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ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF PHITOSOPHY

EE Progrex PrfiI i t he rc N ucou Trrnrlrtod lrom tho f,urtlan by Dmltrt Eeltavskg col{tEtvls Dodgnod bY Vadlm Kulethou

' Page T. Oftaepuar Inl,roduction t5 E M AT JII43 M AI4AJI ttTI4rIECIt[fi !]PI,IA ,t IA IICT OPI4fr @IIJIOCOOI4I4 I'IIOI]LEMS OF METHOD IN THE HISTORY OF Ha aruanufrcnot a,aufre t7 Ihe.History oI ?hilosophy-the Development of philo- sollrcal tlrowledge . l9 Ilialectical Materillism and Hegel's phiiosoply' oi in.' Histo_ryof Philosophy. .... 4t A Contribution to the Critique of the Latest pluralistic Concept of the History of Philosoohv 62 'l'ho Dialectical-Materialist View of " ttre philosophical !yqlom 83 l.'}hilosophy and Everyday Consoiousness . 100

2 I)IALIJ.CTICAL MATERIALISM AND DIALECTICAL IDEAL IgM ttg lmrnrnuoltmnrnnuol Kaut and l?th-Century philojophicalphilosophical Ration_ tlhtrr t2t I(ant'r Dootrlno o[ "Thlnge ti thenjetvos;' and ilou-;o; 136 I'ho l)lalootloal trtoailrmif Johann Gb*iiel-ricnte l-.-l 154 I,lrlloroplry of tho powei of neas-on . 'l'holLofot'; .- tgt Soolll Morinlhc of Hecel' 204 Dlaloctlcal Matoriafism anil' (Jnlvorsality tlthe Hegeliin-Concept of ihd of Practice . 'of' 22!. Lonin.on ihe .Hegelian ioncept the'Coiutia'enie'oi ulalocttcs,_ Logic and -Dialectic.il- . - 242 Dialoctical Materialism.Miterialism,'Oiat.oticif IaeaUsm'ldcrti"- andonrt Conrem_nan+aa porary Coutem- @ I,Iagatelrcrno

ouffffi38-82 0302000000 INTRODUCTION

'l'Itese essays on the history of philosophy deal, above nll with methodology. They also examine world outlook, Irocause a Marxist study of the history of philosophy must lnalyze the relation of dialectical materialism to the phi- losophy that preceded it. The Marxist approach to the development of pre-Marx- inn philosophy first of all singles out classical German plrilosophy, one of the theoretical sources of Marxism. 'l'herefore, this book poses a number of important although rrot yot sufficiently analyzed issues, related to the historical lspoct of the emergence and development of dialectical irlonlism, whose outstanding role as the precursor of dia- locl,ical materialism was repeatedly stressed by the found- lrs of Mnrxism. 'l'ltis book supplements my monographs Problems ol the lllatory ol Philosophy (Moscow, 1969; English translation prrbllxhorl in l{)73, German in 1962 and 1979, and French Irr 1tl7;l) nnd Malor Trends in Philosophy (Moscow, lll7l), rrnd dlflcusses issuos that wore not sufficiently lxnmlnorl ln tlrom. Oorrsoquontly, this book omits the top- icn wlrlch, nlt,hough very important, were discussed at Irrngth in thosc monographs. 'l'lro principal objective of this book is to use the study of cortain aspects of methodology and of dialectical ideal- ism to outline the fundamental role the dialectical-mate- rinlist theory of the history of philosophy plays in shap- ing the world outlook. A comprehensive analysis of that t,lroory is certainly relevant, and its importance transcends l,lrc bounds of a purely historical study of philosophy. As Frederick Engels emphasized, the history of theo- rt'tical thinking, and consequently the history of science, lrc inseparable from the history of philosophy. According l,o Ilngels, the rejection of philosophy as "the science of scicnces" that is opposed to specifig soiences is inseparable lrom r orlttorl cveluatlon ol the legacy of philosophy, process boo-auls I nocessary logical expression of the historical "the art ol worklng wlth coicoits is not iniorn deueloprnent knowledge-only because I am and ako h not givon witti ordinary overyday rrf tlrc of conscious- lrying to define the role of the history 9l philosophy in the .nets but req-uires roal thought,-iristory, and . . . ttrii ttiought simi- kngw larly haa ompirical ng,, old development of theoretical thinking. We a long not more andl not less pre-Marxian saw thal ompjrical natural l,liirt even the greatest of the scip,ncs. Only by learning to as- rro between the development of knowledge and the similate the results of the development of philosoffry arr- link past -it rlovclopment of the ability to think in concepts. For exam- ing- -the two and a half thousand years wiit rid ability exercise judgment (to itself on the one hand natural phiiosophy lrlr', Kant said that the to of any standing data the more general concepts and cat: apart from it, outside and above irrnke empirical fit it it, and bn- the othei ogories) was an inborn quality, and that no or hand also of its own limited method' of thought, which _education was inheritance tinining could make up for the absence of that essential its from English empiricism."-(8; 20) perfectly way his systeir Theoretical thinking essdntialty l,r'uit. frant's view fitted in the is firi"t

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Engels described the great discoveries of natural science objective: that of revealing the laws that govern the_ d-evel- in the mid-l9th century (the discovery of the cell and its opment of the given sum-total of phenomena in a definite formation, the law of energy transformation, Darwin's lristorical frame,work laid down in the study. The latter theory of evolution) as revolutionary turning points in the case is thus a logical reconstruction of the process in ques- historical shaping of theoretical natural science and as l,ion. KarI Marx's Capital is a classic example. the scientiflc foundation of dialectical materialism. In this According to Engels, the logical method "is indeed noth- connection Engels formulated the law of the creative de- ing but thJhistoricil method, only stripped of the historical velopment of materialist philosophy: "With each epoch- torm and diverting chance occurrences. The point whe-re making discovery even in the sphere of natural science it this history beginJ must also be the starting point of the [materialism] has to change its form; and after history also l,rain of thought, and its further progress will be simply was subjected to materialistic treatment, a new avenue of the reflection, . in alstract and theoretically consistent development was opened here too." (3; 3, 349) In the [orm, of the historical course. Though the reflection is early 20th century V. L Lenin in his Materialism and. Em- corrected, it is corrected in accordance with laws provided pirio-Criticisrn offered a profound philosophical analysis by the actual historical course, since each factor can be of the crisis in the methodology of physicsf caused by the cxamined at the stage of development where it reaches its revolution in that science. The roots of that crisis were full maturity, its classical form." (6; 225) Since the study directly related to the great theoretical discoveries that in- of the history of philosophy is regarded essential for de- fl,uenced the shaping of the world outlook. That explained veloping theoretical thinking, it should not be mer,ely q_n why Lenin, while developing Engels' theses about the ompirical-historical study but a1so, and above all, logical- heuristic role of the history of philosophy (those quoted thebretical, theoretically general, and epistemological. In above), also stressed the heuristic importance of the his- Engels' words, the point is to understand the resalts of th9- tory of natural science: "The results of natural science are d,etlelopment ol phltosophy ouer the past two and, a hall concepts, and . .. the art of operating with concepts is not tltousand Aears. Dialectical materialism considers this inborn, but is the result of 2,000 years of the develop- theoretical summing up-task of the history of philosophy (and' ment of natural science and philosophy." (10; 38, 262) science) as a speCial of epistemology, a_ lranch_ of Of course, admitting the outstanding heuristic role of philosofhy studying lhe deuelopment of knowledge taken the history of natural science does not at all detract from in its more general form defined in the major philosophical the importance of the history of philosophy as a school of categories. theoretical thinking. On the contrary, underestimating the In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin mapped out a history of science-and that is still true of some scholars program of fundamental epistemological studies based on interpretation and generalization of the his- -combines inexorably with disdain for the history of phi- i theoretical losophy. But as a rule, the scientists responsible for im- tory of various sciences (the history of the mental devel- portant discoveries systematically studied the history of opment of animals, the history of technology, Ianguage, theoretical thinking, both in natural science and in phi- etc.) and the history of knowledge in general. Lenin ac- losophy. The works of Einstein, Heisenberg, Vernadsky corded priority to the task of summing up the historical- and Timiriazev are a case in point. philosophical process aimed at further developing the epis- Like any historical process, the history of science (and iemoiogy of dialectical materialism. ({0; 38, 351) Method- philosophy) can be studied by two essentially different but ologically, that is a point of tremendous importa_nce. It organically interconnected methods: the historical and the cxpiessly indicates the organic relationship of dialectical logical. The historical method aims to reproduce the proc- materialism to the entire philosophy that preceded it. That shap- ess in question in all its general, typical and unique fea- relationship has a bearing not only on the origil -and tures. The logical method, based on the sum-total of the ing of dialbctical materialism but also on its problems, con- results in a specific historical study, pursues a differpU.t tent and development. That expains why Lenin, in compil- ' i"r

ing his note-: on llegel's Lectures on the H{,story-several ol Phllos- tion of history, is impossible without negation, that is, ophy and The Science ol Logtc, singled out ex- without a scientifically sound critical attitude to metaphys- tremely important tenets of philosophy. Failure to see them ical thinking, to agnosticism, the a priori approach,-sub- precludes any comprehensive evaluation of Lenin's stage ,ioctivism, the idealistic interpretation of the life of society, in the development of Marxist philosophy. It also explains otc. Scientific philosophical criticism is, in the final analy- Engels' following assessment of the attitude of Marxist phi- sis, positive. Error is regarded as an epistemological phe- losophy to the 2,000-year history of idealism: "For it is by nomenont and its scientific understanding does not merely no means a matter of simply throwing overboard the en- locord the error as such; it presupposes the study of the tire thought content of those two thousand years, but of historically transient necessity of that error, its gnosiolog- criticism of it, of extracting the results-that had been ioal roots, and consequently, of the real content (a corre- won within a form that was false and idealistic but which Iate of the truth) of, the philosophical error. This approaoh was inevitable for its time and for the course of evolution to philosophical analysislan ap:proach not only leiilimate itself-from this transitory form." (9;'some 198-99) but also obviously necessary to a certain degiee-largely Each school philosophy oliminates of is in way connected the distinction between study of the -theproblems with the previous history of philosophy. It is impossible o[ dialectical materialism and a Marxist study of his- understand particular to a system of philosophy without tory -of philosophy. Engels' Anti-Dilhring and Lenin's Ma-- studying the history of philosophy as a whole, without Leri,alis m and E rnpirio -Criticis m are good-examples. critically analyzing the various philosophical schools, ap- The nature of criticism depends to a certain degree on proaches, hypotheses, achievements in all fields, including [he object of criticism. This book examines the relation.of those-that later turn out to be spurious. is an antinomy dialectical materialism It to the legacy of classical -historyphiloso- of sorts between the whole and its part: understanding a phy, particularly classicai German idealism. The part presupposes knowledge of the whole, but the latter is of Marxism bears out that any critique of the latter crea- impossible without knowledge of the parts. This dialectical tively assimilates its profound insights. That is what posi- antinomy is solvable, because understanding a part means, tive dialectical-materialist negation is aII about. Lenin de- to a certain degree, understanding the whole, and knowl- scribed it as follows: "Not empty negation, not futile nega- edge of the whole presupposes a certain knowledge of its lion, ruot sceptical negation, vacillation and doubt is char- constituent parts. acteristic and essential in dialectics,-which undoubtedly Thus it riould be an error to believe that the historical contains the element of negation and indeed as its most (or, to be more precise, historical-philosophical) way lead- important element-no, but negation as a moment of con- ing to the truth is only relevant inasmuch as the truth has nection, as a moment of development, retaining the posi- not yet been reached; that once the truth is reached, the tive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclectic- , way to it can be forgotten. In actual fact, everything is ism." (10: 38,226) much more complicated because the truth is the process Each philosophical doctrine is essentially distinguished of the development of knowledge, and the arrival at this by its relation to the philosophical legacy. The issues raised or that truth reveals the epistemological significance of by any doctrine are born of definite historical circum- the road cognition has taken. stances and are theoretically linked to the issues treated Philosophy is essentially a deeply controversial subject. hy the philosophy that preceded it. It reviews these issues, Each point it makes is not only an affirmation but also a interprets them differently, enriches and generally devel- negation, both thesis and antithesis. Substantiating the olrs them. There is a contradiction in the unity of each materialist world outlook means rejecting idealism. A cor- lrlrilosophical doctrine and the philosophy that preceded it. rect understanding of the dialectical method, of the basic A part from relations of historical succession, it also com- sense precepts of the dialectical-materialist theory of re- lrrisos struggle against the doctrines that were its theoret- Ilection, of the fundamentals of the materialist interpreta- ical sources. For example, Spinoza, while directly follow-

{0 11 ing Descartes,. was also a dedicated opponent of dualism, new and more meaningful fundamental precept. On the psychophysical- paralle_lism, the free *lll ooncept, deism other hand, the- aotual liistory of philosoptry-wtrictr Hegel and other fundamentals of the Cartesian doctrinb.' rloes. not- at- all ignore-developJ on a iemporal plaie, Furthermore, the unity is relative. It is always a defi- within the frameworks of essentially different historicai nitely oriented unity, its social and philosophicai bias ac- ages. Aud of this plane-and Hegel iully admits and sys- counting Jo-r its selectivity. This philosophical selectivity tematically demonstrates that-there is no such one-sitied assesses different predecessors diffeiently,-and chooses thi and direct relationship between the preceding and follow- ing philosophical systems. -concepts that fit its principles. For example, Spinoza, un- like other materialist philosophers, The theoretical interpretation turned to' the -underes-pantheist of the actual history of and rationalist tradition in philosophy, obviously philosophy shows that many outstanding philosophers, timating the importance of philosophical empiiicism and could not arrive at any p-ositive evaluation- oi their'pre. empirical natural science. decessors' doctrines even [hough they followed and deiel- oped Because of their distinctive content and social gravita- -the latter (usually, not even quite consciously). Even tiol, philosophical doctrines differ substantially in their llegel, who unlike other creators o-f philosophical- systems ability critically analyze oonsidered his doctrine the result preceding to the results of the- -assertionpreceding of ihe iristory development of philosophy. This refutes Hegel's of philosophy, failed to arrive at a con6ct evahiation oi that since the latest philosophical doctrine iJ the result of the historical role of materialist philosophy, sensationalist everything previous have achieved until then, opistemology, natural science and-the generally nonphilos- it "must then contain the principles of alt; it is therefore, ophic-al methods of research that had alremendous dearing when it is a philosophy, the most developed, the richest, on all the philosophy of the New Ase. and the most concrete". (64; 6, 2l) That line of reason- The revolution in philosophy bro-ught about by Marxism ing would mean that since Berkeley and Hume came after is often described as a radical breaf with all the preced- Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Hobbes, ing philosophical doctrines. their doctrines were a synthesis of the principles laid Such an assessment of the Marxist relation to the philo- down by their predecessors and they built fuller and more rophical. legacy reJgrs only to one aspect of the cohplex developed philosophical systems. Obviously, this was not so. und contradictory historical process of the negation of btri- Hegel e-xamined Berkeley and Hume, harshly criticized lorophy i,n-tho old sense of the term. True, diafectical -utr- their subjective idealism and skepticism, and showed how rlullsm diffors radically from all other philosophical doo- far removed those outstanding philosophers were from any trlnor, lnclrrrling progrossivc ones. But- it wai preciselv critical assimilation of, everything philosophy had accom- tlialoctlcal materialism that critically assimilated,'creativd- plished before them. Berkeley and Hume i,ere by their ly rovisod and developed the accomplishments of all the nature incapable of such assimilation; their philosophical proceding history of philosophy, and ihis muoh more than leanings, historical choice and relation to the preceding |'nV other. philosophioal doctrine. An adequate reflection of philosophical doctrines were clearly one-sided. the Marxist revolution in_ philosophy is pi.ecisety tiii-ieti- Hegel's error is connected with the fundamentals of tlon to the preced,ing_ philosophy wiich, free from any sec- absolute idealism which pictures philosophy as developing tarian narrow-mindedness, is revolutionary-critical, creative, on two planes. On the one hand, it is an extra-temporal partisan and scientiflcally objective. process in the realm of the "absolute idea". Hegel describes In his_ Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin stresses and svs- the latter as authentic philosophical thinking. In this tematically explains that dialectical idealism is closer"io suprahistorical sphere where actual historical development dialectical materialism -!!q", metaphysical, antidialectical, is replaced by logical succession, by the self-development materialism. (10; 3!: 27!) My essays on the history oi of the Concept, each successive stage necessarily includes philosophy, especially those inalyzing classical German the.preoeding logical stages and subordinates them to a idealism, explain this extremely important tenet which

t2 t3 - :) - leads to tlie conclusion that dialectioal materialism (and rojects the idealist, metaphysical interpretation and eclec- orilU dialtrctical riraterialism) ofrers the methodological l,icism, often paraded as "objectively" taking into consid- foundation foi a truly scientilic history of philosophy. cration aII viewpoints, as a synthetic approach, etc. But Kant creatively posed the issue of whether scientific in fact, this "bias" is a consistent scientific approach to theoretical lcnowledge is possible. According to Kant, the l,he history of philosophy. Obviously, it presupposes un- qxistence of pure mathematics and pure (that is, theoretical) compromising rejection of any unscientific interpretation. natural science is an obvious fact because those sciences The struggle against idealism which, in the eyes of a coqprise truly apodictio and universal judgments. Kant bourgeois historian of philosophy who considers himself believed that the theory of knowledge was to explain how l,o be above the "extreme" viewpoints, is a fault of dialec- pure mathematics and pure natural science were possible. tical materialism, is a necessary expression of scientific A still more important and central issue in Critique ol consistency in a study of the history of philosophy. Ac- Pwre Reason, the work Kant considered a fundamental oording to Leonid Breizhnev, "There is no room for neu- introduction to his philosophical system, poses an even tralism or compromise in the struggle between the two more important problem: how is (phi- ideologies." (11; 89-90) losophy) possible as a definite intellectual occupation? Can A dialectical-materialist, partisan approach to idealism, metaphysics be a science? What are the conditions and far from impeding scientific assessment of the role played ways of transition from nonscientific philosophizing to by idealistic philosophy, offers a consistent methodological philosophy as a true science? basis for such assessmeri,. The Holy Family by Marx and' Obviously, the problems that Kant raised and failed to Ilngels is significant in this regard. Here the authors both ans\r/er in a scientific-philosophical way have also a direct consistently expose idealist speculations and stress that bearing on the history of philosophy as a science. How is their outlook is materialist, "which has now been per- the science of the history of philosophy possible? In other fected by the work of speculation itself". (1; 4, 125) This i'ords, what are the philolophical requisites of that means that Marxist philosophy materialistically revises science? The skeptics would not accept that definition of and critically assimilates all the genuine accomplishments the problem. They would pose it differently: is the history oJl idealist philosophy. Which explains why dialectical ma- of philosophy possible as a science at all? Apparently, this terialism, accepted as the theoretical basis for study of formulation also merits attention, because there exist l,he history of philosophy, is the scientifically sound cen- many mutually exclusive philosophical doctrines, each of- l,ral avenue oI research into the history of philosophy. The ferihg its own-whether materialist or idealist, metaphys- only scientific philosophical outlook, which the philosophy ical or phenomenalistic-interpretation of the history of of the New Age proclaimed as its goal, is dialectical-ma- philosophy. For example, the followers of Henri Bergson t,erialist. That is borne out not only by the creative devel- have their distinctive view of the history of philosophy opment of Marxist philosophy but also by the record of which underlies their approach to all pliilosophical doc- bourgeois philosophy in the 20th century. Contemporary trines, they gauge everything by irrational intuitive ideal- idealist philosophy rejects both dialectical materialism and ism. A neopositivist historian of philosophy naturally ac- l,he very notion of a scientific-philosophical outlook. Ac- cords priority to roprosentatives of philosophioal-especial- l,ually, aII non-Marxist (inctuding contemporary) philo- ly idealist-empiricism, agnosticism, etc. sophical doctrines rejeot the concept of the preceding de- A dialectical-materialist study of the history ot' philoso- uelopment of philosophy. An examination of philosophy as phy substantiates and uses a radically different, dialecti- it emerges and changes is alien to al} non-Marxist philoso- cal-materialist approach to philosophical doctrines, their phical doctrines, for they are not, nor can be, d,eueloping relation to one another, etc. Naturally, to a bourgeois his- systems. They view the past of philosophy as something torian of philosophy, the dialectical-materialist view of the pctrified: it either fully belongs to an irretrievably lost history of philosophy would appear biased too, because it lristorical era or, on the contrary, is the work of brilliant t4 t5 lffr\1',Rr'",

minds unaffected by the march of time. Both these ap- proaches exclude the past of philosophy from the actual and many-sided social history. Dialec[ical materialism, a philosophical theory ol deuel- oprh,ent, is itself a developing system of philosophical knowledge and, therefore, though created over a hundred years ago, it remains the philosophy of today. Critically summing up the preceding development of philosophy, dia- lectical materialism also answers questions posed by to- day's philosophical doctrines. Marxist philosophy offers theoretical interpretations and scientific solutions not only .l to its own philosophical problems; its outlook sums 3p the most imfortant accomplishments in all fields of funda- PROBLEMS OF METHOD mental research, practical activity, and mankind's histori- cal experience. The fundamental difference of dialectical TN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and hiStorical materialism from aII non-Marxist philosoph- ical doctrines, its organic links with all progressive tradi- tions in philosophy, its dedication to the future and un- compromising rejection of anything that defends social op- preslion and eiploitation-all that makes the scientific- philosophical outlook of Marxism the on-IV possible basis lor a scientific theory of the history of philosophy. THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY_ THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

. It-appears, at least at first-glance, that the subject of the history of philosophy is definite and clear. Its' name speaks for itself. Still, we must not accord. too much im_ lr.ortance. to _that, because the subject is not fully revealed. lhis point becomes obvious if w"e compare the"hist;t;i philosophy to that of science or art. For example, " 'of ' the history of mathematics reprbduces the progress that science, where each new accomplishment-hierarchy is iooted in past achievements. It presents the of the deveion- ment of mathematical knowledge, with tlre historical stages imperatively related to one another. The history of "art as a sp-ecial science- reproduces the actual emergence of outstanding works of art which, of course, are nlot inde- pendent of one another. But their interrelationship differs greatly from the historical connections between scientific l,heories. , Even tho_se opp-osing the theory of development do not rleny that the study of the history of science does have its l)urpose. -As to art, it is a debatable point of methodology. Apparently, the same is true of the history of philosopfil,. Adherents of idealism 3pong- today's historians' of ptritos_ ophy often say that phitosophical systems are like' great works of art because philosophy is the poetry of 'l'hat analogy completely ignoies the esseniial difference"o"&fis. be[ween the theoretical precepts of philosophy and images o[-art. To-dry, Homer's lliad is stiii largeiy"uo ,outtuir_ irble model of perJection. But today's read6r, wt ite .;joti"g l,hat. great ep_ic, does :rot argue with Homer over tne !od's o[ Ancient_ Greece, their relations with one another "and rvith mortllF, etc._On the other hand, while reaains A;i_- slotle .or Plato, that same reader inevitably ,..p"iar t" l,hoir d-octrrin_es, analyzes them and strives to sepirate the rntional in them from what is false or no longei rJ;;r"t Only Shakespeare oould write Othetto. No on-e .t." cortl

t9 science up to the end of the last century-was predominant- regard to in our have dore-rrl it. But the picture is different with ly a collecting sciencq a science of finished things, pirto'. Aristotle's--d6"i"in"s. Other philosop-hers youJd ,ji'ntury it is essentially a systematisirzg scielce, a sci- course, differently' In processes, the origin and developme-nt of iirv. ir;r..a- tt.i, ia.ut,-although, of crrce o"f the of ftistory of pt itosopny is-. similar to the history I,ircse things ancl of the interconne ction which binds it il" tfrt phys- oT-"ri"rrf-.cience. It'is true that discoveries in' say-' irll these iatural processes into one great whole." (3; i.r-ur*- ifr" work oi certain scientists and bear the im- J.363) nrint oI their perso"utltv Never[heless, iI those scientists One'can draw an analogy between the hisbory of philos- il"i'"trii.i';; ;;k; l,hem,-.o"r!.. others would have made thosc ophy and the history of natural science; the former has a'i""""ri* i" ao" Therefore; it is co^mple.tely ,,iso- evolved from a description merely summing up facts draw a prtuii.t between a historian of phiios- [,o an orderly study, becoming a science about the emer- ;;;;g t" and tt"-;;ilil" of Leibniz or Feuerbach gence'rnust and development of philosophy. But this analogy Byron-' The his- f of philos- "pfrv".t"avi"gan art historian'pirilrt"pfrv .p."*fi'i"g in Tolstoy or not obscure the act that the history t"ii difiers iundamentallv from the historv ophy dif{ers substantially from the history of natural "f science. of art. :etains The word "history" (the Greek historia) stiil The history of philosophy, too, was born as an account it. origi"uf meaning of n'-account, a narration' Ilistory of remarkabl"e and even surprising developments in man's precisely as an account o{ past events intellectual life. For example, Diogenes Laertius believed as a science ,*"rg.d for (a historian is not uri .vt*ii"ess) that are of interest l,hat philosophers and theii doctrines were a wonder. His Famous the oresent. treatiie On the I'iues, Doctrines and Marims ol '"ft5;;i".;;essed of the word "histo- llrst study of the histo- -u,r.. the twofokl meaning Philosophers can be considered the :'; Iorrg,,a gc, th e word'h is Loly' h-1-t ,'v of While Plato's or Aristotle's remarks ry;l- . -o:11- "1i"":-gesl' ihilosophy. urd subjccl,iio aspccts, both as rerum tbout ihe views of their predecessors are of great impor- iir* "hisloriam lo,t-tt strictly arwm and as the ,i"'giitit bhemselves; it ,denotes . t,ance for the history of philosophy, they ale not' ;h;; ili,p.*d and th6 historical narrative' We must rec- speaking, exercises in thc history of philos-ophy' As ;;;j;" t'his combination of both those meanings as. some- f,. graun aptly remarks, Plato failed to regard his prede- ;ft"*"*;;; .i;;ffi;;;i ihan merelv an outward coincidence; cessors as t-hinkers of the past. In his dialogues, Parmeni- ,". ilr.r atlriit thai historiogtaphy emerges simull'aneous^- des, Protagoras and other philosophers participate in the lv with hisl,orjcal actions and events per sei tnele exrst'5 rliscussion on a par with Socrates, Plato's teacher. True, 'J;#;#"i"iit""r-trti. tr'ut generates them'" (63; 164) Aristotle does differ from Plato in this regard. But his ex- times the term presenting his Stifi,--*"--ust admit that in the -ancient lmination of the earlier doctrines is fixed on ;fri.i"rv; already acquired a broader meaning. For exam- own system, and he uses biased criticism of other philos- ,l".- arirtotle used ih. t"'* to denotre an accumulation ophers' theories to prove his own. t;:;".4;;;;i;, ;-a..*rpii""l .of inrormation on actual While Diogenes Laertius' treatise is obviously a mere f;"t.;;iii;h "he set;;;;"il;; theorv, research and logical

20 rsveals such great discrepancies that it leads to an obvious But the skepticist concept of the history of philosophy conclusion: there are as many philosophies as there are was wrong, and shared much of the prejudices of everyday philosophers. It follows that the history of philosophy is a consciousness. Skeptics never raised such fundamentally history ot philosophies; the concept of the history of philos- important issues as: do philosophical doctrines really re- ophy as a single process is foreign to Diogenes Laertius. Iute one another? Do differences between them really Still, he does admit that all philosophers are unanimous in mean that the issues posed by philosophy are essentially their pursuit of truth, but none of them can reach it and unsolvable? Do the substantial differences and contradic- their paths diverge increasingly. Although Diogenes Laer- tions separating philosophies really rule out signiflcant tius was close to Epicureanism, his concept of the history qualities that are common to them all? Does the conten- of philosophy is essentially skepticist. tion between philosophies really have no positivo signifi- I am convinced that philosophical skepticism was the cance? first ever theory of the history of philosophy, and its im- Skeptics never probeil the epistemological nature of phil- pact is still felt in contemporary non-Marxist philosophy. osophical error, they never saw its real, although misunder- The starting point in this theory, as in skepticism in gen- stood, content. But no matter how much philosophers eral, is a negative understanding of philosophy as an erred, we must credit them with singling out that content. "exercise in wisdom" which can never arrive at the truth Skeptics knew absolutely nothing about the dialectics of since philosophy does not and cannot offer a criterion truth and error. Truth (it is not merely a statement of separating truth from error. In the eyes of skeptios, something easily perceived and generally known) and error what philosophers term truths are merely opinions and (of course, if it at least indirectly points to significant and beliefs. Hence the skeptics' disdainful charge of dog- previously unknown facts) are not diametrically opposed. matism leveled at any philosophy maintaining that it is That is why the history of philosophy, even as a history true. oI error, of brilliant errot, is of tremendous epistemolog- Skepticism combines a negative attitude to all philoso- ical importance. And that not only because it outlines, a1-' phies with the conviction that it is the only correct philos- beit indirectly, the correct way of developing knowledge; ophy because it rejects all positive philosophical postu- the history of philosophy cannot be regarded merely as _a lates. Skepticism claims it knows the true worth of any and history oi errors: it iJ also a history of brilliant, although all philosophies: they cannot be trusted. Therefore, skep- far from universally accepted, discoveries. The fact that ticism appears not as a philosophical doctrine about the philosophy, as a rule, does not contain precepts shared by world and knowledge but as a philosophy of philosophy all philosophers does not at all rule out the existence Qf or a metaphilosophy. This ambiguous attitude toward phi- genuinely philosophical precepts. Dismissal of that f act losophy is justified by the claim that negating the correct- is among the theoretical sources of the concepts holding ness of any philosophical thesis does not mean accepting that the history of philosophy is not development of philos- its antithesis as correct. According to the skeptics, all phi- ophical knowledge. losophers differ in their opinions and refute one another; The discovery of the law of the transformation of energy therefore one must refrain from exercising philosophical provided theoretical and experimental natural science with judgment. The fact that skepticism is present in the phi- proof that the fundamental materialist precepts about the - losophers' arguments and, Iike other philosophies, refutes unity of motion and matter (self-motion of matter) and its opponents, is simply ignored. the indestructibility of motion were correct. According to In its analysis of certain philosophical issues, ancient Ilngels, "the unity of all motion in nature is no longer a skepticism (and this is true of the skepticism of the New philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific fact". Age to an even greater degree) did single out certain (O; IOZ; On the other hand, "propositions which were ad- contradictions inherent in knowledge and thus contributed vanced in philosophy centuries ago, which often enough to a more creative approach to epistemological problems, hnve Iong 6een disposed oI philosophically, are frequently

,, 2A put forward by theorising natural scientists as brand-new refute?" (44; 21) Unlike the skeptics, Condillac believed wisdom and even become fashionable for a while". (9; 43) it both possihle and necessary to overcome the state of Thus even those philosophical precepts that are fully philosophy as he described it by creating a system of phi- borne out by special scientific studies do not gain uniuer- losophy based on scientifically verifiable data. Condillac sal acceptance among philosophers. Natural scientists have did much to develop sensationalist epistemology. And, al- long since accepted that consciousness is a quality of though he failed to solve the problem, his work undoubt, highly organized matter. But idealists still dispute (aI- edly brought the solution closer. Today, most theoretical studies though usually with reservations) that fundamental pre- _ of the history of philoso- cept of materialist philosophy. phy stress the increasing differences among philosophical Despite the fallacy of their negativist interpretation of doctrines. For example, the French historian of philoiophy the history of philosophy, skeptics are acknowledged to C. J. Ducasse believes [hat analysis of the existence of so have discovered one of its key qualities. Unlike other many mutually exclusive philosophies makes it possible fields of knowledge, philosophy comprises a great many to grasp the essence of philosophy. In his words, "when conflicting trends, doctrines and concepts, and many are one examines the history of philosophy, one is amazed by mutually exclusive. But the fact that philosophers (at any the contrast between the trend toward agreement increas- rate, prominent philosophers) have different opinions of ingly evident in the natural sciences and the fact that a key issues does not mean that philosophical truths are similar trend is less perceptible, if not completely absent, nonexistent. The only obvious thing (and that is the sa- in philosophy". (46; 272) Unlike philosophers of the irra- Iient feature of the history of philosophy) is that the truths tionalist trend, who insist that philosophy and science are affirmed by some philosophers are denounced as utterly incompatible, Ducasse regards philosophy as a science sal erroneous by their opponents. On the other hand, many g_eneris. Still, the facts that are the subject of philosophy philosophical errors are alleged to be basic truths. This differ radically from those that are the subjelt of any sometimes occurs in other theoretical sciences too. But other science. In philosophy, facts are propositions, and while it happens only occasionally in science, it is the thus "all the problems of philosophical theory are essen- usual thing in philosophy, and may be described as its tially semantic, but not all semantic problems are neces- intellectual climate. sarily philosophical". (46; 282) Of course, this essentially This explains why skeptics, and even philosophers who formalistic interpretation of the nature of philosophy can- have nothing in common with skepticism, admit the not show the way to a scientific solution of philosophical boundless diversity of conflicting philosophies and regard pr:oblems. it as something inherent in philosophical knowledge and While study of the history of philosophy is difficult, as a serious obstacle hampering the eventual arrival at understanding the history of philosophy as a process of the truth. deueloping philosophical knowledge is even more difficult. I-IegeI In the 18th century, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, a was the first to pose this problem. That, apparently, who rejected skepticism, examined that typical rvas why Marx stressed that Hegel was "the first to under- sl,ate of philosophy. In his Treatise on Systems he wrote: stand the history of philosophy as a whole" (4; 2g, 549) "How many systems have already been built? How many despite his idealistic interpretation of that discipline. more will be built? If only one found at least one that is Above all, Hegel rejected the skeptical view of philo- interpreted more or less uniformly by all of its exponents! sophical doctrines as being totally opposed to one another, But can one rely on systems that undergo thousands of ir view rooted in ancient skepticism. He applied his dialec- changes while passing through thousands of different l,icaI interpretation of difference as comprising essential hands; on systems that, whimsical and capricious, appear idcntity to his comparative analysis of philosophical sys- and disappear in the same manner, and are so unreliable l,oms. That was how Hegel viewed differences among phil- that they can be used equally well to both defend and osophical systems, including those that evolved into con-

?4 tradictions. In his 'words, "the htstory ol philosophy and reach a new and higher philosophical level as prob- shows, first, that the seemingly different philosophies are Iems that are yet to be solved; a new approach to these merely one philosophy at different stages of its develop- problems leads to conclusions that enrich the philosophical ment; second, that particular principles, each underlying understanding of reality.'t one particular system, are merely branches of one and the Hegel's Lectures on the History ol Philosophy combine same whole". (64; 6,21) the historical method of presentation that sums up all Hegel's dialectics of difference and identity attributes facts related to philosophical systems and their emergence primacy to the latter, since it is interpreted as unity, and li'ith the logical method that traces the principal stages unity as identity of opposites. Hegel holds that it is pre- and laws in the development of philosophical knowledge. cisely the identity of being and thought that forms the sub- In this he follows his principle of the unity of the histori- stance of all that exists. Hence his inclination to underes- cal and the logical. AcCording to this principle, the history timate the differences among philosophical systems: he re- of philosophy generally reproduces the logical development garded them all as consecutive stages in the developmelt of major philosophical categories; the system of categories of a single philosophy, with its essence unchanged in all forms the final stage of philosophical development, the time: Refuting the skeptical claim that all philosophies system of absolute idealism. "The development of philoso- were false, Hegel was rather inclined to recognize the op- phy in history must correspond to the development of posite view: that all philosophies were true, albeit only logical philosophy; but there will still be passages in the as stages of a single developing philosophy interpreted as latter which are absent in historical development." In a means of the authentic self-expression of the "absolute quoting this postulate .of Hegel, Lenin transforms it on a idea". The latter allegedly gained self-awareness in the materialist basis and stresses that the actual development course of human history, above all in the course of the of philosophical concepts-the discovery of that process development of philosophical knowledge over the ages. musl incontestably be credited to Hegel-is determined by This point of view also means that no system of philoso- conditions that are broader than the content of philosophi- phy considered in isolation from the entire history of phi- cal consciousness: "Here there is a very profound and cor- Iosophy is true. Truth is a process, and this applies first rect, essentially materialist thought (actual history is the and-foremost to philosophical truth as a unity of different basis, the foundation, the Being, which is followed, by and even opposite definitions. Therefore Hegel also op- consciousness)." ({0; 38, 265) . posed the view which, although it rejected skepticism, was In his Phenomenology ol Spirit and especially The equally fallacious because it held that all philosophies Science ol Logic Hegel tried to theoretically reproduce the were true in their own distinct ways, despite the contra- actual history of philosophy as a progressive movement of dictions that separated them. According to Hegel, recogn_i_z- philosophical knowledge. Everyday consciousness, examined ing that philosophies are essentially different yet equally in the beginning of the Phenomenology ol Spirif, rises true is an- assumption that does not merit serious attention no matter how comforting it may appear. '! According to Louis de Broglie, the concept of development in Hegel thus proved that the history of ph,]osophy w-as spirals fits the history of science too: "One cannot compare the development passing from one level of knowledge to the progress of science to circular motion which always returns us to higher and probing increasingly deeper into one and the same point; rather, it can be likened to motion in next, level spirals that periodically brings us close to certain past stages, but the nature of things. In his Lectures on the History ql spirals run fbrever and they rise." (39, 372\. $ course, the spirql- Philosophy, described by Engels as "one of his most bril- like development of cognition is only a comparison illustrating the the development unity repetition and uniqueness and the relations of succession liant works" (2; 475), Hegel interprets - of of philosophy is motion in spirals, since philosophical is- in this veriatile onward process; no mechanistic model can ade- by quately describe it. Among Marxist-Leninist philosophers, B. V. Eog- suei solved in some way at one level are transformed tlanov of the Soviet Union made a special study of that problem the later development of philosophy, acguire new content, (15; 70-79).

26 a7 from immediate sensory verification to the intellectual un- pelled, as they thought they were, solely,- by the f-orce of sense perception and, derstanding of natural laws closed to irr,re reasorr. On the centrary, what really pushed the-m {inally, to absolute knowledge, to the rtnderstanding of t!e i't-,rward most was the powerful and ever more rapidly ahsoluie as the creative basis of all that exists, adequately onrushing progress of natural science and industry." history. This movement of minifesting itself in human 13: 3,347-48) cognition fiom everyday experience to absolute knowledge Since absolute idealism substantiates philosophical parallels the socio-cultural development of man and man- thinking, Hegel ignores the important role of natural i

28 smibe development in general and the conoepts related only nient. the contrast between such trends as rationalism and to'the given subject. Physics, chemistry, political economy' empiricism, rationalism and irrationalism, naturalism and and sociology study fundamentally differont typcs of de- spiritualism, metaphysics and phenomenalism shows that velopment. Marx's Capital presents both a general theory differences between philosophies turn into opposition, of development and a special theory of socio-economic which is also typical of the more general and integral development. forms of the development of philosophical knowledge. Be- Features shared by all development processes are the sides, each of the opposite trends tendl to become pohrized: irreversibility of change, its direction within the frame- rational materialism opposes idealist rationalism, ideal- work of a specific cycle of changes, qualitative transfo-r- ist empiricism opposes materialist empiricism, etc. mations, negation, succession, the emergence and estab- Thus, despite the great variety of philosophies-a faot lishment of a new structure, conversion, the unity of rep- not to be ignored, though it sometimes is in popular etition (reproduction) and uniqueness, the rise of the new, works on the history of philosophy-materialism and and renewal. Progress is the highest form of development; idealism are the two major comprehensive and contradic it is transition to a higher stage (Ievel) of development tory systems. Their opposition has been brought about by that enriches content and improves form. Development is a radical polarization of philosophies. Nevertheless, they thus the unity of qualitatively different processes, each of are not absolute opposites: their opposition exists (and them not yet the process of development itself but its nec- deepens) within the framework of the general philosophical essary constituent element. For example, irreversibility is a field of study. That is an important point to stress if concomitant of the functioning of everything living; there- only because most idealists regard materialism ab a non- fore this process should not be identified with develop- philosophical outlook. ment. Movement and change by themselves are not devel- The struggle between materialism and idealism does not opment, but the latter takes place precisely through rule out relations of succession, but naturally not in the movement and change sense that materialists assimilate idealist views and vice Analysis of the history of philosophy makes it possi- versa. Marxist philosophers regard succession as dialectical ble to single out all those common features typical of de- negation, and its positive character has nothing in com- - velopment. However, analysis also reveals certain trends mon with an eclectic mixture of incompatible views. The that run counter to those listed: abstract negation of the attitude of dialectical materialism to classical German phi- .preceding philosophy, return to historically obsolete phil- losophy is a very good example of this dialectical succes- osophical doctrines, and struggle of opposites which often sion that works according to the scientific principle of rules out mutual transition, interdependence and unity. partisanship in philosophy. A comparison of the history of philosophy with the The natural question to ask is why the history of philos- histoiy of the natural sciences immediately points to the ophy differs so much from the history of mathematics, essential difference between them mentioned in the begin- physics and other sciences? The answer is that philosophy ning of this essay. The forward motion in the history of is both a specific form of study and a specific form of so- the natural sciences is broken very rarely, despite the fact cial consciousness-an ideology. that both continuity and interruption are typical of it. As Obviously, the fact that social consciousness reflects so- a rule, scientific accomplishments are not forgotten; the cial being does not mean that it is a study of social being existence of mutually exclusive concepts is a transient or the result of such a study. The content of social coL- (although permanently recurring) feature; The picture is sciousness is determined by social being, which is an ob- different in philosophy: coexistence and struggle between jective social process independent of consciousness. In various schools, doctrines and trends run all through its certain historical circumstances, social consciousness can history. Unlike discussions in other sciences, there is an become scientific consciousness, i.e. a system of scientific increasing d,iuergence of opinion in philosophical argu- views. The scientific socialist ideology is a case in point:

30 3t reality, i.e, as subjective activity, objec" born special definite and as an of a scientific study, it reflects historically tively determined understanding of social being, the kird specific social being-the capitalist system; place of the of understanding which is not always and not everywhere the working class in that system; the interests, needs and a cognitive process. Natrirally, one should not always abso- emancipation movement of class. that lutely oppose reflecting consciousness to reflecting study. The scientific socialist ideology differs radically from But one must not fall into the other extreme: the content the spontaneous consciousness of the workers takcs that of philosophical doctrines is not to be regarded merely as shape in the course of capitalist development. Naturally, the result study, ignoring objective both reflection of the dependence of the of social being and the reflection of na- social consciousness on social being. ture human conscioushess greatly in differ from a study In desoribing the ideological function of French material- that provides scientific reflection objects. This a of its ism, Marx and Engels stress that "Holbach's theory iS hook contains special essay relationship a on the ol science the historically justifibd philosophical illusion about the (and philosophy) consciousness to everyday shaped by bourgeoisie just then developing ,France, whose thirst everyday experience. Here, noted in it should be that natural for exploitation could be regarded as a thirst for the science differentiates between reflection still of nature through full development of individuals in conditions of intercourse everyday consciousness and data obtained by special stud- freed from old feudal (1; 410) course, ies, the fetters." 5, Of although the latter quite often rely on everyday ex- French materialists were not aware content perience. of that social of their theory, just as they did not consider themselve$ Science does not merely reflect objective reality, whether. ideologists the bourgeoisie, despite perfectly environmental social, of their con- or in human consciousness; science scious hostility to the feudal system and ideology. Marx is the highest form theoretical reflection of the of reality. and Engels demonstrated the historically progressive na- This dividing line between reflecting consciousness (ury ture of the ideology of French materialists and wrote: "Lib- consciousness, including religious consciousness, refLects eration from the standpoint the bourgeoisie, com- reality) and reflecting theoretical study in of i.e., is also valid petition, was, of course, for the eighteenth century on- philosophy. Here example. French the is an The lSth-century possible way offering individuals career materialism philosophical ly of the a new was the scientific and outlook for freer development. The theoretical proclamation of the of its age. The substantiation (albeit in a limited mechan- practice, form) principle consciousness corresponding to this bourgeois of istic of the of self-movement of matter the consciousness of mutual exploitation as the universal was among the greatest accomplishments philoso- of that mutual relation of all individuals, was also bold and phy. French materialists advanced following principle a the open step forward. It was a kind of. enlightenmerut which sociology: man changes in as his conditions of Iife change. interpreted the political, patriarchal, religious and senti- Marx and Engels stressed the importance of that principle mental embellishment . . . the embellishment corresponded for the later development of doctrines. socialist to the form of exploitation existing at that time and had Besides, philosophy it French materialism is the of the been systematised especially theoretical of bourgeois by the writers Enlightenment, a bourgeois ideology reflecting the absolute monarchy)' (l; 5, 410) interests, needs, position the and of the bourgeoisie fight- The materialist interpretation of history makes philoso- feudalism. doubt connected its ing And this is no with phy a unity of a specific form of study and a special form principal philosophical content; specific ex- all this is its of social consciousness, ideology. Marxism discovered and pression. But this fact should be viewed as an objective provided a scientific basis for sociological dim.ension oL (even spontaneous) reflection a of social being in the social the history of philosophy. This new dimension shows the consciousness of that historical era, and not as a result of distinctive way philosophy develops. The materialist un- study. derstanding of this process underlies the scientific method Therefore, reflection philosophical as the content of a of its study, which, in turn, serves as the basis for the theory is expressed in two ways: as a study of specific

Q' 3-01562 33 doctrine ori partisanship in philosophy, of philosophy's role toricai materiaiism is a scientifi" pLilo.ophical outiook that in the socio-historical proceis and the social class roots of not only explains the world but also shows how to trans- philosophical theories. Iorm it. - de' The icience of the history of philosophy studies the Defining the subject of the historico-philosophical science velopment of philosophy. If one considers the above facts, as deuelopment of philosophy, one must shift the accent this- definition- is anything but trivial. Strictly speaking, Irom the process of development and consider the swbject Marxists are the only ones to accept it, while those oppos- of development. What does development of philosophy ing Marxism are almost unanimous in their claim that phi- mean? This question is justified by the fundamental differ- Iosophy has a history, hut not a history of development. ence of philosophy from other forms of knowledge. It is I have already stressed that the development of philosophy true that the sciences that here compared are with philos--differs is a process of differentiation, diver_gence, polarization, and ophy differ substantially. from one another. Biology struggle between materialism and idealism-a strug-gle from mathematics. Social sciences and natural sciences are that-ihapes the prerequisites of the dialectical-materialist two distinct fields of knowledge. Still, this essay has shown view of ihe world. A scientific history of philosophy does that philosophy differs radically from all other sciences, not lose sight of the ideological direction of various doc- and consequently from anything that they may have in trines and records the fact that the development of philos- common. Philosophy, including scientific dialectical-mate- ophy combines genuine progress with constant reversals rialist philosophy, holds a place of its own in the system leading back to earlier historical stages. This regressive-as- of scientific knowledge. Therefore one is justifled to speak pect dominates the idealist philosophy of the latter half of of the distinct way philosophy develops. tt e tgth century and the 20th cenlury, where, in the final For several centuries, unlike knowledge gained from ev- radic-al analysis, each new doctrine revives, and puts a eryday experience, philosophy emerged and existed as construction on, principles that were formulated in the theoretical knowledge. This undifferentiated theoretical past and later refuted. Of course, this does not mean that knowledge contained elements that later transcended the Lourgeois philosophy today poses no problems worth dis- realm of philosophy and became independent flelds of cussing. TEe radicalization of old problems reflects the new knowledge, particular sciences. But science springs from historiial conditions and takes into account the latest sci- philosophy. That would be true only of some, mostly fun- the entific achievements; it is therefore a distinct form of damental, flelds of science. Most of today's sciences owe development of philosophy. Opposing any simplistic inter- their birth to the development of fundamental science that pretatibn of the crisis of contemporary idealism,-the pr?m- had already hived off from philosophy, increasing justifled to the inent Soviet philosopher P. Fedoseyev is perfectly social division of labor, scientific and technological prog- in saying that "some bourgeois philosophers work fruitfully ress, socio-economic development, and the like. The 6reak in the field of formal logic, developing semiotics (including betweel philosophy and particular sciences changed the semantics and pragmatics). It would be unfair to disregard place philosophy holds in the system of scientific knowl- their achievements in that field; one should carefully ex- edge. It also changed the subject of philosophical study; amine all that is valuable here". (32; 132) Nevertheless, it it laid the basis for the development of a scientific philo- the should be expressly reaffirmed that Marxism was sophical outlook. All these processes, combined with the philos- school that produced an essentially different type of s_pecial features of philosophy described above, impart a ophy free from the age-old errors which today's _idealist dis-tinctive quality to the development of philosophy. philosophy philosophy is incapable of correcting. Marxist Study of the history of science shows that t[e emer- is a developing system organically linked to aII scientific gence of new sciences implies the discovery of previously experience and practice. Marxism knowledge, to historical - unknown laws; therefore the great variety of scienies points philoloPhy has fully overcome the fallacious opposition of l,o a great variety of substantially different laws. For to nonphilosophical study and practice. Dialectical and his- sciences in general and for philosophy in particular, this o4 Jr. 35 ' t ' _ '' : , variety oi laws poses the question of the- unity of divetsity sive doctrines is brought about by profound socio-economio as e*pressed in the concept of unive-r-sal laws' causes, the transition to classless communist society is . Th6 laws discovered in various fields of science determine bound to be a stage of tremendous importance for the the essential relationship between phenomena, and their emergetrce of the unity of philosophical knowledge. Natu- relatively constant and recurring interdependence' The prog- rally, this will not end argument in philosophy, but it will ress of scientific cognition mikes it possible to evaluate change its major aspects. hot only the relationship of simultaneously existing phenom- Since Hegel substantializes the spiritual, he sees the between current and future proc- philosophy as development of idealism: "Any ena bui also the linkages-more history of the ;;il. S"i.rr.t probes and more i-nto the^ piocess. of philosophy is essentially idealism or at least has idealism development and its laws. Thus the subject of .dialectical as its principle, and the question here is only how well it materialism-the more general laws of the developm-ent oI has been developed." (64; 3, L71) In rejecting this ideal- society and knowledge-is histo-rically shaped as a ist distortion of the development of philosophy one should ;fit"g"ui"r., up and conceptualization of the history of scien- not go to the other extreme. The history of philosophy is tifio- --Oi.o"r.., knowledge. not the mere history of materialism. "the philosophical approach to the issue of uni- Materialism and idealism, the two major philosophical of deielopmint does not at all detract from the trends, are organically linked with various doctrines also ".r.ui-iu*.imoortance of the spicial laws of development studied by subject to radical polarization. As Lenin wrote, both Ber- and sciences' Marxlst Locke's sensational- astrophysics, geology, biology ^other keley and Diderot were followers of ;irli;;6ht h"?rt #iti, the unitv of substantiallv different ism, the former in the idealist direction, and the latter in [u*t, th.it common dialectical nature. This becomes ob- the materialist. Thus the opposition of materialism and uio"t only during the examination of. physical. oI t.l"': idealism is also present in doctrines that cannot be de- nomic"ot laws but also-when the analysis is applied to the scribed either as fully idealist or fully materialist. *or. g.o.ral laws of social development' This must also The main thrust of any study of the history of philoso- [" ,.d.*ered when describing the distinctive quality o{ phy is analysis of the struggle hetween materialism and general laws of cognition' idealism. Naturally, the character, content and outcome of the-Therefoie, more even the first attempt at interpreting the phrase that struggle are not changeless. For example, according "development of philosophy", a statement,- raises to Engels, ancient materialism "was incapable of clearing 'of -simple problem is a host important questions, because - the up the relation between mind and matter. But the need to io A.t.r-ioe'both the specific nature of developn-rent .in get clarity on this question led to the doctrine of a soul oiif..tpfiv and the subject of development, i'e' philosophy separable from the body, then to the assertion of the im- fu;;li: b;; should, of course, remember that there exist mortality of this soul, and finally to monotheism. The old The concept of a.e1gtog- 165- ,iai."Uv aifferent'philosophies. - materialism was therefore negated by idealism." (8; ment sliould be applied differently 1o- materialism and ideal- 66) In the New Age the materialist philosophy of the 17th ffi;- ih; two basic trends in philosophy'.. Conseqy"'tl{' and 18th centuries won an impressive victory over the ide- the oltl problem "One is not one but many" aritses- rn pnr- alist metaphysical systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Male- il;pht i; (as a paradox). Th-e diversitv of doctrines branche and their followers. But later, classioal German aoes' ,iot rule out phitosophy (albeit- relative and contra- idealism revived the rationalist metaphysics of the 17th dictory). But this rinity should-also be viewed as^ a proc- century. Feuerbach's anthropological materialism negated ..t oi'development and especially- as its result' Overcom- the idealism of Hegel and his predecessors. Classical Ger- il til.;;p;oich thai contrasts. philosophv to nonphilosoph- man philosophy culminated in the victory of materialism. irit .t"a:i'and to practical activity_ n-o doult helps achiev.e But Feuerbach's materialism was limited: its negation of ifr. of phiiosophical knowled-ge. Since lltt split- irlcalism was abstract and metaphysical. tf"g ""iiy;t philosophy'into a multitude of mutually exclu- Meanwhile, classical German idealism raised real issues, "p 36 and their solution paved the way to a scientific philosophical nraterialism and dialectics. It is, however, imperative to outlook. warn against any simplistic interpretations. Marx's words According to Engels, the progress of natural science and do not mean that simian development is essentially human the productive forces contributed to the creation of a sci- development because, in the final analysis, the former letl entific philosophy: "Among the materialists this was plain to the emergence of man. Thanks 'to its inherent specific on the surface, but the idealist systems also filled them- historicism, the dialectical-materialist interpretation of de- selves more and more with a materialist content and at- velopment rules out teleology. Direction is not a property tempted pantheistically to reconcile the antithesis between of development in general, of the process as a whole; each mind and matter. Thus, ultimately, the Hegelian system re- stage of development has its own essential qualities and presents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside its own appropriate direction within a historically definite down in method and content." (3; 3, 348). cycle, era, and so on. Creating a scientific-philosophical system and thus ne- Marx opposed those petty-bourgeois socialists who, fail- gating philosophy in the old, traditional sense of the term ing to scientifically substantiate the concept of the social- was impossible if based on bourgeois ideology. The meta- ist reconstruction of society, declared that people had al- physical opposition of philosophical thought to nonphilo- ways wanted to establish a socialist system, social justice, sophical activity (both theoretical and practical), and the equality, and the like. Marx said that "the tendenoy to- "nonpartisanship" ascribed to philosophy by the bourgeois wards equality belongs to our century. To say now that a1l consCiousness rule out any materialist interpretation of former centuries, with entirely different needs, means of philosophy. The materialism of bourgeois thinkers is in- production, etc.o worked providentially for the realisation evitably contemplative and undecided. In bourgeois philoso- of equality is, first of all, to substitute the means and the phy dialectics can only be idealist. men of our century for the men and the means of earlier The brilliance of the founders of Marxism derives above centuries and to misunderstand the historical movement all from the fact that they theoretically grasped and scien- by which the successive generations transformed the tifically substantiated the need for proletarian partisanship. results acquired by the generations that preceded them". From a radically new position, they gave a new, revolu- (1;6,173) tionary critical interpretation of the entire history of phi- Marx's thesis is very important methodologically and Iosophy and social development, and created dialectical should therefore also be applied to the history of philoso- and historical materialism, thus ushering in a new univer- phy. The reference here is to the principle of historioism sal era in the development of philosophy. and its correct application, which rules against ascribing Marx said that the human anatomy is the key to the sim- the tasks of the proletariat to the emancipation movement ian. By the same token, since dialectical and historical of former exploited classes who lived under different sys- materialism solves problems that had plagued philosophy tems of production relations. It is equally wrong to ascribe earlier, it offers a scientific understanding of its content qualities belonging solely to dialectical materialism to any and signilicance. For example, dialectical materialism of- prior schools of thought. fers a scientific philosophical solution to the problems of Dialectical and historical materialism is the theoretical innate ideas, of a priori forms of thinking in its doctrine and methodological basis of a scientific history of philoso- of the development of categories. This doctrine does not phy that traces the development of philosophical knowledge merely remove those probiems (neopositivism, for exam- and asserts the historical necessity of a scientific phil- ple, rejects them out of hand) but reveals their real ep_is- osophical outlook. But it would be an obvious departure [emological content. The foremost task of the Marxist-Le- from the principle of historicism (and from its concomi- ninist history of philosophy is to study the historical forms tant, the principle of the partisanship of philosophy) to as- of materialism, the historical forms of dialectics, and to sert-as it is sometimes done-that the history of philos- study the categories that provide adequate expression to ophy is the history of dialectical and historical material-

38 -t ism. Applying that formula to the majority of pre-Marxian DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM doctrines-mostly idealist but also scholastic and mysti- AND HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY cal*would be tantamount to espousing them. OF THE HISTORY ?he existentialist history of philosophy is actually the history of existentialist philosophy. The positivist history OF PHILOSOPHY of philosophy is equally subjective: it slights those think- ers of the past who did not share the empirical and sub- jectively agnostic views that were close to positivism. Marxist philosophy differs radically from- aII pre-Marxian and non-Marxist philosophies. The Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy is a scientifically sound, dialectical negation What is the attitude .of philosophy to the history of phi- of previous and current concepts of the history of philos- losophy-that is, to its past and to the systematio study ophy; it critically treats the problems they pose and the of this past? This question did not face Plato and Aristotle, solutions. The more thorough, profound and scientific is the flrst philosophers to analyze their predecessors' doc- the study of the history of philosophy, the more obvious trines in order to substantiate their own views. Later, the it becomes that a scientific theory of the development of history of philosophy was mostly studied by skeptics who philosophical knowledge is possible exclusively on the ba- held that true philosophy negates itself. sis of dialectical and historical materialism. saw onl.y two equally fallacious trends in the philosophy that preceded his own: dogmatic meta- physics and its pointless negation, skepticiqm. The views of Pichte and Schelling on the history of philosophy were, on the whole, equally negative. Manuals on the history oI philosophy did appear during their lifetime, but their au- thors were not prominent philosophers. Hegel was the first to study the history of philosophy as a science, but he put a metaphysical construction on that subject. According to Hegel, the history of philosophy is an authentic form of development, and its theory is of paramount importance for his philosophy. This means that Hegel did not merely study the history of philosophy; he interpreted the history of various philosophies as an inevitable process of philo- sophical development, with its necessarily interconnected different stages and forms. The principle of development that Hegel applied to study- ing the past of philosophy is rooted epistemologically in a dialectical interpretation of the truth. According to En- gels, "Truth, the cognition of which is the business of phi- losophy, was in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical develop- ment of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge." (3; 3, 339)

4L This radically changed attitude to the past of philosophy to all other historical processes. According to him, "a close is a critical standpoint that neither admires nor rejects examination of history shows us that trien's actions are everything about this past. It regards different philosophies conditioned by their needs, passions, interests, their char- not as isolated and independent attempts at studying the acter and talent; and this in- a way that only those needs, history of philosophy but as inherently connected links in passions and interests are the motive forces in this drama, the chain of a contradictory development which is "not a ind oniy they play the leading role". (63; 1,79) The pic- harmless process entailing no struggle, like the develop- ture is differeni in philosophy where, according to Hegel, ment of organic life, but hard, unwilling work against the passion for trutli rules out any interests and passions one's own self." (63; 1, 1,52) that are foreign to it. In Hegel's view, philosophy can and must be a science The diversity of philosophies, their obvious incompati- in the strict sense of the term. The history of science pre- bility, the struggle of'philosophical schools and trends are supposes a continuity of development, that is, progress. facts that skeptics use as arguments in their interpretation This is also true of the history of philosophy. In working of the history of philosophy. Hegel interprets them in a on a dialectical concept of philosophical development, He- totally new way, both dialectical and rationalist-metaphys- gel describes continuity not as a simple accumulation of ical. Diversity if it is signiflcant (and that is the point knowledge but as a contradictory process which derives its made in the comparison of philosophical systems) does not momentum from negation and negation of the negation. exist outside identity; diversity is immanent in identity. Continuity does not mean agreement with the past, accept- Therefore, the diversity of radically different philosophies ance of the past in the present. Hegel reinterprets the con- presupposes-Heg"I their unity, i.e. their necessary interrelation- cept of tradition and says that it is not "just a housekeep- ihip. rejects all discourse on different philosophies er loyally safeguarding what has been entrusted to her as pointless and empty, as bogged down in useless abstract and thus keeping it safe for posterity. . . Tradition is not notions, and as being oblivious of the fact that "diversity an immobile statue: it is alive and it grows the way a pow- is a flow, it must by definition be regarded as a moving, erful stream grows as it moves f arther away from its developing transient moment". (64; 13, 47) source". (64 L3, t3) Metaphysical reason, which does not The-diversity of philosophies is therefore necessary. The accept the unity of opposites, either simply imitates or to- movement from the abstrait to the specific, the essence of tally rejects ideological legacy. But ideological legacy is the history of philosophy, comprises conflicting definitio:rs rather conflicting than uniform in significance. It is "the of unity. Each of these definitions is abstract, one-sided soul of each following generation, its spiritual substance and therefore not true; truth is their unity. The develop- as something familiar, its principles, prejudice and riches; ment of philosophy is the emergence of the unity of phil- but the generation who has received this legacy reduces it osophical knowledge which puts an end to the motley and to the material at hand transformed by the spirit". (641, disorderly diversiiy of philbsophical statements. Accord- L3, 14) ing to Hegel, different philosophies are "necessarily one Metaphysicists believe that the diversity of philosophies philosophy that is developing, a revelation of God as He rules out their unity. Therefore they, in Hegel's wotds, see knows Himself. Wherever several philosophies are present the history of philosophy merely as a "range of opinions, simultaneously, they are different aspects of one under- delusions and intellectual games". (64; 13, 44) This super- lying whole; and because they are one-sided we see one ficial view also dominates studies of human history, and -philosophy refuting another." (64; 15,686) the latter "appears at flrst glance as a succession of ran- Accoiding to Hegel, the differences among philosophies dom events". (64; 13, 17) But world history is different: do not reflect the individual uniqueness of the philosophi- it is an inevitable forward movement. That is true to an cal genius; that uniqueness rises to grasp the absolute and even greater degree of the history of philosophy. It even dissolves in it. Those differences must be interpreted onto- appears that Hegel contrasts the development of philosophy Iogically; they are 'ofundamental differences of the idea it-

42 43 . i'_,

self; it is only in them that it exists... Eaoh system exists develops themii [the preceding systemsl]plqry: to the crea- within one definition but that does not stop here, and differ- tor of a new phiiosophical system. (64; 14, -Hegel's -181) precept ences do not always remain outside one inother. The fate While rejicting obviously fallacious the of those definitions must come to pass, meaning that they about the need foi the final philosophy to consummate are united and reduoed to the level of moments". (641' 13, hirto"y of philosophy, one shbuld not lose sight of -the .fact philos- 48) Hegel views his philosophy as the fate of the absolute that Hegelis doctrine'was really in a way the.fina1 that has come to pass, reflected in the various philosophi- ophy. T[at was precisely what Engels meant: "At any rate, cal systems. Absolute idealism is described as the supreme with Hegel philosophy comes to an end [in the old sense consummation of the history of philosoph-y which by its of the word]: on the one hand, because in his s-ystqlq most splendid . nature presupposes not only the beginning but also the he summed up its whole development in the "absolute destination". (64; 13, 48) That assertion stems fashion; and 6n the other hand, because, even-though.un- from fundamental precepts Hegel's philosophy: phi- consciously, he showed us the way out of the t1!v-1in$ qt the of 3' losophy is the self-cognition of the absolute spirit which ry.t*" to'real positive knowledge of the world'" (3; does not remain incomplete, imperfect since that is incom- 342) patible with the notion of the divine. Thus Hegel's interpretation of the developmenL of phitos-- Almost all philosophers proclaimed their doctrines as the ophy proceeds from- the recognition of the organic link - philosophY: last philosophy meaning their personal accomplishment. nitrieen philosophy and the history of fh.at 1e- Unlike his precursors, Hegel regards the consummation of lationship clifferi [reatly from the one that, say, exists be- philosophy as an ontological process: the absolute spirit tween the given aennite level in the development of -natural overcomes all its alienated forms. "The struggle of final science a.ta its preceding development. The develop- un- self-consciousness absolute self-consciousness? which ment of the naturil sciencts reveals new, previously with deal the former regarded as something happening outside it, is known object of study. Natural science today does not 17th or now abating. Final self-consciousness has ceased to be final, with issues that were the order of the day in the solved and thanks to this absolute self-consciousness has ac- 18th centuries. Those issues are, as a rule, already quired the power it has lacked before. This struggle is re- and are thus of no interest to researchers. The situation is flected in the entire previous world history, and especially different in philosophy where even resolved issues acquire in the history of philosophy." (64; 75, 689-90) , conteirt ,rd ar. thus of interest to the researcher' While the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach were correct Fnitosoptry"r* develops not so- much by discovering new ob- in their criticism of Hegel for his acceptance of the finite jects as 6y reviving, enriching -ald critically reviewing nature of the development of philosophy, they failed to problems posetl at tlie dawn of philosophy.'s That -explainsphilos- grasp the fact that this stems from the ontology of the ra- *fry U.gtt wrote that "the study of- the hist-ory of tionalist-idealist interpretation of history and not merely opfrv i. ihe study of philosophy-itself, and that cannot be from the exaggerated claims of the thinker. They blamed oiherwise". (64; 13, 43)'which Hegel for reducing the history of philosophy to the history Hegel tloei not care particular nlrilosophy ': I"- of his own philosophy. But Hegel tried to prove that his der c6nsideration; in other woids, which philosophical doc' philosophy summed up the entire history of philosophy. trine the study of the history of philosophy leads -to' Ac- While his predecessors claimed that their doctrines were cording to He[el, the answer to that is self-evident because something radically new, Hegel only claimed that his sys- the miltitude-of philosophies recorded in hist-ory is- a sin- tem adequately expressed the real content of the history gle, integrated antl progressively developing whole. It is an philosophy summed accomplish- of and critically up its '- Tl* f"llowing speciflcally historical poilt Engels-r'"gade^ is espe- ments. For each new system borrows from the legacy of cially important in this connection: ".. . the manylold Iorms oI philosophical knowledge, continuing the earlier development Greek philosophy contain in embryo, in the nascent state, almost of philosophy. Consequently, "essentially, only the way he all latei motlei oi outlook on the wotld." (8; 395)

45 44 'torganic system, a totality comprising a weaith of stages nonphilosophical everyday consciousness. lle interpreted and moments". (64; L3,40) Thus Hegel claims to have philosophy (that is, idealism) as a negation of materialism, synthesized in his system this "wealth of stages and mo- although occasionally he did recognize the historical ac- ments" which are definitions of the absolute spirit. "The complishments of materialist philosophy. Still, often Hegel Iast philosophy is the result of aII that precedes it; noth- interpreted materialist doctrines as essentially idealist. For ing is lost, all principles are retained,." (64; 15, 685) example, he said that Thales "described water as an infinite But if Hegel's system is really the result of the study concept, as a simple essence of thought". (64; 13, 209) and summing up of the history of philosophy, theoretically In Hegel's view, the School of Miletus represented the that study must proceed from a definite interpretation transition from everyday spontaneous materialism ,to of philosophy which, to a certain degree, obviously antici- idealism. pates the outcome of the study. It is equally obvious that Hegel's idealist theory. of development postulates the dia- this anticipation of the essence of philosophy is not the lectical identity of the result of development with its ini- result of the given study of the history of philosophy, even tial stage. The identity of being and thought-the basis though the study confirms it. Thus the question of prece- of absolute idealism seen as the summit of all philosophy dence-whether Hegel's system precedes his study of the -must be revealed at the initial stage of that process, al- history of philosophy or vice versa-oversimplifies the task beit in an undeveloped form. Referring to the con- of the study and makes it impossible. cept of the substance emerging from the naive . It would be naive to believe that Hegel first studied the views of the early Greek philosophers, Hegel asserts history of philosophy and then summed it up and thus that they proceeded "from the unconscious precept that set forth his system of philosophy. But it is equally naive thought is also being". (64; 13, 126) That speculative to believe the opposite: that having created his system of assumption underlies the presentation of ancient Greek ma- philosophy, Hegel applied its hierarchy of categories to terialism as unconsciously idealist philosophy. Viewed the earlier development of philosophy, that is, interpreted from this angle, the transition to the doctrines of Socrates it in accordance with the requirements of his system. We and Plato-the emergence of a truly idealist system of know from Hegel's biography that he acted differently, and views-is merely the realization of what earlier philosophy these facts desoribe the development of his system and not could not express conceptually. But this pattern of devel- its results. Hegel built his system by idealistically inter- opment excludes Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus. He- preting Spinoza's doctrine and relying directly on Kant, gel attacks the great ancient materialists, claiming that Schelling and, especially, Fichte. It took Hegel almost 20 their doctrines do not rise above sense perception. years to build his system, and he repeatedly turned to the Idealism-even dialectical idealism-is incapable of grasp- history of philosophy. The creation of his system of philos- ing the signifi.cance of materialist philosophy. Neverthe- ophy and a critical summing-up of the history of philoso- Iess, Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy arc phy were aspects of a single process. As to Hegel's Lectares the most remarkable work in this field, and his theory of on the History of Philosophy, they were written when philosophical development immediately precedes its scien- the system had been completed and underlay the interpre- tific, dialectical-materialist interpretation. tation of the history of philosophy. The latter, like any Hegel's idealism is passionately scientific, but a truly exposition, differed substantially from the study that pre- scientific approach is incompatible with idealism. This con- ceded it and whose results could not be known in advance. tradiction entails the opposition of idealist philosophy to Hegel's dialectical idealism is a brilliant theory of the actual scientific knowledge, interpreted as an imperfect history of philosophy which, however, distorts that histo- form of science, while idealism is described as an authen- ry by reducing it to the history of idealism. Of course, tic manifestation of the scientific approach. That refers this does not mean that Hegel ignored materialism: he above all to the natural sciences. Hegel criticizes their his- fought against it. But he largely regarded materialism as torical limitations: their empirical methodology, mechanis-

46 1l tic notions and metaphysical reasoning. But a materialist discovery oI thoaghts about the absolute, which is its sub- world outlook is what Hegel considers the most unaccept- ject." 1Oa; O, XX; It is the earthly, empiricaliy recorded able thing about natural science. history, and Hegel calls its agents heroes of reasoning in- Hegel's cult of science also extolls idealist philosophiz- tellect.'The philosophical geniis is the historically limited ing. He believes that the primacy of spirit over matter personification of t[e absolute spirit. But, unlike the "em- rirakes science all-powerful. Ontologically, that assertion is pirical" history of philosophy, the absolute spirit is I I9g- based on the principle of the identity of being and thought, ical succession not of historically limited systems of phi- maintaining that philosophy as the thought of thought is Iosophy but of their principles and fundamental categories not only a science of the absolute but the absolute itself, whoie hierarchy forms an extratemporal logical process' that is, the extratemporal realm of the divine. Hege1 wrote. the subject of The Science ol Logic. "But it [the absolute spirit] knows itself as the absolute The notion of the second, substantial dimension of the spirit only in science, and only this knowledge, the spirit, history of philosophy is directly linked to Hegel's panlo- is its true existence." (64; 15, 690) (reason) i.q not gism which holds-that the logical -only -a Thus the deification of thought (as the thought of thoughb means or form of perceiving the essence of things but al- ' in which form coincides with content and the subject so that essence itself. This means that the consciousness means philosophy. Plato extrat-em- with the object) the deiflcation of of its content (philosophical- content) is innate,, described God as a geometrician, a cosmic designer, but poral and extraipatial to the absolute (called absolute Hegel's God is a philosopher whose speculative activity iinowledge, subject substance, God, etc.), since space and creates and maintains the world; everything is born of time are-, according to Hegel, forms of alienated being. thought, of philosophical thought. One must admit, how- Mankind apprehends that absolute identity in the course- of ever, that Hegel usually avoids extreme conclusions: "Phi- its development over the ages. And that is what is called losophy deals only with the brilliance of idea reflected in the history of philosophy, since historical development is world history." (63; 4,938) But in that case philosophy is Ioreign to the absolute. a human and not divine occupation. Still, even as such- Aciording to Hegel, the history of philosophy examines as historically limited spiritual activity-it is radically con- the historical forms of philosophical knowledge for their trasted to scientific knowledge per se. Hegel is often a absolute prototypes; that is, it sees each historically defi- priest (even a high priest), and as such he is not unlike a nite and jimited system of philosophy as a reflection of a fheologian extolling his "science" as the supreme knowl- certain logical definitiveness of the absolute spirit. "Essen- edge, with God as its subject and source. tially, the history of philosophy deals not with the past Thus, according to Hegel, philosophy, or the thought of but with .the eternal and fully present, and it must be com- thought, is, on the one hand, the infinite realm of pure rea- pared in its result not to a gallery, of human spiritu^al er- son that forms the substance of the world, and on the rors but rather to a pantheon of divine images." (64;-6, other hand, a specifically human, final historical spiritual 167-68) That gallery of divine images-iq -ttt primordial sphere. The diflerentiation between ontological and histor- ideal, an imperative that has been established and exists ical being of philosophy permeates Hegel's entire doctrine Iorever and that opposes the temporal history of philosophy of the history of philosophy which cannot be grasped if with all its inherent human errors which Hegel freely ad- this idealist assumption is not taken into account. Viewed mits. Because of that contrast between the historical and from this angle, the history of philosophy has two fun- the suprahistorical, Hegel f aces issues that would have damental dimensions. Philosophy is developed directly hy been pointless in a different philosophical content. For ex- philosophers-individuals acting in the historically definite ample, he asks, "what is the cause of the f-act.that-philoso- circumstances of a given era, country, nation, etc. He- phy exists in time and has a history"? (64; 13, 45) gel describes this aspect of the history of philosophy as ' i propo=. to show that to ignore Hegel's concept of the follows: "The history of philosophy is the history of the dual- dimension of the history of philosophy means to ig-

48 49 nore its major contradictions and oversimpiify Hegel's ur- phy anci the speciffc study of the development of phiioso- derstanding of the real development of philosophy. This phy, which often does not fit into the theory. point is especially important because l{egel not only divides In contrast to the actual development of philosophy, and contrasts two aspects of the history of philosophy; there is no struggle within the framework of the theory of he is equally intent on reducing those opposites to dialec- the history of philosophy that operates with a hierarchy philoso- tical identity. For, according to Hegel, the task of of logical principles and categories. In impersonal absolute phy is to reveal the unity of the transcendental and the reason, all philosophical principles underlying different sys- immanent, the divine and the human, the everlasting tems exist only as a definition of the "absolute idea". Here and the transient; to see the real as the ideal and vice there is no history, nothing appears or disappears. Hu- versa. man history, and consequently the history of philosoply, Although it proceeds from essentially theological pre- is different. Here "extratemporal" philosophical principles cepts there are profound dialectical insights in the differ- are historically definite systems of philosophy. Each be- entiation between the two major aspects of the history of Iongs to, and shares the limitations of its own time, and philosophy. There are two methods in the scientiflc study cannot therefore rise above it. of history: the logical-theoretical and the specific-historical, But if, as Hegel maintains, philosophy deals with some- the latter taking into account the distinctive individual thing everlasting, how can one reconcile that to the thesis features of a given process in a given country, in particu- that-philosophy is "totally identical with its time"? (64; lar circumstances, and so on. Hegel regards his logic as 13, 69) Hegel "reconciles" these mutually exclusive theses the logic of the history of philosophy in its ideal, extra- as referring to different aspects of the history of philoso- temporal form. As to the actual history of philosophy, it phy. Yet, precisely this extreme contraposition made to fit is an alienated and distorted reproduction of philosophy's Hegel's metaphysical system exposes both theses as fal- a priori self-development. "The succession of philosophical Iacious. A historically definite phitosophy is not merely systems in history is the same as that in the logical ar- identical with its time, and the principles of philosophical rival of definitions of the idea," Hegel writes, and ampli- Systems are in systems are not at aII extratemporal truths. lies: "I assert that if we free major concepts emerging indeed transient, but it does not follow that their princi- the history of philosophical systems from everything con- ples are forever true. The fallacy of the subjective idealist nected with their outward form, their speciflc applications, system is the fallacy of its principle, even though a cor- etc., if we take them in their pure form, we will have dif- rectly understood subjectivity is the real and substantial ferent stages of the definition of the idea itsell in its logi- definitiveness of the process of cognition. But Hegel opposes cal interpretation. On the contrary, if we take logical for- historically limited systems of philosophy to their prin- ward motion in itself, we wiII find in it the forward ciples, allegedlv free from empirical limitations and inter- motion of historical events in their major moments; preted as Iogical definitions of the absolute. Besides, he but of course, one must be able to notice these pure con- obviously underestimates the fact that a system is the real- (64; 43) cepts in the content of the historical form." 13, ization of its principle, and not merely its one-sided, ab- Applied rationally, the logical-theoretical and the spe- solute development and e:6position. cific-historical methods of study are equally necessary and Philosophies differ substantially, and so do their histo- genuinely must go hand in hand. But a soientific applica- ries. The doctrines of Democritus, Epicurus, Plato and philoso- tion of these methods in studying the history of Aristotle greatly affected the development of philosophy- phy is impossible within the framework of Hegel's philos- The same cannot be said of all outstanding philosophical ophy. Hegel subordinates the specific-historical study of theories. It follows that the overall relation of philosophi- the history of philosophy to the a priori schematic ap- cal doctrines to their times and to future social develop- proach of substantiated philosophical thinking. Hence the ments is different too. Some philosophies are revived in lat- contradiction between his theory of the history of philoso- er periods, developed and transformed under the impact

50 4,j 5l philosophy, in of new doctrines; others remain but landmarks of man- lation of a -doesphilosophy to its time. "While a kind's intellectual history. The thesis about the extratempo- its content, not rise above its time, it is still above philosophy, Ieading to the conclusion that it in its form because, as thought and knowledge of the ral essence of philosophy makes its systems of philosophy, viewed in substance, form a substantial spirit of its era, this it aII form and chain of images of the absolute, is also wrong because it subject". $[; L3, 69) But this differentiation of deviation from the fundamental the self -evident fact that philoso- conient in'philosophy is a is incompatible with con- phers of different eras are not contemporaries. This simple thesis of absolute idealism which holds that form and leads conclusion that is far from trite: phi- tent are identical in philosophy as the thought of thought' itatement to a the his- losophers each successive era possess'a heritage their Thus Hegel's distinction between the logical and of philosophy jls- predecessors could not have had. torical aspects of the history of is clearly identifies While correctly stressing the historical limitations placed tified and epistemologically necessary. But he on each philosophy by its time, Hegel refers to the de- epistemology with ontology; hence the conflicting assess- philosophy his doctrine, ments of his philosophy often given by its students' For velopment of which, according to phi- impersonal philosophical example, students of Hegel's views on the history of is a-bsent from the realm of the point: (absolute) idea. But precisely because he refers to an ac- losophy usually quote the following very important tual, empirically veriflable process, that truth is exagger- "The latest philosop,hy is the result of all preceding philos- ated; is flnally asserted that any philosophy "can there- ophies; it must then contain the principles of all; it is it the fore satisfy only those interests which are in keeping with tlierefore, when it is a philosophy, the most developed, its time". (64; 13,60) But great philosophies retain their richest, and the most concrete." (64; 6, 2'1.) While quoting significance, influence and, to a certain degree, their topi- that precept, students of Hegel seldom think ahout the way philosophy. cal value for several considerably different eras. Of course' it deicribes his view of the actual history of Hegel is well aware of it but, in his view, it is true ex- Since the quotation refers to the latest philosophy, it ap- cluiively of the ideal aspect of the history of philosophy pears self-evident that it applies to the history of philos- and can refer to its empirical aspect only insofar as it as- ophy. But the assertion that each following philosophy is cends toward the ideal level. The latter is thus the stand- higher than its predecessor fits only the logical order of the ard, the norm, the imperative, but since it is primordial it definitions of the absolute which, as the "absolute spirit", is certainly not the imperative as understood by Kant or deploys its logical definitions in time, that is, historically. Fichte. In this strictly speaking purely logical and not his- Jean Hyppolite, a well-known French student of Hegel's of self-development "each philosophy existed philosophy, refers to that and other similar tenets and ac- torical aspect great and still necessarily exists: therefore, none has disappeared cuses Hegel of discrediting philosophies by treating but aII are retained in philosophy as moments of one them as fully surpassed: "The fault of Hegel's history of whole". (64; 13,50) Hegel is right in stressing the eter-nal philosophy, which claims to present philosophies in a log- in the historical development of philosophical knowledge. ical and chronological order, is that it turns each sub- But he exaggerates and even makes an absolute of that sequent philosophy into a superior one comprising the moment, though it is no doubt important in the historical principle of, and surpassing the one that preceded it." (69; dialectics of tmth and error. Besides, Hegel strives to avoid 82) In the light of the quotation from Hegel cited above, this evaluation of his concept oi the history of philosophy absolutely opposing-ol the logical and the historical be- cause he is aware ttre fact that, contrary to the funda- appears convincing. But it clearly underrates the contra- mentals of his system, that contraposition is relative' This position of the substantial and the historical (the logical explains his attempts at interpreting the historical aspect and the chronological, according to Jean Hyppolite) as- of philosophies not simply as something historically tr11- pects of the history of philosophy on which Hegel insists sient but also as something historically eternal. In this so much, whereas it is clear from his Lectwres oru the IIis- connection Hegel offers a specific interpretation of the re- tory oJ Philosophy that he does not follow his own prin-

52 ciple in specific studies of the history of philosophy. For Thus the differentiation between the logical and the his- example, he does not regard , Epicureanism or torical in Hegel's interpretation of the development of p!i- Skepticism as the summit of ancient philosophy despite Iosophy is equally necessary both for criticizing I-I.g-"1': the fact that they were its latest stages. He even refers to irleaiisi errori arrd fo, singling out his brilliant dialectical Epicurus as a thinker who did not rise above the Ievel of insights. That is the standpoint from which we should view sensory concepts. He is equally disdainful of Skepticism, Hegel's concept of the motive forces of the develop- and describes even Stoicism as a decadent reflection of phi- -.it of philoiophy and the sources of the historical defi- Iosophy's crisis. nitivenesJ of its-content. If the logical is accepted not only Hegel does consider medieval philosophy as surpas- also not as a specific quality of the cognizing subject but -as sing the philosophies that preceded it. Later Scholasticism, the suEstantial, it ii thus accepted as caaEa, sul, as self-de- in his opinion, lost its distinctly philosophical content, with termining. That is Hegel's principal conviction directly re- theology replacing philosophy. ferring tb philosophy, and the development of the latter In analyzing the philosophy of the New Age, Hegel is is interpreted as a substantial process; "the entire history even further from presenting the latest philosophy as a of philosophy is essentially an inherently necessary for- synthesis of all those that preceded it. While praising the ward-moving succession, which is reasonable in itself and is metaphysical systems of the 77th century, he criticizes determined . . . fy its a priori idea. The history of philos- l8th-century philosophers, especially bourgeois Enlighten- ophy must prove it by its example." (64; 13, 50) Th9 ers, as thinkers who had even fallen short of their prede- goal of this logical process, contained in it from the start' cessors, at least in the specific content of their doctrines. is its internal motive force; this means that its result is It goes without saying that Hegel does not regard Berke- preordained from the start. The contradiction between the ley and Hume as representing a higher stage of philosophy historically limited form of philosophy and its infinite con- than the doctrines of Descartes, Leibniz or Spinoza. tent is the direct motive cause of the development of phil- If we now turn from Lectares on the History ol Philos- osophical knowledge. According to Hegel, the finite is not ophy that trace the historical development of philosophi- yet true, and therefore "the inner idea destroys these finite cal knowledge to The Science ol Logic, whose hierarchy of forms" (64; 13, 50)-in other words, it makes the tran- categories leads from the lower to the higher, it becomes sition from one system of philosophy to another a neces- obvious which aspect of the history of philosophy Hege1 sity. Therefore, since the hiitory of philosophy is regard-ed means when saying that each subsequent philosophy is as a logical-ontological succession of the definitions of the more developed, richer and more concrete (Hegel's logic, "absolute idea", it is also determined by the latter and is of course, does not refer to the particular philosophy brtt thus immanent-teleological. Everything that happens in to its fundamental precept, principle and categories). the world is, in the final analysis, a manifestation of rea- One must also remember that generally Hegel's concept son. In Hegel's view, "this great precept. . .-which is the of the development of philosophy is much richer than the only thing that makes the history of philosophy so inte-r- oversimplified version that maintains that each new phe- esting-is nothing other than the belief in Providence, only nomenon represents a stage of development higher than in a different guise". (64; 13,49) the previous one. We know that Hegel considered negation AII those definitions refer directly to the aspect of the a necessary component of development, differentiating be- history of philosophy Heget describes as substance. But tween abstract and concrete negation. Both occur in devel- the latter d-oes noi exist outside the "empirical" develop- opment, but only concrete negation means transition from ment of philosophy because it forms its essence. Accord- a lower to a higher stage. Contrary to the simplistic un- ing to Hegel's wellknown definition, philosophy as a his- derstanding of direct transition from lower to higher, from torically developing phenomenon is an epoch apprehended imperfect to perfect, Hegel describes development as a spi- by thought; it is "thought and the apprehension of the spir- ral in which past stages are revived on a new basis. it of the time". (64; 13,66) Of course, the "spirit of the

54 time" .does not exist independently of the "absolute spir- correspondence in time and, apparontly, also of interac- it'l, so that the speculative and the historical definitions tion and interpenetration. The basic postulate of Hegel's of philosophy are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, that idealist system rejects the essential diflerentiation between which specifically describes a particular historical era (and social consciousness and social being, because both are re- consequently a particular stage in the development of phi- duced, in the final analysis, to the thought of thought, the losophy) is not contained in the general concept of the substance-subject, the identity of being and thought. absolute, in the speculative view of the thought of thought, True, Hegel's philosophy of law draws a firm dividing the self-alienation of the absolute spirit, etc. line between the state and civil society-the sphere of pri- Thus, on the one hand, Hegel reduces. the motive forces vate interests, above all economic ones. But this division of the history of philosophy to pure thought, while, on the has no counterpart in his analysis of the development of other, he tries to connect the emergence and subsequent philosophy. The actual structure of a class society evapo- development of philosophy to certain history-making social rates in the speculative annihilation of the empirical. All upheavals. Discussing the historical premises that led to that leads the study of the specific historical content and the emergence of philosophy, Hegel says they included the social role of philosophy away from the already percepti- division of labor, the rise of "estates", that is, the disin- ble correct (but, of course, not idealist) *ry. The final tegration of the patriarchal. clan, the emergence of the conclusion-absolute idealism does not dare go further human personality independent of the patriarchal way of than that in its analysis of philosophy's place in the social life, the crisis of spontaneous religious consciousness (see Iife of each given historical era-merely recognizes that 64; .13, 66-67). But Hegel gives no specific description of philosophy and all other forms of the social comprise a sin- historical epochs whose content is expressed by this or that gle whole, and that the intrinsic composites of that whole philosophy. Usually, he merely gives a general outline of form a relationship of necessary correspondence. "A defi- the. "spirit of the time", the intellectual climate, the con- nite kind of philosophy correlates therefore with a definite victions that dominated this or that historical epoch; and kind of people among which it exists, with their state sys- therefore philosophy itself, as a rule, appears as the most tenr, government, ... their social life." (64; 13, 68) But important manifestation of the spirit of the time. Hegel's what determines this correspondence, which is no mere view of the relation of philosophy to social relations as a temporal coincidence? Hegel's philosophy answers this ques- whole does. not provide any definite answer to the question tion in the most general way: the uniqueness of the ab- but is rather the question itself. solute spirit. This means that the substantial difference be- Hegel is well aware of the fact that since the question tween two historical epochs is predetermined by the logi- is the existence of philosophy in history, philosophy is not cal structure of the absolute spirit, in which each epoch is the cause of social transformations; the idea of philosophy a necessary step on the way to its self-consciousness. dependent on those transformations is incompatible with According to Marx, Hegel turns world history into the rationalist idealism. "The relationship between philosophy history of philosophy. He identifies the specific historical and political history, forms of government, art and.religion (economic, political, ideological, technological, etc.) devel- is not such that they are the roots of philosophy or vice opment of society with the development of knowledge and versa; rather they are all rooted in the spirit of the time." self-consciousness; and philosophy is proclaimed the au- (64 13,69) thentic form of the latter. This fully accords with the in- Apparently, Hegel proceeds from the concept of the sin- terpretation of world history as progress in the understand- gle, universal absolute spirit, a certain stage of which ap- ing of freedom. The diversity of human history is reduced pears as the spirit of the time, and its diversity is expres- to the development of philosophical consciousness. In He- sed in religion, art, government and, most adequately, in gel's words, "world history is the expression of the divine, philosophy. The relationship between philosophy and all absolute process of the spirit in its supreme manifestations; other forms of social life is that of correlation, parallelism, it is an expression of that succession of steps through

56 which it realizes its truth and reaches self-conscious- nal and the external. These contrapositions are dialectical, ness. . . World history only shows how self-consciousness and the external becomes internal, while their union forms and the striving for truth gradually awaken in the qnirit; world history and, as its quintessence, the developing phil- osophical spirit. Naturally, primacy there are glimmers of consciousness, it apprehends .the is accorded to the log- main pointl, and finally it becomes fully conscious." (63; ical; the empirical is reduced to a means by which the 1,'fhat 75) spirit becomes conscious of its content. one-sided interpretation impoverishes and distorts In his analysis of various aspects of social life, often quite alien to philosophy, Hegel, of course, cannot ignore the diversity-has of the content of world history. Idealism always presented human history above all the fundamental link of philosophy with nonphilosophical as the history of intelleitual development, as the struggle studies and other forms of social consciousness: religion, of reason agiinst error, of good against evil. Althougtr He- art, morality. In exam.ining the philosophy of the New gel's doctrine of the objective logic of the history 9t .g9i: Age, he explicitly states: "Without the independent devel- 6ty to some degree oveicomes certain flaws in the idealist opment of the experimental sciences, philosophy would nev- inierpretation oI history, he is obviously a captive of that er have risen above the level of the ancients." (64; 15, philoiophical-historical precept. But in his analysis of- cer- 283) But this admission does not fit the structure of the iain syitems of philosophy Hegel often convincinq-Iy shows system and therefore does not lead to appropriate theoret- their ielation to specific ieatures of the given historical ical conclusions about the motive forces of philosophical epoch. For example, he reveals the historical necessity of, development: the historical succession connecting systems of philosophy has place social and justification for, bourgeois French Enlightenment. Ac- no for the natural or cording to Hegel, its anticlericalism and even atheism are sciences. obsolete feudal The mechanistic world outlook, directly related to the an exfression-of-and the struggle against the ways their mainstay, the Catholic Church. The Revo- natural science of the New Age, was of great importance Iution of 1789 is seen by him as directly linked to that in- for the development of philosophy. But Hegel pays little tellectual movement to which he refers with obvious en- attention to that fact, apparently because he is a critic of thusiasm, despite his well-known hostility to naturalism the mechanistic approach. His Philosophy ol Nature con- and especially materialism. tains many dialectical conclusions drawn from the natural Hegei's Tie Science of Logic admits only of logical sciences. But since they proceed from materialist precepts, Hegel fails to correctly evaluate their relations philoso- ronoition. between philosophies,-by but not of the historical to relationship recorded hirir between philosophy--and- the phy. He expands the concept of philosophy to the maximum social conditions that are independent of it. Still, Hegel and regards it as an all-encompassing science, compris- needs a sociological assessment of philosophies because, ing the speculatively assimilated natural sciences. Thus he admits, albeit indirectly, the importance of the natural (and according to his fundamental concept, he recogniz-es -not only the logical self-motion of the philosophizing absolute social) sciences for the development of philosophy. But spiiit but also the development of philosophy- in history. that admission is worded so that specific sciences appear to The latter is, of course, necessary because the absolute owe their outstanding achievements to philosophy. Hegel cannot be content with mere self-contemplation. And "the puts an extreme construction on the traditional contraposi- deeper the spirit plunges into itself, the more intensive be- tion of philosophy to nonphilosophical activity (both prac- comes the contraposition, and the broader is the richness tical and theoretical), and that inevitably affects his doc- directed outside; we must fathom the depth by the degree trine on the history of philosophy. of the need, the yearning of the spirit with which it di- FIegeI both underrates the importance of specific sciences rects its search outward to find itself". (64; 15,684) Thus' Ior the development of philosophical knowledge and, without vioiating the principles of his panlogical system, not surprisingly, overestimates the role of religion. Since Hegel combines the logicat and the historical as the inter- philosophy is, in his vie'*', essentially idealist, it differs

58 59 from religion not so much in content as in form. While in which largely dismisses the true motive forces ol the de- his Lectures on the History ol Philosophy Hegel asserts velopment of philosophy and, in the final analysis, recon- that philosophy exists only inasmuch as it dissociates it- ciles dialectics with the metaphysical interpretation of the self from religious consciousness, in his Philosophy ol Re' history of pliilosophy. Hegel's metaphysical system offers ligion he very often slurs over that fundamental difference, a one-sided interpretation of the history of. philosophy so important for idealism too, and even states that "philos- which ignores the study of the development of the mate- ophy and religion are identical". His reservations about rialist outlook; consequently, it ignores the struggle of ma- the dialectical nature of that identity fail to make it plau- terialism and idealism, a most important aspect in the de- sible. velopment of philosophy. The panlogical concept of the A point to remember is that Hegel's arguments to prove two major dimensions of the history of philosophy, the on- the identity of the subjects of philosophy and theology are tologization of its logical-theoretical interpretation, the re- mostly exoteric. And essentially, they even prove the op- duction of philosophy to the thought of thought elevated posite: that philosophy is independent of religion. In He- to the status of the subject-substance-all that, together gel's opinion, religion cannot claim that its subject stands with the theological precepts and conclusions of Hegel's higher than that of philosophy. Philosophy is on the top philosophy, puts a mystical construction on his history of rung of the hierarchy of knowledge because its supreme philosophy and gives rise to contradictions that cannot be subject is the divine. Philosophy is higher than religion be- solved by absolute idealism, and to conservative (and part- cause what is the subject of the imagination and emotion ly reactionary) ideological conclusions. (and Hegel thinks little of their cognitive value) in reli- Marxist philosophy removed the mystical shroud from gion is the subject of conceptual knowledge in philosophy- Hegel's concept of the history of philosophy; it not only This explains why, in Hegel's lifetime, theologians viewed exposed its major flaws but also revealed its outstanding his contention as an act of arrogance on the part of philos- discoveries, accomplishments and insights, whose criticai ophy, an attempt at usurping the prerogatives of the- assimilation and development heiped create a scientific ology. theory of the history of philosophy. In creating his theory of the history of philosophy, He- gel's studies form the basis of that subject as a science. That essentially dialectical theory is the theory of the de- velopment of philosophical knowledge which, in turn, serves as a basis for Hegel's specific and systematic study oI the worldwide history of philosophy. He interprets the de- velopment of philosophy as a distinct form of development, radically different from other forms of development in na- ture and society. The existence and struggle of opposing doctrines is a salient feature of the development of phi- Iosophy; according to Hegel, their conflict does not rule out the interrelationship of their content or the inevitable transition from one doctrine to another. The concept of the conflicting unity of the history of philosophy and the dia- lectical understanding of historical continuity are the great- est accomplishments of Hegel's history of philosophy. I{is idealism distorts all the achievements of his philos- ophy. The idealist interpretation of development distorts that concept and subordinates it to a theological system

60 A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE that truly rules out the opposition of philosophy to theo- retical as well as practical nonphilosophicai activity. That LATEST PLURALISTIC CONCEPT OF THE opposition is typical of the entire pre-Marxian, and, espe- OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY cially, idealist philosophy. Even philosophers of dialecti- cal idealism did uot escape it. That opposition is not a sub- jective opinion advanced by philosophers but an objective feature of the process of differentiation between philosophy and specific sciences. The fact that this opposition, long since devoid of any historical justification, has not only survived but is even more intensively emphasised in to- Diversity of doctrines has always heen, and still is, typ- day's idealist philosophy, is a graphic illustration of the ical of philosophy. Its significance can be understood cor- crisis gripping the latter at present. rectly and expllined scientifically only hy studying the- dis- To substantiate the need for a scientific philosophy, pre-Marxian tinotive aspects of philosophy, th. evolution of its subject classical philosophers tried to prove that the and ideological function, the epistemological and class increasing divergence of philosophies was a transient phe- roots of philosophical errors, the place of philosophy in the nomenon. For example, Fichte was convinced that "there system of fundamental sciences, and its relationship to-art, is only one single philosophy, just as there is only one religion and other forms of the social consciousness. That mathematics, and as soon as that only possible philosophy is the only approach that explains the wide variety of phil- is found and recognized, new ones can no longer emerge; osophical doctrines not as a merely empirically obvious and all the previous so-called philosophies would thereaf- and scientiflcally inexplicable fact, but as a phenomenon ter be regarded only as attempts and preliminary works". of the spiritual life of society that is both historically nec- (52; 3,3) Therefore, he regarded his doctrine as "elevat- essary and historically transient. ing philosophy to the level of a science". Of course, Fich- Today's bourgeois philosophers and historians of philos- te was wrong in asserting that the creation of a scientiflc ophy often present the increasing divergence of philosoph- philosophy would end the development of philosophy and, ical doctrines as a unique process rooted in the sub- consequently, the debate in philosophy. But his thought jective creativity of outstanding individual philosophers' that the situation later described as "anarchy of philosoph- But the fact that the diversity of philosophical doctrines ical system" was historically transient came as a bril- does not rule out their contradictory unity, and that in the liant prediction of the scientific solution of the historical- final analysis it is reduced to the fundamental antithesis philosophical problem. of materialism and idealism refutes this subjectivist inter- Unlike classical philosophical authors, today's bourgeois theoreticians pretation- of the historical process in philosophy. of the history of philosophy try to prove that The development of philosophical knowledge differs rad- philosophy, Iike art (and, of course, Iike religion), by its ically from the development of physics, chemistry, biolo- very nature cannot and must not be a science, and that gy and other sciences, just as philosophy differs from all any attempt at creating a scientific philosophy ignores the those sciences both in subject and in methods of research. unique meaning and signiflcance of that basically unsciep- However, one should not make an absolute of that radical tific "spiritual mode" of human existence. The Swiss phi- difference, as today's bourgeois philosophers and historians losopher Andr6 Mercier said at the 15th World Congress of philosophy usually do. The siudy of the history of phi- of Philosophy, "Philosophy is not a science... Science is Iosophy becomes really effective only when the relation be- neither a philosophy nor philosophy in general." (87;25) tween the history of philosophy and the history of science Theorists like Mercier reject the possibility of a scientiflc is understood not merely as a difference but also as a dia- philosophy, regard the wide diversity of philosophies as an Iectical unity. That is the only methodological approach authentic expression of the sovereign freedom of philo-

62 63 sophical thought, and criticize the classics of pre-Marxian perialist interpretation of the history of philosophy (57 a; ph-ilosophy, charging that their attempts at creaLing q sqr- 40) because Hegel impinges on the unqriestionible sover- think- c.ignty of_ philosophical ;;;; ptilosopfry-bitter ivere quixotic errois of optiTistic systems and mikes them depen_ *fro'"f lacked historical experience' Such is the dent on the historical development of philosophicd knbwl- "r.;rtoof;; oi a viewpoint that actually negates the history edge,_describing each system of philosophy'as the self- oi ptitotopty as a science about the progress of-Pfrilosoph- consciousness of a historilally definite era-. For the spokes- icaf t rrowiudge, and it negates the v-ely possibility of a men of today's_ "philosophy of the history of philos6phy", scientific phil'osophical view of the world' as we see, the historical approach to philosophical docirines That negativist trend found its conc-eptual consumma- is absolutely unacceptable. tion in the-studies in the history of philosopny by a num- According to Lomb_ardi, Hegel tries to read meaning not ber of French, Italian and West German philosophert- Yho only into Plato's truth but alio into Aristotle's truth; con- philos- sequently, call their trend the "philosophy-retognized of the history of he presents all thinkers as contributors to the oot u". Martial Gu6roult is as the leader of gallery of errors in the temple of human knowledge. But ifiri tr."a.-t He is the author of numerous studies of Des- in that case it is perfectly obvious that those think6rs lose tifoir, pi"ttt., Malebralclre, Maimon and of the their autono-my in order to represent mere special ,,mo- "rrrLr,-ett oaotogy of th" hiitory of philoso^phy. Gu6roult'1.t'p- ments" of the concept forming Hegel's doctiine of the nori""r uo"d foilo*.rs include Henri Gouhier, Paul Ricoe- idea. Lombardi obviously oversimplifies Ilegel's history of il; F.- B.rrr.r, Franco Lombardi and V. Goldschmidt' philosophy: the latter considered his philosophy the r6sult name "philosophy oj th9 previous history philosoph!., There is nothing"ptritoiophyt'. surprising about the of thui maintaining of the history of Both the name and, more- that he continued and completed thal history. Hegel wai ;;.;; th;-fii and'the only "philosop\v of the historv of wrong to believe that his system was the end of the de- nhilosonhv" of its kind were createtl by none other tfln velopment-of philosophy; but Lombardi rejects the develop- theory of hts- ment of philosophical knowledge heeel. ifre nrst to evolve a philosophical .the _ altogether, regarding the iori oi philosophy. The theoreticians listed above, howevet' pluralism of philosophical systems ai the only poisible mention" this f act because their doctrine is directly form of existence of phitosophy. The German historian of ""i."opposea to Hegel's theory of the development of philosoptr- philosophy- Gottfried Martin also lapses into this error, ex- ical knowledge-. The point is that Hegel substantiated the cept that he ascribes the pluralistic interpretation ol the p;;"ipl" of" the unity-the contradictory unilV, .of history-of philosoplry to none other than-Hegel. Accord- io"r.J-ot the history of philosophy by demonstrating lh9 ing to Martin, "Dialectics recognizes diametrica"Ily opposite irfi"ry of the opinion dominant during his lifetime that judgments as equally meaningful, and in this s#se it ih; *""t mutualiy negating systems- of philosophy had,no recognizes the diversity of mutually contradictory judg- suhstantial connection with one another and were not drl- ments. From here it- is not far to recognizing the diversity f;;"t aspects of the single, though manifold,- developmert of mutually contradictory philosophie-s. Tliat was what pfrif"t6pfrv. tn Gu6roul's opitiot that would negate the Plato and Hegel did. It is i fact that there are numerous mutually u.r'y"I^ po.tiliiity of the historyof philosophy,.aP 3. :ti"19-u: opposite phil_osophies and that apparently they U"s.t1. history of philosophy hg c-ontends, "abolishes the will always be in conflict. But from a diajectical itand- fact it claims to substantiate" (60; 59) ' point, this fact is not a flaw but rather a necessity. It is '-;;;ailg is important to Brunner, Hegel's !is.t9fv of .philosophv, for_ philosophy that there should be many phi- a "despotic-solution of the issue of philosophical diversity^' losophies;..pl.1jl-osqply can exist olly as a diversity of i,ti- (40; 1-93) because Hegel rejects..the..autonomy ot pnilo- losophies." (85;__283) Martin is obviously wrong i, hir'irr- history of philosophy terpretation sophical doctrines ,.d ?.r"ribes the -of Hegel's history of philosbphy. It is a long as a progressing dialectical removal of the actual drversrly y1{ flo- admitting the diversity ot pnlosophies to plura-- ;f pliii";"phiesl Goldschmitlt charges Hegel with an im- listically interpreting the history of pirilosopiry. And 'Hegel

tr4 5-01562 --

the ,,radical shared the monistic (dialecticai-monistic) approach to the -"philosophy of the history of philosophy', is history of philosophY. idealism". That, of course, is antidlalecticil-idealism that The ideological-objectives of the "philosophy of-the his- mg^taphysically interprets a generally accepted fact: the philoiophy" are obvious. Together with the prin- difference of the history of p-hilosopliy from tory of -historicism, the history"the of cipie of it rejects historical materialismr Pre: mathematics, physics and other sciences. In each of ..tt.d as a crude sociololical concept reducing original latter the components form a relatively orderly system. The works of philosophy to the immediate historical causes of differences between modern physics and classicil mechan- their emefgence.-The "philosophy of the hlst-ory oJ nhilg,s, ics exist within theilunity wtricir represents a process sub- (wrongly ascribed and totally ject to a law Niels Bohr described ophy" opposes'Marxism) this view -(and is the principle of ap_ ,i1", to of philosophy ol any form of so- propriateness-. Naturally, principle doei not- apply 'to the relationship tlg cial consciousness in general) as a simple consequence -of between philosophies. material conditions. independent of consciousness by the The development of each science increases and accumu_ idealistic principle of philosophy's independence from ever- lates truths eventually accepted by all its scientists. A new ything nonphilosophical. That principle rejects the nlate- stage in scientific development is a step forward that over- rialist interpretation-when oI history. Brunner arrives at these comes the limitations of the preceding itage. It is true that conclusions he writes: "While Hegel abolishes the in natural science supporters of the ota oTten against fight"bee, "borr" autonomy of philosophies by rechristening them as mo- the new, even though iis correctness has already ments of his own system, Marx goes even further: he de- out by the facts. But the situation in philoiophy is in- 'stroys philosophy itself by depriving it of its inherent au- comparably more complex: a new system" does nof ,i*rv, tonomy as philosophy. From the supreme discipline it use.d surpass its predecessor. to be, philosophy-turns into an epiphenomenon of man's Martiai Gu6roult offers a subjectivist interpretation of all life in iociety.;' (a0; 1,94) Like oth-ef followers of 4re ''phi- these facts, that call for speciai epistemolopiicrt stlray- Ue losophy of ttie history of philosophy", Brunner still thinks sr1npl{ declares that the past of icience -(Inhke the past in terms of the past. He regards philosophy &S fl sllp€T: of philosophy.) is constantly devalued by itd present. it'i,r"- science which his every right to ignore "Iower" scientifrc Iore philosophy and science are diame[rically opposed, de_ knowledge. I\aturally, Marxism resolutely rejects that in- spite the fact that each system of philosophyl titt,i u"V'.Vr_ terpretatfon of philoiophy, which las become an obstacle tem of scientific knowledge, searc^hes for th'e trutli. "Hdw_ to the effective development of philosophical knowledge' evcr, the point is that_each lystem of philosophy regards principle sovereignty of all systems of philosophy "Gu6_ One must note that the of the - -other as wroirg, wtrite in philosophy is rejected even by idealism if it recognizes phi- roul!'s view, they are all equatiy legitimate in their claim iosophy's'connection to other forms of spiritual life (sci- to the truth. In the history of icienlce, each new achieve- ence, irt) and its own dependence on religion. Not sur- ment,is based on, and surpasses, its predecessors. The ,,phi_ - - losophy prisingly,' the Belgian idealistic philosopher Alphonse .De of the history of philosophy,i sees this fact u. pioot defines philosophy as "reflection on a nolp-h-ilo- of constant devaluation of scieitiic Waelhens ,,theachievement. Foi ex_ sophical experienc6" in his article "Philosophy and Non- ample, lenri Gouhier states that only indisputable fact is philosophy"- and stresses the "indelible bond betwe.l--phi- that the science of today-of discredits tt. s.i6"c. ot iosophy and nonphilosophy". (96; 6, 12) pqt De- Wael- yesterday, while the philosophy todav does not aiscreaii hens advances a neo-Thomist concept of philosophy that the philosof|y.of yesterdayi,.-(5g; lll) according: io the Bergsonian Gilbert Maire, philosophy ties it directly to religion' - never -aregrows 6bsolete: The theoretical precepts of the "philosophy of the histo- ' The physics of Aristotle and bescartes aeaa, f"i ry of philosophy" reject the unity of the history of philos- their philosophies continue to flourish." (gl: 1g) Maire is ophy, ihe possibility of a scientific philosophy, and the de- not a s.upp_orter of the "philosophy-Iargely of the histcirv of phi_ itlopment of. philoso.phy. According to one of its adepts, losophy". But his views Loincide wittt "ttrose''-ot

66 quite different." The "philosophy of the history of philosophy" ence. Their respective interests are that school. (60; g) Yvon Belaval, soholar who close to the expresses the convictions- of many- bourgeois philo:-oplt'.t' a is they may not belong to the relatively small cirole "philosophy of the history of philosophy" is even more aidnougtr the oJ its adherents. outspoken: "The scientist does not need to know move ahead: studies Of course, those assertions run counter to the true his- history of his science to he proceeds from it, and he is tory of science. Newton's mechanics is not discredited, and the state it is in, he real accomplishments of the natural sci- not interested in the past." (43 ;25)'t According to Gu6ro- neilher are other philosophy is a different matter that the scientific accomplish- ult, the picture is totally different in which al- ,rr"".. It past. both ancient and subsequent phi- ments of the past have been surpassed by- n-ew9r achieve- ways faces its Since authors are ments. By misrepresenting the above and laying biased losophies retain their significance today, their our contempor4ries. The opposition of the present stress oo iht fact that many philosophical issues posed in actually past topical, supporters bf ttre "philosophy. of and the past, so obvious in the history of science, is de- ifre are still philosophy. "The in- history of philoiophy" build an impenetrable waII be- scribed as having little significance in the -pt philosophy em- iiosophy and'the sciences. Fof example, I{einrich divisibility of and its history," Gu6roult i*.* - phasizes, the fact of that of West Germany who belongs to that school even "is an essential characteristic of no*Ur.f, (60 a7) But philosophy and its history are re- asserts that "philosophy is not a phenomenon in time' ' ' history." if a.rrtop itt te-poral framework, it itself ally indivisible and the millennium separating a doctrine il;;;; ,oi -but consequence, how then is the his- rr.ui"t the externai framewor-k" for all spiritual events '-' ''' from another is of no (93; The "philosophy of the history of philosophy" tory of philosophy at all possible as an actual process in 13). conditions? How does the the theology of philosophy' time, in radically diflerent social thus becomes history philosophy" see the transi- By making an absoluie of ihe radical distinction between "philosophy of the of ti-on from one historical era to another? It answers these the history-attempts 6f phitotophy and the developm-ent of science, (of- course, by purely- speculative questions by referring to the numerical increase of philo- Gu6roult There was no Hegel in Kant's world, reasoning) to adswer why the legitimacy of oi sophical masterpieces. -the.-history. was Kant in the world of Hegel, and that inevi- phll|*tfii as a science ]ias always been and still is being but there believe that this is because cri- tably affected the latter's philosophy. All this means sim- ffi;;ti;;;i. He wants us to in yardsticks bomowed from science and foreign ply that all outstanding philosophers are not on hand i."iu u"a the "philos- have always hee-n applied to it' Philosoply iny era, a fact of paramount importance for i" pfrif"t"pt V philosophy". But if interpreted fully i."r'U."" iikened to science whose greatest values are its ophy of the history of iut".[-r."rmplishments because they surpass preceding tliat fact compietely refutes the groundless assertion about point view oversimplifies the extratemporal essence of each philosophy. In their - Ttrat of -obviously- ".iii*.*."ts. knowledge, reducing it to a attempts at salvaging that idealist principle the adherents [t . a.u.topment of icientific (or stu- of new results that are higher than past of the trend in question claim that for readers *r*" r".oirulation authors are conteri- the theory of relativity and quantum mecha:rics dents) of philosophical works, their *." b"t poraries no matter when they actually lived' But that as' remain the greatest accomplishryents- of 20th-century phys- sertion is also groundless. i;i ;;; th"ough they weie followed by mlnv- other out- riuiai"g discoieries. Having oversimplified the develop- 't Regrettably, this obvious denigration of the history of science ;;";? .ti*"q Gu6roult cintrasts it to philosophv.and is share"d by some historians of the natural sciences.- For example, not more, valuable tnan according to Alexantlre Koyr6, "Copernican or Newtonian astronpmy asserts that its past is equally, if possesses- today's -;;til' lis.i.r"" two radically is no loiger of interest to-anyone, it no -value -in itr aol its history -have world; that is wlrere the history of science differs from the history ai"ti'".t-tfr.'second, oliects: the flrst, scientific truth which is nontem- of philosophy. And we believe (wilhout discussing in detail how pbrul the acquisition.of that truth in time' jusfified thai opinion is) that lhb doctrines of Ariitotle and P]ato today." (59; tlt). therefore the history of science can in no way be part of sci- retain their validity

69 68 Clearly, to negate the historical facts underlying differ- nomenon that runs counter to the universality of change? e_nt philosophies, their content and form, means to question Gu6roult is aware that the explanation canlrot be reduced the legitimacy of the history of philosophy as a icience. to the assertion: "If no one [no philosopher] can definitive- Study of a history of philosophy offering no historicai ly prove himself right, neither can he definitively refute evaluation of different philosophies runs counter to its prin- others." (60 ; 50) That argument, Gu6roult holds, will be cipal purpose. Still, according to Gu6roult, the historicity acceptable to any skeptic who maintains that all philoso- of a philosophy rules out its eternal value, without which phies are worthless. But the task is to prove, contrary to the it ceases to be a true philosophy. But a study of the actual skeptics, that all philosophies-of course, inasmuch as history of philosophy shows that philosophies retain their they are original systems-are temporally impregnable spir- outstanding value after their own era precisely because itual values. "The problem of the possibility of the history they are the product of a specific time which helped shape of philosophy as a science translates itself (se transpose) subsequent social development. into the problem of the possibility of this science's objects, In Gu6roult's opinion, the proof of the history of philoso- that is, into the transcendental problem of the possibility phy as a science is the same as Kant's famous formula: of philosophies as permanent objects of a possible history; how is pure mathematics possible? How is pure, i.e., theo- in short, into the problem of the possibility of philosophy retical, natural science possible? Kant began by register- as a plurality of philosophies that cannot be reduced to ing that "pure" mathematics and "pure" natural science one another or destroyed because they remain eternally val- did exist, and then went on to examining their epistemo- uable for philosophical reflection." (60; 51) logical premises. Following his example, Gu6roult main- Thus, to prove the thesis about the eternal value of each tains: "Consequently, to say that the history of philosophy philosophy Gu6roult rejects not only the progress of phil- exists means, strictly speaking, only that there have long osophical knowledge but also the fact that one philosophy existed studies of past philosophies, aimed at reproducing can solve (or at least pose) the problems another system the philosophical consciousness of that moment in its orig- has failed to solve or pose. Some of Gu6roult's followers inal sense and assuming that the students understand go even further. According to Brunner, philosophies can their authors." (60 ; 47) Kant proved the existence of pure coexist without coming into conflict with one another be- mathematics and pure natural science by assuming the ex- cause they are not true or false copies of the real. istence of a priori forms of sense perception and thought. (40; 198) The word "copy" is clearly out of place here be- The subsequent history of mathematics and natural sci- cause Brunner rejects even the possibility of philosophies ence fully refuted that assumption. Nevertheless, in defend- being true or false. But if philosophies are not studies of ing the idealist principle regarding philosophy's indepen- objective reality, then what are they? Brunner simply calls dence of history, Gu6roult actually repeats the errors of them objects of art. (40; 198) Philosophical cognition is Kant's a priori approach. thus likened to artistic vision of the world, and philosophi- Gu6roult describes his history of philosophy as "diano- cal systems, to the rvorks of Pheidias, Raphael, Tchaikov- ematics",'r' defined as a science "dealing with the condi- sky, etc. Of course, this "artistic" approach to philosdphy tions in which philosophical works are possible inasmuch as is not supposed to decide which philosophical precepts are they possess indestructible philosophical va1ue". (60; 68) true and which are false. But the solution is too costly: Thus philosophy's alleged independence of history is what it refuses to recognize the fundamental difference betrueen makes the history of philosophy at all possible as a science. aesthetic perception of reality and philosophy, the Iatter But how does onc explain the very possibility of a phe- not at all the creation of artists. Unlike the poet, the phi- losophcr strives to achieve cognition in concepts, qot fm- "' L Greek philosophy, d,ianoia meant meclitation, con- ages-. Poets often ascend to great philosophical insights, but ception, thinking."".tent In Plato's Timaeus dianoema stands for medita- tion. Schopenhauer's Dianoiologie is the science studying the abilities philosophers do not produce great poetry. ApparentJV, that of reason. Gu6roult's "dianoematics" has a similar meaning. is the reason why Gu6roult, although he generally does not

7a 7l oppose likening philosophies to works of art, nevertheless sub_jected to harsh and derogatory philosophical criticism. deems it necessary to introduce corrections into that over- Gu6roult maintains that the diffeiences among philoso- ly straightforward viewpoint. phies need no justification in the eyes of everydal,- reality ' According to Gu6roult, philosophy cannot be viewed in which is itself questioned by philosophical thought. Thus isolation from the yearning for the truth which inspires ev- it is everyday reality and not philosophy that must defend ery true philosopher. That yearning is not simply a sub- itself before reason. Philosophy discovers in everyday real- jective state of rnind that slurs over the actual but not ity (or rather, on the other side of it) its cognizaLle es- at all true content of philosophies. The problem is pre- sence-philosophical reality. The latter, unlike everyday cisely to grasp each philosophy as a distinct realization of reality, is inseparabiy linked to free but not random phil-- that organic yearning for the truth. But if that is so, then osophical judgment, because always and everywhere (even clearly philosophies ought to be compared to one another, among irrationalists) it is based on the rational, and logic to the information supplied by the natural and social sci- is its intellectual tool. ences, and to historical experience or practice, because that For Gu6roult, everyday reality does not stand for the is the only way to ascertain how correctly this or that phi- external world that can be perceived through the senses. losophy understands reality. But that is what Gu6roult re- He expands the concept to cover everything studied and jects, and he asserts that there exist philosophical truths understood by nonphilosophy. The knowledge about that totally different from, and independent of, scientifi.c truths, allegedly everyday reality thus coincides with the and that the former are based on a special kind of reali- knowledge based on experience or practice. And this ac- ty foreign to science. The subject of philosophy is totally tual knowledge, to which mankind owes so much, without opposed to the subject of all the natural and social sci- which modern civilization is impossible, is contrasted to the ences taken together. The conclusion is that the philoso- great philosophies, presented as a self-sufflcient whole in- pher has no need of scientific knowledge and that sCientists dependent of everyday reality, as a closed world of thought are incapable of philosophical discoveries. Gu6roult needs determining itself through a priori precepts. Brunner' calls this contraposition to justify the right he alleges philoso- that concept monadological realism. Each philosophy is phers have to ignore scientific discoveries. Obviously, this presented.as something similar to Leibniz's monad, at least "right" is deduced from a false premise, that of philosophy in the sense that it forms a closed realm of the ideal. being independent of history, including the history of sci- The philosopher both creates and perceives being, the sub- ence. According to Gu6roult, there exists a basis of philo- ject of his reflection. According to Brunner, the realities sophical truth and of the yearning for it, and that basis examined by philosophy are similar to the world of Plato's is independent of the philosopher's will (but not of his transcendental ideas which opposes the exoteric world of consciousness). To justify that thesis, he invents the con- things perceivable by the senses. Thus, for aII their claims cept of philosophical reality opposed to everyday reality, about the fundamental equality of all great philosophies, the subject of science. He interprets the fact that science the proponents of the "philosophy of the history of philos- has long transcended the boundaries of everyday experi- ophy" reject materialist doctrines and defend "P1ato's line", ence to mean that these boundaries are gradually expan- i.e., idealism. Of course, this does not mean that they dingr But that does not bring everyday experience closer adhere to Plato's philosophy. The idealism of today cannot to the allegedly suprascientific philosophical reality. The accept Plato's doctrine as created 2,000 years ago. And the whole thing resembles the claim of theologians that their "philosophy of the history of philosophy" presents that subject of "study" is not of this world. much-vaunted philosophical reality as a world of intelli- Thus Gu6roult claims that philosophy fences itself off gible ideas no matter what their ontological status. Inci- from everyday reality and turns to quite another, in-depth dentally, that interpretation of Plato's philosophy is a sa- reality. Moreover, only that is philosophy which deals with lient feature of Husserl's phenomenology. that reality. The perceptible, tangible everyday reality is Plato used myths to explain the fundamentals of his sys-

7Z I I .

tem. Some adherents of the "philosophy of the history of to technical requirements, although they are no doubt philosophy" try to do the same. F.or eiample, in his ariicle necessary, Ieads Ricoeur to the conclusion that the histor- "Myt!, History and Mystery", Albert Wagner de Reyna, ical (and above all, historical-philosophical) study is sub- one of the more consistent followers of that school, main- jective despite its epistemological objectivity. But that is tains, fully in the spirit of Christian theology, that "myth i'scientiflc iubjectivity", not to be confused with "ill-inten- is_ a-word of truth, because it is a word of trust". (97 ;2a) tioned subjectivity"-in other words, with bad faith or in- Uyth, he asserts, "is true inasmuch as it discoveri reality competence. from its point of view". (97 ;24) This paean to myth hai The subjective aspect of research cannot be ignored. But a definite theological connotation. According to this con- recognizing or denying the subjective approach by the cept, a myth is not even a symbol but a sign of cosmic scholar is not the point; the important thing is to see the mystery coming to man as a revelation. The entire mean- way leading to the objective truth, to its criterion-in oth- ing coded into a myth is incalculably greater than the one er words, to have a materialist understanding of the sub- understood or expressed verbally. Therefore, myth "re- jective aspect of cognition and human subjectivity in gen- veals the being, the essence of the transcendental, of 'cos- eral. That is precisely what the adherents of the "phi- mos"'. (97 ;23-24) Myth is unavoidable because "it is losophy of the history of philosophy" lack, and that leads impossible for man to express his vision in the language them to a subjective approach to the history of philosophy, of logic or science, in which self-contemplation from t[e despite their strict observance of the requirements of "epis- outside is an impossible and absurd venture". (97 ;25) temological objectivity". The principle of subjectivity- Myth can be expressed only in metaphors or symbols. it that is the principle of personal brilliance-is the key con- cannot be grasped by reason, its mission is to shift the in- cept in the "philosophy of the history of philosophy". The tellect that trusts it into the transcendental reality which true content of each philosophy is its expression of the it denotes. unique creativity of the philosophizing individual, a means Naturally, not all proponents of the "philosophy of the of self-assertion. For example, Henri Gouhier main- history of philosophy" proceed as resolutely from abstract tains, "In our view, no ism gives rise to another isrz. Had judgments to "specific" theological statements. Therefore, Baruch died as a child, there would have been no Spinoz- in order to fully decode the "philosophy of the history of ism." (59; 20) philosophy" we would do well to return to its allegedly Actually, the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" scholarly arguments and to the facts (or at least what ap- merely rehashes old idealist ideas. In the 1920s William pear to be facts) that it cites. James claimed that "you, ladies and gentlemen, have a According to Gu6roult and his supporters, the history philosophy, each and all of you". (71;3) IIe reduced the of philosophy must employ a strictly scientific method. But struggle between materialism and idealism, rationalism this much publicized demand for a scientific approach is and empiricism, and all other differences among philoso- in actual fact made for the sake of appearances, because phers to the incompatibility of temperaments. This view it absolutely rules out the evaluation of-fhe method applied which obviously originated in Schopenhauer's doctrine, by how it reflects objective reality and the correspond- Iater led to the existentialist concept of philosophy as a ing objective truth. In this connection, Paul Ricoeur's defi- purely subjective vision of the real. nition of scientific objectivity is significant: "Here we must Needless to say, continuity in philosophy does not mean understand objectivity in its strictly epistemological sense: that each philosophy gives birth to a successor. But Gou- that which has been dveloped by methodical think- hicr proceeds from this elementary (at least for a Marx- ing, arranged in an orderly way, is understood and can be ist) fact to conclude, quite illogically, that the content understandable to others is objective. That is truc of phys- of different philosophies merely reproduces the creative ical and biological disciplines; that is also true of his- personality of their authors. IIe forgets that personal crea- tory." (92; 26) This reduction of the objectivity of a study tivity is not only a feature of philosophy or art but also

74 75 j of science and other spheres of human activity. That Ein- nal and therefore intersubjective signiffcance ascribed to stein created the theory of relativity was no accident. But philosophies? That question remains unanswered. that in itself did not affect the content of his theory to any Adherents of'the "philosophy of the history of philos- substantial degree, for it is a system of objective truths. ophy" rnake no scientific analysis of the poncept of sub- Naturally, Gouhier and other exponents of the sabjectiue jectivity. Neither do they differentiate between subjectivi- interpretation of philosophy cannot accept this because they ty and subjectivism. They completely ignore the fact that oppose philosophy to science and the history of philosophy subjectivity, as the actual difference of one human subject to the history of science. Gouhier flatly refuses to differen- from another, has an objective content. According to Lenin, tiate between the subjective and the objective, the person- "There is a difference between the subjective and the ob- aI and the social in different philosophies. That is why jective, BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS." (10;38, 98) he denies the obvious fact that Spinoza's materialistic pan- As to Gouhier, he bestows a sort of ontological status on theism develops ideas which took an entire historical era the subjectivity of tiie philosopher: subjectivity is the to shape. According to Gouhier, "Cartesianism, Malebran- source of the philosopher's personal universe. chism, Comtism and Bergsonism refer us to the thoughts According to Ricoeur, true subjectivity in an outstanding genius, of Ren6 Descartes, Nicolas de Malebranche, Auguste Comte philosopher makes his doctrine a free work of his and Henri Bergson." (59; 20) He thinks he is merely a work completely independent of other, also brilliant, phil- stating obvious facts that prove philosophy is a completely osophical works. The study of the history of philosophy is individual way of conceptual thinking. But such statements therefore called upon to provide a maximum "singulariza- deiiberately proceed from the groundless assumption thab tion" of each philosophy-that is, to establish its unique- prevent some Descartes, Malebranche, Comte and Bergson worked in a ness. That would it from being included in social vacuum, that their philosophies expressed no real specific trend of philosophical thought. According to that socio-historical needs, and that they did not assimilate the theory, the concepts of materialism, idealism, rationalism, historical experience or scientific achievements of their irrationalism, etc. are merely artiflcial categories obscur- time. But Bergson's doctrine of "creative evolution" was ing the uniqueness of each philosophy, and that uniqueness an irrational interpretation of Darwin's evolution theory makes it impossible to classify them. This approach makes and an attack on Einstein's theory of relativity. an absolute of the moments of interruption, relative inde- The subjectivist interpretation of the history of philos- pendence and uniqueness in the history of philosophy. But ophy is rooted in the subjectivist interpretation of the each of these moments is organically linked to its oppo- indepen- "philosophical reality" discussed above. Philosophies are site: discreteness necessarily implies continuity, said to be essentially not comparable, since each alleged- dence presupposes dependence, and uniqueness-succession. Iy studies its own world. According to Gouhier, "Differ- By making an absolute of the essentially irrationalist no- ences of opinion between philosophers are not accidental: tion about the total incompatibility of great philosophies, they are at the source of all philosophy. Different philos- Ricoeur even denies that many of them have to do with ophies exist because the philosophers' field of vision does the same problems. As he sees it, recognition of even a not cover one and the same world; the differences among relative unity of philosophical problems throughout the philosophers precede their philosophies: there is no agree- long history of philosophy is bound to lead to skepticism, ment in their thoughts because they do not proceed from a doctrine he rejects. "The history of philosophy is, frank- lesson skepticism if it is seen as a series the same data." (59 ; AZ) A closer examination will show Iy speaking, a of that according to the "philosophy of the history of philos- of various solutions to immutable problems called eternal ophy" philosophers themselves create the philosophical (freedom, reason, reality, soul, God, etc.)." (92;57) But reality used to substantiate the pluralistic concept of the apparently he does not understand that rejection of- con- history of philosophy; in other r,vords, that reality is a phil- tinuity in the history of philosophy also leads to skepti- osophical construction, IIow can one then explain the eter- cism: the latter maintains that philosophers can neither

77 70 y'/ learn from their predecessofs not teach their successors. lt is true that colrect posing of a probiem is very impor- Ricoeur himself is rather close to philosophical skepticism tant in philosophy. Everybody knows the importance ol (although he rejects it) precisely because he, like the skep- posing such problems as the unity of the world, substance, tics, essentially denies that philosophical problems can be sclf-motion of matter, criteria of the truth, and so on. To a inherited. considerable degree, philosophy's distinctive nature stems ' In the past, historians of philosophy usually said that from the fact that it advances new issues left unnoticed all philosophers had always posed and tried to solve the in the past and for whose solution the requisite scientific same "eternal" issues. The history of philosophy was llken- information is often lacking. It is therefore clear that the ed to a closed cycle of ideas and unsolvable problems. way philosophical problems are posed develops cognition. Unlike that traditional concept already exposed as falla- If the important thing here is no[ the answer, then at any cious by Hegel, the "philosophy of the history of philoso- rate it is the suggestior-r of possible ways of arriving at it. phy" denies that the philosophical problems treated by dif- But philosophy not only poses questions, it answers them ferent philosophies have anything in common. How to ex- too. It is a different matter that, as seen from the history plain this leap from one metaphysical extreme to the other, of philosophy, those answers were very often unscientific. from the typology of philosophical problems to their "sin- Stiil, that does not mean they should be underrated. If there gularization", or, as Italian existentialist Nicola Abbagna- is a grain of truth in an answer? that, too, is progress. no puts it, their "individualization"? The answer may be Philosophical problems differ radically from the specific is- gleaned from what we have just discussed. The "philoso- sues of any special science because their solution calls for i;hy of the history of philosophy" attacks the idea of a sci- different types of information supplied by science, practice entifrc philosophy, while its defense was a progressive fea- and historical experience, and therefore cannot be the re- ture of pre-Marxian philosophy. For the school in question sult of a specific experiment or demonstration based on lim- (and for most of loday's bourgeois philosophies) philosophy ited data and equally limited theoretical premises. and scientific approach are incompatible. Hence the strug- The "philosophy of the history of philosophy" does not gle against "scientism" in which there surfaces a most con- merely deny the possibility and necessity of a scientific tradictory combination of criticism of some negative con- philosophy. It extolls the unscientific approach (that of sequences of one-sided scientific speciaiization and rejec- idealism, of course) as the highest form of theoretical in- tion of the significance of science as a world outlook in gen- sight into the nature of things. This cult of the deliber- eral. Therefore, the opposition of today's bourgeois philos- ately unscientific, presented as an authentic expression of ophy to Marxism is expressed in a rejection of the con- theoretical reason, is an idealist attempt to debase science, cept of scientific philosophy, scientific world outlook-just the highest form of theoretical cognition. as the bourgeois refusal [o accept the inevitability of so- Gu6roult charges Kant with having tried to assess the cialism is expressed in a negativist rejection of historical value of metaphysics (philosophy) by its capacity for be- necessity in general. coming a science. Gu6roult is convinced that despite their Ricoeur goes beyond the mere rejection of historical con- unscientific nature, all metaphysical systems possess ever- tinuity in philosophical problems. He attacks any solution lasting value. He preaches the following: that which im- of these problems, claiming that this is not the function of parts everlasting intellectual value to a philosophy does philosoptiy: philosophy only poses questions, it should not not depend on its correct judgments but on the "fullness inswer- them. Therefore, the uniqueness, the genius of a of being" individually expressed in it. philosopher cannot be in essence expressed in answering According to Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the founders of ihe questions posed by his predecessors' His genius_ is in the German "philosophy of life", the history of philosophy the fact that he poses problems in a new way, and the an- expresses the substantiality and irrationality of human life. swers come from less significant and essentially nonphilo- Its impulsive, sensitive and spontaneous nature is in- sophical individuals. compatible with the orderly succession and regularity typ-

78 79 ical of lifeless entities. Therefore, Dilthey holds, the his- by his personal likes, tastes and interests instead of scien- tory of philosophy can only be rrnderstood as anarchy of tific objectivity is very far from being a true researcher. philosophies; each philosophy intellectually reproduces the But the point here is scientific good faith which does not spirit of life inevitable in any given historical era and can- at all rule out partisanship in philosophy. A philosopher not be described 1 (or historian of philosophy) cannot be partisan or "non- as true or false: like life, it simply is. { Although the adherents of the "philosophy of the history partisan" by choice. Partisanship in science-and in phi- of philosophy" dispute Dilthey's "historicism" and typo- I losophy-is not a personal but a social position and nlust logy of world outlooks, they too try to substantiate a plu- naturally be free from any subjective preferences. ralistic concept of the history of philosophy, rejecting Biun- Partisanship in philosophy means, above all, a definite ner's "fiction of progress" and maintaining that the, notion and consistent philosophical position of principle. A con- of development cannot be applied to the history of philos- sistent differentiation and contrasting of major philosoph- ophy at all. ies is thus a necessary expression of partisanship in phi- Professing to support more profound analysis of the his- i losophy. Lenin describes it as a position of principle in- tory of philosophy and thereby single out the distinctive compatible with eclecticism and stresses that "this refus- quality of philosophy as a form of cognition and of man- aI to recognize the hybrid projects for reconciling mate- kind's spiritual life, Gu6roult and his followers question the rialism and idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, significance of philosophy and reject the ideal of scientific- who moved lorward along a sharply-deflned philosophical philosophical knowledge, an ideal it took the entire history road." ('/.,0; 14,, 337-38) Obviously, such partisanship con- of philosophy to shape. But the "philosophy of the his- forms to, and even essentially coincides with, the require- tory of philosophy" is seen as a perfect science rising above ments of scientific objectivity. the biased approach of the authors of philosophies who Exponents of the "philosophy of the history of philos- are incapable of objectively evaluating all other philoso- ophy" rightly stress that a historian of philosophy must be phies. According to Brunner, "the object of a historical study a historian in the strictly soientific sense of the term. .But must remain an object, and that quality is guaranteed a historian of philosophy is inevitably a philosopher. Then by the impartiality of the historian. The strictnbss of the how is one to interpret the fundamental precept of the method demands that philosophies be examined as exter- "philosophy of the history of philosophy" that the histori- ngl things quietly viewed by-the historian." (40;184-55) an of philosophy is outside past and present philosophies? Thus the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" has a The historian of philosophy is supposed to place himself unique place in the history of philosophy. It is allegedly a above all philosophies no matter how meaningful they nonpartisan, disinterested judge. According to Brunner, a may be. But he is a historian of philosophy precisely be- historian of philosophy must neither support nor oppose cause he is not outside philosophy. Admitting this obvious tlre system of views he studies. A liking for a particular truth, adherents of the "philosophy of the history of philos- philosophy makes a historian of philosophy disregard the ophy" talk about the inevitable antinomy of the history of difficulties that philosophy is unable to overcome and de- philosophy, and in the final analysis plunge into total con- prives him of the critical approach to the subject, so im- fusion. portant in a scholar. Viewed from that standpoint, adher- Attempting to iron matters out, the "philosophy of the ence to a particular doctrine means an uncritical approach history of philosophy" says that rejection of any adherence to that doctrine and a biased attitude to all others. to philosophies that are being studied does not rule out a In this connection Brunner quotes Edmond Sch6rer, a mid- philosophical position for the historian of philosophy. He 19th century historian of philosophy who said: "To under- is less a philosopher than a metaphilosopher. His philosoph- stand a philosophy we must be alien to it and able, as it ical position is the "philosophy of the history of philos- philosophy, philosoph- were, to regard it from the outside." (40 ; 185) ophy", or the philosophy- of or the Nobody questions the fact that a scholar who is guided ical theory of the history of philosophy.

80 6 -0 t662 8l

,,J thus a mitical analysis of the "phiiosophy oi the his- TEE DIALECTICAL-MATERIALIST VIEW :tory of philosophy" points to the coriclusion that it is an OF THE PHIITOSOPHICAI, SYSTEM idealist interpretation of the history of philosophy. The uiuch-vaunted nonpartisanship is, not surprisingly, re- vealed as pseudo-nonpartisanship-in other words, disguised Maraism is the system of bourgeois partisanship. And that partisanship is indeed in- Marx's views and teachings. compatible with scientific objectivity. We have seen that the "philosophy of the history of philosophy" has a defi- V. I. Lentn nite ideological function. The pluralistic. interpretation of the history of philosophy is also an attempt at substanti- I- have noted scientific-philosophical ating pluralism in social development in general. That ideo- _already - that the world outlook Marxism philosophy . logical conclusion, contrasted to the doctrine about the inev- of negates in the old, traditional sense of itable transition from capitalism to socialism, is more than the term; that 1s, it negates any , at: tempt at a just implicitly present in the "philosophy of the history of _creating complete system of philosophioal knowl" edge-, exhaus-tively covering subject philosophy". Martial Gu6roult spoke of it at the 1'4th j its and- independent * of all the subsequent development of cognition and social World Congress of Philosophy in {968. I life.- is a_ specific, dialectical-materialisi For all its suprahistorical claims, the contemporary bour- It negation typical t::". of the rovolution geois the history philosophy" is a his- in philosophy Marx and Engels br-ought "philosophy of of about by creating torically definite subjectivist expression of the current state dialectical and historical materialisml a of philosoplay fundamentally different from all phi- affairs idealist philosophy gravitating irration- I lUstem of in to losophies of the past. alism. Justification of the anarchy of philosophies is a sa- I In his c-ritique of bourgeois and revisionist attempts at lient feature of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. Not - playing off one precept or component part of Marxism surprisingly, exponents of the school in question consider l against another, Lenin pluralism philosophy and the existence of any always stressed that Marxism was a both the of single, integral sclentific number of "philosophies of the history of philosophy" ful- system. This very important point ly I is also true of Marxist philosophy, but neitlier its f,our- iustified. geois critics nor even some (although admittedly inconsis- The crisis of bourgeois philosophy, the ideological con- l tent) Marxists understand it. Suffice it to recall ihat in the passion for the truth that had "j fusion, the absence of the early 20th century imbuetl the great philosophies of the past, the pseudode- the Marxist attitude to philosophy was ' still interpreted mocratic protest against "standardization" of philosophy as clearly negative. For example, Kail Ka- phi- utsky said: "By that [fVlarxism] I understand not a philos- ascribed to dialectical materialism, the opposition of ophy knowledge, the irrationalist concept of but an empirical science, a distinct view of-socie- losophy to scientific ty.'l (74; 2, 452)* That peculiar a distinct everlasting value of philosophies that is inde- "understanding" of the that philosophical fundamentals of Marxism is importint to re- pendent of their correctness or soientifio worth-all member illustrates the degeneration of bourgeois philosophy. Al' because today it has been revived by the theorists though the "philosophy of the history"of philosophy" raises * philosophy Kautsky's rejectiou of the fact that Marxist -nothiuL -apainstexists important and topical issues, its approach and answers only is an empirical "statement". Therefore he has disguise the crisis of bourgeois philosophy, extolled as a "linkiug" Marxism to bourgeois philosophies. He himseli tries to i.ntgrpret the_materialist view of in the spirit positivism. norhal state of affairs fully consistent with the very na- !-istory of ,ilinked" philosophical knowledge. Asked by a Social Democrat whether Marxism could be to ture of illachism, Kautsky replied: "This doctrine is, of course. incompatible with idealist philosophy, but not with Mach's theorv'of oosdition." ot Q4; 2, 452). This proves that Kautsky overlooked the obvi-ous fact 'F His report is critically -analyz-ed--in.-the articlo "Postulates the Irrationalist History of Philosophy". (3t) that Mach was an irlealist.

82 83 l of the Franklurt Sohool of Social Studies who claim to of- all its ovious and many-sideil nature, is a meaningless state- fer an autherttic interpretation (or, in their own word, "re- ment if it does not demonstrate any substantial identity. construdtion") of Marx's doctrine. For example, Herbert This does not mean that the term "opposition" is alien to Marcuse,, a nian of considerable stature in the eyes of to- dialectical materialism. On the contrary, the point is to un. day's petty-bourgeois intellectuals, echoes Kautsky i1 as- derstand it dialectically and reject its antidialectical inter- seiting thit Marxism "is an economic, nqt a philosophical pretation which is usually totally negative. Essentially; systeil". (82; 103) And here is what Marcuse thinks of that is a specific expression of the more general fundamen- tle works'Marx .*rote while only beginning to elaborate tal distinction between specifi,c and abstract negation. his doctrine-a time when the philosophical aspects of Opposition of the philosophical to the nonphilosophical Marxism were of paramount importance: "Even Marx's in pre-Marxian philosophy was to a certain degree justified early writings are not philosophical. They expresp the 19- by historical considerations, although it was exaggerated gation of philosophy, th-ough they still do so in philosophi- out of all proportion. But it was already an anachronism language." (83; 258) cal 'of 'Mariism in the 19th century. On the one hand, philosophy realized Some" crltics (for example, Jean Hyppolite that it could no longer be a passive observer of social up- and Jean-Yves Calvez) interpret it as only philosophjcal, heavals. On the othei, the great scientific discoveries proved ' ignoring Marxist political eoonomy and scientific socialism ad, oculus that nonphilosophical studies are of great ai tloct-rines essentially different from philosophy. Others importance for philosophy. Philosophical reason began to refuse to accept that Marxist philosophy- exists, citin-g thc realize that it did not rise above the unreasonable empiri. fact that Mariism reiects traditional philosophies and phi' cal reality as pure, sovereign and self-assessing thought. Iosophy in general in the old sense of the term. But the The illusion of philosophy's independence of everything opponents-critique of Marxism ignore the dialectics of that neg-ation. nonphilosophical was shattered. "Philosophers," Marx wrote - d of that aniiscientific interpretation of Marx- in his early works, "do not spring up like mushrooms out of ism and the need to grasp the Marxist approach to ,past the ground; they are products of their time, of their nation, philosophy raise the following queslion,q: what is the Marx- whose most subtle, valuable and invisible juices flow in the ,ist negati-on of traditional philosophies? What is the Marx- ideas of philosophy. The same spirit that constructs railways ist view of philosophy as a sYstem? with the hands of workers, constructs philosophical systems The Mariist negation of traditional philosophies rejects in the brains of philosophers." (1; 1,795) the fact that they all oppose philosophy to nonphilosop]ni- Opposing the philosophical disdain of nonphilosophical cal (and especiaily pracfical) activity anq nonphilosophi- reality, Marxism reveals the historical prospects of philos- oversimplificatio!, must cal siudy. To avoid the error of ^we ophy's creative development through its union with non- remember that this opposition, typical, first and foremost, philosophical theory and the practical political struggle criticized of rationalist philosophies and to-a -certain 4"gT.9 against everything philosophy condemned only speculative- by pre-Marxian materialists and by empiricists, -records ly, if at all. As Marx said, "Hitherto philosophers have oivious differences between the philosophical and the non- had the solution of all riddles lying in their writing-desks, but au- philosophical. Admittedly, those are substantial, - and the stupid, exoteric world had only to open its mouth ihors oi philosophical systems made an absolute of them for the roast pigeons of absolute knowledge to fly into it." and ruled out tfie moment of identity inherent in specific (l; 3, 1,42) Marx condemns the speculative attitude to man- difference. But distinction and identity form a dialectical kind's real problems on the part of a self-sufficient and cor- unity, and they are both important as aspects -of that self-satisfied philosophy. He rejects utopian reflections on relaiion. To cite the example quoted in Engels' letter- to the future of mankind and uses his criticism of capitalist Conrad Schmidt, the subsiantiality of the difference be- reality to search for a way to the future based on laws tween man and woman implies their substantial identity' and history. Marx does not regard his criticism of reality But the difference between in apple tree and the moon, for as a force independent of reality. On the contrary, he con' t34 05 uects that cridicism with the already emerging liberaiion was usually never questioned. This erplains'why philoso- struggle of tho proletariat in bourgeois sooiety. Defining phers readily likened philosophical knowledge in general . part appeared already complete. the scientific sigllriflcance of that partisoz position, Marx fo that of it which - says: "In that case we do not confront the world in a doc- Th:us'philosophical systerns directly expressed tle oppo- trinaire way with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel sition of philosophy to nonphilosophical q!ud& _Descartes ' , down before it! We develop new principles for the world tried to deduce the entire system of. possible philosophical . -'. outou! of the world's own principles." (L;(t; S,3,i44) 144) knowleilge from cogito. Spinoza built his system rnore geo- t ., . Those theses of Marx make it easier to fully grasp his metrico. Kant was right in showing that cogito was not a last thesis on Feuerbach: philosophers only.tried to explain fundamental without premises because it implicitly presup- the world in various ways whereas the task is to change posed "an awareness of the existence of other things out- it. To counter the many non-Marxist interpretations of that side myself". (73; 3, 201) Kant contrasted Spinoza's axio- thesis one should stress the following: Marx does not at all matic method to the thesis he himself proved: axioms.and reject the need for a philosophical eiplanation of the world. definitions in the mathematical sense of the term are im- He is against reilucing the mission of philosophy to the in- possible in philosophy. But he still tried to buil4 a lYstem terpretation of that which exists because such self-restric- bf pure reason as a system of complete and absolute knowl- tion opposes philosophy to the struggle for a radical trans- edge. Sharing the illusions of his ptedecessors, he wr-ote formation of reality. Thus the true meaning of this the- about his philosophy: "This system is unalterable, and I t sis is a categorical imperative: to make philosophy a theo- hope it wili remain so forever." (73; 3, 29) He expected-to . retical substantiation of the need for the revolutionary frand his system over to posterity "as capital not to be in- ,, transformation of the world. creased further." (73; 3,22) Once again, the second major aspect of the Marxist ne- Fichte rejected Kant's dualism and returned to cogito. gation of traditional philosophies is rejection of the oppo- But he saw the latter not simply as an axiom but as actiu- . sition of philosophy to nonphilosophical study of reality. ify through which the Ego regarded itself and the non- It is clear from the history of science that such study is E[o, the ob5ect of its activity. Therefore Fichte viewed the never completed, its results reflect reality only approximate- deductions bt ttre system's major categories also as crea- ly. Still, pre-Marxian philosophy believed its mission was tive activity by the absolute Ego, as its self-developmelt. to create a system of. final knowledge independent of the Like Kant, Fichte believed his system to exhaust the subsequent development of cognition. It is perfectly obvi- subject of philosophical study-in other words, he tho-ught ous that philosophy borrowed that ideal of absolute knowl- his system- was the system of all possible philosophical edge, usually opposed to natural science and history, from, truthi. Schelling labored under the same illusion-:-but with . paradoxically enough, soience itself--meaning, of course, regard to his own system, of course. Accor-ding to Schel- not science in general but its historically definite form. For ling, absolute autonomy is an attributive characteristic of over 1,500 years both philosophers and nonphilosophical the-true philosophical system which "answers for itself and scientists regarded Euclid's geometry as a totally complete conforms within itself". (95; 25) attempt at building a system of '- system of axioms absolutely independent of experience Hegel made a brilliant and requiring no further development. Nobody ever stop- dialectical idealism on the basis of a d'ialectieal concept ol - ped to think that geometrical axioms reflected actual rela- deuelopmenf. He was right in stressing that it was precise- tionships only approximately. Nobody dared even assume ly sysiems that had proven transient eleqenls in p-ast phi- that a different geometry might exist. One should, of course, losophies, because systems h-ad been built by- making an . remember that the level of cognition achieved was absolute of principles true only within certain bounds, out- made an absolute also in formal logic which was believed sirle which ihey ire subject to dialectical negation. Accord- to have essentially exhausted its subject. But formal logic ing to Hegel, ptritosophy is the self-consciousness of a de- rvas a part of philosophy-the part which, unlike others, lin-ite histdricai era wtrictr is a necessary step in the'se1f-

EO 97 i ' I': , ' ' developmenf of the "absolute spirit". Viewed from this an- metaphysical system; this contradiction entails a restricted gle, the transition to a new historical era also means the retrospective interpretation of the development of philos- emergence of a new philosophy. But the philosophy of past ophy. For, according to Hegel, philosophy is the self-con- eras is not simply forgotten. Freed from their historical lim- sciousness of the divine absolute, and its temporal devel- itations, the principles of past philosophies retain their opment merely reflects thgt which is always within it. The signilcance for the entire subsequent development of phi- "absolute idea" comprehends itself through the intellectu- Iosophy. Therefore the negation of the preceding stage in aI activity of mankind in the course of world history, and philosophical development (we should remember, natural- tlevelopment ceases as a result. Thus the history of philos- ly, that Hegel refers mostly to the development of ideal. ophy, just as the philosophy of history, is a game the di- ism) is also the assimilation of what has been accom- vine being plays with humans, the game Hegel mischie- plished and movement toward a new and higher stage of vously calls the guile of world reason. philosophical cognition. Truth is a process; it is knowledge in Working on his system as an encVcloped,ia ol philosoph- development, progressing from one definition to another, ical sciences, Hegel inevitably comes to oppose natural more specific definition, thus forming the developing sys- philosophy to natural science, the philosophy of history to tem of categorial definitions. According to Hegel, "the true the science of history, the philosophy of law to law as a form in which truth exists can only be its scientific sys- science, etc. Hegel's speculative system is realized by making tem". (64; 2, 6) Hegel thus arrives at a new concept of an absolute of the achieved level of scientific knowl- philosophical system; he rejects characteristics which his edge, with its inevitable gaps. But philosophy refuses to predecessors accepted as constituents. accept blank spaces on the map of the universe, it fills them Hegel also tries to overcome the conviction that a philo- out by natural-philosophical or philosophical-historical spec. sophical system is deduced from an initial postulate. The ulation. system of categories in Hegel's The Science ol Logic is not Contrary to Hegel's expectations, his doctrine proves the simply a result of deduction; rather, deduction is regarded fallacy of any metaphysical system-building, that is, of any as a means of reproducing the objective process of devel- claims to a system of complete philosophical knowledge. opment, interpreted as the self-development of the substan- As Engels says, ",Sysfematics impossible after Hegel. The tial spirit which becomes the subject-substance. Therefore, world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent according to Hegel, the final result of a philosophical sys- whole, but the knowledge of this system presupposes a tem is its beginning which, however, has completed its knowledge of. all nature and history, which man will never development, deployment and realization. It follows that all attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill in the count- the previous philosophies must be regarded as moments of less gaps with figments ol his otDn imagination. . ." (8; the system of true philosophy taking shape in history. 400-01) In this case systematics is a metaphysical philo- "Thus philosophy," Hegel asserts, "is in development, and sophical system claiming exhaustive knowledge of the world so is the history of philosophy." (64; 13, 42) This under- as a whole. While rejecting these systems as utopian, En- standing of philosophy (and the history of philosophy) as gels also emphasizes that "the world clearly constitutes a a d,eueloping system. is Hegel's outstanding contribution to single system", thus revealing the real ontological content the development of philosophical knowledge. of the concept of a system in philosophy. Viewed from this' Nevertheless, Hegel does not break with the tradition he angle, the concept cannot be reduced to rationally group- so rightly criticizes, refusing to apply the concept of a de- ing, classifying and making a system of knowledge. The. veloping system to his own philosophy. Hegel justified this proposition that the world is a single integral whole, a sys- conflict with his own principles by asserting that his his- tem, is not merely a statement, it is rather a philosophical torical era is the final stage in the philosophical develop- generalization based on the cognition of qualitatively dif- ment of mankind. Hegel's idealism theoretically predeter- ferent fragments of the universe. This generalization is mined the contradiction between his dialectical method and justifled only if it does not cou-tradict new knowledge.

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i. ' l; The concept of the world as a system develops, changes law is recognized, phitosophy in the old, traditribnal sense. and accepts comections; that is why it contains no dogmat- of the word comes to an end. Hegel's system completes the ic precepts. In other words, to recognize the world as a philosophical development that preceded it, pointing-al- _- single system means to recognize the fact that cognition beit unconsciously-the way "out of the labyrinth of sys- of the world system will never be completed. This incom- tems to real positive knowledge of the world". (3; III,342) pleteness is both quantitative and qualitative because it Thus Engels contrasts the concept ol systematic cogni- also applies to separate fragments. That is exactly why not tion to the metaphysical concept ol the philosophical (and only in metaphysics and natural philosophy but also in scientific) system. The former does not merely group- the natural and social sciences it is impossible to present rationally, methodically (or even methodologically, episte- the (historically limited) knowledge achieved as a com- mologically)-the available knowledge, but cognizes the plete system of final truths. One must note that already in systems nature inherent in all objects of both natural sci- the 18th century the more advanced scientists contrasted entific and philosophical cognition. Naturally, systems cog- systematic experimental study to the absolute character of nition and building a system (not only in philosophy but their contemporary philosophical systems. For example, also in any specific science) are entirely different things. Jean Le Rond D'Alembert, a prominent ally of l8th-cen- But if the object of cognition is a qualitatively definite sys- tury French materialists, believed that a physicist must tem, the study is aimed at grasping that system. In that possess the "spirit of the system" (l'dsprit de systeme),, case the development of the system of knowledge is the but that he must not succumb to the temptation of build- progressive cognition of a certain system of phenomena. ing philosophical systems that ignore facts which do not This system of knowledge is synonymous with science in fit them and that lead to conclusions which do not follow the modern sense of the word. from a theoretical analysis of the facts. Lavoisier was ful- Hegel contrasts science to the gathering of information. Iy aware of the importance of the systematic method in nat- He sees the scientific quality, truth and the systems ap- ural science, and he himself was working on a system of proach as concepts of one category. "There can be noth- elements. Nevertheless he held that the "spirit of the sys- ing scientiflc about philosophizing withoat a system," he tem is dangerous for the physical sciences" because it says. (64; 6,22) Therefore, here his understanding of phi- obscures study, instead of throwing light on its objects. losophy as a science opposed to the traditional "passion for (54; 708) the truth" coincides with the concept of a dialectically un- Negation of any dogmatic absolute of some system of in- derstood philosophical system. The latter, once again, is a terrelated philosophical precepts does not place in question deueloping system of philosophical knowledge. the possibility or necessity of the systematic unity of phil- According to Hegel, the next major characteristic of a osophical knowledge. Philosophical systems are not born true philosophical system is the unity oJ its component of the claims of outstanding philosophers. They are the inev- principles. This unity is only possible inasmuch as it rules italle result of the process of cognition. Like any knowl- out the making of an absolute out of special, particu- edge in general, philosophical knowledge is limited by at lar principles and consequently opposing them to one an- least.the level of its own development. But this limitation other. Apparently, that is what he means by the following is removed by subsequent development which, of course, thesis: "A philosophy based on a limited' principle distinct is not free of limitations either. According to Engels, a phil- from others is falsely understood as a system.' in actual osophical system "springs from an imperishable desire of fact, the principle of true philosophy is that it comprises the human mind-the desire to overcome all contradic- all particular principles. (64; 6,22-23) Contrary to what its tions". (3; III, 342) Bfi resolving all contradictions is as critics believe, this thesis does not justify philosophical ec- impossible as expressing infinity in figures. Still, this con- lecticism. It refers to the dialectical negation of all par- sideration does not impose any limits on the systematic ticular principles from the standpoint of the universal prin- development of philosophical knowledge. As $oon as this ciple-in Hegel's view, the fundamental idealist precept of

9t' 9tr il' : i f/ i,l / ... rl ,-' I tual objects of study, i.- his monistic system. Working on an idealist system, He- -which are also systems. The con- l. cept of a system as- al integral complex determining its gel proyes that the incompatibility of various idealist doc- ^ trines stems from treating special, particular components and itself determined by fheir interaction*was idealist pre- first formulated cepts as absolutes. He tries to synthesize idealist doctrines by Marx in his study of the capitalisi sys_ production relations. in the belief that the dialectical negation of their special tq- gf The significance of the pie_ Marxian concepts of the system -quite principles turns them into compatible elements of the true was - limited fu"- philosophical system. ristic because they proceeded from the assumption"oa that there Hegel has summed up the history of idealist philosophy. existed, immutable elements (similar to Democritus' _ atoms). The But because of its idealist content, his system contradicis study of a system was-understood as an anal- ysis of all po,ssible combinations the dialectical coucept of development. The "absolute spir- - of immutable compo- nents. The whole was reduced it" demands that philosophical development be tutAUy to its component parts which coTpleted. Despite all dialectical reservations, prin- determined it. Changes in the position- of components- the that is, structural ciple of identity of being and thought reduces being to the changes-did irot impart aoy n'"w quali- ontologically interpreted thought and thus ty to them. rules out the The number epistemological principle of reflection. Knowledge appears of elements comprising each given system (or, mor_e- preoisely, as identical with being; the system of knowledge is inter- whole) was-also regarded- as imiruta- ble, established preted as a system of being that deploys itself and com- once and for all. The systdm itself was there, prehends its deflnitions. Hegel essentially fore considered balanced; the notion o! a systern in de- ignores the sab* velopment jectiue human character of cognition and consequently, the appeared incompatible with the concept of a contradictions between each system knowledge system. The question of_a system's origins was rais6d only of and its oc_casionally-for subject, the latter as a system independent cognition. example, by Kant (with reference to thb of solar The resolution of these contradictions and emergence system). the Marx of new ones are a very important aspect in the deuelop- studies the laws of the development of the capital- ment of cognition, ist system in a totally different way. He examinej tho and that fact also escapes Hegel. But structural the reflection of reality, the distortion of its image and the elements of bourgeois society as fundamentally overcoming (within limits, different from the economic elements oi the feudal system of course) of that distortion are production, important points in the dialectics of cognition, the dialectics of despite the fact that the market of truth and error. monet-ary _commercial capital, profits, interest rates,"coiomy, rent Lenin stresses that the image of reality which is being and the like existed under feudalism too. For example, cognized, distorted not judgments, speculative Marx describes commodity as an economic cell of the cap- is only in italist conclusions and theories. The distortion of the object of sytsem and not otherwise. study is rooted in the basic acts of cognition, in the very Mar-x specially studies the expanded reproduction of the ability to cognize which is also the ability to err-because capitalist system, the transformation of itJ components, the resultant qualitative there is, of course, no special ability to err. (10; 38, 260) new characteristics of the capitalist Overcoming that distorted reflection of reality and arriv- systrem, new trends and contradictions, the concentratiorr ing at an adequate reflection of the object is complex and centralization of capital-in other words, all the proc- a esses dialectical process. Hegel's system has no place for it, be- which determined, as proven later by Lenin, the evolution of system cause cognizing reason is idealistically interpreted as a the of free capitalist competition into substance that has become the subject, absolute the system of monopoly capitalism, and subseqirently state- the that monopoly possesses all possible knowledge. capitalism. A continuation of Marx,s economic studies, Lenin's theory of monopoly capitalism completes Since Hegel's philosophy rejects the epistemological prin- the ciple of reflection, it lacks a clear definition of the issue substantiation of the histoiical inevitability of the transition from system relating to the attitude of the systems of knowledge to ag- the of capitalist socializati-on to the

ge is matic natura philoiophy. .socialist sociat system. According to Lenin, . "soclalism oi fhat negation is ripical both monop- of irrationalism and of m-ost **r"ty the next step forward -from state-capitalist neopositfuists who iigard phi- words, socialism is merely state-capital- losophy not as thgorA but only as a method 4". Or. in other \ *Maruisrn foi ana\rz. isi monopoly which is made to serue the interests ol !?l ing_ statements. In Lenin's words, is the system ;L;{t- p;;i\", i,.a has to that extent ceased' to be capitalist of Marx's views and tea-chings." (10; ZI, b0) I repeal that both mooopoly.i' (lO; 25, 362)'socialist The. history of. the^tTt'$t':: Marxism as a whole and each of iis c6mponent parts and &evblopment of' the system has fully born-e is a system. The development of Marxism is a graphic il- oot tt rt hiiltiant conclusion. Its piedictive value is dif- lustration ol a d,eueloping system. ficult to overestimate. Thus the Marxist _negation of traditional philosophical --ffit Marxist-Leninist economic analysis of capitalism is systems and philosophy in general in the old iense of tfre ,"-"*up-t. of the systems approach- which.specifies, deep- word substantiates a philosophical system of a new type. .os ,r'd substantiates the dialectical-materialist' theory ol Marx and Engels created a dialectical-materialisf philosoph- precisely wh.at distinguishes it from ical system. As the Soviet philosopher - d,iietopment. That is ,,infinitelyF. V. llorri"iti_ the svstems concepts which dominate today's bourgeot's nov rightly observes, their doctrine-is far from- .. r"rrJ6gv and usually negate the principle of developP:I' those philosophical and sociological systems which were r:! "concept The of system has now acq-uired stg- byi-lt ag sys-tems of-final and ultimate tiuths, that is, which l:, ' -universll ! ::, nificance. Tlie systems approach is effectively applied .to claimed to have definitively solved all issues, whether there ,| etc- were-.enough tirgrritti.., biology, Path-ematics,.^-mineralogy, logic, faots for-that or not". (26; 4b) The under, substantially different systems r.nakes standing of a philosophical system system both Th6 multitude oi ^rr ai a of increasingly difflcult to offer a single comprehensive detr- qualitatively and quantitatively immutable caiegories found nition oflhe concept of system. Apparently, here we qu;t its consummation in Kant's table of categorfes. FIe in- also follow Marx's instructions and regard a speciii.g detr- terpreted the latter as eternal and immutable structural nition (in this case, of q system)-as a.unity or $'I:l:,11 forms of-thinking. That divorced them from the develop- more oi less abstract definitions. Thus the very dehnrtron ment of^knowledge and thus turned them into purely suf,- proceed jective of the system becomes a system too' We must - forms of knowledge with no objectiie c6ntent. i*r" tni", methodological position in discussing the issue Kant's a priori approach was an inevitable logical conclu- of philosophical sYstems as well' sion from that antidialictical, formalistic unde-rstanding of t.. Ii the concept of system has universal significance, it categories. But the categories of logic to which he re--fer- to aII philosophies'- T.hey are all sys- red-just as philosophical and general scientific catego- i.:, rn"tt f. applicable tems, irresi-ective of the intentions of their authors or the ries-are- mea_ningtul forms of knowledge: they comprlse *uit tft.V'are set forth. Viewed from this angle, Kierke- certain knowleilge about reality which historically devel- g#ra'., Nietzsche's or Gabriel Marcel's rejection pliP: ops, becomes more comprehensive and reflects objective only- as a subjective "l of the reality more adequately. Suffice Jophicai systems appears'n'ot 3Pp99t it to point to the develop- issue which must bo confused with the objective, sys- ment of the- c_ategory of causality which has clearly shown iiatic content of their doctrines, no matter how they were its-meaningful character. Naturally, meaningful philosoph_ et9.). ical categories set forth (as aphorisms, diary 91tr!eg, . r -,-,--! are concepts that are ne'ither' artifidial Marxist-;;i;priv.i"ur philbsophy was q-olded in the struggle- against nor academic distinctions. inspired" by Hegel's th; iyite4-buildile which is 11,' - The Science ol Logic justly raises the question ideal of absolute knowledge, alieq to the theory oI d-evel- about a system of developing categories. But his panlog- of, ;fi;"i. Engels' Anti-Diihiing is a graphic example th,9 ism oversimplifies and distorts the development of catego- IViarxist st*iggle against that metaphysical tradition which ries,-div-orcing thi! process from the entiie nonphilosop*hi- ao*l"atea pi&ioot- philosophy. Buf later Marxism also op- cal development. objective truths recorded in philosooh'ical pot.a tn. intidialec'tical, wholesale negation of the syste- categories are obtained by the study of the eniire diversity

94 ,. '! of facts and not by the immanept self-development of un- by particular sciences and united by philosophy. Thls aiJr"airg. Philoiophical categories are historical stages means that philosophy strives to grasp the unity of quali- i" it dev"elopmont 6f cognitionr they up in their own deflnite fragments those system realities (nature, -sum par- tatively of *rn "if,t hist'ory of cognition. Like the categories of society, man, cognition, etc.) which, divided, are studied mechan- ti;;Ia; sciences-(for eximple, the notion of mass in by individual sciences. ics or of element in chemistry), philosophical categories AII those reflections about the dialectical-materialist un- approximately reflect objective. reality' derstanding of philosophy as a system can be illustrated -"i+;;a;as" t7th-cen- right in criticizins- the .authors of by an example borrowed from Engels. In his Dialectics ol t"ry-iletrpfrysic"at systems for- aibitrarily ascribing to .being Nature he summed up the discussion of the infinite and it. i""arri'"rtrl, ootologioal definitions. H'egel argur^ecl..that its cognition and wrote: "The infinite is just as much know- iiiorc a"n"itioni must be logically deduced as definitions able as unknowable." (9; 235) Does that mean that phi- ap- oT-i*-u"""tly developing being. Despite its dialectical losophy is fated to remain halfway on the road to the orou"t. tfrut position iaitZa to Iead liegel to the hist-orical truth? Exponents of Nicolai Hartmann's "new ontology" ;;d.;;ilAi"g ot the ontological. But e-pistemological his- other bourgeois philosophers say yes. But the any and many toricism is necessary for a correct understanding of meaning of that quotation from Engels is totally different. il;;lAgt (including the knowledge of the ontologic-al First, it refers to the inexhaustibility of the infinite: ever- -as - to the a"n"itioi. oi beins) comprising a dual attitude: ything that remains unknown in it is also infinite. Sec- of .osnition"and to the preceding level of cognition' ond, Engels sees the cognition of both the finite and the "ti.tfIn" other wdrds, cognition of an object both expresses a infinite as an essentially single process. According to him, deflnite level in thJ development of cognition and- is, to a "AlI real, exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising certain-cog"irJa degree, determined by the latter. That which cannot the individual thing in thought from individuality into par- l. ui or" level of cogrition becomes cognizable ticularity and from this into universality, in seeking and fiff"rtnt historical stage. fhat is why all ontolog-ical establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the "iaut"itio". " of objective reality should also be seen as lim- transitory." (9; 234) t6-d by int t"u:ut of knowiedge attained, therefor-e- The unity between the cognition of the particular, tran- lld philosopny subiect to change, correction, etc. Thus Marxist sitory, and finite and that of the universal, eternal, and epistemologicallj' interprets ont-ology .and any knorvledge infinite can be found both in each particular science and ai aU, thui preventing it from becoming dogma and stim- in philosophy, since the latter is the most common form ulating--nit,?itf its further development-. of the theoretical integration of knowledge, a specific sum- pnitosoptrv rejects both epistelrological skepti- ming-up of the history of cognition. That determines the .ir-'u"a tfre illuslion thit, unlike paiticular sciences,-phi' historical boundaries of the scientiflc-philosophical system ioronhv offers more authentic knowledge of reality' Since of knowledge. Since those boundaries are cognized and scienti-fic philosophy proceeds from scientific data, i! 9b- overcome by generalizing new scientific data and new his- ;o-ri-1y-""""of to possess soTe special knowledge torical experience, philosophy develops and rises to a new, ifi"t-a"it.r. radically"i"irn- froni scientific knowledge. It follows higher level of knowledge. Smug complacency is alien to iliai scientific philosophy, iike science- in general, is a study, that forward movement; philosophy is forever on the go. u"a its resulls refleci reality only approximately' Of Thus Marxist philosophy rejects any claim of absolute course, one must remember that a philosophical. study knowledge, but it differentiates between the latter and ab- deals with those forms of universality, integrity and.uTtitl' solute truths-spe cifi,c knowledge which can deal not only which particular sciences divide into parts, into ltmtteo with the unique and particular but also with the universal' those forms become more accessrble fieltls oi study."But Thus The specific is the unity of different definitions. Absolute m .og"itio". the universalities, integrities and gnitjel l,mth is speciflc truth, or unity of relative truths. Accord- ;i"di;t bt philosophy are not abstract b.ot con*ete, divided ing to Lenin, "Each step in the development of science

96 7 -0 1562 h!,'. \ ;' arids new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the omerge in the borderline areas separating philosopfiy from timits of the truth of each scientific propositlon are rela- particular sciences. Scientific philosophy becomes social tive, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of consciousness not only in content but also in the way it knowledge." (10; 14, 135) functions. Could it be that the future holds an even greater Relative truth is objective;'therefore, to a certain degree recognition of philosophy as a science, as a developing sys- (to be determined) it is also absolute truth. That explains tem of knowledge about science and the view of the world? why, for all its irievitable errors, the history of cognition is ilso the cognition of the absolute. But, according to -En- gels, "The infinity of the thought whictr- knows the abso- fute is composed of an inflnite number of finite human minds, worklng side by side and successively at this infr,nite knowledge, committing practical and theoretical blunders' setting out from erroneous, one-sided, and false premises, pursuing false, tortuous, and uncertain paths, and otten not even finding what is right when they run their noses against it." (9; 234) Stilt, despite the relative, contradic- tory and incomplete nature of any knowledge, cognition -of ths absolute is an actual process. To quote Engels again, llAll true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eter- nal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute-"- (g; ??a\ In developing philosophy as a scientiflc-philosophical system of seeing the world, Marxism admits the qualita- tive change in the place that philosophy occupies in the sys- tem of philosophical knowledge. In this connection bour- geois philosoph-ers bemoan philosophy's fate, clar,ming- that its rol-e is coinstantly declining. But it is only the role of idealist philosophy that is being eroded. The part lVlarx- ist-Leninist philosophy plays in the system of developing soientific kn6wledge is growing, and it increasingly relies on joint research by philosophers who share the same views. The forms of scientific cooperation in philosophy are essentially similar to those of research in modern science. Such a philosophy is at open system-open, naturally, to real and not alleged philosophical accomplishments. Philosophical generalizations of the world outlook and methotloldgy stimulate integration of scientiflc knowledge in today's democratic commonwealth of the sciences. Phi- losophy assimilates the achievements of the natural and sociil'sciences. Particular sciences assimilate the results of philosophical development.-of Philosophical problems arise in ilmost- every field fundamental scientiflc research. Essentially new problems concerning both special scientific issues and those of philosophy, and the view of the world

98 PHILOSOPHY AND EVERYDAY consciousness of individuals. According to Engels, thought milliards CONSCIOUSNESS cxists "only, as the individual thought of many of past, present and future men". (B; 105) The same is true of everyday consciousness too: that form of social consciousness does not directly depend on the purposeful and planned cognitive activity of men. The shaping of ever- yday consciousness (and of everyday experience, its ba- sis) is mostly a spontaneous process, and its necessary ele- ments include involuntary memory. A large part of every- day experience is acquired unnoticed, simply because a The traditional, age-old concept of philosophy is directly man lives, comes in centact with other individuals, reacts associated with the opposition of philosophical reflection to to his environment, to developments in his personal life "unthinking", everyday consciousness. The latter is de- and society, without realizing what has left an imprint on scribed as something possessed by all, including ignorant his consciousness and become part of his personal experi- people. No doubt, a critical attitude to everyday conscious- ence. ness and its basis, everyday experience, is both necessary Everyday consciousness is a multi-layered, complex and and justifled. But the history of philosophy shows that tra- contradictory entity composed of a multitude of percep- ditional philosophical criticism of everyday consciousness tions, emotions and concepts that are generated and contin- (and eveiyday experience) usually fails to understand the uously reproduced by the relatively constant and familiar necessary organic connec[ion of philosophy (and science) conditions surrounding individuals. The diversity, histori- to these phenomena of everyday social developments. The cal transformation and development of those conditions are correlation "philosophy-everyday experience" can only be echoed in the historically developing diversity of everyday correctly understood as a unity of opposites comprising experience and everyday consciousness, its concomitant, not only opposition but also the moment of identity._ thiough which this experience is perceived, interpreted and The sentence repeatedly passed by speculative idealist applied in knowledge and practical activity. We encounter philosophy on the materialist understanding of the world concepts of everyday consciousness everywhere. They are, was usually the following: materialism is not philosophy first and foremost, empirical notions consisting partly of but everyday consciousness which, Iacking intellectual cul- relative truths and partly of illusions and errors: water ture, uncritically approaches its own premises and does not boils at 100" C; gold does not rust; the sun rises in the even suspect the need for a critical analysis of sense im- morning and sets in the evening; money in a savings bank pressions and of its own confidence in their correctness. pays interest. Proverbs are classic expressions of everyday' Since everyday consciousness is not a speculative myth consciousness, polished to perfection by the ages; they are but something actually existing, we should examine the the quintessence of popular wisdom ("life is not a bed of true attitude of materialism and idealism to that form of roses"), the class instinct of the oppressed and exploited reflection of the objective world. Everyday consciousness ("satiety can't feel for"), popular fears and hopes. can be studied by sociology, history, social pshychology, In his economic and historical studies Marx has shown ethnography and other sciences. But here we shall deal that unscientific political economy records and theoreti- with the epistemological and historical-philosophical as- cally substantiates everyday concepts of the bourgeoisie: pects of the issue. Iand produces rent; capital, profit; and labor, merely wages. Historical materialism differentiates between social and Marx has exposed the unscientific essence of those individual consciousness. Individual consciousness, is, of concepts, elevated by crude political economy to the status course, also social. But unlike art, morals, religion and of theoretical dogma, and proved that only live labor pro- other forms of social consciousness, it is the immediate duces value, surplus value and its modiflcations. At the

{00 101 -: ..1- .-.1... ._'i. -' i

same time, he has also explained that the false formula of Aside from its empirical and ideological conterit, anoth- unscientific political economists reflects a certain type of er Drominent feature of everyday consciousness is its re- reality, since the owner of capital does make profit, the ligiius aspect, especially important in- antagonistic-society' " landowner does receive rent, and the working man is paid Untit

r02 103 every philosopher "goes farther than coinmon sense because hensible to everyday consciousness because it persists in w!at is usually called contnlon sense is not philos- .and -latter. recognizing.only that which can be verified by the senses. ophy, is often much less sound than the That is why the concepts and norms of common sense, Common sense comprises the way of thinking, maxims which reflect certain aspects of reality more or less ade- and_prejudices of its time ... and it is absolutely unaware quately, cannot guide a scientific stuily: the latter's field of the intellectual definitions guiding of its time "oni1.,, (64; is immeasurably greater and more significant than that 14, 36) Lenin qu_otes this remark in his notes Hegel,s with which everyday consciousness deals and which.inevi- Lectwres oru the History Philosophy *common ol and, follows it ivith tably limits its competence. A conflict between scientific , sense:the prejudices of its-time,'. (10; SB, Z7Z) concepts and common sense does not refute the former: This formula should be interpreted rathe'r as a'summary only science and practice can refute or confirm them. of Hegel's thesis and recognition of its relative correctness Hence this quotatior.r from Engels: "Sound common than as Lenin's own evaluation of common sense. It is sense, respectable fellow that he is in the homely realm clear from numerous remarks made by Lenin that he res- of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures di- olutely rejected one-sided evaluations of everyday con- rectly he ventures out into the wide world of research." sciousness. For example, while noting that "common (B: 31) sensel'regards the latest discoveries in p[ysics as outland- We all remember how common sense argued against ish (70; 14, 261), Lenin condemns Hegel's attempts at the heliocentric system, non-Euclidian geometry and tho removing the rational content from notions based on theory of relativity. But it was not only everyday con- eve-ryday experience which not only gives rise to but also sciousness but also the conservative contemporaries of Co- daily checks, corrects and confirms those notions. When pernicus, Lobachevsky and Einstein in the academic Hegel declares that Epicurus' recognition of the correct- world who persisted in their refusal to recognize Earth's ness of "perceived being" "does not at all rise above the revolutions around the Sun or the seemingly paradoxical viewpoint of everyday common sense", Lenin says that theories of Lobachevsky and Einstein. Conservative scien- critical remark distorts the essence of materialism: "Dis- tists did not rise above everyday common sense, maintain- agreement with 'common sense' is the foul quirk of an ing that "it is impossible because it cannot be". idej{ist." (10; 38, 291) But in contrasting everyday and scientific consciousness The need to distinguish between scientific, philosophical we should not ignore the diversity of everyday conscious- and everyday concepts was already recognized in ancient ness which accumulates not only familiar notions within Greece: Democritus demanded that a disiinction be made the environment immediately surrrounding men but also between that which is true and that which exists only in their versatile experience, especially that gained in produc- opinion. Francis Bacon's doctrine of idols also contains tion activities. That experience serves as a basis for scien- criticism of everyday consciousness and, which is equally tific conclusions too. For example, according to Professor important, everyday language. However, his criticisrrr does I(olmogorov, a noted Soviet scientist, Euclid's geometrical _not negate the cognitive value of everyday consciousness axioms reflect facts deduced from everyday experience: b-ut tries to purify it, correct its concepts, take account of "In the flnal analysis, confidence in the correctness of the truth it contains, and go further. In creatively devel- axioms is always of experimental origin. If the experience oping,the materialist tradition, diale.ctical materialism has underlying this confidence is a case of pre-scientific ex- proved that the contradiction between theoretical knowl- perience shared by all mankind and turned into a sponta- edge and direct sensory data does not in the least under- neous conviction that does not cite any specific observation mine the significance of the latter. Consequently, it does as proof, then we are dealing with an ohvious truth. The not refute the sensationalist thesis about the sensory ori- axioms of elementary geometry are a case in point." gins of abstract ideas. Usually, this dialectical contradic- (25; 394) Euclid himself described axioms as everyday tion between the rational and the sensuous is incompre- notions.

104 105 l Man had leained to raise crops, build houses and smelt There is no absolute opposition between everyday and not metals long before science began to study these prodrlction everyday (scientific, philosophical) coisciousness.. Every- processes. Agronomy, construction engineering and metal- day consciousness does not exist in isolation, and today it lurgy all paid due account to everyday production expe- is not so commonplace as it was 100 years ago. It evolves, rience, that is, to the everyday notions which guided man I:ut it does not disappear. To a certain degree, it becomes in their work. As to prejudice, it is not confined exclusive- more intellectual because it is affected by culture and edu- ly to everyday consciousness: the history of science cation, and scientific concepts find their way into it; and shows that it is common in scientific (or pseudoscientific) still it remains everyday and commonplace. The same ap- theories. plies to commonplace, everyday experience which is limit- Hegel, who thoroughly examined the opposition of the ed compared to the special experience of science. Every- dialectical and metaphysical modes of thinking, fully iden- day consciousness assimilates experience, knowledge, ideas tified everyday (in his own words, reasoning) conscious- and certain scientific concepts; but it is not independen! ness with the metaphysical view of the world. Describing in assessing their cognitive value. People use them as the objections of everyday consciousness to the doctrines stereotypes of sorts for picking their way in the sphere of ancient Greek Sophists as "the cry of common sense of their everyday, nonprofessional occupations and inter- which knows no other way to help itself" (64; 14,7), He- ests. gel maintained that everyday reason would inevitably Today, men have the telephone, the radio, the television lapse into sophistry because it treated the truths and max- set, the automobile, the cinema and other achievements of ims it was guided by as absolutes. science and technology at their disposal, but they usually Hegel correctly identified the typical features of a have a rather vague notion of the scientific laws underly- definite historical form of everyday consciousness, but he ing the operation of those devices. The individual is con- made the same mistake (which he himself exposed) be- tent to know their purpose, to be able to use and enjoy lieving that the metaphysical limitations of everyday con- them, and to know where to apply should they malfunction. sciousness were something extrahistorical and insurmoun- And it is impossible and even useless for him to under- table. That negative assessment of everyday consciousness strand everything that is clear to physicists, mechanics, stemmed from the rationalist-idealist nature of Hegel's electrical and radio engineers and other specialists. But philosophy which claimed that the outside world perceived because of specialization, scientists themselves are quite through the senses is only an appearance (albeit objec- vague about those accomplishments of science and technol- tive), and that it is the only realm of everyday conscious- ogy which they use but which are not connected more or ness. Philosophy, Hegel claimed, differs from everyday less directly with their own fields. So here, too, there is consciousness in that it regards only as a phenomenon that no absolute opposition between everyday and scientific which everyday consciousness presents as existing. consciousness. Nowadays, there are no people whose con- A specific historical analysis of everyday consciousness sciousness is either purely scientific or purely everyday. leads to a conclusion that was totally alien to Hegel's Both those forms of human cons.ciousness are inseparable. philosophy despite its historicism: the metaphysical featu- Thus the M.arxist understanding of everyday conscious- res of everyday consciousness were products of the same ness is based on the admission of diversity in man's rela- age that gave rise to metaphysical thinking in science.'r' tionship with objective reality, both natural and social. As an agent discovering the infinity of the universe, learning 'r Engels pointecl to the metaphysical limitations of every-day and mastering its laws, creating "the second environment" jaded bourgeoil common sense: "The cart-horse of the commonplace and thus shaping himself, man shapes and develops his' bourseois mind falters of course in confusion in front of the ditch sepaiating substance from appearance, and cause from effect; but scientific consciousness. But as someone merely finding one should not ride cart-horses if one intencls to go coursing over his way in his immediate environment and adapting to it the very rough ground oI abstract reasoning". (6; 223) by using tried and tested methods, man is a creature of

106 t01 everyday consciousness which combines reason and preju- they proclaimed to be identical for all men, irrespective of dice,. real knowledge and illusion in the most unexpected the conditions they lived in and the knowledge they pos- and contradictory ways. sessed-that is, something innate, bestowed on the [uman Since everyday consciousness remains based on every- soul from above. For example, the 16th-century Thomist day experience, it is empirical and thus undoubtedly hos- Dictionary ol Phi.losophical Sciences asserted that common tile to idealism, a fact reflected in the speculative-idealist sens-e "is exactly the same in aII men and in all ages; it criticism of it. Still, once again, it is not always based neither advances nor retreats. It is, as it were, reaion in exclusively on everyday experience and practice. As we its primordial state (l'6tat brat) , reason without reflection see from ancient philosophy (which . emerged hefore and without science." (75; 971) Obviously, such raison d. science and interpreted everyday experience), everyday l'6tat brat, "untainted" by reflection or education, readily consciousness comprises prototypes of both materialist and admits that the existence of God is logically demonstrable. idealist views. In that sense, idealism, as well as material- This explains why modern Thomists fully share the views ism, relies on concepts of everyday consciousness. And of their medieval forerunners about immutability of every- materialists, as well as idealists, argue with it. day experience (allegedly stemming from immutability of Materialism relies on "naive realism" of everyday con- human nature). Viewed from that angle, philosophy cor- sciousness; idealism, on its subjectivist notions. Material- responds_ to its concent-that is, operates as authentic phil- ism criticizes everyday consciousness from the left; ideal- osophical knowledge-only when it is connected solely to ism, from the right. Materialism argues against the preju- everyday experience, interpreting its content. In that iase dice of everyday consciousness; idealism (usually but not philosophy is independent of science, which can neither always), against common sense. A classic example of the refute nor confirm fundamentals of philosophy because latter is Tertullian's claim that religious faith must not science deals with special-that is, scientificl-experience. fear the absurd which common sense rejects. But the In the neo-Thomist view, all philosophers are contempo- history of Christianity and related philosophies proves that raries because they all interpret everyday experience Christian theology and the idealist philosophies which sup- which is unchanging and common to everyone. fhat ex- port it try to reach their goal both by criticizing common perience contains neither affirmation nor negation, is nei- sense (Protestantism, Protestant neo-orthodoxy) and by ther true nor false, but a totality of immediate experiences appealing to everyday reason (Catholicism, neo-Thomism). of reaiity and one's own life. The neo-Thomist apologia of Thomas Aquinas, who proclaimed the harmony of reli- everyday consciousness and experience- just ai thl at- gion and reason, tried to prove that the latter, proceeding tempt to prove the independence of their basic content of from facts of everyday experience, Iogically and inevitably time and space, of science and special scientific experi- concludes that God exists. For example, an object moves ence-is aimed at acquitting the theological philosophy of because motion has been imparted to it. Hence, according Thomas Aquinas: he is treated as our contemporary bn the tb Thomas Aquinas, the logical conclusion that a moving grounds that everyday experience cannot become obsolete. object is impossible without something moving it. But if According to neo-Thomists, Thomism flows directly from the mover is itself in motion, it is aiso a moving object, the pure source of common sense, untainted by specula- that is, it has its own mover. This chain cannot be end- tion; and because of its essential immutability, common less because in that case no motion could have a begin- sense must be understood as the extrahistorical spiritual ning in time. Therefore there must exist something that lgman faculty bestowed on us from above. Rejecting the imparts motion while being itself motionless, i.e., the first Thomist view of some neutral and mute everyday expe- cause. rience which is the only thing philosophy is supposed- to Thomas Aquinas and his medieval followers supported sl,udy, Gaston Bachelard aptly remarks:- "After tlie age-old their appeal to reason as something indisputable by put- dialogue between the world and the spirit, one can no long- ting a mystical construction on that human ability which er talk about mute experience." (36; 8)

108 r09 . -:\ .-.

' in the lSth century, French materialists spared no ef- first giance a compiete paradox srnce rt is made within Iort ..in exposing the ittempts of Catholic theologians and the framework of a subjective-idealist system, becomes philosopheis at using the authority of common sense to clear if we recall that Berkeley idealistiCally interpreted justify their fantastii religious notions' Holbach asserted empiricism based on everyday experience. Today, idealist ihat man can reasotr soundly only when he is healthy, empiricism often proclaims its dedication to ordinary com. "when his soul is neither troubled by fear nor changed by mon sense. For example, in substantiating his subjectivist- illness nor disturbed by passions". (77; 138) Sound rea- agnostic epistemology, Karl Popper proclaims: "I was al- son, he maintained, cannot reconcile itself to religion ways a commonsense philosopher, and a commonsense real- which "demands that we flrmly believe i.n things that are ist. . . I was thoroughly opposed to every idealism, posi- not evident and in propositions that arg 9it-!er barely prob- tivism, or evetr neutralism in philosophy." (90; 322-23) able or greatly contiary to reason". (761' 142) Typically, the pseudonegation of idealism by today's bour- Whereas French materialists proved that religion was geois idealist philosophers is presented as agreement with incompatible with reason, the - Scottish "philosophy.of everyday experience. This is indirect proof of tho sense" saw its principal mission in proving the fact that the main content of everyday experience is large- "om-inopposite. Thomas Reid, the foremost pr-oponent of .that Iy in favor oJ materialism. In his monograph on Charles s6dool, 'maintained in his Enquiry into the Haman Mind Peirce, the Soviet philosopher Yu. K. Melvil notes that on'the Principles of Common Sertse (L764) that the ad- this founder of American pragmatism described his doc- mission of the existence of the outside world cannot be trine as a philosophy of "critical common sense". Common based on the evidence supplied by sensory organs because sense is presented as comprising ideas and beliefs that that evidence is only valuable inasmuch as it commands are "the result of human experience handed down from credence. Common sLnse is the originat ability to believe generation to generation". (29; 382) which precedes sense perception and reflection and leads Lenin criticized the Machist attempts to -ofportray sub- to the idmission of both the external world and God. Thus jectivlst-idealist empiricism as the viewpoint unbiased a lack of faith in God is as contrary to reason as the re- everyday consciousness which allegedly knows only sensa- senses- ar-e tions fusal to believe that the objects reported by the and their complexes and refuses to recognize anything-refer-- ,."1. fh.r.fore, according to Reid,-rejecting religious faith different, that which cannot be sensed.- "The is tantamount io refusin[ to believe that the outside world ence to 'naive realism', supposedly defended by this phi- is real. losophy, is sophistry of the cheapest kind," Lenin wrbte. Thus, historically, both materialism and idealism have "The 'naive realism' of any healthy person who has not claimed to represent common sense. And although because been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the everyday consciousness ob- idealist philosophers consists in the view things, of its organii contradictions thai -sensa-the viously sr]stains opposite philosophies, the everyday expe- environment, the world, exist ind,ependently of our rience it reflects-the experience shared by all mankind, tion, 1f_61v consciousness, of our sell and, of man in gener- and constantly enriched and confirmed by social practice- al. . . Materialism deliberately makes the 'naive' belief of contradicts idealism and serves as one of the starting mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." * points of the materialist world view. Lenin repeatedly (10; 14,69-70) stressed that very important aspect of the issue of the consciousness and philoso- relationship between everyday - nhv. He criticizetl those idealists who tried to use the * In his Philosopktcal, Notebooks Lenin stresses that forms of iriiu" realism" of everyday consciousness to substantiate logic are grgq$cally linked to everyday practice: "Man's practice, was George repeating itself a thousand million times,- becomes consolidated iri their antimaterialist concepts. One of those man's consciousness precisely (and endeavour to by flgures of logic. onlv) on Berkeley, a subjective idealist who said,,"I account oI this thousand-million-fold iepetition. thesb fisurei'have vindicaie common sense." (37; 102) This assertion, a[ lhc stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character." (td'; 98, 217).

110 LLI. goes principles". (55; 2) This thesis correctly identifies an im. Even in it5 undeveloped form, materialism much portant analyzes both epistemological problem, which, however, neoposi- further than naive realism and critically tivism is the prejudices and the empirical content of everyday con- unable to solve because it totally opposes science modern form, material- to. everyday experience. According to neopositivism, since sciousness. In its more advanced science reflection-knowl- recognizes. the existence of matter, consciousness ism studies the dialectics of the active and determinism, objective reality-, correcting the it remains on the level of everyday con- edge, reflection-study of sciousness and language. naive idea about the direct reflection of the outside world its That claim subjectively dis: l,orts the accomplishments of science which has discovered by sense perception, about the identity of the imag-e with x nonsubstantial forms matter, revealed. thLe reflected This viewpoin! dialectically ne- of the complex phy- object in it. siological mechanism gates naive realism but retains and develops th.e-truth it of psychological actions, and aban- precepts materialist, ald { doned the mechanistic concepts of determinism. Those dis- iontains. It follows that the of coveries p.hiiosophy. do not mere.Iy and related theoretical conclusions do not at all *.p".ir[y dialectical-materialisf imply that scientist ,,mat- bounds of everyday consciousness and its a operating with the concept of trinscenl the i ter" is at the same level empiricat notions, but also contiadict the latter' Everyday as a housewife. Proclaiming his opposition to the identity scientific coniciousness, inasmuch as it is not permeated with the _ of and everyday language, Frank is essentially- trying to get relevant scentific concepts, is incapable of grasping the I unity of mutually rid of -matter, a task long laid down by . self-propulsion of mattei, the .determin- Acco-rding the latter, "The ing ind mutually exclusive opposites, etc' That is not ex- to only thing whose existence I we den-y, is that which philosophers call matter or corpo- plfined by the metaphysical (as ass-erted by H-egel)-nature real- simply by the-fact that.the substance." (37; 2, 55) But apparently Frank is more of everydhy consciousness but l consistent Berkeley dialectical thinking is too versatile to fit into than because he denies the existence content of -everyday of both consciousness (he contrasts framework of the limited experience of indi- j it to matter) and cau- the sality, categories directly related viduals. _the to the itey philo- positivism, which differs from Machism sophical issue: about the causal relationship of matter and Usually, today's consciousness, in its rej'ection- of the empirical origin of mathematical l itself with "naive real- In the final analysis, the neopositivist "revolution in ana togicit precepts, does not ally philosophy" dismisses aJ an unscientific view of -rejects all past philosophy with its age-old ism" tut initead it issues. The latter presented Trying overcome the spontaneous materialist are as a disorderly multitude the world. to oI unverifiable and undemonstrable notions of commin sense, neopositivists almost invariably views, unible to rise theological bias. They refuse in principle a.bove -everyday consciousness and naively probing ques- accuse it of a -to tions that cannot answered between reason and preiudice or to analyze the be because they are pliantoms distinguish devoid real content. precisely contridictions of everyday consciousness. For example, of That is the meaning of philos-ophical terms that mark Wittgenstein's pronouncement asserting that what cainot Philipp Frank wants the be discussed ,t' materialism and idealism to be should not be spoken about. This means the distinction between that people without a proper (in banished from the philosophical vocabulary because the the "modern", neopositiv- denote are historically r-oo-ted ist sense of the word) philosophical education argue about concepts those terms- 1o whether consciousness. In his Philosop.hy.'o; ol the world is finite or infinite, knowable of unknow- tions of everyday able, etc. Meanwhile, philosopher Sctenc" he maintains: "Expressions like 'matter', 'mind', the (neopositivist) is - i silent: those issues cannot be answered because 'cause and effect', and similir ones are today merely co.T- they are scientiflc i monsense terms, and have no place in strictly l 'l In this Wittgenstein obviously echoes Nietzsche's ,,Sometimes. discourse." (55; 45-6) That same book also holds that "the i as the saying hints, o.ne can only stay a philosopher if one keens we I silcnt." (89; 2, M). central probiem in the philosophy of science is how j That is not the only case of pbsitivist scientism - putting its own construction get frorir commonsense statements to general scientific ! on irrationalist theses, l I rJ-0t562 113 M.2

;n pseudoissues. But, presenting the age-old philosophical ,'xperiences fear not of a definite, suLstantiai danger, but consciousness as everyday, neopositivists fail to notice ol' the very existenc-e, perceived as dangerous, fragile, un- that their renunciation of the so-called metaphysics- stable-in other words, because the exiitence is ifraid of meaning the problems belonging to philosophy proper-is i t self. rather similar to ordinary common sense which dismisses llxistentialists castigate the "vulgar,, (everyday)-iauses, foar philosophical issues and regards their discussion as empty o[ death, a fear based on perfectly ieal eirpiriial talk unworthy of serious people. and contrast to the existential pos- it fear of the-ultimate -has Everyday consciousness appears idyllic, serene and per- sibility, the possibility not to be, which, in their view, haps even carefree if viewed in the epistemological aspe-ct- no connection with the everyday existence of individuals th;t is, as empirical self-consciousness, the comprehen- among other individuals who live and die. Those who tem- sion of the outer environment, reasonably arguing that porarily stay alive thug acquire a perfectly empirical no- the sell is the selt and therefore the sell is not a cloud, a tion first of others' mortality and then of their bwn. rock, a donkey, etc. But viewed from another angle, as a AII existentialism argues furiously against everyday totality of everyday experiences-that is, all the joys and cxistence, presented as faceless, illusory and meaning- sorrows, hopes and disappointments that comprise everyday less, against everyday, spontaneously materialist con- lif e-that everyday consciousness appears continuously sciousness, allegedly reflecting not reality but pseudo- turbulent. Scientific and philosophical consciousness ap- real ordinariness. An existentialist describes everydiy con- pear as something similar to the ancient Greek ataraxia in sciousness as alienated (although that can only be tiue of comparison. This aspect of everyday consciousness, pre- some of its aspects), claiming that only the existentialist viouily studied by the philosophical doctrines of affects self-consciousness of existence, renouncing everything (both by materialists and idealists), has now been almost rnundane, overcomes alienation. But the "oniological soli- totally annexed by existentialism. The latter revives in its tude" of the existential self-consciousness mystically re- own way the opposition of philosophy to the so-called flects the actual alienation of the personality in bouigeois practical, positive sciences and regards them as utilitarian, society; essentially, existential consciousness is reflned pragmatic and therefore unable to probe the being of that everyday consciousness. which exists, that is, not rising above everyday conscious- Existentialism criticizes everyday consciousness as alle- ness. gedly incompatible with the grasping of the substance of Existentialism opposes the natural scientific descriptions being. According to Heidegger, philosophy violates itself of objective reality with a hermeneutic description of when it reckons with objections voiced by common sense, man's being, defined as worry, fear, being-in-the-world, because the latter cannot see that to which it objects. phi- freedom, etc. Essentially, it is the emotion that fills the losophy, Heidegger writes, "cannot refute ordinary-6) com- everyday existence of individuals. Existentialisminterprets mon sense because it is deaf to its language". (65; But those emotions in the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology, oxistentialism itself, while fighting the mundane (and to divorces them from the empirical source and declares to be a certain degree really exposing the depersonalizing in- existential, that is, a priori inherent to man's selfness. In fluence of bourgeois_ relations), Iimits phllosophical prob- that connection, Heidegger and Sartre, following Kierke- lcms to a detailed description of everyday conscioushess, gaard, draw an essential dividing line between fear r:motions and concepts. Although Husserl's subjectivist- (Furcht, la pear), generated by external empirical causes idealist phenomenology does distil them, yet foi all its and allegedly insignificant as far as "existence" is con- criticism, existentialism is not much interested in cerned, and anguish (Angst, l'angoisse), caused by the all that lies beyond the everyday consciousness and "existence" itself and therefore insurmountable. An exis- lhe. ordinary (an_d_ negatively interpreted) emotions it tentialist regards existential consciousness as cleansed of criticizes so harshly.- It sees nothing wbrth noting in its everyday aspect, of philistine conformism, because it cvcryday life, especially in social intercourse because- its tt4 tt5 place for misanthropic interpretation of existence offers no has also changed (where -love phi- Everyday religious consciousness things like work, or knowledge' 't' Existentialist probability, believes (critical) it has at all survived). In all no one Iosofhy borrows even its theory of "extreme" any more that God created the world in six days, if prosaic everyday lif-e, situitions, which elevate man above only because common knowledge that days (and irredeemahle it is from everyday notions of impending death, nights) came into being after Earth had taken shape and sin, etc. . Paradoxically, a philosophy -claiming to oppose begun to rotate on its axis. This explains the genuine de- quiie uncompromisingly everything ordinary is incapable, spair Berdayev who said most people, including extricating of that due to its extreme individualist limitations, of Christians, had turned materialist because they believed itself from the quagmire of everyday bourgeois -routine. only material power-military economic-and philosophy critically ana- in the or Unlike existentialiim, Marxist not in the power of the spirit. The Protestant Church has everyday con- lyzes everyday existence and the relevant reconciled itself to this.situation and no longer requires its definite social phenome- cepts and emotions as historicaily adherents to accept all the dogmata: it is enough to believe throughout history but na which do not remain unchanged that God and Jesus Christ His son exist. transformation are changed in the course of the communist his The Condition ol the Working-Class in England maintained that common In of society. Medieval scholasticism Engels offered the following description of the life and spir- sense is the awareness of certain fundamental principles, all itual development of British workers on the eve of the independent of the time and place and identical with more prove industrial revolution: "They could rarely read and far peopie; but today there is no longer any need to rarely write; went regularly to church, never talked pol- ihat common sense and everyday consciousness as a whole, with it' itics, never conspired, never thought, delighted in physi- reflect the social environment and change together exercises, listened inherited reverence when the mundane com- cal with . Indeed, from the point of view of both Bible was read, and were, in their unquestioning humility, mon sense and scienie and philosophy (materialist philos- exceedingly well-disposed towards 'superior classes'. . . centuries, the the ophy, too) in, say, the l8th or early- {9th They were comfortable in their silent vegetation, and but substance containing a very idea of a cubic centimeter of for the industrial revolution they would never have emerged absurd but also ex- huge amount of energy-making was not only from existence, romiLntic was, between the this which cosily as it treirely mystical, and no distinction was nevertheless worthy human beings." (1; natural (really existing or not of supernaturil (unreal) and the 4, 309) There is no need Lo describe here the tremendous possible). changes in the consciousness of all the working people ' philosophy are cautious.jn Today, both science and -very developments which led to the nimpossible". Meanwhile, brought about by subsequent their interpretation of the notion establishment of the new, socialist system first in the USSR everyday ionsciousness has grown uied to the miracles and then many other countries. The victory of social- i "by hardly be- shaken by in worked man's inteilect and can ism radically everyday consciousness. capitalist has not, yet changed In scientific and technoiogical breakthroughs. It mass consciousness has greatly. As helieves that there countries, too, changed lost its sense of wonder, but it firmly Jacque Maritain, prominent Catholic philosopher, re- field science and a are no miracles-at least not in the of marked, "Nobody wants to die for capitalism any more-nei- technology. ther in Asia, nor in Africa nor in Eutope." (84; 124) This " H*. I tlo not refer to the "optimistic" version of existentialism admission by an opponent of Marxism is evidence that (Abbasnino. Bo]now and others)- which tries (albeit in vain) to there is increasing realization among the exploited masses drrercdme the pessimistic interpreiation of positive emotion-? (joys of that only destruction of capitalism can bring about their family life, hblidays, customs-, etc.) typical of "classical" existen- tialism, beiause the truly positive, signiflcant and genuine cotrtent social emancipation. oT lite'iJ basically inconipa-tible with the existentialist approach,to I do not propose here to analyze the impact of socio- the world. The Soviet philbsopher A. S. Bogomolov has substantially economic, scientific and technological progress on everyday and scientiflcally analj'zed th-at latest type of existentialism' consciousness. I would only note the major aspects of that

116 tL7 historical process: it supplants irrational notions and other groundless beliefs in everyday consciousness and brings everyday and scientiflc consciousness closer together which, however, does not cancel out their substantial difference. Everyday consciousness becomes increasingly rational, mor- aI, discriminating, esthetically demanding, independent and critical. It no longer merely adapts to the existing con- ditions but plays an ever more active part in man's crea- tive activity. All that greatly changes the relationships be- tween philosophy and everyday consciousness and experi- ence. The latter is an integral part of social practice, which 2 underlies all forms of knowledge. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND DIALECTICAL IDEALISM I

IMMANUEL KANT AND I7th-CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALISM

Immanuel Kant, the father of classical German philoso- phy, both followed and criticized l7th-century rationalism. Like philosophical empiricism, philosophical rationalism is the bourgeois self-consciousness of the era of emergent cap- italist mode of production. Its distinctly antifeudal char- acter is evident in the rationalist conviction that the "nat- ural light of reason" (lumen naturale) is innate to every human being irrespective of his intellectual abilities or education. According to Descartes, "the ability to reason and to distinguish truth from error-which is usually cal- led common sense or reason-is naturally equal in all men". $5; 27) The thesis is not merely a theoretical con- viction but an ideological declaration of the antifeudal, bonrgeois revolutionary movement. Rationalists were intransigent in their opposition to scho- lasticism, although the latter, unlike medieval mysticism, also appealed to reason and logic. They exposed the fallaoy of scholastic dogma which maintained that theology was on top of the hierarchical ladder of knowledge, science was at the bottom, and philosophy in between. Rationalism proclaimed science to be the highest form of theoretical knowledge, and reason, the highest scientific authority. Turning to the "great book of the world"-that is, to na- ture-Descartes considered it a matter of paramount im- portance to create a philosophy that would help in har- nessing the elemental forces of nature. The rationalist struggle against scholastic philosophizing spread far beyond the bounds of the specific historical sit- uation which generated, shaped and inspired it. It was a struggle against all that was uncritically taken for granted -that is, against dogmatic thinking which ignored the tzt need for analyzing, checking and substantiating its asser- among man's greatest theoretical errors. Kant revised the tions, assumptions and precepts.'r rationalist doctrine of the causes of etror, proving that sense Like rationalists, Kant regarded the critique of dogmat- perception, affect, could not deceive us because it was ism as the foremost task of philosophy. In his words, "Our not a judgment. It is the mind and reason that are guilty age is truly an age of critique to which everything must of error-and not because they proceed from experience bow. Religion, because of its holiness, and law, because of but because they try to draw conclusions independently its greatness, want to be outside the realm of that critique. of experience, thus depriving themselves of their only ba- But in that case they understandably rouse suspicion and s is. can no longer count on the genuine respeqt with which rea- The rationalist cult of reason (and the concept of. pure son treats only something that can withstand its free and thought as its concomitant) was a one-sided (and often open trial." (73;3,7) In demanding a con'sistent and leading to idealistic conclusions) interpretation of the math- sweeping critical analysis, Kant went much further than ematical form of knowledge, which rationalists considered l7th-century rationalists because he stressed the need for a a priori, based on the purely logical deduction of cer- critical analysis of reason itself too. tain theses from axioms. Rationalists were convinced that Rationalists maintained that bourgeois transformations philosophy could be constructed as a mathematical sys- were necessary because social institutions were to be changed tem of conclusions and that this would end philosophical to conform to rational human nature, to the require- argument and make it possible to comprehend the absolute ments of universal reason. This identification of bourgeois in aII fields of study. It only remained to identify fun- transformations with the realization of the ideals of reason clamental philosophical axioms and appropriate definitions. was the uncritical aspect of the rationalist concept of rea- Spinoza attempted that in his Ethics. son, which was pictured as an absolute and autonomous Unlike rationalists, Kant maintained that there could be ability to comprehend, evaluate, judge and establish norms, neither mathematical axioms nor definitions in philosophy. an ability independent of both sense perception and social In his view, philosophy comprised "not a single fundamen- conditions. In the rationalist view, reason never errs. Ac- tal that deseives to be called an axiom". (73; 3, 496-97) cording to Descartes, error is rooted in the will which is In contrast to mathematics, philosophical definitions are guilty of wishful thinking. Spinoza and Leibniz thought it not apodictically authentic, rather, they are an etposition was rooted in sense perception which was allegedly vague of available concepts. On the other hand, mathematical by its very nature and led to wrong conclusions if treated definitions are shaped by the modeling of concepts. There- as a basis of speculation. fore, "in philosophy, the definition as an expressly clear Rationalists arrived at the concept oI pare reason-that definitiveness must rather complete the work than begin is, of thought independent of sense perception and, in their it. On the contrary, in mathematics we have no concept opinion, able to overcome the inevitable limitations of sen- before the definition, because only the latter provides the sory data. The importance of the latter was clearly under- concept; therefore mathematics must and always can be- rated. Kant accepted the concept of pure reason but reject- gin with deflnitions." (73; 3,495-96) ed its rationalist interpretation. It his view, reason's glaim Treating axioms as self-evident truths, rationalists con- to supraexperimental knowledge outside experience was cluded that intellectual (that is, independent of sensory data) intuitive truths serving as the unshakable basis of * One must admit in this connection that the cult of reason (in the entire philosophical science can and must be the start- the comprehensive sense of the term) permeated not only rationalism ing points of philosophy. The doctrine of intellectual in- but aII ideologies of progressive {7th-century bourgeoisie, including tuition is a central proposition of rationalism.'r It underlies philosophical empiricism. Locke wrote: "Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything." (78; 295). However, this does not '- Sttn, *e must remember that Locke and some other empirical mean that the rationalist and the empiricist concepts of reason were philosophers recognized intellectual intuition as the decisive moment identical. oI cognition. But, unlike rationalists, empirical philosophers con-

t22 t23 content of mathematics and mechanics. the rationalist conviction that the boundaries of experience the most important lfherefore, t[e issue was to grasp that fact (without which, can be transcended. In the rationalist view, mathematics possible) the had problem, was philosophy's I(ant maintained, no science was and explain already solved that now it truths- turn. possibility of infinitely universal and necessary Locl

1"26 1,27 of the culture of the human intellect in general. Science means that the concepts of God, personal immortality and is a sphere of sound sense, philosophy is the realm of rea- the like must be excluded from the field of scientific knowl- son. Human reason is by nature metaphysical: unlike sound edge, and all that remains to them is the field of faith. sense, it strives to transcend experience. And man, a In this connection Kant contemplates the need to limit rea- metaphysical the sentient being, is a being, differing from son-that is, pwre reason with its a. priori claims: "We have animal in his ability not merely to reason and speculate imposed limits on reason so that it would not lose the but to think metaphysically. However, so far all metaphys- thread of empirical conditions and not rush off into the ical doctrines have been false and unscientiflc. That, of realm of transcendental substantiations." (73 3, 392) In course, has not been accidental, and it points to the fallacy this quotation, Kant's agnosticism is aimed against meta- of the fundamentals and the very method of metaphysical physics. But the point is that, according to Kant, the en- philosophizing. Therefore Kant sees his priucipal objective tire outer world which.is independent of consciousness, the !n radically reforming metaphysics and transforming it world of "things in themselves" which is also proclaimed into a science. But he views the task of creating new, to be essentially unknowable, is transcendental too. Hence transcendental metaphysics as a total rejection of all the the fideistic leanings in Kant's agnosticism: "I had to re- previously existing metaphysical systems. This explains, stricl (aufheben) knowled,ge to make room for faith." (73, among other things, his words to the effect that "it is not 3, 25) metaphysics that I am working on in the Critigrue lol Pure And so Kant's reform of metaphysics essentially inter- Reason) but a completely new and heretofore untried sci- prets its key precepts as devoid of objective content that ence, namely, a critique of reason that speculates a priori". exists outside consciousness. Rationalist philosophers re- (72; 228) But it should also be noted that Kant considered garded the supranatural (metaphysical) as a distinct, high- the Critiqae ol Pure Reason a substantiation of, and an in- est and often divine realm of being, Kant declares it to troduction to, transcendental metaphysics. be merely an aggregate of ideas of pure reason. Those Seience for Kant is the model of true knowledge. Hence ideas do possess vitally important, especially moral, signifi- his formulation of the dilemma: either metaphysics be- cance, but the latter bears no relationship to objective comes a science (naturally, a science sai generis) or it has reality which precedes and is independent of knowledge. no right to exist at all. Kant's philosophy shows that tra- Metaphysics is supposed to study the origin and signifi- ditional metaphysics cannot become a science because its cance of those ideas, but not to prove the existence of re- precepts are theoretically undemonstrable and experimental- spective otherworldly entities. Proceeding from these pre- Iy unverifiable. Setting forth the task of creating a rad- cepts, Kant provides a thorough critical analysis of the ra.- ically new metaphysical system, Kant proves the need for tionalist docfrine concerning the identity oI physical (real) a scientific philosophy. This methodological approach dif- and logical substantiations, and of the theory of a priori fers substantially from the rationalist one in its profound knowledge, created by prominent t7th-century rationalists. understanding of the difficulties of turning philosophy into Even before he wrote his Critiqae, Kant attacked the a scientific philosophical view of the world. cornerstone of rationalist philosophy: the conviction that The rationalists of the t7th century tried to build sys- what is logically necessary is by the same token physi- tems of absolute knowledge and explained the failure of cally necessary too. Rationalists reasoned approximatqly aq earlier attempts by the errors of individual philosophers. follows: if a certain logical conclusion has been deduced Kant does not share those illusions, he is fully aware of in accordance with logical rules (that is, if no logical er- the conflict between metaphysics and science, and he ror has been committed) , the content of that conclusion searches for ways to overcome it. He concludes that major should be regarded as objective reality, even if experience metaphysical ideas should not be interpreted as concepts does not confirm it. The meaning of that thesis becomes of actually existing transcendental entities, but only as clear if we recall that often logical deduction does lead to facts of consciousness, as ideas of pure reason. But this a discovery-that is, it does establish previously unknown

128 9-01562 ,.29 physical facts whose existence was not confi.rmed by ob- il, records certain actual characteristics of theoretical sci- servation or experiment for a historically long period of tntific knowledge especially of mathematics, whose precepts time. But the point is that logical reasoning cannit reveal ;rrc rclatively independent of experimental data. At the lev- facts that are not implicitly present in precepts underly- r:l mathematics and logic reached in the 17th century, the ing logical deduction. Meanwhile, 17th-century rationalists path leading from empirical data to logical and also math- tried deduce to the existence of transcendental entities from cmatical precepts was still completely uncharted. And ra- speculative premises that, naturally, did not go beyond the l,ionalists believed that logical and mathematical precepts experimentally comprehensible. Rejecting that absolute in- were totally independent of experience. They regaided the terpretation of the potential of deduction, Kant argues that latter merely as an aggregate of individual senie percep- logical substantiation relates to its consequence in such a tions. Naturally, this limited understanding of experience way that the latter can be grasped in it logically, under failed to explain the universality and necessity of logical the law of identity. In other words, a logical consequence and mathematical precepts. And rationalists always an- is only valid because it is essentially identical with its swered this question in the same way: logical and matliemati- premise; that is revealed by a logical breakup of the prem- cal propositions are universal and necessary precisely ise: be- the conclusion is revealed to be its part. For exam- cause they are completely independent of experience, because ple, "complexity" is the premise of "divisibility"; that be- they are a priori. comes obvious when we break up the concept of complexi- At that time, the concepts of universality and necessity ty. An actual premise is a different matter: here the con- as specific features of theoretical propositions could not yet sequence is not a part or feature of the premise. Therefore, be subjected to a special scientiflc analysis. Neither logic an analysis of an actual premise does not reveal its pos- nor mathematics possessed any data confirming the fact sible consequence, it does not point to the inevitability of that the universality and necessity of their piopositions precisely this, and none other, consequence. For example, were not at all absolute, that they were limited, first, by what causes rain is an actual but not logical premise, be- the level of knowledge achieved and, second, by their the- cause there is no logical reason for rain. oretical premise. AII that became obvious only after non- According to Kant, an actual premise makes it possible Euclidian geometry, the theory of relativity and quantum to reveal the relationships among empirically established mechanics had been created. facts, but cannot go it beyond experience. Meanwhile ra- , This expl_ains why Kant did not reject but merely revised tionalists, having identifled the actual premise with the log- the rationalist concepb of the a priori. Like raiionalists ical one instead of differentiating between them, concluded (and all philosophers and natural icientists of the time), that they had broken through into the realm of the su- he could not explain the objective emergence and histori- praexperimental and supranatural. Kant brilliantly expo- cal develop-me1t o-f universal and necessary theoretical pre- sed those illusions, which led to the major errors of ration- cepts. At the level then reached by science and philosolhy alist metaphysics. it was even more difficult to explain the univeriality and The concept of a priori or supraexperimental knowled,ge necessity of the categories of theoretical thinking: for ex- was central to l7th-century metaphysical systems. For ex- ample, space, time, causality. No one-at least among the ample, Leibniz asserted that apart from truths of fact there scientists-doubted that all natural phenomena existed in existed truths of reason which the latter arrived at without space and time, that they aII had deflnite causes, etc. But resorting to experience, to sensory data. The principles of could one prove that those categories were really universal Iogic, the axioms and demonstrations of geometry were re- and necessary? That was why Kant followed iationalists garded as indisputahle a priori truths, with obvious uni- in differentiating between pure (a priori) and empirical versality and necessity as their salient features. The defi- knowledge and maintained that logic and mathematics nition of the a priori as universal and necessary means were a priori disciplines, while mechanics combined a priori that the problem of the a priori is profoundly meaningful: l'undamentals with knowledge deduced from experiencle.

130 t3t How does Kant's concept of the a priori differ from the ccption; strictly speaking, the latter are not enough to rationalist one? At first glance it might seem that this is lrrovide genuine knowledge, at least the knowledge of re- where Kant's polemics with t7th-century metaphysicians lations among phenomena. It follows that categories are is least effective because he himself supported the a priori recessary prerequisites of empirical knowledge which, Iike approach. But in actual fact Kant's understanding of the theoretical knowledge, is rational. Hence Kant's illusion: a priori differs radically from that of rationalists. The lat- oategories precede experience. The point is that Kant (and tef recognized a priori knowledge of the world. It follows all thinkers and scientists of his time) does not yet realize that they assumed the existence of some way of knowledge l,he historical development of experience in which catego- other than that based on experience, .and they accorded ries emerge and develop. This error, inevitable for its priority to that different way. That is where Kant breaks time, must not obscure Kant's historic contribution to the iway fro- rationalism. He is convinced that ideas and understanding of this problem: he has revealed the unity concepts not taken from experience possess no real content of the categorical apparatus of thinking with the content of at alf; they only perform an instrumental function-that cxperimental knowledge. That is why Kant does not con- is, they are necessary formal means of cognition. The con- fine himself to opposing "pure" (a priori) knowledge to tent of knowledge stems only from sensory data, but the empirical knowledge, the way his predecessors did. He a priori is undoubtedly necessary as a torm ol knowled,ge proves that since the precepts of theoretical natural science that unites sensory data into definite images. Such a prio- are universal and necessary, they are not purely a priori ri forms of knowledge inolude the categories of unity, di- but both a priori and empirical-a priori in form and em- versity, reality, causality, interaction, possibility, necessity, pirical in content. etc. Nothing contemplated a priori is independent of knowl- The rationalist negation of the unity of a priori (that is, edge. According to this doctrine, a priori forms are not properly theoretical) and empirical knowledge led to the sufra- bttt pre-brperimental. In other words, they precede inevitable conclusion that a priori precepts (judgments, experience as its premises and conditions that enable ex- conclusions) were purely analytical-that is, that they did peiience and knowledge to become reality. It is only in not produce new knowledge but merely revealed that which this limited sense that one can and must view the part was already implicit in the subject of the proposition. The played by the a priori in klowledge and a priori knowledge cntire wealth of mathematical knowledge was thus reduced in general. Kant stresses that "for us, the only a pri_ori to something predetermined and preformed in the logical knowledge is that of objects of possible experience". (73; premises of mathematics. That inevitably came into con- 3, 735) He explains this point further: "The only thing that tlict with the development of mathematics, mechanics and reason can do a priori ii anticipating the form of possible l,heoretical natural science in general. experience in general, and, because that which is not a The principle of the unity of the a priori and the empir- phenomenon cannot be an object of experience, sound sense ical enables Kant to refute that rationalist dogma too. can never leave the confines of sense perception which \Vithout denying that analytical judgments exist, Kant re- is the only realm where things can exist." (73; 3,217) gards the discovery of a priori synthetic judgments as his Thus a priori forms of knowledge are necessary for-or- greatest accomplishment. In his view, such judgments exist ganizing rindom sensory data into a system of knowledge, iu mathematics and mechanics because they proceed from and nof for soaring above experience and into the world ir special type of sensory observations that he defined as of imaginary entities. In contrast to his predecessor!, Kant a priori observations. They are possible in other sciences, is well aware of the fact that experimental knowledge im- l,oo, because the latter adapt the a priori to sensory data. plies the use of categories. For example, the simple state- 'l'he significance of a priori synthetic judgments is that ment that the sun warms a rock links sense perception to lhey provide an actual increase of knowledge. Kant's pre- the categorial relation of causality. Kant differentiates be- rltrcessors believed that only empirical judgments \yere syn- tween the judgments of experience and those of direct per- l,lrotic because they recorded newly observed data. That

132 133 approach selerely limited the possibilities (and prospects) systems was not a reversal because it generated an effec- in the-devel_opment of theoretical natural science.-Kant pui tive and systematic development of the d,ialectical tradi- an end to that antidialectical opposition of analytical and tion., advanced in the 17th century, first and foremost, by synthetr,c judgments, and his new approach was clearly of the authors of metaphysical systems: Descartes, Spinoza outstanding importance for the develbpment of theore[ical and Leibniz. The fact that Kant delivered his critique of natural science. metaphysical systems within the framework of his trans- I! ! easy to see that Kant's doctrine of a priori synthet- cendental logic and especially transcendental dialectics ic judgments was an attempt at philosophiially substan- clearly points to the great significance of his philosophical tiating the possibility and necessity of.tfieoretiial natural Iegacy for the development of the dialectical mode of think- science which was as yet practically nonexistent in Kant's ing. time. But mathematical physics already existed, and it p-rompted Kant to raise the more general question about the epi.qfsmological premises of theoretical knowledge. The latter, by its very nature, transcends the confines of avail- able experience. That is precisely why it is theoretical and not empirical knowledge. In Kant's system, however, the theoretical, which he considers a priori, is independent of any possible experience because it is based on a priori-sen- sory observation. The assumption of that distinct type of observatio-n-that is, the concept of the a priori natu-re of space and time-distinguishes l(ant from the rationalists. This distinction reveals the contradictions of Kant's a pri- ori appr_oach. On the one !and, he asserts that the a priori is merely a form of knowledge. On the other hand, by as- suming the existence of a priori synthetic judgments, he admits, to a certain degree, the existence of a priori con- tent too. The contradiction between the form and content of theoretical knowledge thus remains unresolved. Still, the problem ig posed in a comprehensive way (inasmuch as it was possible in that historical period). Summing up, we can say that Kant was the first to sub- ject t7lh-century rationalist metaphysics to such meatting- lul and, prolound criticism. He was the only t8th-century thinker to have singled out and developed further the more valuable ideas of philosophical rationalism. True, he failed to overcome rationalist metaphysics because he criticized it from idealist and agnostic positions. But to believe that metaphysics could be positively overcome (with every- thing of value retained and later assimilated) at that time is to ignore the need for a historical approach to the de- velopment of philosophy. As Marx and Engels noted, clas- sical German philosophy revived l7th-century rationalist metaphysics. (L; 4, 125) And that revival of metaphysical t34 KANT'S DOCTRINE not enter Kant's system, but with which one cannot remain OF "THINGS-IN-THEMSELYES'' there. Pointing to the antinomy of Kant's understanding AND NOUMENA of "things-in-themselves", Jacobi saw nothing in it except for logically uncoordinated assertions. He opposed Kantian philosophy with the intuitivist doctrine of faith as the only demonstrable comprehension of meta-physical reality-in other words, he vindicated everything Kant's Critictrue ol Pure Reason refuted. The contradictory nature of Kant's doctrine of "things- in-themselves" is rooted in the attempt to reconcile mate- The concept of the "thing-in-itself" is central to Kant's rialism with idealism..Jacobi's mistake was that he nega' philosophy. The recognition of the objective existence, in- tiuely assessed the contradictions he spotted. But those con- dep_e:rdent of knowledge, of "things-in-themselves', is insep- [radictions are very meaningful, and one can even say that arable from philosophical mateiialism. But in contrait they indirectly point to the profound approach to the prob- to Kantian philosophy, materialism demonstrates that lem. Dialectical materialism substantiates the need for a "things-in-themselves" can, in principle, be comprehended positive evaluation of contradictions inherent in outstand- and irrevitably turn into "things-for-us". Lenin criticized ing philosophical doctrines. Meaningful contradictions that certain pseudo-Marxists who tried to prove "that the ma- attempt to overcome the limited and one-sided approach to terialists Marx and Engels denied the existence of things- problems are not merely flaws but to a certain degree vir- in-themselves (i.e_. things outside our sensations, pe"cep- tues of those doctrines. Let us recall that Marx regarded tions, and so forth) and the possibility of their cognitioir, the contradictions of David Ricardo's theory of value as and that they admitted the existence of a fundimental prerequisites for a correct approach to an extremely com- boundary between the appearance and the thing-in-itself." plex economic problem. I would think that an analogy (nat- (10; 14, ll7-l9) urally, only in the epistemological and methodological as- Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself" is profoundly con- pects) between Kant's doctrine of "things-in-themselves" tradictory. While recognizing the "thing-ii-itself" as the and Ricardo's theory of value is both justified and fruitful, source of sensory experience and even admitting that it because we are dealing not only with the emors-brilliant may be a phenomenon-and phenomena are kndwable- errors-of the German philosopher but also with objec- Kant nevertheless insists on the absolute unknowability of tively existing contradictions. "things-in-themselves" and even considers them transcen- It would be wrong to blame Kant for his inconsistent ap- dental. Hence the inevitable question: perhaps Kant re- proach, for having misunderstood or overlooked something, gards -"things-in-themselves" as noumeni, i.e., supranatu- for the contradictions that were so obvious to his follow- ral, otherworldly entities? The affirmative answer which ap- ers. That would be an antiphilosophical analysis of a phi- pears- inescapable would rule out the materialist trend, bound losophy. Had Kant interpreted "things-in-themselves" sim- by the assumption of "things-in-themselves" as generat- ply as absolutely transcendental or merely as an epistemo- ing our perceptions. But then how do "things-in-them- Iogical phenomenon, that would have been quite consistent, selves" differ from noumena? Regrettably, Marxist philos- but he rvould not have been a great thinker. ophV [a,s not yet produced a special study of that ques- Lenin demonstrated a profound approach to the problem tion, although it would be extremely impoitant for a-cor- of the need to overcome the primitively materialistic er- rect understanding of l(ant's philosophy" rors in the critique of Kant's philosophy. A scientific cri- Friedrich Jacobi, one of the first critics of Kant, made tique of the latter does not simply reject but corrects his the following observation which later became proverbial: postulates. In this connection Lenin said that "Marxists the "thing-in-itself" is a concept without whicti one Qaq- cr:iticized (at the beginning of thq twentieth qentury) the

136 137 Kantians and Humists more in the manner of Feuerbach postulate. And Kant follows his thesis about the insuffi- (and Biichner) than of Hegel." (10; 38, L79) Of great ciency of the materialist (actually, mechanistic) premise methodological importance, that observation points to the with a demonstration of the fallacy of idealist monism need for studying the diverse real content of Kantian con- (that is, of deducing the external world from consciousness). tradictions so that they could be resolved in a truly scien- Here, Kant refers not only to Berkeley's "dreamy" and tific way. "dogmatic" idealism but also to the "problematic" idealism We know that before he wrote his Critiqwe, Kant had of Descartes which deduces knowledge of the existence of created a basically materialist cosmogony which, in full [he outer world from cogito, self-consciousness, regarded as accordance with the laws of classical mechanics, adequate- a fundamental premise that makes all other premises re- ly explained the facts established by astronomy and pro- dundant. According to Kant, the existence of self-conscious- vided a scientific (for its time) interpretation of the "sys- r.ess proues the existence of the outer world perceived tematic structure", origin and development of the solar sys- through the senses, because "the consciousness of my own tem. Explaining the principles of his study, he said: "Here being is also the direct consciousness of the being of other one could say in a certain sense and without arrogance: things outside myself". (73; 3,201) This postulate recog- Giue me matter, I will build, a world, out ol it! that is, give nizes the dependence of consciousness on the external me matter, I will show you how a world must emerge world, but Kant's concept of the outer world is ambiguous from it." But then, how can one "boast about this success because it points both to "things-in-themselves" and to phe- when we deal with the most insignificant plants or insects? nomena.'l- Can one really say: Giue me matter, I will show you how This quotation is from the section Relwtation ol ldeal- one can create a caterpillas? .. . So do not be surprised if Lsm written for the second edition of the Critiqie of Pare I dare say that it is easier to grasp the constitution of all Reason. It is directed against those reviewers who believed, celestial bodies and the cause of their movements-in short, not without justification, that the book leaned toward the origin of the world as it exists today-than to under- subjective idealism. By stressing the points where he dif- stand, on the basis of mechanics, the origin of one single fers from Berkeley, Kant insists that an aggregate of con- blade of grass or caterpillar." (73; 1,231-32) cepts organized in a definite way and understood as nature The evolution of Kant's views before the Critiqae led perceived through the senses or as the world of phenom- him to conclude that the origin of life, let alone of con- ena inevitably implies the recognition of a world totally sciousness, thought, could not be explained by the motion, independent of knorvledge, the world of "things-in-them- development of matter. Of course, this refers only to me- selves" which underlie the world of phenomena. The sub- chanical motion and a mechanistic interpretation of devel- jective nature of that which is perceived through the senses opment. But neither Kant nor all his contemporaries had is rooted in the distinctive mechanism of human knowl- any idea of other natural processes, those subject to non- edge, but the sensory images which form the content of mechanical laws. Mechanistic materialism is incapable of external world, and sense perceptions point directly to the tracing the origin of life, and Kant proceeds from this fact "things-in-themselves" affecting our sense perception. Thus in his rejection of all materialism: in his view, the me- the existence of consciousness proves the existence of the chanistic form of that philosophy is not a historically tran- thinking are involuntary because they are caused by the sient limitation but the very essence of the materialist existence of "things-in-themselves" which should be regarded (and natural scientiflc) explanation of the world. as the causes of the former and which to a certain de- While he does not reject but instead justifies and sub- stantiates the mechanistic method, Kant nevertheless stres- 'r In another place in the Critique ol Pare Reason, Kant is even ses its limitations. Hence his conclusion about the essen- rnore explicit in connecting consciousness (and self-consciousness) to objective reality, to "things-in-themselves": "I am as sure of thir tial impossibility of philosophical monism: the diversity of cxist,ence of things outside myself that are related to my sense as reality cannot be explained by assuming one fundamental ol my own existence in time." (73; 3, 31).

138 139 gree determined not only the diversity of sensory data but cism. But naturally, the contradictions of knowledge, of also the distinctive features of their content. the evolution of unknowable "things-in-themselves" into According to Kant, the fact itself that the world .oi phe- "things-for-us" have not disappeared. These contradictions nomena undoubtedly exists proves the existence of "things- are reproduced (usually, in a qualitatively new form) at in-themselves" hecause the very word "phenomenon" im- each historical stage in the development of knowledge. The plies the existence of something different, of the non-phe- difference between the "thing-for-us" and the "thing-in- nomenor, conceivable only as the sensorial imperceptible itself" is not only the epistemological difference between basis o{ things or phenomena perceived through the senses. the known and the unknown. As Lenin emphasized, "the In other *or-cls, "phenomena ilways imply a thing-in-itself thing-in-itself is distinct from the thing-for-us, for the lat- and, consequently, point at it"... (73; 4, L09) ter is only a part, or only one aspect, of the former". (1.0; Thus Kant both the materialist and the idealist 14, ll9) Therefore, the known is part of, and to a cer- solution of the"eje"ts key question of philosophy, and he stres- tain extent depends on, a broader, still unknown whole. ses the need for a dualistic starting point: on the one hand, Each new stage of cognition also reveals that which was hand, consciousness,' the subject of knowledge; on the other unknown before-new unknown phenomena. That, too, is the world of "things-in-themselves", independent of ald an expression of the progress of knowledge: the notion of totally opposed to both consciousness and its object, the the diminishing unknown is true only within a certain frame- world of'phenomena. That latter world is in correlation work of knowledge; it must not be applied to knowledge with the activity of knowledge. It is the dualistic opposi- as a whole, to all available and possible (but not yet ob- tion between the subjective and the objective, !h9 spiritual vious) objects. For in the flnal analysis, the subject of the and the "material", ihe phenomenon and the "thing-in-it- entire process of cognition taken in its historical entirety self" that is the central premise of Kant's agnostici.qm. is infinite. True, by cognizing the finite we also cognize the In contrast to materialism, which conflnes the absolute infinite, but the fundamental difference between the two opposition of the spiritual and the material to the key pro-b- remains. I;ir of philosophy (that of the relationship betwe.en .the Marxist philosophy is equally incompatible with the ag- spiritual and th'e matbrial), dualism rejects fhis limitation, nostic refusal to believe the knowability of "things-in- But interpreting the opposition as absolute in- -3!1 aspects.. themselves" and with the opposite metaphysical faith in Kanfs doc-trine of the essential unknowability of "things- the attainability of absolute knowledge. The latter view, in-themselves" is not only based on the dualistic opposition laid down by the authors of l7th-century metaphysical sys- of the spiritual and the material: it also reflects and offers tems, was revived by Hegel. Theologians have always been a subjeclivist interpretation of the historically- definite sit- attracted to that view too, because they hold that the Gos- uation in natural icience and certain general features of pel contains all truth, and absolute truth at that. the cognitive process. As Engels said, in Kant's time "ot'tt Prominent skepticist philosophers-such as Bayle and knowledge of natural objects was indeed so fragmenlary Moltaigne-contributed signiflcantly to the struggle against that he iriglrt well suspeci, behind the little we know about theology and metaphysical system-building. Thus it each of thim, a myst6rious 'thing-in-itself"'' (3; 3' L02)- would be unhistorical to ignore the connection of Kant's Even in the first half of the tgth century, Engels pointed agnosticism (particularly, of the thesis about the essential out, chemistry treated organic elements as mysterious scientific fallacy of all available and possible "proofs" that "things-in-themselves". It follows that Kant offered 1 Philo- God exists) to an obvious antitheological position, albeit sophical interpretation of views held by many naturalists of inconsistent and mitigated by numerous reservations. It is, his l,ime. of course, no accident that the Vatican entered Kant's Since that time, outstanding scientific discoveries and works on the list of proscribed books: the dogma of the their practical application have convincingly refuted th.e logical demonstrability of the existence of God is among basio postulates of Kg.nt's and all o{,her types of agnosti- the fundamentals of Catholicism. Kant proposes to impose t4o t4L limitations on the metaphysical and theological claims of t,he a priori as coming before experience and applicable reason. His doctrine is thus aimed directly against specu- only to experience-therefore, inapplicable supraexperi- Iative metaphysics of the LTth century, and especially rncntally. against its later followers who interpreted the rationalist at- Kant reduces the metaphysical theory of being (ontolo- tempts at creating a theoreticai method designed to over- Cy) to a doctrine about the categories of cognizing think- come the limitations of the available experience as sub- ing, about the categorial synthesis of sensory data. For all stantiating the possibility of suprasensuous, supraexperi- its subjective character, the epistemological interpretation mental knowledge providing theology with a rationalist of categories posed a real dialectical problem. It is no ac- methodology. cident that Kant uses the transcendental analytical approach Kant rejects the rationalist dogma about the identity of to demonstrate the need for a new, nonformal logic he real and logical postulates, used by speculative metaphys- calls transcendental. ics to "prove" the existence of transcendental entities ancl Transcendental dialectics-one of the key sections of the God, the immortality of the soul, absolute free will and the Critique ol Pwre Reason-is devoted directly to demonstra- Iike. He also rejects the rationalist premise about the su- ting the fallacy of metaphysical claims to supraexperimen- praexperimental nature of a priori precepts, and contrasts tal knowledge. The major ideas of metaphysics-the psy- it with a trew interpretation of the a priori as a Jorm oJ chological, the cosmological and the theological ones-are kruowledge which is essentially inapplicable outside expe- devoid of objective content and cannot even indirectly rience and possesses only empirical content. Despite Kant's prove the existence of transcendental entities. Reason deals subjectivist interpretation of the forms of knowledge, this only with intellectual concepts whose content is taken ex- concept of the a priori approaches the rational understand- clusiveiy from experience. By synthesizing intellectual con- ing of the nature of theoretical knowledge. This explains cepts, reason does not enrich them with new, supraexperi- why Kant's famous question formulated in the fleld of mental content. That is why the metaphysical ideas of rea- transcendental analysis-how is pure natural science pos- son are nothing more than mere ideas expressing reason's sible?-is essentially a question about the possibility of striving to "make the categorically perceived synthetic uni- theoretical natural science. We know that Kant answers ty totally absolute". (73; 3,164) Thus the idea of the sub- it expressly in the affirmative. stantial soul contains the absolute unity of the thinking It should be emphasized that for aII his polemics with subject; the idea of God, the absolute unity of the condi- t7th-century metaphysical philosophers, Kant is, to a cer- tions concerning all objects of thinking in general, etc. tain extent, their successor too. The theological implica- The l7th-century metaphysicians regarded noumena as tions of speculative metaphysics are not in the least its transcendental and essentially divine entities, perceived by major content. The rationalist theory about a priori think- the suprasensuous cognitive ability of reason. But Kant de- ing and knowledge is rooted in the accomplishments of flnes them as a priori ideas of pure reason (not based on 17th-century mathematics and mechanics, in the distinctive experience). He says: "But in the end, one cannot see the aspects of the development of these deductive sciences possibility of such noumena? and outside the realm of phe- whose postulates are apodictically universal. What is the nomena everything remains empty (for us); that is, we source of that indisputable (it seemed at the time) universali- have reason problematically extending beyond the realm ty? The tTth-century rationalists examined the logical of phenomena, but we have no such contemplation, nor can form of mathematical constructions and arrived at what we even form a notion of such contemplation, by which ob- they considered to be the only possible conclusion: that jects could be given to us outside the realm of the senses . . . those constructions were independent of experience, that Consequently, the concept of the noumenon is only they were a priori in character. Hence, too, the more gen- a demarcation notion, used to limit the claims of the sen- eral conclusion about the possibility of supraexperimental suous and therefore applicable only negatively." (73; 3, knowledge. Kant rejects the latter conclusion, interpreting 221) But if the concept of the noumenon has no positive

142 t1t3 calls into question the assumption that nomena are the product of synthesis, brought about by rea- content, this also son's metaphysical reality exists: "The division of objects into unconscious productive force of imagination through phenomena noumena, and of the world into ltrat pe-r- Llre use of transcendental schemata and categories. Accord- and ing ceived through the senses and that grasped intellectually to Kant, "phenomena are not things-in-themselves but r-rnly play is inadmissible in a positiue seruse." (73; 3, 221) a of our concepts which are, in the flnal analy- Kant's theory of the problematic nature of the transcen- sis, reduced to deflnitions of the inner sense". (73;3, 613). metaphysics makes it possible to Thus the ambiguity of Kant's concept of the "thing-in- dental as the subjeot of itself" better understand his agnosticism. Kant holds that the cog- leads to a s,rbjectivist distortion of the concepl of nature and the cognitive process. But that, naturally, can- nition of the world of phenomena, of nature (i.e., the sub- justify ject of the sciences) is inflnite. OnIy the transcendental is not the neo-Kantian rejection of "things-in-them- unknowable. Viewed from that angle, Kant's agnosticism selves". "The world in itself," Lenin writes, "is a world can be described as antimetaphysical (of course, if we re- that exists withou.t us." (10; 14, l7B) He points out that fer to the theory of meta-physical reality and not to dia- I(ant's mistake was not recognizing the existence of "things- Iectics). StilL one must stress that Kant's agnosticism is in-themselves" but insisting on their transcendental, un- organibally linked to the ambivalent interpretation of ob- knowable nature. Everyday experience itself, Lenin empha- jective reality and the subjective-ideali-st conclusions it en- sizes, proves that '"rhings-in-thems0lves" are knowable, for iails. Kant's concept of the transcendental, of the meta- "each one of us has observed times without number the physical encompasses everything objective, everything that simple and obvious transformation of the 'thing-in-itself' outside and independent of consciousness and that pre- into phenomenon, into the 'thing-for-us'. It is precisely this is transformation cedes knowledge. Thus he does not stop at an antimetaphys- that is cognition." (10; 14, 120). ical assertion that the existence of metaphysical entities, Those who interpret Kant's philosophy idealistically usu- the noumena, is undemonstrable: he turns the physical- ally equate "things-in-themselves" and noumena. For ex- of knowledge-into m-eta- ample, Paul Foulquil's Dictionnaire d,e la langue philoso- what is outside and independent phique physical, transcendental. Therefore, the thi-ngs which-affect proceeding from the dichotomy "phenomena-nou- generate sensations and therefore exist before mena" claims that the "thing-in-itself" is synonymous with bur senses, "noumenon". zr83). independently of knowledge are described as (53; This view is shared by Dagobert and -"things-in-themselves". luprl- Runes (94; 215), (57; sensuous But in that case, wtrat is Iuller 2, 231) and Rudolf Eisler. (47; BB7) accessible to knowledge? If sensations caused by "things- But all those scholars confine themselves to an in-themselves" provide neither knowledge about them nor analysis of Kant's terminology and do not deal with the es- sence even any basis ior suoh knowledge, then where does Kant's of his theory of "things-in-themselves" and noume- na. Besides, they fall back on the vagueness of Kant's ter- agnosticism end? minology: Kant tries to solve the problem he poses by subjectively he often unites those two concepts in the gener- interpreting the known reality as existing within and al notion of the intelligible, "understandable substance" maintains that "objects of elperience (Verstandeswesen) . (73; 3, 219) through experience. He The are neuer giuen trt themselues: they are given only in ex- fact that Kant sometimes classes "things-in-them- selves" together with noumena is weII known, but calls perience and do not exist outside it". (73; 3, 350) Th. it perceived through the senses thus appears as a phe- I'or elucidation. Kant never regards noumena as "things- world in-themselves". knowledge, taking shape only in the course oI In his theory, a "thing-in-itself " is not nomenon of idea pure cognition. Knowledge about an object and the object itseli ln of reason; that is the key premise of tran- essentially identical, because "things-in- scendental aesthetics, that is, the theory of sensation. are treated as "ifhings-in-themselves" themselves" are excluded from the sphere of knowledge' affect our senses. As for the nou- True, the content of our sensations is independent of con- rnena, they have nothing in common with sense perceptions or: with the cognitive process general. sciousness, but things perceived through the senses as phe- in t44 l0-01562 1,45 I have already quoted Kant's phrase that the existence idealism? It is a complete antithesis of the latter.,' 0B; of noumena is problematic and undemonstrable. "Things- .4, 38-39) * in-themselves" are a different matter. Kant repeatedly stres- This quotation clearly bears out Kant's desire to dis_ ses that their existence is obvious from the existence of linguish between "things-in-themselves,' phenomena. and noumena as the world of He dismisses as absurd the asser- a priori pure reason. He describes ,,things_in_them- tion that "the phenomenon exists without that which ap- _ideas-_of ,,correspondin[', selves".literally as things, objects to sense pears". (73; 3, 23) That which appears is the "thing-in- perceptioas despite their essential unknowabiliiy. itself". Kant's view, ,,objects Appar_ In that conclusion inevitably follows cntly, this means that different of our seises,'i,tor_ from the distinction between "things as objects of experi- respond" to the distinction among sense perceptions. Re_ ence and as things in themselves" (731' 3, 23), although felr_ing to those "objects"-that ii,,,things-in-ti.rrrr.lrr"rl, one cannot still understand why "things-in-themselves" also says that {hey appear, manifest themselves can be absolutely unknowable -Kant in if they really appear. But sense perceptions: "we know only their appearances',. That that does not in the least affect the distinction between ,,things-in-themselves', is, Kant regards the existence of as "things-in-themselves" noumena. free ,,through and God, absolute an obvious fact: we know about these ihings the wiII, the immortal soul are noumena all which Kant calls concepts we receive as results of their impact on our id,eas of pure reason; "things-in-themselves" that cause senses". sensations are a different thing. True, in his foreword to . It would be wrong to consider this emphasis on material- the second edition of the Critique ol Pure Reason Kant ist trends a purely polemic says exaggeration which does not that regrettably, the existence of "things-in-them- reflect Kant's profound convictions: the dualistic selves" is theoretically nature of undemonstrable, but in- the same his theory caused inevitable fluctuations now to the left, breath he stresses that they "provide us with all the material the right._Kant ,,thing-in_ loy^1o -uses the concept of the of knowledge even for our inner sense". (73; 3, 30) He itself" to try and limit-th-e subjectivist leanings describes the impossibility in his"sys_ to theoretically refute the'skep- l,em. On the other hand, by resorting to subjeitivist episle_ ticist questioning of the objective nature of "things-in- mology he tries to overcome the alleged themselves" do[mati.- of th" as a scandal of philosophy. But he disproves materialist recognition of objective reality ind its inflnite the metaphysicians' attempts demonstrating at the objective knowability. AII that is clear from the contradictions of reality of noumena. He is especially explicit in hii Pro- I(ant's interpretation of "things-in-themselves". legomena, popular an attempt at a version of the Critiqae Neo-Kantians have excluded "things-in-themselves', from ol Pure Reason: "The essence idealism is assertion of the Kant's philosophy but they have retained the world of nou_ that only thinking beings exist, and that the other things mena, having thus accepted (albeit indirectly) Kant,s dis_ which we we perceive think in contemplation are merely tinction between those two concepts. Stiil, they pass over concepts within thinking beings, concepts to which no ob- in silence the materialist implicalions of that distinction. ject outside them corresponds. On the contrary, I say: things are given to us as objects senses existing of our 'i Sometimes Kant interprets ,,thing-in-itself,' outside us, but we know nothing about what they really the term differentlv. lpplying it,. among g.[her ihings, to human riason (the ;rii.i..t;f are, we only know their appearances, i.e., the images they kno-wledge in general) inasmuch as it is,,reason examined ouiside emoirical generate in us by affecting our senses. Therefore, I natural- application. Viewed from that angle, itself is not a nhe_ ly recogaize that there exist objects outside us, i.e., nomenon and it is not subject to-any conditions of sensuousn'esi-,, things (73; 3,386), it "is present about whose essence we know absolutely nothing but which and remains the same in itt t"-a"-uc- Lions and. in all tcmporal conditions, but it, is not in time ancl does we know through the concepts we receive as results of no[..acqurre. Ior example, a new state in which it did not exist t'arlier". their impact on our senses and call bodies, a name thus (TS; *.g.8Al..Obviously, ip t_his case too, Kant distinguishes denoting only the appearance of the object which is un- bolwee-n tlre "thing-in-itse]f" and the noumenon that is o"nlv known rtlea ot rcason which is neithcr empirically applicable nor connlcted^, to us but nevertheless real. How can one call this in any way to the world of phcnomena. t46 10* 147 fhe irrationalist Lev Shestov mentions it with indignation, t,o stress that Kant does not consider "things-in-themselves" unable to accept the fact that Kant treats "things-in-them- postulates of practical reason. Moral reason has noth- selves" as undoubtedly objectively real, in contradistinc- ing to do with them at all. Kant maintains that conscious- tion to noumena. Writes Shestov: "Here is an amazing fact ness is only moral inasmuch as it is not affected by "things- which none of us has given enough thought to. Complete- in-themselves", i.e., is not determined externally. Thus the ly dispassionately-I would even say, with joy and re- distinction between "things-in-themselves" and noumena, lief-Kant arrived by his own reasoning at the 'undemon- tentatively advanced in the doctrine of theoretical reason, strability' of the existence of God, the immortality of the becomes a radical opposition in Kant's ethics. Practical rea- soul free (which and will he regards as the content of met- son is not engaged in cognition at all. Its ideas express aphysics), believing that faith based on morality would be only moral self-consciousness. Therefore, Kant holds, "we quite enough for them and they would well serve their pur- cannot even assert that'we cognize and discern the possi- pose of being modest postulates, but he was genuinely hor- bil.i_ty of these ideas, let alone their reality". (73;5,4) rified at the idea that the reality of outer things could rely Kant counters theology by proving that morality is the on . God, faith. . Why should the immortality of the soul source of religion and not vice versa. Of course, that is an and freedom make do with faith and postulates, while sci- idealist viewpoint, but it is clearly aimed against theolo- proof entific is lavished on the Ding an sich?" (34; 221-22) gy. That also means that postulates of practical reason are This rhetorical question clearly shows what consistent ideal- not preconditions of moral consciousness but its necessary ists totally reject in Kant's philosophy. convictions which coincide with the conviction about the The thesis about essential inapplicability of categories categorical imperative of recompense. But that conviction (and of all a priori forms in general) to the suprasensuous is incompatible with the facts of real life in the real world. is among the fundamentals of Kant's theory. But he ap- Nevertheless, moral consciousness remains what it is only plies not only the categories of existence and causality but inasmuch as it is convinced that justice knows no limits also others, whose significance, according to him, is con- in space or time. According to Kant, "the belief in life af- fined to the realm of phenomena, to "things-in-themselves". ter death is not a prerequisite of demonstrating the retri- Gottfried Martin, a prominent West German expert on bution justice imposes on man; on the contrary, it is rath- Kant's philosophy, remarks in this regard: "One can well er that the conclusion about life after death is drawn from say that Kant applies almost all categories to the thing-in- the necessity of punishment". (73; 7, 306) itself, especially the categories of unity, quantity, causali- Kant actually maintains that the inevitable failure to (86; ty, community, possibility, reality and necessity." rid the world of injustice forces moral consciousness to ac- 227) But all that is not true of noumena: Kant applies no cept divine judgment. And, since morality is essentially an categories to them, thus denying their connection to sen- uncompromising acceptance of the internal law, theologi- sory data. cal postulates express the insoluble contradictions between "things-in-themselves" It may seem that the opposition of what must be done and what is. In Kant's ethics, God is to noumena refers mostly to the Critiqae ol Pu,re Rea- infinite duty inevitably conceived by pure practical reason. soz and not to Kant's theory of ethics, advanced in the Cri' V. F. Asmus is right in saying that "Kant completely re- tique Practical Reason extent, con- of which, to a certain iects the real ontological significance of religion's supernat- tradicts the first Critique. But an analysis of Kant's ethics ural content. . . The concept of God is rooted not in the disproves that view (as will be shown momentarily) and relations of concepts and their features but in the depth confirms the conclusions drawn from his theory of theoret- of consci,ence, in man's inability to reconcile himself to the ical reason. I(ant's ethics dcfincs noumena as postulates reality of evil, to the moral discord that exists in the of practical reason. This means that the assertion about world, to social evil" (L4; 443) the existence of absolutely free will, personal immortality Among postulates of pure practical reason Kant singles and God are factually and theoretically groundless. It pays out free wiII as an absolute (and in that sense preiimin- t48 149 ary) condition of morality, whose very existence proves that l(ant's system, the moral law forbids lies but permits, where there is this free will. But this does not refer to a noume- rrocessary, figures of silence-and Kant often resorted non or the so-called ontological, primal freedom conceiva- l,o them because his "religion within pure reason" was of- ble^only as an a_ priori idea, but io relative freedom, quite ficially condemned. Thus Kant asserts that the idea of free- suffl-cient to explain the possibility of morality. ',Freid,om dom (actually, simply freedom) should be conceived as in the _practical sense is will's (Willkiir) independence of preceding and generating the ideas of God and immor- ympu_lsi,on by the impuls_es of the senies.', 1iZ; S, erc1 lality. This definition of freedom by Kant is essentialiy similar tir Therefore, on the one hand, there is the fact of freedom, those provided by Spinoza and other pre-Marxiin material- obviously borne out by the existence of morality, and on ists who understood freedom as reasbn's domination over the other hand, there are theological ideas which can only affects. And although Kant holds that practical freedom be interpreted as convictions held by moral and essentially stems from the idea of transcendental fieedom, he inter- free consciousness. It is only practical reason, Kant main- prets will's relative independence of sensory impulses as tains, that, "through the concept of freedom, provides the an empirically established fact which forms a sufflcient concepts of God and immortality with objective reality, basis for acti_ons dependent on the subject and determining with the right and, moreover, the subjective need (the need its responsibility for the consequences. of pure reason) to be assumed". (73; 5, 4-5) What then is the position of the idea of transcendental To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted immedi- freedom among other noumena (postulates of practical rea- ately that Kant uses the term "objective reality" to express s-o-n)? Theology claims that absolute free will-is incompat- the necessary universal significance of ideas of reason (and ible with the natural order of things, that it is a case of forms of knowledge in general), and not to denote reality direct divine predetermination. In this problem, too, Kant independent of knowledge. The concepts of God and im- actually opposes theology: in his view, the concepts of God mortality which, according to Kant, are not deduced from and personal immortality proceed from the concept of free- the material of knowledge and which form what might be dom. Here Kant is more categorical than anywhere else. called secondary postulates of practical reason can only be "Since its reality is demonstrated by a certain apodictic explained proceeding from its subjective need as the re- law of practical reason, the concept of freedom is the cor- sult of its freedom, aimed at the realization of the moral nerstone (Schlusstein) of the entire edifice of the system law. Therefore, these ideas are not arbitrary; man creates of- pure, ev-en speculative reason, and all other concepts the concepts of God and immortality not in any way he (those of God and immortality) which, being mere ideis, likes but according to his far from arbitrary needs. This are not based on that system, are added to it, and with idea was later to be expressly stated by Feuerbach: arvare it and because of it they acquire firmness and obiective of his helplessness before the external world and search- reality, i.e., their possibility is demonstrated by the fact ing for at least illusory support in his struggle against the that freedom is real, because this idea manifests itself in elements, man creates the idea of something omnipotent. moral law. But freedom is the only idea of speculative rea- But Feuerbach is an atheist, while Kant remains religious son whose possibility we know a priori although we cannot "within pure reason". According to Kant's philosophy of comprehend it, because it is a condition of the moral law religion, "the doctrine of the existence of God is but doc. we know. But the concepts of God and. Intmortality are not trinal faith". (73; 3, 553). Such faith is inevitably limited conditions of the moral law but merely conditions of the l-recause it runs counter to the , lecessary object of the will, determined by that law." (73; that is, the self-criticism of reason, which holds that one 5,3-4) cannot "positively expand the realm of the objects of our One can hardly find another quotation where Kant for- l,hinking beyond the conditions of our sensuousness or as- mulates his interpretation of the interrelationship of ideas sume the existence of not only phenomena but also of ob- of practieal reason as explicitly and even lrankly. Under .fects of pure thinking". (73; 3, 240) By applying this pre-

150 t51 celt to religio-n, ,,I ,,thing_in_itself Kant_says: must not even say: it is mor_ logically consistent deflnition of the ,'. In ally certain that God ex_ists, etc., but: t ,- ;;; his case, such a definition would have been" tain, etc." (73; -oru[y u" ,"i- oi u._ 3, 555_) Kant,s philosophy of religion"is, of cape from the_problem Kant wanted to pose and deal with course, not atheism, but it has played an impo"rtant role comprehensively. Any attempt at fornially defining th" in the his_tory of atheism in the New Age. "thing-in-itself" is hopeless. A deflnition of itre ,i"ti-_ Thus Kant's concept ,'thing-in--itself" of the is contrasted ited diversity of things is only meaningful irrur*r.t,"eat, as of the noumenon, although the ,,thing_in_ it unites its numerous abstract-that itself"L" !lr.g .concept is] inevitablt ;";_ is interpreted as existing outside sp"ace and time-and sided-definitions. But how does one define ttris aiversitv-or is not, strictly speaking, a thing in the .isual sense oi iire the objectively existing which, to a signifi.u"t (r"a,'ir.r_ word because the latter, being spatially definite and sensu_ even overwhelming) degree, is n6t yet orrsly perceived, lr"p.,- the of;""[ ot is a _phenomenon. The"relationship f.i*u." knowledge? these mutually excfusive ,,tt ,,thing_in_it- - concepts, the i"g_i"-itseit;; Thus the antinomy of Kant's concept of the and the noumenon, points to tfie contradictioi b.t*..r, self" reflects the heterogeneous content materialism of the proffl* frl and idealism Kant tries to overcome. Hence poses. Therefore, we should refer not only to thb antinomy also ce_rtain, mostly a terminological, vagueness of dis_ 9f the "thing-in-itself" as a concept but also to the ,o"tr^ tinction which enables many students of kant to t""n dictions of the cognitive process "things-in-themselves" itself, the contradictions into noumena. This corfusion oli which, to a certain_ extent, Kant exposes. Mo.eover, c_oncepts and w" slurring over the distinction fundamental to should in all pr_obability refer to the contradictiors of otlec- Kant's philosophy rejects the latter's materialist ,.p.ri. tive reality itself. For example, the opposition The materialist of the upp.ur- interpretation of the,,thing_in-it."ti;;_ ance and the essence, the essence and phenomena doei not which, as we have shown, is not alien to Kari-eoco*pur_ depend on knowledge at all. And, if Kant does not distin_ ses all reality__because it exists irrespective of the cog"i- guish..clearly enough between the different meanings tive process. of The concept refers to an infinite murtitudJ of the "thing-in-itself" it is likely because he is the objects not necessarily related d; i; to the cognizing-generite subject, grasp the need for this distinction. The complexity of the and not .simply individual things that sehsa- problem inevitably points to the conclusion tions. -to that th"e incon_ It is a probllm, and, of not only for Kant. He sistency usually stressed in analyzing Kant's doctrine has recorded the fact "orrse, of that objects independent of th; c;t_ "things-in-themselves" is largely the reverse side of the nizing subject do not determine, at leait directly, its the6_ purposeful search for a real solution of the problem. retical notions. The evol,tion This of the latter is affected not search -is incompatible with simplifying the issue for the merely by the object of knowledge but also by the incom_ sake of an iliusory sotuiion that parably more ^arriving lt would satisfy complex interrelationships of phenomena_ a superficial intellect. And, in contrast to the idealist in- natural and-social,_objective and subjective, physical and terpretation of Kantian philosophy, dialectical psychological. "Sninf.ur"ii materialism As the Soviet philosopirer V.' i. interprets and solves Kant's problem in the entirety of its ,ob:,"ryg:, "the duplication of ihe objects of knowledg; ;; historical development. both things-in-themselves and phenomena was not slmply an. epistemological error on the part of Kant. This ambi_ guity-is present in knowledge itself. The thing as it is per_ ceived and general]V k_noyn by the cognizin[ subject and as it exists in itself is both the same and totally difjerent.,' $5;.7Q Therefore, Kant was mistaken not in ai.ti"g"i.tr- ing between phenomena and "things-in-themselves,, 6ut in opposing one to the other. One cannot blame Kant for having failed to provirle a t52 THE DIALECTICAL IDEALISM this knowledge is universal and necessary, or (which in OF JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICIITE Kant's view is the same), objective. Transcendent-al logic is a doctrine about forms of thinking and their application to sensory data. These a priori Iorms are the idealistically and agnostically interpreted univers_ality and necessity of categorical forms of iogni- l,ion. 'Ihus, transcendental logic anticipates, to a certain de- gree, the problems of dialectical logic. "To a certain degree" because Kant rules out the examination of the deuel- Dialectics had existed long before the theory of dialec- opmerut ol categories, regarding them as immutable struc_ tics and d,ialectical loglc appeared. But, as a system of tural forms of thinking and experience in general. But theoretically substantiated postulates, the theory of devel- d_iale-ctical logic (and dialectics in general) eiamines the opment, which is also a theory of knowledge and a method development of the forms of universality inherent in thinking. deliberately contrasted to the metaphysical mode of think- Therefore, although Kant played a prominent part in ing, dialectics emerges only in classical German philosophy. the history of dialectics and founded dialectical idealism, Even Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Diderot and Rous- he was not, strictly speaking, a dialectical idealist. seau did not lay down a theory of dialectics, although they Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a direct follower of Kant, was did have brilliant dialectical insights. the first representative of dialectical idealism. Marx said Immanuel Kant drew up a doctrine about the inevitabil- that Fichte's concept of the absolute subject, together with ity of contradictions at the highest level of theoretical Spin-oza's sub-stance, idealistically interpreted, became part knowledge. Kant's transcendental dialectics deals with un- of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's postulate that substance avoidable errors of pure reason which strives, according to should also be understood as subject (that it becomes sub- its nature, to rise above the inevitable limitations of ex- ject as a deueloping substance) is already implicit in Fich- perience and the mind. te's philosophy. The opposition of Kant's "transcendental logic" to for- Fichte the dialectical idealist differs substantially from mal logic definitely poses the issue of creating dialectical his dialectical predecessors. He was the first philosopher Iogic. As Kant pointed out, formal logic abstracts itself to deliberately develop dialectics as a method of researeh, from any content and examines only pure forms of thinking. the theory of development, the system of the categories of Consequently, those forms of thinking which, for all scientific knowledge, and philosophy as a science. their universality, possess definite content (specifically, all Marx called Kant's philosophy the German theory of the categories are like that), remain outside formal logic. The F'rench Revolution (l; 1, 206). This definition also applies latter is iriterested neither in the necessary and the acci- to Fichte's theory: his dialectics can be properly understood dental, nor in the possible and the real, nor in other cate- precisely as a philosophical interpretation and conscious gories-that is, forms of thinking which reflect the exist- oxpression of that revolution. Manfred Buhr is right ing forms of universality irrespective of thought. According when he says that Fichte's "first works are . . . an open, to Kant, logic is to deal not only with subjective forms of courageous and emotional acceptance of the revolution in thought but also with the forms of universality inherent I,'rance and recognition of the right to overthrow govern- in phenomena themselves. "In this case there must be a ments in general." (41; 43) His later works on the philos- Iogic which does not abstract itself from any content of ophy of law and ethics are largely devoted to the analy- knowledge." (73; 3, 83) Despite the subjectivist interpre- sis of government and law problems and social issues ad. tation of the world of phenomena, this obviously recog- vanced by the French Revolution during the National Con" nizes the need for a new, dialectical logic. This logic is tti vention. Fichte considered himself an ally of French bour- trace the origin of our knowledge about objects because gcois revolutionaries. When militant reactionaries succeeded

,.54 155 The idea people in removing him_Irom the faculty of the University of of shaping their own history was born of the bourgeois Enlightenment Jena, he wrote: "The reason behind it is clear: is ob- as a theoretical generaliza- it tion of the antifeudal popular vious although no one will call it by its name. . . To them movement. But this convic. tion, regarded as self-evident by all opponents of clerical- L lq^l democrat, a Jacobin; that is the whole point." (49; 5, 286) ism, failed to fit in with other, equally significant convic- tions Enlighteners. Fichte was an open and dedicated opponent of the leudal of the They put a naturalist construc- system and ideology that reigned in German states. That tion on society, arguing that people's lives were shaped, on the one ideology, both religious and secular, sanctified the exist- hand, by their external natural environment and, ing o-r-de1 of things as inviolable, natura.l, justified its on the other hand, by their inner nature. But neither the by external age-old history, traditions and customs. The division into natural environment nor human nature depend on people. In that case, . whence conviction people estates, the privileges of feudal lords, the oppression and - - the that shape their own history? poverty of the mass of people, the tyranny of ttre aristoc- r_acy led by the royal family and wallowing in The bourgeois Enlightenment never formulated this an- luxury-all tinomy. that was proclaimed ordained by human nalure and divine True, sometimes, while discussing free will antl reason. Submission and humility were regarded necessity, the Enlighteners did note that contradiction. Sig- as the high- nificantly, est virtues. Any idea that the existing order could or should while lBth-century French materialists offered a be changed was treated as sacrilege. But French fatalistic interpretation of necessity, they nevertheless in- the sisted people Revolution destroyed the feudal system and discredited that shaped their history themselves. This conclusion stemmed directly from its ideology. Fichte welcomed this revolution not only a their atheist world view. as Fichte profoundly landmark in French history and an example to be emu- is aware of the contradictions in the lated. He saw it as an expression of a law oJ world history, naturalist interpretation of human history. Before him, u-luy which pegple had previously failed grasp Kant already pointed to them, but he regarded them as es- to and sentially insurmountable which therefore had failed to become essenc-e because freedom was inherent in an of their the conscious activity. But it is activity that lies at the heart world of things-in-themselves, while necessity belonged of the essence of man and world history. And something to the world of phenomena. Fichte rejects this dualistic if precept proves exists contrary to man's interests and well-being, it meani and that the contradiction between freedom and necessity that man does not sufficiently understand the decisive can be resolved- role of his own activity. Says Fichte: of world his- As an empirical agent, man is totally dependent on nat- "In all ural laws. tory we shall never find anything which we ourselves have "I myself with all that I call mine am a link chain ,1,5) not introduced into it before." (49 6,39) In other words, in this of inviolable natural necessity." (52; 3, Both man's psychological people are authors of their historical drama. Fichte arrived activity and his bodily being are at that conclusion in his article entitled "A Contribution necessarily shaped by forces over which he has no control. to Correct the Public View of the French Revolution". In "What exists in nature is necessarily such as it is, and it that article Fichte explained his conclusion: "y'fo state sys- is absolutely impossible that it be otherwise." (52 3, 10) tem is sale change, it is in their nature that they all According to Fichte, the endless causality which predeter- from mines change. A bad system which runs counter to the necessary each moment of man's life, the universal connection ultimate goal of any state unit must be changed; good of cverything to aII, means that the existence of an empir- a one ical which contributes to the attainment of this goal changes subject is determined by any accidental factor, by the position grain sand itself ." (49; 6, 103) This quotation from Fichte is es- of a of on a seashore, for example. pecially valuable in its admission of the uniuersal and nec- Hence my Ego is not my own creation. "It is impossible essarg character of change. Und,er an!/ conditions, not [or another to take my place; it is impossible for mef having emerged, only when man is dissatisfled, change is bound to occur; to be, at some moment of my existence, dif - change is a universal law. ferent from what I am in reality." (52 3, 15) But if that

{56 157 rs the_ case, no Ego, no personaiity exists. However, the itself creates conditions that determine its history. 0i empirical Ego, the human individual, does not want and course, this approach to the problem is still quite abstract, therefore cannot reconcile himself to the omnipotence oli and it does not rule out an erroneous-and theological-in- nature. This Ego revolts against the slavery imposed on. it, tcrpretation of world history. But in the actual context of and the strelgth of this revolt helps it compreh-end its reai the development of classical German philosophy it led to relation to the external world. "There is in me,,, Fichte the materialist interpretation of history which offered a sci- writes, yearning- ."a for an absolute, independent self-activity. cntific explanation of how and why'mankind was really There is nothing less acceptable for he than existence the author of its historical drama. only in another, for another and We shall later return to the concept of the absolute sub- through' another. I want to be and become something for myself and through my- ject. But before we turn to the analysis of the dialectics of self. I feel- this yearning as soon ai I perceive myielf ; it the Ego and the non-Ego, we should yet again stop to con- is inseparable from my sider those bourgeois-r'evolutionary views of Fichte's which -self-consciousneis.', (SZ; ,, 85) Thanks to historical development whose most esseolial are directly linked to his dialectical understanding of the conte_nt, according to Fichte, is self-knowledge, man realizes world. Feudal ideology treated social contrasts as primal and that he is a slave of his own external and-internal nature absolute. Bourgeois ideology rejected this metaphysical op- only as an ind,iuidual, as an empirical Ego unaware position of man to man as contrary to human nature. In of its unity with the universal Ego of humanily, with the this bourgeois ideologists proceeded from the concept of absolute subject, the infinite activlty which is tLe absolute immutable human nature. Rousseau is the only one to ap- poygl of negation and the absolute power of creativity. proach the issue of the history of society affecting human Self-consciousness, Fichte maintains, forces man io face nature. Fichte repeatedly quotes and supports Rousseau, pseudonecessity. but goes -And then it turns out that he is a prod- he further in understanding human nature. He re- uct gf nature_only, as an empirical Ego, but as a pure Ego duces the latter to actiuity and regards all the qualitative attached to the absolute subject man creates nalure and characteristics of man as objective expressions of that ac- the necessity inherent in it. Freedom is the essence of the tivity. absolute subject. Its will, the absolute will, is ,,the flrst Fichte rejects as unworthy of man the traditional feudal link in the chain of consequences.of this world, the chain view that masters remain masters and serfs remain serfs. that passes through the entire invisible realm of the spir- Developing the ideas of Rousseau and anticipating Hegel's it; just as in the earthly world acLion, the known move- famous postulate about the relative character of the con. ment of matter, is the first link in the material chain which trast between master and slave, Fichte questions the ap. embraces the entire system of matter." (52; 3, ll8) parently self-evident truth: are masters really masters? And That is how Fichte resolves the contradictions inherent do slaves remain slaves? He exclaims with indignation: in the naturalist interpretation of the "man-nature', corre- "Anyone considering himself master of others is himself a lation. He rejects the fundamental naturalist thesis which slave. If he is not always really a slave, then he has the holds that the external natural environment and human na- soul of a slave, and he will cringe disgustingly before the ture itself shape the life of man. However, this correct con- first one who is stronger and who enslaves him. Only he is clusion follows from erroneous idealist premises. free who wants to make free everything around him." (52, Fi.chte's philosophy fails to see the tiue force that shapes 1,237) man's life: social production, social production rela- Thus the opposition between masters and slaves turns tions. This, no doubt, expresses his bourgeois limitations. out to be dialectical The French Revolution brought down How_ever, the important point is that Fichte the bourgeois feudal lords. Fichte idealizes the bourgeois revolution, he revolutionary advances (albeit in the erroneous ideatist sees it as abolishing all relations of domination and sub- form) a brilliant insight which anticipates one of the fun- mission. This great objective justifies revolutionary vio- damentals of the scientiflc approach to history: mankind lence.

158 159 Thus, Fichte's passion for dialectics is rooted in the bour- from a fundamental precept, so that "if and inasmuch as geois revolution. In his view, the revolutionary restruc- l,his first is authentic, the second must also be authentic; turing of society, the consciozzs transformation of state and irnd if the second is authentic, by the same token the third legal rclations, the abolition of the feudal yoke, identifled rnust be authentic, etc," (51; 7). with the abolition of any oppression, reveai the universal However, Fichte'is far from regarding the conscioushess essence of man and human history. of an individual, the individual consciousness he describes The ideologues of the French Revolution, the French En- ns the empirical Eg.o, as the cornerstone of his systenr. That lighteners, were mostly metaphysicians and not dialecti- cornerstone, he maintains, is the absolute Ego whose exist- cians. They absolutely opposed the new tg the old, and that once cannot be questioned either. This he refers to "quite undoubtedly played a revolutionary ideological role. Unlike a different Ego, concealed from ordinary eyes, not te- those people, Fichte was a contemporary of the French vealing itself in the realm of facts, but knowable only by Revolution, he interpreted it drawing on the ideas of his rising to the basis". (50; 35) Fichte hoth opposes the abso- French forerunners. On the other hand, Fichte was a fol- lute subject to the er4pirical Ego and insists that they form Iower of Kant and of the German diaiectical tradition in an integral whole. This is a thesis of tremendous theoret- general. This explains why in new historical conditions ical and ideological significance. Each human individual dialectical idealism became the ideology of the bourgeois comprises something absolute. True, the empirical subject revolution in Germany. comprises the absolute Ego only in a limited, undeveloped The mission of philosophy, according to Fichte, "is to and transient form. But the absolute Ego realizes itself furnish man with strength, courage and confldence, show- in the activity of finite empirical subjects. i"g thq! all this and his destiny as a whole hinge upon While Berkeley is content to examine the individual hu- himself". (52; 5, 345) That is what Fichte sees as the man subject who perceives his sense impressions with com- meaning of his philosophy which he describes as a consist- binations of the latter allegedly forming the objects of the ent development of the concept of freedom. In one of his sensuously perceived world, Fichte deems it necessary to letters to Reinhold he remarks: "The soul of my system is rise from the individual Ego to the universal Ego, the ab- the statement: the Ego is unquestionably conscious of it- solute subject. OnIy that absolute subject is the source of self. These words have no meaning nor value without the everything existing, it is the activity which creates and inner self-contemplation of the Ego." (48; L, 477-78) He rletermines everything. substantiates this postulate by analyzing the concept oi the The empirical subject is potentially absolute only in it- absolute subject, the absolute Ego. self. The opposition between the absolute subject and the The concept of the absolute Ego is the most difficult and ompirical Ego is relative although it is the relation of the the least clear concept in Fichte's system. Naturally, Fich- runiversal to the individual, of the everlasting to the tran- te proceeds directly from the human Ego whose existence sient, the suprasensuous to the sensuous, the infinite to the is, in his eyes, incomparably more obvious than that of ex- finite. According to Fichte, the limitation of this opposition ternal objects, that is, everything he negatively describes (which, naturally, is impossible to overcome), the rise as the non-Ego. In his analysis of self-consciousness, Fich- of the individual to the level of the universal is the most te, like Kant, arrives at the correct conclusion that it is profound essence of all that takes place in the world. This only possible inasmuch as there is the perception of the is likely to lead to the conclusion that for all its specula- external world. But in an idealistic system of views the t,ive abstract nature, the absolute Ego is actually mankind recognition of the external world is a conclwsioz based on in the course of its past, present and future development- intellectual intaition and on the direct awareness of the t,hat is, mankind unlimited by any historical bounds which unquestionable existence of the human Ego. Philosophy, could have restricted the development of its knowledge, its Fichte emphasizes, must proceed only from that which is l)ower over nature and the perfection of its social organi- absolutely authentic: its entire content must be deduced zation. But this idealist abstract concept of mankind, an

,1.61 160 11-01562 abstraetion that to a ceriain extent erodes the distinctive jective knowledge, nature of social development, a reflection_, a replica of things. .. t[" does not at all exhaust ihe rdea, pure c-oncept -or _seeing (blosses Gesicht) is the real- and onlv of the absolute- subjec-t. In the final aaalysis, li,rue absolute .!ein-g *lrr.! reveals itself to pure thougfrt.'i OZ:-d.. lt l _ESo is substaniialized activity transfor"med 31) Fulther, Fichte ,,The 'rr] into the absolute subject. That is ,,something emphasizes: ,rul- b?o' -,irf totally un_ pear only as the life of the concept. conditional and undeterminable by anythiig nigtrer;. The Ego"wh;;; .;T_ (52; 1,314) consciousness would include some other pri-nciple r.sia.t Fichte the absolute concep-t would not be the trui Bgo' f"f *e".- refuses to proceed from the categories of beinp ly an and substance. He maintains appearance of (b2,6,_37) That is precisely that they sh6dd be viewef w-hV Fichte's -thu Pgo." as forms through which activity realizes absolute subject ii, as Marx and Ensels ooi"i_ itself. He is noi ed out, other than- ,,metaphysica[y satisfled with the formula that aitivity is inherent -none aissui"sed'iirit in being. separated from nature_"'. 4, In that case activity is r_egarded as a quality, abilitiy _(l; igg) fnit coicepi-oi'it. an first cause eventually leadi to ihe recognition gf being which, apparently, possesses oitrer L'tritities tod. of the divine ,,That first cause of the a,risting. While But activity is that which makes being being. whose i" t i, ;;;k; (essence) Fichte does not formulate t[is concrusion, rater-h"""-rti*. L q,iitt b.eing is_ solely that it posits itself-as existing, is explicit the. Ego-as_lhg absolute about it. subject." (52; 1, 2gl) This"ex- Thus, Fichte plains-why Fichte rejects strives to prove that since activity is recos- the-traditidnai philosophical con- nized as cept of substance, usually understood -absolute, it is not an object but a ,rUr.i.- rrt as fhe absblute basis only in sense of of this the absolute Ego. This identifiLation of .th.e iiversity _being which is devoid of self-activity activity wjth substance, and independence. It is true that Leibniz revised wil.h _the subject and, finaliy, *itf, the con- (Ichheit). as the idealist c-ept of sub_stance and interpreted it as the force making :df,"..r., solulion ,t tn, f.V'ptli": sophical-proUem implies the absolute the material alive. But Fichte believes even concept opposition of fhe-oi-trre sub- that t6 ject to the_ object aJ the point be insufficient because in Leibniz's view monads of departure. "pittr,er and- not two must be removed: spirit or nature; the activity are substances. Fichte maintains that if the con- two cannot be united at all. Their imaginary unity is partly nypo".isy cept of substance is to be used at all, it should be reduced lig:, a"a to the absolute subject. as Ta^pgrllv tle insonsisiency- imposed 6v [fi" te.ii*; "Insofar the Ego is viewed 6, does not reject as comprising the entire and fully determined- circle .Q2; -3-2) ^He ihe dxisten., oi of all the world o-f things ""i"rl,.of realities, it is substance." (52; L,337) V. F. Asmus is right -perceived through the senses, ii, iriar_ pendence of the individual human- Ego. Ue reiects--ttre to _point out that Fichte's philosophy combines subjective primacy and objective idealism. (13; of the natural, material. 81) Since the absolute Ego is Furtl_r_ermore, treated as something different from mankind, - treating activity as an absolute means ide_ it admitJ the alistic-ally interpreting motion existence of a supranatural and suprahuman fi.rst cause- and change inherent in sen_ slously perceived things covered general that is, recognizes the starting pbint of objective ideal- by the concept of ism. -it the non-Egg. Ih. motion and change of inings are viiwed "My absolute Ego," Fichte writes to Jacobi, "is, of as alienated forms course, not the individual. . But of activity; they are ther"efore rea"cea . the individual must be to activity which Fichte deduced from the absolute Ego." (48; 1,507) Fichte's dis- .both distinguishes from and op_ poses to the motion and change inherent natural tinction between the concepts of the absolute subject and in things'.* mankind - Th, S"viet philosopher--y. .,Fichte to a certain degree anticipates Hegel's concept-only of V. Lazarev says: insisted the dialectical identity of being and thought. "The tnat developTent was gctually contained not iir the ,obiect' itsef thing that undoubtedly exists," he writes Dut only tq the method of theoretical construction and ii the wav in his System ol it rvas. set forth. He believed that the concept-oi-i[.Trm-arr.ioriii the Moral Theory (1812), is the concept, the purely spir- ollec-t' was self-contradictory and aestructi'ie io.-ti. .-rriiir'ri'"rt "-". itual being. The majority cannot rise to such being as the I{is dialectics of self-consciousness did not phvsical-view *r..ly ioi.."t.'irrJ'iifr- concept. To them, the concept is only an expression of ob- of narure gs a morionlesslori.ttl-lf i-iiira-irii, view and was based on it" (22; BB) 1.62 ll. 163 forms 6f are derivatives. world is undoubted- aibeit sub- activity "This iflchte;s piriiosophy provided a co*prtL"nsive, only the sphere of our activity and definitely nothing jectivist-vofuntarist principle of an ac- ly development of the greater. Consciousness of the real world stems from the of paramount importance tive role of the subject, already need to act, and not vice versa-the need to act from con- the existence of "things-in-them- in Kant's system. Denying sciousness of the world; this need is primary, consciousness Kant's agnosticism, the ob- selves", FiChte rejects not only of the world is a derivative. We do not act because we jeet's that is, the n-on-Ego's independence of the subject, learn, we learn because our mission is to act; practical rea- independence of the absolute Ego. Since the absolute Ego is son is the root of all reason." (52; 3, 99) is continuous activity and constant emergence, it lot Fichte offers idealist interpretation of the sub- immutable. thus an something that is ready in advance, something epistemological understanding of practice as process stantially new Its relation to the non-Ego should be viewed a basis He even goes further, describ- negation of the as the of knowledge. of change, of development. Therefore, the practice and therefore as the es- words, the- non- ing as universal activity reality independent of the Ego (in other However, both consciousness and uni- sence of the absolute subject. Ego) must iully take into account the interaction practice something that is different from them. both mutually exclusive and and imply tf oi those opposites which are Activlty is impossible without an object. Therefore the Ego mutually implying. exists. Self-ac- the asserts itself only inasmuch as the non-Ego The ielatibn between the Ego and the non-Ego is op- the tivity of the absolute subject and the existence of its subject of Fichte's supreme principlej. Accordin-g to each other. Fichte formu- Ego originally undo- posite, the objective, determine first supreme principle, the absolute dialectical as a subjective idealist, assert- means that the entire lates this lruth doubtedly posiis its own being. This ing that the Ego posits the non-Ego. That is the second su- rooted in the activity (Tat-han- content of ionsciousness is preme principle, according to which the opposition between Ego.'J\e Eg-o is the source dlung), the self-positing of the ihe ngb and the non-Ego exists only within the abso- of a-li' reality, because it is posited directly and uncon- outside the latter. and lute Ego because nothing at all exists ditionally. ThL'concept of reality is given only through inherent the posits Fichie is well aware of all the difficulties in together with the Eg-o. But the Ego exists because it problem of subject and self- subjectivist-idealist solution of the its- existence, and tlhat because it exists. Therefore, necessary preco_n- But the object. The existence of the non-Ego is a positing and'being are one and the same thing. positing own being. If that is the in are also dition for the Ego its ioncept"s of self-p6siting and activity -general does not posit the existence of the non-Ego reality is active and case, the Ego or. u'rd the sam6. It follows that any condition of its activity; that questions or (52; 1,329) but finds it as a everything active is reality." at least limits the self-positing of the Ego' The bare Car- 'The firit supreme principtb does not yet comprise-.the Hele tesian cogito ergo surn (I think, therefore I am) -is essen- concept of the world of obletts, of the- 1on-Ego. {ch' implies an object independent the Eg-o' tially impossible: thinking te deiiberately excludes everything which is not writes: "The Ego never per- of the absolute sub- of the thinking subject. Fichte thus postulating the absolute freedom perceive itself except in its empir- of conditions, and the ceives itself and cannot ;ect, absolute a"ctivity's independfnle These empirical definitions always im- empirical Ego to shape, create it- ical definitions. . . ifllitv of the human, ply something that is outside the Ego. Even a man's body r.if-ot course, only inasmuch as it approachgs^ tle 9b5o. outside the man's life is "that ,hich he calls his own body, is something Iute subject. Therefbre the meali-"g 9t (52; 1, 223) Typically, Fichte excludes everything personal life, all of its strength and Ego." each devote his entire toaity from the concept of the Ego (in this case it is the all of its pleasures, to ideas". (521 4,460-61) ----Furthei, the pri- empiiical subject). But he agrees that the bodily affects the frrst supreme principle formulates extent even determines it, interpreted) ac- consciousness and to a certain mact oi practical (of course, idealjitically of the subject by the object is in- activity and knowledge in g-eneral' llrt this determination ii"itv o"& theoretical l,erpreted as posited by the subject, as the self-restriction, Attotot" activity is, ahove ali, practical activity: aII other

+0F ,,M : splitting ioto 1wg, self-alienation of the subject. Therefore, l,o affect. the Ego."- (52; according Fichteos 1, 471) Naturally, Fichte,s system t9 theory, the admission"that tlril;_ tloes develop these "They ists "something outside Ego', .not and other similar statementr. the remains within .ornr", are with subjective-idealist of s_ubjective idealism, becausJ the external lncompatible its basis. Tracl_ is interpreied ing them to their logrlal conclusion means .abandoning as the self-restriction. of the subject (that is atreaa5i-pre_ sent s lhjective i4ealism in favor of a materialist recognition o'f in Kant's system) "things-in-themselves" "idealism. As it was to be expected, Fichte or in favor of objective - uses idearist dialectics The objective-idealist trend keeps surfacing to substantiate subjective idealism. The opposition in f,ichie's b;d;;, l,heory, but it is suppressed by vbluntarist sibjectivism. thg.subject and the object is interpreted as' a ,".rli ,i ifr" subject's activity, Th5-, the- analysis of the flrst and the second supreme althoug! this acfivity is' impossibi. ;iii_ principles Fichte's theory out the existence of the o-bject independent ,,Aoy _of slows that he cannot'fully of it. op_ overcome Kant's "thing-in-itself,', that his own philosophi- position as such exists only jnasmuih as the Ego acts, and not fo-r cal consistency forces him to admit the existence of solne- any othel reLsgl.- Opp,osition is generilly prritrA t,hing which only through the Ego." (SZ; I,'Zg7) transcends the bounds of the subjective-idealist solution of the central problem of philosophy. Fichte's con- Nevertheless, for all his attempts at substantiatins the clusion is a continuation of Kantis appioalh to the rela- subjective-idealist solution of the^ problem of sufjeci ana tion object even between theoretical and practical ieason. The problem - despite his conviction ihat their unity cannot of be substantiated .the original impulse-or, more precisely, of the reality otherwise (of course if one rejectJ the de_ independent of peadence of the s-ubject the subject-is reiognized' as insolvabli on the object), Fichte is forced to rvithin the confines admit that his substantiation lackj of the theoretical approach to nhiloso- a biearly necessary ele_ phy; it is s-olved- by the practical ment_ which, however, is ruled out by the entire approach-. One should note, content of however, that this formulation of- ihe problem contains t4-e theory. I! his letter to Reinhold quoted earlier Fichte a rational element: the existence of realiiy that is indeoen- ofrers the following description of thi difficulties in ttre rlent substantiation ,,If of consciousness is proved above all practically.' of the co-ncept of the absolute Ego: the The dialectical opposition Ego posits - of the Ego and the non-Ego, -originally only iis own existence, thei how is it of thesis and possible for something antithesis, of reality and negation, of actilon different to be posited too, that and submission necessarily question which opposes th,e Ego?" (48, raise the about the 1,478) Thi; means that the outcome of this struggle of oplosites. cannot be something that has Why does one oppo- 1on-!go appear ed, alter the site not destroy the other? \4rhy do they not cancel Ego, B-ut- then the- original aCt of self-posiling is not really each other out? Is their synthesis possible and if it is, how can . original because the action of positinf (and-consequently, be the very it achieved? Fichte tries tb answer all those questions, -existence of the subjec[) aheady implies the exist- thereby proving ence of the object, of objective reality. lot only the necessity of the third- supreme princip]e but also theoretical understanding Therefore the non-Ego cannot be reduced the 6f the to the Ego be- interrelationship of opposites in general. cause this reduction would have destroyed the unity of op- In Fichte's opinion, the unity of opposites denotes the posites whioh is the basis and the content of self-oonscioui- t,ransition of the qualities of one aspeii into those of the ness. And Fichte admits that the Ego needs funda- a ol,her. If the Ego defined as activiiy and the non-Ego as mental external impulse, a primal impetus without which -is passivity, the dialectics of these opposites inevitably leads activity, _self-positing and self-consciousness are impossi- ble. the principle l,o the Ego acquiring passive aspects, and the non-Ego, those "Although of life and consciousnesi, the of activity. "Passivity and proof of its polsibility, are, of course, contained activity as such are opposed; in the Ego, nevertheless, activity must necessarily it is not yet the source of any real imply passivit]r and life, any empirical life vice versa." (521, 1,347) in time . . . If this real life must be possible, [his needs Opposition implies the unity of difference and identity, 'still another special impetus on the part of the non-Ego _ There is no identity without difference; there is no differ- t00 ts7 ence without identity. It follows from the second supreme does not have to be demonstrated because it is intuitively principle, according to which the Ego posits the existence obvious. Writes Fichte: "This characteristic of the Ego of the non-Ego, that "the Ego posits negation in itself since which cannot at all be ascribed to the non-Ego is the un- it posits reility in the non-Ego, and it posits reality conditional positing and the unconditional being posited, witfiin itself since it posits negation in the non-Ego. Th]rs without any ground i' (521' 1, 354-55) In other words, the it posits itself to be self-determining since it receives the Ego differs from the non-Ego in that it needs no original detirmination, and it posits itself to be receiving the {e- substantiation. Naturally, this fundamental postulate of termination since it determines itself." (52; 1,325)'r This subjective idealism does not help in solving the problem means that the Ego is both active and passive at the same of the unity of opposites but confuses the issue still fur- time. But the same applies to the non-Ego. The ulity of ther. This key flaw of Fichte's supreme principle is aptly transition up the ijlentity noted in the letter from his outstanding contemporary Frie- opposites- appears as mutual lo oi opposites. ffre Ego not only oppos-es the non-Pgo, it drich H6lderlin to Hegel of January 26, 7795: "But his "oppbres itself". In this connection Fichte says: "The -Ego absolute Ego (: Spinoza's substance) conmprises all reality; oannot posit any passive state within itself without positing it is all and there is nothing outside it: so there is no ob- activity within the non-Ego; but it cannot poqit aly ject for this absolute Ego, otherwise it would not have corn- activity in the non-Ego without positing some passivity in prised all reality; but consciousness without an object is nec- itself.'i (52; 1, 343) Does this dialectics of opposites -not unthinkable, and even if I myself am this object I am cancel out their differences? If that which distinguishes essarily restricted as such, at least in time, and there- the Ego from the non-Ego is inherent in the latter and fore I am not absolute; thus, consciousness is unthinkable that which is distinctive of the non-Ego is present in the in the absolute Ego; as the absolute Ego I possess no con- Ego too, if there is nothing in the subject which is not p-re- sciousness, and insofar as I possess no consciousness, the rJot i, the object and viCe versa "how then can one dis- Ego (for me) is nothing, therefore the absolute Ego (for tinguish also bLtween the Ego and the- non-Ego under these me) is also nothing." (67, 6, L69) cortitiort at alt? For the basis of distinction between Self-consciousness is not the starting point of human life. them which should have made the former active and the If consciousness is recognized being, self-consciousness latter passive is no more." (52; 1,354) is the recognil,'ion of this relation of the world of man to Answering this question-which is essentially-insolvable the outside world and, above all, naturally, to other men. for a subjective idealist because he views the outside Since man, in Marx's wotds, "comes into the world neither world as d"eriveil from the subject-F'ichte maintains that with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtean phi- the problem can only be solved if the absolute Ego posses- losopher, to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and ses a quatity that cannot become a quality of the non-Ego' recognizes himself in other men. Peter only establishes his Therefore, tb solve this problem one must go bagk to- !h9 own identity as a man by comparing himself with PauI as original definition of the ibsolute subject, a definition which being of like kind." (5; 1, 59) -=-WfiE-stressing the great ilnportance o^f Fichte's approach to Fichte understands perfectly that the problem of the syn- th" nrobiem of the-mutuaT transfoimation of opposites. one should thesis of thesis and antithesis cannot be solved by looking not iorset that ils formulation is subjective-idealist, breating_ the for intermediate links combining features of both aspects. ii..ifi.*'"r itre piinciple of the mutual iletermina-tio-n of the .s.ubi99t does resolve the contradiction but object are clescribetl as an identity He holds that this not ;;;i th; antl its plane. is *frich. oo"nir.i''".iiritv tiie sl,renEth-of the activity that shapes it, splits into two merely moves it onto a different Even if there to spring out ot intermediate between the two opposites, as twi- opposites. Accordin[ to Fichte, "Do not -strive - something viiriett to embrace"more than you can embrace. such as conscious- Iight is halfway between day and night, even that inter- ir".. u"A tho thing, the thing'and consciousness' or' to be mgre mediate does not unite the opposites. The unity of op- but that which only Jat-er sp-lits link nrecisc. either of thl two scparately, possible relative and a cer- il1" i;'". that which is neces^sarily iubjective-objective and objectivn- posites is because they are in subjective." (52; 3, 80). tain sense identical. The point, according to Fichte, is that

168 +69 ': i

-"light and darkness.are not opposites in general but differ theory reveals the key features of his dialectics. Accoiding only in-degree. . . T!r" same i's'tru. of tf,E-""fuiirr"frfr't.l- to Fichte, opposition, the struggle of opposites -and their t*g9.tthe-Ego and the non_Ego". (b2;1,840) - rnutual restriction imply the activity of the Ego as their Still, do -why rhe oppositesih"-but ng;'u"a ifr! non_Ego nor primary condition. Therefore, Fichte never mentions the cancel themserves out remain? Fi"t immanent dialectics of the object, although he does demand question t. stresses that this cannot be. resolved by any means of logic; ;ir"; l,hat the basis of the unity of opposites should be sought point is not to unite. these _opposites in some *ay" but io in themselves. Interpreting any reality as subject-object, find in them that which really'ilit* that is, as mutual dependence, primacy belongs ,,h_aving it ffr.r,ifrr. ifr. in which task- is not reduced to immersed."-. ;dr;i;;;-;; ;; to the subject, Fichte is far from seeing contradictions in flqction, invent for t_hem tths;pp;sitesl"; ;#rtri j""rtriJ" objects themselves, irrespective of the existence of the sub- lI^:-:T" tl,ckery; ir means th;; ;i;; the unity';f;;;: ject. Besides, objects are described negatively, as the notr- posited simutraneousty with the positing that Ego which is, moreover, posited by the activity of the Ego. rnreatens:f:"^:::::r,is to destroy it, such a juncture must be alreadv 'fhus, substantiating the concept of the moral subject, Fich- avarlabte in our consciousness, and that our mission te considers it a condition of the recognition of the external merely is to find it through r,cflection." tSZ; I,-Siij world's dependence on the subject: "Our world is the ma- .Accordi-ng to Fichteis theory, the irniiv'of the Eso (the terial for discharging our duty; this is the true essence of ab,lolute fullness of reality) uoa tfr. G[.Tbr"i;; things, the substance of all that is seen." (49, 5, 185) Sub- fullness .of negation) is'formed itrougtr-m,iil;l-;;ff;:""r:eg" jective idealism inevitably distorts a profound approach to tron, on,the strength_of which the Ego partty determines it_ the problem of the unity and struggle of opposites. Never- seII and is partly determined by the'roo"_Ego. But this theless, Fichte's concept of subject-object dialectics provides means that the non-Ego, too, is oniy partly deter-mined i";il; a mystical reflection of the dialectical character of hu- of Ego. Fichte'formulates irr. ifri"a man activity. 1-c-!ivi!4pnnc_rpl€ "the .";i.;; ot his theory as follows: the Ego opposes the di_ The unity of the subjective and the objective reveals the visible Ego to the divisible non-Ego, thafis, bbtf, opporit., rlistinctive objectivity of social relations that are both prod. restrict each other quantitatively, In'part. ucts of the joiut, historically developing human activity Thus the third supreme priniiple,'a synthesis of the two and independent of human consciousness and will. Histor- earlier ones, cancels their orc-sid"dt ess and substantiates ical necessity differs radically from natural necessity which the unco_qditional reality of both the su[jective is independent of human activity. The laws of human ac- jective. and th; ;b: Their relations-are interpreted as a correration, trrat t,ivity are its inner content-the unity of live and objec- is,, in the spirit,of subjecti_ve idealism *t i"f, l,ivized (substantiated in the form of historical conditions, subject's dependence on the object only inasm"En"."odtr;;h" ifr" causes, institutes) human activity. Fichte treats the dis- oljegt- is- l,fV.itf,., recognized as-dependent-destroyed on tfr" ."1;..i. ", tinction between the social and the natural as an absolute, the subjec.tive be fy tfre 6ij..tirr,-"rr" he turns the social, the human into the substantial which rne:,h*l$. oDJectrtve by the subjective . . . Both must continue ex_ tletermines and gives rise to nature. isting. side by side. Theiefore they dialectics reveals the real proo- _ must be -;hi;h.v"tfr.ii"rfi, -ih;i. Fichte's subjective-idealist united, and that through something third in css and, at the same time, puts a mystical construction are equ-al,_ through determinability. Soth ,r. ,of th; ;;b"_ on it. He sees its infinity as a justification of the subjec- ject. and the obje-ct as such, but the subjective a"a irrr-o[- t,ivist, voluntarist view of the world: mankind masters the jective, posit-ed through -onlythesis and antiihesis ana -"t"ur clemental forces of nature and turns them .into its own hu- ly determinable,^and because they are such tfr.V man forces. In Fichte's words, "I want to be master of na- be united and fixed "ro [,ure, want have power over lV llre'the ability of the Ego (forte of-^ and it must be my servant; I to imagination) working in synthlsis." (52, it which is commensurate with my strength, but it must i:4bbr--'of - An examination of the supreme principlLs tr{ichte,q lravo no power over me." (52; 3,28-29) xq +Tt Fichte does not describe his method as dialectical but staiement recognizes the "thing-in-itself 'r, Fichte adds: as'antithetical, thus stressing the triadic relationship he "llut the reason underlying the fact that we connect them has discovered: thesis-antithesis-synthesis. According to Ithings] together must lie in ourselves, f or example, in our Fiche, however, the antithesis is not a result of the d,iuet- perception." (52 1, 370) Still, aside from Fiche's subjec- oprnent of the thesis. The existence of the antithesis is im- l,ive-idealist conclusions, one must stress the rational as- plied in the existence of the thesis, just as one pole of a pect of his reasoning-the recognition of the dialectical magnet implies the existence of the other. Of course, the l,ransformation of the subjective into the objective. Con- correlative unity of opposites is a substantial dialectical re- sequences of subjective human activity become an objec- lation, but Fichte sees it as the only possible one. There- tive process which is independent of men and which shapes fore he does not interpret the relation of opposites (thesis l,he conditions of their subsequent activity and partly and antithesis) genetically, in developmeni.- He describes oven the basis that determines it. even synthesis not as a new stage in development but as Naturally, Fichte offers a subjectivist interpretation of a-juncture of given opposites, as something akin to a form the transformation of the subjective into the objective, i.e., of _universality that unites them. In describing Fichte's an- the objectivization of human activity. But it is also clear tithetical method as a specific form of dialectics, V. F. As- that this dialectical process discovered by Fichte Ieads di- mus aptly remarks that "Fichte's dialectical method alter- rectly to the understanding of social development in which nates between two mutually determined approaches: the material production, an objectivized result of human activ- antithetical and the synthetic. The antithelical approach ity, is, on the one hand, live human activity and, on the Iooks for the quality in which the things under comparison other hand, an activity independent of men and determin- oppose each other. The syntheflc approach searches for the ing all their social relations as a basis. quality in which they are equal. Antithesis is impossible Already in his Phenomenology ol the Spirit, Hegel, pro. ylthggt synthesis and synthesis, without antithesis-." (13; ceeding from Fichte, was on the verge of understanding 96) However, while pointing to the inevitable flaws in Fich- the real content of the transformation of the subjective in- te's subjective-idealist dialectics, one must not underrate to the objective. That was evident in his brilliant defini- his genuine dialectical insights. tion of the essence of labor, a definition that Marx highly I must add that the third supreme principle appears to appraised. According to Marx, Hegel "grasps labor as the contradict the original subjective-idealist premise and, on essence of man-as man's essence which stands the test" the strength of the mutual determination it establishes, im- (1; 3,333). plies only partial determination of the non-Ego by the Ego. Hence, people themselves do create objective conditions True, in the language of subjective idealism this merely independent of their consciousness and will-conditions means that the Ego posits itself as partially determined that, unlike the natural environment, determine human ex- through the non-Ego. Still, the crux of the matter remains istence. Of course, Fichte does not even mention any nature unchanged: obviously, activity, process, being which is irr independent of the subject, but he constantly refers to dependent of the Ego exists not only in the non-Ego but the idea of transforming nature and subjecting it to man's in the Ego itself too. And although Fichte maintains that will. That is how he resolves the opposition between such the entire reality of the non-Ego is merely reality trans- seemingly mutually exclusive theses as "men are makers ported from the Ego, the "alienation of sorts" (Entiiussern) of their own history" and "history is determined by objec- of the Ego, he is forced to recognize this being which is tive laws independent of men's consciousness or will". Pro- independent of, although originating from, the absolute ductive forces develop through human activity, but since subject: "There must be something in things-by-themselves cach new generation inherits the productive forces created that is independent of our perception, something that en- by the preceding generations, it is obviously not free in ables them to penetrate one another without orrr assistance. its choice of productive forces, that is, of the motive forces (52; 1, 370), However, to avoid the impression that this of socio-historical development.

+7? 173 tn Because of its inhereltiy contempiative nature, pre-iltarx- , substairtiating the ffrst supreme principle of philoso- ian materi-alism ignored the transformation of itrt subjec- !.!V lr^cnte compares it to the formal logical law of ide",_ tive. into the objective, tlus weakening the concept of ihe tity. "A.is A'' (or "4:A") is obviouslyl logically subject which was described one-sidedly, mostly as an ob- pr_oposition, but it does not follow that A really "*r.itexists. ]ect, affected by things of the external world. Tie real basis What is the condition of A's existence? According d ;-t- of human history is not nature as such but the ,,second ietivg idealism, the reality of A is posited in the" Ego. nature" created by mankind throughout its history by ma- Fichte- s-ays that "the proposition- A : A is orig-inally terial production. Incidentally, this concept should be ap- meaningful only tor the Ego; it is deduced from the phii_ plied not only to the natural environmeni transformed by osophical proposition the Ego is the Ego; therefore'anv man but- content to which also to his own nature. it is -applicable must lie' in the Ego. .'. Marx and Engels criticized Feuerbach for his lack of Thus no A can be anything--other than posited, in the'Ego, therefore proposition understanding of that fundamental fact and connected it -our will read as follows: what is .frol to his naturalist and, in the final analysis, idealistic views sited in !t u- Ego is posited; if A is posited in the Ego, tiien of social relations. Fichte's dialectics enabled him to set it.is posited (because it. is precisely what is positeiai por_ forth-albeit in a speculative, idealistically absolute form sible, real or necessar-y),,and thui it is untioubteaty t'rue, *that which Feuerbach failed to see because of his met- if the Ego should be the Ego". (51; 4g) No doubt, any la# aphysical limitations. This reveals not only the historical implies ob;:ctg and sonditions *hich are subject'to it. In. signifi,cance of Fichte's philosophy but also the epistemo- this case Fichte opposes the metaphysical absolute con- logical roots of his subjective idealism. struction put on the formal logical principle of identity. The real dialectics of subject and object implies, as its proving its conditionality._For all the falacy of the subjel- origin-al, natural premise, the existence of the bbjective as tive-idealist view of the basis of the law bf identity, ihe a reality preceding (and independent of) human activity, raising of the issue about the need for a critical inter-preta- a reality which is transformed by men. As a result, not tion (and-substantiation) of formal logical laws and-their only the subjective is a consequence of the objective, but real- significance (and limitations) is a philosophical accom- also the objective (in its definite form) is creaied and re- plishment. produced by the subject. To a certain degree, Fichte gues- _.Substantiating the second and third supreme principles, sed this distinctive characteristic of the social as diJtinct Fichte examines the law of contradiction and the law oi from the natural process-and distorted it too, because he the excluded third. Formal logic treated these laws as self- treated the "subject-object" relation as a principle of on- evident axioms. Fichte questions that view as dogmatic. tology. According to him,-intellectual intuition does not proie that Fichte's theory of supreme principles is the starting those laws are undoubtedly true. Only the second and third point in the deduction of the laws of formal logic and sys- supreme prlnciples of philosophy make them true, and even tems of major philosophical categories. Kant accepts these that-and this is especially important-within certain lim- laws and categories as simply existing in thinking, but its. Fichte interprets them as determined by the dialectics of A further analysis of the supreme principles singles out the subjective and the objective. Kant confines his mission major categories of theoretical thinking whiih are thus not to drawing up a table of categories, grouping them by ma- merely det_ected, enumerated and classified but deduced by jor types of judgments and revealing the inner connections a logical development of the concept of the absolute sub- of categories in each of these groups (here Kant formu- ject. For example, the concept of substance is an extended lates the dialectical triad and thus approaches the under- definition of the concept of the absolute subject because-it standing of the negation of negation). Fichte takes the posits itself. But the subjective-idealist concept of substance next step forward. He views categories as forming a hrier- divorces it from nature and thus robs it of its distinc- archy comprising both coordination and subordination. tive content.

174 175 An analysis of the dialectical relation between the Ego theory of .afects-and consequently the praotice he refers and the non-Ego makes it possible to deduce the concepts to is opposed to sensory activity, i.e., that which it really of the boundary, divisibility and quantitative definitiven- is. ness. Any restriction is a definition and negation of a dif- Contemporary critics of dialectical materialism, repeat- ferent definitiveness. Therefore, the concept of the bound- ing their predecessors' arguments, maintain that dialeitics ary compr.ises the concepts of reality and negation. The is essentially incompatible with materialism. And, while Ego and the non-Ego mutually restrict each other, and this ancient materialists already began to develop dialectical restriction is restriction on action. This provides a logical ideas, these critics, ignoring or distorting the history of ma- basis for deducing the categories of interaction and causa- terialism, fall back on such idealists as Fichte and Hegel. lity. The deduction of the latter category is substantiated But it is Fichte's dialectical idealism (and the same is by the distinction between activity and passivity: "That to true of Hegel's idealism) which shows, in spite of all its which activity is ascribed and therefore passivity is not as- accomplishments, that idealistic speculation distorts and cribed is called cause . . . while that to which passivity is cancels out the major dialectical ideas it is connected with ascribed and therefore activity is not ascribed is called ef- because of certain historical conditions. The intellectual in- fect." (52, 1,331) tuition of the pure Ego, the cornerstone of Fichte's philos. Unlike Kant, Fichte did not believe that cause must nec- ophy, rules out a scientific-philosophical analysis of the essarily precede effect; he deduced the concept of causa- cmergence, consolidation and development of conscious- lity prior to the deduction of time. This concept-like oth- ness. Inevitably, this distorts the essence of dialectics. Lenin er categories, to be exact-was devoid of the versatile con- wrote, "One cannot begin philosophy with the 'Ego'. There tent the natural science of the late 18th century was al- is no 'objective movement'." (10; 38, 104) ready bestowing on it. But Fichte treated the Ego as an ab- Space and time are forms of the existence of matter, solute and thus divorced it from nature, and he could not they are the conditions of movement, change and develop- use natural science data properly, although he did aim at ment in nature and society. But Fichte's absolute subject producing not only general but also specific supreme prin- which, being absolute, is conceived outside spaoe and time, ciples needed by all sciences, including natural science. cannot of course be the point of departure in studying the Fichte does not stop at deducing the categories listed dialectics of nature and objective social relations. Fichte above and the laws of formal logic. Since, together with has completely foregone natural philosophy; as to the phi- Kant's "thing-in-itself", Fichte is forced to reject the the- losophy of history, that is where he strays farthest from ory of sense perception being the starting point of knowl- dialectical principles. edge (having replaced it with the itellectual intuition of Since the absolute subject is the starting point, the phil- the transcendental unity of apperception), he faces the un- osophical system must end where it began; therefore, his- thinkable task of deducing the existence of sense percep- tory is a closed circuit, it attains absolute completion. "The tions. But in this case sense perceptions inevitably lose their basic premise from which we proceed is also the final re- cognitive significance. This explains Fichte's assertion that, sult." (51; 36) This approach by Fichte to the problem is "completely disregard,ing perception [italics mine], the the- inevitable in a rationalist philosophical system; Hegel re- ory of science deduces a priori that which, according to it, peated it after Fichte. Obviously, the result that reproduces must take place precisely in perception, that is, a poste- the initial idealist thesis affects the entire understand- riori". (52; 3,34) Here Fichte takes a step backward com- ing of knowledge and the entire theory of science. And al- pared to Kant, and that is an inevitable result of criticiz- though, unlike Kant, Fichte understood the unity of self- ing Kant from the right. Kant insists that "perception is consciousness as a process going through certain progres- essentially that which cannot be anticipated in any way". sive stages (and that, of course, is an important step for- (73 3, 161) Fichte rejects this sensationalist postulate. He ward), nevertheless he maintains: "The theory of science interprets sensuoustress as passivity-which falls within the cxhausts aII human knowledge in its major aspects. .. It ti.I6 t2-01b62 177 a thorefore comprises the objeot of any possible scienie... This idealist .p-ostulate entaiis artificial logical .or.t rrt, Each study that is undertaken solves the problem once and and leads .away from the study of the actua'i sufolaination for all." (52; 3,87) Fichte's works carry a number of suoh of categories, the logical reflection of the metaphysical statements: they stem from the idealist con- iriri"rirri-'pi# ess and the rise from the abstract to the .outifi". cept of the extrahistorical, supranatural subject. Ilegel is right in describing Fichte's d;du;iion";i";;;: Fichte's absolute It is equally obvious that conoept of and phenomena of the external world gererrt, knowledge (and of absolute power and absolute good) inev- ,ggories i, "It is a purely outward transition from one to anoiher by itably leads metaphysical opposition duty and to a of mea,ns. o_f. ordinary teleological examination. The technlqui .being, infinite and finite. As Lenin remar.ks in this connec- useo rs the lollowing: man must eat_therefore, something tion, standpoint oI Kant and, Fichte (especially in mor- -ar'e "The edible must exist-that is the way plants and animars al philosophy) is the standpoint of purpose, of subjective deduced; plants mus_t grow from somethi"j:;5;;;;;; ,il; ought." ('1,0; 38,236) The root of this metaphysical opposi- earth is deduced. What is completely trr[ing--h";-tJ ;il; tion of being and duty, at first glance incompatible with examination of the object itself, an-examinaltion Fichte's voluntarism, is revealed in the basic premise of the of whdt it if. i-n itself." (64; 15, GB8) theoiy of science. . Fichte's subjective idearism has arso affected his dialec- Hegel defined, says in this connection: "I find myself of.the opposition, unity and interchange Ego identical 1tcca1 ]]ndg,rstanding. and still the equals itself, it is inflnite, i.e. _ot opposites. Ile insists that conrtadictions are inhereni- itself. This contradiction that Fichte, is true, with is a it ly necessary, that they shourd not be confusea *itr, trr. tries to settle, but despite this attempt he leaves in existence erroneous contradictions described by formal point logic. Dialec--irm the basic flaw, dualism. The last Fichte touches on is tical contradictions are the motive fbrces of p.8gru.r. only some kind of must, and this does not resolve the con- in Fichte's system, contradic.tions only exist'ln' iildht tradiction, since while the Ego should obviously be with consciousness. Even,.the subject-objeot contradiction is-firei itself, that is, be free, it is at the same time, accotding to sented as a contradiction within ielf_consciorrrr.rr, ur-li, Fichte, found with someone else." (64, 15,629) splittin-g into two. viewed from that angre, Therefore, Fichte's understanding of the absolute also proceed,from the Ego, therefore thoy essEntially"""ir"hi"ii"", makes an absolute of duty, interpreted as basically unat- ;;il-b; regarded as existing outside and independently of human tainable for the historically limited mankind. Fichte writes: consciousness. Resolution of contradiciions ihus r;;;;;; "Ideals are unrealizable in the real world; we merely merely as a logical process of the mutual restricilon based ;i';;;: assert that on these ideals, reality must be asses- cepts, as a transition from one definition to another. sed and modified by those who feel capable of (52; L, it." Naturally, does not obscure Fichte's occaslonar dia- 220) This quotation reflects the impotence German . -this of the lectical inslghts into the objective dialectics of nature. For bourgeoisie which only dreamed about what other Europe- example: "But nature hurries onward in its constant changel an nations were doing. and while I am still-talking about the chosen Fichte's deduction of categories is dialectical only as an -ome"ot, is alreld.V gone and"everything hqs changed; and equal_ approach question need examine these ]t to the of the to Il-,^everything was different before I chose this mom6nt.,, forms of thought in connection with their content, to study (52; 3,9) their genesis, their interrelationship within the system. In his "philosophy of identity',, Schelling tried to over. But categories themselves are examined outside motion, the come the subjectivism of Fichte's interpretition of contra. and Fichte loses sight of their interchanges. He con- dictions and their source. _According to Scheiiing, ;;ri;;;i;- siders it his paramount task to deduce all categories from tions exist in nature- itself, but the latter is oily tt; il_ the concept of the absolute subject, thereby proving that conscious state of the ab-s^olute subject, evolving throulh acceptance of concept is absolutely necessary for build- " that contradictions to the self-conscious Ego, ttre inteile;i. ing system of knowledge. a schelling goes further than Fichte in his- rinderstand-ing oi 178 L2* t79 -an' process, theory the IIEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY dialectics .as objective but hi! -about- absolute identity of subjeci and object, allegedly the primal OF THE POWER OF REASON source of devel-opment, shows that the original pre-nise of Schelling's objective idealism is metaphysical and obvi- The Marxist doctrine is omni- ously not free of elements of irrationalism that dominates potent because it is true. his later works. Hegel profoundly criticized both Fichte's subjectivism V. I. Lenin and Scheiling's absolute indifference. Hegel's c-oncept- of the identity of being and thoughto substantiated in his pre- Phenomenology ol the Spirit and serving as the basic Today's idealist philosophy, often professing to do away a concept of speciflc rlen- mise in The Science ol Logic,- is with idealism, actually'merely negates its historically pro- tiiy from the very start comprising- a difference which gressive philosopher re- develops forms. The irrationalist of today into an opposition, a cbntradiction' Hegel gards rationalist idealism as pernicious, tempting mankind 'Fichte's"uolu", thesis, ideas about the necessary relationship of with an illusory reign of reason in our obviously unreason- antithesis and synthesis into a theory about the law of the able world'r. negation of negition. Fichte saw his deduction of catego- According to Martin Heidegger, a leading existentialist, transcendental logic. He- rie"s as a development of Kant's - reason is the most stubborn enemy of thought. If gel provided a fundamentally new development of Fichte's we follow the logic of irrationalist idealism, reason would dedriction, which led to the creation-albeit on an errone- appear as something divorced from the original, pre-intro- ous, idealist basis-of dialectical logic. Hegel used the.Iat- their spective and allegedly authentic thinking, as alienated ter not merely to deduce categories but also to show thinking. An analysis of contemporary philosophical irra- movement know- development and intertransition, th-e of tionalism shows that its polemic with rationalist phiolsophy lower to ledge irom the simple to the compJex, from the which bas become historically obsolete aimed against was is the higher. But the best Hegel's dialectics could do the dialectical-materialist world view. That is why the ques- but to pose the problems it proclaimed solved' tion Marxist approach rationalist tradi- dialec- about the to the The iheory of dialectics, the dialectical method, tion and its greatest representative, Hegel, is of both sci- basis of idea- tical logic wlre originally worked out on the and ideological interest. the more and un- entific topical It is all list phitsophy. Dialectici, the most comprehensive obvious because today's seemingly speculative critique of bias6d theoiy- of development, could not emerge all at once reason form the mate- has acquired an empirically tangible in in its rational scientifiC form. The road to scientific, pessimism" condemns the pas- ideology of "technological that rialist dialectics created by the founders of Marxism scientific and technological revolution as an allegedly ar- ses through all the stages in the progressive development rogant and suicidal intrusion of human reason into the ir- of pre-Marxian philosoPhY. rational world of the natural, but is actually subtle apolo- gia of the capitalist system. The concept of reason is one of philosophy's fundamen- tals. Already in the ancient world philosophy was described as an examination of the world lrom the uiewpoint ol

* In his critique of Gabriel Marcel's philosophy, B. E. Bykhovsky shows that r:xistentialism is "not a rejcction of idealism but a dis- tinctivc radical form of the latter which cannot regard cven spirit as an object of knowledge because it is thus 'reduced' to the level of the rationally knowable". (17; 558).

181 ....

reasanl as. a rational _interpretation of reality which, differ- 6, 52) Each ffnite thing or phenomenon is based on some- ipS from both mythology and everyday coniciousness, was thing different: on reason, on thought which is free of the the rational human being's attitude, free from irrational af- limitations typical of objects. So Hegel proclaims that "on- fects, to the outside world and its own life. ly thought is the essence of being". (64; 6, 77) He de- , Thg Middle Ages subordinated reason to faith, and phi_ scribes reason as thought, but he also distinguishes it from losophy to religion. But it was Thomas Aquinas who oro- the latter as authentic thinking directed at itself and not claimed faith to be rooted in reason, atthough the redson at the external, sensuously perceived content. In Hegel's he meant was divine, not human. words, reason is "thought which determines itself freely'] . The philosophy of the New Age, shaped in the era of (63; /, 39) Thus Hegel's philosophy puts an absolute, uni- bourgeois revolutions, rejected the views generated by the versal construction on reason, thought, and it rejects the stagnant feudal social production. The founders of the new fact-already known in Hegel's time-that thinking is a philosophy advanced -a new concept of reason, independent function of the brain. of faith. As a rational agent, man was to become m'aster of This does not mean that Hegel ascribes the ability to nature, rebuild society along rational lines, and learn to think to everything existing, that he treats thingS as ani- master himself.'F All those aspects of the new,'t[e progressive mate, the way the hylozoists did. On the contrary, Hegel view of man's mission were summed up in ioncept believes that man is the only living being endowed with of social progress-. B-ourgeois Enlightenment proclaimed so_ sentience, reason, thought. But, he maintains, reason. can- cial progre-ss to be based on the perfection of reason, in- not be understood as a quality, as something inherent in cre.ase of knowledge, and eradication of error and super- this or that body, as something conditional, secondary. Nor stition. is reason, in Hegel's view, a property of specially organ- Hegel's philosophy, - the summit of this upward evolution ized, Iiving matter. All living is finite, it is born and it of^bourgeois social consciousness, imparts i universal sig- dies. But reason is not something that is born and dies to- ,,substanc"e, nificance to the concept of reason. Reaso, is gether with individual human existence. According to He'- ..i.e., that through which and in which all reality finds its gel, to understand reason correctly means to grasp it as the being; reason is infinite power, because it is not so help- suprahuman, supranatural, infinite and universal which, less as to confine itself to an ideal, a duty, and to exist however, does not exist outside the natural, human, finite, as- something special only outside reality, nobody knows individual but forms their substance. Hegel stresses that where, somewhere in the heads of certain people-. Reason this is already expressed in religion, albeit inadequately; is infinite content, the entire essence and tiutli, and it is but philosophy grasps the truth in the form of a concept, for_ itself the object at which its activity is directed, because, i.e., in a way which is adequate to the nature of thought unlike finite activity, it does not need the conditions of and consequently, to the nature of being. the external material of the given means to find in them In Hegel's opinion, the recognition of reason, thought as the -content -and objects of its activity." (63 1, ZS-29) the absolute essence of things does not mean that it negates That is the basic formula of Hegel's absolute ideilism. the material nature of things, that they dissolve in spir- It follows from it that nature and itt that is not thinking it, reason, consciousness. Although things are described are merely its external, alienated expression. All flnite as creations of spirit, they themselves remain spiritless ob- things, Hegel says, "have an untruth in them" because jccts; such is their being for they are not a direct but sec- their existence "does not correspond to their concept". (64; ondary expression of spirit, its transformed, alienated form of being. Hegel distinguishes between reason and spirit, * Manfred Buhr proves it using Francis Bacon's doctrine as an regarding reason as the highest form of the spiritual. Viewed example, Most experts on Bacon- see him as a shipwrecked rc- f lower, [o1mer of logic, but the mosl important point about hii theorv was rom this angle, material things appear as the different. Buhr, however, asserl,s:- "Bacon wanted to be a reiormer alienated forms of the spiritual, its other-being. Thus, the of human society, not a reformer of logic." $Z; BO) opposition between the material and the spiritual is not

t82 t83 removed preserved but and emphasized, sometimes even phy is lppossible. Nevertheless, Hegel's idealism, as Engels ,overmuch. But this opposition is interpreted ' as an external repeatedly points out, is materialism turned upside down. relation, brought about by the splittinf of the spiritual into (64; 3,_348) One must bear in mind that paradox to grasp two mutually exclusive forms of being whicli determine the real content 'each of Hegel's philosophy, his dialectical Id,ea|- other and form the contradictory substantial identity ism, which in some aspects is closer to the dialectical-ma- of thought and being. terialist world concept than m,etaphysical materialism. For _ Hence, Hegel's definitions of reason quoted above do not Hegel maintains that the universe is causa sui, that it pro- deal with merely human reason, because Hegel is an ob. pels itself, although he holds that this universal jective dialecti- idealist. However, according to Hegel, human rea. cal process is rooted in reason; and reason is "the soul of son is directly related to the absolute: it is the highest form the world, it lives in it, is its immanentness, its most gen- of the latter's self-realization. And if absolute reason is uine inner nature, its universality." 'l. (64; 6, 46) God, is- God !t -findsa that overcomes his imperfection.-Jesus Moreover, Hegel's absolute treatment of reason is based on the this God Himself in man, and Christ is His princlple of the dialectical identity of being and thought. symbolic image. Hegel transforms the traditional idealist formula-thought Hegel describes reason as infinite activity, infinite con- is primary and being is secondary-into a new postulate: tent, infinite power, the absolute All. It does not exist sim- thought is being and being is thought. This new idealist ply "somewhere in the heads of certain people", nor is it- solution of the fundamental problem of philosophy is made and that is even more important-"outside reality, nobody meaningful by an important assumption: being and thought knows where". The latter remark is directed against ortho- are not immediately identical. dox theism which insists that the divine is not of this Thus, Hegel to a certain degree recognizes the fallacy yorl{, that this world's existence is allegedly contingent. of the traditional idealist approach to the fundamental Hegel argues that infinite reason and reality are, in the problem of philosophy which holds that thought (and spir- final analysis, identical. Accordingly, he holds that "all it in general) is prior to being. But he cannot accept the philosophy is pantheistic: it proves that reason inside - is materialist solution. A position halfway between the two the world".o (641' 14,437) is incompatible with absolute idealism either. Thus He- Thus Hegel offers an idealist interpretation of Spinoza's gel suggests the following solution: being is inherent in pantheistic materialism. Spinoza's concept of substance, thought, thought cannot be excluded from being, being is, interpreted in the spirit of objective idealism, is, as Marx in the final analysis, thought. notes, one of the basic elements of Hegel's system. Hegel uses all those deflnitions of reason and philosophy to conclude that, strictly speaking, materialism as a philoso- * Although Christian theologists usually present God as absolute ,+ reason, they interpret the worlil as unreasoning, because the divine I *r"Id Iike to stress that pantheism, especiallv in its Spi- is posited outside the world and is its absolute opposite (Protestant nozist form which seriously'the influenced Hegel, is'essentially an urii- theology places special emphasis on this poiat). This exflains why religious interpretation of workl as iwhole. For eximple. the young Marx opposes Hegel's philosophy philosophers of reason to Christian theol- Soviet I. Vasiliev and L. Naumenko stress in iheir ogy and remarks ironicallv that the proofs of God's existence upon analysis o_f Spinoza's materialism: "This is a truly dialectical break- which theologians concentrate so avidly, should sound as follows: down of the fundamental concept of theology anil religion, a breik- "'Since nature has been badly constructed, God exists', 'Because the down that comple_tely plrlverizei the cornerlione of rel"igioiis-idealist world is rvithout reason, therefore God exists' But what does ethics and cosmology. ... One by one, God loses all the-aspects and that say, except that for wh,om the world, appears without teason, attributes ascribed to Him by reliEion. these are immediatelv hence who is without reason himseU, restored lor him Goil, exists? Or lack to their rightlul ownei, manl In' the final analvsis. God of_reaso-n is the existenee ol God." (1; 7, 105) Therefore we must loses- any definitiveness at all and eompletely mcrges with thc take, full note of the important differencc betwcen Hegel's pan- infinite totality of_ all mutually negating 'types of dlfinitiveness'. t_heistic concep-t of absolute-reason rn^o.ther and the theological conc"ept of'the words, the uame is the only thing left of God." (Lg; divine. This distinction is all the more necessary becaus-e Hegel 64-65) often tleliberately slurreil it over.

184 r85 Ilegel reduces being to thought and describes it as an such qnIV inasmuch hs they conceptually express the ob- objective universal process of foryard motion, change jectively existing_forms_ of universality. -princi.and Ii is tiue that logi_ devellpment. This spiritualization of being is the cal categories reflect objectively exisiing forms of univ6r- pal direction of universal progress. Development ii the sality only approximately. But as knowledge develops, they transition of that existing in itself into that existing for it- develop too and provide increasingly preclse reflec-tions oi self. Therefore, according to Hegel, the identity of being interrelationships among phenomena. and thought is a concealed premise and obvlous The epistemolo_gical plinciple an resull - - of reflection inseparable of developgent. In other words, Hegel's principle of the from the materialist world concept is, of course, dlien to identity of being and thought discovers.the iubstantial Hegel. But his concept of the identity (and distinction) of nature of development and puts an idealist mystical con- being and thought offered an idealisi interpretation of'the struction on it. dialectical relation between categories (thiirking) and the The identity of being and thought does not mean that forms of universality existing independently of conscious-, the two are indistinguishable, the way Schelling believes. ness and organically inherent in being itself. trt is rather an identity of opposites which- therefore Metaphysical materialists both polnted to the objective presupposes that an opposition of the latter exists-the op- content -of logical forms and stressed their distinctiy hu- position of thought and being. Such an identity comprises man, subjective character. They never considered how the its own negation; it is thus a unity of identity and non- forms and content of thinking came to correspond to each identity. However, the latter exists only in the former as other despite their obvious difference. Hegel addresses him- its dialectical determination. This dialectical relation of self to an analysi" of this contradictory relationship. In opposites is a continuous process of emergence, of self-de- his examination of the structure of judgments and specr- termination. Contrasting his interpretation of the funda- lations he substantiates the following thesis: Iogical forms mental identity to Schelling's philosophy of identity, He- are as objective as their content. The importance of this gel stresses that "philosophy is not a system of identity; discovery, noted by Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks, that is unphilosophical. . . It is activity, motion, repul- nevertheless should not obscure the fact that Hegel onto- sion-and so not an immutable identity; at the same time lggizes the epistemological objectivity of logical forms, it is identical with itself." (641' 14, 332) Thus, distinction thuq putting an idealist construction on his diicovery. within identity is as significant as identity itself. And if The self-activity of reason within the dialectical iden- being and thought are substantially identical, they are also tity of being and thought is expressed above all as neEa."aci substantially distinct. Substance itself must be understood tion. The dialectic of negation in Hegel's philosophy is, as the unity of identity and distinction. cprqitg to Marx, the moving and generating principle. (t; Hegel's concept of the primordial dialectical identity is 3:-332) But negation proceedi from something biven, statid. not simply a speculative-idealist construct. It comprises Therefore the first act of rcason is alwiys to' record (and naturally, mystifies) a profound understanding of the that which is available, to reveal relations of distinction dialectical forms of universality which Hegel reduces to and similarity. In this quality, reason is merely common logical forms of knowledge. But we must also remember serse, which is "a nec-essary moment of sensible thinking',. that, according to Hegel, knowledge, cognition, is not only \64; ?,356) Nevertheless, common sense is inevitably lim- human activity but also, and above all, the universal, sub- ited by its realm of objects and by its one-siderl positive stantial functioning of the "absolute idea"-that is, of the approach to that which exists. It remains on the ievel of 'idealistically interpreted universe. phenomena, their interrelations and the laws determined While Kant regards categories only as ways to connect by the latter. Common sense cannot understand that the sensory contemplations, Hegel argues that categories are hasis of flnite things "is not in themselves but in the uni- ,the major determinations of being itself. Indeed, causality, r.,ersal divine idea". (64; 6,97) Horn-cver, besides this re- necessity, etc. are not only forms of thinking: they are ference to the divine, Hegel also offers a fully realistic ex-

186 t[litir':;:. sr, 187 planation of the limitations of common sense: the latter is reasoh which, in Hegel's vlew, "calcelslt the "negative-fa- reason fixed in its subjectivity and individuality. In other tional", thus asserting the "positive-rational". words, common sense is simply the reasoning human in- This reasoning-at first glance, completely speculative- dividual, it is "understanding reason or reasoning under- sums up perfectly real, diverse contents which, however, standing" which is inevitably limited. (64; 3,7) In Hegel's are not of equal value (as far as their rational element is language this means that common sense is in contradiction concerned). I have already noted that above all Hegel tries with its essence-sovereign reason. to grasp the "dialectics-formal logic" relation as a dia- The principle of common sense is the principle of iden- Iectically contradictory unity, the unity of identity and dif- tity. But it is not a dialectical identity which forms the ference, which in certain conditions is transformed into a essence of reason and being but a formal identity, the high- relation of mutually exclusive and mutually determining est principle of elementary logic. Observance of this prin- opposites. The fact that.formal logic is linked to the anthro- ciple is doubtless necessary but absolutely insufficient for pological "finitude" of the human individual cannot ob- meaningful thinking. Since commonsense thinking elimi- scure the rational meaning of Hegel's approach to the prob.- nates contradiction as allegedly incompatible with identity, Iem of dialectical logic as the authentic logic of reason- it understands definitions of a concept only in their ab- all the more so because, according to Hegel, in the course straction-and consequently, in their one-sided and finite of his emergence as a member of society and due to his nature. Therefore, while stressing the reasoning character further personal development, the human individual is an of commonsense thinking (and, by the same token, of for- increasingly meaningful and substantial expression of the mal logic), Hegel constantly criticizes the latter, contrasting social whole. it to dialectics as a logic of a higher order. Some authors, The negative nature of reason, formally expressed in He- even Marxists, are often mistaken in their interpre- gel's famous triad, is not confined to its relation to com- tation of Hegel's critique of formal logic. Some see this mon sense. AII forms of the existing-consequently, above critique as a concession to irrationalism, they accuse it of all nature-are flnite determinations of reason. The spirit underrating formal logic, of an unjustified contrast between which is the essence of nature is not yet reason. Neverthe- the latter and dialectical thinking which also has to observe less, the system of natural phenomena and its laws are elementary requirements of formal logic. Conversely, oth- described as rational. For example, referring to the laws ers try to slur over Hegel's critique of formal logic, be- of the solar system, Hegel says that they are "its reason. Iieving that essentially, and despite Hegel's express indica- But neither the Sun nor the planets that revolve around it tions, it is a critique of the metaphysical, antidialectical following those laws are conscious of them." (63; /, 37) mode of thinking. But the point here is that according to Thus, the concept of rational nature is merely an idealist Hegel, reason comprises the principle of negation: it cri- interpretation of the universal character of its laws.'r And ticizes itself, subjecting its own definitions to dialectical at the same time it is, of course, a subtle teleological in. negation (Aufhebung). Hegel was wrong not in criticiz- terpretation of the world, contrasted to ordinary, crude te- ing formal logic but in interpreting the self-critiqae ol rea- Ieology which maintains that "sheep are covered with wool son as an a priori immanent process of the self-develop- only so that I could be clothed". (64;7,10) Hegel defines ment of the concept. the teleological relation as the unity of the mechanical and According to Hegel, the principle of negation is implicit chemical processes. However, this brilliant insight into the in the very nature of reason, because reason is a negation of common sense, that is, of its own limitations. Eventual- * Such visws are often held by natural scientists who are not negation is positive and concrete, because abstract, ra- at all idealists. For example, Louis de Broglie believes that the ly, "concept of the rationality-of the Universe..-. is a basic postulate tional negation as a real moment, treated as ari absolutc of science". (39: 353) Ttiis thesis is an inadequate expression of by skepticism, is itself subject to negation. The negation the scientific'postulate regarding the inevitable interconnection of of negation is the third, synthetic, speculative moment of phenomena, tlieir "orderliiess"-lthat is, their conformity to laws. r88 189 material shucture ol the expedient in iiving nature is only ample, that waS the view held by Spinoza, the briliiant cro- a mopent of the idealist iiterpretation of naturu u""ord"- ator of the idea of the substantial essence of nature. Nev- ertheless, he (natura i1g. tq Hegel, spirit is the goal of nature u"a tt rt i;;hy _tieated substance naturans) and the it both crowns the hierarchy of natural substances world of modes (natura naturata) -that is, the' world of forms their fundamental basis. True, spirit precedes nature"oi rear thing-s sulject to motion and change_as absolute op- 19! i" time, "not empirically,-itself, but in- a way that spirit, posites. The l8th-century French materialists overcame t[.e which posits nature- ahiad of is always already'prel inconsistent approach of their brilliant predecessor and sub- sent rn nature". (64; 7,695) Nature is defiried as the-alien_ stantiated the principle of the self-propulsion of matter. ated being -of the "absolute idea"; and the monolineally But they did not connect the self-propulsion of matter with interpreted hierarchy of nature's stages from the mechani- development, which they did not view as a universal form cal motion of matter to life is described as the comprehen- of the existence of the material. sion of its other-being-or, as Hegel puts it, of its bther- Already in his Phenomenology o! Spirit, Hegel formulates b-y thg "absolute idea". Knowledgl, ciognition of nature is the following principle: the beginning must also be un- thus the realization of the dialectical idlntity of being and derstood as a result-specifically, as a result of develop- thought, the identity that is the active basis bf naturel And ment. This means that the spiritual, at any rate in its high- th9 philosophy of nature (Hegel's idealist natural philos- est form, is not the starting point but the summit, of the ophy) reproduces this road the "absolute idea',, universal development of the universal whole. Contrary to the Chris- reason has taken from its alienation. Moreover, ,,natural tian mythology which Hegel formally constantly upholds pllilosophy is itself part of this road back; because it is (this often deceives scholars who underrate the difference, what cancels the separation (die Trennung) of nature and even opposition, between the exoteric form in which He- spirit and enables spirit to esiablish its esJence in nature". gel sets forth his philosophy and its esoteric content), he (64 7, 23) Naturally, we must never lose sight of the maintains that the highest is a result of the entire histori- {aet- that philosophy, according to Hegel, is no[ simply a cal development. The highest is the sovereign creative hu- distinctive form of human knowledge;- above all, it ii ifre man reason throughout its global historical development. self-consciousness of the "absolute idea". Viewed from this angle, the 'labsolute idea" is an absolute Thus, according to the logic of absolute idealism, the nat- but unconscious source of nature which does not exist out- ural is rational, but it is not yet conscious of its rational- side nature because the latter is its being. ity, and therefore it directly appears as its negation. Mean- In his Conspectns ol Hegel's Book "The Science ol Log- while, according to the definition, reason knows itself ic", Lenin cites the following quotation from Hegel: "For as reason. Therefore, it is spirit comprehending itself. the Idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure No- The transition to self-comprehending spirit, or reason, is tion and its Reality, and thus gathers itself into the imme- the elevation of the "absolute idea" that }ias triumphed over diacy of Being; and in doing so, as totality in this form, the entire diversity of the natural, material and reached it is Nature." Lenin describes this postulate as "archbril- "absolute- spirit",_ that is, mankind. This idealist concept Iiant" and says: "The transition of the logioal idea to na- is related ture. brings one within hand's grasp materialism. to mythology, but it still contains profound-most and lt a of extrenlely valuable dialectical insights. The impor- Engels was right when he said that Hegel's system was tant of these is the idea of. d,eueloping substance materialism turned upside down." Then he adds: "The Pre-Hegelian philosophy saw substance as the first cause, sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel's logic is the the primal source of everything existing. Idealist linked ilialectical method-this is extremely noteworthy. And one this speculative concept with the notion of the divine thing more: in this most idealistic of. Hegel's works there first cause. Conversely, materialists offered a naturalist in- is the least idealism and the most materialism. 'Contradic- terpretation of the concept of substance, but they did not tory', but a factt" (10; 38, 234) And, despite these points recognize the substantial nature of development. For ex- that lead up to materialism, Hegel keeps repeating that the

190 191 "absolute idea" is supranatural,' divine. These statements grasping its essence (freedorr, substantiality), of attaining express his subjective conviction but they contract his dia- strate-legal forms and economic orders ("bivil society,,) lectical approach to the problem of su[stance. Here, He- that are increasingly adequate Lo man's rational nature. gel's position is similar to Spinoza's who did not doubt the Hegel describes the state as a rational-moral organism existence of God because he was convinced that God is and law, as the realization of freedom based, among other nature. things, on private orvnership. The elimination of ilavery Hegel's understanding of development as an infi.nite proc- and serfdom, the establishment of the "inviolability",' of ess negates all attempts at interpreting any of its results private property, freedom of conscience, an end to feudal as_ the flnal completion of development. AIrd, although He- privileges, gel the establishment and legal formalization of constantly violates this categorical imperative of dia- limited civil freedr:ms-Hegel views all that as the final lectics he himself has formulated, "the tiue significance completion of the cause of "objective spirit", despite the and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philoso- fact that acccrding Hegel's system, points phy", to As EngelJ according to Engels, is that "it once for all dealt the out, "just as knowledge is unable to reach complote death - a blow to the finality of all products of human thought conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, io is and action". (3; 3,339) history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect Thus, reason in the entirety of its historical develop. "state", ale things which can only exist in imagina- ment is substance which has become subject, self-conscioui- tion". (3; .3,339) ness. Aside from nature, the finite, alienated spheres of We know that Hegel described the state as an earthly- the existence of "absolute reason" are "subjective spirit" divine being and world history, as God's progress on on the one hand, and "objective spirit" on the other. fhese Earth. These grandiloquent phrases were, of course, not opposites-the human individual and society-form a accidental; even their bornbast expressed the social posi- unjty described as "absolute spirit". The development of tion of the German bourgeoisie, pinning its hopes on the subjective spirit is dealt with by anthropology, phenome- spontaneous development oI the capitalist system and gology and psychology - which comprise the first part of striving to ensure an evolutionary transition from feudal Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit. Here, man is examined as a to bourgeois monarchy. While stressing these socio-politi- bodily, sensuous natural being, as the individual with all cal aspects of Hegel's system, one must remember that it the qualities inherent in tlie latter; he is born, turns from treats "objective spirit" as a finite, limited and essentially a man in himself into a man for himself and, as an adult still alienated form of universal, infinite reason. human being, strives to reach his private goals generated Infinite reason, or "absolute spirit", absolute knowledge, by the conditions of his existence. This being suflers and which is to be regarded as the grasping of the absolute, enjoys life, loves and hates, succumbs to disease and final- frnds its authentic expression only in art, religion and phi- ly dies. The development of the individual aspect is in over- losophy. Only in the creative spiritual sphere which Hegel coming its alienation from the universal, in its eleva- elevates above all forms of conscious and purposeful prac- tion to the social. This concept reflects both a profound un- tical activity, "thinking is by itself, relates to itself, and derstanding of the social essence of the individual and the lras itself as its subject". (64;6, 63) typically rationalist-idealist underrating of man's sensuous Spiritual creative activity is contrasted to other forms life, his subjectiveness, uniqueness, "flnitude". of human activity dealing with material objects. Although According to Hegel, objective spirit is the truth of sub- ttris opposition is not absolute because, jective according to Hegel, spirit not only because man is a social creature the essence of the material is spiritual, this opposition is but above all because, with its negation of the anthropol- of importance for his entire system of views. Speciflcally, ogical limitations of man's individual being, reason begins it, shows that Hegel is not quite free from the romantic to enjoy free development unlimited in time or space. Rea- censure of social reality he himself criticizes as a power- son as "objective spirit" is the socio-historical process of less and affected position. But, apparently this opposition tsz 13-01562 r93 {- is inevitable in a system proclaiming the thought of" that is, if it recognizes the oLvious as obvious and meets thought as the object of philosophy.'r the requirements of logic. Viewed from this anglej error It is equally obvious that the concept of pure thought is rooted in sense perceptions which are by nature vague,. immersed in itself is only applicable to an idealist system in passions which care nothing about the truth, and in the of views, and even that only to the idealistically interpret- will which prefers the desired to the actual" ed logic but not at all to art or religion. To a certain de- The rationalist concept of pure reason (could it perhaps gree, Hegel is aware of this, and that is one of the rea- be compared to certain contemporary notions of tlie elec- sons for his treatment of philosophy as the highest realiza- tronic "intellect" as incapable of error if it possesses all tion of "absolute spirit". But art and r.eligion also deal the information necessary for solving the questions posed directly with the splritual, rational which, as artistic and before it?) was formed on the basis of outstanding accom- religious consciousness develops, increasingly overcomes plishments of "pure" mathematics (and of mathlmatical the inertia of sensory guises to eventually become con- physics). It was a philosophical interpretation of the es'- scious of itself as pure spirit or pure reason sence of mathematical thinking, treated by rationalism as On the one hand, the concept of pure reason is a specu- unive,rsal and para4igmatic. No doubt this concept con- lative-idealist abstraction opposed to empirical study and tained a rational element because it substantiated, albeit reality perceived through the senses. In this aspect, pure paradoxically, reason's independence of faith and of assex- reason is inevitably associated with the teleological no- tions based on authority. Descartes' cogito, which pro- tion that God, who created the world out of nothing (the claims the self-consiousness of the thinking individuai to mythological prototype of pure thought), is, in the lan- be the highest authority in the argument of truth and guage of scholasticism, actus purus. We know that Hegel error, and the rationalist cult of infallible reason are phe- refers to and upholds this definition of the divine. nomena of the same order. Their revolutionary scientific It should, however, be noted that the reduction of "pure and ideological significance is obvious. reason"-that is, the central concept of the entire ration- In the late 18th century, a new period which completed alist philosophy-to a meaningless teleological premise ex- the era of early bourgeois revolutions, Kant opposed the , tremely oversimplifies the task of historical-philosophical rationalist cult of pure reason. Above all he tried to prov6 analysis. The task is to reveal the real and not imaginary that pure mathematics was based on sensory (although a content of this concept, that is, to critically interpret the priori sensory) observations. Kant did not question the ex- idealist error about the fact which was discovered and also istenco of pure reason not based on sensory data, but he distolted by idealist philosophy. argued that it inevitably lapsed into error (paralogism, The rationalism of the {7th century proclaims that rea- antinomy) precisely because it was pure reason, Neverthe- soil" (meaning real human reason) is, strictly speaking, less Kant considered the concept of pure reason highly never mistaken-naturally, if it observes its own rules, significant as the source of the more general, regulatory ideas of knowledge and morality. An analysis of the concept of pure (especially pure 'r To avoid error in understanding Hegel's concept of the object practical) reason as independent -of individual conscious- of philosophy, one must stress that thought as the object of philos- ness but existing only in the consciousness of individuals ophy is not thatr which is studied by formal logic. The latter deals shows that the point here (if we abstract ourselves from with forms of thinking irrespective of their content. Ilegel, on the contrary, is interestetl in the meaningful forms of thinking, reality the idealist mode of expression) is social corusciowsness as reflected in thought, and the forms of universality equally ia- and - the totality of all theoretical knowledge possessed herent in knowledge and in objective reality. That is why Hegel's by humanity. This real meaning of the concept of pure say, doctrine stoicism, stresses that they _ critique of, the logical of reason, evident Kant's concept . regard forms of thinking only as "formal forms which determine -already in of categorial no content as such". (64; 14,451) Hegel disassociates himself from transcendental consciousness preceding any individual ex- this understanding of thought as the object of philosophy. perience, was fully revealed and systematicatly developed tg4 l3* 195 by Fiegei in. his doctrine oi the forms of absolute spirit: effective way of overcoming it. He only refers to the sur art, religion and philosophy. mounting of alienation in consciousness, and that im- So, ai a consistent- idealist, Hege1 puts an absolute olies the retention of alienation in actual life. Con- construction on spiritual production, that is, the produc- iciousness, which allegedly overcomes alienation, appears tion of knowledge, artistic values, the development of rea- (since the case in point is religion and idealist philoso- son itself, etc. Since reason in its absolute ontologized phy) as alienated consciousness, although, according to form is treated as the primordial, the substantial, Hegel, Marx, "the superseding in thought, which leaves its object for all his insights into the role of labor in the emer-gence in existence in the real world, believes that it has really of man, is totally incapable of grasping that, as Engels put overcome it". (l; 3, 341) it, "it is in the measure that man has learned to change But then what is rational about Hegel's doctrine of au- nature that his intelligence has increased". (9; 231) Ma- thentic reason, or "absolute spirit"? This essay is to deal terial production is reduced to spiritual production, andJhe lather with what, in Hegel's view, defines social con- 'is activity of pure reason. This sciousness and human knorvledge in general, than with latter regarded-course, as the stresses-of idealistically-the social character of what is of value in his understanding of art, religion, phi- -production. Iosophy and its history. This definition of these higher Marx says that Hegel understands labor as the emer- forms of the spiritual lies in the dialectic of negation, in gence of tlie human p-ersonality in society.- But "the only historical nature and development. In other words, the iabor which Hegel Iinows and recognized is abstrac-tly higher forms of the substantial imply not a cessation of mental labor". (t-; 3, 333) And the point is not only that development but, on the contrary, development in its ful- Hegel puts an'absolute construction on the intellectual lest form, free from one-sidedness. Moreover, Hegel asserts moirenti inherent in any labor or presents the highest in- that genuine development takes place only at the stage of tellectual forms of man'i productive activity as the essence "absolute spirit". That is why the category of development of labor in general. The crux of the matter is much more appears only in the third part of The Science of Logic, in profound: b1i elevating spiritual production above material the doctrine of the concept which, according to Hegel, is production, Hegel triei to find a way toward overcoming direct basis of life. man's alienation in bourgeois society. Although l(ant asserted that pure reason is fated to err Since Hegel fails to see the true cause of man's aliena- by its very nature, he was naturally unable to explain tion-the eiisterrce of alienated Iabor-therefore, f ollow- why it comprises the highest forms of knowledge and thin-k- morality. Kant was not fully aware of this contradiction ing the logic of idealism (and the logic .of bourgeois in! in gineral), he sees the source of alienation in the and he never posed it as a problem to he solved. But products Hegel not only interpreted it but also offered a solution of *o"rta of oljecti,-activity and especially in the .objectivized of human that oppose man's self-consciousness' sorts in his doctrine of "absolute spirit". According to Marx, "The issue, therefore, is to surmount Hegel regards the rationalist dogma about the infalli- til obieit of consci,oasness. Obiectiuity-as such is regarded bility of pure reason as a thesis; I(ant's postulate that it as an estranged, human relationship which does not corre- is precisely pure reason which errs appears as antithesis. spond to the essence ol man', to self-consciousness' The As to his doctrine about the development of pure reason ,Ziiproprioiii" of the objective essence of man, produced inherent in mankind, Hegel describes it as a synthesis, as wit-hin ihe orbit of estrangement as something alien, there- a negation of negation. However, the question is not ex- foreidenotes not only thJ annulment of estrangement, b:ot hausted by the speculative form of the triad. Hegel if obiecttuitg as *611. Man, that- i.s t9 s.qy, it :Sgql*: finds even a specific form of the understanding (and ;a ; a no"n-obiectiue, spirituat being." ({; !, 333-34) expression) of the dialectic of negation inherent in In his exposition and description oi the phenomenon pure reason: the principle of the historical character ot of alienati6n, Hegel is incapable of pointing to any req,son,

t97 196 , Reasbn is 'Iimited at least by the level of its develop- "Wherein does the movement of pure reason consist? In ment. The historical character of reason, an outstanding posing itself, opposing itself, composirg itself; in formulat. discovery of Hegel's method obviously contradicts the ing itself as thesis, antithesis, synthesis, or, yet again, in unconditional universality and infinity of reason he pos- affirming itself, negating itself and negating its negation." tulates. But it is an actual and not seeming contradictlon, (1; 6, 164) Marx exposes the fallacy of Hegel's atteriipt the motive force of the development of knowledge. If we at interpreting the human as the suprahuman, the histor- discard the idealist assumption of the supranatural (al- ical as the suprahistorical; but he also stresses the out- though inseparable from nature) divine first cause, the standing importance of the dialectic of negation and offers point, it turns out, is that "human thought is just as a classic formula of this law governing the knowledge and much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for development of objective reality, the law Hegel discovered. knowledge just as much unlimited as limited. It is sov- According to Marx, . dialectics "includes in its com-_ ereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its prehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sov- of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the ereign and it is limited in its individual realization and in negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; be- reality at any particular moment." (Engels.) (8; 106) cause it regards every historically developed social form Thus Hegel treats the essence of human thought as abso- as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into ac- lute and divine, and its historical character as the sub- count its transient nature not less than its momentary ex- stantial expression of its human existence. But both defi- istence..." (5, 1, 29) Lenin describes positive dialectical nitions of thought (knowledge) are equally substantial. And negation-a moment of connection, a moment of develop- Hegel actually proves it contrary to his own postulates. ment-as a highly important element of dialectics (10; "Absolute spirit" or absolute reason posits its definitions 38, 225-26). as 'true, but then it dialectically negates them, contrasting Naturally, because of the idealist premises of his sys- thesis to antithesis and uniting'these opposites in a syn- tem, Hegel is unable to reveal the real motive forces be- thesis which constitutes a ne.w, higher stage in the devel- hind the historical development of knowledge, forces deter- opment of reason. Hegel does not say that reason errs mined by the socio-economic process. The deification of and overcomes its errors: this mode of expression is in- Iinowledge actually rules out a sociological interpretation compatible with the dignity of absolute reason. In actual of the history of knowledge. And the assertion that there fact, however, Hegel reveals the dialectic of truth and is no development within divine reason because the latter error and proves that the power of reason consists in that is outside space and time extremely confuses the idealist it dialectically negates its definitions as rrntrue and thus concept of the historical character of reason. grasps the truth, the latter evolving further also through Flegel is right to stress the historical character of each dialeqtical negation. philosophical system: he sees this character as both its . Thus, on the one hand, Hegel grasps the necessarily limitation and its real historical significance. But he does contradictory nature of the universal process of cognition, not apply the principle to his own theory. Hegel is con- oI its development through the negation of negation. But vinced that his system crowns the self-comprehension of on the other hand, FIegeI mystically interprets this real pure reason. This means that he is guilty of the same il- historical process-fi.rst, because it is identified with the lusion for which he justly criticized his predecessors. Then development of nature and society, and second-and that, how do we explain his attempt at a theoretical substantia- of course, is a result of the substantialization of reason- tion of the need for a final system of philosophy lhat Hegel presents the materially determined historical de- would end philosophical development? The point here is velopment of knowiedge as the self-propulsion of pure rea- not vanity or conceit but the very principle of absolute son; Referring to this fundamental flaw in Hegel's inter- idealism maintaining that absolute reason fully compre- pretation of the development of knowledge, Marx says; hends itself in everything born of its infinite power. This t98 x9q pgqns- that, for all their pantheistic interpretation, teleo- u'here it is less applicable than in some particular disci- lo$ical premises make a consistent dialectiial examination pline restricted to the confines of its subject. However, one of the history of philosophy impossible. Hegel's philosophy must also remerrber that philosophy does deal with thq 9f the history of philosophy admits only the pait and-re- absolute, if only in the sense that the motion, change and fuses to recognize philosophy's future. development of matter is absolute. However, - one must nbt oversimplify Hegel's postulate The problem of the everlasting value inherent in certain about the absolute completion of the hiitory lf phitosophy, results produced by the development of knowledge and . the way the French personalist P. Ricoeur- does. He h-olds the principle of the dialectical negation of knowledge can- that according to Hegel, the entire preceding development not be opposed to each other. The dialectical understand- of philosophy providentially leads to HegAI'J system (vers ing of negation means understanding its relativity. It moi) and is a monolinear process where each system has therefore implies negation of negation itself which takes bg9-, merely a failed attempt of anticipating Hegelian place in the course of "living, fertile, genuine, powerful, philosophy. (92; 55-56) In actual fact, Helel siw his phi- omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge". (10; los_ophy as 1,1]e summit of the process which had progres- 38, 363) This statement formulated by Lenin in his crit- sed over millennia. He credited himself not with-solving ical analysis of Hegel's philosophy is a dialectical-mate- problems the -over which his predecessors had agonized, rialist definition of the everlasting verity of the major re- but with completing their accomplishments. It is true that sults achieved by scientific knowledge. Therefore, the ele- Hegel's entire philosophy is, in a certain sense, the result ment of truth contained in Hegel's concept of absolute 9f pr,e-Hegelian philosophy: he organized it into a system. knowledge should be contrasted to the absolute relativism [Iegel's emphasis on the dialectical interpretation of s.,c- r,,,hich is widespread in contemporary bourgeois philosophy cession is the salient feature of his concept of the history and which maintains, the way KarI Popper does, that "in of philosophy. science, we never have sufficient reason for the belief that Of _ course, absolute knowledge-in Hegel's view, the we have attained the truth. . . It is, using the language of completion of the history of philosophy-must not be in- Plato and Aristotle, information concerning the latest ter-preted to mean that, from the standpoint of the philos- scientific 'opinion'. This view means, furthermore, that we ppher, a -stage has been reached where everything is have no proofs in science (excepting, of course, pure math- I

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THE SOCIAL MEANING Some experts believe that llegel's philosophy is a feu- OF HEGBL'S PHILOSOPHY dal-romanticist leaction to the French Revolution. On the contrary, others see it as the ideology of the bourgeois rev- olution. Halfway between these extremes there are those maintaining that Hegel's doctrine is a theory of the "Prus- sian" road of capitalist development or, conversely, of the period of the Restoration which was forced to reconcile it- self to the gains of the bourgeoisie but did all it could to restrict them. Of course, these conflicting assessments of the ideological content of IIegelian philosophy could be Like his brilliant predecessor Heraclitus, Hegel is often explained by the confli.cting ideological positions of their called an "obscure" philosopher. That is'und6rstandable. authors. But such mutually exclusive points of view have But in this case we have to examine why he is called also been advanced by Marxists. This brings us back to that; apparently, his "obscurity" should not be reduced to the "obscurity" of Hegel's philosophy which thus acquires the coltplelty- or flaws in the exposition of his theory. a certain meaning and possibly even some concealed pur- True, Hegel's language is difficult, it has to be studied, pose. And so the question arises: could it be to a certain and it takes getting used to. Still, this distinctive lan- extent artificial, deliberate, at least where Hegel sets forth glage is very. expressive and very good for conveying all his socio-political beliefs? After all, in feudal Germany the nuances of his thinking. (suffice it to recall Marx's critique of the Prussian censor- Hegel once wrote to van Ghert of Holland that the dif- ship regulations) one could only express, argue and pub- ficulty of his language was explained by the complexity, licize antifeudal views in an "obscured" form. On the the abstract and speculative nature of the philosbphical other hand, this "ohscure" approach perfectly fits into the content which appears simply incomprehensible to those traditional distinction between exoteric and esoteric philos- not well versed in philosophy. But Hegel obscure not is ophies.- 9n_lV for beginner students of philosophy. Therefore, this Hegel spoke differently about quite important socio-pol- "obscurity" is not superflcial but subitantial, meaniirgful. itical issues in his works. This is particularly obvious Some -experts explain this shortcoming in Hegelian philos- when his letters to friends (which were often delivered by ophy by the complexity of its dialectics which often runs friends too, and not by postal services) are compared corrnter to ordinary common sense. That explanation is with his published works. As far as the latter are con- b-oth apt and insufficient, because those who }iave grasped cerned, we should distinguish (of course, it is not a funda- the true content of Hegel's dialectics see it as-highly mental distinction) between the works published by Hegel logical and therefore acceisible to a cognizing mind," himself and his lecture courses publshed by his students Hegel's philosophy is "obscure" not only for-laymen but after his death and based on his own notes and the sum- also for experts on philosophy. Another important point is maries written by students. It is equally interesting to that both the "supersubtle" speculative distinctions in compare Hegel's socio-political views set forth in his Phi- He-gel's philosophy ind his socio-political and philosoph- losophy ol Law and those advanced in his aesthetics and ical-historical postulates appear unclear, although the [at- history of philosophy where he expressed these vews in ter are set forth in a more or less popular way and are passing and no doubt much more freely. The French ex- free of dialectical "paradoxes". The argument is not so pert on Hegel's philosophy Jacques D'Hondt has recently much over the meaning of the category of "being in it- made a comparative study of Hegel's works that differ in self" as over the social meaning of his philosophy. Is it their origin. (68) progressive or reactionary? This debate began in Hegel's The French Marxist has clearly demonstrated the truth liietime and continues to this day. of a long-advanced assumption: that Hegel was much more

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6xpiicit about topicai socio-political problems in his iectu- *ori.s whi"h were sobjert io censorship;'someti-". L" for- res and Ietters to friends than in his published works. This mulated his postulates with deliberate ambiguity (in this does not mean that Hegel advanced- reactionary ideas in connection, Engels pointed to the thesis about the ration- his books and revolutionary ones in his lectures and, es- ality of the real and the reality of the rational), often he pecially, letters. An examination of Hegel's letters and oth- did not pursue this or that formula to the end and con- e-r documents makes- i! possible to elucidate and amplify cealed, something. In the period of the French Revolution the postulates he laid down in the books he edited for pub- Hegel thought that the time had already come when peo- lication himself. This cancels lhe certain vagueness which ple could express themselves more freely. But these hopes often obscures the meanlrg . true ol some. of" the principai turned out to be vain, and Hegel, who regarded the "cun- postulates of Hegel's social philosophy. ning of universal reason" as the fundamental objective We might also refer to the four large volumes of. Lec- law of world history, .acted in accordance with his own tares on the PhilosophU of Law rccorded by Hegel's stu- maxim: reason is as powerful as it is cunning. Truth must dents in 1818-1831 and published by Karl-Heinz Ilting and not be bare: it is too blinding. to excerpts from some of his manuscripts, specifrcally those Therefore, the distinctive features of Hegel's thoroughly he used for his lectures. (70) In the introduction to the organized manner of exposition are rooted not so much fust volume, Ilting shows that Hegel, adapting to the in the uniqueness of his personality (although that is ob- changing political conditions (specifically, to tlie rise of feu- viously important too'$) as in the fact that a bourgeois da1 reaction), often altered some of his especially provocative ideologist, who relies for his livelihood only on his position statements concerning the monarchy and other topical po- in a leadal hierarchy, is forced to partly conceal and litical issues. However, the principal content of his theory partly disguise his real views. And it is not only a case of the state and law remained essentially unchanged. of insincerity, secretive behavior or "timeserving". The With regard to esoteric and exoteric philosophies, one point is also that clear class consciousness is in general should stress that antiquity and the Middle Ages generated not typical of the ideologist of the bourgeois revolution. many esoteric doctrines intended exclusively for members Holbach was perfectly sincere when he dedicated his of a particular religious sect or a closed (sometimes even L'Ethocratie to Louis XVI. An ideologist of the revolution- secret) philosophical society. The ideologists of the bour- ary bourgeoisie, he entertained illusions concerning en- geois revolution usually rejected such doctrines because lightened absolutism. The petty-boirrgeois revolutionary they ran counter to the overall spirit of the bourgeois En- and republican Jean-Jaoques Rousseau believed that mon- lightenment. But. in their struggle against the dominant archy was the best state system for a large country and feudal relations and their religious sanctification, these dreamed about a philosopher on the throne. ideologists resorted, when necessary, to esoterically cipher- The foremost illusion of revolutionary bourgeois ideolo- ing their true views and to exoteric language which should gy is the belief that bourgeois social transformations are not be taken at face value. Justifying this ideological natural, rational and, in addition, flnancially sound. The technique, the British l8th-century materialist Anthony bourgeois thinkers of the 17th, t8th and early 19th cen- Collins said that although the philosophical mind was a turies believed that those opposing such transformations good judge of the truth, it yielded to the need for don- were either ignorant or malicious. Philosophers of the rev- ning a mask. Therefore, Hegel is no exception. His socio- olutionary hourgeoisie were striving to convince, educate political views often appear unclear precisely because he deliberately obscures them by all kinds of reservations and * Alreacly a professor at Berlin University, Hegel wrote to vague definitions and sometimes by such statements-usu- Niethammer: "On the one hand, I am a timid man; on the other aIly, affected-which contradict his basic, systematically hand, I like quiet, and I do not at all enjoy watching the storm presented postulates. approach all these years." (38; 272) put his friend Hiilderlin con- tradicted that when he wrote to Hegel: "You like it when it is noisy So, Hegel was not at all always lrank in those of his but I neecl quiet." (67; 6, 13&39).

206 ,:

government's .actions), and convert their class enemies. This shaped what might a-bo,t his divine authority, aboui be called their educational ideology which guided bour- state-sovereignty personified in the monarcn, "p"n"ii, geois ideas to adapt to the feudal world concept. If we re- Hegel's lifetime, iI that could not iaii to ;";;"i.. ;;i;";l call that, under the impact of the spontaneous development tlgq_r-9."g advocates of the republic. ffris servif""rr,?*.t of capitalism, feudal lords gradually switched over to a gl H.q:l': philosophy o[ law was the subjec[ of auu^.iri_ rng c,trcrsm bourgeois economy, we see that the educational ideology by young Marx in his manuscript essav ,4 was based not only on illusion but also on fact. Such, ap. Lontribution to the oJ_Hegel's phitosoph.y .Critique 'eniiosoptty ol Law,. parently, are some of the key reasons behind both the ex- Specifically, Marx shows-that ihe ir; a mystical rt ;ff;; plicit and implicit meaning of Hegel's works, behind both interpretation of constitutional'm"orar"rr-, tn .,"o1 what he said and how he said it and, finally, what he de- sent it as the absolute social ideal which realizes ii.trr,-,ti"_ liberately suppressed: let us recall that even Kant, who g-el converts all the attrihutes of the consiitutionar *oourrt io preached rigorously ethical behavior, argued that in cer- the Europ-e_ of. today into the absolute ..fi ani.r-i;;;;;;^ rne ,the ;; tain cases omission did not contradict morality. u)tu,. He does no-t sa-y monarch's will is the final-i-t. Let us turn to Hegel's Philosophy ol Law, the work usu- decision', but 'the will's linal decision is ttie *oorr.i'. ally cited to prove his reactionary socio-political views. Iirst proposition is empirical. The second p.rurrt. tfrr-;*;i;: Here Hegel refers to the traditional classiflcation of state ical fact into a metiphysical axiom." ii; J,25i-ri;-i'l;. forms adopted since antiquity and says that monarchy, same time Marx notes that in lact Hegei places t'fr. ,iri.t_ aristocracy and democracy in the shape they took in the est possible limitations on the *orrrcd,, f,nctions il[;; past are one-sided forms of state organization which "can- duces them to acts that have nothing ir, with the not tolerate the principle of free subjectivity within them- functions of the head of state. Mirx interprets"o**oo H;g;i;; selves and are unable to correspond to a developed reason". viewpoint as follows: "The hereditary character of the rion. (64; B, 360) The principle of free objectivity is none other arch follows from his concept. He is io be the p.r.o" .p..i6. than a speculative (and esoteric) definition of the bour- cally distinguished from tlie- whole species, tio* ,ti'-otfr* geois-democratic concept of civil rights of the individ- persons. What is it, then, that ultimitely and nr*fy ais_ tinguishes person ual. one from all others? ThL body."ffru The"hieh- With regard to "feudal monarchy" (his own term) He- est function of the body is seraal actiuity. frigfr?.t gel declares that "under this political system, the life of the constitutional act of the king is therefore hls sexual i.tirr- state rests on privileged persons whose whims determine ity,.for,through this me mikes a king.,, (i; .r, Ai Mr;, much of what is to be done to preserve the state's exist- ironically comments on l,hat statemeit of Hegel's' *hi;h ence." (64; B,359) d,escriles. the king's highest mission tn d.eii'"ar;r;;:-;I_ Hegel contrasts feudal monarchy-i.e., autocracy as a though this royal. prerogative is related neither to legisla- system of arbitrary political rule-to constitutional monar- tive nor to executive power.'r' chy which he considers the highest, final and essentially absolute form of state organization: "The evolution of the -'t We should here recall the overall assessment of Hegel,s phi,los_ state into a constitutional monarchy is the task of the new 2t.hy ol La_w which Marx offers i" inu oii*ri:riiiiaTiirh; 1;i; world in which the substantial idea has acquired an infi- biicher: "The criticism of the Ge;;ai-philosophv ol state oia io*. u-hich_attained its most consistent, nite form." (64 8, 355) Thus Hegel extols the immediate richest ;;d fi;;i-i;r;;";;; Llrrough Heget, is both .a critical urialy;il of ifr. *oa.r"-;i;U;;t objective of the bourgeoisie. This obviously contradicts He- oI tne colnected 'v't,nore with it, and the resolute negation of the gel's dialectics. But does it contradict the interests of the uerm-an.^realrty pori.ti_car_ and legal consciousness as praclised, hitherto. bourgeoisie? I1..,-To,rt drstrnguished, +os! univers-al exprcssiorr oI which, raised Io lne levej oI a science,.is mon- the spzculatiue philosophg oJ law itself', In connection with the deflnition of constitutional Unforrunately, rhis thesis whi6h revdalJ g"guf,r'r#io_ pglrtrca-l.(1l,jt 181): archy, Hegel holds forth in detail about the greatness of views has not been examined rn detail in Marx"ist stuoies the monarch (who is allegedly above responsihility for the of tho history of philosophy

208 1(-01562 We have seen that indeed there is much that is ,,ob- it differently. When a reactidnary of a conServative is foreed scure" in Hegel's socio-political views. That is why we must to admit that without a constitution one can no longer separate the real content of his social philosophy from all preserve monarchy, he sees the constitution merely as a sorts of exoteric phraseology, bows and scrapes before the new monarchist guise with democratic trimmings. A super- Prussian state and government, etc. All that must also be ficial examination of Hegel's Philosophy ol Law can lead taken into account, but only inasmuch as it expresses He- to the conclusion that Hegei advocates precisely such new gel's genuine convictions. And it is this fact thit calls for democratic guise for absolutism. In actual fact, howevern investigation. he argues against this approach, although he does s[,ar it Let us begin the examination of this "obscure" problem ouer. Let us recall that in his PhilosophA ol Law he speaks with the fact that Hegel proclaims the establishment oI about the development of the subjectivity, initiative of so- constitutional monarchy to be the supreme political goal of ciety's members, about the development of civil rights and his time. Some scholars believe that this fait alone proves representative institutions as a highly essential content of the conservative character of his politics. I believe th;t this the constitution. The citizens' private aims are legitimate view is clearly unhistorical and abitract. aims, and even arbitrary action by an individual (of course, In a revolutionary situation, when absolutism is ready within legal bounds) is to be regarded as necessity. to "bestow" some scanty constitution on the people in or- Such is the view of Hegel, who stresses the flrst element der to strengthen its own social basis, the demind for a in the expression "constitutional monarohy", while the con- constitutional monarchy is usually couruterreuoluti.onary. servatives naturally underscore the second. When feudal absolutism is on the verge of collapse, the But the real meaning of Hegel's understanding of con- propaganda of constitutional monarchy is taken up by po- stitutional monarchy is expressed explicitly and unequivo- litical reactionaries. But Hegel advanced and subsiantiaied cally in those of his works which do not deal directly with the slogan of a constitutional monarchy at a time when Iaw. F or example, in the third chapter of his lectures on there was yet no reuolutionary sitaation in Germany, when aesthetics (Beauty in Art, or the ldeal) he says that in the all attempts at imposing legislative restrictions on absolut- pfst, works of art usually portrayed kings and queens, and ism failed and the very idea of a constitutional monarchy adds: "The monarchs of our time, unlike the heroes of the was officially dismissed as "demagoguery". Could it be that mythical times, are no longer some summit of the whole this forced Hegel to accompany his demonstration of the which is concrete in itself; they are rather the more or less need for a constitutional monarchy with all sorts of res- abstract center within institutions that have already been ervations about the greatness and inviolability of the mon- independently developed and established by law and the arohist principle? And perhaps the objective logic of ideo- constitution. The monarchs of our time no longer have the Iogical struggle demanded such maneuvering also because most important functions of the ruler in their hands; they monarchist illusions still ruled the bourgeoisie? no longer exercise legal judgment; finances, civil order and Engels probed the true meaning of Hegel's concept of sec-urity are no longer their own special occupation; war constitutional monarchy; "Hegel pronounced, in his Phi- and peace are determined by the overall conditions of for- losophy ol Law, Constitutional Monarchy to be the final eign policy which is not subject to their direct personal and most perfect form of Government. In other words, he g,uidance or power; and when the final, highest deiision in proclaimed the approaching advent of the middle classes all these matters of state rests with them, nevertheless the of the country to political power." (1; 11, 14) Three dec- specific overall content of these decisions depends little on ades before the t84B Revolution the slogan ,of constitu- their individual will; it, too, has been determined before tional monarchy in Germany was a bourgeois-reuolationarg it is presented to them for decision. Thud the summit of slogan which undoubtedly helped the antifeudal opposition the_ state, the monarch's own subjective will is purely for- mal to consolidate its forces. in its relation to the universal and the public.'; 164; True, advocates of constitutional monarchy can interpret 10, 248-49) Of course, those firmly subsribing to the piej-

210 t4* 2'j,.,1. .,.' udice that flegel's socio-political views were reactionar$ to's principle is the principle of the conscious free wi1] of tf,ese sufficientiy clear theses as a complaint the inilividual which in recent times has been pushed to "urti"t.tpretsorts about the decline o-f royal authority, because He- the forefront, especially by Rousseau: that freedom of the "ig"f it quite cautious here too: he describes a process that individual is neiessary precisely as that of the individu' iuk.r pir." in history and does- not express-at least di- al, that each indiviclual- must be able to express himself rectlyiSit attitude to it. Nevertheless, this attitude is ob- fully." (64; 14, 295) vious to those who have grasped the essence of his philos- Hegel'contrasts Plato to Rousseau the bourgeois revolu- motio!, ald ophy: the history of mankind is its forward tionaiy, whose viewpoint he regards as an expression -of tfraf is the reason why the desire to freely build one'b life, the necessary development of the idea of statehood, the de- substantially inherent in the human personality, becomes velopment free from the arbitrary approach qf philoso- possihle. T}iat is why the qu-otation cited above desmibes phers. True, Hegel does make a reservation: in Rousseau's They can hardly i{egel's convictions iufficiently -clearly. doctrine, "this opposite principle is in the extreme and ap' be ialled simply monarchist: under the constitutional mon- pears in its total one-sidedness". (64; 14, 295) This reser- archy which ire sees as the summit of social development, vation should not be presented as an attempt at disguising ihu ,rorurrh is a figure-head because all matters of state revolutionary views. Hegel really disagrees with Rousseau are decided by appropriate state bodies' This explairy S9- on many points. gel's unequivocai statement: "When laws are unshakable In his Philosophy of History, Hegel develops his concept ind the siate is organized in a certain way, that which is of the constitutional monarchy and puts the demands for the monarch's exclusive decision irrel- the freedom of. ownership and individual to the forefront, subject to -appears ,ompared to the substantial." (63; 4,937) seeing them as the central moments of objective (real) "rrltIn his Phttosophy ol Law Hegel goes into gre-at detail freedom. As a result of the establishment of this "objec. to prove the adviniages o{ hereditary--over elected monar- tive freedom"-that is, capitalist social relations-"all un- ctry. ttris has nothing to do with extolling hereditary mon- freedom stemming from feudal relations ceases, as do all archy. When Hegel asserts that only the latter corre- determinations stemming from feudal law, tithe and quit- sponds to its concept, he simply stresses that the question rent. Furthermore, real freedom demands the freedom to of formal, actually fic[itious supreme royal authoril,y must choose an occupation, meaning that man must be allowed decide itself, as ii were, on the strength of birthright and to use his abilities l,he way he chooses and that all govern- not as a result of political struggle. Viewed from this an- ment positions be accessible to him. Such are the moments gle, Hegel's negation of elected monarchy is perfectly jus- of real freedom which are based not on sense because sense tified. Hegel's concept of constitutional monarchy centers admits the existence of both serfdom and slavery, but not on the doctrine of royal authority but on that of "civil on man's thought and self-consciousness which belong to society" (btirgerliche Gesellschaft).Jn hJs Lectwres on the his spiritual essence." And further Hegel stresses: "A cit- Histoiy oi Phltosophy he analyzes Plato's theory oJ the ide- izen must not only be able to do his job but also to profit aI staie and formulates his view of the rights of citizens. from it; it is not enough for him to he in command of his Plato's ideal, he says, faces the past, when there was no abilities, he must also be able to apply them." (63; subjectivity of the individual as an element of social or- 4,927) ganization. "Plato did not recognize the knowledge, the Hegel contrasts feudal law to bourgeois law which he ivill, the decision of an individual, he djd not recognize- his idealizes: private ownership is defined as "freedom of own- right to stand on his own two feet, and did not know how ership", and the elimination of serfdom (formal freedom) he- could reconcile this right to his idea. But justice equal- as "freedom of the individual". But this idealization of Iy demands that this principle, too, be accorded its proper bourgeois transformations (whiclt, in Hegel's time were rath- place,'and that this piinciple be supreqrely dissolved, !!at er tempting prospects l,han fact) was typical of revolu- it bu in harmony with the universal. The opposite of Pla- tionary bourgeois ideology. Those who did not idealize such

212 .nationwide transformations in the era of bourgeois revolutions were suring the demands for a"constitution, the king mostly its feudal opponents. declared there was no force on Earth that could make him Finally, to conclude our examination of the question of replace the "natural" relations between the king and the constitutional monarchy, we can refer to some of the ideas people-relations based on some inner truth-with conven- Hegel expressed in his letters to friends. In one of his let- tional constitutional relations. ters to Niethammer (Hegel always remained loyal to the Ideologists of the feudal-romanticist reaction saw Hegel's convictions he expressed in this letter) he stresses that the concept of constitutional monarchy as an attempt at ap- problem of the constitution is not reduced to the restric- plying the British pattern to the conditions of Germany. tion of royal authority, that the most important point here In Britain, the preservation of the monarchy upheld con- is the freedom of the people and their participation in elec- servative traditions, but it was naturally not the king-a tions and decision-making. Without it, any constitution king who reigned but lot ruled-that stood in the way of turns into Sihitrary rule, grossness and cruelty, which in completing bburgeois-dbmocratic transformations. Buf in turn leads to stupidity, dissatisfaction with everything so- Germany, a backward country, the issue was not comple- cial, servility and meanness. Hegel knew full well that the tion but commencement of bourgeois-democratic transforma- "constitutions" graciously granted to the people by the tions. As it specifically appears in his articles, Hegel's po- monarchs of some small German states simply disguised litical program is modest enough. In my opinion, this also royal despotism. Hegel connected the introduction of the "explains his negative attitude to the British Reform Acts constitution to profound changes in the very way of life (1831) which envisaged a substantial democratization of of the people: "There is a great and profound meaning to the electoral system. Hegel was firmly convinced that the creating a constitution; it is all the more great and pro- "absolute spirit" was progressing slowly and barely found the more freely-in Germany-the country is perceptibly and that this was where its irresistible ruled and things are done without any constitution, and power lay. this is considered not only possible but preferable!" (38; While seeing the "obscure points" in Hegel's philosophy L, lg7-gg) as a deliberate step to disguise the political program of the It is obvious that Hegel idealizes the social consequences bourgeois revolution (of course, this refers to the Germ,an of introducing the constitution and the constitution it- theory of the bourgeois revolution), we must also remem- self; he sees it as something similar to the substantial ba- ber that there is .a contradiction between the self-con- sis of social life which has achieved genrrine self-conscious- sciousness of a bourgeois philosopher and the actual social ness and freedom in its development. Meanwhile, no con- meaning of his doctrine, that is, between its subjective form stitution prevents the exploiter classes from going their and objective content. The author of this or .that theory is own way. The idealist understanding of history inevitably often not aware, or not fully aware. of its objective mean- entails a reappraisal of the legal superstructure and legal ing; on the other hand, his own evaluation of his theory consciousness. Nevertheless, it should be noted that such is not comprehensive with regard to its ohjective content idealization of the constitution idealizes bourgeois democ- and sometimes even distorts it. This general methodologi- ,racy and not bourgeois monarchy. cal consideration which is among the principles of the his- To show the degree to which Hegel's understanding of iory of philosophy is particularly applicable to Hegel be- constitutional monarchy and the monarch's role contradict- cause the contradiction between method and system per- ed the feudal ideology then dominating Germany, I might meates his entire philosophy. In this connection one can quote the speech made by Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prus- say that the content of Hegel's theory is infinitely more sia 16 years after Hegel died. Demanding new credits from significant than the one he was aware of and expressed' the joint landtag, the king asserted that no constitution Hegel's philosophy was an ideology of the bourgeois rev- could equal a king's fatherly concern for his subjects: "I and olution. Subjectively, however, he supported not the revo- my house, we want to serve the Lord!" (56; 49) And, cen- lution but reform-a gradual bourgeois transforrnation of

2',1,4 feudal qocial relatiogs. one must therefore distinguish be- actionary features of the Prussian state and obviously f,w.qen Hegelian diale-ctics-a theory of revolutior,"rnd Hr_ idealized its role in German history. gel's interpretation of it. That is i rather difficuli Gk [; Elevation of the state to the absolute, even its deification cause Hegel simu,ltaneously created the revolutionary theo- is one of the central and salient features of Hegel's socio. ryof development and its reformist interpretation. political views. His system describes the state as "objective Hegel's dialectics is a theory of immanent, absolute and spirit", and its finite, limited forms are the family and irresistible development. But he interpreted ii to mean that "civil society"-that is, the sphere of private interests, in. social progless was spontaneous and that it was no use cluding economic ones. By recording the relation "the state "subjectively" interfering in that process .which, h; ,ii;_ -civil society", Hegel posed a question whose material- ged, was inherently rational. Hence the idea of )""o"iiiii- ist solution is one of the fundamentals of the scientific- tion to social reality, which is interpreted simply as what philosophical understanding of history. exists.. "Comprehen{ge what is is the,,This task of philosophy, for Naturally, Hegel solves this question idealistically: he what is is reason." Then he adds: rational sees the state as a moral and legal organism which deter- is _reconciliation with reality.', (64; B, 1g) This interpreta_"i6*i,birt mines the basis of civil society. Thus he uses his absolute tion of dialectics completely cancels iis central (in Lenin;s approach to the state as a principle substantiated by the view) idea, that of positive negation, and replaces dialec- entire content and structure of his system. But the central tics with a reformist approach io feudal instiiutions which question of any revolution is that of power;.the revolution is justified by the simple statement that they change and destroys one type of state and replaces it with another, his- - improve. torically more progressive type. Hegel's system does not _This "uncritical p-ositivism', (Marx,s term) of Hegel's philosophically substantiate the need for the revolutionary philosophy directly affects his attitude to the piussian sLte. transformation of the state. On the contrary, that system The latter seen is as the most adequate embodiment-tt of-a implies an immanent, spontaneous development of the state. fhe Protestant Reformation which He'gel .ortrariea, But, contradiction his system (and accord- ,,In in to in full gSltai" -extent, to the French Revolution. Hegel writes: ance with his method), Hegel separates the state conform- tiis IJSht, Friedrich II is a figure of worl"cl history. He ing to its concept from the pseudostate which is terminat- may.be called the ruler, with whom the new era blcame ed by a revolution. "In a state which is truly rationally rcality in which the true interest of the state realized its compartmentalized all laws and institutions are none other universality and its supreme justification. . . He was the than the realization of freedom according to its substan- hero of Protestantism, Lut not only personally, like Gus- tial determinations." (64; 10, 128) But not every state is a tav 4dolf, but as the king of a greaf power.-.'. Frederick realization of freedom. For example, describing the French the Great not only turned Prussia as a protestant power state on the eve of the 1789 Revolution, Hegel excldims in- into one of the great powers of Europe, but he was also dignantly: "What a state! The totally arbitrary rule by g1g) a pLilosopher king." (63; 4, ministers and their whores, wives, lackeys; so that the enor- We must, of course, remember that Hegel saw the prot- mous host of petty tyrants and idlers saw it as their di- estant Reformation not only as the struggle of a new re- vine right to plunder the wealth of the state and the sweat ligion against Catholicism but also as t[J struggle of the of the people. Shamelessness and injustice were rampant, emergent bourgeois social relations against the dominant morals could only be compared to the baseness of institu- feudal system. Apparently, his assessment of pmssia took tions. We see a lack of individual rights in the civil ancl it into account that already in the second decade of the political aspects, as well as in the sphere of conscience, 19th century Prussia had become the strongest German thought." (64; 15, 516) This attack on the French (antl state (both militarily and economically)'unification and that this had any feudal) state shows that l{egel did not put an absolute largely predetermined its role in the of Ger- construction on the state when he was to explain the need many. Be it as it may, Hegel indulgently tolerated the re- for the bourgeois revolution that had already happened. l2ta 217 Condemning the abstract opposition of necessity to being, stem from the dialectical analysis of the socio-historical he often made this opposition specific and historical. process. Thus, the contradiction between the objective social con- Hegel often drew on dialectics to produce conservatrive tent of Hegel's philosophy and his subjective views was and even reactionary conclusions, but in all such cases he rooted in the inconsistent and halfhearted nature of the a_ctually violated dialectics. For example, he maintained bourgeois revolutionary spirit. Lenin points to the crux o[ that the development of the state, evdn when it leads to the matter: radical is- "Although Hegel himself was an admirer of -change, "orderly and outwardly imperceptible mb- the autocratic Prussian state, in whose service he was as tion". Marx cited this statement as oEviouily ionflicting a professor at Berlin University, Hegel's. teachings were with both dialectics and the entire historical record oT revolutionary." (10; 2, 27) Lenin draws a firm line between bourgeois revolutions, and said: "The category of gradual the subjective views of the thinker and the actual social transition is, in the first place, historically false; and in the direction of his philosophy, and even opposes one to the seco-nd place, it explains nothing." (1; 3, 57) other. The role of the latter in ideological struggle is in- The contradiction between the philosopher's subjective dependent of the thinker's consciousness. Hegel's left-wing views and the real social trend of his theory should not be followers grasped this real content of his philosophy and interpreted to mean that Hegel was a conservative (or even used it to arrive at revolutionary and atheist conclusions. reactionary)- even though his doctrine was revolutionary. Of course, such conclusions wer-e alien to Hegel, and he Any contradiction has its limits, it is restricted in real life: would have opposed the Young Hegelians had he lived to ignore this truth means yielding to the irrationalist long enough to witness their emergence. Nevertheless, the interpretation of dialectics in the spirit of illogic. Hegelian left did not simply impose these conclusions on, - -Hegel's attitude to the French Revolution exposes the and ascribe them to, Hegel's philosophy to use the prestige fallacy of the absolute, metaphysical opposition of the of his name: they actually followed from his theory-his thinker's subjective self-consciousness to the actual content dialectics, to be precise. Paradoxically enough, the cen- of his philosophy. Hegel described that revolution as tral meaning of his own doctrine was in many respects un- "world-historical for because of its content it is of global clear Hegel; meaning and importance". (63; to this surfaced in the course of his- -historical 4, 931) After the Congress tory. of VTnna, when feudal reaction emerged triumphant and What then is the revolutionary significance of Hegel's was destroying bourgeois-democratic gains, trying to stamp philosophy? Lenin answers this question as follows: "He- out memories of the revolutionary past, Hegel passionately gel's faith in human reason and its rights, and the funda- declared: "It was a glorious sunrise. All thinking beingi mental thesis of Hegelian philosophy that the universe is celebrated that era. Exalted, moving feelings reigned at that undergoing a constant process of change and development, time, the enthusiasm of the spirit swept the world, as if it led some of the disciples of the Berlin philosopher-those were only then that the divine was really reconciled with who refused to accept the existing situation-to the idea the world." (63; 4,926) Those enthusiastic words were fol- that the struggle against this situation, the struggle against lowed by serious reservations, but they were already unable existing wrong and prevalent evil, is also rooted in the uni- to belittle the assessment. versal law of eternal development. If all things develop, if True, Hegel did not believe the revolutionary road of institutions of one kind give place to others, why should the bourgeois transformation to be inevitable for all countries. autocracy of the Prussian king or of the Russian tsar, the But he said it in so many words (in his Lectures on, the enrichment of an insignificant minority at the expense of the History of Philosophy) that certain conditions make revo- vast majority, or the domination of the bourgeoisie over Iution inevitable. When the popular spirit, he said, realizes the people, continue forever?" (10; 2, 2l) Obviously, that the existing legal basis is no longer necessary and has such radical conclusions were impossible f or Hegel, turned into shackles, "an alternative arises. Either the peo- but they have their er671 objective logic: they inevitably ple destroy, by an internal violent explosion, this right

218 219 which still demhnds recognition; or it quietly and gradu- DIaIncuCAL MATERIALISM ally changes the law which is still regarded as law but is ANP THE HEGELIAN CONCEPT no longer a genuine integral element of morals, it is that OF THE UNIVERSALITY whiih the spirit has already overcome." (64; 14, 276-77) OF PRACTICE Of course, Hegel supports a quiet and gradual transforma- tion of the feudal superstructure into the bourgeois one. This ideological trend reflects the distinctive nature of the Remarkable: I{egel comes to bourgeois revolution which begins only when the capitalist the "idea" as the coincidenco of structure takes shape within the feudal system. Still, He- the notion and the object, as gel is fully aware of the fact that such peaceful evolutiou truth, through the practical, pur- calls for the readiness of the ruling social forces to welcome . posive activity of man. A very the new. "The state is transformed without violent rev- close approach to the view that olutions when this realization is universal; institutions man by his practice proves the faIl like ripe fruit, they disappear, no one knows how- objective cortectness of his ideas, each bbws before the inevitable fact that it must lose its concepts, knowledge, scienoe. I right. But the government must know that the time for it V. L Lenin has come. If the government, unaware of the truth, ties it- self to transient institutions, if it undertakes to defend the insubstantial which is law against the substantial. . . it is Marxist philosophy has revealed the diversity of prac- for that reason overthrown by the advancing spirit." $A; tice, its epistemological, socio-economic, socio-political, rev- 14, 277) olutionary functions, its universal content and meaning The ideology of the bourgeois revolution is logically in- which ar-e expressed in fundamentaliy different ways in ma- clined to compromise with the ruling feudal forces; one of terial production, social transformations, knowledge, artis- the reasons is that the bourgeoisie stands to gain the mosi tic activity and any human activity in general. The dialec- from such compromise. The hourgeois revolutionary spirit tical-materialist theory of practice exists and develops as a is always limited, inconsistent, halfhearted; but it is these critical summing-up of the entire history of knowledge, i4- features that win over a certain part of the ruling feudal cluding the history oI philosophy as an important element. classes to the bourgeois side. And Hegelian philosophy Significantly, the classics of Marxism advanced the central authentically expresses the essence of the bourgeois revo- postulates of the Marxist philosophical theory of practice lutionary spirit during the rise of bourgeois relations in a above all in their studies of the history of philosophy: backward, feudal country. That is what makes his philos- Marx's Contribwtion to lIegel's Philosophy ol Law, Engels' consciousness of an era. Lud,wig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Phi- ophy- the social Hegel's philosophy loses its "obscure" appearance under losophy, and Lenin's Materialisrn and Empirio-Criticism and the spotlight of Marxist-Leninist analysis. The social mean- Philosophical Notebooks. This, naturally, gives rise to the ing of the Hegelian doctrine becomes obvious. Why then following question: what role did the problem of practice do the bourgeois philosophers of today present him as a play in pre-Marxian philosophy? Marxist philosophy differs politi6al reactionary, as a theorist of the totalitarian state? from all its predecessors, including progressive ones, in that Ironically, Hegel the great bourgeois thinker is today it has made the question of practice the central philosoph- an ally of the progressive social forces in their struggle ical problem. Still, one should not underrate the philosoph- against reactionarY ideologY' ical legacy without which dialecticai and historical mate- rialism would have failed to emerge. Strictly speaking, there was no problem of practice 4s a philosophical problem in ancient and medieval philoso-

221 lri

IF f: E ii phy, even in those theories which posed ,,pi,actical', (morai, tice substantiates itseif by giving birth to the world of the edu-cational) -problems before phil'osophy.'O;itl; ti;";: objects it creates, it is really above the subjective activity nod ot,early bourgeois revolutions, which is also the periocl of individuals-as it is seen, for example, from social pro- oI revolutionary change in philosophical subjects, does the duction, the determining basis of social life. Naturally, He- pro.blgm of practice 6ecome- a philosophical issue. gr"o" gel never makes this conclusion, but it follows from the and Descartes are th-e first philosophers to proclaim man materialist interpretation of his postulates which describe master of nature. Still, while entruiting the practical tasli practice as the substance of the "absolute idea", the con- of grasping natural laws to philosophy, lhose tiink.r. u tent of the cosmic genesis and the entire development of no distinction -ut between -specificphilbsophy'and particular sciences. the universe, the dialectical identity of the material and Nor.do tllqv studV th,e ielation' of ptritosopn-y to the spiritual. Hegel expresses it as follows: "The absolute practice. The philosophers of the l7th and I-Bth centuries idea is above all the unity of the practical and the theoret- see practice mostly as the application of scientific know_ ical idea and, consequently, it is also the uniLy of the idea ledge.or the activity of individuals who proceed from their of life and the idea of knowledge." (64; 6,408) everyday experience and pursue their private aims. The But the opposition of thought and being which directly contrasting of philosophizing to non-phil-osophical, and es_ determines man's life is no illusion. It is stark reality to pecrally _practical, activity is retained, despite the attempts which we belong body and soul. Our life constantiy shows at a philosoptrical understanding of its accomplish-nrt. us that the thinkable and the really existing are quite dif- and epistemological significance. ferent things. Theoretical knowledge, therefore, is not The new. stage in [he development of the philosophical enough because it strives only to see the world as it is, understanding of practice is conhected with tfru .-rJgr"c, while the point is to make it into what it should be. oI classical German philosophy. Atthough the Kantian- pos- The theoretical idea-or knowledge-interpreted by He- tulate about the primacy oi practical""rso, over theoreti. gel not only as human activity but also as the self-propul- cal reason reduces "pure" piactical reason to moral con- sion of the "absolute idea" draws its content from its other sciousness, essentially, it aFeady transcends the bounds of being-from the outside, alienated world. This reliance on uthi"l. The point is that there are philosophicrt pront.rn. the external imposes limitations on the theoretical idea, ylrr.rh can only be solved practicaliy. Thd philosophy oi therefore it is not yet the all-encompassing substance-sub- Fichte, the direct successor df Kant, is not oriy , th;;;y ;f ject which generates everything existing and contains it in science but also the philosophy of idealistically interprlted itself as its recognized content. These limitations cannot practice. be overcome by theoretical means; theory must turn into goes still further. He sees thought as practice. It is only on this condition that the concept in S"g-gl an almighty-sees and all-creative "absolute idea". In otf,er words, he itself becomes a concept for itself-it now appears not thinking as practical activity. Viewed from this argle, p.ac_ only as knowledge but also as activity changing the exist- tice is not merely human activity. True, man is ihe'only ing being. Thus, as a practical idea, the concept introduces live, finite creature capable of purposefui practical activity its content into the objective world, thus overcoming the which effectively transforms tiie world around him. But "external" bias of the objective, its alienation from the Hegel's practice is above man: Iike thought and reason, it spirit, and rebuilding the world on a rational basis. is described as substantial activity which, by mediating the But the practical idea is also limited because it opposes f.undaqgn-tal opposition of thought and being, brings ibout the theoretical idea as its negation. According to Hegel, it their dialectical identity. Theie seeminglj'uninielligible "still lacks the moment of the theoretioal idea" (64; 5, idealistic theses actually quite objectives the lead to an important-practical coiclu- 323)-that is, the understanding of the and sion: the- opposition between theoietical and activ- ways leading to them, and the critical assessment of reali- ity is relative. Practice is the unity of thd spiritual and ty which it changes no matter what the latter's nature. At the material; that is why it is univ-ersal. And-since prac- this stage in its development, the practical idea grasps re- ,,, l.

ality-still inadequately, as something which is "insignificartt that Hegel's idea? It is necessary.to return to this." (10; by itself and which must attain its true determination and 38, 271) only value solely through good as its objective. (64; 5,324) Lenin does return to these problems later in his notes The inadequate evaluhtion of objective reality is overcome on The Science oJ Logic. In the section dealing with prac- by the development ol the practical idea, of practice because tice in the theory of knowledge he critically analyses He- the latter assimilates theoretical knowledge and masters it gel's understanding of the relation "theory-practice". as the knowledge of reality and of the laws governing its Lenin dismisses idealism and shows that Hegel dialecti- change, thus comprehending that its own opposition to the cally understands both the relation of theory to practice and theoretical idea is only relative. This produces and estab- that of practice to theory. This leads Hegel to conclude lishes "an objective world whose inner basis and actual that practice enriched by theory becomes the highest form stability is the concept. This is the absolute idea." (64; of knowledge at each separate stage of its development. 5,327) Referring to Hegel's thesis quoted above, Lenin says: . Despite its idealist character, the dialectical concept of "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has practice Hegel develops profoundly anticipates the true not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate content and meaning of social practice. The practical change actuality." (10; 38, 2L3) of the existing is the fundamental condition of its knowl- I must stress that Lenin does not refer to any and. all edge. Therefore, practice is the basis of knowledge and practice. Practice is examined in its development, as a the highest form of its realization. Naturally, Hegel pre- transition from one stage to the next, higher stage. Simul- sents these truths in an idealist manner: the spirit cognizes taneously, the relation of practice to knowledge changes only that which it creates itself. But since this creative too; the latter also develops and reaches the level of theo- spirit has not yet achieved self-consciousness, it treats the retical knowledge. Theory is transformed into practical ac- reality it transforms as unspiritual and therefore insignif- tivity, raising it to a new, higher level. Guided by theory, icant. But reality is not at all insigniflcant because its practice corrects, enriches it and makes it more spegific. essence is spiritual. The practical idea cancels its own ne- It is the unity of immediate actuality and universality in- gation of reality, comprehending it as its own creature. The herent in practice in its developed form and organically practical idea in this aspect, as the "absolute idea", is Iinked with theoretical knowledge that makes practice the above knowledge, because it "has not only the dignity of criterion of the truth. And that is why theoretical verifica- the universal but also of the simply actwal". (10; 38, 213) tion of the results of study and their testing by practice Lenin sets much store by this postulate of llegel's. In his complement and enrich each other, ruling out any absolute notes on The Science ol Logic Lenin analyzes Hegel's pos- approach to both the truth and its criterion-that is, sci- tulates about the theoretical and practical idea and reveals ence and practice. their rational elements. Defining his subject-"Hegel on Today's idealist philosophers reject the Marxist view practice and objectivity of cognition"-Lenin shows how of practice as the criterion of the truth and point to the close the German idealist is to the correct epistemological opposition between knowledge as a spiritual phenomenon uriderstanding of the role of practice. Lenin sums up and and practical activity directly connected to material ob: materialistically corrects Hegel's theses as follows: "Theo- jects. Unlike these contemporary bourgeois philosophers, retical cognition ought to give the object in its necessity, Hegel totally rejected the metaphysical opposition of in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, an- thought, logio to practical activity. According to his theory, und fiir-sich. But the human notion 'definitively' catches practice is a process which turns the spiritual into mate- this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only rial and the subjective into objective. Lenin points to the when the notion becomes 'being-for-itself in the sense of rational element of this concept and brilliantly deciphers practice. That is, the practice of man and of mankind is Hegel's idealist postulate: "For Hegel action, practice, is a the test, the criterion of the objectivity ol cognition. Is logical'syllogisrn', a figure of logic. Antl that is true! Not,

224 l5-01562 225 .f of course, in the sense that the ffgure of iogic has its other- Let us recall that Hegel describes the idea not as man's being in the practice of man ( - al:solute idealism), but concept of some thing but as something allegedly indepen- vice.versa: man's prac{ice, repeating itself a thousand mil- dent of man and mankind: the impersonal process of think- lion'times, becomes consolidated in man's consciousness by ing which takes place in everything natural and social and figures of logic." (70 38,217) comprises their absolute essence, substance. The same ap- Pre-Marxian materialism countered idealism by substan- plies to the concept which, in Hegel's view, is not only a tiating the epistemological principle of reflection, but it form of human thought but also an authentic form of the did not pose the problem of the relation of the logical "absolute idea", that is, it is also absolute. According to forms inherent in knowledge to objective reality. Engels Hegel, the idea "should not be understood as an idea points out that metaphysical materialism "restricted itself about something, just as the concept should not be under- to the proof that the content of all thought and knowledge stood only as a definite'concept". (64; 6,385) must derive from sensuous experience . . . It was modern Hegel uses the word "idea" to denote substance, first, idealistic, but at the same time dialectical, philosophy, and because of his idealist interpretation of the category of especially Hegel, which for the first time investigated it substance, and second, because in substantiating the dia- also as regards lorm". (9, 266) lectical concept of developing substance he argues that Because he opposes metaphysical materialism, on the substance .becomes subject, mankind, the theoretical idea, one hand, and Kant's subjectivism, on the other, Hegel, the practical idea, etc. That is why he describes the idea despite his idealism, anticipates the correct understanding as the absolute, the single which combines itself to shape of the logical forms as forms reflecting objective reality, certain ideas. The latter, in their logical development, form although his exposition is strictly idealist. He holds that the system of categories of dialectical logic, the system of ail things are judgments, speculative conclusions. Referring universal determinations applicable to both knowledge and to these seemingly absurd statements, Lenin remarks: being. These postulates of Hegel's become clearer if we "Very good! The most common logical 'figures'- (aII this connect them to the philosophical tradition begun by Plato in the Par. on the'First Figure of the Syllogism') are the who maintains that the transcendental world of ideas is most common relations of things, set forth with the pe- the source of the world of things perceived by the senses. dantic thoroughness of a school textbook, sit venia verbo." In Plato's view, there are as many ideas as there are in- (10; 38,177) dividual things and qualitative definitive features inherent Hegel approaches the understanding of the fact that the in them; all that cxists in the sensuously perceived world reproduction of the relations of objective reality in forms has a counterpart in a certain idea of the other-world. of thinking is the result of the protracted, versatile, aggre- Hegel rejects this infinite multitude of ideas whose quan- gate practical activity of men. Lenin notes this fact and tity and quality are actually determined by the sensuously stresses that the seemingly absolute stability of the figures perceived things: it leads nowhere. He recognizes the exist- of logic is determined by their constant practical _ap- ence of only one universal primordial idea which is chris- plication. These figures have the firmness of prejudice, they tened the "absolute idea" and is the unity of being and are axiomatic precisely (and only) because they are repeat- thought, is thought-being, subject-object. Thus, reason, ed a thousand million times (10; 38, 216-L7). Summing thought, knowledge, practice-the principal intellectual up Hegel's understanding of the role of practice in knowl- characteristics of man-acquire a suprahuman significance edge, Lenin says: "Undoubtedly, in Hegel practice serves and are regarded as attributive definitive features of the as a link in the analysis of the prooess of cognition, and universe, its mode of existence, motion and development. indeed as the transition to objective ('absolute' according Hegel's panlogical approach extrapolates man's features into to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clearly sides wjth reality which is independent of him; it is a case of most Hegel in introducing the criterion of practice into the the- sophisticated intellectualist anthropomorphism. ory of knowledge." (1,0; 38,2L2) But the point is that, side by side with this thinkable

228 15* hypostatized free, directly .determin ed; lowest ability to want, in follow- world of the absolute, endowed with buman 18,4) qualities, there exist nature' society, the empirically ob- ing which man acts as a natural being". (64; Hegel between natural motives, also called desires, served liie of men in which reason' thought and knowledg-e differentiates yearnings great purpose meaning. are neither infinitely powerful nor absolute nor universal' and the of content, and Naturally, Hegel cannbt deny the opposition between the Passions stand still higher in the hierarchy of man's inde- -world great deed extratemporal of the absolute where everything has pendent sensuous activity. In Hegel's view, no passion. most developed comprehended and realized, and the iTpe-rfect human is possible without Interest is the been yearning. not reality exists in space and time, in which knowledge and meaningful form of sensuous It must *hi.h human individ- ,s far from complete, is not free from ernor, and practical be confused with self-interest in which the activity is direcied at limited, finite objectives. Aware..of ual is not conscious of his substance. The value of inter- contradiction, Hegel tries to express it conceptu-ally: ests in human life is -trard to overestimate: nothing can this existence interests essence bt world "is thi concept in and for take place without an interest. The of the true ttrl determi- so the world is itself the idea. The unfulfiIled implies the existence of inclinations-substantial itself, and man's disappears when we learn that the end goal of na[ions of man's senses which distinctively describe V""rriirg individuality. it e worla is ai ichieved as it is eternally being aohieved . . . not The will is the highest ability of the senses and the But this correspondence of being and duty is -some- petrified ind immobile, because good, the end goal mind. The will assesses sensuous motives; the former, as thing -world, the latter although of t[e exists only inasmuch as it constantly gener- the highest ability to want, rises above Choi,ce is result of this assess- (641, 6,407) it is dependent on them. the ates itself." of Thus the ansbtrt. is'realized in its extratemporal being' ment. Since choice is determined by the individuality constantly realized in its other-being too, which human existence, by itself it is sti[ arbitrary, but, because l"i-ii-i" from natural motives, is Hegel describes as an alienated form of the absolute' Such the will, freeing itself the rule of man and society. While in the sphere. of fiIled with rational, universally significant content, choice are"real nature, in- absotute practice is described as mediating motion overcomes arbitrariness, expresses the will's essence ihe thus becomes freedom. He- *fii"f, turns tfre opposites of being and thought into a dia- creasingly adequately, and In real human life practical activity is gel's words, "the subjective will is a purely formal deter- lectical identity, in Only i'nseparable from natural motives, attractions' mination which says nothing about what it wants. arotooot and premise deter- passions and interbsts. But the absolute does not exist out- the rational will is this universal which is interprets moments as society, human activity. That is why the op- rnined and develops in itself and its iide nature, (64; the position beiween ihe "absolute idea" and human history organic members." 1, L44) According to Hegel, free only inasmuch as is rational, i.e. is deter- is as retative as the antithesis of thought and being' There- will is it tir.l in, point is to reveal aspects of ttre eternal in the mined by rational motives which, rising above human in- movement, to grasp the relative dividuality, possess universal significance. But man's ra' friri"ri""tty transient social given: ;-.rgence of the absolute, and the absolute as de- tional essence is not something directly it is con- ;;-ih; process emergence. The human individual veloping. stantly in the of rational, his own activity. He Hegel begins his analysis o-f praotice as human actiuity becomes social, or through the human individual whose consciousness makes a man of himself. by d6scribiig Thus far from rejecting its genetic ,ip""tt direJth only as sensuousness. Although Hegel.does the will-Hegel is distinctive nature of man's sensations link to sensuousness, he even tries to systematically trace ti"gft o,rt th" distinc- "-oi the senses, he sees man rather as object it-is inherent only in man and, like reason, is a ii" ifi"-rpt ere of to he examines the forms of sensuousness as tive determination of human nature. The same applies tian subj-ect), passions, interests, inclinations and, certain extent, forms of itre'emergence of the human personality' The low- to a yearnings which differ radically from the motives of est form of sensuousness is the natural motive, "the un- even 229 228 animals. Hegel himself .i..tt.. this fact, but his panlogi- which is typical of rationalism and finds its extreme ex- cal premise maintaining that substantial reason is the source pression in Kantian philosophy. The analysis'of the vari- of s^ensuousness prevents him from correctly understanding ous forms of sensuous activity enables Hegel to pose-al- sensuousness as a relatively independent sphere of human beit within an idealist framework-the problem of the fun- life and activity. Hence the inevitable contradictions in damental significance of practice. Hegel's theory about the relation of will to sensuousness, Thus, according to Hegel's theory, spirit exists, on the beciuse in his examination of man as an individual He- one hand, as knowledge, and on the other, as the will, ac- gel, naturally, cannot fail to see that man's sense percep- tivity aimed outward. The will "strives to obiectiuize its tions are the source of his thoughts, which are very often internal content, still bearing the form of subjectivity". directed at sensuously perceived objeits and therefore (64; 7, 359 60) Knowledge implies the existence of an ob- prove the dependence of abstract thinking on sensory ject of cognition which-is external to the subject. The op- experience. position between cognizing activity and its object must in describing the emergence of the will as an exclusively be mediated; otherwise the object cannot be an object of human phenomenon, Hegel correctly indicates tle princi- cognition. This mediation can only be practice as the unity pal direction of that procsss: the fiIling of the willwithso- of the spiritual and the material. bial content, the determination of acts of will by socially If knowledge is the interiorization of external reality, meaningful motives. Although, according to Hegel, the practice is the exteriorization of the internal content of concept of morality is broader than that of ethics, reducing consciousness acquired through previous cognition. Because the oLjective content of the will and practical activity-in of its dialectical relativity, this relation of the internal and g.oerri to morality and law is, Lenin stresses, a one-sided external is mutually transitive: the external becomes in- ipproach. (10; 35, 212). Of. course, the point here is that ternal and vice versa. Iaw and *bt"iity'rr" th. basis of Hegel's "civil society"- According to Hegel, practice "essentially unites the in- His understanding of social life is substantially determine-d ternal with the external. The internal determination with by the legal world outlook-the classical form of bourgeois which it begins must be removed as far as the form is ideology. As will be seen further on, Hegel has brilliant concerned, i.e., it must cease to be purely internal and be- 'insighii into the role of labor in the development- of man. come external; but the content of that determination must Nevertheless, he does not regard labor activity as determin- be preserved; for example, the intention to build a ing precisely the human character of volition. This limi- house. . i' (64; 18, 16) taiioir and the concomitant errors are rooted in idealism Thus the transformation of the internal determination of rvhich makes it impossible to understand material produc- consciousness (and knowledge) into something external- tion as the basis of social life. that is, practice-is, in Hegel's view, the constant content Initially, Hegel examines the will in its relation to sen- of human life, a content which realizes human essence, suousnesJ, but later, in connection with the determination Jruman spirituality and freedom. The determinations of the of the objective, universal content of volition, he shifts his human Ego "must not remain only the determinations of analysis io the relation of the will to substantiated rea- its concept and thought but become externally existing. son. The rationalists of the 17th century already defined Here I determine things, I am the cause of the change of the will as a special form of reason. They contrasted the these objects." (64; 18, 4) This definition of practice will to affects so they could substantiate their concept of stresses its universal character. Indeed, if we abstract our- the rational will. As a dialectician, Hegel restricts this selves from the distinct features of fundamentally different contrasting, both connecting the will to affects and differ- forms of practice, what is general and typical of any entiating between them. As in other cases, here he applies practice appears as a process (of course, a material process his famius formula of dialectical identity. This approach which Hege1 the idealist fails to see), initiated and imple- helps overcome the abstract-rigorist concept of the will mented by human individuals organized in a certain way zao ??1 'l Hegel's understanding of practice-';the transformation tory. This elevafion of the personal to the, social is possihle of the internal determination into something external" only through labor. (64; 18, tG) is inadequate because, among other things, it In his eiamination of Hegel's analysis of useful activity interprets the fact of the transformation of the external Lenin stresses that the German philosopher pays special ' into the internal merely as the process of cognition. But attention to labor tools. Hegel compares them to the goals man, by changing external nature, changes his own, hu- men pursue in their labor activity. He believes that every- man nature too. Generally, the creation of the "second na- day cbnsciousness sees labor merely as a means for attain- ture" cannot be understood correctly only as the transfor- ing certain goals which are the sole reasons why labor is mation of the internal into the external:'of naturally, man's im-plemented. Viewed from this angle, labor tools are only mind does not possess an ideal image everything he toois, i.e., external means used to attain that which is of creates in pactice. Since the conditions of social life creat- greatest importance: tlle end. Hegel questions that consum- ed by men are the determining basis of their being, prac- er approacfi which, incidentally, is typical of the idealist tice comprises the transformation of the external into the vie# bf history. He contrasts this to the dialectical under- internal too. In this regard it is the exchange of substances standing of the relation "end-means". The ends which ap- between nature and men organized by men, the transfor- p.rt as"products of human subjectivity are actually dictated mation of the social into the natural and vice versa. In- by the contlitions of men's hfe and human nature itself, .teriorization and exteriorization are equally both acts of while the tools (instruments) of labor embody the imma- cognition and acts of practice. nent end of human activity-mastering the forces of na- Hegel's concept of the dialectics of the internal and the ture. That which appears-ileans, as the immediate end turns out external tentatively pointed to the correct way toward un- to be essentially a while the means serving a sub- derstanding the unity of knowledge and practice. But a jective end (of meeting men's imm-ediate needs) is .an ex- clear description of this way called for rejecting the ideal- pression of the principil end (and me-aning) of human ist premises of Hegel's system and demystifying, material- iife-the realization of its potential, the development of the istically assimilating and creatively developing Hegel's human personality. method. This task was brilliantly fulfiIled by Marx and In this connection Lenin quotes the following passage Engels and later Lenin. from Hegel: "The Means is higher than the finite Ends of The high evaluation of labor activity is typical of He- external lsefulness: the plough is more honorable than . gelian philosophy. He believes that labor is the most im- those immediate enjoymerrts wtricfr are procured by it, and portant form of practical activity: "Practical culture ac- serve as Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the-im- quired through labor comprises the need and habit to d.o mediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. I{-HIS something, further, restriction ol one's d,oing, partly because TOOLS UAX POSSiTSSES POWNN OYER EXTERN.A.L of the nature of the material and partly-and mostly- NATURE, ALTHOUGII AS REGARDS HIS ENDS, EE because of the arbitrary acts by others, and the habit, gen- FREQUENTLY IS SUBJECTED TO IT." Lenin sees this erated by this discipline, of performing objectiue activity thesii as "the germs of historical materialism in Hegel". and acquiring universally significant skills." (641' B, 261) (10; 38, 189) Explaining the positive content of Hegel's sees oJ ends Marx the significance of Hegel's Phenomenology Iine of reasoning, he says: "In actual fact, men's -are Spirit above all in the fact that in it, Hegel "grasps the engendered by the objective world and presuppose it,-they i:ssence of labor and comprehends objective man-true, be- find it as something given, present. But it seerns to man cause real man-as the outcome of man's own labor". (L; as if his ends are iali"n from outside the world, and are 3,333). independent of the world ('freedom')." (10; 38, 189)- For- According to Hegel, the emergence of man as a mulating the subject of study-"Hegel and historical ma- member of society concisely repeats the history of man- terialisd"-Lenirr ldvaqced n fhesis pointing to the prin- kind; the personality masters the experience of \yofld hi$- ,c., ?a3 / cipal direction of such study: "Historical materialism as cizing Hegel's understanding of activity's relation to the one of the applications and developments of the ideas of world of objects. He counters idealist dialectics with the genius-seeds existing in embryo in Hegel.,' (10; JB, 190) dialectical-materialist understanding of the organic con- Inevitably, the following question arises: ho* orr" nection between needs, abilities, attractions and objects ex-plain the fact that, having profoundly understood"ro the through which they are fulfiIled. For example, the ability role labor activity, Hegel iJ so far from recognizing pro- .of -:lt to see implies the existence of the sun; the emergence and duction as the determining basis of social life? , ulro*., development of this ability is the result of the sun's impact lies in his idealist understanding of labor as exclusively on the development of organic life. Furthermore, the very s_piritual, intellectual activity. This means that Hegel re- existence of life implies a certain diversity of conditions. dlces material production to spiritual production, diisolves This means that there is an internal and not external con- the former in the latter. Hegel's view bf the worid fails to nection between living things and their "life forces" on see the inner connection of the supreme spiritual mani- the one hand, and the diversity of things which constitute festations of human life with the diversity of the man- their living conditions on the other. But this does not made "second nature".-Idealism prevents Hegel from grasp- mean, as Hegel believes, that objects are produced by the ing the fundamental phenomenoi of physicaj-ot labor aria tfi, abilities inherent in living things, that they are the objec- facts describing the distinctive featurbs tfre objective ba- tivization of the spiritual potential, etc. This inner connec- sis of social development. tion of the living, including human life, and its supreme, The idealist distortion of the essense of labor is rooted spiritual manifestations with the diversity of the world of in the fundamental precept of Hegel's panlogism which re- objects and the man-made "second nature" is a product duces. being, the miterial to thought,-"orsdioosrress, self- of the development of nature, man, society. Hegel's ideal- consciousness. In Hegel's opinion, man is essentially self- ism prevents him from grasping this law because idealist consciousness. The bodily existence of man is descri-bed as dialectics distorts the actual process of development.' the "other-being" of the human essence, as alienation. Of Marx notes that Hegel "sees only the positive, not the course,- Hegel admits both the existence of material prod- negative side of labor". (1; 3, 333) The positive side is ucts of human activity and the fact that they are needed that labor creates not only the things man needs but also to satisfy men's needs. But he asserts that thi material is man himself as an active agent, member of society, etc. a-product of the spiritual, its other-being, an alienated form In Hegel's words, man in the sphere of production "is the of existence. end for himself, and he relates to nature as to something This goncept finds fullest phe- its expression in Hegel,s"Economic which is subordinated to him and which bears the imprint nomenology ol Spirit. Marx criticizes his ,,Andit in of his activity". (63; 2, 449) Despite the profound insights and Philosophic Manuscripts ol 1844: since it is not of this understanding of production (industry), it suffers real tna_n, nor therefote- nature-man being haman na- from bourgeois one-sidedness, which Marx stresses. Main- ture-who as such is made the subject, but onty the abstrac- taining that man is "the end for himself" in production, tion of man, self-consciousness, so thinghood cannot be I'Iegel obviously forgets that for millennia, production has anything but alienated self-consciousness.,, (t; J, 385) To exploited man; therefore the producer at, say, a capitalist counter this idealist mystification of human consciousness' enterprise, is least of all an end for himself. relation to the world of objects, Marx explains that the ob- Of course, Hegel does not connect the existence of slav- je_cts of man's needs and instincts "exist ouside him, as ery and serfdom, or capitalist exploitation of labor, to o-bjects independent of him; yet these objects are obiects production, to historically definite levels of its development. that he needs-essenhial obiects, indispensable to the mani- Hegel's brilliant insights, described by Lenin as the germs festation and confirmation of his essential po$r'ers',. of historical materialism, do not include one about the (1; 3,336) existence of social relations of prod,uction, the social form So we see that Marx does uot Qonfine himself to criti- of the development of productive forces. Marx stresses that za4 ?45 Hegel shares the view of the classical political economy of the satistaction of a need; it is merely a metans to satisfy his time which, for all its scientific accomplishments, iden- needs- external to it." (t; 3,274) , tifies' capital with accumul-ated labor, production of goods Ueget's Iack of undbritanding of the n-egative aspect of with production of things in general-that is, perpetuates labor"proves that not only idealism but also the bourgeois the capitalist form of social production, seeing it as the world'outlook in general makes both the materialist un- only rational form consistent with human nature. and the scientiflc-philosophical derstanding of his[ory "un' The category of relations of production is the central cat- derstandin[ of practiie as universal human activity abso- egory of historical materialism. In describing capitalist lutely imp-ossible. Practice in its fundamental form-i'e', production relations and examining the .laws governing as materiil produotion-is the basis which determines aII their operation, classical bourgeois political economy did social life. In the broadest sense of the word, practice is not single out that category because it regarded slave-own- the active basis of the active process of cognition. Distinct ing and feudal relations not as a historically definite so- forms of praotice are the oriteria of th-e verity of knowl- cial form of development of productive forces but as un- edge, espe-cially those of its forms which are conneoted to just legal institutions, explained by the employers' lack of ro[oitior, firsf and foremost to scientific research. Practice humaneness and economic competence. Hegel generally by, and directly linked to, the development of sci- shared this view. The only difference was that he regarded "o-rirh.d the summit of knowledge. entific knowledge-action, is slavery and serfdom as historically necessary, inevitable Any human whether individual or oollective, is forms in the development of the "objective spirit" of na- clirectly or indirectly connected to practioe. Practice is not , tions, with the latter realizing only gradually that freedom only tlie changing oi nature but of social retrations too' Any is the substantial essence of man. insirumental ict,- even when the instruments are a man's Marx counters Hegel's one-sided understanding of labor, hands and legs, is practical. This understanding- of prac- his disdain for the antagonistic contradictions inherent in tice, of its universal character, is, of course-, totatly -ilqoT' the development of production with the concept of alienat- pati'ble with idealist phiiosophy, in-cluding dialectical ideal- ed, labor, which makes it easier to understand the devel- ism, despite the fact-that it was the frrst in the history of opment of private ownership, class contradictions and ex- phiiosopfiy to pose the question of the universal character ploitation. Referring to the antagonistic social relations of of practice. production, Marx says: "Labor is man's coming-to-be lor fhe Marxist concept of revolutionary practice is all the himself within alienation, or as alienated, man." (1; 3, 333) more incompatible with idealism because of the latter's Alienated labor is the alienation of the product of labor class limitations. In their understanding of practice, bour- and of the very productive activity; the transformation of geois thinkers usually proceed from the empirical nolign both into spontaneous social forces that rule men. Alienat- 6t tfre need to reproduce human life, the need to satisfy ed labor is antagonistic relations of production under which "external" requireirents instrumental to human life. Hegel man subjugates and exploits man. The alienation of labor tries to connelt practice to the overcoming of the aliena- which Hegel (and all bourgeois thinkers) fails to notice tion which, accofding to his theory, is inherent in "civil is in the fact that "labor is erternal to the worker, i.e., it society". But he declares that alienation, which he treats does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, as the universal relation of spirit to its other-being, can therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, only be overcome by knowledge in what Hegel describes does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely at its absolute forms: art, religion and philosophy. It is his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and precisely knowledge and not practice-which Hegel reduces,- ' ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself in the final analysis, to knowledge-that absolute ideal- outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He ism regards as universal activity and therefore ascribes to , feels at home when he is not working, and when he is it functions and abilities it does not possess. working he doep pot feel at home . . . It is therefore not Hegel accords the place of revolutionary practice, which

?36 is aware of the need to.appiy material force against mate- According to llegel's iogic, the French Revolution could rial social relations that enslave the workirg ,rlarr, to pure_ only have realized the philosophy of the Enlightenment, ly spiritual activity which has completely rEnounc"a dir..t the ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Holbach, HeIv6- connection to material objects. Tliis means that [Iegel,s tius, et al. AII these thinkers differed substantially from ovetcoming of alienation is not practical but theorelical one another but were united in their struggle against feu- and even speculative. This supersbding of alienation is. in dalism. Although Hegel justifies this struggle, he criticizes Marx's words, "superseding in thoug-ht, which teaves'its the French Enlightenment, describing it as a subjective object in existence in the real world,,.'(l; S, Z4t) Marx understanding of the task of rationally transforming soci- counters this seeming negation of alienation with its revo_ ety. Hegel sees the French Revolution (and revolution in lutionary-practical n6gation which really attains its of general) as a social restructuring based on subjective hu- jective- In his famous Theses on Feuerbach he says: ,,The man reason, while the objective-rational, the "absolute coincidence of the changing of circumstances arrd of hu- idea"--"absolute spirit" is the social form of its being-is man activity or self-change can be conceived and ration_ the determining content of the world historical process. Ac- ally understood only as reuolationary practice.,, (t: i, 4\ cording to Hegel, the highest forms of realization of "ab- As I pointed out earlier, Hegelt doctrine trarisfo"m's solute spirit" are not revolutions but the state ("objective the theoretical idea into the practical idea. In the context spirit") and forms of social consciousness-art, religion of this plocess, which in its purely logical form is the self- and philosophy-which he interprets as forms of compre- motion of the "absolute ideat and in"its speciflc historical, hending the absolute and therefore defines as "absolute t_emporal other-being is the history of manliind, Hegel poses knowledge". "prattice. question about combining philosophy wittr Any revolution fights against the existing state power. -tle.This combination is _inte-rpreted-as the realization oi ptiitos- Hegel vindicates the French Revolution and its ideologists, oph^y. On the one ha-nd. philosophy he does not regard necessary, objec- ,,ibsbluteis the extrateilporal bu[ revolutions as a self-consciousness of the divine idea',; ard oi the tively inevitable form of the rational transformation of soci- othe-r, it is the self-conscious ',absolute spirit,;-i.e., man- ety because he fails to detect the antagonism of social re- kind throughout its historical development. fhiloropiry can lations and ignores the class nature of the state. He sees be realized only in this latter aspeit, and Hegel aii..Uy the Reformation as a form of the rational transformation connects it to the French Revolution. It is preciiely in thii of social relations. However, aware that the Reformation connection that Hegel maintains: "The cbnsciouiness of was also a revolution, albeit in a religious guise, Hegel the_spirtual is now essentially the basis, and through this concludes: "A principle is false if it maintains that right phi.losophy now reigns. It hai been said that the ?rench and freedom can throw off their fetters without freeing R-eu-olution sprang from philosophy, and not without reason conscience, that revolution is possible without reformation." philosophy has been called world wisd,om because it is not (63; 4,931-32) -only truth in and for itself as pure being but also truth Thus, according to Hegel, philosophy can find its objec- because it comes alive through worldlinesi." 163; 4, gZ4) tive realization and truly combine itself with practice only However, one should stress that in Hegel's view, the through reforms carried out by the state itself. This com- transformation of philosophy into practice-the rational promise view expresses the class position of the German transformation of the world-did not-find its adequate ex- bourgeoisie and its desire to peacefully transform a feu- pression in the French Revolution. Hegel follows the above dal monarchy into a bourgeois one. Hence Hegel's ideal of quotation with these words: "Thus one should not object the state: constitutional monarchy. But in this (and other) to the fact that the revolution received its first impulse form of state organization, paramount importance is accord- from philosophy. But this philosophy is only abstract tLink- ed to religion and not to philosophy. Hegel is convinced ing, non-concrete comprehension- of absolute truth, and it that "the Protestant Church has reconciled religion to - is here where the great distinction lies.,' (68; 4, gZ,4) law. There is no sacred religious conscience which is

238 239 isolated fr,om, or evon opposed to, seoular law." (63; gation of all iorms of domination over man-is to become 4,937) the ideological banner of the emancipation movement of Aceording to Hegel, the state, and especially constitu- the working class, the world outlook of the Communist tional monarchy, is the substantial embodiment of reason. Irarty. "As philosophy finds its material weapons in the But what then is the role of philosophy in social progress? proietariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritaal weapons in Hegel's approach to this questlon is Contradictory. He holds philosophy." (7; 3, 187) This radical change of philosophy's that philosophy is realized in society as a force ensuring social position also transforms its content and relation to the advancement of culture. But his conviction is even social practice and social reality in general. stronger that philosophy must never become practical' Phi- Thus, having posed the problem of the universality of losophy deals above all with contemplation, with the ra- practice and advanced a number of fundamental postulates tional comprehension of the existing. Summing up his un- about the epistemologic3l role of practice and the part it derstanding of philosophy's relation to practice, Hegel says: plays in the shaping of the human personality, Hegel is "Philosophy deals only with the brilliance of the idea, re- nevertheless unable to grasp socio-historical practice, ma- flected in world history. Aversion for the clash of direct terial production as the active, determining basis of social passions in reality prompts one to undertake a philosophi- Iife, and the emancipation struggle of the working people cal examination; its interest is to grasp the development of as a tremendously important historical form of revolution- the self-realizing idea, namely, the idea of freedom which ary socio-political activity. Marxism-Leninism connects the exists only as the consciousness of freedom." (63; 4, 938) solution of the problem of the universality of practice He- In 7841 young Marx proceeded from Hegel's theory gel posed to the revolutionary transformation of philosophy about the relation of the theoretical idea to the practical and practice by creatively combining the two. This can be one and, in his doctorate thesis, concluded that by consist- attained only through the communist transformation of so- eutly developing its postulates, philosophy necessarily ciety and the creation of a scientific-philosophical, dialec- turned into revolutionary practice. True, at that time Marx tical-materialist world outlook. generally shared Hegel's idealism, especially its Young ,He- gelian interpretation and held that "the practice of -philoso- [Uy is ilself theoretical." (/1.; 1, 85) But subsequently Marx crowned his philosophical development with the creation of dialectical materialism and scientiflo communism. Marx concludes that sinoe revolutionary theory seizes the masses it becomes a material force. He singles out the work- ing class from among aII those oppressed and exploited as the most revolutionary, capable, by its very position in capitalist society, of destroying all political and economic oppression.- Marx counters the Young Hegelian "philosophy of self- consciousness" by proving that by itself, philosophy can- not yet realize the humanitarian ideals it has worked out in the course of its historical development. "Philosophy cannot bo made a reality without the abolition of the pro- letariat, the proletariat cannot be abolished without philos- ophy being made a reality." (L; 3, 187) This mgans lhqt philosophy-naturally, the revolutionary philosophy which arrives at the negation of capitalism and thereby at the ne- t6-01562 240 IENIN ON THE IIEGELIAN CONCEPT materialist soiution too. For example, referring to the in- OF THE COINCIDEI\CE OF DIALECTICS, troduction to Section III of The Science of Logic and the LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY appropriate paragraphs of Encyclopedia of the Philosophi- cal Sciences in Outline (paragraphs 213-215), Lenin iays that they "ARE PERHAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF DIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence, so to speak, of logic and epistemology is shown in a remarkably brilliant way". (10;38,192) The section and paragraphs in question deal with the "idea" whioh is defined as "the adequate ooncept, objec- Lenin does not believe that Hegel's dialectics has been tively true or true as such". (64 5, 236) In Hegel's termi- fully reshaped in the materialist spirit and continues the nology, an adequate conoept is one whose content is work of Marx and Engels in this regard. The Soviet phi- thought itself and not external, material reality perceived Iosopher E. V. Ilyenkov is right to say that "in the form through the senses. Accordingly, he deflnes the objective of a critical analysis of Hegel's concept, Lenin examines truth as the coincidence of the object of knowledge and the the state of this philosophy of his time, compares and eval- concept desoribed as the object's essence grasped by uates the various approaches to its cardinal problems" thought. There is definitely a rational element in these ideal- (211' 213). This is borne out 4ot only by Lenin's notes on ist postulates because knowledge (and therefore truth) The Science ol Logic and other works by Hegel but also does not merely record or reproduce phenomena but also by Lenin's own works. For example, Materialism and Em- reveals their essence and laws whioh are grasped and formed pirio-Criticisrn,like Engels' Anti-Diihring, is a work on the through concepts. Of course, we must remember He- history of philosophy. That is how we should interpret gel's opinion that "something is true only inasmuch as it Lenin's words in the article "On the Significance of MiIi- .tant is the idea". (64; 5, 236) Hegel explains it by stressing Materialism" about the need for a further study and that "the kind of reality which does not correspond to the materialist interpretation of Hegel's dialectics. concept is merely a subjective, accidental, arbitrary phenom- Lenin's analysis of the Hegelian philosophy singles out enon which is not truth". (64; 5, 238) But sinoe even those fundamental precepts of Hegel's dialectics which pre- this precept rejects the nominalist (and conceptualist) in- viously remained unnoticed. Ahove all this applies to the terpretation of the concept and scientific abstraction in gen- principle of the coincidence of dialectics, logic and the the- eral, it indirectly points to the need for a correspondence ory of knowledge. Materialistically interpreted, this prin- between concepts and objects of knowledge. ciple has become part of Marxist philosophy. Therefore its In his notes on the section "The Idea" in Hegel's The examination makes it possible to better understand the re- Science ol Logic Lenin shows that Hegel's "idea" is a mys- lation of dialectical materialism to the Hegelian philosophy tified portrayal of the history of mankind which, through and the classical philosophical heritage in general. its practical activity and knowledge, increasingly grasps Hegel's understanding of dialectics as a theory of knowl- and transforms its environment and being. Materialistically edge and logic is rather abstract and idealistically distort- interpreting Hegel's postulates, Lenin says: "The Idea ed. Hegel sees it as directly foilowing from the fundamen- (read: man's knowledge) is the coincidence (conformity) tal idealist postulate. The latter regards everything exist- of notion and objectivity (the 'universal'). This-first. ing as born of thought which is interpreted not only and "Secondly, the Idea is the relati,on oI the subjectivity not so much as human activity but as the self-propulsion (: man) which is for itself (: independent, as it were) stresses that of the "absolute idea". Neverthelesso Lenin to tlre objectivity which is d,istinct (from this Idea) . . . despite its idealist mystification, Hegel's approach to this "Subjectivity is the impwlse to destroy this separation problem is the theoretical starting point for its dialectical- (of the idea from the object).

242 l6* 243 "eognition is the process of the submersion (of the category of matter does not include such obvious physical mind) in an inorganic nature for the sake of subordinating characteristics as its existence in space and time, its mo- it to the power of the subject and for the sake of generali- tion; naturally, these are not excluded because Lenin con- zation (cognition of the universal in its phenomena) . . . s.iders them secondary or such that will possibly be reject- "The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: ed by the subsequent development of natural science. The thought (: man) must not imagine truth in the form of epistemological deflnition of matter records (naturally, in dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale the most general form) its distinction from consciousness- (matt), without impulse, without motion, like a genius, that is, it serapates objective and subjective reality. It like a number, Iike abstract thought." (10; 38, 194-95) would be wrong to regard this philosophical concept of Lenin's conclusions both explain how Hegel mystifies the matter as negative, meaning that matter is not mass, some- history of knowledge and show the rational element of his thing possessing a molecular and atomic structure, etc., concept. Hegel has revealed the unity of ontology (the the- but objective reality. Lenin's philosophical deflnition of ory of being), logic and epistemology and delivered a pro- matter is not negative but positive. Besides, it points to found critique of their metaphysical opposition. Contrary the necessary epistemological condition of any possible sci- to the opinion of metaphysicians, ontological definitions of entific desription of material processes. This means that all reality-that is, the categories describing the world as a characteristics of matter-both known to science and as whole, its motion, development, etc.-are not final truths yet undiscovered-should be viewed as objectively real and but the developing knowledge about the world. therefore existing independently of cognitive activity. The need for an epistemological examination of the cat- Cognition is a historical process, and its interpretation egorical definitions of objective reality is rooted in the and generalization is the central task of dialectical-mate- very nature of dialectical and historical materialism. The rialist epistemology. Seen from this angle, epistemology is epistemological interpretation of ontological definitions also the theory of those phenomena and laws of the world makes our understanding of their objective content more pro- which are revealed in the course of the historical devel- found and reveals its relation to the existing level of the opment of knowledge. Epistemological categories largely re- development of knowledge. Ontology thus becomes the epi- fer not only to cognitive activity (and human activity in stemology of objective reality. The prominent Soviet phi- general) but also to reality which is independent of man. losopher B. M. Kedrov stresses quite rightly that "to recog- In other words, epistemology also comprises categories de- nize the unity of dialectics, iogic and the materialist the- scribing the object of knowledge. ory of knowledge means to admit that a Marxist cannot Logic (dialectical logic) is not simply a science about even try to pose philosophical questions either as purely the subjective forms and rules of human thought. Its ob- methodological, completely isolated from the theory of ject cannot be separated from that which is cognized in knowledge (from materialism), or as purely epistemologi- logical forms, and the latter cannot be regarded as indif- cal, completely isolated from the method of cognition (from ferent to the content embodied in them. dialectics), or as purely logical, completely isolated from Hegel resolutely criticizes those who see logical forms both the materialist theory of knowledge and the dialecti- only as formal functions of thinking and confine them- cal method, the way it was possible in classical formal log- selves to the description of these functions. Of course, this ic." (23; 6-7) critique does not apply only to Kant (although it does ap- Lenin's philosophical defrnition of matter is a highly ply above all to him) but to all traditional, formal logic in- effective and instructive example of the epistemological which begins with Aristotle. While stressing that the de- terpretation of an ontological category, an interpretation scription of the forms of thought irrespective of their con- based on the application of the Marxist principle of the tent rvas a great accomplishment of Aristotle's, Hegel calls coincidence of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge. for a further examination of these forms and of their log- We know that Lenin's epistemological definition of the ically generalized content. The first task is to see how

244 245 these formal functions of thought "by themselves corre- omnipresent, suprahuman thought (the "absolute idea") spond to truth". In this connection, Lenin points to the ide- which appears as both subject and object (in Hegel's ter- alist vagueness, reticence and mysticism in Hegel's ap- minology, subject-object), both knowledge (absolute know- proach to the problem, but he also stresses that Hegel tries ledge) and the object of knowledge, of philosophy. to understand logical forms as the quintessence, the sum- Naturally, no one denies the fact that the examination ming-up of the history of thought: "In this conception, Iog- of the laws of knowledge, thought is among the central ic ooincides with the theory ol knowledge. This is in gen- tasks of philosophy. However, Hegel's idealist understand- eral a very important question." (10; 38, 175) ing of the object of philosophy inevitably leads to a mys- Generally, Hegel examined the coincidence of dialectics, tical interpretation of the coincidence of dialectics, logic logic and epistemology mostly in connection with his ex- and epistemology, a question he himself poses. This is position of dialectical logic. Naturally, in creating a met- graphically seen in his understanding of the transition from aphysically closed philosophical system supposed to have the abstract to the concrete. Hegel is right to point out completely grasped the absolute, Hegel does not raise the that the development of scientific knowledge proceeds from point that the philosophical theory of the world and know- abstract, one-sided, incomplete knowledge (which implies ledge which sums up the continaizg history of knowledge the breaking-up of the object of study into separate parfs cannot be completed. He was equally uninterested in exam- and aspects, and the examination of each of these sepa- ining the dialectics of the transition from sensuous ex- rately) to concrete knowledge which unites the already perience to abstract theoretical thinking. Lenin says that examined separate aspects or parts of the object of study that Hegel failed to understand this dialectical, leap-like tran- are abstracted from the whole. "The concrete is the unity sition and that it was inevitable because thought, which of different determinations, principles; to achieve their full Hegel interpreted as the substance of things, was accord- development and appear fully determined before conscious- ingly described as the source of notions, contemplation, ness, these must first be established and fully developed sense perceptions, According to Hegel, "In all forms of spir- separately." (62; 18, 782) However, Hegel puts a mystical it-in feeling, contemplation and notion-thought remains construction on this actual cognitive process and presents as the basis." (64; 7, 1,1,1) it as ontological-in other words, he describes the transi- Naturally, the problem of the coincidence of dialectics, tion from the abstract to the concrete as the emergence logic and epistemology also comprises the examination of and development of things themselves, of reality itself. Ac- the relation between the dialectical laws of objective real- cording to Marx, Hegel was wrong to understand "the real ity itself and the laws of its reflection in epistemology and as the result of thought which synthesizes itself in itself, Iogic. But Hegel only tentatively poses these questions immersing itself in itself and developing from itself; while which arise on the basis of the materialist interpretation the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is of nature and the knowledge of it. Still, his approach to only a way through which thought appropriates the con- the coincidence of dialectics, Iogic and epistemology is crete and reproduces it as the spiritually concrete. But this among the greatest accomplishments of pre-Marxian philoso- is by no means a process of the emergence of the concrete phv. itself." (7; 1, 22) Hegel proceeds from the identity of being and thought, This quotation from Marx graphically expresses the op- interpreting it in the spirit of objective idealism: he sees position in the approach of dialectical materialism and di- thought (since it comprises the entire diversity of reali- alectical idealism to the coincidence of dialectics, logic and ty) not so much as an ability inherent in the individual epistemology. According to Hegel, the laws governing the but as the source, the original essence of everything exist- development of objective reality do not exist outside and ing., which reaches the summit of its development and self- independently of the "absolute idea", that is, thought in consciousness in man and in human history. Viewed from its absolute interpretation: objective reality dissolves inthis this angle, everything existing is a manifestation of this suprahuman thought. And since Hegel presents knowledge

246 247 \ both as a subjective human process and as the ontological direct sensory relation to the external world as a disguise essence of the objective world, his ontology directly blends to be removed. For example, in the beginning of. lhe Phe- with logic and epistemology. Instead of the concrete unity nomenology-object ol Spirit he analyzes the sensory relation -of of dialectics, Iogic and the theory of knowledge, which does subject to and says that the object, as seen by the not rule out certain distinctions among them (Hegel stresses subject, "is whether it is or is not known; it remains even that dialectical identity comprises difference), there is when it is not known; but there is no knowledge if there the total identity which cancels out the distinction between is no object." (64; 2, 75) However, a further analysis-of subject and object, thought and being, reflection and ob- the so-called sensory verity is completed by the conclu- jective reality. sion that the object of sense perception is not something But the complexity of the coincidence of dialectics, logic definite, but, on the contrary, that it is some indefinite and epistemology is rooted, among other things, in these "this", "here", "now" "which can be applied to any object distinctions, in the fact that laws of being cannot be de- and points, first and foremost, to the existence of the sub- duced from thought; they are merelyreflected inthought, in ject. "Its truth [the truth of sensory verity] is in the ob- logical forms, categories, etc. The fact that thought, sci- ject as an object inherent in me (aLs meinem Gegenstande) ence reflect, comprehend forms of matter's existence does br in the opinion (im Meinen); it is because I know of it." not at all mean that these forms of matter's being (for ex- (64; 2, 77) Thus, irrespective of consciousness, the exist- ample, mol,ion, time, space) are generated by thought. A ence of the object is described as an appearance, and mate- scientific solution of the problem concerning the coinci- rialist sgnsationalism, as the viewpoint of ordinary con- dence of dialectics, logic and epistemology must fully take sciousness which is alien to philosophy. into account the distinctive aspect of cognition as a reflec- By rejecting materialist sensationalism, Hegel rejects tion of the external world in human consciousness. The lat- the theory of reflection. He uses the concept of reflection ter, unlike the mythical "absolute idea", is historically lim- mostly to describe the correlation of different, mutually de- ited, exists in time and space, and comprehends the sur- termining moments of essence. In this connection, Hegel rounding reality above all because the latter affects man's says that in essence "all is posited as the being ol reflec- sensory organs. tion,, a being which shines in the other and in which the Warning against a one-sided epistemological interpreta- other shines". (64; 6,229) tion of the object of Marxist philosophy, the Soviet philos- This idealist distortion of the concept of reflection is ex- opher L. F. Ilyichev aptly remarks: "An effective exami- plained by the fact that Hegel's philosophy treats cogni- nation of logical-methodological, epistemological problems tion as a process inherent in things themselves, in nature. largely depends on progress in the theory ol objectiue dia- That, too, idealistically distorts the obvious objective ne- lectics, because subjective dialectics reflects the objective cessity of cognition as a process historically determined by dialectical process. The philosopher pursuing his study in the development of nature, man and society. But obvious- another direction would risk a formalistic interrpetation of ly, in Hegel's view, concepts or notions do not reflect mate- methodology and epistemology, an isolation of the theory rial objects; on the contrary, material objects are "reflec- of knowledge from the fundamental dialectical-materialist tions" of the concept. That is why he tries to "find only a theory of objective reality." (22; L00) Hegel's panlogism mirror of us ourselves in this external being, see the free identifies objective reality with its reflection in conscious- reflection of spirit in nature". He states explicitly: "Im- ness, knowledge. But Hegel no doubt understands that ages of nature are only images of the concept, but in the sense perceptions are man's direct link to the external mate- element of external being. . ." (64; 7, 696, 695) rial objects which surround him. Hence his assessment of These }Iegelian postulates bear out Lenin's remark about empiricism as a necessary element of cognition. However, the ideological affinity between the idealism of Hege} and he identifies empiricism and sensationalism with the met. that of Plato who regarded material things as pale, imper- taphysical understanding of cognition and regards man's fect, distorted images of otherworldly ideas and concepts.

248 21t9 Whilernoting Hegel's negative attitude to materialist sen- Hegel sees his mission in the analysis oi the motion-and sationalism, to the materialist theory of reflection-which interrelationships of all scientiflc categories because logic clearly made it impossible to tackle scientiflcally the prob- must be the science of knowledge in the entirety of its lem of the coincidence of dialectics, Iogic and epistemo- development. Lenin calls this definition of logic brilliant. logy-we must draw a firm dividing line between-the ob- (10; 38, 103) He values equally highly the inclusion of jective content of Hegel's philosophy and its subjective ex- the category of life into logic and Hegel's approach to the position. The point is that Hegel's dialectical interpretation place of practice in dialectical logic. Without these cate- of forms of thought brings him closer than his predeces- gories, dialectical Iogic cannot reflect the forward-moving sors to the understanding of their actual relation to objec- development of knowledge and its objective content which tive reality. Above all, Hegel puts an end to the tradition- determines appropriate logical forms. al belief that logic deals only with subjective forms of Naturally, one should remember that in his introduction thought. Opposing the Kantian interpretation of logical of the so-called ontological categories into logic, Hegel does forms as a priori and consequently subjective, Hegel un- not confine himself to merely posing the prohlems of dia- wittingly approaches the correct understanding of logical lectical logic; he is substantiating the system of absolute relations as forms of reflection of objective reality. His idealism which transforms actual history into the history well-known postulate that all things are speculative deduc- of self-knowledge, of the self-development of the concept tions is a good example. Lenin refers to Hegel's transition whereby the much-vaunted "absolute idea" allegedly man- from deduction by analogy to that of necessity and says: ifests itself and comprehends itself. Exposing the Hege- "Hegel actually proued, that logical forms and laws are not lian mystification of objective reality and of its reflection an empty shell, but the reflectioru of the objective world. in men's consciousness in the course of the historical de- More correctly, he did not prove, b:ut rnade a brilliant velopment of knowledge, Marxist-Leninist philosophy pro- gu,ess." (10; 38, 180) duces a materialist solution of the dialectical relation be- Thus, although Hegel rejects the materialist principle of tween the objective historical process and cognition. That refrection in epistemology, he inevitably arrives at conclu- is how dialectical materialism approaches Hegel's postu- sions that bear out and develop this principle in connec- lates about the connection, mutual transformation, notion tion with the very complex question about forms of thought and development of concepts. and their relation to forms of being. Lenin describes the key problems of dialectical logic as Opposing the subjectivist, fonmalistic interpretation of follows: "Logic is the science of cognition. It is the the- logical forms especially distinct in Kantian philosophy, ory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature Hegel does not confine logical forms only to judgments, de- by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not ductions, etc. We know that Hegel takes a broad view of a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstrac- forms of thought as comprising all the more general con- tions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., cepts and categories which reflect general and substantial and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science : 'the log- connections and relations among phenomena. That is why ical Idea') embrace conditionally, approximately, the uni- his logic includes the concepts of quantity, quality, meas- versal law-governed character of eternally moving and de- ure, essence, contradiction, basis, phenomenon, appearance, veloping nature." (10; 38, 182) Thus mediation is typical causality, reality, necessity, freedom, etc. But unlike Kant, of all stages of cognition. whose transcendental analysis also deals with such con- But if scientific knowledge of objective reality cannot cepts, Hegel sees all these categories not as subjective be its immediate reflection, if it is necessarily mediated, it forms of human thought but as definitions of things them- follows that scientific knowledge always represents certain selves whjch are independent of man's will. Besides, his stages in the development of knowledge, the transition from logic also includes the concepts of the mechanical and ignorance to knowledge, from one type of knowledge to chemical processes, Iife and purposeful activity. another, more profound one. It also means that any knowl-

250 25r edge must be examined in its relation to a different, pre- tific understanding of cognition as a process. For example, vious type of knowledge, for the cognition of 2ny object the history bf physics historically reveals not only its ob- also result of own development. The ject and the scientific understanding of the latter, but also of science is the its distinc- same applies to the categories which are the logically gen- lhe process of cognition of physical laws and the eralized content of knowledge developing in history. But tive features of this process, the emergence and develop- the history of knowledge is infinite; therefore, categories- ment of physical categories, the interrelationship of these lorms universality-must also change and categories, etc. as the logical of know- develop. The principle of the universality of development tn ttie dialectical-materialist view, the theory of know- must be successively applied to all categories of philoso- ledge can only be the summing-up of the his-tory of practical human activ- phy and science without exception. As Lenin says, "if euerA' Iedle, the hisiory of the sciences ind history, of the thing d,weLops, does not that apply also to the most gen- ityf for only this summing-up of real -real epistemologi- corucepfs and cotegories of thought? not, it means eiperience of knowledge can help solve key eral If know- not connected with being. it does, it cai problems-let alone those issues of the theory of that thinking is If certain means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialec- Iedge whose very formulation is dire-ctly linked to has objective signiflcance." (10; stales in the development of scientifi-c-know-Iedge and.so- tics of cognition which Kissel is right 38, 256) ciai practice. The Soviet philosopher M. A. in th-e old Thus, any absolute treatment of categories, including to say that Marxist philosophy 'iis not ontology those of dialectical materialism-in other words, disregard sense of the term, tliat is, it is not a speculatively devel- scientific knowledge about of the constant need for their further development and gen- oped theory of being which shuns analysis replaces dialectics with the world". (24; L75) eralization-in the final substantiated the metaphysical mode of thinking. Even empirical discov- Traditionai philosophical empiricism the knowledge and geography, and other sciences are es- principle of the sensory origjn of theoretical eries in astronomy psychology of know- development of those sciences. arbitrarily reduced epistemology to the sentially the results of the special This is particularly true of the basic concepts of this or ledge. Today, the psychology of knowledge is a who p-osses- science, especially philosophy. science mostly studying the human individual [hat psycholog- Naturally, the concept of the atom or the molecule above ses certain cognitive abilities. The importance of of dia- objective existence of these material parti- ical studies for the substantiation and development all implies the underrated' cles because concept reflects the objective fact that Iectical-materialist epistemology-epistemology, must not be this which studies atoms and molecules exist. But equally obviously, the sci- But it is equally obvious thaf pos- the development of knowledge (primarily in its categorial entific reflection of the given objective fact has hecome of all and ap- forms) deals with the aggregate cog-nitive .gxperience sible due to the development of certain knowledge precisely means Viewed from this mankind, and not with the individual. That is propriate methods and of study. epistemology angle, the modern scientific concept of the atom or mole- why the' exposition of dialectical-materialist of psychologi- cule sums up the history of knowledge. cannot be piesented as a recapitulation -the- sensation, perception and thinking. In his critical interpretation of Hegel's dialectics, Lenin cal theory about - of knowledge also ap- constantly stresses that the scientific understanding of ob- What i have said about the theory categories are the key junc- jective reality each given stage of development a!s-o plies to dialectical Iogic whose at process of cognition' iums up the history of knowledge about the real world, iures, the main stagei of the historical process from the viewpoint the histbry of the sciences and of the versatile practical Dialectical logic srims up this precisely reason of the historical oI the logicalforms and categoiies emerging and-develop- human activity. It is by Naturally, development (without which cannot cor- ing in it and of their relation to one another. of knowledge it refuses to that the scientific, dialectical- thi-s does not mean that dialectical materialism rectly reflect external reality) materialist dia- materialist understanding of the world is also the scien- deal with special philosophical problems of 253 252 lectics-such as the theory of the deveiopment of the ob- Lenin elaborates upon the postulates he advanced in eai,- jective world, or problems of dialectical logic and the the- Iier works. For example, he stressed in his Materialism and ory of knowledge. These problems do exist, but only with- Empirio-Criticism that millions of individual producers in in the framework of unity, because materialist dialectics capitalist society interact in some way in the course of pro- is the theory of development both of the material world dqging and exchanging goods, thus changing social beiing. and of its reflection in knowledge and the latter's logical "The sum-total of these changes in all theii ramifications forms. Therefore, the coincidence of materialist dialectics in the capitalist world economy could not be grasped even o,n the one hand, and dialectical logic and epistemology on by seventy Marxes. The most important thing is that the the other, means only that, like epistemology, dialectical laws of these changes have been discovered, that the ob- logic is the theory of development, a theory determined by iectiue logic of these changes and of their historical devel- the distinctive character of its object of study in each of opment has in its chief and basic features been dis- its _three aspects. Thus the coincidence of dialectics, Iogic clos-ed..." (10; 14,325) Thus, using the operation of com- and epistemology is not an abstract identity devoid of dlf- Todity-capitalist economy as an example,-the f,enin formulates ferences. As the general theory of development, as the the epistemological understanding of category of law theory of knowledge and its logical forms, materialist dia- which he later develops aud classically defines in his Phit- lectics dialectically studies the dialectical process. osophical Notebooks. In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin materialistically The description of each category from the point of view- interprets Hegel's concept of law. On the one hand, he of its objective content and place in the development of stresses the objectivity of law as the relation of essence, knowledge graphically shows how dialectical materialism a relation which exists outside and independently of con- applies the principle of the coincidence of dialectics, Iogic sciousness. On the other hand, he underscores equally firm- and the theory of knowledge. Viewed from this angle, the ly that the concept of law is a definite stage of-the histor- principle of coincidence is the truly dialectical approach to ically developing knowledge which far from exhausts the f,he study of phenomena, an approach which takes into ac- knowledge of phenomena and relations of essence in gen- count the existence of the subject of cognition and the hisl eral. This means that any scientific law-for example, a torical level of knowledge, which rules out dogmatism, the law of physics or chemistry-expresses objective, real, es- absolute interpretation of the results achieved by cogni- sential relations. But it expresses them relatively, accord- tion, and concessions to absolute relativism, subjectivism ing to the existing objective conditions of cognition, and and agnosticism. consequently However, that is not it is an objective but relative truth-that is, - all there is to applying-not the princi- a certain stage which knowledge reaches and will later f_le o! coincidence, because the point is only to levea1 surmount. Referring to Hegel's assertion that "the realm the objective content of a given category and stiess its rel. of Laws is the quiescent reflection of the existing or ap- ativity as _a stage of knowledge, but also to define its place pearing world", Lenin arrives at the following, quite re- among other categories and its relation to them. Foi ex- markable, epistemological conclusion: "Law takes the quies- ample, when we deal with .the category of necessity, we cent-and therefore law, every law, is namow, incom- must define its relation to such categories as law, essence, plete, approximate." (10; 38, 151) Obviously, this does not possibility, chance, probability, basis, etc. It is equally in- in the least diminish the cognitive value of science. sufficient to state that the category of reality possesses Lenin warns against absolute treatment of the knowl- such-and-such objective content and is also a definite stage edge which is contained in any law formulated by science. in cognition. A correct objective dialectical, epistemological But, although phenomena are richer than laws, the cogni- and logical definition must explain the relation of the cat- tion of the laws governing phenomena is the comprehen- egory of reality not only to that of possibility but also to sion of their essence. such categories as existence, essence, phenomenon, appear- As he often does in his Philosophical Notebooks, here ance, necessity, contradiction, development, etc.

254 255 -f ', ".1-'.:l:i-r;'.

In analyzing the relations among categories and thus a ol Zeno of E[ea, Lenin says, with good. reiison, that "ihe certain system of ca[egories, one should oxamine the move- questiou is not whether there is movement, but how to ex- ment of concepts and their intertransition-that is, define press it in the logio of conoepts". (10; 38, 256) Hegel an- concepts dialectically, not as immutable but as moving, swers this question which was posed in ancient times, by flexible, capable of mutual transition: to approach them creating dialectieal logic, by substantiating the unity of from the viewpoint of motion, change, development. There- dialectics, Iogic and the theory of knowledge. fore, materialistically interpreting HegeI's idealist theory We know that unlike Hogel's method, his system is oon- about the self-development of the concept, Lenin says: "Di- servative and dogmatio. In his logic, philosophy of nature alectics in general is 'the pure movemelt of thought in and philosophy of spirit Hegel claims to have exhausted- Notions' (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: all human knowledge-at least as far as its principles and human concepts are not fixed hut are eternally in move- theoretical fundamentals. are concerned. This is au inevi- ment, they pass into one another, they flaw into one anoth- table consequence of the premises of absolute idealism, be- or, otherwise they do not reflect living life. The analysis oause the latter eventually reduces the history of knowl- of concepts, the study of them, the 'art of operating with edge (and history in general) to the gradual comprehension them' (Engels) always demands study of the mouement by the "absoluto idea" of its own essence and of the entire of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual tran- wealth and diversity of developmeut it comprises outside sitions." (70; 38,253) time and space. Significantly, Lenin sees the observance of the require- The contradiction between method and system in Hege- ment of motion, change-in short, of the dialectics of con- Iian philosophy clearly shows that Hegel is unable to con- cepts-as the observance of materialist principles in epis- sistently follow, within his own philosophical theory, his temology and logic, for we know that materialism demantis own principle of the ooinoidence of dialectics, Iogic and the correspondence of consciousness to being which is essen- theory of knowledgo. For, according to this prinoiple, any tially dialectical. Metaphysical materialism cannot consist- knowledge (even absolute truth) must be viewed as a cer- ently observe that principle oI reflection in epistemology- tain stage in historical development, and the oategories As iar as Hegel is concerned, he reveals, in a distorted through whioh this or that content is cognized and formu- idealist form, the unity of motion in thought (in concepts) lated must be compared to other categories-that is, they and in being. Engels refers to it by saying that Hegel's must also be evaluated as certain stages in the development philosophy is materialism turned upside down. And in his of knowledge. But Hegel's oognition and development are Phtlosophtcal Noteboolts, Lenin stresses the correctness and completed by absolute knowledge because the "absolute insight of Engels' deflnition precisely in connection with idea" comprehends itself, and by the same token it com- Hegel's theory of the concePt' prehends its "alienation", "other-being", etc. Lenin sees the merit of Hegel's view not only in that he Another important point is that because of his idealist has proven the obiectivity and essentiality of inler con- premise, and the long-established philosophioal tradition, tradiitions, the universal and essential character of motion, Hegel resolutely opposes philosophy to other scienoes, main- guessed change and development and that he brilliantly -at taining that only philosophy deals with truth, that in the more general laws of development, but also in that he other sciences truth is not pure and is relegated to the is able to express this objective dialectic in the logic of background by other ideas, claims and intentions which concepts-in other words, that he has produced dialectical have nothing to do with it. That is why Hegel contrasts logic.- For, starting from ancient Greek -philosophy, many the philosophy of nature to natural science, the philosophy philosophers, while detecting the contradictions of motion of history to history, the philosophy of law to law, etc. In or cogniiton, arrived at a metaphysical negation of move- his opinion, cognition is dialectical only in philosophy ment, at agnosticism and irrationalism. In his notes on (more precisely, only in speculative-idealist philosophy) Hegei's Hisiory of Philosophy and on the famous aporias because it comprises the analysis of concepts and thought

256 r?-01502 257 'is the riblect oI knowledgo; other sciencos, esBecially those it is an approximateiy true reflection of the aotuai proc- dealing rrith material objects, are by their nature undia- ess of fall as it takes place in nature. However, today's Iectical. Consequently he believes that dialeotics, logic and aerodynamics regards Galileo's law as merely a certain epistemology coincide only in philosophy, and Qven that stage in the cognition of the process in question: aerodynam' inasmuch as it deals with thought, knowledge. Naturally, ics has to take into account the weight and shape of the this error is inevitable for speculative-idealist philosophy. falling object, the environment, the atmospheric conditions Un1ike the Hegelian panlogism, dialectical materialism all the factors which classical mechanics ignores. consistently applies the principle of the coincidence of dia- -i.e.,Such is the way the knowledge of a certain law devel- lectios, logic and epistemology. Observing this principle in ops in history, generalizes and sums up the history of philosophy means not only to reject dogmatism and dogmat- knowledge, examines the categories of classical mechanics ic claims to absolute knowlodge and absolute, final truth, connected to this process and their relations of ooordina- but also to positively examine, develop, enrich, elaborate tion and subordination, and graphically shows the essence on and offer a concrete interpretation of, all the postulates, of the dialectical-materialist application of the prinoiple laws and categories of dialectical and historical mate- proclaiming the unity of dialectics, Iogio and epistemolo- rialism without exception- That is exactly why dialectical gy in special spheres of knowledge. This is also the'ap- materialism is not a science of sciences in opposition to proach to be used in examining relations betweeu Eucli- other, allegedly "flnite" and limited sciences. Like all sci- dean and non-Euclidean geometry; between classical and ences, dialectical materialism is developing, it flnds new modern, quantum mechanics. While classical mechanics data, it deepens, elaborates on and offers a concrete inter- treats the categories of mass and velocity as independent pretation of, its postulates and conclusions. of each other, quantum mechanics sees them as insepara- Another, equally important point is that Marxist-Leninist bly linked. philosophy demands that the principle of the coincidence The question of applying the principle ofthecoincidence of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge be applied of dialectics, Iogic and epistemology to special spheres to all soiences without exception. According to Lenin, "con- of knowledge-a question Lenin poses in his Philosophical tinuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in Notebooks-opens new vistas before knowledge in any sci- the d,ialectical elaboration of the history of human thought, ence. Proceeding from that precept, Lenin points out as science and technique." (10; 38, L46-47) This means that early as in Materialism and Ernpirio-Criticisrn that the elec- any postulate, concept or law in any soience must be viewed, tron is as inexhaustible as the atom. Lenin's brilliant con- first, from the standpoint of their objective content (re- cept of matter is based on the dialectical understanding of flection of objective reality); second, epistemologically, as the object's nature antl the scientific knowledge about it. a certain stage in the development of knowledge, as tran- Lenin stresses that any natural scientific theory of matter sition from one type of knowledge to another, more pro does not exhaust all its qualities but is a definite stage in found type; and t[ird, from the standpoint of dialectical the development of knowledge about matter, a stage inev- logic which analyzes the interconnection and movement of itably negated dialectically by the subsequent develop- calegories irrespective of whether they are generally sig- ment of knowledge. It follows-as I have noted earlier- nificant philosophical categories or the fundamental no- that a concept of matter truly comprising all its states and tions of some individual science (such as mass, inertia, qualities, including those not yet known to science, can velocity and acceleration in classical meohanics). only be an epistemological concept, an epistemological cat- For example, Galileo's postulate that the velocity of an egory. Naturally, this does not rule out the need for the object in free faII does not depend on its shape and mass philosophical theory of matter to record aII of its attrib- is correct because it is abstracted from the environment utes studied by natural science. in which this free fall takes place. Although this funda- Thus, in laying down the materialist principle of the mental of classical mechanics refers to free fall in vacuum, coincidence of dialectics, logic and epistemology, Lenin,

258 il?. 255 :',

I.,ti ;.

unliLe ,H"gel, demonshates the necessity of its applicatiou DTA,LECTICAL MATERTALTSM, . in any specific science. Stressing that Hegel's The Science DIALECTICAL IDEALISM ol Logi'c sums up the history of thought, Lenin says that AND CONTEMPORARY the laws governing the general trend of human knowledge, BOURGEOIS CONSCIOUSNESS of all science in general, also operate in each individual science. "To trace this more concretely and in greater de- (IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION) tail in lhe history ol the separate sciences seems an extra- ordinarily rewarding task." (1; 38, 318) This is also the way to understanding Lenin's famous words to the effect that Marx's Capital applies dialectics, What I have understood from Heraclitus is wonderful, logic and the theory of knowledge to one science-political Socrates used to say, bgt what I have failed to understand must be even bettei. Today's opponents of Marxist philos- eoonomy. He says that "Marx applied flegel's {lale-cligp in iis rational form to political economy". (1; 38, 178) ophy do not follow this wise example: they blame Marx- Suffice it to compare the dialeotical-materialist, strictly his- ism for their own lack of understanding of this doctrine. torical interpretation of economic categories (Iabor, value, Hence the opinion that Marx rejects philosophy as an ex- capital, money, etc.) in Marx's Capital with their interpre- planation of- the world and sees it only as a means for tation by the classics of English political economy to un- ihanging it. However, suffice it to recall certain statements derstand the importance of applying the principle of the in The Gerrnan lileology concerning this issue to see that coincidence of dialectics, logio and the theory of knowledge Marxism is against the apologia of social reality. Marxism in political economy. And since Marx's Capital is the finest counters it with a scientific explanation of social relations example of such study, Marxist philosophers must exam- and theoretically substantiates the need for their transfor- ine the methotl ol Capital and grasp its signifieance which mation. Marx's Capitat is a great exatlple of this revolu- goes far beyond the confines of economics. tionary-critical explanation of social reality. The attempt at- accusing Marx of the intention to do away with philosophy is equally fallacious. A one-sided interpretation of quotations from Marx lends an appear- ance-of objectivity to such claims. But in the history of of philosophy- there is no single cut-and-dried definition concepts, including the conclpt of philosophy. Feuerbaoh says ihat his philosophy is no plrilosoplry, but no one would think of-calling him a non-philosopher. Marx and Engels consider it necessary to do away with philosophy in the old sense of the word, that is, specu- iative philosophy opposed, on the one hand, to_positive sci- ences, and on the other hand, to the socio-political move- ment. For Marx, philosophy is an integral part and a spir- itual weapon of the great emancipation movement which is to forever end exploitation of man by man. This fact, which testifies to Marx's profound understanding of the sociol mission of philosophy (today no one denies it, at least formally) serves as a pretext to s-ome critics of Marx- ism for desciibing it as "prearranged thinking". Marxism pqtlineq the qcie$iflc wayS of studying the

a0t trends, contradictions and motive forces of our era. A cor- rational principles. According to Hyppolite, this conviction rect understanding and creative application of Marxism im- is fallacious and it means that Marx is essentially as much plies a rejection of a biased approach to it. But throughout of an.idealist as Hegel is. Here, idealism is interpreted not the history of social thought, no doctrine has sufrered so as a certain ontological or epistemological theory but sim- much from distortion as Marxism. And today, when even ply as the belief in the power of human reason, the- inevi- its opponents have to reckon with Marxism and study it, Iabitity of progress and the feasibility of social ideals. 'it is being distorted more than ever before. Sometimes it Since conteiporary bourgeois ideology is irreversibly seems that certain bourgeois scholars study Marxism not so lhostile to socialism, it opposes not only Marxism but also much to understand it as to collect more ."evidence" for re- Ithe great rationalisi traditions of its own past. Thus the futing it. This sheds light on the latest "discovery" by the ,reduction of Marxism to Hegelianism bears out the spirit- bourgeois experts on Marx: that an immanent part of Marx- ,ual crisis of today's bourgeois society, its moral erosion ist theory is, of all things, Hegelianism. and ideological impotence. In his Essays on Marr and, Hegel, Jean Hyppolite, a Lenin describes-Hegel's faith in reason, his conviction French existentialist neo-Hegelian, draws a parallel be- that the struggle with the existing social evil is rooted in tween Hegel's Phenomenology ol Spirit and Marx's Capital. the objective liw of universal development, as, the- rev-olu- Hyppolite sees both works as developing the same theme tionary aspect of Hegel's philosophy. (L0; 2, 21) IT- Hyp- of alienation. "Just as in Hegel's Phenomenology," he says, politeis oplnion, this very important aspect,- critically .ac- "the producer, according. to Marx, alienates himself in cepted and materialistically developed by Marx, is naive, goods and money, and this monumental alienation consti- obiolete and disproved by history. tttes Capital; capital, the really leading protagonist of Karl Ldwith is close to existentialism, and he believes Marx's work, is produced by man and ends up as dominat- that Marx, like Hegel, was a rationalist: "Hegel's princi- ing man in history and reducing him to a simple cogwheel ple-the unity of reason and reality, and reality itself as-th.e in its mechanism." (69; 160) Lnity of being ancl existence-is also Marx's Principle-." - Jean Hyppolite is a serious scholar and an expert on (80;- 109) Lit;ith is sure to know that Marx thoroughly Hegel's Phenornenology ol Spirit. Surely he knows that criticizecl'Hegel's ontologization of reason, thought as- early Marx's Capital-even viewed as an economic interpretation as 1843-1844-. Nevertheless he asserts that Marx failed to of Hegel's theory of alienation-differs substantially from (overcome Hegel's speculation,-critical i.e., that he could not remain Lhe Phenomenology which deals with the alienation of self- ,on the level-of a analysis of Hegel's philosophy. consciousness, with overcoming alienation by grasping the Like Hyppolite, Liiwith essentially does not distinguish be- absolute. But Marx thoroughly criticizes the idealist con- tween the rational and the materialist interpretation of the cept of absolute knowledge, proving the fallacy of Hegel's forward-moving development of society: inexplicably, he understanding of alienation as the alienation of conscious- :sees the very idea of the inevitability of social progress as ness and self-consciousness, and countering it with the ma- idealist. terialist postulate about the alienation of the product of Erwin Metzke, an evangelical critic of Marxism, is well labor and labor itself. True, Hyppolite does not deny that. aware of the fact that one cannot ignore the opposition He even admits that, according to Marx, the proletariat's between Marxism and Hegelian absolute idealism, qo he class struggle, and not knowledge, leads to the overcoming tries to treat these two opposites as identical by a sophistic of alienation. But, although he points to that distinction interpretation of dialectics. According to Metzke,- -Marx's between Marxism and Hegelianism, Hyppolite does not con- materialism and Hegel'si'The idealism form, of all things, a sider it important. In his view, much more important is unity of opposites: connection between Marx and that which brings the two thinkers closer together and not Hegil is its-etf dialectical. It c-omprises an opposition. The the difference between them: the conviction that alienation dep,-th of connection corresponds to the depth of gontradic- carr be overcome and that society can be restructufed oq tion." (88; t5)

?OZ z6a This dismissal .of the tundamental opposition between and the slowing down of motion are harbingers of death, Marx's materialism and Hegel's idealisni is an important and speculation about them bores him as it doee Spinoza. ideological indicator of today's bourgeois critique of Marx- Let tlie dead bury their deail. Eviirything that exists in ism. The latter is accused not so much of negativism (as time, especially everything alive, is transient, and its ener- was the case in the early 1900s) as of an insufficiently gy is born of its limitation. The power of the living is in critical approach to the great rationalist traditions of the the combination of opposites. The habitual, the routine, past. There is no need to recapitulate here the fundamental the traditional belong to the past which is of interest only opposition between materialist dialectics and Hegel's ideal- inasmuch as it is the road to the present. Hegel admires out- ist dialectics, between historical materialism and the ideal- stllding personalities above all because they oppose routine. ist philosophy of history, between sciedtific communism Flegel opposes history to nature: nature lacks passion, it and Hegel's bourgeois views. To refute the legend about always repeats itself. But no great deed is possible without Marxism's allegedly Hegelian view of the world, one has to passion: it is the realm of history, where emergence and _analyze what is really common to Marx and Hegel and to destruction are inseparable. Here, development is continu- spot the fundamental opposition of dialectical materialism ous; there is constint irreversible change, the emergenee to dialectical idealism within what is common to them. of the new which is unlike what existed before it or sti]I philosophy era Hegel's is the self-consciousness of the survives. Here the new battles the old. The struggle of op- when bourgeois society established itself, it is actually the posites is what gives birth to the new. As Hegel shys, attempt theoretically interpreting so- first brilliant at this "Something is therefore vital only if it contains a contradic- ciety's past and future. Marx's theory is the self-consbious- tion, and it is precisely the power which is capable of con- ness of the era of the emancipation of the working class, taining and withstanding it." (64; 4, 69) It is ridiculous to it is a brilliant scientific understanding of the immanent say that one cannot think a contradiction; to think devel- development of bourgeois society which, by its own prog- opment means to grasp the contradiction. ress, creates material and spiritual prerequisites for a rev- Of course, these ideas and the perception of the world olutionary transition into its opposite, the socialist social connected with them is only one aspect of Hegel's theory.- system. This means that Marx's dialectical materialism is He is the creator of the last great metaphysical system. a direet and immediate continuation of Hegel's dialectical And the system, in turn, subjects the method to itself and idealism both theoretically and historically. distorts it. Already the Young Hegelians pointed to the "Hegelian philosophy," the Russian revolutionary Ale- contradiction between Hegel's dialectical method which re- xander Herzen said, "is the algebra of revolution, it eman- jects completion of development and his system which es- cipates man, exceptionally and completely destroys the tablishes, within the framework of bourgeois law and or- Ch.ristian world, the world of myths that have outlived der, absolute boundaries of the socio-political and intellec- themselves." (19; 23) Naturally, this does not mean that tual progress of mankind. The Young Hegelians looked for Hegel has fully appreciated the importance of revolutions the roots of this contradiction in the philosopher's person- ln human history. That understanding is precisely what ality, in his official status and conformist prejudice. As he lacks. But the most powerful and, one might even say, early as his first philosophical study-rough drafts of his remarkable aspect of Hegel's method and of himself as man doctorate thesis-Marx goes incomparably further. "It is and thinker is, as facques D'Hondt rightly says, his tire- quite thinkable for a philosopher," he says, "to fall into less and passionate interest in everything that changes, is one or another apparent inconsistency through some sort in motion, alive and transient. Goethe's mountain peaks, of accommodation; he himself may be conscious of it. But quiet yearns, the symbol of the unattainable for which man what he is not conscious of is the possibility that this ap- bore Hegel. Above all he is interested in the living, in parent commodation has its deepest roots in an inadequacy what has come and will pass; it is ever emerging, and He- 9q ig q+ inadequate formulation qf hie principle itself." gel describes this state as unrest. (68; 1,4-L8l Calmpess (1; 1,84) aw ?05 .l

principle, i.e., iilealist speculative-idealist interpretation of negation. The latter The inadequacy-ilialectici, of Hegel's - -the character of his was exposed 'by Marx in his practically always leads to reconciling the new with fhe old Contribation to the Critiqae ol Hegel's Philosophy -ol because speculative nogation negates itself and also be- Law written in 1843. Here- Marx shows that idealism dis- cause the old, since it resists the new, is, according to He- torts dialectics because it sees the relation of opposites as gel, no longer old. existing only in thought which, although tre-ated-ontologi- In stressing that Hegel's dialectics is limited, inadequate cally aid as an absolute, nevertheless remains tho-ught. There- and inconsistent, one must not Iose sight of the generally are solved only- in accepted, although disputed by the opponents of Marxism, fore, according=pure to Hegel, contradictiols ih;'t*il of th-ought, i.e., in the course of medita- truth that Marxist dialectics is as opposed to Hegel's dia- tion. These co-ntradictioni are merely thought, they do not lectics as Marxism as a whole is opposed to Hegel's bour- really struggle against each other; each sees the other as geois theory. The rev.olutionary aspect of Hegel's dialec- tics, the rational element, method, the passion for its- other-being. of his :t, 1839-1821, when he worked on his doctorate thesis, truth, historicism, the profound conviction in the possibili- Marx noted the two mutually exclusive aspects of Hegel's ty and objective necessity of the rational transformation of ai"i.rtir.. Still paying homage to He-gel's idealism, Marx human life--that is what makes Hegel's philosophy rele- r"v. tttt "dialedtic iJttre inne-r, simple light, the.piercing vant today. eyL of love, the inner soul which is not crushed bV- !l.e Many scholars overlook the fact that Hegel not only of the spilll"' profoundly criticized the views of the l*lightenment but ;hy-;f ;aleriat division, the -inner -abode g"T rh"ray in the following phrase he stresses that "dia- also upheld its finest traditions: not the Enlightenment L"ti" it also the torrent which smashes the many and their which is often pictured as something similar to the smug ioo.rds, which tears down the indepeldent forms-,-sinking optimism of the philosopher Pangloss, but the one that in the one sea of eternity". (7; 7, 498) IVLarx mercilessly ridiculed his pseudophilosophy, the one that deveiops""urvifring lrecisely this second, revolutionary aspect ot.He- anticipated, in the famous story of Frankenstein, the con- s.t't a'iut6"tics. Having begun with atheism and a critique flicts of today stemming from the spontaneous advances in 3i .p.."irtive philosoplhiziig, he arrives at an integral d.ia- science and technology, the Enlightenment which bril- leciital-materialist understa-nding of reality, at scientific liantly exposed, in Rousseau's theory, the contradictions in- herent in progress and generated antagonistic re- cOmmunism--Nrd;rily, and the new economics. by social ihe transition from idealist to materialist dia- lations. l."ti.t be understood without due regard to the de- Hegel was far from the oversimplifred notion that the """irbtof Marx's socialist and economic views and his light of truth is itself enough to dispel the darkness of ""t"p*t"torr"'iicat political activity, first, as a revolutionary demo- error, that good triumphs over evil thanks to its immanent Lrat, and ihen as a conscious exponent of the fundamental significance. But he was even further from rejecting the i"i.i"** of the working class, the creator of its scientific idea of progress or seeing it as threatening human exist- ence because progress ia.otogy. Marx himself-notes that, stressing, first, tt'-t 9"- merely is not straightforward but gr"i.'io"".ction of his the-ory to the exp-erience of the realizes itself through struggle and suffering. Fully con- irort ing-ctass movement, and secot-d, that dialectics in its scious of the difficulties and contradictions of social prog- rationai interpretation is incompatible-with the hourgeois ress, Hegel was nevertheless absolutely free from the the workl which makei an absolute of the capi- views held by those of our contemporaries who believe that "ir*taiist "fmoae of production. But negation-dialectically con- no social transformations are capable of overcoming the crete and not ienselessly negativist negation-is a most inevitable disharmony of human existence. Hegel's bril- important element of dialectics. That is how Marx under- liance is clear from the way he connects the genesis and rtrira. it, and that is why his analysis of Hegel's dialec- development of the "unhappy consciousness" category to iics comprises, as an important element, the critique of the the status of an enslaved man who is conscious of himself

?66 2fi7 as a personality that is inherently free and capable of crea- duced ,if we the- se_cond part llege|s '"i ' This enslavement should be interpreted suf- "p-eel" of dictum: eve[- ' tive activity. ything rational is real. course, Hegel ficiently brbadly because, according Hegel, is deter- Of did not desoibe i . to it bverything thinkable and expressea in-words and,phrases . I mined by the situation in which man chooses between life as rational. Concerning medieval scholasticism which some bourgeois philosophers are ready to see as a model of me- thodical scientific thinking even today, Hegel he was the first prove is relative, that said that it truth, to that truth was "a barbaric philosophy of mind, devoid any real .--i ' it is the development of knowledge. But naturally, he never of content". (64; 15, 198) The rational must be sound, au- even way pragmatisis, neoposi- it .i - conceived-of asserting-the thentically manifests itself as dialectical concept which r ' bourgeois philosophers assert today-that a tivists and other reveals the unity of the universal, the particular, the indi- ' ':-''- truth is reduced to usefulness or that it is a convention vidual.Therationalis.realonlyinasmuchasitscontentis t. agreed upon by scientists. says Hegel, "is a noble "Truth," objective, necessary. This understanding of the rational . word and a still nobler cause. If man's spirit and soul are ",. differs radically from the subjectivist-abstract necessity at ...)' still sound, this word must make his breast heave higher." (64; 6,29) which Kant and Fichte stopped. These predecessors of He- gel were brilliant thinkers, and they cannot be blamed ' , i' : According Engels, no other postulate of Hegel's gen- foi' to some of today's philosophers still maintaining that I erated such diversity of interpretation as his famous ideals "ever- cannot be realized in this world. They hold such is ., ything real is rational, everything rational is real". Both that " the otherwordly nature of ideals: realizing .: proponents feudalism saw this all attempts at myopic liberals and of them lead catastrophic consequene.es because . justification Heinrich Heine to the world Bhrase as a of the feudal ways. essentially cannot be better regrettably, grasp revolutionary meaning of that but, it can obvi- .. was the first to the ously be worse. Hegel's thinking was both I important ideas of the progressive bour- much more sober ,r: dictum. The most and much nobler: "Should an idea be too good exist, geoisie of the l7th-tgth centuries, proolaimed almost si- to t',,, , it is the fault of the ideal itself." (64; 14, 274) multaneously by Bacon and Descartes, were those about Marx Engels I rationally-or- and directly develop Hegel's idea by oppos- mastering the elemental forces of nature and ing abstract necessity and the contrasting : r ganizing the life of society. Hegel's phrase is the quint- of the ideal to reality. This self-developing reality generates ideals and essence these ideas. of surpasses them in its subsequent development. ',' idealist construction put on it_ by Unlike He- Despite the cleartry gel, the founders of Marxism are perfectly Hegel, the idea about the rationality of reality is filled aware that uto. i pias are not produced by reason which abstracts itself from r profound and even materialist content. The science -,' with a reality and is engaged in imagination, but are definite re- . Age discovered the diversity of natural laws a of the New flectiol (from a definite social position) historical ,,r" and came very close to the understanding of social laws. of real- ity. That is why they distinguish between progressive and . ; Naive teleological notions were replaced with the theory reactionary utopias, showing that the former unscientifi- _. c_ally, reflect priori. These scientific the actual trends of social development while , . view, it was so obvious as to be a the latter idealize past presenting idealist expres- the it as a Iost paradise ,. i concepts found their philosophical, albeit be regained. Thoroughly , panlogism, the postulate to criticizing various forms of sion in Hegel's specifically in utopianism, Marx, Hegel, Hegel not describe every- like argues-is that the rational ide- about the "rational reality". did stemmilrg from reality -itself expanded form, the real is aI merely a spiritual ex- thing existing as real. In its pression of the real, historically definite L- which has its necessity loses trend of social de- necessity. The existing lost v-elopment; appears unattainable, justification: must yield its place to the new, the pro- if it it is only because 1: . its it the trends it expresses are still embryonic. , gressive. "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve," i An equally profound materialist copcfusio4 cep bP d9- f'since ,, Marx says, closer examination will always Show

?0$ 269 that the problem itself arises only when the material con- tioir of the'turbulent stream of life from a solitary cli#. ditions for its solution are already present or at least in Nor is it merely a philosophical fad successfully exploit- the course of formation." (6; 2l) fhus Hegel's postulate ing Schopenhauer's legacy. This pessimism, which intel- that "everything real is rational, everything rational is lectually expresses the self-alienation of personality in bour- real", at fiist glance a mystification of the socio-historical geois society, oensures the struggle against obsolete capi- process, is actirally a brilliant insight into its inevitable talist relations of production. In other words, it is the subtl- progress. est apologia of conformism which appears as nonconform- - ism since it creates the impression of intellectual independ- nut tbday's bourgeois ideologists see the idea- of -proq- ress as an illusion of the Enlightenment'gone bankrupt' ence and opposes the saccharine meliorist sermons of a progress does exist, they maintain, it exists only in an large part of bourgeois ideologists. But this misanthropic If justify extiem-ely one-sided, limited and distorted form. As to the view of the world from above does not in the least trend w[ich dominates history, they see it as mostly re- social pessimism. Hegel was right when he said that it contemplate gressive. "The social pessimism of a large part of today's was vanity to everything as vanity of vani- [ourgeois philosophert," P. N. Fedoseyev- observe-s, "indi- ties: "Perhaps treating the conviction that everything is censures protest against the historically nothing as the ultimate wisdom is really some profound rectl! aiy -obso- profundity lete iapitalist production relations. It is apologia of conform- life, but it is the of emptiness. . ." (64; 14, 64) ism in a most subtle form, conformism which appears as That was also Hegel's approach to the enthusiasm of the nonconformism and widely'uses pseudocriticism of capital- French Revolution. The most valuable aspect in his assess- anticapitalist phraseology, which actu-ally vin- ment of that revolution (which the ideologists of aristocrat- isry and -but punishment dicates contemporary Capitalism, allegedly radically trans- ic reaction saw as divine for man's sins) is formed." (33; 1{) the understanding of its historical necessity, popular char- rational, everything rational is real' acter and great importance for socio-historical development Everything'rqal is general. No, it is no[ a secular formula of Leibniz's theodicy, ridi- in "I am convinced," Hegel wrote in 1816, "that culed by Voltaire. It is a formula of historical optiTism the world spirit of our times uttered a command to ad- which ii perfectly conscious of the fact that the tragic is vance. Such a command encounters resistance; this being but that really exists not only in per- presses on like an armored and compact phalanx, inexor- mot idola theatri it perceptibly, sonal but also in social life. But neither the tragic nor'the ably and barely as the sun moves, forward comic nor their various combinations cancel either purpose- through all obstacles." (62; 2, 85-86) These words recog- human activity or that dialectios of social develop- nize the objective inevitability of fundamental social trans- ful formations expose ment because of which struggle against the existing evil is and the fallacy of its speculative-ideal- objective inevitability of change and devel- ist interpretation. Anyway however, Ilegel's approach to rooted in the greatest opment. the historical event of his time paved the way : Ridiculing sober historical optimism has recently- be- toward understanding the objective inevitability of the so. cio-historical process. come fashi&able with many bourgeois philosophers. Hege! That was where his dialectics led, and was capable because used to say that it is childish to fight fashion, but he did it of that it was the intellectual expression revolution's power. not mean iashion in philosophy because philosophy is. an of this historical Dialectics demands that historical events be examined intellectual occupation- which is too serious and very -im- portant for man-kind. Still, some philosophers who- f-gllow in their interrelation, in their immanent, contradictory move- philosophical fashion see the historical o-ptimism of IIegeI ment, development It is precisely the idea of the spon- of harsh reality, as fear oI taneity of the dialectical process, even in its speculative- ind Mirx as an idealist dismissal idealist the true nature of life which offers no hope of salvation to interpretatibn (i.e., as the process of thought), that directly approached anyone. But today's social pessimism is not simply escapism the understanding of the obiectiuity - of that process: i ia George Sintayana, preaching plaoid contempla- the thinker does not simply transform a

270 27t i-..

0oncept into another concept, it becbmes its opposite itself, istic conclusion alleging that social development is prede- l it spiits and transforms itself into another. In this connec- termined. In the course of socio-economic progress the sig- tion Lenin referred to the germs rof historical' materialism nificance of the ontiro past of production for its ourrent in Hegel's philosophy of history. Naturally, these germ-s state diminishes and not increases. By his theory about ctjuld not develop-iu a speculative-idealist system which the role of material production in the development of sooi- saw the activity of individuals, social groups and clas,ses ety, about the working masses as the key productive force, as a means used by absolute spirit, world reason to realize Marx has overoome the fatalistic concept of history Hegel ik world historioal goal. True, as Wilhelm Windelband did not break free from, and totally refuted the subjectiv- correctly observes, Hegel's absolute spirit is actually h-u- ist notion holding that history is the result of man's will. man spirit. But the idealist mystification of mankind's Historical materialism shows that the sway the elemental a held millennia (and still historical activity inevitably turned world history -into forces of nature .over man for predetermined teleological process, i.e., into the teleology felt in some spheres of man's life today) is not rooted in of historY. natural but in human, social, historical causes. This means The discovery of the materialist understanding of histo- that it is historically transient. ry is a true revolution in the history of sociological thought- Today's bourgeois philosophers and sociologists very of- -Marx and Engels have not merely proYen that material ten describe Marx's theory of society as a technologioal l:- production is an objective and necessary coldition of so- concept of history. This superficial view is usually based cial life. That was nothing new. Even the demonstration on a biased interpretation of arbitrarily selected quotations that material production transforms not only external but from Marx. Besides, it ignores the fact that in the Marxist al.co human nature is anticipated to a certain degree in view, productive forces and technology are two different Hegel's understanding of labor-Marx points to !4e!. in_his things. The most important productive force is man him- "Edonomio and Philosophic Manuscripts of L844". The self, with his historically shaped abilities which vary from most important thing Mirx has demonstrated, the source. of person to person. This obscures the fact that as a whole, all his iubsequent discoveries, is the faot that mankind they are the product of social development, which makes 'itself creates bbjective conditions that shape its develop- them and the extent to which they are developed as a ment. Neither geographical conditions' nor the climate nor whole independent of human consciousness and wiII, al- other natural fictors-oan be the determining force of the though each individual himself develops and perfects his socio-historical prooess. In the final analysis, productive abilities, i.e., cannot entrust this task to others. forces are this force. Marx sees technology as a most important element of The development of produotive forces is an objective Lhe means of production and, of course, an indicator (and process of succession which differs fundamentally from suc- not at all the only one) of the degree to which produc- cesbion in the history of ideas; there is no freedom of choice tive forces have developed. Other indicators are the social in the former: people cannot freely choose their produc-- organization of labor, the way production is managed, the degree to which scientific advances are applied technologi- 'whotive forces. But it ii the people and not "absolute spirit" create and develop productive forces, and the histori- cally, etc. In the Marxist view, since technology is a means cal necessity which emerges on this basis is the unity of of production (and-another important point-a means of live and materialized human activity. The progress of pro- cognition, a means of meeting oultural needs, a means of ductive forces and therefore also the development of man's medical treatment and, regrettably, of destruction too) it substantial forces neoessarily change the ratio of material- is naturally in a certain dialectical relation to the objeotives izetl and live human labor in favor of the latter. And it helps-objectives attain. This is seen not only from the fact that people determine the conditions of their life inasmuch as many become feasible, attainable only through tfiey .create these conditions. Thus recognition of- the de- the given technological means, but also from the fact that cisive rols of productive forces does not leail to the fatal- they actually owe their emergence to the development of

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I

,i technology. Besldes, while Marxism explicitly stresses the progress. But it was precisely Marx who, aiready in the I importance of seientific and technological progress, it does mid-l9th century brilliantly exposed those contradictions I not lose sight of its possible and actual negative conse- and proved that they could only be solved by the commu- quences. But since historical materialism has nothing in nist transformation of social relations. Marx overcame not history which Commou with the technologioal concept of only tatalism and subjectiuism but also the naturalist in- maintains that the all-important and decisive force is pre- terpretation of history which even the greatest of pre-Marx- to cisely technology, it is equally free from the temptation ian materialists had failed to surpass. In his "Economic ascri-be the negative consequences of technological devel- and Philosophio Manuscripts of 1844", Marx described his opment to technology.- Marx holds that thgse _negative con- understanding of history as "accomplished naturalism", sequences are inevitably brought about by the fact that meaning that the motive forces of social development are by production and application of technology are determined natural and not supernatural. That was also why he said the law of value, i.e., by the minimum of man-hours ne- his accomplished naturalism was humanism: the forces that cdssary for the production and application of technology. create history are human, although they are obviously not In this connection Marx spoke about the terrible conse- the forces of each given generation. Neither nature nor quences of the capitalist application of technology (ur4 mankind are all-powerful. Nothing is all-powerful. But labor force) which opponents of Marxism only discovered there is the potentially all-powerful mankind, just as the all- in the past 25 years. powerful nature, and these potential infinities can never be Paradoxically, while today's bourgeois philosophers and realized in full. The road to inflnity remains infinite in each sociologists ascribe the technological interpretation of his- of its sections, i.e., there are infinite opportunities for creative tory to Marx and describe him as a "philosopher of tech- activity before us and our inflnitely removed descendants. nology" who succumbed to the "eros of technology", they The Marxist world outlook is full of vigor and optimism, are iitually themselves under the influence of the teohno- it is based on a profound understanding of human history logical philosophy of history, although they have a_ nega- in all its complexity and contradictions. The Marxist view- tive view of it-in other words, they have succumbed to point, Lenin remarked, "may be called historical optimism: technophobia. They talk about the "demon of technology-" the farther and the quicker things go as they are, the bet- reigning over mankind, they say that mankind's onty {; ter it will be". (10; 2, 525) Defining the objective con- ternative is either to defeat the demon or be destroyed. All ditions of the communist movement, he said that a Marx- this idealist-irrationalist talk shows not only technophobia ist "believes in the present course of social development, but also consciousness, albeit mystified, of the contradic- because he sees the only earnest of a better future in the tions and difficulties generated by the spontaneous devel- full development of these contradictions". (L0; 2,525) opment of science and technology, b_y alienated social re- The historical optimism of Marxism is organically linked personalityr tations and by the self-alienation of the "Bo-ur- to the dialectical-materialist theory of development. geois irrationalist philosophers," the Soviet philosopher Marxist philosophy sees objective infinite presenting reality as an A. C. Yegorov remarks, "are not above their sphere conscious and purposeful human action. There qu- for pessimism and mysticism as an adequate expressio+ ol are no unknowable "things-in-themselves"; the entire re- for inan nature. Naturally, this is not so. One should look cord of science and practice shows that "things-in-them- psyche and the roots of irrationalism not in the human selves" turn into just as necessity "in itself" final "things-for-us", not even in reactionary bourgeois ideology but, in the turns into necessity "for us", i.e., into freedom. Naturally, analysis, in the general crisis of capitalism which is ex- the unknown, the undiscovered, the unaccomplished, the cul- presieil'both in bourgeois ideology and in bourgeois future will always be greater than the known, the discov- ture." (20; 399) ered, the accomplished. That is what is meant by the in- Today's bourgeois ideologists often accuse Marx of over- finite prospects of social progress, and the scientific-philo- Iooking the contradictions of scientific and technological sophical Marxist world outlook is to help in realizing them.

274 18i 275 BIBLIOGRAPHT 23. Itegpou B. M., E0uttcm6o lua,nenmuhu, aoettnu u neopuu noavaH,u&. floruruagar, M., 1963 24. Itucceur M. A., Yueuue o 1ua,nenmune e 1ypxgaax,oit fiutocofiuu XX eena, uag. JIIV, JL, 1970 25. Itonruoropor A. H., ' M.' 1971 3. Karl Marx and l'rederick Engels, Selecteil, Works it three volumes, 33. @egoceea [. H., (CoBercREe yqeulre na XIY Mexgyuapoguom Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977 $rnoco([cnou noErpecceD t, @uaoco$un u cospent'eHruocmb 4. Kar'l Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 34. Illecror JL, YnoapZx,ue u orrTnpooen'ue, flapur., 1964 5, Karl Marx, Capital, Vol, 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974 35. ItrzrrapyttB.trl.,-Teopua, nodH,av,u&i rto?una u |uatr.enmuna fr. Itaru- 6. Karl Marx, .C Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, &Vma, in: Etudes sur l'h.istolre ile la Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, [976 philosophle, Librairie Fischbacher, Paris, 1964 12. Apaaraixu iI. f. B: Bonpocbl fiuaocoSuu,.. 1962' N 6 lohann Gottlteb Fichtes unil die Franzdslsche Reuolutton, YEB 13. AcuvcAcuyc il.B. @., Ila1pinnwe-Ila1pax,ruwe $u.noco$cnue6utoco6cnue mpll?tt,mpg|w, !t. 2, ua4. MfY, - Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin. 1965 M..M,, It97t 42. Buhr M., V ernunfi- M ensch-Geschlchte. Akademie-Verla g, Berlin, 1 977 14. Acuyc B. @., in: 17. EuxoscHufi E. 0., <@pauqyacrufi aRBI4cteEqI[aJrI'rBM) B: Coapeneu,naa An f nternationallournal lor dhe Logical'anil Psychologtcal Stud,y ol 6ypmyaaruaa fiu.aoco$u* rrog peA. BoroI[ouosa A. C. ugp., flomar- T'F the Foundatlons of the Sclences, Vol. 3 (1950-1951), issue 3, Nos. 6 ua4ar, M., 1962 ' andT 18. Bacrurren triI,, HayueuHo JI., , M., Atheismus> in; f ohann Gottlieb Ftchte's siimtliche Werke, Bd. 5, zweite Abtheilung, dritter Band, Verlag von Veit und-Comp', rs71 F?": 21. lluresron 0. B,, fiuaaenmuvecnae rloeuho,. Ovepnu ucmopuu u trleo- Berlin, 1845 il! puu, flottu'tua4at, M., 1974 50. Fichte'1, G,, Die Thatsachen iles Bewusstseyzs, Cotta, Stuttgart/ 22. ,Aasv\ea II. @.)

276 277 51. Fichte J. G., (leber den Begrill iler Wtssenscholtllehrc oder iler 78. Locke 1., An Essay Concernlng Euma-n [Jnilerstanillng, Vol' 2, sqgennanten Philosophie, bei Christian Ernst Gabler, Jena-/Lei- J. M. Deht & Sons Ltd., Londot, 1974 pzig, 7798 zg. i,bm6ardii"., repres I'hiitoricismirD i1,i La philosophte ile l'htstoire 52. Fichte l. G., Werlee, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1911 de la phllosophle 53. Foulqui6 P., Dtctlonnaire de la langue philosophiqie, ?resses uni- AO. i6witfl'ii-.,-lioi Iteget zu Nletzsche, W. Kiihlhammer verlag, Stutt- versitaires de France, Paris, 1962 gart, 1964-G., 54. Foulqui6 P., Saint-JeanR., Dictionnaire de la langue philosophtque. af . filaiie Unc t1gresslon mentale, Bernard Grasset Etliteur, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1969 1959 55. Frank P., Philosophy of Science. The Link Between Science anil Phi- AZ. frla-rcuse H., Kultur unit Gesellschafl, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt losophy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood 1957 Cliffs, N. Y. am Main,'H., 1968 56. Friedrich Wilhelm I!-, Reilen unil Trinhspriiche,Friedrich Ludwig Sg.--- lrard;e Reason onil, Revolutlon.-Hegel anil' the Rl'se of Socl'al Herbig, Leipzig, 1855 ftnorv, The'Humanities Pross, N. Y.'-4!54 57. Fuller B.A.G., A Eistory ol Philosophy. Vol.2. A Historu ol Moit- aa. M"i-riiii"- i., i iitt ii o"i iur l' A me rtsua,' L ibrairie Arthime Fayaril, ern Philosophy, Henry Holt and Company, N.Y., 1955 Paris, 1958 Problctne unil lhre Metko- 58. Qoldschmidt V., in: Etuiles sur 87.- ' I\i;;ier 1,.' il,apnitosopf,ie et li science> in'z Actes d'u XVbme l'htstoire d,e la phllosophie Ciiiiei iohath ie phttisophie ilu 77 au 22 septem'bre 1973, Var- 60. Gu6roult M., in': La philosophie ile l'histoire ile la philosopDle, Isiituto SS. ffit)[" Eli offi.o-*t Geschichte im u-rspriinglichen Arsatz des di studi filosofici, Roma Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Marxischen Denkensl int Marilsrnusstuilien-, zweite Folge' .1Y?/ Paris. 1956 - 89. i[ie-frlidhe p., in: Der Kampl, Bd.l2, Heft 10, Verlag von Georg Emmerling, Wien, 1909 75. Lalande A,, Vocabulaire technlque et critique il,e la pkil,osophie, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, {960 76, Le bon-sens ou iildes naturelles. Opposdes aur id,€es surnaturelles, A Londrds, 1782 i7. Lettres d. Eug4nte ou Prdseruatil contre les pr0jud6s. Tome second, A Londrds, 1768

278 NAME INDEX G K

Galilei, Crallleo-Z5&59 Kqqt, I-mr!anuel-7, 1.4 21,, 41,, Goethe, Johann Wolfgaug vou 46, 52, 69, 70, 79: 87:93, 95: -264 12,1,-55, L57, 1.60, 1.64, 166, 167, Goldsohmidt V.-04 174, 176-78,180, 186; lg5, lg7, Gorgias-i03 203, 222, 226, 231, 24\ 250, Gouhier Henri-84, 87, 75-77 269 Gu6-roult, Martial-04, 87-74, Kautsky, Karl-83, 84 79, 90, g2 Kedrov, B, M,-2td Kierlegaard, S6ren Aabye-94, 1.4 A D Kissel, M. .A.-253 E Kolmogorov, A. N.-105 Abbagnano, Nicola-78, 116 D'Alembert, Jean Le Rond-90 Konstantinov, F. V.-95 Aristotle-19-21, 41., 51, 65, 67, Darwin, Charles-29, 76 Hartmann, Nicolai-97 Koyr6, Alexandre-69 69, L27, 201, 245 Democritus-47, 5t, 93, 104, L27 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Frietl- Asmus, V. F.-149, 1,82, 172 Descartes, Ren6-12, 28, 37, 54, lich 10, 72, 13, 20, 25-29, 84, 67, 76, 97, L2!., .1.22, 125, 37, 4,1,-9,L, 64, 95, 69, 79, g7- L t27, 135, 739, 154, lg5, 222, 8q,- 91, 92, 95, 96, 103, 1(N, 268 !99, t|t,,155, 159, 169, 1?3; Lavoisier, Antoine-90 B Diderot, Denis-37, 154, 239 t77-258, 260, 262-72 Lazarev, V. V.-163 Dilthey, Wilhelm-79, 80 Heidegger, Martin-l14,,1,,1,5, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm- Baohelard, Gaston-lO2, 109 Diogenes I:,aertfus-2t, 22 {81 L2, 20, 37, 54, 64, 73, 122, Bacor, Francis-I2, L04, 182, Ducasse, C. J.-25 Heine, Heinrich-268 125, 127, 130, 135, 154, L62, 222,269 / Heisenberg, Werner-8 270 Bayle, Pierre-L4l He,lvetius, Claude-Adrien-127, Lenin, Y. I.-8, 9, Ll, 13, 27, Belaval, Yvoa-69 E 239 77,8'1", 83, 92-95,97, 104, !.11, Berdayev, Heraclitus-2}4 ,1,45, N.-1t7 26t 137, '141, 177, 179, lgr., Bergsou, Henri-14, 76 Einstein, Albert-8, 76, ,.05 Herzen, Alexander-264 187, 191, lgg, 201, 216, 279, Berkeley, George-l2, 37, 54, Eisler, Rudolf-l45 Hobbes, Thomas-l2, 28 ,1,13, 221, 224-26, 230,232,233, 235, 710, ll7, 1,39, 16l, Bngels, Frederick-5, 7-lt, 15, Holbach, Paul-Henri-33, 1,1,0, 24246, 250-52, 25+60, 262, Bogdanov, B. Y,-27 20, 23,26, 32,33, 39, 41, 45, 127,207, 239 272, 275 Bogomolov, A. S.-tt6 84, gg-gl, 94, 95,97, gg, 101, Hdlderlin, Friedrich-169, 207 Lcucippus-47 Bohr, Niels-67 ,1.02, ,1,05, 706, ll7, 725, 134, Homer-l9 Lobachevsky, N. I.-105 ,1,40, Bolnow, Otto-116 73q, 163, 174, lg5, lg2, D'Hondt, Jacques-205, 264 Locke, John-tz, 37, 122-25 Braun, L.-21 193, 196, 7gg, 202, 203, 207, Hume, David-tz,54 Lombardi, Franco-64, 65 Brezhnev, Leonid-t5 2t0, 227, 232, 242, 256, 269, Husserl, Edmund-73, 714, ,115 Liiwith, Karl-263 Broglie, Louis de-27, 189 269,272 Hyppolite, Jean-S3, 84,' 262, Brunner, 4-q4 66, 71, 73, 80 Epicurus-1r7, 51, 54, 104 263 Buhr, Manfred-l55, 182 Euclid-86, 105 M Bykhovsky, B. E.-t8l Byron, George Gordon-20 I Mach, Ernst-83 r Maimon, Salomon-64 Ilting, Karl-H einz-206 Malebranche, Nicolas de-37, Fedoseyev, P. N.-34, 270 Ilyenkov, E. Y.-242 64,76 C Felerbach, Ludwig-20, 28, 37, Ilyichev, L. F.-248 Marcel, Gabriel-94, 181. 44,86, 138, 751, 774,221,261 Marcuse, Herbert-84 Calvez, Jean-Yves-84 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb-4t, 46, Marie, Gilbert-67 Collins, Anthony-206 52, 63, 64, 97, 154-90,222, 269 I Maritain, Jacque-lt7 Comte, Auguste-76 Foulqui6, Paul-145 Martin, Gottfried-65, t48 Conilillac, Etienno Bonnot de- Frank, Philipp-Ll2, 113 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich- Marx, Karl-9, L5, 25, 30, 32, ?4,25 Frederick the Great-216 136, 1,37, 162 33, 38, 39, 57, gl, g4-96, 93- Copernicus, Nicolas-l0s Fuller-145 James, William-75 95, l0l-03, L25, L34, 136, L37,

280 281 155. 163. 169, 173, 174, 184, Sch6rer. Etlmond-80 SUBJECT INDEX t85: 187.'196. 197-99, 205, 209, Schmidt. Conrad-84 219'. 221'. 232:. 23ts.36, 238, 240, Schopeuhauer, Arthur-7O, 75, 242:,247',258; 260-67, 269, 270, 271 272-75 Shakespeare, William-19 Melvil. Yu. K-tll Shestov. Lev-148 Mercior. Antlr6-63 Shinkaruk, V. I.-152 Metzke.' Erwin-263 Socrates-2l, 47 Mitin, M. 8.-203 Spinoza.-54,76, Benedict-tl, 12, 46, Montaigne, Michel-l4l 87, 122, 123, 125, 127, 135, 150,. 154, 155, 169, 184, 1gl, L92,265 N A and dlstinctlon- - 25,-identity 26, 84 85, 187, 108, 179, Naumenko, L.-L84 T Actiuity-156, 159, 162-65, 168, 180, 185{7, 222,223 Newton. Isaac-68 t7t (Lenin's defrnition 223-24 - o|l-24445,-matter 259-60 Niethanimer, F, l.-207, 214 -cognitive-92-93, Nietzsche, Frieilrich-94, lt3 Tchaikovsky, P. I.-7t 232-34 is not one but Tertullian-108 -labor-229, 63, L64, 165, - many"-36-"one Thales-47 -practical-16,22,1.-22, 225, 226, 231-32, 237 42, ,,12, 159, 182 - -opposites-3'1,, P Thomas Aquinas-l08, 164 222, 223 l6L, LBt*-72, 179, ,.86, 198, 265 Tiedemann, Dietrich-lO3 -theoretical-63, A gno stic is m-11, 14, 129, l40-4'l, -space and time-177 Timiryazev, K. A.-8 t& - (Hegel's, Spino- Parmenides-2| I ev-20 - -substance Pheidias-71 Tolstoy, Alienatio n, s elf-alie natlo n-103, za's)-162, 175,184, 19f-92,227 Pierce. Charles Sanders-ltl ll5, 163, 165, 172, 182, 183, - -substantiation anil con- Plato-l9. 20, 2L, 47, 47, 51, 190, 196, lg7, 234, 236-38, 262 sequence-130 65, 69, 70, 73, 127,201,212-13, Y Antinomies-|O, 81, 137, 153, - -the absolute and the re- 227,249 t57 lative*228 prtopi finito and the infrnite Popper, Karl-tll' 201 van Ghert-204 A approach-lL, 95, '1,14, - -the Protagoras-21 123, 128-35,'1,42-43 Vasiliev, I.-184 -97, historical and the log- Vernadsky, V. ',41 I.-8 - -the 9, 27 Frangois Marie Arouet ical-8, n Yoltaire, c internal and the ex- -239,270 - tenal-231,232-the gories ( phllo Raohael-71 C ate sophtcal)-46, - -the means and end-233 Reirl. Thomas-ll0 54,252,255-57 - -thesis and antithesis, syD- Reinhold, Karl Leonartl-160, w ol-9&-98, 2M thesis-l0, 169-72 -deflnition whole and a part-l0, r66 -Fichte's-174, 178{;0 - -the Ricarilo. David-137 Waelhens. Alphonse De-66 -Hegel's-95, 96, 180, 186{7, 93 Ricoeur, Paul-64, 74, 75, 77, Wasuer, Albdrt de ReYna-?4 250,25L Ciuil society-17, 2L2, 217, 230 78.200 l3L-33, l5l, 154, Cognition (knowleilge)-8, 7, Windelbanil, Wilhelm-272 -Kant's-95, ,1,12, Rom'bach, Eeinrich-68 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Jo- 155, 174 22, 27, 88-92, 95-98, 128, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques-154, hann-ll3 132, l3?, L4042, l"A, L45, !52, -separate 176 L64, ,1,65, 180, 186, 190, 199, 159, 207, 213, 239, 267 -casuality-95, Runes, Dagobert-l45 - ancl form-3O, 48, 200, 22'1,, 224, 225, 23r,, 232, - 53,-coDtent t34 179, 187,250 237, 242, 243, 245-48, 25t-53, Y --contrailictions-141, 169, 257 s t7t, t79,180, 236, 265 -253 Yegorov, A. G.-274 19, Cornrnon- -psychology- sense-l0&ll, lL6 - -development-7, 16, Santayana, George-27O 26, 29-30, 34-37, 64,65, 88-92, Concept-6, 7, 27, 42, 44, 732, Sartre. Jean-Paul-l14 94, 186, 191, 192, 197, 198, 182, 223, 224, 227, 252, 253, Schelling, Frietlrich Wilhelm z 202, 203, 25L-54, 257, 265 255-57 Josepli 46, 87, 179, autl trecessity- noumenon-136, 74349, von-41, - -freedom,1,60, -and 180, 186 Zeno ol Elea-257 157, 158, t7l 151, 152

282 283 Consciousnese-ZLi 27, 13&40, -5, 13, 39, 46,47, 63, 87-89, -formal-86, 154, 175, 188, 189, ,Lu, 149, 169, 234 -historical-16 126 L54, 155, L60, 177, 185, 237, 245,246 155, 150, 230 -scientifie-109, 264,266,267 L54, 24$ -transcendontal-.14t!,180 -moral-149, 27, 28, 32, 47, -objective-180, 184 -everyday-z3, ,1,18, 12,'/,,10, l6L, Logical ?"tkl, 246, 106, 10&10, L12-74, tLl, F -subjective- l,l.l, lorms-L87, 233 165-74, 179 248,250,25/,. 57, 195, 239 Freeilom-2\\, 2'1,4, 217, z?fr Iileology-BL, 32, 65, 66, 82, 103, 156, 159, 160, M -social-Bl-33, 57, L07, Funilarnental prcblem. of phll- 102, l8l, -philosophical-Z7,tt4 osophy-[A\, 167, 185 205, ZLl,216 (and petty-bour- (Maralst phtlosophy) 103, lt7 -bourgeois Maralsm -religious-60,evoryday experience- geois)-32, 33, 102, 207,208, 13, 15, 16, 33-35, 38, 40, -10, 83-86, 9498, ti,L0, L37, -anil1,03, LAI, l0g-12,208 (see also E 263, 270 61, 66, Sptrtt) 32, 102 181, 203, 221, 2A, 2Q, 253, Intellectual-socialist-31., intaition-123-24, 261! 262, 264, 272, 273 Conttnatty (hlstorlcal, relatton H isto rtc al-phllo s o p htcal prc c e I s 160-6,1., 175, L77 Materialisrn ( iltalecttcal'mate' to the preceiltng phllosophy) 9, 12, '1,4, 76, 20, 2'1,, 22, rialist philosophy)-8, 31., 38, 27, 42, 57, 58, 24,-5, 25, 29, 33, 47, 57-6,t, 66, Interest-229 3t, 1,'1,L, !,L2, 75:18,-l.l-1.4, 200, 273 67, 69, 79, 80, 81, 82 Irrationalism-1,4, 73, 76, 95, 39, 46, 47, 61, 700, 1{3, 1L8, l{8, l8'1., 188, 262-63, 136, 256 -Hegel's-12-L3, 25, 27-29, 37, 41, 52, 64, 65, 87€9, 9t-93, 274, 275 -dialectical-5, 8, 9, ll, L3, 14, D 199-200 16, 34-36, 41, ll2, L37, l53i 242, ?A:7,258 E is torical-phllo s o phlc al s taily r 18th-century-32, 33, Deiluction-L29, t30 -principles ol-41, 42, 50, 51, -French, Definttion-Lzl, 153 137, 138, 153, 194, 195, 2L5, 1L0, 125-26, 157, lgL Knowleilge-\1, 73, 89-92, 96, Dialectics-\8, 39, 52, 61, 135, 217 -mechanistic-l38 97, !?A, l3?4 133, 139, '1.4L, 225, 226, 1.54, 177, 179, 180, 188, l8g, Historicisrn (flegel's concept ot ,1,42, -metaphysical-185, 19&99, 2L8-t9, 24?-43, 255, worlil historg)-l9, lg7, 202, 25L, 252, 254, 257 256 (and specific) (old, metaphys- 256,27'1.-72 203, 2L0, 272, 273 -absolute -28, -pre-Marxian (Fichte, Hegel)-166, 258 49, 96, 87, 94, 97, 98, 128, ical\-174, 187, L90, 226 -idealist -epistemological-96, 178, 193, 200, 239, 257, 2,62 idealism-3l, 3&38, 76, 774 204, 216, 235, 242, 263, Ilistory-20-21, 26, 156-59, 195, -and' ,112, 264,266,267 212, 217, 232, 250, 251,.257, -a priori (supraexperimental) 100, {08, !,L3, L37, 152, 264, 266, 265, 272, 273 142 225,226 -materialist-255-56, -130-33, Material, the, anil sPtritual, the 267 understandin 9-2|A -empirical-13L-33 -idealistic n, 36, 37, 1.83-84, 193, 196-97, 223, {55 -materialistic unclerstanding- -philosophical-Z7, -140, -transcendental-154,Iogic aod epistemology- 10, 33, 158-59, 237, 27L-72 43, 54, 59, 62, 66,7L,80, 87- 231,234 -as Method ( methodology 75, 242-48, 250, 253-55, 257-60 Hlstory ol philosophy-7-10, 92 )-13, (soien- 139, 1,42, L55, 259, of-754, 155, 180-81 13-15, 79-23, 26, 30, 3L, 34-37, theoretioal 94, -scieniiflc 47- Duallsrn-LZ,-theory t40, t78 3943, 4446,49-51, 57, 58, 60, tiflc, theoretioal)-14, 35, 260 '.38, 48, 126, 131, L33, L34, 61, 63, 64, ffi{t,77,22'1,,26L 130, -antithetical-172 of-19, 2l-, ?A, 25, 34, 195, 196, 223, 224 251-54 -dialectical-L0, 134, L35, L72, E -subject35, 4L (see also Practice) r80 and logioal-8, 9, -historical27,50 Emptrlcism-Lz,,1,4, 1,1,1, lzt -24, 248,253 I L -metaphysical-94, 95, 106, Eplstentology-9, 53, 24448, 707, 128, 137, L78 253,254 (see also Cognition) Iilealtsm (iilealist philosophy) Labor-196, 232-37 Xrom the abstract ,1.4, -transition Error-ll, 22, L22, 123, 137 (see 15, 3,1,, 36, 37, 39, to the concrete-Z4? -10, -alienated-236of-233 Hegel's systom-2l5, 232, also Trath,) 63, 66, 67, 73, 74, 79,88, 89, -tools -and Esoteric, the, anil exoteric, the 9,1., 92, 98, 104, 108, 11G13, Law-L9l, 213, 230, ?.57 257,265 57, 209 Monarch,y, IIegel"s concept ot tgl, 205, 206, 209 139, 181, 230, 23'1,, 234, 237, -philosophy-56, Eucliilean-60, (Eaclid's) geonetrA 263, 264,266 Laws-3\,36, L74, 175, L90, 246, and constitutional- 247,250,254, 255, 260 -feudal208, 209 105 27-29, 44, 53, -absolute-12, Logic al-210-15, 239 Eaperience-86, 57, 6t, 182, 185, 190, 199, -constitution 1,80, Motion (anil matter)-z3, 30, 72, 100, tol, 251 L55, 179, -evoryday-34, -dialectical-Lru,L88,245, 25G54, 256, 257 138, 163 104, 105-07, tt0-13 -dialectical (German olassical) 284 285 Iil the bourgeois Enlighten- s 54, 89, 90, -ofment-32, 157, 160, L82, 203, -metaphysical-13,,25-3A, 84 135,'1.41,, 142 Nat;ural science-6-8, g-21, 23, 26',1, 270 Science-lZ, 3t+.36, 47, 48, ffi, bourgeois-M, 63, !.73, l?4, 24,.-29, 47, 6, 59, 90, 176, -today's 64 79, 92, 105, Llz, T 257,259 262,274 M5. lA) separate trends (development) of- Technologg-273, 274 -empirical-12 -his[ory 27, 31, 35, 8, 20, 133, 134, -existentialism-75,'1,14-'t6, 8, 19, 20, 21, 30, Theism-126, 184 -theoretical-7,,1.42 - 181 41, 86, 252,253 36, 42,67-69, 60, ?.?4, (see Theory-Z\, 47, 50, 51, Negation ( d,ialectical)-tl, 42, School-84 also Rnowledge) 225 - -Frankfurt 95, 54; 84, 85,87, 88, 91, 92, 174, 38, Self-consciouszess-F7, 58, 138, 96, - ll2-,1.4-neopositivism-14, reflection-l0, 32, 92, f80, 187, 188, 198, 199, 201, 139, 158, 169,177,234 -of102, ll2, 187, 249, 250 108, 109 S e n s o t i o nal i s m 203,266-87 - -neo-Thomism-66, -?.48-50 "L'htng-in-itself'-13b37, l3S of the history Sltepticism-Lz, i4 2%26, 41, ,1.4,1.,,1,44-49, - oI-"philosophy philosophy"-63-68, 7&75, l,4l 152-53 54, 71, 77,78, Thlnktng-7, 29, l0l, 1,12, 122, 78-82 S p irit ( anitr natare L89-9L, ) -1,,63, 123, 782,183, 194 222,266 possimism" Z3l. o 224,225, 175 - -"tochnologicaln4 5L58, -L81, 49, 53, -theoretical-5-9,being-96, 162, 222, 2X), of partisanship in -absolute-28,192, {93, 197, 198, -principle 87, 88, 92, -and227, 2?.8,234, 2/8 Obiectluity (anil subjectlvtty) 215, ?,39,272 -u!0-4'1.(see also Martism) and subjective- of being and -74-77 ,1,17, - thought,-identity Hegel's concept Ontology-44, 53, 143, L74, 244 Practice-|||, 164, 165, -objeotive of- 192, 193 47, 57, 92, 162, 179, 180, Optlmtsm 176, 229-33, 25'1, (see B, 22L-26, 237, also Subiect-oblectl 18ffi7,246 2ll, 215 stite-s7, 192, 193, 216-19, -historical-270, 275 -revolutionary-23741 (see also ,SpiriI) Oatlook-\L, 78, 172, l8l, cal-29, 24'1, 240 -socio-politi T rath-/!,O, Ll, 22, ?A, 26, 29, -bourgeois-28, ?37 theory-22/b26 Sablect philosophical-15, -and(seo also Actiuity, Reuolu- 4!,43, 51, 52,7t, 72, 88, 102, -scientifio (and empirical) 206, 207,257, 268 16, 32, 35-39, 61, 93, lgl, 240, tlon) -absolute160-66, 16&69, 172, 177-79 - 241, 98, 142 n5 Progress-}l, 42, 57, 182, 186, S abj ectiuis m-'1,1, 40, 75, L67 -absolute-97, 98, 268 (see also Phtlosophy) 203, 216, 293, 267, 269, 270, Subiective, the -relative-97, 272,273 (Hegel's) the objectivs-7?, 144, -objectiveerror-zl, 52, -24392, 19495, -and170-74 -and198, 199, 267 Subt ect-obj ecr-16&68, 770, L7 L, P R 173, 174 (see also Splril) w rtntogism.-227, 234, 248, 2ffi, Rotionalism ol the 17th-c.-96, Systems (philosophical)-28, 268 12L-25, 127-32, L34, 135, 143, 42, A. 46, 49, 51,, 52, 58, 64, wiil-229-3t Pantheisrn-L84 185 t8l, Lg4, 203, 230, 263 65, 67, 77:73, 80,8&95, 177, -freedom-126, 150-51, 158 Pessimism Reality-L66, llL, 243, 26,1, 199,246 W orking class-24'1,, 266 -social-270 -everyday-72, 73 Philosophy 7 4, 7 6 -philosophical-72, -subject of-96, 97, 127, 128, Reason-42, LZL-23, 128, 129, 194, 240, 21t1,,248 143, 18134, lg7-90, lg2, -as a system of world outlook 194-98,20L, 207, 230 -98 -practical- l,4g-51, 167 -and science-zi, 32, 34, 35, 128-29,'146, 151,, 62-64 67-69,72,96,97 -pwe-122-23,194-.97 -and religion-l03, ll0, 116, -theoretical- 1,48, 167 126, 183, 239 -historical charaoter of-197-99 -Hegel's-28, 29, 4l-46, 48, 50, (see also Spirit) 57, 6L, g7-gl, 195, lg0, lg2, Reuolutian L94, lgg-20,1,,232, ?4042, 2A7, attitude to-155, 156, 256, 258, 263, 264 -Fichte's159 the New Age-13, 75, 37, -Hegel's attitude to-219, 238, -of182 239, nl

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