to master’s or professionally oriented graduate students in general. In the local public and private universities, undergraduate education is the core of all educational activities. In reality, almost all of the private universities are relying on tuition fees as their main source of income, and the local public universities tend to identify their core function as the human resource development necessary for the local communities. Recently, the number of universities only with graduate schools has increased, but these universities provide mostly professionally oriented graduate education. In 2003, the government created a new category of graduate schools called “professional schools” to encourage the nonaca- demically oriented professional to undertake graduate-level education in fields such as law, accounting, and teacher training. In these universities, professors who have professional, or nonacademic, backgrounds are actively employed. According to Article 13 of the Standards for Establish- ing Universities, the government guidelines setting up these universities, “those who have excellent knowledge and experience on the field of the educational program,” are recognized to meet the requirements to teach Akiyoshi Yonezawa 105 at the university without an academic career background, from 1985 and later. Through establishing mass and universal higher education, the pathways to enter the academic profession have been diversified. For example, it is not rare for senior government officials, employees in research and development divisions of private enterprises, journalists, and high school teachers to become university professors based on their professional expertise. However, the typical career path for university faculty is still to pursue the academic track within the university sector. After earning master’s or doctoral degrees, they enter their first academic jobs as research associates or assistant professors. These days, it is becoming more common to earn a PhD before getting that first academic job. The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), a government- supported research council, provides positions for postdoctoral research fellows and recommends that applicants work at universities other than the one from which they graduated, or to choose host researchers different from their graduate program supervisors. The continuing decline of the younger age cohort and the gradual increase of graduate degree holders are making it more difficult to enter the academic labor market. Especially in the fields of basic sciences, humanities, and social sciences, competition for a full-time position is becoming more intense. Minazuki (2007) described this unclear career path of doctoral students as “working poor with high qualification,” arguing for the necessity of systemic support for youth who seek academic career paths. Before national universities and most local public universities became incorporated in 2004, academic staff status was that of civil servants. In 1997, the Act on Term of Office of University Teachers, Etc., was enacted and made it possible for national and local public universities to hire staff on fixed-term contracts. Japan does not have an established tenure system as in the United States, while it is a relatively recent phenomenon that “non-tenure” or fixed-term contracts were applied widely among university faculty. Some universities, such as the Open University of Japan or Akita International University, have opted to employ all faculty members, including full professors, on fixed-term contracts. However, it is more common to offer fixed-term contract employment to those in junior positions in both public and private universities. The national and local public universities set the retirement age at around 65. Although it is possible to get a pension after age 65, many faculty members seek work in private universities and in national 106 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education and local public universities in roles such as management positions, including presidents, deans, full professors, fixed-term full-time research positions, and part-time lecturers. As of 2014, the government suddenly requested that the employment status of a significant number of national university staff be transformed into one-year contract positions. The government rationalizes this reform as increasing flexibility to recruit internationally competitive academics who are more interested in annual salaries than long-term job security and pensions. However, this should be understood as the long- term government effort to reduce the number of employees who are assured lifetime employment in the public sector. The international profile of Japanese university faculty is very weak. As seen in Table 5.1, the percentage of international faculty is limited, although it is gradually increasing. The percentage of international students is also limited, comprising only 3.8 percent of total tertiary enrollment in 2011 (OECD 2013). The number of programs and classes offered in English is increasing but is still highly limited. Only a few universities have established English as the official language for faculty meetings. Therefore, most international faculty members have to communicate in Japanese or do not actively participate in university governance. The lack of an international profile is apparent even among universities situated at the top of the world rankings. At the Univer- sity of Tokyo, the top national university in 2013, the percentage of international students among regular students was 22.3 percent at the doctoral level, 12.7 percent at the master’s level, and only 1.7 percent at the undergraduate level. The academic profession in Japan is still considered to be attractive in Japanese society. In April 2013, average monthly salaries in private universities were 1,005,049 Japanese yen (US$10,332) for presidents; 723,525 yen (US$7,438) for professors; 575,876 yen (US$5,919) for associate professors; 516,023 yen (US$5,304) for assistant professors/lectures; and 467,336 yen (US$4,804) for research associates. Most faculty members in national and local public universities are paid based on salary scales similar to civil servants. If they achieve a tenured position, their salary is enough to sustain an upper-middle-class lifestyle. In recent years, however, significant budgetary constraints at the national and municipal government levels have created strong pressure to reduce personnel expenses. Particularly from April 2012 to March 2014, most national universities made a temporary cutback of faculty salaries to reallocate the budget to recovery of areas damaged in the tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident of March 2011. Akiyoshi Yonezawa 107

Historical origin

The modern Japanese higher education system has a relatively short history. The University of Tokyo, the first national public university, was established in 1877. The first generation of professors at the University of Tokyo, as well as other national higher education institutions, was dominated by “foreign experts” with salaries aligned with international standards. At the same time, the Japanese government systematically assigned young Japanese leaders, especially graduates of the University of Tokyo and the national higher education institutions, to replace these foreign experts. Some of the Japanese replacements had just returned to the country after completing their research training in Europe and North America. In 1880, graduate programs began at the University of Tokyo, and these later became graduate schools. In 1881, the share of Japanese among professors at the University of Tokyo had already exceeded 50 percent, and the status of foreign professors was changed to “foreign teachers.” At the University of Tokyo’s School of Law, the use of Japanese and Chinese teachers for graduate thesis supervision was allowed in 1882, and the teaching language was changed from English to Japanese in 1883. From then on, professors in Japanese universities were recruited from the Japanese academic communities, though some had the experience of studying abroad (JICA Research Institute 2003; Amano 2009). The Japanese government was relatively cautious in increasing the number of universities until the 1910s. In 1897, the second university, Kyoto Imperial University, was founded. After that, five imperial universities were established. From 1918, the government began allowing the establishment of private universities and universities with single disciplines. These universities also developed a strong network of their own alumni, some of whom became professors at their alma maters. By the end of World War II, in 1945, the number of universities had risen to 48. Japan experienced drastic educational reform after World War II, through the transformation from European-style universities into US-style universities with undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral programs. Although the number of universities increased dramatically through the upgrading and merging of former polytechnics and other higher education institutions, the number of universities with doctoral programs was limited until the end of the 1950s. Based on this historical background, the number of universities that could foster academics had been rather limited, at least until the 1970s. 108 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

The academic communities in many cases were formed through strong networks of university alumni and were controlled by a limited number of academic bosses (Cummings 1972; Cummings and Amano 1977). People who sought to become academic staff and who wanted to be introduced to the proper person within the academic network would consult with these academic bosses. Shimbori (1966, 1981) described this as the domination of alumni networks in the labor market in Japan, including the academic labor market.

The mechanism of inbreeding In the literature in Japanese, academic “inbreeding” is basically defined as faculty members whose affiliation is the same as the university from which they graduated. This definition is much wider than the commonly used Berelson (1960) definition of a “recruitment practice where universities hire their own doctoral students, who subsequently remain at the institution to work for their entire careers” (Horta 2013). To avoid confusion, this chapter explains the Japanese notion of inbreeding as the dominance of the alumni network in university recruitment and personnel decisions. From 1954 to 2006, book publisher Kojunsha published a full list of faculty members in all of the universities in Japan, along with their ages and the universities where they acquired their final degrees. Shimbori and his group developed a database of these academics by tracking annual mobility and analyzed the domination of the network of alumni from a limited number of universities over the entire academic labor market in Japan. In particular, Yamanoi (1990) made a full-scale analysis of academic mobility in Japan and demonstrated the existence of a strong influence of university networks in academic mobility among Japanese universities. Journalists have also paid attention to the dominance of alumni among university faculties, mainly among prestigious private universities. From 1996, the Asahi University Rankings have published rankings based on various indicators, including the percentage of university faculty who acquired their final degree from the university where they are currently working (Yonezawa 2013). Table 5.2 shows the latest results. The top universities in Japan tend to have a high rate of employment of those who acquired their final degrees from those same institutions. Some private universities mainly focusing on the education function, such as Nihon University and Soka University, are also listed within the highest inbreeding group in the original rankings, at least in a limited number of fields. Akiyoshi Yonezawa 109

Table 5.2 Percentage of faculty members who acquired their ﬁnal degrees at the university where they are currently working (2012)

Law Economics Humanities Science Engineering

Kyoto National 81.2 46.9 77.3 56 75.8 University University of National 83.2 40.0 68.7 66.5 70 Tokyo Waseda Private 61.5 44.8 68.2 59.4 University Tohoku National 23.0 20.8 57.7 42 61.3 University Osaka National 23.0 33.3 43.5 40.2 58.1 University Keio University Private 55.8 33.6 56.6 49.2 Hokkaido National 39.2 20.8 31.7 27.4 54.5 University Nagoya National 29.9 28.9 34 26.2 42.8 University Doshisha Private 43.9 50.0 39.7 26.1 University Kyushu National 30.7 36.8 40.4 32.2 University Soka University Private 52.2 22.7 30.5 27.6 Nihon Private 48.3 21.6 58.9 University Hiroshima National 25.8 55.6 28.6 University Tokyo Institute National 33.3 69.3 of Technology

Source: Asahi Daigaku ranking 2014.

The percentage of alumni faculty is high in fields such as law, humanities, and engineering and relatively low in economics. In the field of economics, however, the percentage of faculty members who earned their PhD abroad is relatively high. For example, among 58 PhD-holding faculty members at the University of Tokyo’s School of Economics, 30 (51.7 percent) earned their PhD overseas, 24 (41.4 percent) earned their PhD from the University of Tokyo, and only four (6.9 percent) earned their PhD from other Japanese universities, according to the profile list of faculty members available at the official website of the School of Economics on 17 April 2014. Additionally, 23 (39.7 percent) of those who earned their PhD overseas have also studied at the University of Tokyo. This implies that even in the field of economics, alumni still dominate at the top universities. 110 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

On the other hand, the longitudinal trend of inbreeding rates varies among universities. Figure 5.1 shows the trend of faculty members who acquired their final degrees at the university where they are currently working from 1994 to 2010 in the schools of law and engineering among selected universities. In the schools of law, the two top national universities – the Uni- versity of Tokyo and Kyoto University – have maintained a very high share of inbred faculty. In the mid-2000s, the share shows a temporary drop because of the 2004 national policy to expand law faculty numbers through the establishment of graduate-level professional law schools. However, the inbreeding percentage has again increased. On the other hand, top private universities, including Waseda University, Keio Uni- versity, and Chuo University, have experienced a gradual decrease of the alumni percentage. This same tendency is observed at Osaka Uni- versity, one of the former imperial universities located in the second largest metropolitan area in Japan. Nagoya University, the youngest former imperial university, experienced a gradual increase during this period, though the rate of inbred (alumni) faculty still remains around 30 percent. All of the universities in the sample with schools of engineering have experienced a gradual decrease in inbreeding, though on average this remains at more than 50 percent. The exception is Nagoya Univer- sity, which has the shortest history, having been established in 1939. The Tokyo Institute of Technology, the top engineering national university that was not recognized as having a high percentage of inbreeding in the 1990s, is now ranked as having one of the highest rates of inbreeding. It should be clarified that the dominance of alumni among faculty is not limited to a number of top universities that produce competitive researchers in the academic labor market. Table 5.3 shows the percentage of university faculty who graduated from undergraduate or graduate programs at the universities where they are currently working. Table 5.3 indicates a high percentage of alumni, especially among young faculty members. These young faculty members could be research associates or lecturers in their first academic job, and most faculty members under age 30 do not yet hold doctoral degrees. As shown in Table 5.4, the percentage of university faculty who finished formal doctoral programs is not necessarily high.1 On the other hand, the percentage of alumni gradually decreases among the older age group. This suggests that senior academic jobs, such as those at the rank of professor, are more open to nonalumni applicants, especially in less Akiyoshi Yonezawa 111

100

0 1994 2000 2005 2010

University of Tokyo Kyoto University Wadeda University (Private) Osaka University Chuo University (Private) Keio University (Private) Nagoya University

100

0 1994 2000 2005 2010 University of Tokyo Kyoto University Wadeda University (Private) Osaka University Tokyo Institute of Technology Keio University (Private) Nagoya University

Figure 5.1 Percentage of faculty members who earned their ﬁnal degrees at the university where they are currently working, schools of law and engineering (1994–2010) Note: The private universities, Waseda University and Keio University, do not separate their schools of engineering and natural sciences. Thus, data from those two universities include both ﬁelds. The data from Nagoya University shown in 2005 is from 2004. Source: Asahi university rankings (2002, 2007, 2013). 112 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

Table 5.3 Percentage of alumni among faculty, by age and institutional type (2010)

Faculty age Institutional type

National Local public Private

<24 22.2 100.0 85.7 25–29 51.6 48.7 59.3 30–34 49.0 39.3 46.8 35–39 47.6 34.3 37.1 40–44 46.6 30.6 29.2 45–49 41.7 25.3 25.3 50–54 38.8 20.0 22.8 55–59 36.0 18.0 20.9 60–64 33.3 18.4 19.1 >65 28.6 10.5 12.1 Total 42.2 26.2 27.5

Source: School Teacher Statistic Survey 2010 (MEXT).

Table 5.4 Percentage of faculty who completed PhD programs, by ﬁeld/discipline and institutional type (2010)

Field/discipline Institutional type

National Local public Private

Humanities 41.4 46.7 46.4 Social sciences 48.9 57.1 56.5 Natural sciences 74.6 73.8 67.8 Engineering 65.1 69.8 55.3 Agriculture 60.6 68.3 53.9 Health/medical Sciences 54.6 40.0 35.9 Education 34.4 41.0 30.2 Art 16.7 13.6 9.2 Total 56.5 50.3 43.9

Source: School Teacher Statistic Survey 2010 (MEXT). prestigious universities. These results indicate that Japanese universities still have a strong tendency to employ their own graduates in their first junior-level job. It is also true that the tendency toward inbreeding is more apparent among the top research universities. As previously mentioned, the number of universities that have competitive doctoral programs is limited. This highly hierarchical structure of the domestic production of the next Akiyoshi Yonezawa 113 generation of researchers has led to the domination of graduates from the limited number of research universities in Japan’s academic labor market. According to Fujimura (2005), 50 percent of Japan’s university faculty ranks were dominated by the alumni of only five universities in 1961 and 12 universities in 2001. In some areas, such as medical and engineering schools, the number of universities that have doctoral programs is greater, and there is a tendency to recruit alumni even among second-rate universities. Why, then, has the dominance of university alumni been so widely seen among top universities? This could be understood through the governance structure of Japanese universities. In the traditional top national universities, especially imperial universities, the chair system became the core organizational structure by the end of the 1980s (Ogawa 2002). A chair system typically consists of a professor, one or two associate professors and lecturers, and one or more research associates. At the top universities with long-standing traditions, it is common that final academic staff decisions are made through a vote by the kyojukai (the professoriate), the regular meeting among professors (Yonezawa 2014). These meetings may also be open to other academic staff, such as associate professors and lecturers. In the traditional universities, the kyojukai functions as a republic of aristocrats (or professors) who represent the respective (and segmented) academic fields. Therefore, it is difficult for other faculty members to raise an alternative view against the professor in that chair. To maintain and develop the academic culture of the chair, the professor may try to recruit a candidate to succeed an associate professor or research associate, typically from among the alumni of that chair. Opposing the hiring chair within the selection committee or at the moment of voting among the professors could be taken as a political action, in which case the professor mounting the opposition may expect a counterattack during the recruitment process for his/her own chair. These chair professors have been expected to function as academic bosses who provide influence in the allocation of positions in other universities. Universities that do not have doctoral programs must recruit their staff from other universities, especially in the case of setting up a new school or department, when they will recruit an influential key person with a wide network for recruiting. They are also under the influence of alumni networks of the universities from which they graduated. Therefore, some schools or even universities could be a “colony” dominated by the alumni of one or a limited number of leading universities. 114 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

Ushiogi (2009) explained the tendency to enhance recruitment of alumni among Japanese universities as an action to raise prestige. He argues that a school’s recruitment of its alumni has been recognized as an indicator of its capacity to foster the next generation of researchers. Based on a detailed analysis of historical data, Iwata (2011) concluded that it took imperial universities before World War II around 14 years on average to produce the ﬁrst professor from their own alumni. After about 25 years on average, about 60 percent of newly appointed professors of these imperial universities were selected from their own alumni.

Actions to avoid inbreeding These inbreeding traditions, however, have been criticized for a long time, and national and institutional policies that deter inbreeding customs have been introduced, as the Japanese government and academic communities have worked to change this tradition. Yamanoi (2005) points out that the Japanese Association of National Universi- ties proposed modernizing university personnel policies around 1960. Cummings (1972) revealed that open searches in faculty recruitment first started in the natural science fields. Yamanoi (2005) mentioned that Riken (the National Academy of Natural Sciences) took the leading role in introducing an open search system. He also points out that the Department of Physics at Nagoya University started its recruitment system based on department-level meetings, and this system influenced the democratization of the recruitment system for some departments in the University of Tokyo and Kyoto University. Cummings (1972) also argued that private universities established after the mid-1950s, many with less prestige at that time, tend to rely more on open search. In general, however, universities with long traditions and prestige tend to stick to inbreeding. In a report by the OECD (1970), the reviewers visited Japan in 1969, criticized the inbreeding system, and recommended an open search system. They referred to cases in Europe in which information about job vacancies, applications, and candidate selection was accessible from outside of the universities (Cummings 1972). By the end of the 1980s, Japan achieved leading economic status globally, based on its high-tech manufacturing industry. Based on the success of the industrial sector, by 1990 the academic performance of Japanese universities, particularly in the fields of engineering and natural sciences, also became globally recognized. The Japanese government accelerated its policy for university reform starting in the 1990s. In 1994, the University Council, the advisory body of the Ministry of Education, Akiyoshi Yonezawa 115

Science, and Culture (Monbusho), published a report on the reformation of faculty recruitment. This report recommended improving academic mobility, introducing an open search system, and actively recruiting faculty members from industry and other countries (Yamanoi 2005). At the same time, the introduction of the fixed-term contract gained significant progress in the 1990s during the process of comprehensive general education reform (Yamanoi 2000). Based on interviews with 36 faculty members of Japanese universities, Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa (2011) argued that the hiring process of university faculties in Japan transformed from a closed process to an open process by the end of the 20th century. Prior to then, recruitment committees composed of school faculty members usually did not reveal job vacancies and searched for candidates mainly by relying on their own networks. However, the diffusion of public job advertisements and the increased pressure of global competition in academic performance, especially in the fields of natural sciences and engineering, forced the recruitment system to become more transparent. Traditionally, job vacancies were published in letters to universities that might have potential candidates. For example, Yamanoi (2000) analyzed letters informing of job vacancies that were issued by a school of education at a comprehensive national university from 1965 to 1992. He estimated that the school issued at least 5,000 job vacancy letters during that time. Yamanoi (2000) also pointed out the evolution of open recruitment approaches during this period, based on the number of letters received in a year: 184 in 1975, 237 in 1981, 372 in 1987, and 407 in 1992. He also pointed out that the share of letters from former imperial universities (national research universities) was only 1.9 percent, and the share from prestigious private universities established before World War II was 1.1 percent. This means that universities with a critical mass of alumni in the academic workforce were not actively utilizing the open process in recruiting new faculty members. At the same time, these research universities became more cautious in the direct recruitment of faculty members from among their graduate students by the 1990s (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011). The Japanese government, however, took a crucial role in the publication of academic job vacancies. To resolve the lack of a widely available jobs database, the government set up a web-based database of academic job vacancies in 1997. Nowadays, almost all publicized job openings at Japanese universities are available on the web-based open-access database called Japan Research Career Information Network (JREC-IN), provided by the Japanese Science and Technology Agency 116 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

(JST) in both Japanese and English. Universities and research institutes submit information about their job vacancies. Researchers can search and access all of the information on the website and can receive notices about vacancies if they register on the JREC-IN. The number of people accessing the database has increased over the years from 9,089 in 2002 to 18,321 in 2012. The government has also tried to encourage universities to open searches for faculty members to the international community, for example, by making this a requirement to receive excellence-initiative project funds, such as the Global Centers of Excellence and World Premier Ini- tiatives (Yonezawa 2012). Tying project-based funds to more transparent hiring procedures applies pressure to prestigious universities to expand their recruitment of new faculty members internationally. However, these new recruitment systems are more often applied to junior positions with fixed-term contracts. Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa (2011) determined that these changes in the recruitment process are mainly focused on the younger generation, and the strong tendency toward inbreeding still exists among leading universities, partly through informal networks and communication. When professor positions are open, in some cases the search for candidates to fill full professorships is open to both internal and external candidates. However, in many cases, committees are set up to consider promoting associate professors. In most of these cases, associate professors are promoted without open competition from external candidates. As mentioned in Table 5.1, the percentage of those holding the rank of professor among university faculty is high in Japan. This is basically due to the long-term change of the structure of job status among university faculty under the governmental policy controlling the total number of civil servants, including academic staff at national universities. In most cases, national universities tried to limit new recruitment of junior staff in order to ensure job security and promotion among senior academic staff. On the other hand, based on the national policy to promote science and technology, the number of graduates from PhD programs has significantly increased: 4,358 in 1985; 8,019 in 1995; 15,286 in 2005; and 16,445 in 2013. To foster the next generation of researchers, in 1996 the government began a project to support 10,000 postdoctoral fellows. Postdoctoral fellows are defined as researchers working at universities and research institutes on fixed-term contracts without faculty positions such as professors, associate professors, lecturers, and research associates. Akiyoshi Yonezawa 117

The number of postdoctoral fellows rose from 6,224 in 1996 to 15,220 in 2011. Michinari Hamaguchi, president of Nagoya University, in his oral presentation at the Human Resource Subcommittee of the Council for Science and Technology in July 2013,2 argued that the actual number of postdoctoral researchers, including those not appearing in the official statistics, could be estimated at 20,000 in 2013. Limited job opportunities for university faculty and the significant increase of doctoral graduates and postdoctoral fellows have inevitably led to the diversification of career patterns for young researchers. The National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) (2009) published its survey results on the career paths of 75,193 graduates of doctoral programs from 2002 to 2006 and pointed out that only 19 percent became university faculty, 14.7 percent became postdoctoral fellows, and 16.7 percent became researchers outside of universities. Saito et al. (2011) published a survey report by the NISTEP on 15,220 postdoctoral fellows in 2009 and revealed that 73.7 percent continued the same postdoctoral fellowships in the next year, 13.9 percent became postdoctoral fellows in other institutions, and only 8.1 percent became university faculty members. These results indicate that the diffusion of the open recruitment system among young researchers is related not only to attempts to avoid inbreeding but also to the worsened career environment for young researchers in Japan. The national government and leading research universities started to secure the career path of excellent researchers with the provision of a tenure track for a limited number of graduate students. In 2006, the MEXT started a funding project called the Program to Dis- seminate the Tenure Track System. In this scheme, 42 projects were selected to recruit young researchers on fixed-term contracts but with a clear path to tenured positions. All of the selected projects published international job advertisements in both English and Japanese. How- ever, the percentage of those who acquired their final degrees at their own universities was 84.6 percent at Waseda University, 50 percent at Nagoya University, 47.8 percent at Kyoto University, 47.1 percent at Tokyo Institute of Technology, 35.7 percent at Keio University, 33.3 percent at Osaka University, 27.3 percent at Tohoku University, 18.2 percent at Hokkaido University, and 16.7 percent at Kyushu Univer- sity, according to internal self-evaluation reports. The University of Tokyo did not disclose its percentage of alumni, but revealed that 57.1 percent of the selected researchers held previous jobs at that same institution. Following up on that project, the MEXT started a 118 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education new project for the diffusion and establishment of the tenure-track system. The above results indicate that recruitment of inbred university faculty occurs in the early stages of their academic career. As shown in Table 5.3, inbreeding can happen more frequently in the recruitment of young researchers. This may imply that academic performance cannot be clearly judged until researchers reach a certain age. Then, inbreeding can happen if universities do not have a strong inclination to avoid it, even though job openings are published internationally. How- ever, universities and the government have a strong reason to expand the tenure-track system, because the severe lack of university jobs for young researchers decreases the attractiveness of the academic career in general.

Impact What is the impact of inbreeding on academics and on faculty activities? This section examines the inbreeding process and its impact in detail by utilizing data from a survey conducted by the author and his colleagues in 2009. The survey was originally aimed at comparing the perspectives and behaviors of Japanese and non-Japanese faculty members working at Japanese universities. The questionnaires, written in both English and Japanese, were distributed via postal mail to 3,925 faculty members in 34 universities with a large number of non-Japanese faculty members; of these, 637 responded (16.2 percent). The sample selection ensured that non-Japanese and Japanese were selected in equal numbers, in the same fields, and with the same position levels. Therefore, the sample ended up including many faculty in fields with a strong international profile (e.g., natural sciences, engineering, and language and cultural studies) and, in many cases, from prestigious research universities. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of alumni among 231 respondents working at the selected comprehensive research universities – namely, the former imperial (national) universities and two top private universities. Among these selected respondents, 40.3 percent studied at the universities where they are currently working and 18.6 percent completed all of their studies there, from their undergraduate degrees through to their doctoral programs. The percentage of faculty with these same two types of profiles becomes higher among faculty in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) (43.6 percent and 19.6 percent, respectively) and among Japanese faculty (46.4 percent and 27.5 percent, respectively). However, this tendency is not consistent across all of the selected institutions. Figure 5.2 also shows Akiyoshi Yonezawa 119 the results of three national universities and two private universities that had enough respondents; there is no clear pattern of inbreeding with respect to academic fields and nationalities. Through the detailed examination of career paths from undergraduate studies to the universities where faculty members are currently working, respondents from selected universities could be grouped into four categories. This categorization is modified from that of Horta (2013) to put the focus more on the “perfect” inbreds, starting from undergraduate programs, typically seen in Japan.

1) Perfect inbreds: those who have never studied and worked outside of the universities where they are currently working. 2) Partial inbreds: those who not only have studied at the universities where they are currently working but also have study experience at some program level(s) (undergraduate, master’s, or doctorate). They have no work experience other than at the universities where they are currently working. 3) Silver-corded: those who have studied at the universities where they currently work at least at one program level (undergraduate, master’s, or doctorate) but have work experience outside of the universities where they are currently working. 4) Noninbreds: those who do not have study experience at the universities where they are currently working.

Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of these four categories, by age and job status, from among the respondents of selected comprehensive research universities. The figure indicates that the total percentage of inbred and silver-corded faculties is high in the youngest age group (under 35) and in the oldest age group (over 54). This result is inconsistent with trends at the national level, examined in Table 5.3, where the gradual decrease of the percentage of alumni (including inbreds) among older age groups was observed. We can conclude that the high percentage of those categorized as inbred and alumni in the older age group is uniquely observed among comprehensive research universities that can generate next-generation researchers through their academically competitive graduate schools. The similar tendency can be observed in the trends of the inbreds and alumni by job status. Namely, the total share of alumni is not low even among the senior faculty. Several factors might explain these phenomena. First, young and junior academics, such as research associates and assistants, tend to be recruited for their first job under the strong influence of senior faculty, 120 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education Undergraduate + Doctor Undergraduate Master + DoctorMaster noninbred Undergraduate Doctor Undergraduate + Master Doctor Undergraduate + Master Undergraduate 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Private A Total (N = 24) = (N Total A Private National A Total (N = 42) = (N Total National A 33) = (N Total National B National C Total (N = 63) = (N Total National C Private A STEM (N = 17) = A STEM (N Private 16) = B STEM (N Private National A STEM (N = 33) = National A STEM (N 26) = National B STEM (N National C STEM (N = 51) = National C STEM (N Private A Japanese (N = 14) = (N A Japanese Private 38) = (N B Japanese Private 22) = (N B Japanese Private National A Japanese (N = 25) = (N National A Japanese 24) = (N National B Japanese National C Japanese (N = 35) = (N National C Japanese Percentage of inbred faculty among selected comprehensive research universities (2009) Imperial + Private Total (N = 231) Imperial + Private STEM (N = 163) Imperial + Private Japanese (N = 138) : The Survey on International Attractiveness of Japanese Universities in 2009, conducted by the author and his colleagues. : Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of respondents. Figure 5.2 Note Source Akiyoshi Yonezawa 121 Perfect inbredPerfect Partial inbred noninbred Silver-corded 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 35–44 (N = 78) 45–54 (N = 28) Over 54 (N = 24) = 54 (N Over Lecturer (N = 18) Under 35 (N = 86) = Under 35 (N Assistant 72) (N = Professor Professor (N = 32) Research Associate/ Associate Professor (N = 40) = (N Associate Professor Percentage of inbred faculty at selected comprehensive research universities in Japan, by age and status (2009) : Survey on the International Attractiveness of Japanese Universities in 2009 implemented by the author and his group. Figure 5.3 Source 122 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education in the process of moving from the status of graduate students to alumni. Second, senior faculty members may have been recruited under the old custom of inbreeding, while younger and mid-career faculty may have been hired under a more open recruitment system. Third, as examined in Table 5.4, there is a large pool of alumni among these selected universities, and the inbred and silver-corded faculties of these universities may have been recognized (or misunderstood) as the survivors of severe competition with other inbreds and alumni. Finally, we should note that the partial inbreds – those who have study experience but no work experience outside of the universities where they are currently working – are almost exclusively found among younger age groups and junior faculty. This could be understood as the impact of the widened enrollment capacity of graduate programs from the 1990s though national policies for fostering high-level knowledge workers. This policy expanded opportunities for graduate-level education in these prestigious research universities to those who finished undergraduate programs at other, often less-prestigious universities. In examining this inbreeding phenomenon, the academic fields and nationalities of university faculty are also important factors. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of the four categories above among the respondents from selected comprehensive research universities, by fields and nationalities. The figure indicates that the degree of inbreeding is higher among Japanese than among non-Japanese. In particular, the perfect inbreds – those who, from undergraduate education onward, do not have study and work experience outside of the universities where they are currently working – are found only among Japanese faculties. Nevertheless, the inbreeding phenomenon can also be observed among non-Japanese faculties. In other words, social networking among inbreds and alumni is also utilized for recruiting international faculty members. However, this may not be the best solution for optimiz- ing the academic productivity of Japanese higher education. Horta and Yonezawa (2013) pointed out that the research productivity levels between Japanese and non-Japanese faculty are indistinguishable in Japanese universities, while foreign academics generally outperform, for example, in the United States. At the same time, the interviews at the top Japanese research universities and institutes that the author conducted reveal that these institutions simply face a difficulty in attracting non-Japanese faculty with no previous connection to Japanese research communities (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 2010). As previously mentioned, the survey sampling referenced here is based on the distribution of non-Japanese universities in relatively large Akiyoshi Yonezawa 123 Perfect inbredPerfect Partial inbred noninbred Silver-corded 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% HSS Japanese (N = 35) = (N HSS Japanese STEM Japanese (N = 100) = (N STEM Japanese HSS non-Japanese (N = 23) = (N HSS non-Japanese STEM non-Japanese (N = 61) = (N STEM non-Japanese Percentage of inbred faculty at selected comprehensive research universities in Japan, by nationality and academic field : Survey on the International Attractiveness of Japanese Universities in 2009 implemented by the author and his group. : STEM stands for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. HSS stands for humanities and social sciences, including language educa- Figure 5.4 (2009) Note tion/studies Source 124 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education universities. Therefore, the sampling in the field of humanities and social sciences tends to be highly biased toward those who are engaged in language teaching, both Japanese and non-Japanese nationals. In general, language teachers, especially the non-Japanese, tend to get their final degrees in their home countries, typically work under fixed-term contracts, and do not have a strong commitment to university governance and research activities (Yonezawa, Ishida, and Horta 2013). Therefore, analysis here of the impact of the inbreeding phenomenon is limited to Japanese faculty in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Here, the impact of inbreeding will be examined in two ways: the frequency of information exchange as an indicator of impact on the behavior and networking of university faculty and then the number of published articles as an indicator of the impact on the academic performance of the university faculty. This approach is based on the idea that research productivity is influenced by the communications and networks among academics (Horta, Veloso, and Grediada 2010). Figure 5.5 shows the frequency of information exchange concerning research and teaching among Japanese faculty in the STEM fields. The average scores are on a five-point Likert scale from “never (0)” to “frequently (4).” Respondents were categorized into three groups: “(perfect and partial) inbreds,” “silver-corded” faculty, and “noninbreds.” Within the inbred grouping, the scores of perfect inbreds are shown separately. The scores of the partial inbreds are not shown because the number of respondents in this category is too small. The results are shown in two age groups, “under 40 years old” and “40 or older,” to control for the effects of age and experience. While the results shown in the figure are rather complex, we can identify the following tendency. First, as to communication concerning research-related matters, the frequency is generally low among the inbreds and high among the silver-corded. The perfect inbreds do not have frequent communication within the departments, and among respondents in the older age group, communication is rather low even within the institution. Second, as to communication concerning teaching-related matters, the inbreds are not active in general, while the perfect inbreds are not always the least active. What is the impact on performance? Figure 5.6 shows the number of international-refereed journal articles in English that the sample faculty published throughout their entire career. Respondents are again limited to Japanese faculty members in STEM fields. In STEM fields, it is now common even among Japanese faculties to write quality articles for Akiyoshi Yonezawa 125

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50 ResearchTeaching Research Teaching Under 40 40 or older 0.00

Within InternationallyJapan Within InternationallyJapan Within InternationallyJapan Within InternationallyJapan Within institution Within institution Within institution Within institution Within department Within department Within department Within department

Perfect inbred Inbred Silver-corded Noninbred

Figure 5.5 Frequency of information exchange concerning research and teaching among Japanese faculty in STEM fields (2009) Note: Data reflect calculated averages of responses to a survey with the following Likert Scale choices: 0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = occasionally, 3 = sometimes, and 4 = frequently. The “inbred” data in this figure include responses from both “perfect inbreds” and “partial inbreds.” Source: Survey on the International Attractiveness of Japanese Universities in 2009 implemented by the author and his group. international-refereed journals in English. Respondents are also divided into two age groups to control for the length of their academic careers. Within the Japanese respondents in the STEM fields, 9.4 percent said that they published 100 articles or more, and the maximum among the responses was 600 articles. To avoid skewing results by including a small number of extreme cases, responses over 100 were counted as 100. The result shown in Figure 5.6 is generally consistent with frequently seen results of analyses on inbreeding, and the theory as presented by Horta (2013), Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa (2011). Namely, among both younger and older faculty members, noninbreds publish the most and inbreds publish the least, on average. This suggests that having study and work experience in more than one university enhances productivity partly through facing open competition and partly through the development of wider academic networks. At the same time, the inbreeding phenomenon typically seen in the context of recruitment through a closed system that relies on alumni networks is ineffective 126 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

50.0

45.0

40.0

35.0

30.0

25.0

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0 Perfect inbred Inbred Silver-corded Noninbred Under 40 40 or older

Figure 5.6 Average number of published international-refereed journal articles in English over an entire career among Japanese faculty in STEM fields (2009) Note: Responses greater than 100 articles are counted as 100 articles. “Inbred” in this figure includes both “perfect inbred” and “partial inbred” faculty. Source: Survey on the International Attractiveness of Japanese Universities in 2009 implemented by the author and his group. for maximizing research performance, mainly because of nepotism and insufficient search efforts for talented candidates. However, the results of perfect inbreds, who constitute the majority of the inbred category, contradict the general discussion on the effects of inbreeding mentioned above. Those who have never left their current university in their entire academic lives perform better than partial inbreds, and the differences in performance between perfect inbreds and silver-corded faculties are not as drastic among the younger generation. This may be understood as the impact of a hierarchical screening system at the entrance examination for undergraduate programs, which has somehow identified highly talented students, some of whom have succeeded in developing their academic careers in the protected and sponsored contexts of their home institutions. That said, the difference in performance is apparent in the older generation: the perfect inbreds perform worse than the noninbreds and the silver-corded faculty who went through the recruitment process from outside of the universities where they are currently working. Akiyoshi Yonezawa 127

Conclusion

Similar to other East Asian countries, Japan has a highly hierarchical higher education system in terms of research capability. The number of universities that can foster the next generation of researchers is limited, and the alumni of those top universities have dominated the national academic labor market. Many prestigious universities, including private universities, have recruited their alumni into junior academic positions. However, the increasing pressure for global competition and the continuous endeavor to enhance academic mobility, from both the government and the academic communities, are opening up the academic recruitment system. Although the university recruitment system is becoming more open and transparent, there is no clear indication that inbreeding can be avoided in Japan, despite the fact that the examination of survey data of academics’ careers reveals that inbreeding has a negative impact on academic performance, at least in the STEM fields. The top universities still have a large pool of candidates among their alumni, and inbreeding is sometimes regarded as a source of university identity and prestige. The change toward greater openness in hiring is occurring mostly in the peripheral parts of the academic community. At the same time, the conditions and future prospects for young academics, in general, are becoming worse due to the highly competitive open search systems and the increased application of fixed-term contracts. At this moment, further government reform of Japanese universities is under discussion. A more centralized decision-making process, including personnel matters, plus a wider usage of fixed-term contracts and a salary scale are being proposed. The Japanese tendency toward inbreeding may become weaker through these university reforms, and this is inevitable considering its negative impact on academic performance. However, it is clearly problematic that the reform effort does not tend toward reforming the core of the system, but instead ends up making the academic profession less attractive on the periphery, especially among the younger generation.

Notes

1. Japan has a doctoral degree-granting system based on the thesis. In the humanities and social sciences, it used to be common to earn a doctoral degree after accepting a full-time academic job. In the ﬁeld of engineering, some researchers who belong to private enterprises earn doctoral degrees based on 128 Inbreeding in Japanese Higher Education

the thesis, under the strong tradition of encouraging research activities among the staff of the research and development divisions in the private enterprises in Japan. 2. See http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu10/siryo/__icsFiles/ aﬁeldﬁle/2013/10/29/1340718_06.pdf

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National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP). 2009. Wagakuni no Hakase Katei Shuryosha no Shinro Doko Chosa (Survey on the Trends of Graduates of Doctoral Programs in Japan). Tokyo: NISTEP. OECD. 1970. Reviews of National Policies for Education: Japan. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2013. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. Ogawa, Yoshikazu. 2002. “Challenging the Traditional Organization of Japanese Universities.” Higher Education 43: 85–108. Saito, Keishi, Yasushi Kanegae, Toshiyuki Misu, and Hidekazu Sayama. 2011. Post Doctor To no Koyo Shinro ni kansuru Chosa (Survey on Careers of Postdoctorates). Tokyo: NISTEP. Shimbori, Michiya. 1966. Gakureki (Credential). Tokyo: Diamond. [In Japanese]. Shimbori, Mimiya. 1981. “The Japanese Academic Profession.” Higher Education 10: 75–87. Teichler, Ulrich, Akira Arimoto, and William K. Cummings. 2013. The Chang- ing Academic Profession: Major Fingings of a Comparative Survey (Volume 1). Dordrecht: Springer. Ushiogi, Morikazu. 2009. Shokugyo toshite no Daigaku Kyoju (University Professors as a Profession). Tokyo: Chuko Sensho. [In Japanese]. Yamanoi, Atsunorii. 1990. Daigaku Kyoju no Ido Kenkyu (Research on the Mobility of University Professors). Tokyo: Toshindo. [In Japanese]. Yamanoi, Atsunori. 2000. Daigaku Kyoin no Kobosei ni kansuru Kenkyu (Research on Open Search of University Professors). Higashi Hiroshima: RIHE, Hiroshima University. Yamanoi, Aatsunori. ed. 2005. Nihon no Daigaku Kyoin Shijo Saiko (A Study of Academic Marketplace in Japan). Higashi Hiroshima: RIHE, Hiroshima University. [In Japanese]. Yamanoi. Atsunori. ed. 2007. Nihon no Daigaku Kyoju Shijo (Academic Marketplace in Japan). Tokyo: Tamagawa University Press. [In Japanese]. Yonezawa, Akiyoshi. 2012. “Japan’s University Education in Social Sciences and Humanities under Globalization.” In Business, Social Sciences, and Cultural Stud- ies: Issues of Language, Public Opinion, Education, and Welfare, edited by Asuncion Lopez-Varela, 397–410. Rijeka, Japan. Intech. Yonezawa, Akiyoshi, K. Ishida, and H. Horta. 2013. “The Long-Term Interna- tionalization of Higher Education in Japan.” In Internationalization of Higher Education in East Asia: Trends of Student Mobility and Impact on Education Governance, edited by K.H. Mok and K.M. Yu, 179–191. Oxon: Routledge. Yonezawa, Akiyoshi. 2013. “Rankings and Information on Japanese Universities.” In Rankings and Accountability in Higher Education, edited by P.T.M. Marope, P.J. Wells and E. Hazelkorn, 171–185. Paris: UNESCO. Yonezawa, Akiyoshi. 2014. “Academic Profession and University Governance Par- ticipation in Japan: Focusing on the Role of Kyoju-kai.” Educational Studies in Japan 8: 19–32. 6 Academic Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich

There are two opinions: one is mine, and another is wrong – that’s what inbreeding brings us to (From an interview with a vice-rector of a regional university)

The academic productivity of universities depends on academic staff as well as on management structures at these institutions that are able and qualified to provide conditions for productive work, reasonable decision-making, and proper career incentives. However, academic norms should not be underestimated. In a university, as a professional organization, there are both administrative and academic control systems, and the latter is based on academic norms. One of the most important norms is concerned with talent recruitment and its priorities, policies, and practices. A university’s decision to hire or not to hire their own graduates is one of the key decisions: it defines the characteristics and quality of people recruited, as well as how the management of academic teams is structured. For Russian universities, a rather high level of hiring from within (inbreeding) is traditional, and the reasons for it are cultural, infrastructural, and financial. In this chapter, we examine the causes of inbreeding and its consequences in the context of productivity, social norms, and emerging organizational structures. We use data from a set of detailed interviews with top management (vice-rectors and deans) of regional Russian universities collected in 2012. Interviews were focused on employment policies and the causes and consequences of inbreeding. We also use data from Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations (MEMO), which consists of annual representative surveys of students and their families, school teachers and faculty at colleges

130 Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 131 and universities, heads of colleges and universities, and employers. It is designed and administered by Higher School of Economics, under ﬁnancial support of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russian Federation.

Characteristics and context of the higher education system

Size of higher education system and types of institutions Today, the Russian system of higher education includes 609 public and 437 private institutions. There are also slightly more than 1,600 regional branches related to these institutions; approximately two-thirds of these belong to public institutions and the rest to private institutions. In this chapter, we focus on higher education institutions only and do not consider research institutions affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences, which are, in the Russian context, separate from the university sector. There are three kinds of higher education institutions: universities, academies (which are educational institutions, not research institutions affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences), and institutes. Uni- versities offer educational programs in a wide range of areas; they also offer postgraduate programs (at the doctoral level), do research, and coordinate research and methodological activities in their key areas of expertise. Academies differ from universities by the narrower range of programs they offer, as well as the smaller number of research areas they address. Institutes are different from universities and academies in terms of offering an even narrower range of ongoing educational programs and research activities. The largest number of higher education institutions – just over half of all public higher education institutions (HEIs) – is affiliated with the Ministry of Education and Science. However, there are more than 20 other ministries and agencies that have HEIs under their jurisdictions. Among the largest HEI “operators” are the Ministry of Agriculture, Min- istry of Health and Social Development, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Sport and Tourism. The university sector is not homogeneous. During the 2000s, new types of public institutions of higher education were introduced: federal universities and national research universities. Federal universities are the main universities in a federal district whose mandate includes providing the district with professional staff. The status of a federal university provides opportunities for research (both fundamental and applied) in priority scientific fields and to receive relevant 132 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

financing. Today, in Russia, there are nine federal universities, organized through the mergers of several smaller universities in respective regions. Federal universities can include scientific organizations under the supervision of federal agencies of the executive authority and the Academies of Sciences. National research universities received their status in 2008– 2009 on a competitive basis, based on their programs for institutional development. As of today, the status has been awarded to 29 universities, each for a 10-year period. As has already been mentioned, there is a long tradition of separation between the university sector and the academy sector (Academies of Sciences) that carries out fundamental scientific research. Fundamen- tal research funding most often goes to the scientific institutions of the Academy of Sciences. Only a few universities in Russia – among those that have special status (either FU or NRU) – receive state funding for fundamental research. There are six million students in the Russian higher education system, with only 15 percent enrolled in private universities. In the past, only 65 percent of secondary school graduates enrolled in HEIs. In 2009, the share of all 17-year-old high school graduates who became first-year university students was almost 90 percent. In 2012, 76 percent of high school graduates were admitted to higher educational institutions that same year. Naturally, with such a low level of selectivity, the average level of the entering population becomes a central problem. While 45 percent of the total number of students at Russian higher education institutions is enrolled as full-time students, 4 percent of students are enrolled part-time, and the rest of students (slightly over 50 percent) are enrolled in some kind of distance learning program. Part-time and distance program quality differs drastically from full-time programs and, in most cases, the former basically consists of acquiring a formal title without any relevant competencies. At the present time, the total number of faculty at state universities is estimated to be around 400,000, with around 300,000 of them full-time. (See Figure 6.1, which shows approximate distribution by position. A more detailed discussion of positions is provided further along in this chapter.)

Faculty salaries Despite a recent salary increase in the higher education sector, faculty incomes are still low. The university sector in Russia is not as ﬁnan- cially and socially attractive as it was in the Soviet period. Salaries at Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 133

15% 13%

22%

49%

Professors Associate professors Senior lecturers Lecturers, assistants

Figure 6.1 Distribution of faculty at public universities, by academic rank Source: Ministry of Education and Science, 2012.

Russian higher education institutions are not sufficient to place faculty, especially associate and assistant professors, in the middle class (Androushchak and Yudkevich 2012). On average, senior faculty salaries do not provide for middle-class living, either. Their average salaries are just slightly higher than average wages of people with a university diploma. For young faculty, the situation is even worse: their salaries are less than the average for the whole economy (including workers without higher education), and to support themselves and their families they need either to teach in several universities, to give private lessons, or to have some employment outside academia. This pushes many academics to find other work, in addition to their basic duties. The most frequent sources of additional income are overtime teaching at the same institution or teaching at another institution, teaching private classes for school children and students, and work outside the academic sector altogether. As a result, some faculty at higher education institutions are employed part-time – they may be staff workers employed at a certain percentage of full-time status (e.g., “half-time”), they may be part-time workers receiving payment based on specific work tasks, or they may be workers holding a contract providing an hourly wage (see Figure 6.2). On the whole, it is hard to say that the academic profession in Russia is financially attractive. Recruiting the best graduates with broad career 134 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

22%

78%

Staff members Part-time with payment according to work tasks

Figure 6.2 Distribution of faculty at public institutions, by type of employment Source: Ministry of Education and Science, 2012. prospects on the nonacademic job market in Russia and abroad is very difficult. The majority of graduates do not perceive working in higher education as a competitive employment option. The average monthly salary in higher education in the first half of 2013 was around 30,000 rubles – around US$1,600, as calculated using the purchasing power parity index for 2012 (OECD) – and this is a little higher (112 percent) than the average salary in the Russian economy as a whole. According to MEMO data, in 2011–2012 around 65 percent of full-time faculty had additional employment at other state educational institutions. A significant number of faculty who have additional employment mention that the reason for this is low salary at their main job (see Table 6.1). Relatively low salaries and poor social status of academic work cause an unbalanced age structure in the academic profession. Young faculty members (under 30 years) represent only about 13 percent of the academic profession (see Figure 6.3). However, the share of senior faculty is rather large and grew substantially during last 20 years (see Levin-Stankevich and Savelyev 1996, for comparison). Such a change in the relative representation of different age cohorts could be explained in two ways: on the one hand, incentives to enter the university sector for young people, as we will demonstrate further along in this chapter, are nowadays quite low. On the other Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 135

Table 6.1 Faculty who have additional employment because of low salary levels (presented as a percentage of all those who have additional employment)

2010 2011

Public Private Total Public Private Total HEIs HEIs HEIs HEIs

Reason for an additional 47 33 43 52 40 50 work at other educational institutions or other organizations – low salary level at the main place of work N 650 160 850 659 119 778

Source: Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations, 2010–2011 (survey of faculty of higher education institutions).

22%

37%

21%

20%

34 or less 35–44 45–54 55 and more

Figure 6.3 Distribution of faculty in public institutions, by age Source: Ministry of Education and Science, 2012. hand, incentives for senior academics to retire voluntarily are few (if these exist at all), and there is no compulsory retirement age. Indeed, even after an age of ofﬁcial retirement most senior faculty prefer to keep their positions and to beneﬁt from getting both pension money and salary. Russia is also characterized by quite low academic mobility. In the 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities, carried out by the Center for Institutional Studies (National Research University Higher School of 136 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

Economics), and using the CAP study methodology, the large majority of respondents were employed during their entire academic career at a single university. Specifically, 72 percent started working at the institution where they currently worked the same year that they started an academic career, and only around 10 percent mentioned that, since getting their highest degree, they had been employed in two or more institutions. Among junior faculty, the percentage of those who started working at the institution where they were currently employed the same year that they started an academic career is 82 percent – five percent of junior faculty respondents had been employed by two or more institutions. For senior faculty, these numbers are 69 percent and 13 percent, respectively. According to other data (specifically, from the 2012 MEMO surveys), among senior staff, 53 percent have worked at only one institution during their whole academic career (though some of them were working at more than one institution, simultaneously). As a closely related phenomenon to that of low mobility, inbreeding is quite widespread at many Russian universities. By inbreeding we mean the policy of hiring one’s own graduates. We also use this term as a synonym for the consequences for such a policy (as the prevalence of inbred faculty at the departments). While purely inbred faculty constitute around one-third of the faculty population in public universities,

Table 6.2 Inbred and single-university faculty, by percentage and absolute number

Inbred faculty 36 1,191 Highest degree at this institution 45 1,397 Did not mention that he/she has been employed by two 85 1,410 or more higher educational institutions/research institutions Currently not working at another higher education 82 1,410 institution/research institution in addition to this institution Year of ﬁrst full-time appointment (beyond research and 72 1,363 teaching assistant) in the higher education/research sector matches with year of ﬁrst appointment to one’s current institution (beyond research and teaching assistant)

Source: 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities (CAP methodology), Center for Institutional Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics. Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 137 almost two-thirds of faculty members have a single-university career (see Table 6.2). The share of inbred faculty at private universities is far below, at 10 percent – reﬂecting the fact that private universities normally do not have a core full-time faculty and usually attract faculty from public universities to part-time positions or pay-per-hour contracts. Most private institutions do not offer doctoral degrees. Data from the 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities suggest that there are no differences in the percentage of inbred faculty in different types of institutions (e.g., national research universities, federal universities, and other institutions). But there are differences between groups of institutions selected by other criteria. For example, institutions enrolling students with the highest average marks on the Uniﬁed State Exam, which is needed to graduate from secondary school and to enter a university, have the lowest level of inbreeding. There is also no difference in the percentage of inbred faculty among those academics who work full-time or part-time. However, there are some differences in inbreeding levels for different disciplines (see Table 6.3).

Contracts, promotion policies, and the role of inbreeding

Chair system The governance system in Russian universities is based on the chair system. Chairs (kafedras) are the smallest organizational units – they are subdepartments, essentially – and, at the same time, they are the center of decision-making, in terms of the issues related to the educational process (including faculty recruitment). Formally, a chair is defined by a narrow research area, developed by those employed by the chair. This unit is a highly hierarchical structure ruled by the head of chair, who basically makes all the main decisions. Therefore, when new faculty are hired, they are employed by a specific chair, rather than a department. An average state university in Russia has approximately 15 chairs, while a private one has around 10 chairs. On average, a state university employs 12 teachers per chair, while a private one just 8 teachers. Another hierarchical level in Russian universities involves departments, which may be called institutes in some universities (usually those focused on engineering). The departments essentially unite the chairs that provide courses within one educational program. Unlike departments at US universities, chairs in Russia are characterized by a greater concentration of power, stronger hierarchical patterns, and the fact that a chair is first and foremost a teaching unit. 138 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities l Engineering, manufacturing and construction, architecture sciences, mathematics, earth sciences Law Life sciences Physical Business and administration, economics Social and behavioral sciences Humanities and arts 68 80 85 69 80 76 65 44 Teacher training and education science Percent of inbred faculty in different disciplines : Yudkevich et al. (2013), unpublished 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities (CAP methodology), Center for Institutional Studies, Nationa faculty Inbred facultyTotalN 32 100 20 87 100 15 128 100 31 79 100 20 100 142 24 100 51 35 33 100 221 56 100 341 Table 6.3 Noninbred Source Research University Higher School of Economics. Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 139

To coordinate, plan, and control the educational process, chairs use individual teaching load (at the chair levels), which is the amount of instructional work a teacher (or chair) needs to provide during an academic year. The annual load is calculated in hours; a teaching assistant’s workload is 750 hours per year versus 600 hours for professors. Such a workload means that a teacher has at least three full days of instruction a week, sometimes even four, which leaves minimal time for research. The number of faculty positions assigned to each chair is deﬁned by aggregate teaching loads that a chair is responsible for in the university curriculum. So, each chair is interested in maximizing the number of courses within educational programs at a university, to be able to get more faculty positions. These incentives are clearly counterproductive. Once given the privilege and duty to deliver lectures (normally a PhD is required for this), people teach the same courses for many years and become highly specialized within these courses. Since it is hard for them to switch into other areas and deliver new courses, the curriculum becomes rigid and prone to stagnation. To delete a course from a program would often mean leaving someone without their long-standing job, and chair heads understand this perfectly. So, they are interested in keeping the status quo, which ensures that all chair teachers keep their jobs.

Start of an academic career An academic career for most young people starts not with obtaining a PhD, but with entering a PhD program. Normally, when the head of a chair or a department needs a person to teach classes, one of the professors of this chair/department offers this position to one of his students. At the same time, at the beginning of the academic year, this person will typically start a PhD program, with this professor serving as scientiﬁc adviser. So, such PhD candidates both teach (holding a position of teaching assistant) and do their research toward the dissertation. This kind of inbreeding practice is rather widespread in Russian universities. Low academic mobility is supported by rather low geographical mobility between regions, in general, for highly skilled people (which, in turn, is due to infrastructural and social obstacles that make moves from region to region complicated). Inbreeding makes impossible the existence of an open academic market – with consequences in line with the main ﬁndings on the impact of inbreeding on academic productivity (Wyer and Conrad 1984; Eisenberg and Wells 2000; Soler 2001). Young people are usually hired from within, and there is no or little 140 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities competition between them, but rather a competition between their research advisers or mentors. For a university, there is no way to check the quality of external candidates by relying on market signals, because there are none. While competitive procedures for hiring formally exist, nobody (neither universities nor candidates) relies on them in reality. At the senior level, hiring also relies heavily on informal or semi- formal networks. Almost all transfers are made through informal invitations to apply, even if open calls are formally always in place.

Hiring practices and contract extension To see if universities, as employers, are open to an academic market, one can look at their hiring policies and practices. Even though open nondis- criminatory procedures for recruitment exist and open calls for vacant positions must be made (according to legislation), many people believe that “outsiders have no chance” and do not apply. This reinforces the situation of zero outside supply. Both faculty and chair heads (who are the main actors responsible for employment decisions) believe that employment policy should be targeted toward a university’s own graduates (Table 6.4). There is almost no hiring from the international academic market. There is also no formal tenure system, and all faculty contracts are 1, 3, or 5 years in length and assume competitive mechanisms will be used to determine contract extensions. Indeed, when a contract period comes to

Table 6.4 Chair head and faculty opinions toward employment policy

University employment policy should Head of chairs Faculty be directed primarily on hiring ...

Own graduates 62 45 Active researchers who are able to 48 36 combine research with teaching Faculty with long teaching experience 39 32 Practitioners ready to combine work 15 29 with teaching Graduates from other universities 11 12 All who are ready to work full time 3 6 Total 99 670

Note: Percentages in both columns are valid; as this was a multiple-choice question, the columns do not necessarily sum to 100 percent. Source: Sivak and Yudkevich (2009), a survey carried by the Laboratory for Institutional Anal- ysis of Economic Reforms (National Research University Higher School of Economics) at economics departments of St. Petersburg universities, 2007. Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 141 an end, each university is obliged to make an open call (with announce- ments published in the general press and on the university website) to advertise the vacant position. To get his or her contract extended, a faculty member applies formally for this position. If there are alternative candidates (from within or outside the home institution), the incumbent and the new applicants compete with each other. Formally, existing faculty do not have any advantages over potential external candidates. If a chair head wants a person to be replaced, he starts looking for an alternative candidate in advance and encourages him or her to apply for the position once the vacancy is announced. He also makes the preferred candidate understand that it is just a formality and the position is somewhat guaranteed, otherwise nobody would apply, to avoid feeling “the shame of being rejected.” The academic committee that makes the decision on extension (and compares candidates, if there are any challengers) is usually an internal body and consists of people from the very same department or chair. This committee communicates its decision to the faculty senate (which normally approves this decision, if there is no any conﬂict associated with a particular candidate); the decision is then approved by the university academic council. Informal convention is rather stable here: people do not apply to calls for positions, since nobody believes that an external candidate would be

Table 6.5 Faculty pathways to employment

Pathways to employment Percentage

Was invited by someone from 36 administration of an institution By recommendation from a staff 30 member of an institution Was invited to work at a institution as a 21 graduate of this institution Through a state employment agency 3 Through a nonstate employment agency 1 Through an open competition 6 Other 4 Total 1, 185

Note: As this was a multiple-choice question, the column does not sum to 100 percent. Source: Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations, 2012. 142 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities chosen over an internal candidate (see Table 6.5). So, if the incumbent has at least minimal publishing output (including lecture notes and other teaching materials) and there are no social tensions within the chair, the contract is extended. To some extent, such a practice is similar to what is seen at Argentine universities, where strict formal rules of contract extension and faculty promotion coexist with their rather relaxed implementation in reality (Garcia de Fanelli 2012). The reason for this lies in the chairs’ responsibilities and duties in terms of teaching. Chair heads need people who are able to teach certain courses and to “cover” existing teaching loads that the chair is responsible for within the university curriculum. At the same time, there are no obligations of the chair in terms of total research output. Again, this creates a bias toward teaching priorities. Concerning promotion, in general there are no formal rules that deﬁne conditions under which a faculty member could/should be promoted to the next rank. To gain promotion to an assistant professor position, a person must hold a PhD, but this condition is not sufﬁ- cient. If there is no vacant position at the chair, or the chair head does not want this person to be promoted, there is practically no avenue for professional growth.

Causes of inbreeding

There are a number of conditions that support inbreeding in the university sector. Some of these are related to severe financial constraints that universities face as employers. Indeed, starting salaries are rather poor; thus, for young faculty it is quite difficult to rent an apartment, especially in another city. Therefore, academic mobility (to another city especially) is severely limited. Social infrastructure is rather poor, as well. So, in general, for a young person, it is expensive and complicated to move to another city.1 There is another mechanism through which financial constraints work. Academic salaries are rather poor both in absolute and comparative terms. Once the graduate is on the job market outside academia, it is very hard to bring him or her back. Thus, the university tries to prevent the person from going to the market and encourages him or her to stay in academia, offering early involvement into teaching and research activities. However, MEMO (2012) data show that administrators are rather optimistic when estimating competitiveness of faculty salaries at their institutions: in the 2010–2012 surveys, 84–89 percent of administrators Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 143

Table 6.6 Competitiveness of faculty salaries according to university administrators

In comparison with other In comparison with similar institutions business organizations

Public HEIs Private HEIs Public HEIs Private HEIs

Absolutely 3362 noncompetitive Rather 8112523 uncompetitive Rather 51 66 45 59 competitive Absolutely 38 20 24 16 competitive N 242 109 229 103

Source: Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations, 2012 (survey of administrators of higher educational institutions). at public institutions and 86–94 percent at private institutions said that their institutions are rather competitive or absolutely competitive in comparison with similar institutions; when compared with business organizations, these numbers are 68–72 percent for public institutions and 74–77 percent for private institutions (see Table 6.6). Inbreeding is also enhanced by the organization of university sector – both in general and at the institutional levels. Since Russian research is mainly concentrated in the Academies of Science and not in universities, universities (until recently) had few incentives (on average) to hire the best researchers. Hiring was undertaken (and still is based in most cases today) with teaching in mind, since university faculty are hired mainly as teachers – in Russian even “faculty member” is translated as “teacher.” Certainly, evaluation of teaching abilities of external candidates is a more complicated task than the evaluation of research performance. To evaluate research, one can read publications and see in which journals the candidate has been publishing. In the case of teaching, one can only evaluate this when seeing a teacher “in action.” Unlike research, one has to evaluate the process, not the results.

It does not make sense to pull junior faculty out from other cities or institutions because it is not clear what this person has been taught there. Here, if you hire a graduate of this institution, you know in 144 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

advance what disciplines, at what level and by whom he was taught. You can talk to this person and ﬁnd out what he has learned, not what mark he has got. (Vice-rector of a regional technical university; male, 55 years old)2

The state financing per student is significantly higher for PhD students than for students at undergraduate or master’s levels, while actual expenses could be significantly lower. So, strong incentives exist for universities to have graduate programs with large enrollments. The share of “outside students” in doctoral programs is normally quite low. PhD students are universities’ main source of teaching assistants and junior faculty. The best doctoral students are given assistant positions from the early stages of their study and integrate slowly into the faculty ranks during their studies. At the end of the program, they are already considered a part of the faculty. So, the organization of doctoral education exerts a strong influence on hiring policy, with respect to young faculty. It allows for a trial period for a department to determine whether a PhD student is a good candidate for an assistant professor position in the future:

Hiring goes mainly through a graduate school. First of all, persons who have completed a post-graduate program, who have an opportunity to move on in a scientific field, who have proved him/herself during graduate program [are hired]. Because there is an important part of a post-graduate education – [which involves] having teaching practice at a university. They usually receive offers to stay and work at departments to which they were affiliated as graduate students. Many of them start working as graduate students and continue working at the same positions after graduation. (Vice-rector of a regional federal university; female, 45 years old)

Most people are starting to do it [teaching] in graduate school. This is not yet professional teaching, it is not yet a profession, because graduate school can result in anything. A person can go into business or industry. A young man, while in graduate school, is eligible only for an assistant position. As a rule, in most cases, this occurs at a department level, that is, a department where he is a graduate student [offers him/her] to work as an assistant, to help with classes. In most cases he/she is hired for a year, it’s something like a probation period. (Vice-rector of a regional federal university; male, 51 years old) Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 145

As was stated earlier, under the chair system in Russian universities, the chair heads are responsible for recruitment. So, they have incentives to take either their own students or students of the senior professors within the chair. New faculty members are usually selected to fit the teaching (not research!) agenda of the chair, so it pays to take a former student who will be able to reproduce the previous practice of teaching in particular courses. A focus on the impact of teaching objectives is not surprising. Indeed, since most of research has been focused in institutions of the Academy of Sciences and not in universities, many higher education institutions are mostly focused on teaching. While there are some obligations of faculty to do research, these requirements are rather formal. Given high teaching loads, people almost have no time for research activities. So, usually all discussions within the chair are focused around teaching and not research matters. Most universities do not provide their faculty with individual offices or even shared ones. Quite often, each chair has one room with a secretary, where faculty and assistants can spend their time between classes. This space does not provide conditions for work and faculty members usually do not spend time within the university when they are not teaching or holding office hours (if any). Such a situation with the shortage of space has an important impact on the way people communicate to each other. There is no environment for collaborative engagement and few incentives to discuss research, so it is hard for academic norms to spread within the larger groups outside the classic “senior colleague – younger colleague” dyads. The narrowness of educational programs may also play a role in reproduction of inbreeding. Quite often, universities provide quite narrow training in one particular field, so they become monopolists in a cor- respondingly narrow market of related skills. In substantial part, such narrow training is an inherited feature from the Soviet period of the planned economy, where specialists were trained not for the market but for particular industries and enterprises. That is why inbreeding is more widespread in such fields.

Our university is a very special one, we provide a narrow training, complicated training. And those who have passed through our graduate school, ..., who have experienced the whole system from the inside, they adapt immediately and actively. It takes longer for external colleagues to adapt to work in our environment. (Vice-rector of a regional teacher training university; male. 60 years old) 146 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

So, as one can see, inbreeding is supported by the whole range of institutional, infrastructural, and ﬁnancial circumstances of Russian universities. It is also (as we will see in the next section) deeply rooted in the culture of the academic system.

Social factors in universities

In the Russian university system, the notion of the “scientific school” is given a high value. It is widely believed that precisely defined “scientific schools,” consisting of several generations of scholars working together for many years and nurturing subsequent generations, were the main drivers of success. Such schools take an apprentice and develop him or her to the master level within the school. He or she learns from the senior gurus and then brings his or her own students into the school as a next generation. On the contrary, mobility and changes of institution are quite often considered a kind of betrayal and competing for best scholars as hostile behavior.

Actually, [scientific] schools that are forming, they are serious, we have about 20 of these schools, and if a school is forming ...for example, I have two teachers, I consider them as my teachers, and I have an entire squad of my apprentices, like any of our professors [ ...] it is a continuation of a course of scientific investigation, which is important, and, in the end, of traditions. (Vice-rector of a regional medical academy (with no special status); female, 58 years old) Hiring institution’s own people is a kind of continuity, a continuity of a scientific school . ...We have, for example, a narrowly focused department of Oriental Studies, and we have a very strong department of European languages, with highly qualified faculty. So of course we are interested, firstly, to offer a job [to our graduates], secondly, opportunities for research career, it’s a corporate spirit, it is everywhere, and thirdly, to ensure the continuity of a scientific school, a new infusion to a scientific school. (Vice-rector of one of the top-ranked institutions located in Moscow; male, 32 years old) I think it [inbreeding] is rather positive. There is the concept of a scientific school, when it is formed from the first year as a student, when students are involved in research under a guidance of assistant professor or professor. These relations are developing over the years Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 147

and so a school is forming. When accidental people come, even talented, it breaks: a person has his own scientiﬁc interests, and he is faced with the fact that nobody is interested in his studies. Working with own graduates is a positive thing in terms of research. (Vice-rector of a regional university (with specialization in social and economic sciences); male, 56 years old)

Not surprisingly, social ties play an important role in an academic environment. They could be important for young faculty members in promotion and contract extension. Indeed, since in reality all open competitive procedures for hiring are often reduced to hiring from within and for promotion from within, it is very important for a young person to have someone influential to support his or her candidacy. Such informal support often complements other existing grounds for decision-making around the professional advancement of young faculty (such as teaching quality and research results). One of the reasons for this is that each open entry position is attached to a chair and is normally associated with a particular discipline to be taught and, often, a specific professor who gives lectures on this discipline. So, those professors often prefer to choose people to work with on personal grounds, preferring those whom they already knew as students. That is one possible explanation for why, for inbred faculty, affiliation with a department or university is more important than affiliation with the academic discipline (see Table 6.7).

Table 6.7 Importance of afﬁliation with academic discipline/department/ university

Affiliation with Affiliation with Percentage N academic department or discipline is more university is important than more important affiliation with than affiliation department or with academic university discipline

Noninbred 56 44 100 244 faculty Inbred faculty 38 62 100 130

Source: 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities (CAP methodology), Center for institutional studies, National Research University, Higher School of Economics. 148 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

Norms shape the academic reality in such a way that young people are offered career trajectories along which they start moving from the ﬁrst years of their study, passing from a student role to PhD candidate and then to teaching assistant roles. The organization of academic life in Russian universities supports inbreeding practices.

Consequences of inbreeding

Consequences of inbreeding can be found on three levels: individual faculty members, institutions, and the higher educational system.

Individual level There are some significant differences between inbred and noninbred faculty with respect to time and effort distribution, as well as productivity. According to MEMO data, inbred faculty spend significantly more time on private teaching – on average 11 hours a week in comparison with 7 hours for noninbred faculty. Among inbred faculty, 45 percent hold administrative positions, while among noninbreds this figure stands at 30 percent (a significant difference, chi-square) (CAP data, Yudkevich et al. 2013). Insiders more often attend university or department seminars in the home institution and less often seminars organized by chairs at other universities. Inbreds also less often participate in research projects with colleagues from other institutions (see Table 6.8). These results are consistent with some previous studies of inbreeding (Velho and Krige 1984; Horta, Veloso, and Rocio 2007) that showed that the academic communication of inbred faculty tends to

Table 6.8 Faculty participation in research projects, by percentage (2010, 2012)

2010 20123

Inbred Noninbred Inbred Noninbred

In the last two years 37610 participated in individual or collaborative projects at other institutions N 225 568 245 528

Source: Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations, 2010, 2012 (survey of faculty of higher education institutions). Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 149 be limited to their close colleagues. Looking at the total number of publications, one may think that inbred faculty are more productive. However, one should be very careful with such quantitatively based generalizations, since inbred and noninbred faculty choose different targets for publication. For instance, for inbred faculty, it is easier to publish in a journal produced by their own university, edited and controlled by senior staff of this same university, with whom inbred faculty generally seem to have stronger social ties. Thus, among those who published an article in a university journal in 2011 (according to MEMO 2012 data), 52 percent were inbred and 42 percent were noninbred. Having narrower horizons, inbred faculty with no outside experience often believe that it is impossible to publish in a good journal without informal connections. They overestimate such connections over individual merits and achievements.

Institutional level Inbreeding has an impact on an institutional level, as well. On the one hand, several negative consequences exist, and these are mentioned quite often by university top management and some policy-makers. Even the term itself reﬂects perception of the phenomenon as negative. As one of the deans from a regional national research university told us:

What is wrong with inbreeding? No inﬂux of other genes. Degra- dation, in biological terms. I did not accidentally say that this is a biological term. It is a value-laden term. Inbreeding is a negative characteristic in genetics. Accordingly, by using the term “academic inbreeding,” we are referring to reproduction from close relatives and thus about degradation. One can generate different attitudes toward inbreeding merely by replacing the term.

Inbreeding prevents crossbreeding of ideas (“allowing no fresh air into the system”) and supports the parochialism of ideas (i.e., reinforcement of the ideas of leading researchers of a given institution):

There are of course negative things. It is blood stagnation. One should ﬁght it, and there are ways to ﬁght it. When people from the same group keep coming to work . ...They just keep coming and this is that stagnation. (Vice-rector of a federal university; male, 51 years old) 150 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

Anyway training outside your own university is important. Self- teaching is not always a good technology. In my opinion in modern higher education an academic is incomplete if he doesn’t have working experience at other academic institutions that he could compare to experience at his institution. Otherwise it is a provincial parochialism. (Dean of a regional national research university; male, 56 years old)

Inbreeding as a recruitment policy may also be harmful since recruitment choices are then based on identity and previous personal/professional/academic contacts (e.g., contact of the PhD student to his or her mentor) rather than on quality. There is some anecdotal evidence from different countries about favoritism and biased decisions under severe inbreeding. That obviously hampers the evolution of the institution. In particular, it reinforces and favors research in the directions that are popular among senior people in the department – it is difficult for new topics to emerge and gain support. With inbreeding and, hence, low mobility, seniority within a given institution plays a major role. Seniority (not research productivity) becomes the most important factor for social academic status and power. For young people, it is important to keep good relationships with senior colleagues since, in many respects, they depend critically on them, as was mentioned earlier. For example, chair heads are responsible for the promotion of younger faculty. Real evaluation is undertaken very rarely, so relationships with chair heads become very important, as in Italy, where it was found that social ties with senior members of the discipline play a major role in career advancement (Pezzoni, Sterzi, and Lissoni 2009). Moreover, inbreeding hampers mobility by making difficult the integration of newcomers from outside the institution into this local system of social ties and standards, the center of which is a chair head, who, in turn, reinforces this practice of hiring. When a new person comes from another university, people sometimes react rather suspiciously, thinking “there should be definitely something wrong with him at his previous workplace.” Inbreeding and the importance of social ties in general also have an impact on the governance models within universities. In the long run, inbreeding strengthens the hierarchical mode of governance that prevails in Russian universities, as opposed to shared governance, because it Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 151 maintains relatively stable small communities within an institution. So, by the time one attains an administrative position and has strong social ties with some other people in the organization, the vertical structure of governance is reproduced. Social ties grow with seniority and administrative status in the university, which is one of the reasons why the governance model in Russian universities is so vertically organized. People with low seniority and those at the lower level of the academic ladder (e.g., senior lecturers and lecturers) feel that they have no impact on important academic decisions within the university at the level of chair, the faculty, or the university as a whole. However, some benefits of inbreeding may also exist – at least under some conditions. Inbreeding practices make sense if the best candidates for a position are those in-house. It may be the case for top universities and departments. As was mentioned earlier, data from the 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities show that at the best institutions (universities with the highest entry texts results of students) the percentage of faculty who have studied at these universities is 55 percent or higher (with one exception). The average for the whole sample is 60 percent (with a minimum of 20 percent and a maximum of 84 percent). We may therefore suggest that top institutions in Russia are more inclined to retain their graduates which is in line with previous findings (Massengale and Sage 1982). This makes even more sense in early developing fields or for institutions in highly specialized areas, where it is difficult to find better replacements elsewhere. In the sample of the 2012 survey of faculty at Russian universities (using the CAP methodology), among 13 institutions where the inbreeding level is above average (36 percent) and varies between 38 percent and 58 percent, eight are specialized in narrow technical disciplines or are the only institutions in a region that provide educational programs in certain disciplines. There are other potential benefits of inbreeding on an institutional level. Inbreeding creates institutional identity and fast organizational buildup, as there is a shared set of institutional values. It also creates consistent research teams. Moreover, inbreeding provides safety from recruitment “gambles” – those who are responsible for hiring know exactly who they are bringing in (i.e., they have known them as students). Institutions can see potential hires from the early stages of their study and involve them in teaching and research from the very beginning, preparing them for a university career. 152 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

Finally, institutions can recruit people more cheaply from within than from the broader academic labor market. This is important in a situation of underﬁnancing of higher education, when salaries at higher education institutions are often uncompetitive in comparison with the business sector. Inbreeding allows investing in people’s human capital with lower risk of losing them as soon as they become more competent.

Macro level The negative consequence here is that inbreeding generates mediocrity, as knowledge is reproduced but not questioned and challenged. This is reinforced by the fact that the Russian academic community in general – excluding mathematics, some natural sciences, technical specialties, and few others – is not well integrated into international science in terms of publications (not all universities provide access to journal databases, only a few faculty publish abroad, there are almost no Russian peer-reviewed journals indexed in Web of Science and Scopus, etc.). Aca- demic mobility in terms of international conferences is also low, in general, and only some institutions provide ﬁnancial support for this kind of mobility. So, other ways of exchanging ideas are also limited. However, a positive point here is that inbreeding has allowed the system of higher education to survive under conditions of underﬁnancing from the state and low quality of infrastructure and services.

Policies, challenges, and future trends

It is hard – perhaps impossible – to judge whether inbreeding is a productive or counterproductive practice. One may only say that (all other things being equal) the teaching orientation of higher education institution makes inbreeding more reasonable, while research objectives may suffer from such a policy. Inbreeding may be also justified under conditions of a weak academic market and severe financial constraints that universities may face as employers. Nonetheless, inbreeding might be a problem for the future development of a globally competitive university system in Russia. Indeed, it enforces the closeness of Russian universities and their orientation “toward the inner self” and makes them less open for communication and cooperation on the broad academic market. However, the academic community and policy-makers do not see inbreeding as a problem for the academic system in general. Indeed, at the institutional level, there is little understanding that an anti-inbreeding policy may be considered as a means for improving Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 153 competitiveness. As interviews with top management in different universities across Russia suggest, most people believe that there is no need for special measures to cope with inbreeding. People see inbreeding as an inevitable practice and therefore see no reasons to discuss it. However, some of them mention that inbreeding might have some negative consequences (in addition to positive ones) and suggest several things that could improve the situation, in terms of attracting outside people and coping with negative consequences of inbreeding (for a university, in general, and inbred faculty, in particular). As the most important condition of bringing strong noninbred, outsiders into the university, people mention the need for better funding for universities. They also say that providing starting salary supplements and grants, as well as subsidized apartments, should help in the competition for young, bright people with the nonacademic labor market. Speaking of coping with negative consequences of inbreeding, university policy- makers suggest that training abroad and international cooperation is important. They also say that external evaluation of faculty qualifications should probably be considered as a means to reduce the level of inbreeding. On the policy level, there are also no special plans to force universities to decrease the level of inbreeding or to bring it under control. All special government programs that support leading universities specify targets for faculty quality (in terms of publications, etc.), but do not restrict universities in the means they may undertake in working to reach those targets. So, there is little pressure in the system in general to change inbreeding practices. However, some trends that can potentially influence the inbreeding situation should be mentioned. First, in recent years, more and more accomplished students leave for master’s and doctoral programs in US and European universities – an option that students did not have in the Soviet period. It is now hard to retain the really best students and staff at their home universities – inbreeding becomes less efficient and therefore less attractive. The government has launched several programs to support leading research universities. As mentioned already, these programs do not specify any restrictions on hiring policies but provide universities with better incentives for hiring individuals who are more productive when it comes to research. Finally, educational programs become more general (the Bologna process and the competition for the best students play important roles here), so universities become less monopolized in terms of skills that are required for successful work there. 154 Immobility and Inbreeding in Russian Universities

Notes

1. In the case of moving to a regional town, and not to the capital, it is quite nonproﬁtable as well, as Russia is a highly centralized country, with salaries and living standards generally higher in Moscow than in other parts of the country. 2. This and all further citations are from the set of detailed interviews with top management at Russian universities. 3. In 2011, no signiﬁcant differences between the two groups were found.

References

Androushchak, Gregory and Maria Yudkevich. 2012 “Russian Higher Education: Salaries and Contracts.” In Paying the Professoriate: A Global Comparison of Compensation and Contracts, edited by Philip G. Altbach, Liz Reisberg, Maria Yudkevich, Gregory Androushchak, Iván F. Pacheco, 265–278. Routledge: New York. Eisenberg, Theodore and Martin T. Wells. 2000. “Inbreeding in Law School Hir- ing: Assessing the Performance of Faculty Hired from Within.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1): 369–388. Garcia de Fanelli, Ana. 2012. “Labor Contracts and Economic Incentives for Argentine University Faculty.” In Paying the Professoriate: A Global Comparison of Compensation and Contracts, edited by Philip G. Altbach, Liz Reisberg, Maria Yudkevich, Gregory Androushchak, Iván F. Pacheco, 37–48. Routledge: New York. Horta, Hugo. 2013. “Understanding the Pros and Cons of Aca- demic Inbreeding.” University World News, 11 October (291). http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20131009120224656 (accessed at 12 October 2013). Horta, Hugo, Francisco Veloso, and Grediaga Rocio. 2007. “Navel Gazing: Aca- demic Inbreeding and Scientiﬁc Productivity.” Department of Engineering and Public Policy Paper 118. repository.cmu.edu/epp/118/. Levin-Stankevich, Brian L. and Alexander Savelyev. 1996. “The Academic Pro- fession in Russia.” In The International Academic Profession: Portrait of Fourteen Countries, edited by Philip G. Altbach and Ernest L. Boyer, 567–616. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Massengale, John D. and George H. Sage. 1982. “Departmental Prestige and Career Mobility Patterns of College Physical Educators.” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 53 (4): 305–312. Pezzoni, Michele, Valerio Sterzi, and Francesco Lissoni. 2009. Career Progress in Centralized Academic Systems: An Analysis of French and Italian Physicists. Bocconi University Working Papers 6. Sivak, Elizaveta and Maria Yudkevich. 2009. “Academic Inbreeding: Pros and Cons.” Educational Studies 1: 170–187. Soler, Manuel. 2001. “How Inbreeding Affects Productivity in Europe.” Nature 411: 132. Velho, Leah and John Krige. 1984. “Publication and Citation Practices of Brazilian Agricultural Scientists.” Social Studies of Science 14 (1): 45–62. Elizaveta Sivak and Maria Yudkevich 155

Wyer, Jean C. and Clifton F. Conrad. 1984. “Institutional Inbreeding Reexam- ined.” American Educational Research Journal 21 (1): 213–225. Yudkevich, Maria, Yana Kozmina, Elizaveta Sivak, Olgai Bein, and Irina Davydova. 2013. The Changing Academic Profession. Analytical Report, HSE. http://www.hse.ru/pubs/share/direct/document/113800381 (accessed at 29 May 2014). 7 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga

In a country with only one major university for a long time, academic inbreeding was necessary and inevitable. As part of socialist Yugoslavia, Slovenia was its most developed region and professors of Slovenian universities were rarely graduates of the Yugoslav universities. Further, due to the “non-aligned” character of Yugoslav foreign politics, borders with Western Europe were open and study at foreign universities was not impossible, especially in science, technology, and medicine. Nev- ertheless, the possibilities for study abroad were fairly limited due to economic conditions. Moreover, study abroad has often led to brain drain. Despite rising enrollments since the 1990s, Slovenia is still a small higher education system (with only four universities) and academic inbreeding is a recognizable feature. There are no aggregate statistical data on this phenomenon, nor do the higher education institutions specifically trace academic inbreeding. However, we have some evidence of the extent of this phenomenon from the EUROAC1 survey on the academic profession in Slovenia that was conducted in 2013 (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). In this survey, 50.6 percent of respondents confirmed that they are employed at the same institution where they obtained their PhD (Kle- menciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). The highest share of inbred academics (67.6 percent) was reported at the university in the capital, the University of Ljubljana (established in 1919), and somewhat lower (47.5 percent) at the University of Maribor (established in 1975), which are the two oldest universities in the country. The two newer universities, one public and one which is formally considered to be “private” (i.e., established by a municipality and not by the state but largely financed from the state budget), were founded after 2000 and established PhD programs only within the last few years.

156 Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 157

Hence, by definition, they have very few inbred academic staff. The EUROAC survey does not include data for the “private” university, but does for the new public institution, the University of Primorska (established in 2003). The University of Primorska shows only 16.4 percent of inbred academics among EUROAC respondents (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). The fact that there are inbred academics at all in such a new institution suggests that new institutions are also hiring some of their very own recent PhDs.2 We do not have data from the private university and a number of colleges (self-standing faculties or “higher schools,” in Slovenian legal terminology), but our expectation is that, given their more recent emergence, we will find less academic inbreeding in these institutions. Data from EUROAC also show that academic inbreeding is the highest in the fields of engineering, manufacturing, and construction (62.5 percent), then agriculture, forestry, fishery and veterinary sciences (58.1 percent), followed by natural sciences, mathematics and computer science (57.0 percent), and medicine and social services (56.3 percent). The lowest share is in education and teacher education (36.8 percent), and social sciences, business, and law (43.9 percent). Arts and humanities with 47.7 percent lie somewhere in-between (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). In terms of academic rank, we found the highest numbers of inbred academics among associate professors (64.5 percent), then assistant professors (62.6 percent), while inbreeding among full professors appears to be the lowest among the senior staff (52.6 percent). The evidence of a gradual phasing out of academic inbreeding perhaps lies in a lower share of inbred faculty among assistants and young researchers: 41.2 percent of our respondents in this category report having obtained PhD at the same institution where now employed (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). This chapter analyses the causes of academic inbreeding in Slovenia and its consequences. There are a number of structural conditions, which continue to impair a more radical extraction of academic inbreeding. These are discussed in the following section, which also introduces the general characteristics of the Slovenian higher education system. The next section discusses hiring and appointment practices, which indeed have become more open, transparent and more meritocratic, yet have not brought about major change in academic inbreeding practices. The final section introduces the consequences of inbreeding. The data for this chapter have been obtained from national legisla- tive documents and institutional statutory documents. We have also drawn on the data obtained through the EUROAC survey of conditions 158 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding of academic work in Slovenia conducted in 2013, which involved sending an online survey to 5,791 academic staff employed at Slovenian higher education institutions. This survey was fully completed by 728 respondents; thus, with a 13 percent response rate. Partial responses to the survey were excluded from the sample. Given the highly complex and long questionnaire, the low response rate is not unexpected; indeed, it is similar to the response rates obtained by the same survey conducted in other European countries (Kehm and Teichler 2013; Teichler and Höhle 2013; Teichler, Arimoto, and Cummings 2013). We draw here on the observation by Horta (2013) (citing Krosnick 1999 suggesting that “while a low response rate could be problematic, studies demonstrate that datasets resulting from low response rates can yield more accu- rate measurements and quality than those with greater response rate levels” (Horta 2013, 493). Furthermore, the survey resulted in a nicely representative sample – including all main categories of academic staff, across disciplines, departments where employed, gender, academic rank, and so on (for details, see Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014) – thus, meeting the criteria that representativeness is more relevant than response rate for generalizability of survey research (Horta 2013). Finally, the EUROAC survey and the present study present the first in-depth analysis of the academic profession in Slovenia and, as such, represent a great deal of “ground work” in this area. As such, we are unable to draw from other studies in the Slovenian context.

Structural conditions for academic inbreeding: Higher education in Slovenia

With a population of two million in south/central Europe, Slovenian higher education institutions enroll in total 84,300 students, of whom 81 percent are full-time students (SURS 2013). In 2012–2013, there were 5,596 ranked academic staff, assisted by 3,050 assistants, language preceptors, and other nonranked staff academic staff (SURS 2013). The student–staff ratio is, on average, 1 ranked academic staff member to 19.3 students, or if we include all academic staff, 1 ranked or nonranked faculty member to 11.6 students. Among academics at higher education institutions, 37.8 percent are women; 20.8 percent of all academics are over age 60 (SURS 2013). All three public universities are comprehensive research universities, albeit different in age, size, research impact, and also reputation. Together, they form a small and highly stratified system, which is particularly conducive to academic inbreeding. The University of Ljubljana Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 159 was established in 1919 and served for 70 years as the national university (Zgaga 1998). Upon its establishment, all professors came from foreign universities; therefore, at least initially, it was impossible to speak of inbred staff. Its role as the national university, closely connected to emphasizing the national language (which was, in modern history, a generally sensitive political issue), further strengthened after 1945 and more and more of its professors completed their PhD studies at home. There was little competition between, or division of work with, other Yugoslav universities due to the highly decentralized higher education system of socialist Yugoslavia and the traditional cultural differences (Zgaga 1998). In the 1990s, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, some of academics from other universities in the region found shelter and employment in Slovenia. Only in 1975 did the Slovenian higher education system change significantly with the establishment of the second university – the University of Maribor. The third public institution, the University of Primorska, was established only recently, in 2003, and the “private” Uni- versity of Nova Gorica emerged from a previously freestanding faculty, which acquired the status of a university in 2006. In addition, different types of nonuniversity higher education institutions exist: one public freestanding faculty and 39 private freestanding faculties and higher professional schools (all of them very small). The freestanding institutions have been legally allowed to operate since 1993; the first one was established in 1996 but most of them have emerged only recently (Zgaga 1998). The majority of enrollments are still at the public institutions: about 86 percent of all students are enrolled in public institutions and about two-thirds of all students are enrolled at the University of Ljubljana (Zgaga et al. 2013). The possibilities for a highly mobile academic labor market within Slovenia are somewhat curbed simply due to the small number of institutions and the fact that some third cycle (PhD) study programs in are conducted only at one of these institutions. Furthermore, the system is highly stratified: most (but not all) faculties or departments at the University of Ljubljana are perceived to be of higher academic quality and hold more academic prestige than other institutions in similar fields elsewhere in the country. The stratified system, with the University of Ljubljana at the top of the pyramid, explains why the highest level of inbreeding is at this institution. PhD holders from Ljubljana have often found appointments at other universities in the country, as well as abroad. Movement in the opposite direction – that is, those with PhDs from other Slovenian 160 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding universities securing employment at the University of Ljubljana – is less common because most (although certainly not all) faculties and departments at other universities do not enjoy the same level of prestige. Of course, for a small portion of domestic professors, it was always possible to gain a PhD abroad. Besides this fact, somewhat lesser rates of academic inbreeding among full professors in our data could be an indication that, at the time of their first academic appointment, the mobility between the two only universities – Ljubljana and Maribor – might have been more fluid than was the case a generation or more later. It can also mean that currently, with the establishment of new institutions, full professors are the ones more likely to change institutions. On the other hand, it could also be explained through the fact that those generations of academics, in particular, still think of their faculty as their true alma mater, and not the university. Until 1990s, individual faculties enjoyed full legal and financial independence and the university served more as a network of independent faculties (Zgaga 1998; Zgaga 2013). Hence, moving from obtaining a PhD from one faculty to employment at another faculty at the same university may well be considered as changing institutions in the minds of full professors. Those academics that currently hold the rank of full professor built their careers in a system where faculties held independent legal and financial identity. Before the 1990s, the deans of the faculties negotiated funding directly with the Ministry. The feeling of belonging and formal affiliation was to the faculty and not to the university. The university had neither much decision-making power over the faculties nor much sym- bolic value. It is likely that academics internalized that value system and have not shifted their perception of belonging in the wake of the university governance reforms. Hence, for them, changing from one faculty to another within one university really means a change of “institution.” The establishment of Slovenia’s two newest universities diminishes somewhat the overall rate of academic inbreeding at the system level. Both new universities created new academic openings that were filled predominantly by academics coming from Ljubljana and Maribor. How- ever, both new universities are of marginal size especially when compared to the University of Ljubljana. In the absence of historical data, it is difficult to establish when a decrease in academic inbreeding began and whether it occurred with the massification of student enrollments, which led to an increase in study programs, a rise in instructional needs, and thus more academic hiring. Our impression, supported by data on the present state of academic inbreeding at both older universities, is that this was not the case. Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 161

Until the late 1970s, there was only one university, and later there were only two universities, producing potential future academics. Both institutions had at the time tendencies toward fairly closed academic recruitment practices, as opposed to open and solely meritocratic hiring. Until the 1990s, when higher education was still in the elite stage and academics were few and had high social status, academic favoritism certainly marked the hiring practices at universities. Nepotistic practices in hiring were common across independent faculties. The 1990s brought about signiﬁcant changes: the formulation of the new higher education system in the newly independent state happened simultaneously with rising student enrollments and a transition from elite to mass higher education (Zgaga 1998; Zgaga 2013). However, in the two old universities, there were no real professional incentives for academics to move to other universities in the country; at least, there were no incentives for the best academics to do so. To put it differently, the job security, public recognition, good salary, and other fairly satisfactory work conditions disincentivized academics from seeking positions elsewhere, once they had made it “into the system.” The following section analyzes the contemporary labor market conditions and the impact of these on academic inbreeding.

Labor market conditions

Slovenia has a higher education system where the academic job market has not taken on (so far) market characteristics. Academics in public universities are employed as civil servants. They have fairly similar salaries across institutions, tend still to be relatively generously paid, and thus have little financial incentive to change institutions. According to legal requirements, all academic vacancies must be publicized externally on relevant national online platforms, and there is a fairly open and transparent selection process stipulated in legislation. There are several bodies of legislation regulating employment of academics. The Constitution of Republic of Slovenia ensures the right of all employees to social security and health insurance, participation of workers in the management of their organizations, and the right to form and participate in representative bodies. Academics and researchers in public higher education and research institutions in Slovenia are civil servants, and their status and remuneration provisions are defined in the Civil Servants Act and in the Act on the Civil Servant Payment System. This means that their base salary and bonuses are set through a comprehensive collective bargaining framework for the whole of the central 162 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding government and public services. Centralized negotiations result in a mandatory agreement with syndicates (unions) regarding base salary, bonuses, and the code of conduct. By law, syndicates must be consulted regarding working conditions, the employment framework, the right to strike (or minimize service), the introduction of new management tools, and government restructuring. The last such comprehensive collective bargaining framework between the government and the Higher Education Syndicate [Visokošol- ski sindikat Slovenije] was established in January 2012. Based on their rank and length of service, academics are categorized into different pay-scale grades. There is some flexibility in terms of bonuses for performance [dodatek za delovno uspešnost] but not much, and the issue of merit pay is somewhat controversial. Employees are entitled to full social security support and have fairly robust guarantees with regard to job protection and dismissal. Consequently, the salaries for ranked academic staff in public universities are similar across institutions, that is, fixed according to academic rank and number of years worked in the rank (Altbach 2000). As such, salaries do not necessarily factor in to academics’ choices of employment. In addition to regular salary, academics can get additional payments (e.g., for additional workload, teaching part-time and PhD students, research and development projects, and consultations). The academic salaries at public higher education institutions in Slovenia are widely believed to guarantee a comfortable middle-class standard of living. In other words, the overall academic salary (base salary and bonuses) for full-time faculty is still fairly comparable to salaries of higher ranking professionals in other sectors. However, this trend might be changing with increasing salaries for top-tier managers, lawyers, and medical doctors. Still, academics in ranked positions are not financially pressured to seek additional employment, although they often do so – because there is opportunity for additional income. The professoriate in Slovenia enjoys a relatively high social status and tends to be respected by the public. Hence, academics are frequently invited to serve in ministerial and similar positions, on the boards of companies, and in other influential posts. In the EUROAC survey, 14.8 percent of respondents confirmed having additional employment at another public research or higher education institution, 4.7 percent reported working at another private higher education or research institution, 6.5 percent worked at other public education institutions, 4.4 percent also worked in business organizations, 4.3 percent were also self-employed, 3 percent worked for government, and 1.2 percent Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 163 also worked in private nonprofit organizations (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). Public universities have adopted competition clauses, according to which academics who wish to teach at other Slovenian higher education institutions have to ask for permission from the rector or dean of the institution where they are employed. In 2013, media brought to public light a discussion on academic salaries, which were depicted as rather high. In the data offered, an assistant (pay-scale grade 30–35) earns as base salary between EUR 1,373 (equivalent to PPP$ 1,716)3 and EUR 1,670 (PPP$ 2,087) and up 20 percent more for additional weekly workload. An assistant professor (docent) (grade 48) earns, on average, a base salary of EUR 2,572 (or PPP$ 3,215) and up to 15 percent more for additional teaching. Full professors’ salaries are (grade 50–55) between EUR 3,009 (PPP$ 3,761) and EUR 3,661 (PPP$ 4,576) and up to 15 percent extra for additional teaching. These figures correspond to our survey, where respondents reported their average net income as EUR 2,128 (equal to PPP$ 2,671) for full professors and EUR 1,115 EUR (or PPP$ 1,394) for assistant professors. These data position Slovenian salaries somewhere in the middle of the European countries (Altbach et al. 2012). Salaries tend to be highly taxed, but social welfare arrangements ensure that expenses such as health care, retirement funds, schooling for children, and paid vacations are provided by the state. The above data show also a high disparity between nonranked and ranked academic staff, where full professors’ salaries are about three times higher than those of assistants and young researchers at the start of their academic career. The salary conditions at public universities differ from those at private universities and colleges where remuneration scheme is less closely regulated, but there is also less job security, which makes such employment less attractive than having a position at a public institution. In addition, private institutions, to a large extent, offer part-time employment and contractual work. We do not have, however, any data on salaries from these institutions. All in all, academic staff at public higher education institutions enjoys a high level of social security support and fairly satisfactory working conditions. This is shown also in the EUROAC survey: 55 percent of all full professors and 42.5 percent of associate professors report that they are very satisfied or satisfied with their employment. The share is lower among assistant professors (36.1 percent) and even lower among assistants and young researchers (27.1 percent) (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). Furthermore, the majority of academics have not considered changing employment, but those who have done so 164 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding have mostly considered transitioning to a nonacademic position or to a higher education institution abroad (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pec-ˇ jak 2014). However, in the recent period, there is also a growing number of those who teach part-time or on a contractual basis (about 20 percent) and do not enjoy the same job security and civil servant benefits as ranked academic staff (SURS 2013). These staff members statistically lower the proportion of inbred faculty in Slovenian universities. Also relevant to a discussion of inbreeding is the fact that the Slovenian academic job market is almost entirely closed to international academics. There are several reasons for this, revolving mostly around the fact that Slovenia is neither a notable study destination for foreign students nor does it practice much in the way of internationalizing the education on offer in the country (Klemenciˇ cˇ and Flander 2013). The Higher Education Act of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 8, speci- fies that the language of instruction at higher education institutions in Slovenia is Slovenian (a language spoken by a bit more than two million people worldwide). The law allows for a few exceptions to this rule. Instruction in foreign language is permitted in study programs of foreign languages. It is also allowed in parts of study programs, if these are conducted with the participation of a foreign lecturer (typically, a visiting lecturer through the Erasmus scheme or a bilateral agreement) or if a large number of foreign students (in practice, most often Erasmus exchange students) are enrolled. Institutions may offer study programs in foreign languages if the same study program is simultaneously offered also in Slovenian. Given budgetary constraints, such simultaneous offer of the same programs is very rare (Klemenciˇ cˇ and Flander 2013). Con- sequently, among Slovenian institutions the demand for employing foreign lecturers is almost nonexistent. Short-term visiting lecturers are, at present, a much more feasible and also much likelier way of involving foreign academics in teaching, and such examples are more and more frequent. The Higher Education Act of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 62, stipulates that higher education institutions may, for a limited period of time, invite a visiting lecturer to conduct part of a study program, regardless of the conditions stipulated regarding promotions, which make appointment to an academic rank a necessary condition for teaching at a Slovenian higher education institution – provided that the course leader holds an academic appointment at that institution. Only the “private” University of Nova Gorica has in its statutes a provision for hiring adjunct academic staff who can also be from abroad but “for conducting parts of a course” only (Statutes of University of Nova Gorica, Article 76). Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 165

The Employment Relationships Acts (for the public sector and for the area of education) are the second body of legislation influencing academic employment. One of the key conditions is that details about all job vacancies at higher education institutions are by law required to be made available externally, more specifically in the database of the Employment Service of Slovenia,4 on the hiring institutions’ web pages, and in daily local or national newspapers. Advertising internationally, however, occurs only extremely rarely. For example, data from The Researchers Report on Slovenia by Deloitte (2012, 3) show that in 2011, there were only five researcher posts advertised through the EURAXESS Jobs portal5 – a notably small number when compared to the EU average of 24. It is also not a widespread practice to advertise academic job openings through international academic job search web pages, academic or professional journals, or academic association mailing lists. The key reason for this is that academics in Slovenia are expected to be able to teach using the Slovenian language, which significantly restricts the pool of potential candidates for academic vacancies. Hence, the number of foreign citizens employed at higher education institutions is still highly limited (in 2008, 2.7 percent of all higher education staff were foreign citizens; the majority employed as lecturers in language departments) (Kolar and Komljenovicˇ 2011, 3).

Academic career path: Hiring and promotion

There is no one single path of recruitment into an academic career in Slovenia. The most expected and desired path is that professors identify capable students during their undergraduate studies. Professors then encourage these students to continue on to graduate study. It depends a great deal on the position of the mentor within the institutional hierarchy and his or her informal influence and power whether the student will eventually make it into academic career at the home institution. Powerful mentors have more leverage to claim instructional needs and know how to negotiate new position openings. They also know how to prepare their students for academic careers in terms of “promotion points,” which they will eventually need to secure an academic appointment. Such conditions (i.e., the importance of mentors for initial talent identification and early career development) are naturally conducive to inbreeding. However, in the hiring and appointment processes for ranked academic positions [visokošolski uˇcitelji], that is, assistant professor or higher, the influence of mentors diminishes. Here, the practice is that deans 166 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding appoint the search and appointment committee following a fairly open and transparent process. However, informally, the expectations and the pressures from colleagues and others to hire internal candidates are inevitably strong and cannot always be resisted. Again, those who have been trained at the hiring institution under the mentorship of a well- informed and supportive mentor will be at an advantage, since the mentor will, in the course of the years of academic training and during the time spent in junior positions, prepare his or her protégés for appointment to rank. The impact of having sufficient information and preparation to face a fairly complex set of appointment requirements should not be underestimated. Also not to be underestimated is the importance of close social ties in Slovenia’s fairly small, tightly knit academic communities. The EUROAC data show more inbreeding in the STEM disciplines (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). Given the particular work arrangements in laboratories and clinical settings, we can assume that these contexts are more conducive to the formation of mentor– protégé relationships, which lead to preferential treatment in hiring of those from the home research team or lab group. The STEM disciplines traditionally receive the most money for research and enjoy the highest proportion of young researchers’ positions; therefore, these conditions contribute to the creation of personal networks and hiring “by acquaintance.” The development of mentor–supervisee ties depends on the particular path taken by each individual into the academic career. There are four distinct paths. After graduation, the mentor helps the student explore employment opportunities to stay at the same faculty, while pursuing postgraduate studies as a graduate student. From this arrangement stem the first two paths to the academic career. One comes through employment as a “young researcher” while pursuing a PhD and the second is through employment as an “assistant,” which is a nonladder appointment. First, positions for young researchers have existed since the 1980s as a particular scheme of government financing of postgraduate study and research training. At present, this scheme is administered through the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS). It is potential mentors who, together with their home institutions, apply to the agency for funding of a “young researcher” position. Those who are successful are then allocated funds to hire young researchers for a fixed term, up to a maximum of three and a half years for a PhD program.6 The mentors select postgraduate students who wish to become young researchers, and these Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 167 can be from any institution. The Slovenian Research Agency imposes only two eligibility conditions on student candidates: that their average grade for all examinations and course work at the graduate level is at least eight (out of ten) and that they fulfill the conditions for enrollment in postgraduate studies for a PhD. The selection of young researchers at the institution must be conducted by the host institution following an open call and in accordance with the agency’s guidelines on funding, evaluating, and monitoring research activity.7 Hence, the rules (at least formally) obstruct academic inbreeding, even though they do not necessarily prevent it. A young researcher is not required to do assistant work (i.e., teaching), but rather to do research work: he or she is paid to work on the PhD thesis, participate in the mentor’s research group, and sometimes do a bit of teaching (maximum three hours weekly, whereas for a professor the norm is six to eight hours and for assistants ten hours and more). Mentors might engage young researchers in other work – for example, lab work or sometimes research administration – but this is still the most comfortable path to enter an academic career. This path was strengthened in the last decades, but the current austerity measures have brought severe restrictions; in some disciplines (e.g., humanities), this option may even have become even marginal. The second path to an academic career is through employment as an assistant. Assistants belong to the category of nonranked higher education staff (together with language preceptors, librarians, sports and special skills teachers, etc.). The conditions to be elected to the role of assistant are to have a university degree with high accomplishment (a master’s, PhD, and/or or specialization) and show capacity for teaching, research, and/or artwork (as relevant). Unlike young researchers who can devote substantial amounts of time to working on their thesis project, assistants have to work 10–14 hours or more (up to 18 hours teaching, working in labs, examining students, etc.). In other words, assistants are hired on a fixed-term contract. It is especially common to see assistants hired into faculties that have high student enrollments, and thus high teaching needs, and insufficient funds for employing ranked academic staff. The hourly teaching rate of assistants is significantly lower than that of ranked staff, which allows institutions to do more teaching with fewer staff. Whether assistants will eventually be hired as ranked academic staff depends on two factors: if they succeed in gaining appointment to the rank of assistant professor (docent) and if a position opens up for them. It is possible that assistants are promoted to rank but remain employed as assistants if no positions open. 168 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding

Given that the professors typically choose the assistants among their own students, this arrangement is conducive to academic inbreeding. The third path into an academic career is taken by PhD holders who have self-funded their PhD studies, most frequently while working full- time or part-time in another job outside academia (and perhaps even outside Slovenia). It can occasionally happen that when particular competences are needed for teaching and there are no immediate candidates apparent from within the faculty (or other faculties), such candidates might be recruited into a ranked position. Again, the standard procedure would be to publically advertise a position, but certain individuals may be encouraged to apply. Indeed, the practice is that a particular academic “finds” the most suitable candidate, and this often implies encouraging one’s own former students to apply. The fourth and last path into an academic career concerns professionals not working in higher education institutions and not necessarily holding a doctorate. Individuals (with a PhD or without, if the teaching to be undertaken is related to specific professional competences) working in companies or government institutions are initially invited to help teach in particular course, on a contractual basis. From this arrangement a part-time, fixed-term employment can emerge to teach one course (which often corresponds to 25–33 percent employment). It is possible that such an individual eventually progresses into full-time employment. These four career paths have not changed much over the years, but the circumstances within institutions have changed significantly. There were periods (in the 1990s and the first half of 2000s) when there were many new open positions for young researchers and assistants. Nowadays, however – due to austerity measures – there is much less opportunity. Furthermore, criteria for first election to an academic title have become more stringent. Processes of appointment to academic rank are managed at the faculty level, both for new elections to rank and for those internal candidates who are applying for appointment to a higher rank [izvolitev v naziv]. Faculties tend to observe the appointment criteria strictly and discour- age candidates to apply for promotion if there are doubts that the application will be successful. These discussions tend to cause some tension between academics and deans and dean’s offices [dekanat]. Candidates apply directly to the faculty. Faculty leadership appoints three members to the appointment committee, from which one is not employed at the same faculty and often also not at the same university. The problem is that, due to the small size of the country, in some cases Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 169 it is impossible to find peers at other universities. Some disciplines and fields exist at one university only. Increasingly, foreign academics are invited to serve on the appointment committees. Having foreign academics as members of appointment committee reflects changes in the academic culture, also poses a significant challenge in terms of translat- ing the entire opus of candidates’ work into a foreign language, unless reviewers are sufficiently fluent in Slovenian. The members of the academic committee then prepare a report to the faculty leadership following the guidelines on appointments to academic title approved by the university senate. The faculty senate obtains the three reports and also checks all bibliographic and bio- graphic data on the candidate. It appoints a chair of the faculty human resources committee to ensure that all criteria in the guidelines are observed. The entire appointment file then proceeds to the standing university appointments’ commission [habilitacijska komisija]. This commission has 13 members, who cover all disciplines, and one student representative; however, among its members not all faculties are always represented. The commission discusses each candidate and votes on appointment. If the candidate obtains a majority of votes in favor, then the file goes back to the faculty senate, which has the final say, by which it is (in theory) also possible to reject the appointment, even if university commission approved it. The exception to this procedure is in appointments for full professors where the university senate, and not the faculty senate, has the final vote. This procedure is strict and also serves as a filter against any academic abuse. Especially over the last decade, commissions – which are respected bodies within universities – have emphasized international academic engagement of candidates among its criteria, and academic success at home is no longer a sufficient reason for promotion. Before the 1990s, due to a particular funding scheme, the funding earmarked for employment of academic staff was specified at the ministry for each faculty. That is, since faculties were independent legal entities, Slovenian universities did not make these decisions on this budget item for their faculties. Deans could discuss budget items with the ministry, but the ministry decided on the distribution on funds. Changes occurred after 1993 until an amended law in 1999 introduced lump sum funding, which was gradually implemented at the beginning of 2000s. At present, funding within the university is distributed by the rector and the management board according to mutually agreed criteria. So, in practical terms, this means that once the dean gets his or her share of the university cake, he or she then determines how much money he or she has 170 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding available for teaching. From this sum, he or she needs to cover the academic staff already employed and to ensure that all instructional needs are covered. This information determines whether and how much funding is available for opening new positions (or not). For any new position, approval from the rector is also needed: the competences of the rector have been strengthened in this regard in recent years. This change has reduced the power of the individual senior academic staff in terms of employing young academics. Due to the recent austerity measures in the public sector, the funding for universities has decreased in the past year significantly, effectively placing a freeze on any new appointments except if funded through external (e.g., research project or market income) funding. Given the massive curricular reform in Slovenian universities following the Bologna recommendations, there was a certain reconsideration of instructional needs and some new positions (part-time or full-time) have emerged due to this reform. However, with the Bologna reforms changes, also followed with respect to the criteria for hiring and promotion. Specifically, the shift has been toward a more unambiguously meritocratic approach to hiring. While the criteria for academic appointments have always been transparent, they were in the past more ambiguous and open to interpretation. In the last decade, the criteria for measuring research productivity in particular (but also teaching) have become strictly defined and quantifiable through bibliometric indicators. Our observation is that the present academic culture reflects the firm intention of the deans to find the best – academically strongest – candidates. These intentions are motivated by the rise of the evaluative academic culture conducted under the emerging political rationality of New Pub- lic Management, as applied to higher education. New instruments of quality and evaluation have been imposed on institutions through the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance, adopted in the framework of the Bologna process (ENQA 2005).8 These practices transcend approaches to hiring and promotion and, consequently, academics’ research choices and career pathways. The new quality assurance system imposes on institutions more stringent criteria for measuring academic research productivity and thus prompts institutions to be more mindful of these criteria in their academic human resources strategies, including academic appointments. Furthermore, the competition for public research funding has become fiercer and one crucial aspect of the selection criteria is candidates’ research productivity. Benchmarking institutions on scientific Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 171 publications, citations, and international collaboration has become the norm. The bibliometric criteria are adopted by independent government bodies – most importantly, the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency (NAKVIS) and the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) – and implemented not only through external quality assurance and reaccreditation procedures but also through external research funding schemes. The same criteria are promoted by the University of Ljubljana, especially, and the also Rectors’ Conference, and directed toward the newly established universities and other higher education institutions. The intention of various institutional and policy actors appears to be to push scientific activity to a more developed stage. Consequently, the institutions are imposing the same criteria on their subunits and on individual academics; this has significantly changed the expectations and choices in academic hiring and appointments by the deans and their academic appointments committees. Usage of bibliometric indicators is not uncontroversial and certainly should be debated in light of the possible effects it has on academic research choices and the academic profession, in general. All faculties must prepare annual business reports in the framework of these quality assurance systems. These reports include several items on scientific productivity and international cooperation in research: the number of scientific publications (from Web of Science data), the number of scientific publications with foreign partners (again, from Web of Science data), and the number of pure citations in the last five years. Slovenia’s faculties and universities are benchmarked against each other on these indicators. In addition, Slovenian universities, as others around the globe, compete on the international ranking lists. These developments are translated into the criteria for new appointments and, especially, into criteria for promotions to a higher rank, where “promotion points” are directly calculated from various bibliometric indicators. Such specific and quantifiable criteria diminish the influence of personal ties on hiring and promotion; however, they do not completely eradicate such influence, nor can they eradicate academic inbreeding in Slovenia due to the structural conditions discussed earlier.

International cooperation as a buffer to academic inbreeding

We have discussed above that Slovenia is a small, stratified higher education system with a rigid academic labor market, which is also fairly 172 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding closed to hiring foreign academics from abroad. In such a system, one way to combat academic inbreeding is to send Slovenian students to conduct PhD studies abroad. This has always been a reality, but in the past there were insufficient support mechanisms for candidates. The Slovenian government established in 2002 a general scholarship scheme, within the framework of the Slovene Human Resources Devel- opment and Scholarship Fund,9 to support the best students in the country to study at the best foreign universities. The requirement is that these students must return to the country and be employed in Slovenia for at least as many years they have received scholarship support. If they do not comply with this requirement, they are legally obliged to pay back the money. In 2012, EUR 8.5 million was granted for funding different forms of student mobility; most of this was earmarked for scholarships for Slovenian students to study in undergraduate and graduate programs abroad, although some of it was also to be used to attract postdoctoral researchers from the Western Balkan region (Slovene Fund 2013). While some of these students indeed returned and became employed at Slovenian universities, this certainly has not been a major trend. There are several explanations for this. In the recent years, there have been no new faculty openings in Slovenian universities due to the financial crisis. Perhaps a more important explanation lies in the social networks and the mentor–supervisee relationships discussed earlier, which still tend to favor internal candidates. Those trained abroad might not have sufficient information about all of the requirements of the appointment procedure and thus are less prepared to meet them. Appointment criteria include both research and teaching. Students studying abroad might not be aware of the specificities of the requirements or be unable to fulfill them in PhD programs that operate differently than the typical arrangements in Slovenia. The public perception of hiring at Slovenian public institutions still is that they seek to appoint the “very best internal candidates,” who of course fulfill all the specificities of the appointment criteria. This brings us to the final question of what can be done to mitigate the most frequently observed consequences of academic inbreeding: lower scientific productivity and academic stagnation due to limited connect- edness and information exchange with colleagues from outside own institutions. For Slovenia, the answer lies in short-term international mobility as part of internationalization strategies. Internationalization in general has been emphasized as a key policy objective in the nation’s higher education strategies (Kolar and Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 173

Komljenovicˇ 2011); to make progress toward this objective, academic mobility is highlighted as an important instrument. Academic mobility also features in institutional strategies: both in terms of teaching mobility schemes and through international research cooperation (Klemenciˇ cˇ and Flander 2013). There are several schemes to support outward mobility; however, typically these are not sufficient for longer-term mobility. Mobility grants, such as ERASMUS, administered by the Centre of the Republic of Slovenia for Mobility and European Educational and Train- ing programs (CMEPIUS), are typically sufficient only for short-term mobility for teaching (on average, one week for university teachers). Longer-term mobility is possible through research grants; however, these are portable to other EU countries only if a short-term stay in another EU country is part of a research project. Short-term mobility has also been incorporated into promotion criteria. Already in the 1990s, the University of Ljubljana implemented a rule that promotion to the title of professor title is not possible if the candidate has not worked for at least three months at a foreign university. This principle was also adopted by other universities. Recently, this rule has been extended to consideration of promotions to the title of associate professor (University of Ljubljana 2011). Both conditions have been inserted into the national guidelines on minimal criteria for academic appointments issued by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency (NAKVIS 2010). This condition does not tackle academic inbreeding directly, but it tackles it in a specific way in which it is perceived in Slovenia. Essentially, it tries to buffer the assumed negative effects of academic immobility, such as “more inward oriented information exchange and lower scientific productivity” (Horta 2013, 487), by incentivizing academics to participate in shorter or longer term mobility while employed at their institution. When it comes to appointments to academic rank, all of the universities follow the basic requirements for appointment developed by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency (NAKVIS 2010). These basic requirements include knowledge of at least one widely spoken foreign language. For appointment to full and associate professor, it is also required for the candidate to have conducted research, teaching, or artistic work at a foreign university or research institute for a minimum of three months (at least 30 days without interruption) after being awarded a PhD. At the level of assistant professor, a less specific requirement of active participation at the international level is stipulated (usually proved by attending conferences abroad or by activities within EU projects, etc.). These criteria have been adopted and extended 174 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding by the institutions and, in recent years, the proportion of staff that complies with this criterion is markedly increasing. At the University of Ljubljana (2011), candidates for promotion need to demonstrate various aspects of “international impact.” One aspect includes course leadership in international study programs, or teaching experience at a foreign university. Furthermore, in terms of demonstrating teaching capacity, this can also be done through thesis supervision (mentorship) of exchange students. No other specific aspects of working with incoming students are mentioned. In the scoring system for evaluation of candidates for appointment, the following international activities in teaching count toward appointment to an academic rank: participation in international projects for curriculum development, development of study methods, and so on; confirmed pedagogic work at a foreign university; organization of summer schools, seminars, and competitions with mostly international participants; and participation in organized pedagogic training (at the level of the university or internationally). The University of Maribor (2012) does not add any specific criteria regarding international teaching. As mentioned earlier, university statutes stipulate that working with international students is considered one of the regular work obligations of academics. However, in the scoring system for the evaluation of candidates for appointment, it is stated that lectures at a foreign university are valuated differently, depending on the number of hours taught. Also, lectures for incoming students at the University of Maribor are also counted. The University of Primorska (2013) has the same provisions as the University of Ljubljana when it comes to demonstrating teaching competences or international impact. For promotion to the rank of associate professor, but not for full professor, the candidate also needs to demonstrate international engagement (e.g., completed international or bilateral projects, research or teaching at foreign institution). The guidelines specify that shorter stays at foreign institutions score pro- portionally less, but can be added up to a maximum score for this category. The University of Nova Gorica (2013) added to the basic requirements several criteria on international engagement, such as: for assistant professors, it requires postdoctoral training abroad or study abroad, and for associate and full professors it requires cooperation with foreign institutions and groups. It also enables appointment of adjunct professors, for which teaching at a foreign university can serve as an example of pedagogic work. Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 175

In short, the expectation is that short-term mobility will help academics to remain connected with the international academic community and thus continue to progress academically. In other words, short-term mobility is a buffer for the potential consequences of academic inbreeding, even if it is not spelled out like this in national policies and regulations. The question of whether this approach works remains open. We will discuss the consequences of inbreeding in the next section.

Consequences of inbreeding

Despite a fairly high degree of academic inbreeding, especially at the two largest and oldest Slovenian universities, this does not appear to have the detrimental implications for academics’ research productivity as expected in the literature (Horta 2013). In the regression analysis of EUROAC data on the inbreeding qualifier, we have found no statistically significant differences between inbred and noninbred academic staff when it came to feelings of belonging to the faculty or university, or favoring teaching over research (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014), which are some of the key distinctions reported in other studies on academic inbreeding (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2010; Horta 2013). When asked to describe their research work in the past or current academic year, slightly fewer inbred academic staff (35.6 percent) report working alone on a research project than noninbred academics (37.2 percent) (Klemenciˇ c,ˇ Flander, and Žagar Pecjakˇ 2014). But when asked whether they collaborate with colleagues at other higher education institutions in Slovenia, surprisingly more – but not many more – inbreds responded affirmatively (78.5 percent, as opposed to 74 percent of noninbreds). Similarly, more inbred than noninbred academic staff report collaborating with colleagues abroad. One of the measures of internationalization was whether academics have lectured at home in a foreign language or lectured abroad, and on both questions inbred academic staff reported more of such activity than noninbred academics. For example, 48.5 percent of inbred academic staff report having lectured abroad in the last three years as opposed to 41.5 percent of noninbred academics. Similar findings are seen in success rates for acquiring international research project funding. More inbred than noninbred academic staff report participating in projects at home and abroad. The only slight exception here relates to serving as principal investigators in research projects funded from national sources – 16.4 percent of noninbreds 176 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding academics indicate they have been principal investigators in these contexts, as opposed to 15.0 percent of inbred academic staff. Inbred academics also appear to be more productive in terms of research, judg- ing from self-reported data on publishing books and articles, editing or preparing scientific reports, with the only exception being editing international scientific books (which as indicated by 10.4 percent of noninbreds, as opposed to 8.1 percent of inbred academic staff). This finding stays the same even if we filter the data according to academic rank. What we deduce from these data is that international engagement and also research productivity are higher among inbred academic staff. This can be explained by the fact that the most prestigious faculties and departments still tend to train and later employ the best PhD students. In the EUROAC data, the highest percentage of inbred academic staff are at the University of Ljubljana, which at the same time qualifies as the top Slovenian university; and the most competitive one when it comes to acquiring research funding. For example, in 2012, the University of Ljubljana was granted 65 percent of all grants (44 in total) from the Slovenian Research Agency for the purpose of establishing research programs (Slovenian Research Agency 2014). The case of Slovenia as a small and stratified higher education system clearly shows that not only are the structural conditions for academic inbreeding unique, but also that the consequences of inbreeding do not always confirm the propositions highlighted in the literature. The most inbred university is also the most prestigious and, overall, produces the most and best research in Slovenia. Because it is the best university, it tends not to hire PhDs from other Slovenian universities; rather, it still hires the best PhDs who are typically trained precisely at this university. We do not wish to claim that the University of Ljubljana could not benefit from attracting excellent foreign researchers if this was more practical – it certainly would. It is overall the best Slovenian university, but in global terms, it is a relatively minor player.10 But the fact of the matter is that academic inbreeding does not show detrimental consequences for this institution, when it comes to research productivity, despite what the literature suggests. There certainly are biases in hiring procedures, and, as elsewhere, the influence of tight social networks and mentor–protégé relationships is present. But these practices are of equal (if not even lesser) significance to academic inbreeding as the structural conditions explained earlier. Last but not least, we should add here that at the University of Ljubljana efforts are right now being made to simplify the process of Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 177 appointments to academic rank of the candidates who (may) come from abroad. On the other hand, the university recently got a grant for the promotion of internationalization; one of the actions is the employment of foreign experts for a longer period of time (at least one semester).11

Conclusion

We posit that the present causes of academic inbreeding in Slovenia do not lie as much in social factors as they do in structural and legal aspects of the Slovenian higher education system. As described in the introduction, personal ties up to nepotistic practices were undoubtedly common characteristics of all social institutions, including academia, before and after the political changes begun in 1990. We do not consider academic inbreeding to be a part of Slovenian academic culture in the sense that this culture would blindly favor personal ties over merit, or hold a conviction that homebred academics possess certain (necessary or desirable) qualities which those coming from outside do not have. However, we observe that the leverage held by individuals to influence academic hiring and promotions has been significantly curbed starting from 1990s on. Over time, both the criteria for hiring and academic appointments, as well as the associated processes have become more open and transparent and more meritocratic; however, structural conditions, such as the number of universities, the vertical differentiation of universities, and the relatively closed nature of the labor market for foreign academics, have largely remained the same or at least not changed significantly. On the system level, we see some phasing out of academic inbreeding. This has been provoked mostly by the emergence of new institutions and reinforced by the culture of measuring research excellence. The government measures specified in the Research and Innovation Strat- egy of Slovenia 2011–2020 (Kolar and Komljenovicˇ 2011) specifically address scientific excellence as well as researchers’ mobility, training, and career development. The objective stated in the strategy is also to strengthen the qualifications of the academic and research personnel and ensure effective interinstitutional and interstate mobility for researchers. Given the stringent policy on language of instruction, employing foreign researchers might come ahead of employing foreign academics for teaching. Sending students abroad to do PhDs with the intention that they will return to academic positions in Slovenia is much discussed, and the government has set up a significant scholarship 178 Slovenia: The Slow Decline of Academic Inbreeding fund for study abroad (Slovene Fund 2013). However, several conditions must be met to ensure their actual return. Availability of postdoctoral positions is one, and these are not widespread. The popular perception regarding job openings for ranked positions is that these still tend to be reserved for internal candidates. The conditions of academic work, especially in terms of time and resources available for research, do not necessarily make Slovenian universities highly attractive. For all these reasons, candidates who have completed their PhD abroad are more susceptible to brain drain. Given the small size of the Slovenian higher education system and the structural limitations to prevent academic inbreeding and in view of short-term mobility as a factor in the discussion of academic promotions, it makes sense, then, to discuss several different categories of academics in Slovenia – using Horta’s (2013) concepts: noninbreds, pure inbreds, intrauniversity inbreds, and mobile (pure or intrauniversity). Noninbreds are academics who are working in a faculty different from the one where they obtained their degree. Pure inbreds are those who have obtained degrees at all levels within same institution, that is, faculty or school. They have also not been engaged abroad at other universities for notable periods of time. This category of academics is increasingly small in Slovenia and is phasing out with the retirement of older professors and the conditions of new appointments. Intrauniversity inbreds are a category of academics who make sense in systems where universities tended to be highly decentralized. Until the mid-1990s, Slovenia’s two universities fit into this category. They acted as networks of legally and financially independent faculties. Moving between faculties within the same university meant changing professional context and social networks almost as if moving between two different universities. Most senior academics in Slovenia have spent their early academic career in this kind of fragmented university. Even at present, for a better understanding of academic inbreeding, it is relevant to discuss the extent to which, in practice, faculties may or may not be integrated within the same university in practice and how interconnected the various academic communities are. Finally, mobile (pure or intrauniversity) inbreds are working at the same faculty (or within the same university) where granted the PhD degree, but have spent significant amounts of time working at foreign institutions. In Slovenia, mobile inbreds are becoming a dominant category: academics tend to spend some periods of time abroad, but usually not extensive amounts of time. Nevertheless, international cooperation through international research projects and short-term mobility for teaching have presented a buffer for negative Manja Klemenˇciˇc and Pavel Zgaga 179 consequences of academic inbreeding, which in a small and stratified higher education system is structurally impossible to fully eradicate.

Notes

1. The more complete name for the EUROAC study is “The Academic Profes- sion in Europe: Responses to Societal Challenges.” This was a collaborative research project within the EuroHESC Program, conducted by INCHER Kassel and partner institutions from 2009 to 2012. 2. Those holding only a master’s degree cannot be employed as ranked professors, that is, assistant professors and higher ranks [visokošolski uˇcitelji], but only as assistants who have to obtain a PhD in due time otherwise they lose employment. 3. PPP conversion factor to market exchange ratio for 2012 (0.8 for Slovenia). 4. Available at http://english.ess.gov.si/ 5. The EURAXESS – Researchers in Motion portal is a joint initiative of the European Commission and the countries participating in the European Union’s Framework Program for Research. The portal provides access to a complete range of information and support services for European and non- European researchers wishing to pursue research careers in Europe. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/index.cfm/general/about 6. Available at http://www.arrs.gov.si/en/mr/predstavitev.asp 7. Available at http://www.arrs.gov.si/sl/akti/prav-sof-ocen-sprem-razisk-dej- jun-12.asp 8. Available at http://www.enqa.eu/pubs_esg.lasso 9. Available at http://www.sklad-kadri.si/en/ 10. Webometrics performed by the Cybermetrics lab (Spanish National Research Council) ranks University of Ljubljana 192 in global ranks, University of Maribor 431, University of Primorska 2375 and University of Nova Gorica 3065. Available at http://www.webometrics.info/en/Europe/Slovenia?sort= asc&order=World%20Rank 11. See http://www.uni-lj.si/aktualno/novice/2014022813271069/

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Introduction

There is a dearth of academic scholarship on the incidence and character of “academic inbreeding” in South African higher education, considered for the purpose of this volume to be a policy of employment that strictly favors a university’s own graduates who have no or little experience of education at any other universities and no significant outside work experience. This chapter explores the phenomenon of academic inbreeding in South Africa. To begin with, I critically review the notion of “academic breeding.” While I use the definition of “academic breeding” that serves as the departure point for the authors contributing to this volume, I argue that the definition is too narrow to encapsulate the range of academic inbreeding in South Africa that should be equally of concern. I then describe the South African context of higher education and the academic workforce and workspace in order to ground the discussion on the nature and extent of academic breeding and its possible causes and consequences in South Africa.

Conceptualizing inbreeding

For Horta, “academic inbreeding” is “a recruitment practice where universities hire their own doctoral students after graduation, who subsequently remain at the institution to work for their entire careers” (2013a, 488). A Turkish study similarly deﬁnes academic inbreeding as “a situation wherein PhDs are employed in the very same institution that trained them throughout their doctoral studies” (Inanç˙ and Tuncer 2011, 165). The phenomenon is, thus, “grounded in the principle of institutional immobility” (Horta 2013b). In contrast, “academics working at the same university where they held their doctoral degree but

182 Saleem Badat 183 having previously worked at another university after concluding the doctorate could not be considered inbreds” (Horta 2013a, 488). The reference to doctoral graduates is unnecessarily restrictive; the level of the degree held should be less of a concern than a person assuming immediately a post at the university from which he or she has graduated. A wider definition is especially “useful for assessing academic inbreeding rates and practices in disciplinary fields where ...hiring only those with a PhD (is) not necessarily the norm ...or in developing higher education systems where the majority of the academic population does not hold a PhD” (Horta 2013b). “Inbreds,” it is suggested, can be of two kinds: “pure-inbreds” are characterized by immobility in that they “have never performed research elsewhere, except at their own university, including during the doctorate degree and the post-doctoral period” (Horta 2013a, 492). “Mobile-inbreds” who join their alma mater, in contrast, “have spent scholarly-focused periods of time elsewhere either during their doctoral education, their post-doctoral period or both” (Horta 2013a, 492). The reality is that there are “many different types of inbreeding,” related to the number and levels of degrees received from the employing university, the nature, extent, and length of association with the employing university, and so forth (Eells and Cleveland 1935a, 266, 267). Concep- tual clarity on what constitutes “inbreeding” is therefore important. The phrase “academic inbreeding” conjures pejorative connotations. Even in the absence of scholarly and empirical research, it suggested a dangerous phenomenon that was destructive of the academic enterprise and to be shunned as a matter of policy and practice. As McGee noted in 1960, “although the practice seems to be almost universally deplored, there have been relatively few quantitative studies of it, and no systematic attempts have been made to explain its prevalence in the face of odium” (1960, 483). Academic inbreeding, it has been argued, “limits the exchange of scientific knowledge and leads to academic fossilization”; constrains knowledge production, which has detrimental effects of innovation and social development, and is a hindrance to merit-based academic appointments, which “limits the talent pool from which the selection is made”(Inanç˙ and Tuncer 2011, 165). It is implied that “inbred faculty are less creative, independent, connected and original than non-inbred faculty” and that “academically inbred faculty and their practices would ultimately lead to inferior scientific output when compared to non-inbred faculty,” since the “generation of new knowledge in a university relies extensively on the creativity of the researchers” and “the combination of a pool of existing and emergent 184 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case knowledge” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 4, 6). The concern is that inbreeding retards “external contacts with other educational, scientific and societal institutions” in a context where “openness and collaboration are of critical importance” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 4, 6). The empirical research on academic inbreeding emphasizes its negative consequences. Inbred “academics have lower levels of achievements when compared to their non-inbred counterparts” (Horta 2013a, 489). The prospects of “academic advancement, scholarly productivity, and outside professional recognition are distinctly greater” for noninbred academics (Eells and Cleveland 1935b, 328). Those academics who are inbred “publish on average fewer research outputs oriented towards international literature” (Horta 2013a, 507; Horta 2013b). Inbreds “frequently become steeped in the traditions and practices of their own institution (and) lack the broad outlook necessary to academic achievement” (McNeely 1932; cited by McGee 1960, 433). They also tend to “a reproduction of learned knowledge, practices, and a consolidation of social structures” (Horta 2013a, 490); prioritize “institutional loyalty ...over loyalty to the scientific field,” which gives rise to inertia, “a resistance to the implementation of new methods, theories and flexible forms of organization” and more “rigid institutions, because closed groups tend to consolidate and reinforce existing social structures over adapting new ones” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 22; Horta 2013a, 490–491). If the commentary on inbreeding is largely critical, it is recognized that “at some point in the development of higher education systems,” academic inbreeding “is likely to have been beneficial as it fostered a fast build-up of knowledge capability, research team cohesion, reinforcement of institutional identities and belonging, diminished risks including the recruitment gamble, and provided organisational stability” (Horta 2013b). Employing one’s own graduates can also represent “a public statement of confidence” in the quality of such graduates and “be a viable strategy for the development of a critical mass in a specialty area with the least investment of scarce resources” (Conrad and Wyer 1982, 46). It is noted that appointing new graduates to their alma mater “reduces the cost of the selection process, particularly the time devoted to assessing the applications of unknown candidates” (Godechot and Louvet 2010). It could also “be an attractive option for reducing uncertainty in hiring decisions” and lowering “hiring searching processes, long-term retrenchment costs, (and) the uncertainty of failure in the hiring decision,” which promotes “an efficient use of human resources ...and knowledge” (Conrad and Wyer 1982, 46; Horta 2013a, 491). Saleem Badat 185

Inbred recruitment can “enable a kind of ...academic efficiency” (Godechot and Louvet 2010). There is an appreciation that “imped- ing universities from hiring their own in transparent and meritocratic recruitment practices could lead them to lose resources that in some cases institutions – particularly those in developing countries – may critically need to develop key scientific areas” (Horta 2013b). There could even be “strategic reasons for the presence of academically inbred faculty, even if its negative consequences on scientific outputs are recognized;” some argue “that academic inbreeding is an integrant part of the development process of any higher education system” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 21). It has been further noted that “major research oriented universities always had a greater percentage of inbred” academics “because of their almost monopolistic position as producers of doctorates”; indeed, “a number of studies have shown this to be a consistent phenomenon across countries” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 6). This could equally be the case in small and highly differentiated national systems of higher education. With respect to Mexico, it is observed that “it is possible that inbreeding practices are moderated by the nature of the institution, such that in leading research oriented universities academic inbreeding would not be as damaging to scholarly activities” because of their “cosmopolitan environment” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 19; 18, 22). Similarly, other factors associated with outstanding research universities could also mediate the negative consequences of inbreeding: “inbred faculty ...would be exposed to an environment with greater quality, openness, collaboration and diversity in terms of ideas and practices which can minimize the negative effects of inbreeding” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 7). There are disciplinary differences with respect to inbreeding. Eells and Cleveland found that

the amount of inbreeding is almost twice as great in the biological sciences (40 percent) as in home economics (22 percent). It is markedly greater in chemistry (37 percent) and the biological sciences than in the physical sciences (28 percent). It is greater in education (34 percent) than in the general social-science ﬁeld (27 percent); in modern languages (33 percent) than in ancient languages (28 percent). (1935a, 66)

In so far as prestigious law schools in the United States are concerned, inbreeding at the top seven schools in the early 1990s was 35 percent “compared to 15 percent in a random sample of 872 law professors; 186 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case

38 percent of entry-level academics at 11 prestigious law schools were inbred as compared to an average of 20 percent across 32 schools.” An interesting finding is that “the great majority of inbred faculty are white males” (Eisenberg and Wells 2000, 378). While there is much commentary on the relationship between academic inbreeding and research and publishing, there is largely a silence in the literature with regard to the implications of inbreeding for teaching-learning, community engagement, and other aspects of institutional culture and life. It has been contended that inbreeding results in the “reproduction of learned knowledge (and) practices” and “favors an institutional assimilation of beliefs (and) norms” that can give rise to “a resistance to the implementation of new methods (and) theories” (Horta 2013a, 490, 491). It must be supposed, then, that inbreeding will have negative consequences for creativity and innovation in curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. One interesting finding in the Mexican case was with respect to community engagement: inbred academics “appear to be more involved ..., generating 46 percent more consultancy contracts and 8 percent more prototypes and patents than their non-inbred peers” (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007, 17). With respect to institutional culture, it is suggested that as “inbreds are more likely than others to preserve and transmit institutional traditions and values ...they can provide a powerful anchor against diverse educational currents” and “offer continuity that outsiders simply cannot bring to an institution” (Conrad and Wyer 1982, 46). Yet in a context such as South Africa where the transformation of universities and their academic and institutional cultures are urgent imperatives, inbreds could also hinder much needed changes. In relation to academic disciplines and department, inbreeding could stifle necessary epistemological, curriculum, and pedagogic innovation and ossify hierarchical relations between older and younger inbred academics.

The South African context

Racial discrimination under colonialism and apartheid and inequalities of an institutional and spatial nature related to class, “race,” and gender profoundly shaped South African higher education, establishing patterns of systemic inclusion, exclusion, and marginalization of particular social classes and groups. Apartheid ideology and planning resulted in higher education institutions that were reserved for different “race,” ethnic, and linguistic groups and allocated different ideological, economic, social, and educational functions in colonial and apartheid society. Saleem Badat 187

The differences in allocated roles constituted the principal basis of inequalities between the historically white and black higher education institutions prior to 1994. With the creation of a constitutional democracy in 1994, all South African higher education institutions needed to be liberated from this past to enable them to serve new societal goals. In 1994, the higher education “system” comprised 21 public universities, 15 technikons (polytechnics), 120 colleges of education, 24 nursing colleges, and 11 agricultural colleges. These differed widely in terms of the nature, breadth, and quality of academic provision, the adequacy of infrastructure and facilities, and the level of state investments and funding. By 2001, the colleges of education were either closed or incorporated into the universities and technikons. Thereafter, some of the 36 universities and technikons were either merged, unbundled, or incorporated, to give rise to the present landscape of 11 traditional universities, which offer largely degree programs; six comprehensive universities (one distance), which offer a wide range of degree, diploma, and certificate programs; and six universities of technology, which are vocationally and career focused. Two institutes of higher education were created in provinces without any universities and established as universities in 2013. The country’s 1996 Constitution (Republic of South Africa 1996) provided for private higher education institutions, on condition that they did not discriminate on the grounds of “race,” registered with the state, and maintained standards that were not inferior to those at comparable public educational institutions. Post-1994, a significant achievement has been more equitable access to higher education and the deracialization of the student body. By 2011, black students comprised 81 percent of the total student body of 938,200 and women some 58 percent (CHE 2013a). The overall participation rate in 2011 was 17 percent (CHE 2013a). The 2012 Green Paper for Post-School Education and Training notes that “despite the many advances and gains made since 1994,” higher education is “inadequate in quantity ...and, in many but not all instances, quality,” and that it continues “to produce and reproduce gender, class, racial and other inequalities with regard to access to educational opportunities and success” (DHET 2012b, x). The National Planning Commission (NPC) notes that “despite the significant increases in enrolment a number of challenges remain” and that universities have not been “able to produce the number and quality of graduates demanded by the country” (NPC 2011, 16). A key challenge for South African universities is engaging effectively with the historical “legacies of intellectual colonisation and 188 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case racialisation” and patriarchy (Du Toit 2000, 103). Du Toit argues “that the enemy,” in the forms of colonial and racial discourses, “has been within the gates all the time,” and that they are significant threats to the flowering of ideas and scholarship (Du Toit 2000, 103). Cultures characterized by colonial and racial discourses endanger “empowering intellectual discourse communities,” and “ongoing transformation of the institutional culture” is therefore a “necessary condition of academic freedom” (Du Toit 2000, 103). Transformation implies decolonizing, deracializing, demasculanizing, and degendering South African universities and engaging with ontological and epistemological issues in all their complexity and their implications for research, methodology, scholarship, learning and teaching, curriculum, and pedagogy. Thus, for example, Mamdani (2011) argues that “the central question facing higher education in Africa today is what it means to teach the humanities and social sciences in the current historical context and, in particular, in the post-colonial African context” (2011). Moreover, what does it mean to teach “in a location where the dominant intellectual paradigms are products not of Africa’s own experience but of a particular Western experience”? (Mamdani 2011).

The academic workforce and workspace

The academic workforce and workspace in South Africa has been powerfully shaped by the historical realities of colonialism and apartheid, and pre-1994 racism and patriarchy. Historically, there were no speciﬁc laws that prohibited the employment of black persons as academics, even at those institutions that were reserved for whites. The nonemployment of blacks, except in the disciplines of African languages, was a matter of social convention. At the dawn of democracy in 1994, academics at South African universities were overwhelmingly white (83 percent) and male (69 percent) (CHE 2004, 62). Although black South Africans (African, colored, and Indian) constituted 89 percent of the population, they comprised only 17 percent of academics. The underrepresentation of Africans was especially severe: although comprising almost 80 percent of the population, they constituted 10 percent of the academic workforce. Similarly, while women made up just over 50 percent of the population, they comprised 31 percent of the academic workforce of South African universities. It was only after 1994 that South Africa’s academic labor market became more open. The country’s 1996 Bill of Rights unambiguously proclaimed that individuals and “the state may not unfairly discriminate directly Saleem Badat 189 or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth” (Sections 9.3 and 9.4). One of the purposes of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (Republic of South Africa 1997) was to ensure “the right to fair labour practices.” In terms of the 1998 Employment Equity Act, as amended, there can be no absolute barriers to any individual applying for an academic post, being employed, or promoted. In 2012, the full-time permanent academic staff at the levels of professor, associate professor, senior lecturer, lecturer, and junior lecturer at South African universities totalled 17,451 academics (DHET 2012a). In the same year, there were an additional 34,122 temporary full-time and part-time contract staff, including student teaching assistants and tutors (DHET 2012a). While white academics (53 percent) and male academics (55 percent) continue to predominate, the representation of black and women academics has improved considerably since 1994 (DHET 2012a). The distribution of academics across universities continued to be characterized by the contours of “race” and ethnicity. In 2009, the proportions of black academic staff at universities ranged from 17 percent to 91 percent; gender distributions varied between 29 percent and 51 percent of academic staff (DoE 2010). A post- 1994 democracy could not be blind to these effects of colonialism and apartheid. Nor could it blithely proceed from a notion that the advent of democracy would in itself erase the structural and institutional conditions, policies, and practices that grounded inequalities in academic employment. It was this reality that gave salience to the idea of redress and made it a necessary dimension of post-1994 higher education transformation. The 1997 White Paper on higher education enunciated “equity and redress” as fundamental principles. This entailed “fair opportunities to both access and succeed,” and involved “not only abolishing all existing forms of unjust differentiation, but also measures of empowerment ...to bring about equal opportunity for individuals (1997, 1.18). The Employ- ment Equity Act of 1998 observed that ‘as a result of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices,’ there (were) disparities in employment, occupation and income.” A policy of employment equity was necessary to “promote the constitutional right of equality,” “eliminate unfair discrimination in employment,” and “achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative” of South Africans (Republic of South Africa 1998). 190 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case

In 2012, only 39 percent of academics at South African universities had a doctorate as their highest qualification, concentrated largely at the traditional universities as opposed to the comprehensive universities and universities of technology (DHET 2012a). Just over one-third (34 percent) of academics possessed master’s-level qualifications; they, together with academics with lower level qualifications, were mainly at comprehensive universities and universities of technology. Whether and to what extent inbreeding contributes to the relatively low level of academics with doctorates is an interesting research issue. Academics are usually employed following a period of postdoctoral work or on completion of doctoral or master’s degrees. They tend to enter universities at the junior lecturer or lecturer level and progress to senior lecturer, associate professor, and the professor levels on the basis of achievements related to teaching, research, community engagement, professional contributions, and leadership and management abilities. Academics are either employed in permanent, full-time tenured positions after a period of probation, or on full-time or part-time temporary contracts of varying duration (one to five years), depending on the nature of the post (temporary posts, replacement posts for academics on sabbatical, posts funded through “soft funding” by donors of various kinds). Academic salaries and benefits are negotiated between university managements and unions at the level of individual universities. South African academics are relatively well-remunerated, relative to professionals with similar expertise in the private and public sectors and academics in other countries (see Altbach et al. 2012). A recent study indicates that South African academics are the third best remunerated in Commonwealth countries (ACU 2013, 2). In 2011, professors in public universities earned on average US$83,000 per annum, associate professors $65,000, senior lecturers $54,000, lecturer $43,000, and junior lecturers $32,000 (HESA 2014). The remuneration package of full- time tenured academics usually includes a fixed annual salary as well as benefits related to pension, medical insurance, life assurance, and housing; in some cases, there are also rewards associated with research outputs. An academic occupation situates academics as part of the middle-classes and confers on them a middle-class lifestyle (Poulantzas 1978, 259). The perception that academics are relatively poorly remunerated, or that the increased workloads and demands on academics make an academic career less appealing, means that attracting, retaining, and cultivating next generations of academics is a challenge, especially in certain disciplines and fields such as statistics, accounting, and geology (HESA 2011). Saleem Badat 191

Recruitment and selection of academics is generally through open competition. Universities usually advertise academic posts in the major national weekend newspapers, on their own websites, and on other media platforms. They may also actively “head-hunt” and use search agencies and overseas specialist higher education media. However, universities are permitted, especially where employment equity may be fostered, to restrict their search for candidates to only advertising internally within the institution. They may also screen specific internal or external candidates for academic posts if they are deemed to meet all the requirements for the post. Thus, Rhodes University, a research-intensive university located in a small town, for which employment for spouses is a major challenge, has a formal policy of screening spouses if they are suitably qualified. Recruitment and selection processes are generally matters of institutional policy that are adopted by university senates (the highest academic decision-making body) and councils (the highest governance body, constituted by 60 percent external members and 40 percent internal members). Human resources departments of universities facil- itate processes of academic recruitment and selection by setting into motion selection committees; these committees are comprised largely of academics from relevant academic faculties and departments and are chaired, depending on the level of the appointment, by the head of university (vice-chancellor), deputy heads (vice-chancellors), deans of faculties, or senior academics; they may include trade union representatives. Typically, selection of academics is against a formal job profile that sets out the academic qualifications, expertise, and experience that are sought, the responsibilities to be undertaken, and the standards to be achieved. Successful candidates normally serve a period of probation of between 18 months and 36 months before they achieve tenure, though there is no formal tenure review as in the United States (Koen 2002, 412). Conditions for full tenure may include achievements such as completion of courses related to teaching-learning and postgraduate supervision, submission and evaluation of teaching portfolios, completion of or substantial progress on a higher degree qualification, or research accomplishments. Generally, clearly formulated criteria and processes exist for academic staff promotions, though in a differentiated higher education system it must be expected that promotion criteria and benchmarks will vary between universities in accordance with their missions and goals. At Rhodes University, academics may apply or be nominated for promotion and the applications are considered by a high-level 192 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case university academic promotions committee that is comprised of the vice-chancellor, deputy vice-chancellors, all academic deans, and six additional academics drawn from each of the six academic faculties. Also in attendance are two representatives of the trade union that represents academics. While the members of the academic promotions committee are selected on the basis of academic status, the six additional academics are selected to maximize diversity with respect to “race” and gender. Decisions on promotions involve peer judgements and are high stake for the academics involved; an appeal process is provided in the event that an academic is unsuccessful. The academic promotion criteria are also used for determining the status of new entering academics, in order to ensure there are no inequities between existing and entering new academics. In the face of South African labor and equity laws and the existence of a wide range of institutional actors and stakeholders (various governance bodies, student organizations, academic and support staff unions, and the like), violations of the formal rules related to the recruitment, selection, and promotion of academics – while not impossible – are not likely. To the extent that there are illegal and informal practices, this is more likely to be the result of the absence of, or weaknesses related to, formulated and adopted policies and rules, or individual misdemeanors rather than systemic abuses.

“Academic inbreeding” in South Africa

If “academic inbreeding” is defined as a policy of employment that strictly favors a university’s own graduates, who have obtained their highest degree from their alma mater and have no significant outside work experience, such policy does not exist at South African universities. Labor laws prohibit such policy, and universities with such a policy would be guilty of creating an absolute barrier to employment, which is illegal in South Africa. However, as will be noted, there has historically been extensive “inbreeding” of different kinds, including institutional inbreeding. There has been just one study on academic inbreeding in South Africa, which focused on the discipline of psychology. The authors claim that academic inbreeding has “reached almost epidemic proportions at South African universities” and that the “phenomenon has been described as a cancer in tertiary education” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 152). They suggest that various factors have contributed to inbreeding: the geographical isolation of South Africa, especially in the period prior to Saleem Badat 193 globalization and the proliferation of the new information and communication technologies; the absence of scientific exchanges with other African countries; censorship on the part of the apartheid state prior to 1994; the previous enforced division of universities and academics along lines of “race,” ethnicity and language; the different “political-cultural value system of certain academic institutions;” “political appointments” of academics, which “led to one-sided training and indoctrination;” the reality of “political affiliation, rather than academic credentials (being) the determining factor” in academic appointments; and academic sanc- tions and the cultural boycott during the apartheid period (Fouché and Louw 2001, 152). Fouché and Louw contend that academic appointments at a graduate’s alma mater “are almost the order of the day in South Africa” and that “the exposure of both learners and academics to such a limited mindset and academic framework can only be detrimental to the development of critical and creative thought” (2001, 153). They draw on Conrad and Wyer, who note that “prohibitions against inbreeding are based on the fear that institutional vitality will be harmed, that institutional parochialism and reduced productivity will result. Traditions may remain unchallenged, change may be hindered, and intellectual life and research efforts may become increasingly narrowed and stunted” (1982, 46). Conversely, they suggest that “academic productivity, external professional recognition and promotion opportunities are significantly greater for academics who are not inbred” (Conrad and Wyer 1982, 153). In their study of the psychology discipline, with a response rate of 36 percent (149 out of 411 questionnaires), Fouché and Louw found that 44 percent of academics “obtained their psychology qualifications from a single university” and that 63 percent of academics “graduated from the universities where they were employed” (2001, 156, 157). They also found that 46 out of 90 (51 percent) academics “had obtained all their qualifications (undergraduate and postgraduate) from the university where they were employed” and 37 (41 percent) academics “had completed their post-graduate studies at the university where they were employed” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 157). They, however, concede that “it is possible that some academics may have obtained a degree from the university at which they were employed at the time of the study, but been employed at other universities in the interim” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 158). The authors acknowledge that while “some individuals function opti- mally in constantly changing circumstances, ...others prefer stability and permanence” and that “the pool of South African universities is 194 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case limited” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 158). Still, they are of the view that inbreeding must be countered and fear that “too many academics do not fully realize the consequences of inbreeding” and that “the true danger of inbreeding ...lies in (its) insidiousness: (the) negative consequences are often not known until it is too late” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 166). They propose that “a department should ensure that not more than 50 percent of its staff have completed more than 50 percent of their studies in that department;” that appointments should prioritize “candidates from other universities;” that departments do not “employ individuals who obtained their post-graduate qualifications in that department, unless they have gained experience and/or obtained qualifications elsewhere;” and that departments should select no more than 50 percent of their “own students for master’s and doctoral degrees” (Fouché and Louw 2001, 158). While the authors contend that academic inbreeding has “reached almost epidemic proportions” and that appointments of graduates at their alma mater is pervasive, they provide no empirical evidence to substantiate these claims. One cannot generalize on the basis of a single study, which is simultaneously the study of a single discipline. Detailed empirical investigation is needed before one can make claims on academic inbreeding in South Africa. Furthermore, how extensively, by whom, and why inbreeding is considered to be “a cancer” is not specified at all. The reality is that academic breeding has neither been nor is an object of major discussion in South African higher education, and there is little consciousness about this issue. I am therefore skeptical that there is any informed and widespread consensus about inbreeding being “a cancer.”

Propositions on inbreeding

In the absence of a detailed study on academic inbreeding in South Africa and on the basis of informal conversations with some university leaders, senior academics, and senior human resource ofﬁcials, I wish to advance four propositions. First, rather than being a policy of employment or the result of institutional policy or informed and conscious choice, inbreeding is the outcome of certain institutional conditions and a matter of dispersed individual choices and informal practice (McGee 1960). Second, there is considerable inbreeding (in the region of an average of 40–50 percent) in South African higher education, at all kinds of universities (traditional, comprehensive, and universities of technology) and individual universities, and in most disciplines and ﬁelds. Saleem Badat 195

Third, inbreeding is likely to be more pronounced at the prestigious research-oriented universities, universities of technology, the previously historically black universities, and those universities that previously used or continue to use Afrikaans as the medium of teaching. For example, at Rhodes University, a prestigious research-oriented university, in 2012 36 percent (121 out of 336) of academics received their higher degrees at their alma mater: 100 (30 percent) were “mobile inbreds” (had experience of studying or working elsewhere) and 21 (6 percent) were “pure inbreds” (with experience largely only of their alma mater). Senior informants with considerable insights estimate extensive inbreeding at the universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, both prestigious research universities, with considerable variations according to disciplines and fields. The beauty of the geographical environments in which these two universities are located was also remarked upon as a possible contributor to inbreeding. Fourth, private higher education colleges as relatively new phenomena – and essentially undergraduate degree, diploma, and certificate awarding institutions – will be characterized by negligible inbreeding. Their academic staff will almost certainly be products of the public universities. The causes of academic inbreeding in South Africa are likely to be varied. The prevalence of inbreeding could be an effect of the relatively small size (23 universities) of the South African higher education system, reinforced by the absence of any deliberate policies to mitigate the adverse consequences, such as state-sponsored training of academics in other countries. Seven universities produce 74 percent of all doctoral graduates and the bulk of peer-reviewed scientific publications; these institutions are likely to seek to retain their outstanding doctoral graduates for postdoctoral work and as the next and new generations of academics. Certain fields and disciplines (such as veterinary science, medicine, dentistry, engineering, and architecture) are confined to a small number of universities and produce small numbers of doctoral graduates. Both the cases noted above will encourage inbreeding, unless this is combatted by deliberate policies of postdoctoral work being prohibited at the university that awards the doctoral degree, or by policies supporting academics being trained in other countries or by active recruitment of academics from other countries and universities. Choosing among candidates who are deemed to be suitable for an academic post, there could be the temptation on the part of selection committees – and especially the members of an academic department – to select candidate X, who has either undertaken his or her highest degree or conducted much of his or her academic study at the university 196 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case doing the hiring. Various issues could play a role here: familiarity with candidate X; candidate X is an outstanding academic who has already made his or her mark or displays great potential as an academic; candidate X has already undertaken tutoring and some teaching for the hiring department and university; candidate X works on the same research issues as the supervisor and other academics at the hiring university; candidate X is a “safe option” because he or she is known and is “one of us,” rather than unknown and “different”; candidate X’s familiarity with the hiring university means that he or she can “hit the ground running.” When a university takes a decision to restrict recruitment to internal advertising, it is on the basis of awareness that there are suitable internal candidates. While the internal candidates may not always have undertaken their highest degree at the hiring university, it is probable, especially in the case of posts at the entry junior lecturer and lecturer levels. A similar dynamic likely prevails when the decision is to screen a candidate for an available academic post, particularly in the case of entry-level junior lecturer and lecturer posts. However, internal advertising and screening are not the norm, but exceptions. From the perspective of quality, it is pertinent to observe that at the doctoral level (and usually at the master’s level), there is external examination of dissertations, and at some universities supervisors are precluded from functioning as examiners. In light of the apartheid past, a key challenge is the deracialization and degendering of the academic workforce and ensuring that more blacks, women, and people with disabilities become academics. An imaginative national program to develop the next generations of academics has been formulated, and it has been recognized that this “deserves to be implemented” (HESA 2011; NPC 2012, 319). Those identified as potential academics and committed to an academic career are employed as apprentice academics. The large majority register for their higher/highest degrees at the university where they serve their academic apprenticeship. Thus, unless current practices are changed, important initiatives to build the next generations of academics (and especially black and women academics) will result in inbreeding. Should the proposed national program be implemented, the degree of inbreeding at universities could increase. There is also another way in which inbreeding could be intensified. As only 39 percent of academics possess a doctorate, the NPC has called for improving “the qualifications of higher education academic staff ...to over 75 percent by 2030” (NPC 2012, 319). Three Saleem Badat 197 factors may result in many academics registering for a higher qualification at their institution of employment. The South African funding framework provides universities large public subsidies for master’s and doctoral graduations; universities could be tempted to encourage academics to register at their own institutions, while staff fee rebates and other financial support could be additional incentives. As the higher degree will, in most instances, be undertaken through largely part-time study, convenience will be a second factor. Familiarity with the institution and academic colleagues could also play a role; an academic becoming incorporated into an existing or new research program at his or her institution could be a further reason for registering at one’s own institution. A mitigating factor is that not all South African universities are accredited to provide doctoral programs in every discipline or field, and academics may thus need to undertake their doctoral work at other universities. South Africa’s production of postgraduates is incongruent with its level of economic and social development, and there is considerable emphasis on increasing the quality and numbers of master’s and doctoral graduates (DHET 2012b, 42). The NPC proposes that “by 2030 over 25 percent of university enrolments should be at postgraduate level” (15.5 percent in 2010) and that there should be “more than 5,000 doctoral graduates per year against the figure of 1,420 in 2010” (NPC 2012, 319). Research master’s and doctoral programs based on research dissertations (as opposed to professional, usually coursework-based study) involve close professional relationships between students and supervisors, which occasionally meld into personal relationships. Academic supervisors are encouraged to identify undergraduates with academic potential, support them to proceed to postgraduate study, and promote the idea of an academic career. These strategies could also promote inbreeding as an informal practice. Notwithstanding the existence of formal policies and processes regarding appointments and promotions and the requirement for members of selection committees to declare any personal relationship to candidates, it would be naïve to imagine that social networks play no role in academic recruitment and selection. Informal lobbying on behalf of candidates occurs on the basis of the strength of the academic profile of specific candidates, the requirements of academic departments, the implied danger of losing a good candidate to another university should he or she not be successful, and social equity imperatives. Inbreeding can have potentially adverse consequences at the levels of individual academics, institutions, and the national system of 198 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case higher education. At the individual level, the inbred academic will likely have been supervised by an academic in the department of which he or she is already a member (or will join). He or she could also have been a member of a research program in the academic department, and/or undertaken tutoring and teaching. On the one hand, there is the advantage that the inbred academic would be entering a familiar environment, be able to maintain momentum in teaching and research, and possibly become more rapidly productive in research and publishing than an outside candidate. On the other hand, there can be power relations that work to the detriment of the inbred academic: he or she could become a “clone” of senior academics, locked into their research concerns, paradigms, orthodoxies, methodology, methods, and techniques, and stifled in pursuing his or her own research issues and approaches. The extent to which inbred academics in South Africa manifest the lower levels of scientific productivity and extra-institutional connections found in other countries is a matter for empirical investigation. My hypothesis is that the impact of inbreeding on individual research productivity will be conditioned by the kind of university and academic department in which inbred candidates are employed. Inbred academics are likely to approximate the norms, standards, and benchmarks of academic productivity of their universities and academic departments. Research and postgraduate-oriented universities – and academic departments with a high reputation for teaching, research, and postgraduate quality and outputs – tend to seek out and employ outstanding candidates, whether inbred or otherwise. In this case, inbred academics are likely to be as productive as other academics. Conversely, at universities of technology and the principally undergraduate teaching universities, inbred academics are likely to approximate the norm for these universities and their departments. From the perspectives of reproduction and transformation, inbred academics are likely to reproduce existing conditions and performance at universities and in academic department rather than transform them. If this is indeed so, universities and academic departments whose goals are to enhance teaching quality, cul- tivate research cultures, or increase research productivity are unlikely to achieve these goals by appointing inbred candidates and particularly “pure inbreds.” Beyond the source of their highest degree and their absence or lack of experience of other universities or work environments, inbred South African academics are likely to differ from noninbreds. For one, their nonexposure (or limited exposure) to other university and extra- university environments could mean that they are poorly equipped to Saleem Badat 199 introduce, contribute to, or deal with the institutional changes that are necessary in a complex and challenging higher education environment. In post-1994 South Africa, the issue of the transformation of academic and institutional cultures looms large and calls for openness, intellectual and organizational creativity, and institutional innovation. For another, the limited experiences of inbreds – if combined with an uncritical loyalty to existing traditions, customs, and practices – could result in them becoming bulwarks against institutional change. Paradoxically, it is also possible that under certain conditions the sustained exposure of inbred academics to their institutions could equally make them harbingers of institutional change. Turning to the institutional level, in South Africa, models of academic governance and academic organization are fairly uniform and are the products of laws, policies, customs, and traditions generally associated with modern British universities. However, South African universities are not immune from global trends and fashions, and today many are criticized for an alleged drift toward mangerialism and corporatism and the diminution of academic self-rule and authority. Aspects of governance, traditions, norms, and rituals could be shaped by academic inbreeding; how, in what ways, and to what extent this has occurred are questions for empirical investigation. To approach academic inbreeding in South Africa parochially, as a purely institutional matter, is to obfuscate other kinds of inbreeding spawned under apartheid by racism and patriarchy. Fouché and Louw suggested that the causes of inbreeding included the historical racial, linguistic, and political division of academics and universities, censorship, and the role played by “political affiliation” in academic appointments (2001, 152). Intellectual discourse, academic programs, student admissions, and the academic workforce were powerfully shaped by racism, sexism, and political interference, which resulted in inbreeding based on “race” and gender, as well as epistemological, theoretical, and methodological orientations. This robbed universities of the intellectual and social diversity, which are the wellsprings of scholarly and institutional vitality. Discourses associated with apartheid continue to shape knowledge production and the preparation of new graduates and new academics (Herman 2008). Given this and the imperative of social inclusion and justice in and through higher education, a key challenge is intellectually, academically, and culturally transforming South Africa’s universities and reorienting them to serve new constitutional and social goals. This requires robust questioning of the roots, objects, and content of 200 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case disciplines, disciplinary traditions, and the epistemologies, ontologies, methodologies, concerns, issues, and questions that have been dominant – and which have perhaps constrained scholarly thought and writing. Overcoming the academic inbreeding rooted in racism and patriarchy, as well as intellectual and epistemological inbreeding, is as important as the inbreeding based on the source of the highest degree and experience largely of a single institution. It follows that, at the level of the higher education system, South Africa should avoid parochial and ultranationalistic approaches to the employment of academics, as this could have adverse consequences for the vitality of its system. Geographic, national, cultural, and linguistic difference and diversity are powerful wellsprings of institutional vitality and intellectual, scholarly, personal, and institutional development. Diversity is a necessary condition for “human learning, understanding and wisdom” and a powerful means of “creating the intellectual energy and robustness that lead to greater knowledge” (cited in Moore 2005, 8). Further, “diversity enriches the educational experience” by providing opportunities for learning “from those whose experiences, beliefs and perspectives are different from” one’s own (Moore 2005, 9). Con- versely, institutional and scholarly life is diminished by an absence of diversity, which also “compromises an institution’s ability to maintain its own missions and goals” (Moore 2005, 2, 9). At South African universities, 19 percent of master’s and 25 percent of doctoral graduates are international students, largely from the rest of Africa (CHE 2008, 40, 42). They enrich South African universities and are a potential pool of the next and new generations of academics. There are two dilemmas: one is the risk of a “brain drain” that denudes other African countries of graduates, and the other is that legislation provides for only black, Chinese, and female South Africans to be beneficiaries of employment equity. While the employment of “suitably qualified” black and female South Africans must be a priority, there should be little impediment to employing talented international – and especially black and female – graduates of South African universities, and outstanding academics from other African countries and elsewhere. These academics can contribute to transforming and developing South African universities and are an important counterbalance to inbreeding based on nationality.

Conclusion

Academic inbreeding – whether as a policy of employment that strictly favors a university’s own graduates who have no or little experience of Saleem Badat 201 education at any other universities or outside work experience, or as a matter of informal practice – can potentially constrain the development of South Africa’s universities and its higher education system as motors of the production of professionals and knowledge for economic and social development. Concomitantly, other kinds of academic inbreeding predicated on racism, patriarchy, prejudice and intolerance, and political interference in universities equally constrain learning and teaching, as well as the cultivation of graduates and knowledge production. Inbreeding is best countered by a number of conditions and strategies. First is to genuinely value and institutionalize intellectual, epistemological, methodological, and social (including “race,” class background, gender, language, nationality, sexual orientation) diversity as necessary conditions for institutional, scientiﬁc, and scholarly vitality. Second is to actively promote through policy, planning, and funding mechanisms high levels of mobility of postgraduate students and academics across universities, other institutions, and national boundaries, along with collaboration across universities and countries around student supervision (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 42, 43). Third is to ensure that there are open, transparent, and equitable processes of academic recruitment, selection, and promotion. Ultimately, it appears that there are three critical issues related to inbreeding. One is the speciﬁc historical and structural features and “stage of institutional development” of a university and higher education system and their implications for academic employment (Horta 2013b). There is merit in the argument that

at the early stages of development of higher education systems (and universities), the practice of academic inbreeding is unavoidable and perhaps necessary or desirable since it permits to quickly build up research and teaching capacity. It also fosters stability, the enhancement of shared beliefs, and the consolidation of collaborative agendas. (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 37)

In this context, “academic inbreeding tends to be a characteristic of elite universities throughout the world because both tend to emerge during the early stages of the development of higher education systems” (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 36). This occurs because universities wishing to become “national elite” universities need “to quickly build up better research and teaching capabilities than other universities. To do so, they tend to hire their own doctorates” (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 36). Over time, such elite universities tend 202 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case to “maintain an almost monopolistic position as main producers of doctorates”; universities that are established later generally have lower inbreeding rates than elite universities “and tend to hire doctorates from elite universities” (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 36). There may, therefore, be good institutional reasons why, despite the possible pitfalls of inbreeding, a university may still employ so-called inbreds; thus, “a policy that forbids or severely limits inbred hiring, promotion, or retention may not be in the best interests of any institution” (Conrad and Wyer 1982, 48). Inbreeding could be a deliberate institutional strategy related to the level of development of the university, linked to specific institutional missions and goals, or a matter of the deployment of resources. Various institutional mechanisms could mediate and moderate adverse consequences of inbreeding. When a university employs an “inbred candidate,” it does not mean that an incompetent or less competent candidate has been chosen over a more competent one. The real issue is not one of inbred candidates, as a so-called inbred candidate could possess an outstanding academic track record and be the superior candidate compared to candidates from other universities. The fundamental problem is a policy of employment that stringently favors a university’s own graduates who have no or little experience of education or work at any other universities or institutions. This “con- tradicts the ...universalistic values of the academic community: the impartial selection” of the most suitably qualified scholar for a particular academic post and largely, unless related to goals of equity and redress, “an indifference towards the candidates’ social characteristics or personal ties” (Godechot and Louvet 2010). A second critical issue regarding inbreeding is the extent of understanding of the comparative historical dimension of inbreeding and the relative advantages and negative consequences of inbreeding. Academic inbreeding needs “to be understood contextually” and historically: if at specific moments it can serve useful purposes in the development of universities and national system of higher education, at other moments it could “become more detrimental than beneficial” and induce “inertia, institutional parochialism, and intellectual isolation” (Horta, Machi, and Yonezawa 2011, 37). The third critical issue is the need, in the face of institutional conditions and diverse higher education goals, to cre- atively formulate and implement employment policies and strategies that can sensitively address and mediate challenges effectively and per- mit ways to realize possibly paradoxical university and system goals simultaneously. Saleem Badat 203

In a context of the lack of scholarship on academic inbreeding, there is very little discussion on this issue in the South African academic or policy community. In light of the radicalized and gendered development of the South African academic community, inbreeding is likely to be strongly condemned. Conceptualizing “academic inbreeding” rigor- ously would evoke considerable debate, as theoretical and conceptual clarity loom large in South African higher education scholarship. For the moment, however, academic inbreeding is not an issue on the policy horizon. To the extent that it becomes an issue of concern, little intervention will be necessary at the legal level as South African employment laws favor equity of access and opportunity. More likely is that greater awareness of the dynamic of inbreeding will result in higher education research community and universities more purposefully addressing the historical and contemporary extent, facilitating conditions, and possible beneﬁts and drawbacks of inbreeding.

References

Altbach, Philip G., Liz Reisberg, Maria Yudkevich, Gregory Androushchak, and Ivan F. Pacheco. eds. 2012. Paying the Professoriate: A Global Comparison of Compensation and Contracts. New York: Routledge. Association of Commonwealth Universities. 2013. ACU Spotlight: Academic Staff Salary Survey 2012–2013, No.4, October. London: ACU Programmes and Policy Unit. Conrad, Clifton F. and Jean C. Wyer. 1982. “Incest in Academe. The Case for Selective Inbreeding.” Change 14: 45–48. Council on Higher Education (CHE). 2013a. Higher Education Participation 2011. Pretoria: Council on Higher Education. Council on Higher Education. 2008. Post-Graduate Studies in South Africa: A Statis- tical Study. Pretoria: Council on Higher Education. Council on Higher Education. 2004. South African Higher Education in the First Decade of Democracy. Pretoria: Council on Higher Education. Department of Education (DoE). 2010. Education Statistics in South Africa 2009. Pretoria: Department of Basic Education. Department of Education. 1997. Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education. Government Gazette No. 18207. Department of Higher Education and Training. 2012a. HEMIS 2012 Source Data, Tables 3.3 and 3.4; Personal Correspondence. Department of Higher Education and Training. 2012b. Green Paper for Post-School Education and Training. Pretoria: Department of Higher Education and Training. Du Toit, Andre. 2000. “Critic and Citizen: The Intellectual, Transformation and Academic Freedom.” Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies 9 (1): 91–104. Eells, Walter C. and Austin C. Cleveland. 1935a. “Faculty Inbreeding: Extent, Types, and Trends in American Colleges and Universities.” The Journal of Higher Education 6 (5): 261–269. 204 Academic Inbreeding: The South African Case

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Introduction

Inbreeding, in the real biological sense, is not strange in Spanish history. The Hispanic Empire, one of the biggest in history, was run by the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs. This dynasty (1516–1700) frequently saw the marriage of close relatives in such a way that consanguineous unions were prevalent. In the historical literature, it has been suggested that inbreeding was a major cause of the extinction of the dynasty, when King Charles II “the Bewitched,” physically and mentally disabled, died in 1700 without begetting any children from his two marriages. It is likely that the occurrence in Charles II of genetic disorders could explain most of the complex clinical proﬁle of this king, including his infertility, which ultimately led to the extinction of the dynasty (Alvarez, Ceballos, and Quinteiro 2009), provoked the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), which involved most European countries and eventually triggered the end of the Hispanic Empire. Nevertheless, inbreeding (endogamia in Spanish) in the academic sense is a relatively new word in Spanish. Academic endogamia entered the Dictionary of Current Spanish only in 1999 as a second meaning of the word. This is because, as we will explain in this chapter, academic inbreeding in Spain – although rooted in several historical, sociological, and cultural factors – is a direct consequence of the governance model of Spanish universities that was implemented after the Franco dictatorship. The speciﬁc way of understanding university autonomy in the last 30 years triggered the academic inbreeding we now see. The previous system had many other faults, but not inbreeding. Academic

206 José-Ginés Mora 207 inbreeding is also the consequence of the low level of geographic mobility within the country among Spaniards, in general, and academic staff, in particular. Generally speaking, inbreeding is not perceived as a serious problem among Spanish university staff and leaders or even in the society as a whole. Nevertheless, the most international and dynamic sector of the faculty believes that academic inbreeding is feeding a dangerous parochialism in institutional governance and leadership, which is certainly slowing down the competitiveness of Spanish universities in a global world and, consequently, the intellectual growth of the country and its development in the knowledge economy.

The Spanish higher education system

Higher education in Spain consists almost exclusively of universities. There are 80 universities, 50 of which are state financed and public, while 30 are private; some privates are owned by the Catholic Church or other organizations, a few of them are for-profit institutions (e.g., part of the Laureate International Universities network), and there are even some private universities owned by foundations which belong to regional governments (a peculiar way of avoiding the rigidity of the national rules for public universities). The number of universities has risen in recent decades: in 1968, there were only 17 universities in Spain. The increase in the number of private universities has been even more recent. In the academic year 2011–2012, there were 1.6 million students, a number that has remained relatively steady in the last decade after previous decades of expansion. Of that student population, 88 percent were enrolled at public universities. Six universities (one public and five private) are distance learning based, accounting for 13 percent of the total student population. While the number of students enrolled has stabilized, the participation rate in the higher education system has increased considerably. It can be estimated that roughly 50 percent of the secondary education graduates are entering higher education. About 54 percent of university students are women, but the proportion of women among university graduates reaches 59 percent. Formally, all universities have a similar structure and scope as a consequence of the traditional strict state regulation. In principle, all universities may deliver programs of any level and are engaged in research activities. Consequently, it is expected that academic staff at all universities undertake research activities. This is an important trait 208 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities for defining the academic profession in Spain that has important consequences for workload, status, and promotion. Private universities, generally speaking, are more focused on teaching activities, and, with few exceptions, research is not an institutional priority. Research in Spain, mostly conducted by universities and the CSIC (Council of Scientific Research), has reached a good level of academic productivity. The percentage of Spanish publications in terms of world production (measured by number of publications in the Science Cita- tion Index, or SCI) in 2011 was 3.04 percent, placing Spain as 9th in the world in this ranking (SCImago). Nevertheless, the contribution of applied research to development (in the form of patents and technology transfer, etc.) is not so optimistic. As we will discuss later, these facts have something to do with the assessment of academic staff, which has focused more on academic production and less on other academic outcomes. As in the rest of Europe, the old university model changed dramatically in the 19th century. Spain adopted the Napoleonic model of higher education. Universities were organized as state agencies totally regulated by laws and norms issued by the state at the national level. Professors were members of national bodies by discipline and moved frequently from one university to another. This situation began to change during the 1970s, when the system started to shift from elite to mass higher education. In 1983, the University Reform Act (LRU) was passed, resulting in a profound transformation in the Spanish higher education system. Universities became autonomous entities and responsibility for universities was transferred to regional governments (Mora 2006). Nev- ertheless, the Napoleonic tradition of civil servant staff remained, and the central government still has the capacity to establish general rules for salaries, duties, access conditions, and promotion across all public universities. Another remarkable consequence of the LRU was the strong democratization of the internal structure of universities. The power was transferred to collegiate bodies, where nonacademic staff and students are also present in considerable numbers. Boards with large numbers of members make the decisions on schools and departments and elect deans and heads of departments. On the other hand, the real influence of external stakeholders is minimal. This situation has played a critical role in the increase of inbreeding in the last few decades. A new legal framework was drawn up by the central government toward the end of 2001 and reformed in 2007 (Ley de Ordenación Universitaria, LOU). This act established the National Agency of José-Ginés Mora 209

Accreditation (ANECA), which accredits not only study programs but also individuals. This is important because this has changed the rules for hiring and promoting academic staff, as we will explain later.

Academic staff

As we will show further along, nowadays the level of inbreeding in Spanish universities is very high. This is a consequence of several factors. One of them is the change in the structure and organization of academic staff that happened in the last decades. To understand the current situation, it is necessary to have a look at the previous system.

The old structure of academic staff The current structure of academic staff in Spain was deeply shaped by the legal changes implemented during the 1980s (Mora 2001). For- merly, tenured academic staff belonged to national bodies, organized by discipline, and had civil servant status. Appointments to a position in a university were made at the national level in a process where the university with the vacancy was not involved. For instance, when a university had an available position in the category of catedráticos (the highest category of professors), a public call was made to occupy the position. Only catedráticos from other universities and the same discipline were eligible to present their candidacy. Seniority in the national body of catedráticos was the main reason for being selected for the vacant position. When nobody from the national body applied for this vacancy, an open competition (oposición) for candidates with the legally determined requirements was held to cover the vacancy. The selected candidate was appointed as a member of the national body of catedráticos and sent to the university where the vacancy was available. The new catedrático was placed at the bottom of the ladder (by disciplines), and, in most cases, these individuals started a long pilgrimage from a smaller university to reach a position in another university considered more important – at that time, starting in the only university of the Canary Islands and ending in Madrid, Barcelona, or one’s original alma mater was the regular path for many academics. The internal organization of universities was extremely hierarchical. Departments did not exist and the basic unit was the chair occupied by the catedrático. Each catedrático headed his or her own chair for all teaching and research issues and was in charge of all the people working 210 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities in the chair. The second category of tenured staff (adjunct professors) developed a dependent function in relation to the chairs. Although the legal status of nontenured staff was not too different from what we currently see, their direct dependence on the chair made their career position very closely linked to the personal relationship with the chair holder. It is important to remark that, at that time, inbreeding was not relevant in Spanish universities. On the contrary, institutional mobility was high. Nevertheless, there was a kind of “discipline inbreeding” in the sense that only people protected by the gurus of the discipline were able to begin climbing the ladder. There was an informal network of professors by discipline that (again, informally, yet crucially) supported (or not) the candidates for new positions. In some cases, when the network was split into groups with different favorite candidates, the competition for the new position could be ﬁerce. The situation, in spite of the lack of inbreeding, was not a model of intellectual freedom and equality. Loyalty to “old professors,” and not necessarily academic merit, was the main condition to progress in the academic career.

The current structure of academic staff The University Reform Act of 1983 deeply changed the former situation of academic staff. The main structural changes were as follows: (a) departments, with several professors working together and sharing teaching and research activities, substituted the former individual chairs; (b) professors are now appointed only for one specific university, and they have to compete against any other candidate if they wish to move to another university. The legal changes implemented during the 1980s have deeply shaped the current structure of the academic profession in Spain. The hierarchical system based on the individual power of the chair holder and the excessive influence of the national guild of chairs holders collapsed. The current situation of academic staff is considerably more open and better adapted to university needs. Nevertheless, new conflicts, as well as unresolved longstanding problems, were turning up, especially related to selection mechanisms and increasing inbreeding. One of the remaining problems is that salaries and working conditions are defined by the central government. Con- sequently, there are no economic stimuli for mobility: all universities are offering the same salaries and benefits. Another problem, closely related to inbreeding, is the system of access to the academic career and promotion of academic staff. José-Ginés Mora 211

Entry to the academic profession There are two main starting points for an academic career: interns and assistants. Professors hire interns for research projects (they are paid by the funds available during the duration of the project) or they can receive a public grant (for a limited period of time). Assistants are academic staff with some teaching load, responsible for practical lectures or laboratory work with students. Generally speaking, interns and assistants are also simultaneously doctoral students preparing their thesis in the same department in which they are working. Under the LRU, there was no formal process for reviewing the performance or capacities of interns and assistants. Nevertheless, an informal process begins when new staff starts off in a department. To develop their academic career, starting with the doctorate, a new staff member establishes some informal agreement with a professor (or professors), who is the tutor of the thesis. Depending not only on the capacity and work of the individual but also on the success of these informal connections, the career trajectory of the new entrant moves faster or slower and with more or less success. Generally speaking, the next step after the doctorate is the promotion, as soon as possible, to a tenured position at the initial level (there are three levels of tenured positions). When there is a vacancy for a tenured position, or the university (under requirement of departments) decides to create a new position, a public call for candidates is made. The call is open to everybody who satisfies the academic requirements for the position, but the support of the department (or a professor of the department) is critical in the development of this call. This support is based to some extent on academic merits, but certainly personal links play a crucial role. People at the beginning of their academic career know that keeping a “good relationship” with one or several professors in the department is a necessary condition for promotion. As we will explain later, nowadays this relationship is a necessary condition but not sufficient. A few years ago, it could be both necessary and sufficient. When the system was regulated by the LRU (1984–2001), the academic requirements for a tenured position were only formal (to hold a doctorate, for instance). Then, a selection board composed of five members was appointed to select the best candidate. The university appointed two members to this board, following the recommendation of the corresponding department. The other three professors were appointed in a random process whereby only professors in the same field from other public universities were eligible to be selected. The board held a public session where candidates presented their merits, which 212 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities were discussed by the members of the board. After secret discussions, the board recommended the appointment of one or none of the candidates. Universities created new positions following departmental requests. In many cases, departments only made this request when they had a suitable internal candidate who fulfilled the academic requirements and who had a reasonable chance of obtaining the position. In some universities, the rectorate (i.e., the central authority) of the university formally recommended the department to undertake a call and threat- ened departments with some type of penalty if the local candidate was not selected. Secondly, departments appointed two out of five members of the selection board. If there are no internal disputes, the local candidate (i.e., the favorite of the department) had a better chance. It is obvious that this selection procedure concealed a dangerous lean- ing toward inbreeding. In fact, few candidates from other universities participated in these competitions. Nevertheless, the way of developing these calls for new positions or vacancies has changed in the last few years, to some extent as a consequence of the debate on inbreeding that started at the end of the 1990s. The main change was the establishment around ten years ago of the process to “accredit” individuals; this development made an enormous impact on the promotion system, as we will see in the following section.

Academic staff assessment From the beginning of the 1990s, the individual activity of academic staff was evaluated through several mechanisms (Mora 2001). Nowa- days, two assessments are critical for promotion. The first is the research activity assessment for tenured staff. This assessment started in the late 1980s. National panels composed of experts by discipline are in charge of the assessment of individual research activity. For each period of six years, tenured professors can present their most relevant publications to the corresponding panel in the hope of receiving positive assessment (called a “sexenio”). This evaluation is relatively strict, and “research periods” are frequently evaluated negatively. Consequently, positive assessment has become an internal symbol of prestige among academics. Nevertheless, the most important effect is that many universities have established a certain number of positive assessments as a prerequisite for promotion to higher positions among tenured staff. The second assessment (individual accreditation) is currently playing a critical role in Spanish universities. As we mentioned before, it was José-Ginés Mora 213 clear for any independent observer that the Spanish higher education system had a serious problem of inbreeding, lack of transparency, and, in some cases, even corruption in the process of hiring new staff. With the objective of facing these problems, a new national law established (as of 2007) individual accreditation as a condition to apply to most academic positions (except the initial positions) in any public or private university. Quality assurance agencies (one national and several regionals) are in charge of this process. The curricula vitae (CVs) of individuals are assessed by committees of experts, which accredit that an individual has sufficient merits to apply for a given university position (from assistant to full professor). This system, quite peculiar to Spain, has a strong effect on Spanish academic life. Obtaining accreditation for the next level has become the goal (even the obsession) of Spanish academics apart from, obviously, full professors. As accreditation is based mainly (although not exclusively) on research performance, the increase of publications in journals included in the relevant citation indexes has been enormous in the last years. In principle, this is not negative; but, as happens frequently everywhere, teaching is the loser in this game. This system cer- tifies that accredited individuals at each level have reached a reasonable level of quality in research and in teaching (although the assessment of teaching is weaker), and they are eligible to occupy the corresponding position in any university. The system does not avoid inbreeding but at least guarantees that all possible candidates, including the local ones, reach the same quality threshold. The old system favored the local candidate in some cases with not enough merit. The new system does not guarantee the selection of the best candidate, but at least guarantees that the selected individual has an acceptable level of performance.

Data and facts on inbreeding

In this section, we present a collection of data from different sources in order to give a picture of the level of inbreeding in Spanish universities. It is necessary to make some preliminary remarks. First, we have not elaborated new data, something that was beyond the possibilities of this study. We have instead collected available information from different sources. Second, we have not used a strict deﬁnition of inbreeding because the different available sources do not use the same deﬁnition of inbreeding. The data we present here can be considered as proxies of a more formal concept of inbreeding: to work in the same university from which one has graduated. 214 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities

Research on inbreeding In research, looking at the academic careers of university faculty and members of research centers, Cruz, Sanz, and Aja (2006) estimated that 93 percent of those who obtained a place in a university department in Spain between 1997 and 2001 were working in the same center before they were granted the tenured position. This study also found that 70 percent of professors entered the contest as the sole candidate. Furthermore, 56 percent had no postdoctoral experience abroad at the time of winning the tenured position, while only 26 percent had stays of more than six months abroad. These figures show a very low level of mobility and a strong tendency to select people from inside. Cruz and Sanz (2010) provide empirical results from a survey showing evidence of a significant level of inbreeding, but they also show signs of the existence of internal labor market dynamics starting in the pre- doctoral period. They found a very limited degree of early postdoctoral mobility across universities; 69 percent of the PhD graduates did not change their employer after getting their doctorate. A further indicator is that 46 percent of the surveyed population stayed at the same university for their whole career trajectory (bachelor’s degree, doctorate, and tenured position), while 61 percent got a tenured position in a department located in the same university that awarded their doctoral degree. In more recent work, Sanz, Cruz, and Alva (2013) find the following:

Research productivity contributes to career acceleration, but that other variables are also signiﬁcantly associated to a faster transition. Factors associated to the social elements of academic life also play a role in reducing the time from PhD graduation to tenure. However, mobility signiﬁcantly increases the duration of the non-tenure stage. [ ...] Results show clear effects of seniority, and rewards to loyalty, in addition to some measurements of performance and quality of the university granting the PhD, as key elements speeding up career advancement. Findings suggest the existence of a system based on granting early permanent jobs to those that combine social embed- dedness and team integration with some good credentials regarding past and potential future performance, rather than high levels of mobility. (Sanz, Cruz, and Alva 2013, 1)

This study illustrates well the current situation, where all new entrants in the academic career have been assessed more strictly than before. Aca- demic performance is not the key aspect for being promoted, probably José-Ginés Mora 215 because all candidates have good credentials; the critical factor is the previous level of integration in the team. The conclusion is that the system perhaps does not select wrong candidates, but clearly prefers internal ones.

Mobility and inbreeding Several universities have carried out surveys of academic staff in recent times to know their opinion about current educational reforms. We had access to private data from six universities in different regions that provide a snapshot of the situation with regard to mobility and inbreeding.1 In Table 9.1, we present the percentage of positive answers to several questions. The six universities given in this table are presented in order of age, from a very old university (UN 1) to one founded recently (UN 6). These data provide information about whether the current staff have studied in the same university but do not differentiate by degree (bachelor, master’s, or doctorate). The most remarkable fact from this table is that the older the university, the higher is the level of inbreeding (column A). In the oldest university, this percentage reaches 90 percent. In the more modern universities, the percentage of inbreeding is lower, probably because they are not old enough to produce by themselves all the academic staff they need. Still, it is surprising that in a quite young university (only 15 years old), the percentage of academics who have studied in the same university reaches 36 percent.

Table 9.1 Percentage of academic staff by university answering YES to the following questions

A. Have studied in the same university where they are employed B. Had some international experience as students or staff C. Have worked only in the current university D. Have worked in another university of the same region

Responses

University A B C D C + D

UN19025591676 UN28624763 78 UN38121741084 UN46921641074 UN55930572683 UN63627532375 216 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities

Approximately one out of four academics had some international experience as a student or staff member (column B). Nevertheless, around two out of three have worked only in the same university where they are currently employed (column C). If we add the percentage of those who have worked in another university in the same region (column C + D), the total is around 80 percent. That is, the work experience of most academics is limited to the same university or to a neighboring one. The lack of interregional mobility (in many cases just intercity mobility) is evident from these data. As we will discuss later, inbreeding in Spanish universities is to a great extent related to the lack of mobility of academics but also to the lack of mobility of Spaniards, in general. We also have data by age and gender. Younger academics (below 45 years of age) have more international experience than the older group (27 percent vs. 18 percent) but, not surprisingly, the level of inbreeding is higher among the younger cohort (65 percent vs. 59 percent) because the tendency in recent times has been to make the academic labor market even more restricted for mobile people. The opportunities for academic mobility were higher some years ago when the system was still growing. The answers to the same questions by gender show that women are more mobile than men at the international level (25 percent vs. 21 percent) and they have a lower level of inbreeding (59 percent vs. 65 percent).

Publication and academic inbreeding An article published in Nature by Navarro and Rivero (2001) was one of the first that raised the problem of inbreeding in Spain at an international level. That publication provoked in Spain a certain scandal, even in the media. Navarro and Rivero (2001) calculated inbreeding in Spanish universities by determining whether the affiliation of a scientist’s first publication coincided with their current affiliation as a faculty member. This is not a strictly correct way of measuring inbreeding, but, bearing in mind the scarce mobility in Spain, it is quite likely that the first publication of a young scientist was made in the same university where he or she received the PhD. Using this proxy measure, this research compared possible inbreeding in Spanish universities with the situation in three other countries: the United States, the United King- dom, and France. They collected data from 40 researchers from each country holding permanent positions in science departments. The percentage of external candidates who obtained a permanent position in each country was revealing: 93 percent of candidates to posts in the United States were external, as were 83 percent in the United Kingdom José-Ginés Mora 217 and 50 percent in France. In Spain, by contrast, only 5 percent of the tenured positions were given to individuals who had published their first paper while working in another institution. The conclusion (similar to other previous figures) is that in Spain 95 percent of tenured staff published their first scientific paper with the same affiliation they currently hold. As in most cases, the first publication comes from the doctoral thesis; it is quite likely to affirm that around 95 percent of the tenured staff obtained their doctoral degree in the same university in which they are ultimately employed with tenure.

Explaining inbreeding in Spanish universities

It is generally accepted worldwide that inbreeding is a wrong practice with perverse effects on academic performance. We also agree with this point of view; nevertheless, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd reasons that explain this practice from many different angles. The discussion about inbreeding should be open to a broader analysis, including not only higher education or research policies but also sociological, structural, and economic aspects. In this section, we do not pretend to justify inbreeding, but we will try to explain why inbreeding became so generalized in Spanish universities. We try to demonstrate that inbreeding is not necessarily the consequence of lack of integrity of academic staff (although in many cases this is true). Inbreeding is the consequence of many other factors rooted in the Spanish culture and university structure. Inbreeding is a practice more linked to academic systems in which institutions have not yet developed more universalistic approaches, job markets are not fully developed, salary levels are rigid, working conditions are similar, or the reputational systems of institutions have not been consolidated. Consequently, to understand inbreeding in these systems requires considering structural and institutional factors. Inbreeding cannot be considered just a case of academic corruption (although sometimes it is linked with corruption). Inbreeding is, in some contexts, a natural consequence of structural factors, as Cruz and Sanz (2009) point out:

inbreeding and aggregate low mobility levels are better understood in the context of the organizational dilemmas between mobility and loyalty, between cosmopolitanism and job security, or between retention and turnover. These dilemmas are institutionally embedded. (p. 28) 218 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities

In the next sections, we will discuss in more detail some of the structural factors that explain (though do not justify) inbreeding in Spanish universities.

The lack of an open academic labor market Academic inbreeding in Spanish universities is partially the consequence of a selection process formally based on standardized evaluation of applications, but, in practice, it is based on the informal evaluation of individual skills (for those candidates working in the same department where the job opening is available) and personal relationships developed during the period of training. The Spanish situation is identical to the one described in French universities by Godechot and Louvet (2008):

It can come about from a form of loyalty towards those who are almost like colleagues and who have been supported in earlier stages and often entrusted with scientiﬁc and pedagogical responsibilities. It is a way for a department to offer employment opportunities to doctors or, subsequently, to the assistant professors it produces, when external departments, themselves equally guilty of inbreeding, may well remain closed to them. (p. 2)

To understand the favoritism for local candidates, we should note three points. First, all academics in Spanish universities have teaching and research duties but in the selection process only research performance is easily assessed. If the local candidate has a good research record (although perhaps not the best) and the department knows that he or she is a good teacher, the natural tendency is to support this individual. Second, CVs do not provide good information about skills and attitudes that are important for working in a team. Again, there is a tendency to act in the safer way, selecting the local candidate who is known to have these personal competencies, without taking into account if the external candidate has these same competencies or not. Third, and this is even more critical, all other departments in the country are doing the same thing, with very few exceptions (e.g., within very selective departments in some disciplines). A typical situation in a Spanish university is the following. A young person, normally a brilliant student, wants to start an academic career. He or she establishes contact with a department or professor (in most cases, in the same university where he or she is already studying), starts to cooperate in some way in research and teaching activities, enrolls in the doctoral program of the same department, and, after several years of José-Ginés Mora 219 cooperation, is ready to move up the academic ladder. At this moment, the department has two alternatives. First, the “honest one,” is to say to this person: “Congratulations you are ready, look for a good job in another university.” The second, the “inbreeding one,” is to say: “You are ready, we are going to try to find a more stable position for you in this department.” The problem of the “honest” solution is that in fact you are condemning this person to unemployment, because the probability of getting a position in another university in Spain is almost zero, as all of the other universities, generally speaking, exhibit the same inbreeding behavior. In this situation, what is more honest and fair? The answer is not so simple. The correct alternative should be agreed upon at the national level; otherwise, the inbreeding alternative will prevail. In some very recent research, Sanz, Cruz, and Alva (2013) explored academic careers in their early stages, especially early tenure, in the Spanish university and research system, in relation to scientific production and mobility. Not surprisingly, they find that “[neither] the idea that inbred faculty are less productive than their non-inbred colleagues, nor the idea that they are more productive, finds much support” (Sanz, Cruz, and Alva 2013, 8). This is because, on the one hand, as we have mentioned, the quality profile of inbred academics is not bad, but on the other hand, the inbred academics work on teams where publishing and developing other research activities together has some advantages mostly when research productivity is measured through simple criteria based on indicators, something increasingly frequent in the international academic world. In this research, Sanz, Cruz, and Alva (2013) find the following:

Embedded in an institutional context of low mobility and limited competition, internal job market dynamics operate and strongly affect the timing of academic rewards. Early tenure in Spain is explained by career trajectory and the social construction of the market more than by the previous performance measured by publication output, which has no positive effect in the probabilities of getting tenure shortly after being awarded a PhD. (p. 10)

That is, the social network explains better than other variables the likelihood of making it onto the solid part of the ladder: the tenured positions. This form of recruitment, based on an ethic of loyalty, also reduces the cost of the selection process, and it is not inefﬁcient when the selected candidate has a reasonable level of quality and performance. The real 220 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities problems of this model of recruitment and promotion lie elsewhere. First, this model makes corruption easier. If the system works well, the local candidate perhaps is not the best but has at least a good academic level. Nevertheless, in some cases, the personal relationship with professors in the department (family relations, nepotism, or other links) were the main criteria for promotion, and the local candidate does not reach even a minimum acceptable level. This situation disappeared with the introduction of the individual accreditation we mentioned before, and nowadays at least the basic level of candidates is guaranteed. The second discernible problem is that the model is unfair to people who were not able to establish strong internal links in the department for some reason, or to people who went to another university to obtain a doctorate. To a great extent, intellectual independence and mobility are punished in Spanish universities. To move up the academic ladder, you need to work reasonably well, no question about this, but you also need to “keep your seat warm” as much as possible. The main negative consequence of this model is a long-term effect. Perhaps inbred academics exhibit good performance, not too different from that of noninbred colleagues. But inbred academics, also with low mobility and lack of experience in other places (international or national), have a clear tendency toward parochialism, to work in the local world, to lack international links, and to be outside of the global academic community. In the short term, inbreeding could damage candidates’ equal opportunities; but, in the longer term, this isolation certainly deteriorates the quality of teaching and research in a globalized world.

Lack of competiveness among universities In Spain, the distribution of resources to public universities is made basically according to the number of students, type of degrees, and teaching loads. To keep going or to advance ﬁnancially, universities do not need to compete for the best professors, tuition fees are quite homogeneous, and the contribution of research overheads to the funding of universities and research centers is relatively small, except in a few universities. In addition, salaries and working conditions are very similar in all universities. There are no reasons to move to another university looking for a better job. Similarly, universities in Spain do not have strong differences from the point of view of quality and prestige. Certainly, some universities have more prestige, and some departments in these universities may be more attractive with a better working environment. Nevertheless, these departments are normally in the big cities where the José-Ginés Mora 221 cost of living is higher, but the salaries of faculty are the same as in small cities. In a system where universities cannot provide distinctive salaries or working conditions to their academic staff, they cannot reward achievement in a relevant way, or there is not much reputational institutional differentiation, there are no incentives to mobility. Inbreeding is also a consequence of this lack of mobility that is in part motivated by the lack of differentiation among universities.

The governance model Many factors explain inbreeding, but certainly the governance model is the key factor that triggered inbreeding in Spanish universities. As we mentioned before, since 1983, universities were no longer dependent on the state and decision-making power was transferred to collegiate bodies. In addition to governing universities, the main responsibility for managing institutions also rests with academics. Under this model of strong collegial governance with no external control, the interests of individuals or groups become more important than the interest of the institution. The perverse consequence is the tendency to support members of the group instead of looking for the best people for the institution. Three examples illustrate how informal policies are used for supporting local candidates

• Calls for new tenured positions are proposed by departments. Uni- versities, some of them even in formal documents, send recommendations to departments requiring them to make such proposals for new positions when they are reasonably sure that the local candidate has good opportunities of winning. In many cases, it is the local candidate (and not the department) who decides if, in fact, the position has to be created depending on if he or she feels ready for the public call. • Tenured positions require dedication to teaching and research. The call for these positions has to define the teaching and research profile required by the department. The teaching profile is relatively open based on the real needs of the department, but the research profile could be quite narrow, even adjusted to the personal research profile of the local candidate. In some cases, the research profile has been almost identical to the theme of the doctoral dissertation of the local candidate. • Sometimes, the way of supporting local candidates is to establish a list of merits that the evaluation boards have to take in account. For 222 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities

example, the knowledge of the regional language (something acceptable, if not disproportionally overrated), or considering a merit to be contracted at the moment of the contest by the university offering the position. Even more surprising, the value of any merit (publication or activity) developed in the same university which is offering the job might have a premium of 50 percent over the regular rating of each activity (something that sounds more appropriate for a frequent ﬂyer program than for assessing the academic merits of a future professor).2

The origin of this misbehavior is the lack of external control and the lack of incentives to maintain high standards in departments. In the absence of these elements, there is a logical trend toward promoting close colleagues instead of bringing in new people who may destabi- lize the internal status quo. Some people believe that the solution is to make the process fairer by changing the procedures. It is true that some changes, such as introducing individual accreditation, have had a positive effect on the average quality of candidates, but this has not reduced inbreeding. Others have been defending for many years a more radical change (Mora 2000). They think that the way of running universities, and not just the promotion process, must change, by introducing external controls and incentives to promote competition for the best staff. In a more competitive context, universities will look for the best candidates, internal or external, because to raise the quality of the department would be an objective of all its members.

Mobility reluctance To a great extent, inbreeding in Spanish universities is a consequence of the lack of mobility among academics, but this fact is not speciﬁc to academics. Spaniards are extremely rooted in the place where they were born or grew up, which is normally the same place. Moving to another city and, even worse, to another region is something that most people avoid as something undesirable. Spaniards have the mentality that being from somewhere means something for forever. An indicator of this tendency could be the fact that the proportion of households living in owned dwellings reaches 81 percent in Spain, 58 percent in France, and only 40 percent in Germany (Eurostat). On the one hand, people in Spain consider owning their own house as something important in their lives. On the other hand, this ownership of their houses (with its inherent mortgages and long-term costs) is a strong brake on mobility. People are only ready to move if the opportunities and salaries in other José-Ginés Mora 223 place are much better, something that will not happen in the academic world, with universities and salaries being rather homogeneous. We do not have adequate data, but it is likely that most academics not only have studied in the same university where they currently work but also were born in the same city or at least in the surrounding area. To support this idea, we will consider the percentage of university students who are studying in a region but their family residence is in another region. With the exception of the region of Madrid, which attracts a higher percentage of students from other regions – 26.2 percent of the students in this region come from another region, due to a greater offer, including many private universities – the proportion of students going to study in a region different from the region of residence is very small. For instance, in Catalonia, a region with some of the most highly reputed Spanish universities and the attractiveness of Barcelona, only 6.8 percent of its students come from outside Catalonia. Even more remarkable is the fact that only 2.2 percent of people resi- dent in Catalonia go to study in another region. In the case of Madrid, the percentage of mobile students (3.4 percent) is only slightly higher (MECD 2013). In spite of this reticence toward mobility at a national level, to have a short international experience has become more common in recent years for Spanish higher education students. In 2012, the number of ERASMUS students from Spain who carried out part of their studies in another European university stood at 36,718 (the number of Europeans coming to Spain was 37,432). Nevertheless, the Seneca program (a national program similar to ERASMUS to promote internal mobility) only awarded 2,129 scholarships during 2011–2012, and not all were used. This provides an idea of the lack of interest among young students to move to another region inside Spain. It is evident that students do not move too much within Spain, and in some regions mobility is almost exceptional. Given these tendencies at the student level, we should not expect very different behavior at faculty level.

Conclusions

We have presented data from different sources and studies from different authors. The definition of inbreeding in each case is slightly different, and in some cases the variables for defining inbreeding are only proxies. In spite of these limitations, the conclusion is quite evident: the level of inbreeding in Spain is extremely high. It would be reasonable to estimate an average figure for inbreeding between 80 percent and 224 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities

90 percent. In spite of this high level, inbreeding is not perceived by Spanish society or by university people as something particularly negative. It is true that there are voices speaking out against this generalized practice, but they come mostly from “outsiders” (graduates who, after obtaining a PhD abroad, realize that they have scarce opportunities to return) or some rare “insiders” (people in the system but with relevant international experience and vision). In most cases these people, outsiders and insiders, are brilliant professionals, but certainly they are not part of the core of the university system, which is mostly in hands of the more traditional people, and consequently they have scarce capacity to change the status quo. We have mentioned in this chapter several reasons that explain why inbreeding is so high in Spain. Inbreeding is the consequence of the lack of mobility, the lack of a competitive labor market, the lack of an institutional model of governance promoting efficiency, and last (but not least), the consequence of a social culture in Spain of strong identification with one’s hometown or region of origin. Another key point is the issue of why the problem of inbreeding is not considered relevant in the Spanish university world and even in Spanish society. Perhaps the main reason is that the negative effect of inbreeding is not immediately evident. Cruz and Sanz (2010), in an empirical study in Spain relating inbreeding and scientific productivity, show that inbreeding is not a significant variable. Neither the idea that inbred faculty are less productive than their noninbred colleagues nor the idea that they are more productive find much support in the empirical models. Inbreeding is a way of selecting people that, under certain circumstances, is efficient. The same idea is supported by an empirical study of Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga (2007), demonstrating with Mexican data that inbreeding has a relatively small effect on productivity: their estimations suggest that academically inbred faculty generate on average 15 percent fewer peer-reviewed publications than their noninbred counterparts. The traditional argument that inbred staff are less productive is not evident. The problem is that we are measuring productivity with only one indicator: published papers. The relevance, the quality, and the impact of the papers are not considered. Perhaps, a more comprehensive assessment of productivity will bring out a different result, but in any case at this stage a critique of inbreeding based on its effects on research productivity is not evident. On the other hand, many people feel comfortable with inbreeding. As Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa (2011) pointed out: José-Ginés Mora 225

The “old boys” networks also highlight the role of power, institutional belonging, cliques, and maintenance of status quo. In other words, academic inbreeding reinforces organizational/institutional academic cultures, consolidates research agendas, and guarantees organizational stability. ( ...) at the early stages of development of higher education systems (and universities), the practice of academic inbreeding is unavoidable and perhaps necessary or desirable since it permits to quickly build up research and teaching capacity. It also fosters stability, the enhancement of shared beliefs, and the consolidation of collaborative agendas. (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011, 37)

If inbreeding does not reduce research productivity, at least in a significant way, and it has even some advantages (reinforcing stability and collaboration), where is the problem with inbreeding? The real problem has a different dimension. Inbreeding is not a major problem for a regionally- or locally oriented university, with a vocational orientation and limited strength in research. The problem of inbreeding appears when universities face the demands of a complex society, when they try to insert themselves into the globalized world, and when they endeavor to lead the knowledge society – “In these cases inbreeding become more detrimental than beneficial, as it fosters inertia, institutional parochialism, and intellectual isolation” (Horta, Sato, and Yonezawa 2011, 37). There is evidence that that inbred faculty are more centered on their own institutions and less open to the rest of the scientific world. Lack of mobility at the early research career stage is decisive in influencing academic behaviors and scientific productivity. Less mobile academics have more inwardly oriented information exchange dynamics (Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2007; Horta 2012). These negative facts of inbreeding can be applied to Spanish universities and not only to their research function. Certainly, the research output measured by number of publications is high, but the level of impact is lower (SCImago) and the knowledge transfer impact even lower. In spite of recent reforms linked to the Bologna Process, teaching in Spanish universities is still quite traditional: most teachers are just reproducing the methodologies used in their own departments because they do not have any external experience. But probably where the negative effect of inbreeding is more notorious is at the institutional level: the lack of international presence (apart from Latin America) and the weak role of Spanish universities on the world stage is a consequence of 226 Academic Inbreeding in Spanish Universities the parochialism of university leaders who, in many cases, never had an external experience or hardly speak foreign languages. Inbreeding is not perceived as too dangerous in Spain, but certainly this phenomenon is slowing down the competitiveness of Spanish universities in a globalized world, the intellectual growth of the country, and its development in the knowledge economy.

Notes

1. The survey from which we draw these data was carried out with another purpose, and we must maintain conﬁdentiality with regard to details of the survey and the names of the institutions involved. These data were collected recently and from universities in different regions. The survey was administered online to all types of academic staff in these universities. The number of respondents and the response rate were very high. Obviously, the universities included in the sample are not representative of the country from a statistical point of view. Nevertheless, they are quite diverse. One is old, others are from the second part of the 20th century, and two are relatively new. Five are public and one is private. The size range of these institutions is also diverse. Although this is not a scientiﬁc sample, there is no reason to expect a relevant bias in these data. 2. There is a web page (http://www.corruptio.com/) mentioning many data like these, with the names of universities and persons involved. We do not mention these details because this is not the objective of this chapter. Also, we do not have full evidence of them, though in some cases we were able to check personally the authenticity of the information provided.

References

Alvarez, G., Ceballos, F.C., and Quinteiro, C. 2009. “The Role of Inbreeding in the Extinction of a European Royal Dynasty.” PLoS ONE 4 (4): e5174. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0005174. Cruz Castro, Laura and Luis Sanz Menéndez. 2009. “Mobility versus Job Stability: Assessing Tenure and Productivity Outcomes.” Research Policy 39: 27–38. Cruz Castro, Laura, Luis Sanz Menéndez, and Jaime Aja Valle. 2006. Las trayectorias profesionales y académicas de los profesores de universidad y los investigadores del CSIC. http://digital.csic.es/ handle/10261/1667 (accessed 17 November 2013). Eurostat. Statistics on Income, Social Inclusion and Living Conditions. http:// epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_ conditions/ introduction (accessed 12 November 2013). Godechot, Olivier and Alexandra Louvet. 2008. Academic Inbreeding: An Evalu- ation. Published in laviedesidees.fr, 22 April 2008. Horta, Hugo. 2012. Deepening Our Understanding of Academic Inbreeding Effects on Research Information Exchange and Scientiﬁc Output: New Insights for Academic Based Research, Published online: 12 August 2012, Springer Science+Business Media B.V. José-Ginés Mora 227

Horta, Hugo, Machi Sato, and Akiyoshi Yonezawa. 2011. “Academic Inbreeding: Exploring Its Characteristics and Rationale in Japanese Universities Using a Qualitative Perspective.” Asia Paciﬁc 212 Education Review 12: 35–44. Horta, Hugo, Francisco Veloso, and Rocio Grediaga. 2007. Navel Gazing: Academic Inbreeding and Scientiﬁc Productivity. Department of Engineering and Public Policy. Paper 118. http://repository.cmu.edu/ epp/118 MECD. 2013. Estadisticas universitarias. http://www.mecd.gob.es/servicios-al- ciudadano-mecd/estadisticas/educacion/universitaria.html (accessed 17 Octo- ber 2013). Mora, Jose-Gines. 2000. The Academic Profession in Spain. In The Changing Academic Workplace. Comparative Perspectives, edited by P. Altbach, 165–191. Boston: CIHE. Mora, Jose-Gines. 2001. “The Academic Profession in Spain: Between the Civil Service and the Market.” Higher Education 41 (1–2): 131–155. Mora, Jose-Gines. 2006. “Spain.” In International Handbook of Higher Education, edited by P. Altbach and J. Forest, 995–1003. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Navarro, A. and A. Rivero. (2001). “High Rate of Inbreeding in Spanish Universi- ties.” Nature 410: 14. Sanz-Menéndez, Luis, Laura Cruz-Castro, and Kenedy Alva. (2013). “Time to Tenure in Spanish Universities: An Event History Analysis.” PLOS-ONE 8 (10): e77028 – 1–17. SCImago. http://www.scimagojr.com/ (accessed 17 February 2014). 10 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé

Introduction

To the best of our knowledge, academic inbreeding has never been a focus of attention among either Ukrainian academics or policy-makers, so this chapter is the first attempt to discuss academic inbreeding in Ukraine. High levels of inbreeding (about 50 percent) in Ukrainian universities are caused both by a deeply rooted tradition of networking and by current day factors, such as unified salaries (i.e., little differentiation in salaries across universities), high corruption rates, and the dependence of university funding on the quantity of students rather than quality of education and research. We believe that academic inbreeding in Ukraine is not a problem in itself, rather, it is a consequence of deeper problems in the education system, namely, its high centralization and rigidity and low levels of competition between universities, students, and faculty members (as known from the economic theory, insufficient competition lowers both product quality and production efficiency). Besides, academic inbreeding is only a part of a larger phenomenon, which can be called the “preference for insiders.” Thus, to get a university job, the crucial thing is to be “recommended” by someone (e.g., by a current faculty member) to the people making hiring decisions. And studying at a university is just one of the ways to get to know a person who could provide such a “recommendation.” This “preference for insiders,” and inbreeding as a part of it, reinforces existing problems of the education system, the main one being the low quality of both teaching and research at universities. Thus, formal policies tackling inbreeding (e.g., a ban on hiring own graduates for a few years after graduation) can soften these problems by introducing some elements of competition and market-based relations into the system.

228 Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 229

This chapter is structured as follows. First, we describe the sources of information that we used and to which we refer in the text. Then, we provide some historical perspective, explaining the emergence of the inbreeding “tradition.” After that we describe inbreeding in the context of the Ukrainian higher education system and explain how the system’s current features encourage inbreeding (or, rather, “preference for insiders”). Finally, we present the results of an econometric study that tried to ﬁnd out whether inbreeding depends on individual and university- level factors and whether the fact of inbreeding impacts the salary and research productivity of faculty.

Data sources

When starting to work on the issue, we did not have any data at hand. The State Statistics Service (SSS) of Ukraine provides only very general information on the number of faculty and their scientiﬁc degrees. In order to collect some information on academic inbreeding, we made an online survey based on the inbreeding questionnaire we received from the organizers of this research project. Lacking resources to conduct a ﬁeld survey, we distributed a request to complete this questionnaire among our graduates, as well as our and their acquaintances who we know work in academia. We received 59 responses. To have a more comprehensive picture, we added several personal questions to the questionnaire asking respondents to “tell their stories” – that is, explain how they became employed at their current job. Although the majority of our online survey respondents are economists, they work in different universities across Ukraine, and we think we can rely on this survey to evaluate the general situation with regard to hiring practices in higher education. Throughout this chapter, we refer to this survey as “our” survey. Another source of data we were lucky to obtain is a survey performed by the Centre for Society Research (2013). The sample includes 424 university faculty members.1 The purpose of that study was to explore the existence of democratic procedures at universities and the attitude of professors to proposed reforms in higher education. However, the survey also contains information on a wide range of aspects of faculty employment, such as working hours, publications, participation in conferences, income levels, and so on, including the question on whether a person works at the same university from which he or she graduated. We used these data to perform an econometric analysis of the factors that determine inbreeding and the impact of inbreeding on the “price” 230 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine and “quality” of faculty members. We refer to this survey as CSR-2013, when citing its data in the text. We also used the data collected by the State Statistical Service of Ukraine, including the data of Ukrainian Longitude Monitoring Survey (ULMS) – an extensive survey that includes a wide range of individual and household-level data (employment history, income, expenses, living conditions, etc.).

Ukrainian academic realities

The situation in the Ukrainian higher education sector is a reflection of the situation in the country in general. Therefore, it is important to make a few points about Ukrainian society before turning to the discussion of academic inbreeding, since some types of social interactions causing inbreeding in Ukraine may be unclear to a non-Ukrainian reader. The first thing to know about Ukraine is that it is a post-Soviet country, and, as other countries of the Commonwealth of Independents States (CIS, includes all former Soviet republics except for the Baltic states), it has kept many of the social features of the Soviet Union (USSR). These features are described in the vast literature on Soviet society, so we refer to them very briefly here. An interested reader may refer, for example, to the books of Lane (1990), Strayer (1998), Sacks and Pankhurst (1988), Haines and Leggett’s (2001) CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991, or the writings of Soviet dissidents (e.g., the excellent book by V. Voynovych, The Anti-Soviet Soviet Union), or to the articles of Starr (1988) and Fisher (1992), or a more recent overview by Buxton and Konovalova (2012). The Soviet legacy still influences the life of the Ukrainian people, although not uniformly. While the private sector has mostly adopted modern market-based practices, state enterprises (and the majority of universities belong to the state) are more inclined to reproduce “traditional” (uncompetitive and inefficient) hiring and production methods. Perhaps the main difference between the Soviet Union (and its pre- decessor – the Russian empire) and Western countries lies in the area of values: the former enforced supremacy of the state over an individual, established vertical organization of the society while discouraging horizontal ties between citizens, and punished independent thinking. The Soviet Union, and Ukraine as a part of it, had a long history of eliminating the most independent, creative, and socially active people (those who in the Western society would belong to the middle class). Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 231

Instead, an ideal “Soviet person” should have been physically healthy, believe in communism and the Communist Party leaders, and ask no questions. Moreover, that person should have informed the secret service (the KGB) about “anti-Soviet developments” among his/her friends and relatives. As a result, post-Soviet societies are characterized by very low levels of social trust (Lomnitz and Shenibaum 2004) and civil activity and high levels of conservatism (caused by the fear of change) and paternalistic expectations.2 Tight state control over all aspects of individual life caused the intensive development of informal interactions that replaced the market mechanisms absent in the planned economy. These included underground production enterprises, black markets for foreign currency and smuggled foreign goods, underground press (samizdat), and also widespread corruption and clientelism – so that very restrictive rules and laws were softened by opportunities to circumvent them. These last two features of the Soviet society have played a pronounced role in the life of post-Soviet countries and in their academic environments, as well (Walker 2011). Networking was among the most prominent features of the Soviet society. Personal connections were needed for practically everything, from buying deficit goods to getting examined by a good doctor, from entering a “prestigious” university to obtaining a job. Despite the introduction of market mechanisms, this tradition of exploiting personal connections remains rather strong. For example, Bilyk and Sheron (2012) show that “relatives and friends” remain the most important channel of the job search in Ukraine (over 50 percent of people find their job through this channel). The high level of inbreeding in Ukrainian universities (according to CSR-2013 data, 48.6 percent of faculty are inbred) can also be partly attributed to this tradition of hiring by personal (informal) recommendations. In the Soviet economy all the enterprises, land and housing (with the exception of individual houses and small adjacent land plots in vil- lages) belonged to the state, and no private initiative was allowed – entrepreneurship was a crime until the late 1980s. Markets (in the economic sense) were absent. Production plans were developed by ministries and imposed on enterprises; prices and salaries were also centrally set. There was no job search in the usual sense because potential employers cared more about a person’s registration3 (propiska) – that is, the official right to live and work in a specific location – than of his/her qualifications. Someone could get a job without registration only through informal channels (personal recommendations). Often, a person had 232 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine to accept employment for which he or she was overqualified, simply because a hiring enterprise offered registration. “Young specialists” (university/college graduates) were centrally distributed into their first workplaces in the same way as goods were centrally distributed between enterprises and stores. For this purpose, universities and colleges created “distribution commissions” that included the head of the institution, heads of chairs, representatives of the ministry for enterprises of which this university/college prepared specialists (i.e., the heavy industry ministry in the case of a technical institution, the health ministry in case of a medical institution, etc.), and also representatives of students’ Communist Party organizations and trade unions (an interested reader may consult the Soviet Decree on the Distribution and Usage in the Economy of Graduates of Universities and Colleges). These commissions assigned graduates to their first workplaces, taking into account students’ grades and family situation, the needs of enterprises (which sent requests for a certain number of specialists to the ministries) – and informal recommendations of “influential people.” To get a good job assignment (i.e., in a large city or in the European part of the USSR), students usually tried to establish personal relations with the distribution commission members. Becoming a faculty member was one of the best options for a graduate – first, because a university offered a more pleasant working environment than a factory, and second, because in the USSR university professors received rather good salaries and had high social status. For example, a teaching assistant’s salary was close to the national salary average, while a senior lecturer could earn up to 80 percent more; the salary of a docent (Candidate of Sciences) was twice that of national salary average, and a professor’s salary was three times higher than the average. At the same time, an engineer at a plant earned 80–120 percent of the average salary (the data come from “Historical Materials” and “Analytical Club” web resources). On the demand side, if there was a vacancy at a university, professors would certainly hire one of the students they knew rather than request a “cat in a bag” (i.e., a graduate of unknown quality) that would be “distributed” to them from another institution. Under such hiring practices, inbreeding was inevitable, and, by and large, it was the only way for a person to become a faculty member. From such hiring practices “corporate attitude” toward students emerged, which is still prevailing at the universities. This means that from the very beginning university professors view their students as their possible future colleagues, and by offering a student entry into Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 233 a PhD program, a professor acts in the same way a company boss does, sending his employee for qualification-enhancing courses. In the same way as a firm expects this educated worker to “pay back” by working for the firm, a university expects a PhD graduate to be loyal to the alma mater and to “pay back” by working there, at least for a few years after graduation (and students know about these expectations). This “corporate loyalty” allows for the extension of an academic tradition and the creation of “scientific schools,” where a professor chooses some of his students to become his research assistants and later continue his research (and his teaching responsibilities) after he retires. If a young specialist is not very enthusiastic about teaching, this practice can lead to the reproduction of outdated curricula that do not correspond with the modern labor market demands. Besides clientelism, corruption remains a very big problem in Ukraine4 too. In the academic environment, corruption is maintained not only by tradition but also by the rather low salaries of faculty. According to CSR-2013 data, salaries in the higher education sector are close to the national salary average as reported by the State Statistics Service (note, however, that SSS data underestimate the average salary because many people are paid “in envelopes,” that is, officially receive the minimal salary and get the rest in cash). At the same time, only 20 percent of university professors have a side job (CSR-2013 data), so their total (official) income is not enough to support a decent life (see Figure 10.1). Hence, preconditions for corrupt behavior arise. Unfortunately, we do not know the share of faculty that receives “unofficial side earnings” in

Can afford anything Can afford buying durables (such as a fridge or TV set)

Enough money for Enough money for food and clothes but food, hard to buy cannot afford Not enough money clothes durables even for food 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Figure 10.1 Distribution of faculty by household income, by percentage (subjective estimates) Source: CSR-2013 data. 234 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine the form of bribes, but according to anecdotal evidence and some surveys, this practice is quite common (we discuss this problem in more detail below). Widespread corruption at educational institutions devalues diplomas and degrees and undermines the screening function of higher education, thus creating additional incentives for inbreeding. The next section takes a closer look at these issues.

Higher education as a screening mechanism

One of the functions of higher education, besides providing knowledge needed to perform certain duties, is screening, that is, filtering “better” people (able to master the university program) from the others (the dropouts). For this screening mechanism to work, it should be as objective as possible, that is, students must honestly earn their grades. However, this is often not the case. In Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet countries, widespread disrespect for the rules and their poor enforcement lead to ubiquitous cheating (and many students do not consider this to be a bad thing). It is very common for students to cheat on exams, to submit essays/research papers downloaded from the Internet as their own, and to buy course papers and diploma theses. Moreover, there are quite a lot of firms selling student papers, diploma theses, and even dissertations. Because of that, education has almost entirely lost its screening function. This means that determined students can obtain good skills and knowledge together with good grades. However, “bad” students can obtain the same grades for money or based on family/friendly ties to faculty members. Hence, based on the diploma (or degree) alone, a potential employer cannot tell a “good” student from a “bad” one. Therefore, he or she must use some other screening mechanisms. For this reason, private-sector employers pay more attention to previous work experience and personal recommendations than to candidates’ records of formal education. For example, a survey of a job-searching website “Head Hunter” (2013) shows that 59 percent of people looking for a job think that a “diploma is important but not essential,” and 51 percent of people currently employed did not have to show a diploma when they applied for the job they hold. Knowing this, students try to gain some work experience as a sign of their quality, so many begin working full-time in their first or second year of studies. Naturally, getting a job deprives them of the time for studying but does provide money for “buying” diplomas.5 This creates a vicious circle devaluing education. Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 235

For universities, “previous work experience” is a student’s performance during his or her studies. Hence, by hiring from among their own students, universities reduce uncertainty, which they would face if they looked for needed candidates on the open market. As the academic career of a person advances, he or she can develop additional (impre- cise) signals of his/her “quality” – first of all, scientific degrees and/or ranks and, connected to these, publications in Ukrainian and foreign journals (with the latter being much more valuable). An academic can also establish connections with faculty of other universities, for example, at conferences and other events. Therefore, as our study shows, younger faculty are more likely to work at a university from which they graduated, whereas “older” faculty members have greater chances to be invited to another institution. In today’s Ukraine, the inbreeding tradition is quite strong. More- over, it is viewed as a natural aspect of the system. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever questioned this tradition or discussed the phenomenon of inbreeding in Ukrainian universities. However, inbreeding does not arise from the preference of universities for their own graduates alone. Rather, it is the consequence of the “preference for insiders.” According to individuals (currently employed at educational institutions) with whom we communicated in the context of this research, a crucial thing in the process of being hired by a university is to know someone from within the faculty who can recommend you to the people making the hiring decisions. Without an (informal) recommendation, an applicant’s CV will not even be considered. Studying at a university is just one of the ways to get to know key decision- makers. Although there are formal rules for hiring of faculty – a public announcement must be made and candidates must be considered at a chair meeting – in reality, very often the winner of the competition is known before the competition takes place. The first reason for this state of affairs is the great rigidity of the academic environment, in the sense that people who were themselves “recommended” to their current job continue this tradition by “recommending” either their students or acquaintances. The second reason is the poor screening role of formal qualifications, as discussed above. So, current faculty prefer “a bird in the hand” (someone they know) to “two in the bush” (someone who could just as easily turn out to be a disaster as a genius). To sum up, two main reasons for inbreeding in Ukrainian institutions are tradition and corruption, which devalues formal qualifications. We need to note that these reasons cause much more urgent problems than inbreeding, the main one being the inadequacy of the preparation 236 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine students receive in relation to the demands of the modern labor market. This means that fresh graduates often have either obsolete skills or no skills at all. To overcome this problem, Ukrainian higher education needs fundamental reform, but during the last 20-plus years, the changes have been very modest. These changes and the main features of the current higher education system in Ukraine are discussed in the next section.

The Ukrainian higher education system

Main trends since 1991 More than 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the system of higher education in Ukraine is still transitioning from the Soviet tradition to a more modern and Western-oriented approach. Ukraine officially joined the Bologna Process in 2005, but progress toward European education standards is very slow. In fact, the only fully completed reform was the introduction of the Diploma Supplement of the form approved by UNESCO/CEPES in 2010. The three-cycle bachelor’s/master’s/doctoral degrees system was introduced only partially – the Soviet degrees of Junior Specialist (incomplete higher education) and Specialist (an intermediate degree between the bachelor’s and master’s levels) remain, as well as the Candidate of Sciences and Doc- tor of Sciences degrees in postgraduate education.6 The European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) was introduced only “on paper” – although students receive some freedom in arranging their study plans, the share of mandatory courses remains quite high, and the range of elective courses is limited. The “job allocation” system fell apart in 1991 but was formally restored in 1996: students who studied free of charge, that is, were sponsored by state budget funds, are required to work for three years in a job assigned to them by the university – usually at a state-owned enterprise. However, often the fulfillment of this norm is purely formal – the most common situation is that a student brings a letter from an enterprise “willing” to hire him or her, and then gets an assignment to that enterprise but in reality works elsewhere. Academic mobility of both students and faculty remains rather low. In fact, if a student wants to study abroad for a few months, he or she receives practically no assistance from his or her alma mater during the application process, and upon return he or she often has to pass exams for the courses that he or she “missed.” Similarly, professors find opportunities for foreign fellowships on their own. According to CSR-2013 Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 237 data, only 12.5 percent of surveyed faculty had a foreign fellowship within the last three years. Another big impediment to the development of higher education is the fact that foreign diplomas and degrees are not recognized in Ukraine. To obtain recognition, individuals with degrees from foreign universities have to complete a rather long and expensive “nostrification” procedure at the Ministry of Education. Taking into account that the majority of Ukrainian universities can offer neither decent salaries nor a good academic environment, very few graduates of foreign universities would be sufficiently motivated to go through this nostrification procedure in order to teach there. Mobility of faculty within Ukraine is also low – in line with the generally low mobility of the Ukrainian population (according to a representative survey performed in 2012, 36 percent of Ukrainian population have never left their region (oblast) in their life, and another 36 percent visit other regions of Ukraine less often than once a year). The biggest obstacles to mobility in the general population as well as academic mobility are low salaries that do not provide sufficient funds to rent housing. In Ukraine, the majority of the urban population (and there are no universities in rural areas) lives in flats that their parents or other relatives received from the Soviet state and privatized in the 1990s. So, individuals who for whatever reason do not own a flat in a given location are at a comparative disadvantage because renting housing is rather expensive – at least compared to the academic salaries on offer. Perhaps the most important feature of the Soviet higher education that Ukraine still preserves is the separation of teaching and research. While universities are focused on teaching, research is performed mainly by scientific research institutions of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and its branch academies. We see two reasons for the teaching/research separation that characterized the USSR. The first is the orientation of universities toward the “production” of practitioners for the needs of industry and agriculture rather than scientists. The second reason is disproportionate development of the military sector. There were numerous secret research institutions7 serving this sector, and research results from other institutions could be made secret any time if they seemed to be useful for military purposes. This secrecy would be much harder to enforce at universities than at specialized institutions. In today’s Ukraine, separation of research and teaching is observed mainly because of the great inertia of the system. Although the need to bring research into universities is recognized at the state level, the state policy on this issue boils down 238 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine to the requirement for university faculty to have a certain number of research publications per year. However, since faculty salary depends on teaching hours (and to receive a decent salary, teaching workload must be very high, as explained below) usually implementation of this requirement is purely a formality, that is, the publications have very little, if any, scientific value. For example, a professor can publish his or her lecture notes or submit a rather low-quality “research” publication to a university edition that no one reads. Some universities have founded research institutes, and some professors perform research or consulting services for outside firms in order to earn some extra money, but these are mostly applied studies. One important positive feature of the Soviet education research system – the strong connections of universities and research units with production enterprises – was lost during 1990s economic crisis and has never recovered. A big difference between Ukrainian and many Western universities is the absence of the university autonomy. The majority of Ukrainian universities belong to the state and are tightly controlled by the Min- istry of Education. The ministry issues state educational standards (to which private universities should also adhere), develops the structure of specialties, effectively controls elections of university rectors and the granting of scientific degrees and ranks, and so on. The highly centralized education system of Ukraine is also a Soviet legacy. However, while in the USSR the purpose of this centralization was ideological control and loyalty enforcement, in today’s Ukraine its main purpose is control over cash flows generated by universities.8 In 1932, the universities were deprived of the right to grant postgraduate scientific degrees (Candidate of Sciences and Doctor of Sciences). This right was transferred to the Higher Attestation Commission (HAC), a centralized scientific body designed primarily to control the ideological content of dissertations rather than to assess their scientific value. In Ukraine, the Higher Attestation Commission existed until 2010, despite strong opposition among faculty members and researchers. In 2010, the HAC was dismissed, but instead the Ministry of Educa- tion and Science (MES) created within itself the Personnel Attestation Department (PAD), which now controls the dissertation defense in the same way as the HAC used to. PAD approves the members of dissertation defense commissions at universities, reviews dissertations after defense, and makes the final decision about the granting of scientific degrees. State control over universities begins with the need to obtain a license, and if a university intends to issue diplomas of the state standard, Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 239 it should pass the accreditation procedure every five years (every ten years for “national” universities). In principle, the higher the level of accreditation obtained by a higher education institution,9 the more autonomy (and state funding) it can obtain (the key word here is can, as the MES decides on the exact “amount” of autonomy that an institution actually enjoys). Naturally, the greatest financial autonomy is observed at private higher education institutions, but they still must adhere to state educational standards. Currently, 27 percent of higher education institutions are private, but since they are smaller than their state and communal counterparts, they educate only about 10 percent of students. Usually, private universities employ professors of state universities on a part-time basis. It is logical to assume that the emergence of private institutions has decreased the overall share of inbred faculty – as these institutions are new, naturally, they will not have inbred faculty until they produce some graduates. Also, since they do not have inbreeding traditions, they may adopt competitive hiring practices. Unfortunately, we do not have any data to verify this assumption. The most noticeable quantitative trend of higher education in independent Ukraine is the reduction in the number of vocational schools and colleges and a more than twofold increase in the number of universities, mostly due to upgrading of lower level institutions. Thus, the number of university students per 10,000 inhabitants increased between 1990 and 2013 by 236 percent (from 170 to 401), while the same ratio for students of vocational schools and colleges declined by 37 percent (from 270 to 169). The decline of the Ukrainian population overall, together with a considerable increase in the number of students, have led to an increase in the share of population with higher education. Thus, between 1989 and 2001, this share grew from 9.5 percent to 13.6 percent, and by the end of 2012 this share reached 21.1 percent.

Financing of higher education Ukraine’s system for financing of higher education institutions is designed in such a way that funds a university receives, and ultimately faculty earnings, depend on the number of students that an institution educates. A certain number of places at each university are financed by the government (these students study free of charge and get stipends), while students in excess of that preset quantity must pay tuition fees (usually the secondary school graduates with higher test scores are admitted to the budget-financed places.) The total share of fee-paying students has 240 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine grown fast, from 18 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 2000, and reached its highest level in 2004 (61.5 percent). Since 2005, the share of fee- paying students has been decreasing gradually because the number of state-funded students has been falling more slowly than total number of students, which declined by 23 percent during the last five years due to demographics. In 2013, 49 percent of students were paying tuition fees. Besides charging tuition fees, universities can earn money in many other ways, for example, by providing (applied) research services for commercial firms, by organizing short-term courses (foreign languages, driving, etc.), and by renting out facilities. However, state- or commu- nally owned universities/colleges receive their main funding from the state or local budgets, and, unlike additional earnings, this funding is assured (a university/college has the right for a guaranteed number of budget-financed places for the first-year students that is equal to the number of graduates it produced in a given year). In Ukraine, government financing of education exceeds 6 percent of GDP, and about a third of these funds is allocated to postsecondary education. The distribution of government funds between universities is mainly determined by the relationship between the university heads and the ministry officials. Every year, higher education institutions receive a “state order,” that is, the number of students in each faculty/specialty, for whom the state will pay. Using economic forecasts of the labor market, the Labor Ministry determines the demand for specialists in different fields in the coming five years, and hence, the number of students who should be admitted to the respective faculties in the coming year. Then, the ministry distributes these budget-funded places between the institutions that it “owns.”10 Since several institutions may prepare specialists in the same field, the distribution of budget-funded places often depends on informal connections between rectors/directors and the ministry officials. To sum up, government financing of a state or municipal university depends on the number of students that this university enrolls and on relations between the university rector and the Ministry of Education, while additional earnings of universities mainly depend on the number of fee-paying students enrolled. Hence, universities are discouraged from expelling “bad” students and rais- ing the average quality of their graduates – so, instead of providing quality education universities are often just selling diplomas. Realizing this, students lack incentives to study hard or to demand high-quality education, and universities do not work to improve the quality of their teaching and research (since their budgets are based on quantity,not Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 241 quality of students and publications). This means that universities are not encouraged to look for the best teachers/researchers on the market and can stick with those in whom the existing faculty has some interest and with whom they are comfortable working. For the same reason, university jobs are rather secure – as long as a faculty member teaches certain courses and produces the needed number of publications per year (regardless of the quality of these publications), he or she will keep the job, unless he or she has a conflict with a higher level university official. Therefore, under current financing conditions universities have no incentives to change hiring practices favorable to “insiders” and inbreeding. If the government introduced student loans/grants instead of financing “budget places” at universities, the students would be encouraged to choose universities with higher quality education and research, rather than those with a larger number of budget-financed places. This would create incentives for universities to raise the quality of both students and faculty by looking for the best candidates on the market rather than simply for “insiders.” Another reason for high levels of inbreeding and low intra-university mobility are uniformly low salaries of faculty across the higher education sector, as shown in the next section.

Salaries of faculty Faculty salaries in state-funded universities are unified across the system and calculated according to the Law “On Unified Tariff Scale.” By this law, the basic salary of a faculty member is calculated according to a standard formula and depends on the country’s current minimal salary rate, the nominal position of the faculty member, his or her scientific degree/rank, the program level where he or she teaches (bachelor’s, master’s, or PhD), and several other factors, such as usage of a foreign language in teaching.11 However, depending on the workload, a person can earn a fraction of the basic salary (0.25, 0.7, 1.2, etc.). The workload is computed according to the following procedure. First, the university calculates the number of needed academic positions as the number of students divided by the workload “norma- tives” (in terms of students per teacher) defined by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. On average, the normative is ten students per teacher, although this varies depending on the field of studies, form of studies (full-time or distance), and level of education (bachelor’s/ specialist/master’s). A university receives budget money to fund these positions. 242 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

Then, the chairs calculate the workload for each professor based on the courses he or she teaches. The total workload consists of four types of workload: teaching, methodological activities, organizational activities, and research. Teaching workload should not exceed 900 hours per year for universities and 720 hours for colleges. These norms mean that a person who teaches, for example, 1,000 hours per year while the maximum is 900 will get 110 percent of a basic salary because of the “overload.” The maximum total workload for a professor is 36 hours per week and 1,584 hours per year. Next, the chairs total the workload of all their teaching staff, calculate the number of positions they need to achieve this, and provide these data to the university administration. However, usually the number of positions that chairs require is higher than total number of positions that a university can provide (based on the number of students). There- fore, the chairs get fewer positions (and less money) than they require and they must reduce the workload of their professors. Usually, this reduction is achieved by cutting research hours, since these are the hardest to justify. This also leads to competition for teaching hours between faculty members, since in practice salary depends only on teaching hours, and research has to be done in one’s “free” time. To receive a decent salary, a university professor must take on a rather high teaching workload. According to the CSR-2013 survey, the average teaching workload of university faculty is 18 hours per week. However, actual workload differs by ﬁeld of studies: professors of natural sciences and technical disciplines are the busiest and teach almost 20 hours per week, while for information technology (IT) professors the average workload is 14 hours per week. Naturally, higher teaching workloads leave less time for research. Thus, according to CSR-2013 data, 64 percent of surveyed faculty spent less than 30 percent of their time on research and 93 percent of faculty spent less than 50 percent of their time on research. Despite the high teaching workload, salaries at universities remain rather low. The CSR-2013 survey shows that 43 percent of faculty receive less than USD 360, 35 percent get USD 360–550, and 16 percent get over USD 550 per month (see Figure 10.2).12 At the same time, the average monthly salary for the entire economy in 2013 was USD 400, while the average salary in industry was USD 460. Thus, university faculty members are comparatively poor. According to the CSR-2013 survey, the majority of faculty households had enough money for food and clothes but could not save for durable good (please refer to Figure 10.1, previously mentioned). Hence, they can be classiﬁed as pertaining to the lower middle class. Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 243

40 35 30 25 % 20 15 10 5 0 <300 300–430 431–550 551–740 >740 Monthly salary, USD equivalent

Figure 10.2 Distribution of faculty by monthly salary, by percentage Source: CSR-2013 data.

Respondents to our online survey mostly believe that the salaries of regular faculty are not competitive, while top-level salaries and income received with additional employment within the same university is more or less comparative to income that people with similar qualification get in other industries. Given the unified salary structure and a focus on teaching, there are no incentives for fresh graduates to try to find a job at another university, especially if this involves relocation to another city/town. Another university, most probably, will offer neither higher salary nor a more interesting research environment, while staying at the alma mater implies working with people whom a student already knows and who know him/her.

Labor market, employment, and promotion policies

Academic employment in higher education Several years ago, the practice of providing tenure to faculty in Ukrainian universities was cancelled, and now all the faculty members have temporary contracts. Typically, contracts do not exceed five years in length, but rectors and deans of “national” higher education institutions can be hired for up to seven years. Also, 25 percent of respondents to the CSR-2013 survey had one-year contracts, while another 29 percent held five-year contracts, and 14 percent of respondents indicated having three-year contracts. If a university is not an individual’s main 244 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine workplace, he or she can sign a short-term contract – for example, to teach one discipline during one semester. When a contract expires, competition for a vacancy should be announced, but this competition is often just a formality. In the majority of cases, the vacancy is opened for an existing candidate, and the only purpose of the competition is to fulfill formal hiring requirements prescribed by law. Eligibility for employment to specific academic positions depends on a candidate’s (scientific) degree held, teaching experience, and the number of research publications produced (exact qualifications are defined by the Order of the Ministry of Education). In Ukrainian higher education, there is a system of scientific ranks and degrees. The scientific degrees are Candidate of Sciences and Doctor of Sciences (when communicating with Western colleagues, Ukrainian Candidates of Sciences add “PhD” to their names). These degrees are granted by the Ministry of Education and Sciences after an individual defends the dissertation and publishes a certain number of research papers. Scientific ranks are senior researcher (only for employees of scientific research institutions), docent, and professor. Ranks are also granted by the MES upon application from a university. To qualify for a scientific rank, a faculty member should have a certain number of years of teaching experience and a required number of publications. Teaching at universities normally requires a scientific degree (Can- didate or Doctor of Sciences), while a master’s degree is sufficient for teaching in colleges. An exception can be made for positions where faculty are not expected to perform research, such as foreign language teachers at technical universities. During the last few years, there has been a noticeable reduction of university faculty because of the decline in the number of students. Between 2010 and 2013, the number of college faculty decreased by 2.5 percent (about 1,000 in absolute terms), and the number of university faculty declined by 3 percent (over 5,000 in absolute terms). At the same time, the share of university faculty with scientific degrees grew from 49 percent to 53 percent, which means that faculty members without degrees were the first to be laid off (the share of college faculty with scientific degrees remained stable at 3 percent).

The role of inbreeding in hiring and promotion Usually, career development at a university proceeds as follows. A master’s student intending to pursue PhD studies makes an arrangement with a professor from among the current faculty willing to become his Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 245 or her research advisor (or sometimes a professor makes an offer to one of his or her good students). To enter a PhD program, students must pass exams, but it is clear that students having the “support” of a faculty member have greater chances for admission to a budget-funded place. (PhD programs that charge fees usually enroll all applicants and charge tuition of USD 500–USD 4,000 per year, depending on the university and the form of studies – full-time or distance.) PhD programs in Ukraine normally last for three years.13 A PhD student takes courses in philosophy and a foreign language in the first year of studies, and passes an exam in his or her specialty before the dissertation defense. For the rest of time, this student is writing the dissertation for the Candidate of Sciences degree. The dissertation topic must be approved by the chair meeting, and quite often this topic is proposed by the individual’s research advisor – as an extension of his or her own research. Simultaneously, with PhD studies, a student starts working as an assistant, teaching seminars or laboratory classes. A person who has three years of teaching experience and a Candidate degree14 can apply for a lecturer or senior lecturer position. Formally, the decision to appoint a person to this position is taken during a meeting of the chair and approved by the faculty of Scientific Council. Also, formally, a competition is announced for a vacancy. However, in practice vacancies in the majority of cases are open only to existing candidates (e.g., fresh PhD graduates of the university or acquaintances of the current faculty). So, in the vast majority of cases vacancies are filled before the competition starts. Promotion up the career ladder is decided in a similar way – to obtain a docent or a professor position – which are quite distinctive academic ranks – a person not only should adhere to formal requirements (i.e., have certain amount of teaching experience and a certain number of publications) but also should have established relations with a chair head or a faculty dean. Thus, the necessary conditions for promotion at the universities are (1) a scientific degree; (2) relevant teaching experience and (3) a sufficient number of publications. Usually, universities require at least one publication per year, but these publications are often of low quality (see Shaw, Chapman, and Rumyantseva 2011). It is very easy for a professor to publish an article in a Ukrainian academic journal, since there are over 1,500 such journals in Ukraine, and many just accept publications for a fee, without reviewing them. Therefore, publications in international refereed journals are much better signals of an academic’s quality. Because of that, the MES changed the rules for dissertation defense – 246 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine since September 2013, to be able to defend a dissertation, one must have 20 percent of publications in international refereed journals. Sufficient conditions for promotion at universities are (1) the availability of vacancies (which depend on the number of students, as explained above) and (2) good relations with other faculty, especially the dean and the rector, since promotion is largely dependent on these people. Thus, almost 40 percent of CSR-2013 survey respondents indicate that “good relations with administration” are very important for career development. Another 33 percent think that this factor is “fairly important.” As already explained, inbreeding is a mechanism that can replace screening. Since it is hard to find out how good a person is based on the number of his or her publications (since those can be of low quality) or grades (since those can be bought), faculty prefer to hire people they know – either former students or acquaintances. Hence, the role of inbreeding in hiring is rather high. However, as soon as a person enters a university (either through inbreeding or via personal ties with university officials established in some other way), promotion does not depend on inbreeding alone, it also depends on other factors – publications, participation in conferences, scientific degrees and ranks and so on, as well as on the good personal relations with faculty or university administration.

Corruption in higher education

In Ukraine, corruption is an important issue. The country permanently occupies a place at the bottom of the corruption perception rating – an overview of corruption in education worldwide can be found in the “Global Corruption Report: Education” published by Transparency International in 2013, and Ukrainian reality is described by Osipyan (2009). When the entire country has a corruption problem, it is hard to expect that education will be different. Here, we briefly list the sources of “additional earnings” for faculty. Before the introduction of external testing in 2008, a considerable source of corruption in higher education was entrance exams. Faculty members could either provide private lessons for high school students willing to enter a given faculty or directly submit the “correct” entrance exam grade for the “right” students, that is, either students somehow related to that faculty member or those who approached him or her and paid for the grade. Once students are enrolled, some professors will provide better grades on the end-of-course exams either for money or in exchange for work Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 247 that students might do for them, such as typing up a professor’s book. In addition, there is an entire business in Ukraine of writing course papers, diploma theses, and even dissertations for money, and faculty are sometimes involved in this business, too. A quick web search provides hundreds of links to services that offer to write specialist/master’s theses (USD 200 and up), as well as Candidate (USD 2,500 and up) and doctoral dissertations (USD 7,000 and up). Some of these firms even guarantee a successful defense of these dissertations, which means that they have connections with universities’ defense commissions and the Ministry of Education. We should also note that the situation in Russia and other post-Soviet states is very similar. For example, a web-search for firms that sell dissertations in Russia showed over two million links, and the price range is similar to that seen in Ukraine – USD 2,500 and up for Candidate dissertations and USD 6,000 or more for doctoral dissertations. This situation is widely known and accepted (or at least there is no active opposition to it) within academia.15 A representative survey performed in 2011 by the “Democratic Initia- tives Foundation” in Ukrainian universities showed that 62 percent of students were in one or another way involved in corruption at their institutions. The extent of corruption depended neither on the university ownership (state or private) nor on the source of funding for the student (state budget or own money). Students with higher average grades, however, tend to be less involved in corruption practices than others. At the same time, 21 percent of surveyed students think that corruption is the norm. It should come as no surprise that cheating and plagiarism are rather common among students of Ukrainian universities (Stephens, Romakin, and Yukhymenko 2010). In fact, a large part of the research papers published by faculty is plagiarized too. As already explained, this widespread corruption undermines the value of higher education and its role as a screening mechanism, thus diminishing the role of education in the job search.

The role of education in the job search

The low importance of education as a screening factor is conﬁrmed by the study of Coupé and Vakhitova (2010), who showed that returns to education in Ukraine (a 5.6 percent increase in wages for every year of higher education) are the lowest in Eastern Europe and were practically stable during the last 20 years, while in other countries they have substantially increased. 248 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

In contrast, different surveys stress the importance of social ties. For example, the ULMS-2007 survey contains information on the employment history of respondents in the period 2004–2007 and shows that from 48 percent to 68 percent of people got their job through relatives or friends. Data from the 2009 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) show the relative importance of different factors for “getting ahead” in life. This survey shows that in Ukraine “knowing the right people” is fifth among the group of “essential, important or fairly important factors,” similar to other transition countries. However, in the group of “essential” factors, “knowing the right people” is second, after education – the same as in Russia, while in other transition countries this factor appears in third or fourth place. Thus, although admitting the importance of education, Ukrainians view social ties as an essential factor to get ahead in life. This is true in the academic environment, as well. Indeed, 73 percent of faculty questioned during the CSR-2013 survey mentioned that “good relations with administration” is important or rather important for career growth – this factor is fourth after “high quality of teaching,” “number of publications,” and “high quality of research.” In line with these findings, our online survey showed that kinship or other social ties is the second important factor in hiring decisions, after the number of publications – its average score is 2.14 on the scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (not at all important). At the same time, the score of “studied at the same university” is 3.07 on the same scale. On the scale from 1 (very often) to 5 (not at all often) competition between internal candidates is much more common (score 2.5) than an open competition (score 3.5), and very often competition is a fiction (score 1.9). In their comments, our survey respondents once again stressed the importance of personal ties – for example, one respondent became acquainted with a dean at a conference and afterwards was hired (while before that institution’s human resource department told him there was no chance to find a job at their university). A few of our respondents indicated that there was no way to get an academic job without personal ties. One of them said that it is hard to talk about inbreeding at all because “you have to start with the fact that children of faculty or their friends usually enter the same university [and later are inbred].” All of the above confirms our earlier conclusion that widespread inbreeding reflects social connections with current university faculty established during studies, rather than a preference of university administration for own graduates per se. Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 249

Causes and consequences of academic inbreeding

Factors that impact inbreeding The fundamental causes of inbreeding are discussed at length in the previous sections. Here, we now describe the results of the econometric analysis based on CSR-2013 survey data. The purpose of this analysis was to find out whether certain individual and faculty-level factors impact a person’s probability to be inbred, and also whether inbreeding impacts the “price” (salary) and “quality” (research publications) of faculty. The details of this analysis are presented in Sologoub and Coupe (2014). The CSR-2013 survey shows that 48.6 percent of faculty work in the educational institution from which they graduated. We tried to find out which personal and universitywide factors affect the probability of a person being inbred. We consider personal characteristics such as gender and work experience (age), as well as signs of a person’s “quality” – such as scientific degrees/ranks, research productivity (number of publications in Ukrainian and foreign journals), usage of foreign language in teaching, and the fact that a person received a foreign fellowship. For the university-specific factors, we include university size (the number of full-time students), “national” status, and also the size of the city where a university is located. We found that a “better quality” person (i.e., one with more teaching experience, more research publications, or foreign fellowships) is more likely to find another job and, hence, less likely to still work at a university from which he or she graduated. This is consistent with the “signaling” reason for inbreeding indicated earlier – as a person earns additional signs of “quality” (teaching experience and research publications), he or she is more likely to find a job at another institution. Table 10.1 shows how common is inbreeding in different fields based on CSR-2013 survey data. We see that the highest share of inbred faculty is observed in medicine. We can suggest several explanations for this fact. First, medical universities are among the hardest to enter, and personal ties play more important roles there than in the universities of other specialization (“dynasties” of doctors are common in Ukraine). Second, there is normally only one medical university in a city, so if a person wants to teach and does not want to move to another place, he or she necessarily remains at the alma mater. The results of regression analysis indicate that medicine is the only field with inbreeding levels significantly higher than in any other field. 250 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

Table 10.1 Share of inbred faculty by ﬁeld

Field % of inbred Total faculty number of observations

Humanities 40.3 120 Economics 54.0 51 IT 40.5 37 Medicine 79.4 34 Pedagogical science 0.0 12 Law 50.0 18 Natural sciences 47.1 51 Social sciences 25.0 12 Technical sciences 60.8 74

Source: CSR-2013 data.

Very small universities (those with fewer than 1,000 full-time students) are less likely to inbreed their faculty, but universities larger than this have very similar inbreeding levels. “National” universities are more likely to have inbred faculty, possibly because they are considered more prestigious places of work, which means that (1) it is harder to get into them, so personal connections play a higher role, and (2) students are more willing to stay at them because of higher salaries and better career prospects.

Impact of inbreeding on faculty “price” and “quality” Next, we tried to ﬁnd out whether inbred faculty differ from other faculty in terms of cost (i.e., salary) and quality (measured as research productivity and probability of winning a foreign fellowship). We included personal and university-level characteristics described above as control variables in these regressions. As the dependent variable, we used monthly income brackets (income values are converted from UAH to USD at the average rate for 2013, or UAH 8.12 per USD 1). The analysis of the dependent variable shows that 29 percent of surveyed faculty earned less than USD 308 and 61 percent of this group were inbred; 33 percent of faculty earned USD 309–432 and 45 percent of this group were inbred; 20 percent of surveyed faculty earned USD 433–555 and 47 percent of this group were inbred; 12 percent of the sample earned USD 556–740 and 35 percent of this group were inbred; 6 percent of the sampled earned more than USD 741 and 43 percent of this group were inbred. Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 251

The main conclusion from the estimation of this regression is that, even taking into account all other factors, inbred faculty receive lower salaries. This suggests that while inbreeding can increase the chance to get a job as a faculty member, it does not lead to a higher wage in itself. Next, we look at the impact of inbreeding on the “research output” of a person, three variables serving as proxies for “research output”: (1) the number of publications in Ukraine and the CIS (these include articles, monographs, and books) during the last three years; (2) the number of publications in other countries during the last three years; and (3) participation in foreign fellowship(s) during the last three years. The main conclusion from these regressions is that the quality of inbred faculty does not differ from quality of other faculty – they have the same number of publications as noninbred faculty and the same probability to get a foreign fellowship. Therefore, in Ukraine inbreeding can be viewed as a second best solution to the low signaling value of education. While teaching a student or supervising his or her diploma work, a university professor learns about the true level of knowledge of that student, whereas diploma grades of an “outsider” may reflect his or her true knowledge or be fake (i.e., obtained in a dishonest way). Clearly, the rational behavior would be to offer a position to a person with known rather than uncertain characteristics. Likewise, a university faculty member can recommend hiring a person whom he or she had not taught but is acquainted with in some other way (e.g., seen at a conference, or worked together). This is not a perfect solution either, but in the current situation it may be an acceptable way to fill university vacancies, since professors will not recommend “bad” candidates, feeling responsible for a person they recommended. Finally, we tried to find out whether inbred faculty members are promoted faster than noninbred academics. We compared the number of years that inbred and noninbred people worked at each level of the academic career ladder – assistant, lecturer/senior lecturer, docent, and professor – and did not find any statistically significant difference between the means of these variables. This confirms our conclusion that being a student at a university plays a role only during the hiring process, and once employed, other factors become more important. The results of the data analysis suggest that the quality of inbred faculty is the same as quality of other faculty, although the costs of hiring inbred academics are lower. 252 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

Conclusions

Two main factors causing high levels of inbreeding in academia in Ukraine are (1) absence of a tradition of competitive hiring and preference for “insiders” and (2) loss of the screening function of education because of widespread corruption. In Ukraine, in general, personal ties are very important during hiring processes. As shown by the ULMS- 2007 survey, from 48 percent to 68 percent of people find a job through relatives or friends, which is comparable to the extent of inbreeding found by this study on academics (48 percent in the CSR-2013 survey, 68 percent in our online survey). In the Ukrainian academic environment, personal recommendations have almost completely replaced the competitive selection process. In the opinion of our survey respondents, a person without inside connections cannot get a job at a university without first establishing social relations with the person making hiring decisions (usually, a chair head or a faculty dean). Studying at a university is one way to establish those relations. Other ways include being someone’s relative or friend, getting recommended by a person close to the administration, or getting acquainted with the decision-maker in some other way – for example, at a conference. After being employed at a university, a person will be promoted if he or she (1) keeps good relations with other faculty and university officials and (2) adheres to formal requirements for a given position, that is, has the necessary teaching/research experience, publications record, and a scientific degree or rank. In the absence of real screening mechanisms, inbreeding can be viewed as a second-best option for hiring new faculty, given that, typically, university professors will offer positions to their best students. Our econometric analysis showed that inbred faculty are not different from other faculty in terms of research output or the probability of winning a foreign fellowship. However, inbred faculty do get lower salaries. Our regression analysis also showed that more distinguished faculty (i.e., those with longer work experience and a higher number of publications) are less likely to be inbred, which means that when a person earns “signs of quality” other than degrees and grades, it becomes easier for him or her to find a job at another university. Inbreeding is less common in very small universities (of less than 1,000 students), and is independent of the university size after this threshold. This “small university phenomenon” can be explained either by the absence of vacancies (i.e., in small universities, the number of Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 253 faculty members is also small) or by fewer career growth opportunities for students at these universities. Universities with a “national” status have slightly higher level of inbreeding since they are more prestigious places of work and offer higher salaries. Currently, inbreeding is not on the agenda of either researchers or policy-makers in Ukraine. In fact, no one seems to have considered it a problem. Perhaps it will not be discussed as a problem any time soon because there are many other “bigger” problems in Ukrainian higher education. To name a few, there is the high centralization of the higher education sector and insufficient university autonomy; low salaries and high teaching workloads for professors; low levels of university research productivity, both in terms of quantity and quality, especially in the humanities and social sciences; high rates of corruption and low standards of studying and research work (including ubiquitous cheating and plagiarism); low sensitivity of educational programs to the needs of the modern economy; and other concerns. Policies tackling these problems would automatically reduce the level of inbreeding. For example, providing universities with the right to issue their own diplomas (rather than those determined by the state’s standards) and grant scientific degrees would provide incentives for universities to add some “real value” to their diplomas, that is, to improve quality of teaching and make students earn their grades rather than buy them. Allowing universities to develop their own study plans and financing students rather than universities would strengthen the competition between universities and further improve their quality. Trying to raise the quality of their teaching and research, universities would be forced to look for the best faculty on the market and adhere to competitive hiring procedures, which they now engage in only formally. All these pro-competitive policies will ultimately lead to the reduction of the share of faculty hired “by recommendation,” including inbred faculty.

Notes

1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only survey of university faculty performed in Ukraine (the State Statistical Committee provides only very general data on faculty numbers and their scientific degrees). The survey included questions on a wide range of topics – workload, salary/income, research publications, and so on. One of the questions made it possible to determine if a faculty member was inbred. The selection procedure for the sample was as follows. Universities were distributed by fields (specialization). In each field, two to four universities were randomly selected. In each 254 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

university, a faculty was randomly selected, and in each faculty two or three chairs were randomly selected. Then, several faculty members from each chair were randomly selected and interviewed. At the end, the sample con- sisted of over 50 universities represented by no more than eight faculty members from each institution. The sample represents all regions of Ukraine and the main fields of study, so we believe these data are rather reliable. 2. The results of opinion polls constantly show low levels of social activity and high level of paternalism in post-Soviet societies. For example, while in the European Union (EU) 45 percent of citizens belong to some sort of social organization (a club, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), a political party, etc.), in Ukraine and Russia, this share is only 13 percent and 16 percent, respectively. These EU data come from the all-EU survey “First European Quality of Life Survey: Participation in Civil Society” by European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and working Condi- tions (2004), the data on Ukraine from the Institute of Sociology Survey (2012), the data on Russia from the All-Russia Centre for Studying of Social Opinion (2005) – please see http://top.rbc.ru/society/12/01/2006/92945.shtml, http://www.hse.ru/monitoring/mcs/ustmcs. Such low levels of civil activity can be explained by the absence of traditions of horizontal organizations in the USSR, where political parties, except for the Communist Party, were prohibited, and other organizations, such as trade unions or youth organizations (Komsomol), were in fact subsidiaries of the Communist Party. The purpose of these organizations was to control their members rather than to protect their rights. Tight state control together with the universal provision of minimal living standards caused high level of paternalism in the Soviet society, which is still felt today. According to the poll performed in May 2013, 35 percent of Ukrainians think that “Ukraine constantly needs a ‘strong hand’ ” (i.e., an authoritarian leader), and 42 percent think that “the state should be fully responsible for provision of all the necessary things to every citizen” (http://dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/gromadskii-sektor-i-politika- vzaemodija_-neitralitet-chi-borotba_—zagalnonacionalne-ta-ekspertne- opituvannja.htm). In March 2013, 31 percent of Russians believed that “Russia constantly needs a strong hand” and another 46 percent believed that “Russia needs it in the current situation”; 63 percent thought that it is good that V. Putin currently has practically all the power in his hands (http://www. levada.ru/08-04-2014/rossiyane-o-silnom-lidere-i-edinovlastii) 3. The purpose of the registration system was to limit internal population mobility in order to have more control over citizens. Soviet state valued loyalty more than anything else and tried to enforce it with all possible means. One of these means was employment: enterprises and institutions could be ordered not to hire certain people (dissidents), so they could take only positions for which they were much less qualified, and often far from urban centers. Sometimes, a dissident was deprived of any job at all, and then jailed for “parasitism.” 4. In some way, corruption and rent seeking have become state policy, since many laws are designed in such a way as to provide much room for corruption. For example, many entrepreneurs complain that it is impossible to adhere to all the tax regulations, and a tax inspector can always find a reason to impose a fine (or extract a bribe). According to the Doing Business Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 255

rating – 2013, the Ukrainian tax system is in 164th place among 189 countries, and entrepreneurs spend, on average, 390 working hours a year to file taxation documents. In 2013, Ukraine was in 144th place in the Corruption Perception Index report, together with Central African Republic, Iran, and Nigeria. 5. We need to note that until recently an important motive for male students to enter a university and even begin PhD studies was avoiding the military draft (men under 25 can be drafted for one-year military service). In late 2013, the draft was discontinued, but it was renewed recently because of the war in the eastern part of Ukraine. 6. In July 2014, a new education law fixing the main (although not all) flaws of the higher education system was adopted. Namely, the law eliminates the Specialist degree and introduces the PhD, provides more autonomy to universities, and allows for a greater role for students in university life. Implementation of this law will take up to ten years. 7. In 1990, there were 1,400 organizations performing R&D in Ukraine, of these 149 universities did not perform military research (according to State Statis- tics Service data). We could not find the data on the number of institutions that performed military research in Ukraine, but in the entire USSR there were about 700 such organizations. The majority of these organizations were located in Russia, but we can assume that at least several dozens of them operated in Ukraine. 8. There is anecdotal evidence that each university professor taking bribes from students provides a part of the cash he or she “collects” to a faculty dean. In turn, the dean provides a part of these moneys to rector, and the rector passes these along to ministry officials. To be fair, we should note that this situation is not unique to education, and similar schemes exist in other ministries, in the police force, the customs service, and so on. 9. There are four levels of accreditation of higher educational institutions in Ukraine. Institutions of the Ist level provide Junior Specialist degree (incomplete higher education equivalent to ISCED-4), IInd-level institutions provide Junior Specialist or BA degree (basic higher education – equivalent to ISCED-5). Institutions of IIIrd accreditation level provide BA/Specialist/MA degrees and are called institutes. Institutions of IVth level are called universities and are expected to perform research (to get the IVth accreditation level, the university staff should produce certain number of publications). Some universities are granted the status of “national” by the Cabinet of Ministers or a president decree (although the exact criteria for granting of this status are unknown). This means that they get more funding, and their senior staff is appointed for seven years (in all other universities – for five years). For the easiness of understanding, in this text we refer to Ist –IInd level institutions as “colleges” and to IIIrd – IVth – level institutions as “universities.” The system of after-school education also includes vocational schools, which produce qualified (blue-collar) workers without higher education. 10. Although ultimately owned by the state, some higher education institutions “belong” to ministries. For example, the Agriculture Ministry “owns” 17 universities and 13 colleges that prepare specialists for agriculture, the Health 256 Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine

Ministry “owns” 13 universities and 22 colleges that prepare doctors and nurses, and so on. State financing for these institutions goes through the respective ministries. Certainly, the highest share of institutions (37 percent, educating 61 percent of students) is subordinate to the Ministry of Education. 11. University positions imply a basic salary rate that is two to three times higher than the minimal salary established by law in Ukraine, which in 2013 was equivalent to USD 105 per month. 12. Salary data in Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) are converted to US dollars at the average exchange rate for 2013 (UAH 8.12 per USD 1). 13. Note that a person can obtain scientific degrees also in scientific research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. In 2011, there were 275 scientific research institutes and 249 universities offering PhD programs. However, scientific research institutes enrolled only 15 percent of PhD students. Of PhD students at universities, about 20–24 percent defend dissertations in three years, in scientific research institutions this share was eight to ten percent in different years, implying that in scientific research institutes it is harder to defend a dissertation since one has to do some “real” research (and also because of severe underfinancing of this research). Comparing the number of aspirants who defended the dissertation in a given year with the increase in the number of Candidate of Sciences in the economy of Ukraine in the same year, we see that the former figure is 50 percent–100 percent higher than latter. This is explained by the fact that dissertations are not necessarily defended by PhD students. In principle, a person can write a dissertation and defend it at a university on a fee-paying basis (universities can legally charge to organize a candidate’s exams, publication in their journals, and the dissertation defense). However, it is clear that many of these dissertations are not written by the people that defend them. We need to note that in Ukraine (and in Russia as well) government officials and others often buy a scientific degree for two reasons – first, to show off (the equivalent of buying an expensive watch or a luxury car) and, second, to have a “safe haven” of a university position after they leave their current job. 14. A student willing to obtain a Candidate degree should invest not only his or her time in writing the dissertation but also money into the dissertation defense. The necessary costs include payments for: publications in scientific journals (since 2013, the number of required publications for PhD students increased from three to five, and of these at least one should be published in a foreign journal); publication of the dissertation summary (100–200 copies) and mailing of these to scientific libraries in the CIS; publication of a defense announcement in an MES journal; travel expenses of two official opponents if they come from other cities (sometimes they demand additional payments for reviewing the dissertation); and organization of the after-defense ban- quet for the defense commission. If a student’s alma mater does not have a defense commission (a defense commission should include a certain number of Doctors of Sciences – specialists in the field of the dissertation), the student may defend the dissertation in another university. In this case he or she will have to additionally pay for taking the candidate exams and for the work of the defense commission. These are only the official expenses. Unof- ficial payments to defense commission members largely depend on the field Ilona Sologoub and Tom Coupé 257

of study – they are close to zero for natural sciences but can reach hundreds or thousands of dollars for “fashionable” fields, such as law or economics. Therefore, the total cost of the dissertation defense can vary from USD 1,000 to USD 20,000 and more. 15. It is hard to expect honest practices in higher education institutions when there is corruption at all levels of government. This situation is tolerated by a large part of society, so the officials do not conceal their revenue-generating activities. There have been numerous journalistic investigations into the mis- use of budgetary funds by government officials, including in particular the Ministry of Education. However, these reports had no consequences for the persons involved, since judicial and law enforcement authorities are part of the same system.

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academic fossilization, 31, 183 Argentina, 45–72 academic immobility, 5–6, 55–6, 173 academic faculty member, 50 academic inbreeding, 1–4, 35–40 academic labor market, 47, 49–50, as an unconscious practice, 14 55–7, 67 as an understandable practice, accreditation, 48 2–4 alumni recruitment, 52 comparative studies, 40 auxiliaries, 51 as a problematic practice, 1–2, 15, causes of inbreeding, 54–8 45–6, 114 chair system, 49 academic labor market, 14 elite private universities, 48, 53 Argentina, 47, 49–50 enrolment, 47 China, 92 full-time positions, 49–50 Japan, 100 hiring practice, 51, 53 Russia, 140 internal labor market, 50–4 Slovenia, 171–2 old secondary teacher, 51 Spain, 216 part time positions, 51, 57, 66 prestige of universities, 48 academic mobility, 4, 19 private universities, 47–9, 52–4 geographic mobility, 19, 23 professors of the system, 55, 66 academic productivity of inbred public universities, 47, 51–2, 58 faculty, 25–30, 36–9 salary, 50, 56 Australia, 28, 39 teaching university, 67 China, 82–4, 93 tenure, 52, 58 Japan, 124–5 Asahi University Rankings, 108 lower, 20, 26–8, 39, 92 Australia, 28, 39 not affected, 27, 39, 96 academic productivity, 28 Portugal, 27 statistical incidence of Russia, 27, 40, 150 inbreeding, 39 Slovenia, 175–6 auxiliaries, 51 South Africa, 198 Spain, 28, 208, 214, 224 Beijing Normal University, 76 in time, 28 Beijing University of Aeronautics & Turkey, 28 Astronautics, 79 Ukraine, 249 Boston College Center for United States of America, 27 International Higher Education, 1 academic profession, 73, 105–6, Brazil, 36–7 133–5 Academy of Sciences Russia, Catholic University of Chile, 48 131–2, 145 Central South University, 79 Academy of Sciences Ukraine, 237 chair system, 33–4 access to higher education, 187 Argentina, 49 administrative inbreeding, 68 Japan, 33, 148–9 Akita International University, 119 Russia, 137–9, 145

259 260 Index chair system – continued general attitude towards Spain, 209–10 inbreeding, 23 Ukraine, 242 geographic handicap, 22 China, 40, 73–98 having all PhD supervisors from one 211 project universities, 89 institution, 21 985 project universities, 79, Japan, 108–9 88–90, 94 lack of financing, 22 academic productivity of inbred low student mobility, 40 faculty, 82–4, 93 reputational differentiation, 56 causes of inbreeding, 87–92 Russia, 142–6 Cultural revolution, 87–8 South Africa, 195–6 discrimination of inbred faculty, 95 Spain, 218–23 faculty promotion, 85–7, 93 stage of development of academic general 4 years institutions, 73 system, 21, 39, 55 inbreeding in academic disciplines, Ukraine, 249–50 81–2 See also internal causes of inbreeding inbreeding by gender, 76 prestige of universities, 79–81, 90–1 France, 33, 37, 216–17, 222 research and teaching university, DOCTHESE database, 37 73, 74 inbreeding in academic fields, 37 research university, 73, 79–81 statistical incidence of short circle 3–year colleges, 73 inbreeding, 37 statistical incidence of inbreeding, funding, 34 80, 92–3 Spain, 220 supply and demand of PhD holders, Ukraine, 239–41 88–90 Chuo University, 110 Germany, 33 collegial governance, 221 consequences of inbreeding, 25–32 Hausberufungsverbot, 33 individual level, 29–31 higher education system, 101, 175, institutional level, 31–2 236 positive, 32 Japan, 101–6 system level, 32, 152 Russia, 131–2 Slovenia, 158–9 definition of inbreeding, 18–20, 74, South Africa, 187 108, 182–3, 223 Spain, 207–9 discrimination of inbred faculty, 30, Ukraine, 236–43 38 Higher School of Economics, 1, 131 China, 95 hiring factors, 10–12 gender, 30, 38 Argentina, 51, 53 bureaucratic procedures, 51 equal opportunities in the labor competition, 11–12 market, 32 graduating from the hiring external causes of inbreeding, 21 institution, 12 academic immobility, 57 political interests, 51 Argentina, 54–8 professional qualification, 12 China, 87–92 Ukraine, 228–9, 235 closed recruitment process, 23, 115 work experience, 12 Index 261 hiring practice, 10–12 mechanism for inbreeding, 108–14 Argentina, 50–4 non-Japanese academics, 118 Russia, 140–2 nontenure track system, 34, 105 South Africa, 195–6, see also open open recruitment, 114 recruitment prestigious universities, 100, 108, Hokkaido University, 117 115, 118 Huazhong University of Science & reasons for inbreeding, 23, 39–40 Technology, 81 salary of faculty, 102–3 Hunan University, 96 statistical incidence of inbreeding, 109–12, 117, 120–1 inbreeding in academic disciplines, 38, 77, 81–2, 138 Keio University, 110, 117 biology, 38 Korea, 40 China, 81–2 inbreeding and departmental computer science, 37, 157 prestige, 40 engineering, 38, 60 kyojukai, 127 humanities, 76, 109 Kyoto Imperial University, 107, Japan, 109, 118, 120, 122–3 110, 114 law, 28, 39, 59, 157 Kyushu University, 117 medical science, exact and natural science, 38, 112 psychology, 60, 63, 192 Mexico, 37, 185 Slovenia, 157 social sciences, 60, 81, 250 Nagoya University, 101, 110, 114, 117 South Africa, 192–4 Nanjing University, 79 Spain, 38 Napoleonic higher education institutional tradition, 32, 199 system, 208 internal causes of inbreeding, 23–5 national academic competitiveness, administrative convenience, 24 32, 100, 207 collegial governance, 221–2 National Academy of Natural ethic of loyalty, 24 Sciences, 114 reducing uncertainty and risk of National Accreditation Agency failure, 24, 184 CONEAU Argentina, 48 social connections, 24 National University of Córdoba, 57 teaching mission, 25 National University of La Plata, 57 See also external causes of New Public Management, 170 inbreeding Nihon University, 108 985 project universities, 79, 89, 94 Japan, 21, 33–4, 39, 99–129 academic productivity of inbred open recruitment, 11 faculty, 124–5 alumni network, 99, 108, 113 Germany, 33 chair system, 33–4, 113 Japan, 114 higher education system, 101–6 Spain, 209 history, 107–8 Open University of Japan, 105 Japan Research Career Information Osaka University, 110, 117 Network, 115 kyojukai, 113 Peking University, 4, 76, 81 mass higher education, 100, 105 Pontifical Catholic University, 47 262 Index

Portugal, 27, 37–8 Monitoring of Education Markets academic productivity of inbred and Organizations, 130–1 faculty, 27 non-tenure system, 140 statistical incidence of retirement, 135 inbreeding, 38 salary of faculty, 132–7 prestige of universities, 6–7, 25, 36, 40 scientiﬁc school, 146 Argentina, 48 statistical incidence of inbreeding, elite private universities, 48, 50 136, 138, 140 low quality institution, 7 middle status departments, 22, 36 prestigious institutions, 6–7, 21–2, salary of faculty, 20 58, 66, 78, 195 Argentina, 50 reputational differentiation, 55, 221 Japan, 102–3 Spain, 220 Russia, 132–7 promotion of faculty, 30 screening function of higher proposals to eliminate inbreeding, education, 234–6, 246, 252 33–5 Secretaría de Políticas Universitarias eliminate the detrimental effects of Argentina, 47 inbreeding, 33–5 Shanghai Jiaotong University, 79, 81 enforcement of academic Slovenia, 156–81 mobility, 33 academic productivity of inbred Germany, 33 faculty, 175–6 implementation of tenure track, 34 benchmarking, 171 increased funding, 34 brain drain, 156, 178 international advertisement of comprehensive research vacancies, 34 universities, 158 merit based selection procedures, 33 consequences of inbreeding, 175–7 non-tenure track system, 34 Higher Education Syndicate, 162 public advertisement of higher education system, 158–9 vacancies, 33 hiring practice, 161, 165–71 quota for hiring inbred faculty, 33 inbreeding in academic transparency, 33 disciplines, 157 international academics, 164–5 Renmin University of China, 81 internationalization, 172–3 Rhodes University, 191, 195 labor market conditions, 161–5 Russia, 27, 40, 130–55 academic mobility, 135, 139, language of instruction, 164–5 142, 150 National Quality Assurance and academic productivity of inbred Accreditation Agency, 171, 173 faculty, 27, 40, 150 New Public Management, 170 academic profession, 133–5 salary of faculty, 162–3 Academy of Science, 131–2, 145 statistical incidence of inbreeding, causes of inbreeding, 142–6 156–7 chair system, 137–9, 145 stratiﬁed university system, consequences of inbreeding, 158–9, 176 148–52 teaching, 167 federal university, 131–2 young researcher position, 157, 163, higher education system, 131–2 166–7 hiring practice, 140–2 Soka University, 108 Index 263

South Africa, 182–205 statistical incidence of inbreeding, academic productivity, 198 37–9 access to higher education, 187, 203 Australia, 39 apartheid, 186, 189, 193 China, 80, 92–3 causes of inbreeding, 195–6 France, 37 colonialism, 186, 189 Japan, 109–12, 117, 120–1 consequences of inbreeding, Portugal, 38 197–200 Russia, 136, 138, 140 deﬁnition of inbreeding, 182–4 Slovenia, 156–7 discrimination, 189 South Africa, 193 employment equity, 189, 200 Spain, 214–15 higher education system, 187 Ukraine, 250 hiring practice, 195–6 Sun Yat-Sen University, 85 inbreeding in academic disciplines, 192–4 Taiwan, 40 intensiﬁcation of inbreeding, 196–7 teaching output, 28, 46, 142 policy of employment, 192, 202 Slovenia, 167 prestigious universities, 201–2 Spain, 208, 213, 220 teaching quality, 31 salary of faculty, 190 tenure, 30, 52 statistical incidence of Argentina, 52, 58 inbreeding, 193 Japan, 34, 105 technikons, 187 Ukraine, 243 South China University of United States of America, 53 Technology, 79 terminology of inbred academics, 38 Southeast University, 81 adherent, 19, 26, 38 Spain, 30, 33–4, 37–8, 206–27 insiders, 29, 40 academic mobility, 210, 214, 222–3 mobile academics, 19, 38, 43 academic productivity of inbred mobile inbred, 19, 35, 178, 183, 195 faculty, 28, 208, 214, 224 non-inbred, 75 academic staff assessment, 208 outsiders, 40 catedráticos, 209 partial inbred, 119 causes of inbreeding, 218–23 pure inbred, 19, 119, 136, 183 chair system, 209–10 silver corded academics, 19, 26, entry to the academic profession, 39, 119 211–12 Tohoku University, 117 Franco regime, 206 Tokyo Institute of Technology, funding, 220 110, 117 higher education system, 207–9 Tsinghua University, 76, 79 international recruitment, 34 Turkey, 30, 33, 39 lack of discrimination, 30 deterioration of teaching and language of instruction, 222 research quality, 31 open academic labor market, 209 lack of discrimination, 30 prestige of universities, 220 merit base selection procedures, 33 salary of faculty, 217 211 project universities, 89 statistical incidence of inbreeding, 38, 214–15 Ukraine, 228–5 structure of academic staff, 209–10 academic inbreeding, 235, 246 teaching, 208, 213, 220 academic productivity, 249 264 Index

Ukraine – continued academic productivity of inbred accreditation, 239 faculty, 27, 122 causes of inbreeding, 249–50 tenure, 53 chair, 242 Universidad Nacional de General corruption, 228, 233–4, 246–7 Sarmiento, 49 funding, 239–41 Universidad Nacional de Lomas de higher education system, 236–43 Zamora, 49 historical context, 236 University of Buenos Aires, 46, 58–65 nostriﬁcation, 237 doctoral education, 61 preference for insiders, 228–9, 235 University of Cape Town, 195 private universities, 239 University of Ljubljana, 156, 158–9, quality of education, 240 171, 173–4, 176 recognition of diplomas, 237 role of personal networks, 231 University of Maribor, 156, 159, 174 salary of faculty, 232–3, 241–3, 249 University of Nova Gorica, 159, screening function of higher 164, 174 education, 234–6, 247, 252 University of Primorska, 157, 159, 174 separation of teaching and University of Stellenbosch, 195 research, 237 University of Texas, 22–3, 75 statistical incidence of University of Tokyo, 106, 107, 109, inbreeding, 250 114, 117 tuition fees, 239–40, 245 University of Tsukuba, 102 university autonomy, 238–9, 253 United Kingdom, 216 United States of America, 22, 24, 27, Waseda University, 110, 117 33, 36, 90 Wuhan University, 79