Title: from Bambi to Stalin: the Politics of Control and Power Within the Further Education

Title: From Bambi to Stalin: The Politics of Control and Power Within the Further Education Sector under ‘New’ Labour

Dr. Michael J. Hammond Research and Development Manager Dudley College

Paper presented at the Discourse, Power, Resistance Conference: Global issues, Local Solutions. University of Plymouth, 5-7 April.

Abstract

This paper critically analyses the power shifts that have taken place under the ‘New’ Labour Government within the Further Education (FE) sector. It identifies the shift from the neo-liberal market forces and new managerial model of the Conservative Governments’ of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, encapsulated by the Further Education Funding Council (FEFC) and the planning and control model of FE created by the Government of Tony Blair, and encapsulated in the Learning and Skills Council (LSC). The paper analyses the potential reasons for the change from the FEFC to the LSC. The paper concludes by analysing possible issues that have arisen out of the LSC planning and control model, and the developing importance of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in the planning of regional education and training, which lead in conclusion to a consideration of the question, what’s next for FE?

“From Bambi to Stalin”

Part of the title of this work may seem to be somewhat cryptic in nature. The phrase, “From Bambi to Stalin” came from the mouth of the Rt. Hon. Mr. Tony Blair MP Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, when as leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, he was commenting on the attempts by members of the media and

1 Conservative party members of parliament to label him, on his succession to the leadership of the Labour party on the death of Mr. John Smith, the previous leader. Initially, seeking to draw attention to Mr. Blair’s relative youth and inexperience, Conservative MP’s were wont to shout, “Where’s Bambi?” to their Labour colleagues opposite. Less that a month later, as allegations of Mr. Blair’s ruthless control of the parliamentary Labour party began to surface, then those same MP’s began to refer to Mr. Blair as a “Stalinist” type figure. This led Mr. Blair to conclude “From Bambi to Stalin in the matter of a week.”1 This theme is useful as a concept for this paper, as it might be argued that it emphasises a policy change in relation to the central management and control of the FE sector under the ‘New Labour Government’, as opposed to that of the former Conservative Government.

Introduction

This paper begins by looking at the neo-liberal concepts of management and control, that provided the underpin to the Conservative Government of 1979-1997. It identifies the creation and function of the FEFC (hereafter referred to occasionally also as Bambi because of its small size and relative inability to control the FE college sector) and possible reasons for its demise, and replacement with the LSC (hereafter occasionally also referred to as Stalin, as it is supposed to have control of planning the FE sector). The paper also looks at how the role of the LSC differs in concept from that of the FEFC. This paper then concludes by looking at how the LSC planning and control model appears to be actually working, and the potential increasing involvement of Regional Development Agencies (RDA) in the development and control of the PCET and FE college sector.

Methodology

This paper stands at the end of a large piece of longitudinal research undertaken by the author, this being the authors Doctorate thesis, and at the start of a new large piece of longitudinal research on RDAs and the potential effects of regional policies on FE colleges and the FE sector (Hammond, 2003). Therefore this paper will rely heavily 1 The author is unable to provide a reference for this speech, as it was seen by the author on television. The analogy, however, works well in relation to the theme of this research, and the author is keen to retain the concept contained within the phrase.

2 on the previous Doctoral research, as well as intimating preliminary findings from primary literature, currently being gathered for the author’s next research project. This paper therefore represents ‘grey’ literature, as it is research in progress, and the question of what next for FE, is intended to be developed by the researcher over the next three years or so.

The Birth of Bambi

The FEFC was designed to be a ‘Bambi’ type organisation. It was not in any way intended to interfere in the management of FE colleges, or have any management or policy control function (Hammond, 2003, p87). This was because the FEFC was designed to mirror the neo-liberal new managerial market forces philosophies that were developed by the Thatcher Government while in opposition (Russell, 1978; Gamble, 1988; Thatcher, 1997). Thatcher believed that the state required ‘rolling back’, that managers should be free to manage, and that the creation of quasi markets would produce financial efficiencies and increase quality, not just in FE, but in all public services (Levitas, 1986; Hall, 1988; Grocott, 1989; Clarke, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; Clarke and Newman; 1997). Many of the philosophies of management enunciated by Thatcher and her disciples came from the work of Tom Peters the American management guru (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pollitt, 1993; Dunleavey and Hood, 1994).

The Conservative Government were, however, also becoming concerned latterly at the skills gap that they discovered within British industry, and the effects that this could have on potential competitiveness of UK companies in international markets. These concerns were also being raised by both business and trade unions (Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 1989;Institute of Manpower Studies, 1989; Royal Society of Arts (RSA), 1991; Coldstream, 1993; Macfarlane, 1993). This represented a change from early Thatcherite thought, in that Thatcher believed that pure market forces would dictate the need for training (Lawson, 1992; Hutton, 1995). The agenda was therefore a bold one that the Conservative Government set itself, particularly, as it was determined that the cost of this much needed expansion in FE, would take place through efficiency savings, and not through any input of new money

3 from the Treasury (FEFC, 1992;Smithers and Robinson, 1993; Bradley, 2000; Smithers and Robinson, 2000).

The market therefore was going to create expansion at little or no cost to the Treasury, and create successful high quality FE colleges meeting the needs of industry. FE colleges that were not performing well, were to be weeded out by market forces, and would eventually go bankrupt, and the Government confidently expected that anything up to two-thirds of FE colleges might disappear under this regime (Bradley, 2000;Hammond, 2003, p73). The Conservative Government through the FEFC, sought to control this process by use of a funding methodology, and a concept known as convergence. The concept of convergence was a relatively simplistic concept, based on the idea that all FE colleges should be paid the same rate per unit of work they produced, anywhere in the country. Before the creation of the FEFC, FE colleges had been under their Local Education Authorities (LEAs), the funding they received had more to do with the historic way that the local authority viewed their FE colleges, rather than being based on any national formula. FE colleges, therefore, were receiving vastly different rates for identical work being carried out, and the FEFC were tasked with creating a national unit rate for work of an equivalent nature called the Average Level of Funding (ALF). This policy therefore meant that over a period time, all FE colleges had to converge (hence the term convergence) towards this national uniform rate. Because of the variations in units, this meant that some FE colleges had to make large efficiency savings, as the amount of money they received per unit dropped year on year (Hammond, 2003, pp75-76).

While FE Colleges faced convergence, they also faced growth targets amounting to 25% over three years from the FEFC (Smithers and Robinson, 1993,p37). To make sure that FE colleges would grow at the rate that the Government and the FEFC required, the FEFC devised a funding methodology, which required FE Colleges to grow, by reducing the amount of core units they automatically received each year by 10%. This required the FE colleges to bid to the FEFC for more units known as bided units to grow significantly to meet the particular FE College’s own targets agreed with the FEFC. Failure to meet the FEFC targets, led to the offending FE college being constrained in their possibilities for expansion, with subsequent budget reductions as their entitled core units fell (Barrow, 1997, p141).

4 It might appear that the FEFC held more characteristics of “Stalin”, than of “Bambi”. It should however be remembered, that the FEFC was not intended to interfere in the management of the individual FE colleges. It was only supposed to set the rules, and then act as a funding agent. It had no planning or accountability responsibilities whatsoever. It was in any event a very small organisation, composed of no more than 200 people employed nationally. Therefore, perhaps like Bambi, when the problems arose which required a strong hand, the FEFC found itself unable to address them, and indeed the interviewee from the FEFC in Hammond (2003) expressed the view that the FEFC had not been designed or intended to address them, as that was the responsibility of the corporations of the individual colleges to control their FE colleges, and the senior management within them (Hammond, 2003, 87).

Bambi gets into trouble?

Hammond (2003) defines a number of unintended consequences of the FEFC model, which had not been foreseen by its creators, or had been underestimated. First, there was the amount of industrial relations problems that took place between the unions and the FE colleges, as to save money, FE colleges were forced to try and get their staff on to Colleges Employers Forum (CEF) Contracts, and to make staff redundant (Kimberley, 1997, p249). National pay and conditions bargaining broke down, and staff working in FE colleges found that the FE colleges themselves, were beginning to set their own pay rates, rather than nationally agreed ones (Burchill, 1998). Much of the encouragement to FE colleges to force staff on to new contracts was alleged to have come from the CEF, and this was implicitly agreed to by the then Chief Executive of the CEF (Ward, 1997, p65). Secondly, there were repeated allegations of bullying in some FE colleges by managers against their staff (Evans & Robinson, 1998, p326). Thirdly, at the same time as this was going on, however, principals of FE colleges were getting ‘large’ increases in their salaries (Reeves, 1995; Tauberman, 2000). An exasperated member of the Select Committee on FE, described his experiences thus:

“For example, in the governance of a particular college again in my area, they say this year that they may be £180,000 short in their budget

5 and then they say they will not be. Then they write a letter to staff, saying that they are going to be probably twenty-five teaching redundancies and seventeen non teaching redundancies and at the same time they are giving the principal a twenty six per cent pay increase, amounting to something like £9000 a year. This surely is not good governance in the college and people just lose all respect for the college and the governors of the college and confidence as well.” (Steinberg, 1998, p146).

Fourthly, a further issue that became prominent in FE colleges, was the issue of sleaze. There were a number of cases where the governors of the college [as intimated by Steinberg (1998)] failed to control their senior managers properly, and as a result, public money was squandered or wasted on personal items, or inappropriate hospitality, or ‘marketing’ trips abroad (NAO, 1999a; NAO, 1999b). Often this sleaze was driven by what the contributors in Hammond (2003) described as “The Charismatic Corrupt Principal”. The principal of a FE college in East Anglia described to the author his experience of one “Charismatic Corrupt Principal”, who was eventually dismissed by his college amid great public scandal and publicity.

“ I can give you evidence of a former [charismatic corrupt] principal of a West Midlands college, actually three quick stories of a very strong principal with a bullying nature. I mean the first time I saw him, he was principal of another South West college, and he used to drink in my local pub. So I actually bumped into him a couple of times. This jolly sort of fairly not unintelligent guy, who clearly had a quick brain, but an awkward sort of style. I arrived for this meeting with him and other colleagues, and because he knew me, he said to his secretary: “Right Jill, keep the others out for half an hour, because I just want a chat with X”. I thought, “Oh that’s nice”, and we walked into his room, and he took out a bottle of red wine and he sort of poured me out a glass, and he said: “Life’s a shit isn’t it?” Then he began to talk about nothing to do with work, and sitting outside was the former Chief Education Officer for Buckinghamshire, and the principal of another college, and you know it was just amazing to me. I mean he was sozzled before the meeting started.”

He continued:

“The next time I saw him, a short period after, I was going to a meeting in Yarmouth, about quarter past five, and a BMW hurtled towards me, and nearly forced me into the ditch. [The driver of the BMW] backed up, and the bloke got out, and it was him, and he shouted: “You want to bloody well look where you are going X!” And I looked at him, and we

6 didn’t have a bad relationship, and I said: “Blimey it’s only five twenty, I’m going to Yarmouth, where are you going to? And he said: “I’m going to college man. I get in there everyday now 6.00 p.m. I get out of there at 7.30 a.m. before the ‘buggers’ get in. I’m on my third vote of no confidence you know. I just replied to the last one, wishing them luck for the next one. I can’t stop X, I can’t stand it when they come in”. And off he went, and then I didn’t hear about him for a long period, until I heard he had got the job in the West Midlands. I saw him at a conference, and he said to me: “ I’m the cat that got the cream!”And he told me, and I thought he was joking, but subsequently found out he was serious, that he’d put in for the biggest pay rise in the sector. But he was the only Principal who requested from his Board of Governors a helicopter, so that he could get round the country from meeting to meeting. Not a lease car, a lease helicopter.”

That principals were able to behave in the way that they did held much to the failures of corporations to control their managers. Under the Further and Higher Education Act

(1992), responsibility for planning had passed from the LEA’s to the individual corporations. The Government had intended that the corporations of FE colleges would contain predominantly business people (Coulson-Thomas, 1990; Further

Education Unit, 1994) however, in practice, governors often were unable to control their Principals, (Hammond, 2001; Hammond, 2003).

Finally, in an attempt to meet their growth targets, FE colleges began to engage in the franchising of their courses to private training providers and community groups. Often this franchising of FEFC units to private training providers, allowed FE colleges to make up to £10 per unit ‘profit’ (Melia, 1999;Rospiglosi, 2000). At the Select

Committee hearing into FE, franchising was an element of concern to the committee, as the very high levels being undertaken in certain colleges meant that in the view of many on the committee, franchising was beginning to “distort” the work of FE colleges (Atkins,1998,p93). Margaret Hodge, who chaired the committee (and who subsequently became Minister for Further and Higher Education, June 2001- June

7 2003) was very critical of the quality (and thus value for money) that franchising was giving. In questioning Ms. Patricia Morgan-Webb (a FE college principal, and the chair of a loose affiliation of FE colleges who were heavily involved in franchising) she stated:

“The issue is whether [franchising] it is value for money. Let me ask about two of your members. Halton College and Handsworth College. Halton College has 39,000 students, 9000 of whom actually go to Halton, the rest are spread. …the one which actually caught my attention first…[was] the TESCO course on what is called “ambient display”, what I call shelf stacking. Some quotes from the inspection report on quality: “A majority of the curriculum areas inspected were judged to have some weaknesses in curriculum delivery”” links with industry are rarely used in the design of college based courses”, “from a cohort of 865 candidates who started NVQ level 1 in cleaning building interiors in 1995, only sixteen per cent had achieved their qualification by October 1996.” This makes us question value” (Hodge, 1998, p97)

She continued:

“If you look at Handsworth, the FEFC inspectors there said: “The rapid growth has tasked the colleges’ ability to manage and control the effective delivery and quality of the work it has undertaken through this franchise provision.” They said: “Poor quality control had a detrimental effect on the education experience of many students”. The inspectors said: “Thirty three per cent of courses had weaknesses which outweighed strengths- well below national standards”. “Some tutors did not know enough about their subject, many lacked teaching skills, some English tutors spoke poor English.” It goes on and on.”(Hodge, 1998, p97)

It should be noted that both Handsworth and Halton Colleges suffered from allegations of sleaze, due in part to their franchising operations, subsequent to the sitting of the select committee. At the time of the Select Committee, the FE college sought to blame the Bambi FEFC, for sitting back, and providing colleges with no advice or guidance on how to undertake franchising operations (Price, 1998, p100). In response to Select Committee concerns about Franchising, the FEFC belatedly issued guidance on franchising for FE colleges, which gave responsibility for the control and management of franchising to governors (FEFC, 1998; FEFC 1999a;FEFC, 1999b; FEFC, 1999c).

8 The ‘New’ Labour Government was in this way, beginning to make the FEFC guarantee the FE college sector more, and thus in terms of management and control of FE colleges, Bambi was beginning to act like Stalin (Hammond, 2003).

The Death of Bambi and the Birth of Stalin

The FEFC was, as has already been intimated, a small organisation nationally, and the desire by New Labour to steer and control the FE college sector more, meant that New Labour soon became disenchanted with the FEFC. This being because it was unable to deliver what they required of it, which was not surprising really, as the FEFC had been designed to do the complete opposite of steering the system, namely funding it, and leaving governors and FE college managers to get on with it (Hammond, 2003). In the debate on the Learning and Skills Bill (2001), the then Further and Higher Education Minister Baroness Blackstone berated both the FEFC, and the former Conservative Government for creating a system that allowed sleaze and mismanagement to thrive, and having no method of controlling it (Blackstone, 2000b, column 799). This charge was rejected by the Conservatives, who blamed the sleaze problems on the FEFC (Blatch, 2000, Column 799).

First, the creation of the LSC brought together the FE colleges and the private training providers, which had been separated for funding purposes by the Further and Higher Education Act (1992), as the private training providers had been funded by local Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). The structure of the LSC in many ways mirrors both the TECs and the FEFC structure, as forty seven Local Learning and Skills Councils (LLSCs) were developed to plan, manage and fund local provision in their LSC areas, which mirrors the TEC provision. At the same time, there was a national office created to implement national policy, which is in keeping with the FEFC model (Hammond, 2003). In relation to the planning function, then the Labour Government perceived that inputs to planning would be made by research, Sector Skills Councils (SSCs), and National Training Organisations (NTOs)(Blackstone, 2000a, column 879). These proposals were dismissed in the House of Lords by the Conservative opposition, as being bureaucratic, ineffective and a waste of money (Blatch, 2000a, column 884; Baker, 2000, columns 899-900).

9 Secondly, a fundamental purpose of the LSC, which it might be argued was a hangover from the days of the FEFC and the Conservative Government, was the intention by Government, to reduce the amount of FE provision offered through rationalisation of FE colleges and their provision (Blunkett, 1997; DfEE, 1998; DfEE, 1999; DfEE, 2000a; DfEE, 2000b; DfES, 2002). FE colleges were encouraged to specialise on what they were perceived to do best, and close down provision that they were less successful at (DfES, 2002). The LSC was also responsible for dealing with the problems of sleaze, and a reduction in the levels of franchising which FE colleges were undertaking, which led to severe financial problems at a least one FE college (Kingston, 2003). The LSC did, however, also begin to receive some bad publicity from the press for its handling of FE colleges, as it was accused of high-handedness (Crequer, 2001a). Concerns were also expressed at the inception of the LSC, about the actual effectiveness of the LSC model in relation to planning skills needs for the economy. Also of concern, was whether the various targeted tasks given to the LSC conflicted with a further requirement of the LSC to give impartial advice (CBI, 1999, p12; Mager, 2000, p10; Robinson, 2000a, p19; Robinson, 2000b, p89).

The LSC also became responsible for developing the concept of excellence through Centres of Vocational Excellence (CoVE) (LSC, 2001a; LSC, 2001b). Concerns about the CoVE programme were raised by the Learning and Skills Development Agency (LSDA) in research that they did on the CoVE initiative for the Government. These concerns came from practitioners in FE colleges, and LSDA (2001) concluded:

“Our discussions with FE colleges have revealed considerable disquiet about possible exclusion of disadvantaged non-traditional learners from the Centres of Vocational Excellence initiative. The fear that excellence may be equated solely with high level learning programmes or qualifications, has been expressed.” (LSDA, 2001, para 6, p1)

Hammond (2003) also shows disquiet among policy makers about the CoVE initiative, and the potential for success. The Government and the LSC subsequently however were much more upbeat about CoVE provision, arguing that they had met their targets for CoVE creation and were a great success. They concluded:

10 “CoVEs are specialist areas of vocational provision linking colleges and other providers with business partners. They aim to produce qualified workers with the skills needed for a flourishing modern economy. The impressive role of CoVEs in increasing learner numbers and creating high levels of employer satisfaction and optimism for the future is highlighted in a report, 'Measuring Progress: The Impact of the Centres of Vocational Excellence' prepared for the Council by GHK Consulting. It shows: 81 per cent of CoVEs reported actual or forecast increases in the number of learners; and two thirds of CoVEs forecast increases in achievement levels. LSC Chairman Bryan Sanderson welcomed the report. He said:"CoVEs are a strong formula. Employers are welcoming them and the skilled workers they can provide and providers are benefiting from the closer employer links they create. Establishing this many CoVEs ahead of target is a testament to everyone involved in their creation, but also to the value of CoVEs as a key part of the Success For All programme of reform." (LSC, 2004a)

Despite the later supposed success of the CoVE initiative, initially, early after its inception, the LSC was destined to suffer a difficult time at a subsequent Select Committee meeting looking into the effects of the LSC on the FE Sector generally, which met in November 2001. In that hearing, Sheerman the Select Committee chairman tackled the issue of bureaucracy, by accusing the LSC of costing £45 MN more than its predecessors. John Harwood, the then Chief Executive of the LSC, however, refuted this statement, and claimed that the LSC was actually £100 million cheaper than their FEFC/TEC predecessors were. Harwood also claimed that whereas the FEFC/TEC model had employed 11,000 staff between them, the LSC and LLSCs actually employed only 5000 staff. Sheerman also reportedly told the LSC, to start punching “above its weight and lose its fuzzy image” and start showing its mettle by “baying for resources” (Crequer, 2001a). At the same time, there was evidence that staff in FE colleges were feeling under-valued, tied down by bureaucracy and underpaid (Crequer, 2001b; Crequer, 2001c; Tysome, 2001a; Tysome, 2001b; Hughes, 2001).

The concept of bureaucracy was also considered by the Select Committee, and as a result of this political pressure, the LSC commissioned a report into bureaucracy (Crequer, 2001b; LSC, 2002). The report made it quite clear, that the LSC model in its particular form, in relation to its relationship with its providers was not working adequately, and indeed probably couldn’t work. Concern was also expressed about the relationships between the national LSC office and the LLSCs, because again in the

11 view of the members of the committee, this relationship was unworkable. The report further sought to challenge the LSC, LLSCs and the DfES to reengineer the model, to make it more workable. Some relief was given to the LSC, as the report blamed many of the failing bureaucratic processes and procedures on ideas that had transferred from the TECs and the FEFC. The report argued that a new model had to be built based on transparency and trust. The overal message from the report was not however positive about the performance of the LSC up to November 2002 (LSC, 2002).

In carrying out research into the FE sector for his doctorate, the author engaged with a number of policy professionals, some of whom have remained in contact with him (Hammond, 2003). One of the interviewees informed the author subsequently, that the Government were expressing concern to that person, that the LSC were failing to perform as the Government wished, in relation to the rationalisation agenda in FE colleges and the private training providers. The person also said that the Government was concerned that the improvement agenda had not been addressed in the way that had been intended by Government. As much of the data for the thesis was collected in 2001/2, the information is conflicting in relation to the performance of the LSC from 2003-2004, but the author was advised by one of his interviewees in a conversation, that it looked likely that the LSC would have a lot of its powers transferred to the newly formed RDAs, because the LSC system just wasn’t delivering what the Government wanted.

What Next for FE?

In the previous section, it was argued that the LSC was not delivering what had been intended by the Government at its inception and creation. The hypothesis posed in the final section of this paper, is that the Government is seeking to bring the FE sector into their proposed regional structures, and under the control of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The White Paper on regional development, makes it clear that the Government do see an enhanced role for the RDAs, and the proposed elected regional assemblies, in relation to skills. Under the heading of better regional skills, they state:

“Employment and skills are at the heart of regional economic development. The Government believes it is important for national,

12 regional, and local partners to work together to improve employment opportunities and skill levels and thereby increase prosperity and competitiveness. Accordingly, Regional Development Agencies were asked to lead on Frameworks for Employment and Skills Action (FRESAs) and to produce a first Framework for each region by October 2002. The Frameworks are intended to provide a forum for planning and delivery, which will involve all the main stakeholders at regional and local level. Their aim is to enhance the range of services that already exist by bringing together the work of different government agencies, business, the TUC, CBI and other key partners in each region, in a collective approach, which helps to maintain the health of local labour markets. This will mean less overlapping of services and fewer resources being wasted ( my emphasis)” (DTLGR, 2004, para 2.11, p26)

The idea of rationalisation from “Success for All” is it is argued present again in the detail of the White paper, and shows a determination by Government to reduce duplication and supposed bureaucracy. It seems to the author, that the Government are attempting to transfer the role of planning if not away from the LSC totally, more towards some kind of partnership arrangement with the RDAs appearing to take the lead. The author would argue that the role of planning given to the LSC by the DfEE (1999) is now being given to the RDA in partnership with the LSC and others. Prior to the White paper, the author would suggest that the LSC was supposed to carry out the labour market and skills planning as the lead partner, referring to other bodies (Hammond, 2003). Not any more though, as the next paragraph in the white paper makes clear:

“ The first step is to develop a single plan based on coherent, valid and accessible information and knowledge about labour markets and skills. This plan will focus on what needs to happen in the region in order to develop a healthy labour market which benefits employers and individuals alike. Government guidance emphasises that the Framework is as much a process as a product. The joint approach to analysis, consultation, communication and planning are at the heart of the process of developing the Frameworks and will be the areas in which they are likely to add the most value.” (DTLGR 2004, para 212,p27)

This is a different approach than the one envisaged within DfEE (1999), where there would appear that there was intended to be more of a meeting of equals. The earlier White Paper stated:

13 “RDAs are responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of the Regional Economic Strategy, within which their skills strategy will form an important and integral element. In addition, each RDA has a statutory duty “to enhance the development and application of skills relevant to employment in its area” and each has its own Skills Development Fund to help meet priority skills needs. The Government wants to ensure that there is a strong link between the RDAs and the Learning and Skills Council both at national and local level. Learning and skills training should be planned to reflect the needs and priorities of the region set out in the RDA’s regional strategy, and performance against the regional plan should be monitored. This should be a two-way process-the RDA equally being influenced by the Learning and Skills Council in preparing and updating its strategy.” (DfEE, 1999, Para4.19, p39)

In addition the LSC and the RDA were required to work together and share market information to ensure consistent plans, and LLSC plans were also to be drawn up in relation to regional strategy (DfEE, 1999, Para 4.20, p39). The author would suggest that Para 4.21 of DfEE (1999) makes the LSC the leaders, and the RDA the checkers and evaluators of the skills plan. This is not the case in DTLGR (2004) where the plan would appear to be driven by the RDA. Another interesting development of the DTLGR white paper, is the nebulous role that the national LSC appears to have within it. In DfEE (1999), the RDA relationship with the national LSC was advisory. The RDA was to:

“Assess local plans and advise the national council to ensure that they are consistent with overall plans for regional strategies, and to raise any other issues or concerns” (DfEE, 1999, Para 4.21, p39).

The national LSC doesn’t warrant a mention in relation to the planning role initially at least in the regional White Paper. The “Better Regional Skills” section of the White Paper concludes:

“Local learning and skills councils are making a major contribution to the delivery of Regional Development Agencies own regional skills strategies by securing a range of training provision which links directly to local and regional economic needs. The Regional Development Agencies and local LSCs are working closely together to identify skill needs and to develop an effective strategy for targeting specific action in key sectors, particularly in areas where there have been problems with large-scale redundancy, retention and attracting inward investment. A

14 range of collaborative approaches is being developed which will further strengthen the links between Regional Development Agencies and local LSCs, including joint development of regional skills observatories.”(DTLGR, 2004, para2.13, p37)

The RDA is it is argued only the civil service arm, of the proposed elected regional assemblies, and the political power and control will come through these elected regional assemblies. The White Paper discusses the skills agenda in relation to the role of the regional assemblies, and states:

“ Developing the skills of the workforce plays a vital role in economic development. So improving the skills base and equipping people to take up the opportunities being created in a region will be an important component of delivering an elected assemblies objectives.” (DTLGR, 2004, para 4.28p45)

It continues:

“Elected assemblies will assume responsibility for drawing up and organising Frameworks for Regional Employment and Skills Action (FRESAs), which will set out the key priorities of the region in respect of skills development and improving employment opportunities. The proposals will also ensure that elected regional assemblies will play an important role in other aspects of the skills agenda. Specifically this will mean that: the assembly will appoint two members to each of the Boards of the local learning and skills councils in its region, one of whom will have a business background, and will be consulted on other appointments. The national LSC will be under a statutory duty to consult assemblies on its guidance to the local LSCs (my emphasis). Local LSCs will be obliged to have regard to assembly strategies, including in drawing up their spending plans. Local LSCs will be under a statutory duty to consult the relevant assembly on their local plans; and assemblies will be consulted on bids to the Higher Education Innovation Fund.”(DTLGR, 2004, para 4.29, p46)

It is difficult to see, given the regional nature of the Government’s plan for the regional skills agenda, what role the national LSC will be able to take in the process. In a matter of five years, it would seems that the national LSC has gone from using the advice of the RDA in its planning functions, to being required to account to the RDA and the Regional Assemblies for the advice it gives to its own LLSCs! The author

15 would suggest that the concept of a national LSC is out of step with Government thinking about the delivery and planning of education and skills in the regions. The author therefore would expect the national LSC to in the end, become surplus to requirements, if Government policy remains unchanged.

What do the RDAs themselves have to say about the regional agenda? The RDA in the authors region, have produced an “Economic Strategy and Action Plan 2004-2010” which seeks to develop the skills needed for “promoting a Learning and Skilful Region” (Advantage West Midlands, 2004). Under pillar two of their strategy, the RDA propose to tackle the Basic Skills gaps that are perceived to be present in the region, and develop Workforce skills, improve leadership and management skills, develop an enterprise and entrpreneurship culture and expand higher level skills (Advantage West Midlands, 2004, Pillar two, p28-29). The Action plan as to how they intend to achieve this, and who will be involved in the process is also revealing, in that in relation to the development and implementation of basic skills, the lead partner is the Framework for Regional Employment and Skills Action group, which is described in the “glossary of terms” in the following way:

“FRESA aims to develop co-ordinated and collaborative regional approaches to identifying key challenges and delivering actions to address regional employment and skills needs using the wide range of supply organisations in the region.” (Advantage West Midlands, 2004, p88)

It is assumed that the LLSCs locally will be involved in that group, but appears clear that this group is not an LSC group, but an RDA group, and therefore it may be that control of policy in relation to basic skills is passing from the LSC to the RDA. FE colleges (particularly through franchising arrangements) in the way described earlier in this paper, will it is argued be very effected by the determinations that are made by this committee. In relation to the implementation of initiatives to increase basic skills in regeneration zones, and the desire of the RDA to tackle barriers to employment and recruitment shortages, then the lead partner for this initiative, is a body called the “skills for life strategy group”. This group, is tasked with working with key partners, who are identified as being the LSC and the TUC (Advantage West Midlands, 2004,

16 Action Plan Pillar two, p59). Again this is an RDA driven group working with the LSC, rather than being driven by the LSC.

ICT strategies are to be addressed by an “ICT Learning Task Force”. Responsibility for delivering a co-ordinated approach to innovation skills in HEI and business clusters, has been given to the “West Midlands Higher education Association and the Rural Skills Development group”. Developing management and leadership skills in the region are the responsibility of the “Regional Leadership and Management Skills Group and the Succession Planning Steering Group.” The regional Leadership and management skills group, also are given responsibility for improving access to management training for SMEs. Entrepreneurship Strategy (in particular aimed at young people) is the responsibility of the Regional Young Entrepreneurship Group and Local Education Authorities (Advantage West Midlands, 2004, Action Plan Pillar two, pp59-60). The LLSCs in the region are a lead partner in the delivery of a co- ordinated approach and programmes to address higher-level skills shortages and skills gaps, and also addressing access for adults to mature/adult apprenticeships in the workplace. But this lead partnership is shared with a group called the “Partnerships for progression, and ‘Aim Higher’ Regional Steering Group”. Finally, however, in relation to the delivery of a co-ordinated programme to meet skill needs in business clusters, the six West Midlands Learning and Skills Councils are the lead and only partner. The author would suggest that the West Midlands Economic Strategy follows much of what was suggested in the White Paper, and although there would appear to be a role for the LLSCs [albeit much reduced from that originally envisaged in DfEE (1999)]. There would appear to be no formal role for the national LSC, and as stated earlier, it is difficult to see what function a national organisation might usefully play in a regional body.

The Response of the LSC

The national LSC, perhaps sensing danger, has sought to reorganise itself in past months, in January 2004, the national LSC announced that it was developing regional leaders from among the LLSCs in the regions. The reason given for the restructure by the LSC was that they wished to address the skills agenda of the Government more effectively. The regional managers maintained their leadership of a LLSC in the

17 region however, as the LSC believed that this would help the regional manager to understand the issues on the ground. The Chief Executive of the LSC Mark Haysom said:

"We are committed to continuing to develop the localness of our operations. The appointment of the Regional Directors strengthens the role of our local LSCs, allowing for a more streamlined, manageable and responsive reporting structure that avoids unnecessary bureaucracy. It will free up the front line, giving additional strength and confidence to local decision making, resulting in truly local leadership delivering local solutions to local needs.”(LSC, 2004b)

Mr Clarke the Secretary of State for Education and Skills was also quoted by the LSC as saying:

"The delivery of the Skills Strategy will in part depend on the ability of all key delivery agencies to work in partnership at a regional level. The new arrangements at the LSC to put in place a regional management structure will help the key partners to work even more closely together."(LSC, 2004b)

With the greatest of respect to the LSC, the author would suggest that the move towards a more regional approach by the LSC might have more to do with an increasing awareness that the national LSC is in danger of becoming irrelevant, rather than a real desire to reorganise to achieve some Government target. This is because, as the regionalisation process gathers pace, as has been argued in this paper, the national LSC does not have a definable role. It is argued that the RDA blueprint for economic development in the West Midlands has no role for the national LSC, and it might be argued a reduced role for the LLSCs, therefore the author would argue that the national LSC needs to redefine itself to have any hop of survival.

This redefinition may to some extent still be taking place, as the LSC announced further restructuring of its national structure on 16th January 2004 (LSC, 2004c). The LSC’s National Office will be organised around two groups that reflect its core purpose. These groups will be known as Learning and Skills respectively. Supporting these core functions will be two further groups - Finance and Corporate Services. Mark Haysom, the Chief Executive of the Learning and Skills Council explained how

18 it would work:

"The reorganisation of our Coventry-based teams is wide-ranging. We aim to create a smaller, simplified National Office where there is clear ownership and accountability within all areas of our activity. The Learning group will focus on young people and adults, including the development of learning and funding strategies. [The role of the leader of the Learning group] will also encompass building effective relationships with our key customers, including the further education sector, training providers and schools. The LSC will be seeking to appoint a Director of Skills shortly. His or her remit will be to work closely with the Sector Skills Councils and all key employer-led organisations to secure their engagement in learning and skills training.”(LSC, 2004c)

The national LSC therefore, might appear to be effectively reorganising themselves to address the desires of Government, by slimming down the national office, and by creating what might be termed ‘clusters’ of LLSCs around a regional director. Will this be enough in the end to save them? Politically, the author would argue that the ‘New’ Labour Government cannot overthrow their own created organisation too quickly, as this could be seen to be an admission that the LSC, like the FEFC before it, has failed to deliver on their central agenda. This paper has described this as being an improvement in performance of the FE sector, and a rationalisation of FE curriculum, creating leaner and meaner FE colleges. The author would however argue that the national LSC, unlike its regional counterparts has no real function in a regional skills system, therefore the author believes that eventually it will and should be shut down, and the resources transferred elsewhere within the FE sector.

Conclusions

This paper has looked at the creation by the former Conservative Government of the FEFC, according to a neo-liberal model of public services. The paper has suggested that the FEFC was designed not to interfere with the strategic management of FE colleges, which was a role passed on to the individual corporations of FE colleges, when the FEFC was taken out of LEA control. The small size and lack of interference which characterised the FEFC, did this paper has argued lead to its downfall in the end, as it was not capable of addressing the issues of sleaze which emerged from the

19 sector, or of controlling the “Charismatic Corrupt Principals” in the sector (an example of which was contained within this paper). It might be argued that a major failure of the FEFC model, was that it did not produce the level of rationalisation of provision that had been anticipated by the Conservative Government. It is argued that few if any FE colleges closed, although there were some mergers. The Labour Government, on taking office wished to change the FEFC model to one which would drive and manage the sector more, and would bring together the rather artificial divide between FE colleges and work based learning and private training providers into one planning and funding body, that being the LSC.

In this paper, the planning functions of the LSC have been described as well as the concerns that academics and others had about whether these planning functions would be successful on the inception of the LSC. This paper has gone on to suggest that concerns expressed by policy experts about the LSC in the author’s doctoral thesis have proved to be correct, and that the LSC has not been able to deliver what the Government required of it. Much of the blame for this, at least in the view of the authors of the report produced by the bureaucracy task force, has been due to the failure of the LSC to change its ethos from that of the TEC/FEFC model. This is also in keeping with the views expressed by the policy experts in the author’s doctorate thesis, in that the LSC contained predominantly ex-TEC staff (Hammond, 2003). The LSC, like the FEFC before it, has not been able to address the rationalisation of the FE sector envisaged by ‘Success for All’ (DfES, 2002).

The author has suggested in this paper, that Government patience with the LSC may have come to an end, and that the LSC is beginning to be amalgamated with other bodies. The evidence for this the researcher would argue, is the development of the RDA and regional policy for skills. The evidence from the ‘blue-print’ for the West Midlands produced by its RDA (Advantage West Midlands) suggests no role for the national LSC, and a reduced but more central role for the LLSCs in the area, albeit in collaboration with a lot of ‘other’ organisations involved in learning and skills. From the evidence of the White Papers (DTLGR, 2004) and the regional plan for the West Midlands (Advantage West Midlands, 2004) the demise of the LSC both locally and nationally as a planner of FE is imminent. The author expects that in accordance with the White Paper, the transfer of powers to the RDAs will be completed when the

20 regional assemblies are created. This should be an ongoing process in both this and the subsequent parliament after a General Election, expected sometime in 2005. It should however be noted, that the decision to create a regional assembly is one that will have to be taken by the electorate through referendum, so the process may take some time to complete.

Assuming that this process is carried out in the way that the Government intends, then what will be the consequences for FE colleges? The author would argue that the ordinary lecturer in the classroom will not experience any changes unless the RDA succeed where the author would argue both the FEFC and the LSC (so far at least) appear to have failed, and that is in rationalising the sector such that general FE colleges are made to concentrate their attention on curriculum, which in the opinion of the RDA [perhaps through the use of OfSTEd/ALI inspection reports (Hammond, 2003)] they are good at. In that case, then many FE colleges could close or merge, or at least close departments or divisions, which are not deemed to be successful.

As stated at the beginning of this paper, this paper stands at the end of one large piece of research carried out by the author, and at the beginning of another large piece of research on the potential effects of RDAs on the FE sector. The involvement and development of RDAs is in the embryo stage at the moment, and it will be interesting to see how it all develops in practice.

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