Ethnic Self-Identification of Eastern-Ukrainian IDPs

Throughout the Conflict and Associated Mobility Process

Master’s Thesis in Sociology

Migration and ethnic studies track

University of Amsterdam

By Mariia Shaidrova

Student number 11128305

Supervisor:

Apostolos Andrikopoulos

Second reader:

Prof. Dr. H.G Hein de Haas

Date of submission

30/06/2016

Abstract Eastern Ukraine (Donbas region) has been suffering from an armed conflict (May 2014 - present day). This conflict has led to the internal displacement of at least 1.5 million people and is characterized by an explicit ethnic component (Ukrainian-Russian; West-East). It provides an excellent case study for understanding the interaction between ethnicity and mobility in the context of a conflict. The goals of this research were twofold. Firstly, to study how ethnicities were affected throughout the conflict situation and associated migration flows. Secondly, to understand what role ethnic self-identification played in the mobility decisions of IDPs. My analysis combines multi-level mobility theories (e.g., Faist, 2000) with a constructivist approach to ethnicity (e.g. Nagel,1994; Chandra, 2006 ). My research illustrates how these theories intersect in the situation of Eastern Ukraine. The study has a qualitative design, based on in-depth interviews which were analyzed using thematic analysis. These were conducted with 22 respondents from Donetsk and Luhansk (currently living in Kiev and Kharkiv), obtained through snowball sampling. All respondents reported that both the Ukrainian and Russian ethnicities had become more salient and more strongly linked to politics since the conflict began. This political perception of ethnicity redefined the existing ethnic boundaries. To resolve the resulting tensions, some IDPs separated their political views from their ethnicity, referring to themselves as “apolitical Ukrainians” or “Donbas people”. For other IDPs, the strong disappointment in the ruling elite (of both sides of the conflict) led to the experience of “ethnic limbo”, as they refrained from associating themselves with any ethnic group. The interviewed IDPs appeared to have formed a new, completely separate identity of being “Donbas resettlers”. The factors which contributed to this new identity were social exclusion and discrimination in the host cities, quarrels with relatives and friends, and experience of a border between Donbas and the rest of Ukraine. Among my respondents, I observed notable cases of IDPs for whom ethnic self-identification played an important role during at least one of the stages of mobility. This influence was especially strong for those who practiced public professions (journalists, teachers, police) when their views were at odds with the new authorities in Donbas. At some point during the conflict, it became life threatening to publicly identify oneself as Ukrainian on the territory of the self-proclaimed republics. Therefore, safety reasons in case of public self-identification played a crucial role in migration decisions of IDPs. In the later stages of mobility, ethnic self-identification was involved in quarrels with relatives which could push IDPs to relocate or return to the conflict-affected region.

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Table of the contents

Section 1. Introduction Section 2. Methodology 2.1 Preparation 2.2 Sampling strategy 2.3 Data collection and method of analysis 2.4 Researcher’s background Section 3. Theory and Background 3.1 Internally displaced due to the conflict 3.2 Constructivist approach to ethnicity 3.3 Mobility theories 3.4 Background 3.4.1 General History 3.4.2 Ukrainian patriotic movements of the 19th century 3.4.3 The history of Donbas region 3.4.4 The conflict in Ukraine 2014-2016 Section 4. Results and analysis 4.1 The change of the experience of ethnicity as a result of the conflict and mobility process 4.1.1 Political and ethnic identities of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine 4.1.2 Emergence of “ethnic limbo” in IDPs’ narratives 4.1.3 The emphasis on Donbas origin 4.1.4 The change of ethnic self-identification among those who stayed in the conflict affected areas 4.1.5 Donbas “Resettlers” ethnic identity 4.1.6 Ethnographic notes from the field: “It is just Europe trying to atone for their sins” 4.2 The role of ethnic self-identification in the migration process of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine 4.2.1 The first stage of mobility 4.2.2 Social networks in the initial and relocation stages of mobility 4.2.3 The decision to stay in conflict affected-areas 4.2.4 Further mobility stages, consideration of permanent stay 4.2.5 The return stage 4.2.6 Conflict between imposed and real values among IDPs involved in public spheres Section 5. Discussion and Conclusion Research question 1. Research question 2. References Annex

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Section 1. Introduction The main focus of this research is the internally displaced persons (henceforth - IDPs) who are fleeing from conflict-affected areas. The research is based on the case study of Ukraine. Special attention is paid on (1) what ethnic identities became more salient in the beginning of the conflict; (2) how ethnic self-identification evolved during the migration process of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine; (3) the role of ethnic self-identification in the migration decisions of

IDPs. In 2014, protests in Ukraine developed into a serious international armed conflict which is still ongoing in the Eastern part of the country, namely in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In August 2015, up to 1.5 million people were officially recognized as internally displaced persons by The Ministry of Social Policy in Ukraine. Since not all IDPs have registered in official state services it is likely that the actual figure is even larger. Following the conflict, in two Ukrainian regions there were created self-proclaimed Luhansk1 (June, 2014) and Donetsk2 (May, 2014) “republics”, both were recognized only by Republic of South Ossetia that has very limited recognition itself. The self-proclaimed republics were created on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. According to the UNHCR, only 383.0003 people were seeking asylum in Russia (August, 2015)4. This figure points to the fact that majority of Eastern Ukrainians were migrating within the Ukrainian border. People who flee from the conflict could have different considerations, but taking into account the fact that the conflict had from the beginning bright political and ethnic component especially regarding pro-Russian and pro-Western views of South-Eastern and

1 Henceforth LNR - Luhansk National Republic 2 Henceforth DNR - Donetsk National Republic 3 This figure represents registered asylum-seekers only, it does not include people who moved to Russia with different considerations such as, for instance, job offer. 4 UNHCR Map. Ukraine Internally Displaced People. 21st of August 2015. Retrieved from:http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Internally%20Displaced%20People%20M ap%2021AUG15.pdf 4

Central-Western Ukrainians, ethnic self-identification plays its role in mobility process of IDPs (Metzger et al., 2016). Ethnic self-identification is a dynamic process, that is constructed or reconstructed under specific historical, political, personal factors. Chandra (2012) argued that one person can possess several ethnicities, at the same time it does not mean people use all available ethnicities in their routine interactions. Although in this research I stick to the constructivist approach to ethnicity, I still argue that among ethnicities available to one person there are ones that are more difficult to reconstruct, and this reconstruction will take a long time, or it might be impossible to change. For instance, descent-based attributes of ethnicity such as place of birth, parents’ ethnicity. Often these descent-based attributes to ethnicity are available to people, but they are not used in daily interactions. Nevertheless, under some circumstances they might become activated. The conflict can become a trigger for such activation (Kalyvas, 2008). For example, people might never thought about the fact that their father is Russian, but in the beginning of the conflict they would decide to use this fact to justify their desire to become Russian citizens. I hypothesize that this evolution of ethnic self- identification or even situational use of several ethnicities can be triggered not only by the conflict, but the migration process and life experience in the host societies. The salience of one ethnicity in the beginning of the conflict might evolve in migration process. I attempt to connect mobility theories with constructivist approach to ethnicity, looking at how the conflict served as a trigger for some ethnicities to become more salient and how further mobility process can affect these activated ethnicities and change the way people perceived themselves in the beginning.

My thesis focuses on two main research questions: (1) how does the ethnic self-identification of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine evolve in the development of an armed conflict and the following migration?

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(2) what is the role of ethnicity in migration decisions of IDPs from Eastern

Ukraine throughout different stages of mobility process? My thesis will consist of five main sections and each section will include subsections. The first section consists of Introduction. The second one covers Methodology of the study. In the third section I discuss the theoretical framework and the necessary background information on the history of Donbas, political situation, and the conflict development. In the theoretical framework I describe in detail how ethnicity is being constructed. The background information is included to illustrate historical component of ethnicity construction in Donbas. Additionally, this subsection assisted in better understanding of IDPs’ narratives that included historical references. The fourth section is dedicated to the results and analysis of the study and divided into two main subsections according to the research questions mentioned above: (1) experience of ethnicity that is being changed as a result of the conflict and mobility; (2) the role of ethnicity in migration decisions of IDPs. Finally, I will present conclusions and discussion.

Section 2. Methodology In this thesis I illustrate how two completely different theoretical approaches (mobility theories and constructivism) can be connected in studying ethnicity dynamics among those who fled from an armed conflict. As described in Section 1, the main aim is twofold. Firstly, to investigate how ethnic self- identification evolves during and after the conflict and associated migration. Secondly, I study how ethnic identity affects the mobility decisions of IDPs. For both aims, I performed a detailed analysis of the narratives of IDPs. It is obvious that in the scope of this thesis it is impossible to show all mechanisms of ethnicity construction and influences on mobility. I will highlight the most relevant insights into the migration process and ethnicity dynamics which I gathered from my twenty-two respondents.

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Section 2.1 Preparation The process of data collection, literature review, and analysis in my study underwent several stages. First of all, I researched existing literature on mobility theories with a specific interest in migration due to the armed conflict. At this stage I drew a broad picture of internal and external factors that might influence migration choices of IDPs, even though the final choice is never predetermined. During this stage of my research, I formulated research questions that guided my future fieldwork. When I completed the literature review I decided to study in detail historical components of Donbas region. I also looked at geographical and political preferences of different Ukrainian regions, especially Western and South-Eastern ones. Since this stage of my research was going simultaneously with the fieldwork, it assisted me in understanding IDPs, especially when they were referring to some specific events in the history.

Section 2.2 Sampling strategy Concerning the average age of respondents and sampling strategy used in the study, I used personal networks in day care centers, churches, among my acquaintances who volunteer with IDPs. These organizations recommended me to the IDPs they work with. After the first interviews were completed, I asked respondents about their friends and relatives who are also willing to help me (snowball sampling). The average age of my respondents varied from 30-40, but I also had interviews with the women who were over 50, and two young girls of 26. Since all interviews were strictly confidential, I preferred to change some names of the respondents. For the detailed description of respondents and their background see Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the majority of interviewed people are women. Most of the women had small children that made them available for the interview during the day. Sometimes, we met in the

7 house of the one woman and later her neighbors, also IDPs, came to visit and we had talks all together, while children were playing. There was also several interviews conducted on the playground. People whom I interviewed not only shared their own story but often described the experiences of whole families, telling about their husbands and children. Moreover, often I was in places where IDPs gather (day centers, houses) and we had informal interactions. The results of such interactions were also used for the purpose of this research.

Section 2.3 Data collection and method of analysis My fieldwork was conducted during April and the beginning of May 2016 in Kyiv, Irpin and Kharkiv. The choice of the cities is explained by two main reasons: (1) Kharkiv is located in the Eastern part of Ukraine that makes it more familiar for IDPs. Also, it takes the third place concerning the number of IDPs that located there5. (2) Kyiv used to be an epicenter of the protests that partially fueled the conflict in the East and this makes it especially relevant to research identities of IDPs who located to Kyiv. Irpin is a satellite town next to Kyiv. Even though I am originally from Kyiv, it was much more difficult to arrange the interviews in the city. Since many IDPs have already settled down, they were busy and this created problems in scheduling the meetings. In Kharkiv I had a privilege to stay in the family who assists IDPs for already more than a year organizing a day care for children and humanitarian help for adults. Through this family I got an access to many IDPs living in Kharkiv. Almost in all cases in Kharkiv I was invited to the homes of IDPs and was able to see the families in their natural settings and make some ethnographic notes. In Kyiv I experienced such hospitality only during three interviews out of nine.

5 UNHCR Map. Ukraine Internally Displaced People. 21st of August 2015. Retrieved from:http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Internally%20Displaced%20People%20M ap%2021AUG15.pdf 8

The main method of my data collection was narrative interviews. During the meetings, IDPs shared their stories and during the talk, I often indirectly6 asked about their attitudes towards different ethnic groups and sides of the conflict. We also discussed their new life in the host city and how this life has changed their views on the situation. The main problem during the data collection process was the fact that ethnicity, attitudes of people represent a sensitive topic. Moreover, the fact that I am from Kyiv might push IDPs to hide their real attitudes. It is impossible to check this information, but in order to avoid misunderstandings, I spent some time discussing the cases with people who recommended me to the families: volunteers, church leaders, my close friends among IDPs. Usually, these people knew the families I interviewed well enough and shared more information about some specific views. Also, the recommendation of the assisting organizations, church leaders and volunteers became a great support in building trust in IDPs towards me. All interviews were recorded and analyzed using thematic content analysis. The themes will be further be presented. All interviews were conducted in Russian.

Section 2.4 Researcher’s background Since I am from Ukraine myself, it can be questioned how I perceive the situation and myself in the situation that is currently taking place in the country. Even though, I identify myself as Ukrainian, my family is very diverse in ethnic terms. My great-grandfather was German and great-grandmother Jew from my father’s side. All my Jewish family moved to the United States and Germany when I was a small child. At the same time, my grandmother from the mother’s side was born in the Eastern part of Ukraine and originates from Polish high-skilled migrants. Moreover, she identifies herself as Soviet and does not consider a Ukrainian language as existing. Her husband, my grandfather was Russian and came to Ukraine to acquire higher education. Both of my parents’

6 When I felt that people trusted me, I asked direct questions as well. 9 families represented an intellectual elite in the Soviet Union being engineers’ inventors and doctors. Since the Soviet elite was highly Russified, I am speaking Russian with my parents and grandparents. Taking into account the ethnic diversity of my ancestors and the way the identify themselves (as Ukrainians, Jews, Russians, Soviet, and Ukrainian), I decided to refer to myself as Ukrainian. I studied in Ukrainian in both school and university. My diverse roots assisted in understanding better different points of view and I learned to accept it. Considering my own position towards the situation my country is currently in, I do acknowledge that apart from constructed ethnic element in the conflict that there is an obvious aggression from Russia. I know that there are some differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, especially language ones, but for me personally, it did not really matter whether people speak Russian or Ukrainian. Still, the attitude to Ukrainian language changed throughout the conflict development, I started using Ukrainian more on the street of Kyiv. Since my best friend is from Eastern Ukraine and I have family there as well, it was easy for me to get in contact with IDPs. In my interviews I often emphasized that my best friend is from Luhansk and my grandmother was also born in the East – it always helped to make people feel more comfortable during our talks. Moreover, I purposefully decided not to use additional media sources while my analysis (both Ukrainian and Russian) for this not to affect my perception of IDPs.

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Section 3. Theory and background

Section 3.1 Internal displacement due to the conflict IDPs who flee from an armed conflict are an interesting research category and differ from those who are displaced due to the reconstruction or natural disaster. Moreover, the conflict often serves as a trigger for the ethnic identity reconstruction. The problem of internally displaced people started being raised by scholars and policy makers in late 1980s. Only in the 1990s, this category became a part of an international agenda (Cohen, 2004; Brun, 2005; Mooney, 2005). The need of such recognition derived from the growing number of IDPs as a result of conflicts, disasters, and development programs. Consequently, the main purpose of such recognition was to address IDPs’ needs and develop necessary responsive policies. Even though the term internally displaced people became quite prominent during last decades, there are still debates concerning its definition. IDPs are often perceived as those who have been forced to flee in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of human rights, natural disasters, but who did not cross an internationally recognized border. Nevertheless, it is not always clear what are internationally recognized borders, since there are cases when the divided in civic conflicts territories can be recognized by some states and ignored by others (e.g Abkhazia in Georgia). Some scholars (Mooney, 2003a; Brun, 2005; Van Hear, 2000) believe that the growing numbers of IDPs resulted from restrictive migration policies of potential destination countries. Furthermore, “forced to flee” does not exclude the element of choice. The choice is always present in IDPs decisions. As van Hear (2000) argued, economic and forced migrants have in their choices both freedom of choice and compulsion. Nevertheless, we can still argue that so-called “forced migrants” have narrower range of possibilities. In my research the IDPs will be perceived

11 as the ones who migrate internally, more precisely as those who stay under the jurisdiction of the state of origin. As already was mentioned, there can be different causes of massive internal displacement, such as natural and human-made disasters, planned developments (mines, dams), and armed conflicts. The focus of this thesis is on the displacement as an outcome of armed conflicts. According to Muggah (2003), there is a clear differences between internal displacement as an outcome of planned development projects and conflicts. First of all, displacement as a result of the conflict usually is much more spontaneous and unpredictable. Contrastingly, the development caused displacement is usually better “planned” and in many cases is perceived as temporary by both migrants and policy makers (Muggah, 2003). To illustrate the specifications of the conflict caused displacement empirically, I will present findings of Velez & Ibanez (2008) who described Columbian displacement. The authors showed that violence in the place of origin modifies the migration incentives of education, social capital, and location assets. If we turn back to the Muggah’s (2003) notion of “spontaneous” displacement, it can be argued that these “spontaneous movements” were to some extent derived from violence. As was already mentioned, the process of displacement is not a mere movement from A to B, but can include initial location, relocation, return, and even international migration (see also van Hear, 2000). Consequently, in the armed conflicts the spontaneous movements can represent the initial location, when migrants might perceive themselves as temporary, and develop further plans for relocation and return. Even though the violence can influence the decisions of migrants, it does not determine them. Velez & Ibanez (2008) and van Hear (2000) argued that even in acute violent episodes there were people who preferred to stay rather than migrate, and moreover, in some cases the conflict brought especially acute danger for one group and was less damaging for another. According to Amnesty

12 international7, in Ukraine, openly identifying oneself as being Ukrainian in the conflict areas has become a life-threatening practice, while people are being forced to engage in identifying themselves with the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. As for the Colombian situation, Velez and Ibanez (2008) assumed that one of the reasons of such discrepancies in decision-making process can be caused by the effect of violence on different groups, especially if the conflict has presumably civic character as can be seen from the described example. They also mentioned that if there are police and army forces protecting the territory, the number of those willing to migrate can decrease. From the described above, we can see that internal displacement due to the conflict creates a special case in mobility/migration studies. Moreover, considering Ukrainian case, we can see that in the beginning, the conflict had 8 presumably civic character and shortly after – it grew into the international one. Conflict is usually shaping migration decisions of people who appeared to be in the epicenter of it. The effects of the conflict can also include the changes in how people view themselves, in case of civic and international conflict how they identify themselves in ethnic terms.

7 Annual Report on Ukraine, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central- asia/ukraine/report-ukraine/ 8 Still arguable with some scholars 13

Section 3.2 Constructivist approach to ethnicity In this study I base my analysis on the constructivist approach to ethnicity. An important constructivist theorist Nagel (1994) defined ethnicity as: “a dynamic, constantly evolving property of both individual identity and group organization” ( p.1) Another relevant definition of ethnicity is given by Wimmer (2008), who based it on the classical works of Weber (1922). He defines ethnicity as “a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry” (p. 973) Ethnicity is experienced subjectively which means it can be rather unstable and under certain circumstances it can be reshaped and reconstructed. In contrast with primordialists who hold that each person has only one ethnicity which does not change, constructivists have an understanding of ethnicity as a dynamic process. Furthermore, the process of constructing an ethnic identity is complex and can be characterized in multiple ways. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2000) discussed that there are: “Three ways to characterize what constructing an identity entails. These approaches differ in whether they see broad structural forces, discursive formations, or individuals as the agents that act to produce or reproduce a system of social categories. “Constructing an identity” may refer to either the content of a social category, such as making Serb believe that Serbs cannot live with Croats, and vice versa, or the boundary rules, such as making Montenegrins believe they are Yugoslavs, or peasants in Gascony believe they are French.”(p.850) In the current study, I also adopt the term ethnic self-identification, by which I understand the way the person associates him/herself with a certain group. Ethnicity can be often politicized and coincide with non-ethnic categories. Moreover, commonly perceived non-ethnic categories can acquire new ethnic meaning. For instance, “Muslim” identity was formally associated

14 with religion, but currently we notice more tendencies towards more ethnic associations with “Muslim” identity (Chandra, 2006; Fearon&Laitin, 2000). Ethnicity construction is often associated with ethnic boundaries. Fredrik Barth is a well-known social anthropologist who studied ethnic groups and ethnic boundaries. In the book Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1998) he argued that the ethnic boundary “defines” the group (p.15). Furthermore, he argues that when an ethnic group maintains its identity and interacts with the outside world – it determines the rules of membership and exclusion. Ethnic borders are not limited to a particular territory, but are rather a social formation (Barth, 1998). Ethnic boundaries can be revised, revitalized, and negotiated by ethnic group members themselves and by the ones who are outside the group (Negel, 1994). Following the ideas Barth (1998), Wimmer (2008) stresses that the boundary represents both categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. Consequently, the categorical dimension includes acts of social classification, collective representation. Social dimension is about everyday networks that result from individual strategies of distancing or connecting. If we come down to the individual level, mentioned categorical and behavioral dimensions can be seen as two cognitive schemes. The first one is dividing the social world in social groups of “us” and “others (them)”, and another group includes scripts of how to classify someone as “us” and the “other” under given circumstances. When two schemes merge, we are able to speak about an existing ethnic boundary (Wimmer, 2008) . Wimmer further emphasizes that ethnic borders are not necessarily fixed, there are different softening mechanisms.

“Ethnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally.” (p.976) According to Kalyvas (2008) there are certain mechanisms that can make the ethnic border softer. First of all it is about the replacement of certain ethnic attributes that enable individuals to “pass” into new ethnic identity. Secondly,

15 the introduction of new non-ethnic dimensions that can make it easier to join an ethnic category, without specific qualifications (Kalyvas, 2008). Such mechanisms are often present in conflicts, and especially in civic conflicts. In the broad political and social sense the boundaries can be shaped considering context the groups are in. In different societies the group might be identified differently. For instance, Asian American might be identified as Asian in America and as American in France (Wimmer, 2008). Following this line of reasoning, we can see that individual can possess several identities that might become salient in different circumstances or can be reshaped under these circumstances. Even though it might seem that ethnicity can be easily reshaped reconstructed, it is not always happening promptly. Chandra (2006) identifies so called “constrained change” and visibility properties. The former underlines that even though ethnic identities do change in short term, the pattern of and the mechanisms behind such a change can be constrained by a set of attributes, and the latter means that information about an individual’s ethnic identity categories is usually obtained from observations (e.g skin color). Mentioned properties are first of all characterizing those categories in which membership is associated with descent-based attributes. A bright example would be Jewish ethnicity. To be identified as Jew by Jews, the person has to have a Jewish mother. At the same time for non-Jews, any other descent-based attribute, such as parents, can serve as an ethnic marker. As for visibility properties, here it is meant common associations/myths considering the appearance of one or another ethnic group. Ethnicity can be perceived differently by the person and the surrounding. This difference can also trigger the tensions between groups and individuals. As an illustration can serve “Moroccan ethnicity” in the Netherlands. Not all Dutch people will identify second generation Moroccans as Dutch, even though Moroccan second or third generation can identify themselves as Dutch, since they have spent all their life in the country, speak the language and possess the passport. It illustrates how the self-identification might differ from perceived

16 ethnic identity. In the long term, the conflict between self and perceived identities can influence one or another. Consequently, the self-identification will be based on how people are perceived and vice versa. As was already mentioned, there can be several ethnicities possessed by individuals, Chandra (2012) proposes such descriptions as nominal and activated ethnic identities. Nominal identities describe identities that all individuals in a population possess, even when they actually do not identify them, and usually it is connected with descent-identity (region of birth, parents). Whereas, activated identities are those that are actually used by individuals in any given context. Despite the fact that the individuals choose among several identities, this choice can be limited to socially and politically defined ethnic categories. The external opinions that influence the formation of ethnic identities might be immigration policies, ethnically-linked recourse policies, political policies and institutions. For instance, official ethnic categories and policies can also strengthen ethnic boundaries since they become a basis for discrimination and repression (Negel, 1994). This can reconstruct the meaning of particular ethnicities. The salience of one ethnicity among others possessed by individuals becomes especially interesting in the conflict situations, where the pressure of self-identification with different groups becomes higher. Moreover, the conflict can serve as a trigger for the creation of a new ethnicity. Violent conflicts, both domestic and international influence self-identification of people. This influence can be planned by elites, then violence can be seen as elite manipulation of mass public. Also, another constructivist approach presents cultural systems as agents that construct ethnic identities. This approach stress that specific ways of thinking and behaving can drive ethnic reconstruction. Considering the first notion of elites and individuals being a driver for ethnicity reconstruction

(Fearon & Laitin, 2000).

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Toal and Dahlman (2011) argue that political entrepreneurs can play on fears about security through framing insecurity and instability in terms of ethnic divisions. Although many conflicts in the world did not start as ethnic, but almost all included ethnic element (Nagel, 1994). Moreover, in case of ethnic violence people might not be aware which side to blame for the failure of negotiations. Furthermore, these people might not know what side to blame. Consequently, observations of such events can push people to trust leaders who represent a particular side of the conflict, even though these leaders might have provoked this conflict. Also, leaders inside the group create a demand for protection from the out group. Nevertheless, not always people take part in ethnic violence following the elites, but also by following their own agenda (Fearon & Laitin,

2000).

Section 3.3 Mobility theories In this section, I will analyze some of general mobility theories and attempt to apply them to research of the phenomenon of IDPs and the place of ethnic identity in mobility dynamics. According to van Hear (1998), to be able to represent migration decisions in general terms, it is the best to place such decisions on the axis ranging from “choice”/ “few options” on one end to “little choice”/“no option” on the other end. He cites Richmond (1994) who argues that migrants with more opportunities are “proactive” and with less opportunities are “reactive”. Richmond (1994) further shows that the line between two extremes: proactive and reactive is usually blurred. Developing Richmond’s notion, van Hear emphasizes that it allows to include different categories of migrants and their mobility: internally displaced, tourists, labor migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and others. He also includes “stayers” in the scheme, specifying their degree of choice. According to van Hear the mobility is a complex process,

18 where people can move within the borders of a certain state before crossing the international border. Migrants can be displaced and then return. Legal tourists can overstay their visas and then became automatically illegal. This means that by changing categories, people can have different opportunities that shape their migration biography. According to van Hear, IDPs have limited opportunities concerning their choices. However, this choice is always present, and as was already mentioned, migrants can be in different categories with different range of choices in their lives. Therefore on each stage of their migration biography, the opportunities can either decrease or increase. Even though the model of van Hear is useful to understand general mobility picture, causes of such range of possibilities, choices are not depicted and are in need of further elaboration.

Ethnic identity can also serve as one of such causes. In his book The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration, Faist (2000) criticized existing migration theories and proposed a more systematic and dynamic approach to studying mobility. Faist presents the notion of a multilevel migration system approach. He argues that the analysis should include three scales: micro-, meso-, and macro-scales. The micro-scale covers the freedom of choice of the migrant, it is all about individual expectations, wealth, status, comfort, and stimulation. The meso-scale includes people within the network and ties. This level of analysis includes different types of ties, for example, strong family ties, weak ties that include brokers, intermediary agents. Finally, macro-scale considers economic characteristics, politics, cultural setting, and demography/ecology. Economic characteristics include income and unemployment differences. Politics covers regulation of spatial mobility, repressions, conflicts. Cultural setting is about dominant norms and discourses. Finally, the demography/ecology checks on the population growth, availability of arable land and the level of technology. On each level of analysis he described different theories. According to Faist, micro-, meso-, and macro- scale divisions are not necessarily about separate categories, but rather the

19 interaction of such categories. We can hypothesize that ethnic identity can shape IDPs destinations on all levels that were discussed by Faist. First of all, in the situation of the conflict it can represent micro-scale individual self-identification with one or another conflicting sides. Moreover, considering Chandra’s (2012) notion of nominal ethnicity, the individual can activate the ethnicity according to the side it the conflict that is being supported by IDPs, and this can shape the mobility choices. Considering meso- level, we can see that, for instance, ethnic identity can also weaken social networks. From my encounter with Ukrainian IDPs, I noticed how both ethnic identity and ideology broke family ties and people who considered themselves Ukrainian chose not to maintain relationship with their pro-Russian relatives. On macro-scale, we can see that social policies concerning IDPs, different social initiatives can not only raise attention to the IDPs from Eastern Ukraine, but also create a new identity for them, that can further influence their mobility and self-identification. Furthermore, on the macro-level the border policies, and restriction to access to the separatist controlled towns and cities for the ones who hold Ukrainian passport and do not have a special permission can also strengthen the division of ethnic identities among IDPs.

Section 3.4 Background This section contains a concise analysis of the historical setting of Eastern Ukraine. This should aid in understanding the circumstances under which ethnic self-identification of Donbas residents developed and where the narratives of the East-West dichotomy began.

Section 3.4.1 General History Discussions concerning the ethnic differences between Eastern and Western Ukrainians have become increasingly relevant ever since the Soviet Union

20 collapsed. However, the history of this dichotomy extends much further back in time. As Karacsony et al.,(2014) argued: “In Ukraine the dichotomic socio-economic framework reflects not only ethnic and religious differences but also such factors as urbanization, economic development, and even natural elements. ”(p.100) In order to understand such divisions, it is essential to take into account the political preferences, and relevant historical events in Ukraine (Karcsony et al.,2014). These characteristics were often used to stress the difference by political forces in the Soviet Union and by political leaders of independent Ukraine (Osipian & Osipian., 2012; Kuromiya, 2015). This accommodated the construction of beliefs regarding the differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, or between South-Eastern, Western, and Central Ukraine. Each region in Ukraine has a unique history. Regions near the Carpathian mountains experienced Hungarian, Romanian, as well as Austrian rule. Large Southern territories including Crimea have been governed by the Crimean Khanate9. A significant part of central Ukraine was under the Duchy of Lithuania. The Ukrainian history was affected the most by Russian Empire, Austro-Hungarian

Empire, and Soviet Union. In this study I use the terms Central, Western, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. However, different scholars make different divisions. For the sake of clarity I adopt a purely geographical approach which assists in avoiding unnecessary discussion around the divisions. When there the need arises to single out a certain part of Western, Southern, Central or Eastern Ukraine, the necessary specifications will be made. Western Ukraine covers: (1) Galychyna (Galicia) which includes the three modern regions of Ternopil, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk; (2) Volyn – situated in the north west of which Lutsk is the capital; (3) Transcarpathia – geographical center of Europe, major cities Uzhgorod, Mukachevo; (4) Pollisia – major cities Kovel, Sarny, and Bukovyna.

9 Crimean tatars, who were vassals of the Turkish Empire 21

Central Ukraine covers the regions of Podillia, Kyiv, and Poltava. The South- Eastern part of Ukraine is located in a steppe terrain. The region is characterized by a strongly developed industrial component, especially the cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kryvyj Rig, and Mariupol. In the Russian Empire, South-Eastern

Ukraine was often called “Novorossia” (New Russia).

Map 1.Geographical divisions of Ukraine. Retrieved from: http://www.kiis.com.ua

Map 2. Geographical divisions of Ukraine. Retrieved from: http://www.zorya.ca/Regions_Costumes.htm

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Section 3.4.2 Ukrainian patriotic movements of the 19th and 20th century In the 19th century a significant part of Ukraine (Central, South and East) was under the rule of the Russian empire. At the same time, Western regions, such as Galicia were governed by the Austria-Hungarian empire. Often Galicia and Donbas/Central Ukraine are placed in contrast with each other in terms of their nationalistic movements and cultural differences (Himka, 2015). These differences were especially emphasized during the Soviet times. In this subsection I illustrate under what circumstances and how the nationalistic movements developed. Although it is common to associate strongly nationalistic movements with Western Ukraine, and especially with the region of Galicia (Himka, 2015), such movements were also present in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Kappeler (1991) demonstrated that in Galicia the nationalistic movements of the 19th century were strongly influenced by local aristocracy. This aristocracy was mostly represented by highly educated elite and Greek-Catholic priests. Priests and elites were able to build the bridges between peasants and nobility, constructing a common understanding of “the Ukrainian nation” under imperial rule. Consequently, the movements were supported by the representatives of different social strata. The tolerant policies of the Austro-Hungarian empire concerning local political expressions allowed for further establishment. Additionally, the fact that slavery was abolished earlier in Western Ukraine and the overall education level was higher compared to the rest of Ukraine also influenced the development of Ukrainian nationalistic movements. The rest of the country was characterized by the Russian language, the situation of cultural oppression, shared Eastern Orthodox doctrine, and hypocrisy of Ukrainian noble families, all of which was detrimental for the Ukrainian patriotic movements (Kappeler, 1991). The working language in the region was predominantly Russian, especially in the cities (Himka, 2015). The majority of Ukrainians were peasants (Yekelchyk, 2007). Furthermore, the priests and elites were often

23

Russian or they communicated in Russian (Himka, 2015; Kappeler, 1991). These circumstances did not lead to the complete disappearance of the nationalistic movements, but gave them a different form and suppressed their growth. In the parts of Ukraine that were under the Russian empire, the movements had a cultural character. For example, local elite were restoring Ukrainian writings and novels. Literature unions were organized and published the first Ukrainian novels. The working language of the intelligence was Russian (Kappeler, 1991). However, there were successful attempts of promotion of Ukrainian literature and culture. Despite the governmental, cultural and ideological separation, both Galician and Dnieper elites had a common goal in creating a political body for Ukraine in order to acquire independence. Considering the development of patriotic and nationalistic movements in the 20th century, the most famous movement was led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN; founded in 1929), located in the Western part of the country.The more radical part of which was led by Stepan Bandera. That part had a military unit named the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Although their main goal was to fight for independence (from Soviet rule), they were also quite aggressive towards Polish, Russians and Jews who lived in the Western part of the country. Moreover, when overpowered by the grip of the Stalin regime, the OUN chose to side with Hitler’s forces (Rudling, 2006; Katchanovski, 2010). These militants were called Banderivtsi (in reference to Stepan Bandera) as well as “Nazis” in the Russian narrative. Nowadays, it has become an integral part of the pro-Russian propaganda to refer to all Ukrainian nationalists Banderivtsi and associate them with the Nazis (Hutchings & Szostek, 2015).

Section 3.4.3 The history of Donbas region To understand what contributed to the construction of the ethnic identity of the population of Donbas, we will now focus on the history of the region. This

24 subsection is based on the works of Hiroaki Kuromiya, a Japanese historian, who has been researching Donbas for over twenty years. In 2015, Kuromiya published a book titled “Understanding Donbass” in which he combined several of his works about Donbas. Also, information is used from lectures by Ukrainian professor Oksana Mikheeva10, an Eastern Ukrainian sociologist and historian who has been researching the Donbas region for decades. For a very long time, Donbas was a part of the Russian Empire. The name “Donbas” was derived from the basin of the Donets river. The Donets basin covers the South East of Ukraine and South West of Russia. This region has always taken a significant place in the history of Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. The part of the Donbas land in Ukraine was termed “the Wild Steppe”, a symbol of freedom. Since this territory was not assigned to any country for a long time, the Wild Steppe was attracting people who were unemployed, especially peasants without land, former criminals, former slaves and others who wanted to make use of the uncontrolled and free territory. Although the Eastern part of Donbas was largely populated by Russians and the Western part by Ukrainians, the overall ethnic composition was mixed. The emergence of modern industries (mining and steel production) contributed to the growth of the ethnical diversity in the region. An essential event for the industrial development of Donbas was the establishment in 1870 “Novorussian society for coal, iron and rails production” by John Hughe (Friedgut, 2014). This organization was guiding the production of coal, iron and rails. At this time Donbas had become an important industrial center of Russian Empire and it attracted many migrant workers. Unsurprisingly, the majority consisted of Russian migrants, but there were also, for example, English, Polish, and Jewish laborers (Kuromiya & Friedgut, 1993). The workers who came to Donbas from Russia were often peasants who did not possess land in their home villages.

10 Mikheeva, O., (2014). "A person from the Donbas" - the main components of the social construct :[video lecture]. Retrieved from http://uamoderna.com/videoteka/mikheeva-lecture-donbas-ucu 25

This transition from the work on the ground to the work underground was quite difficult and painful for Russian workers. According to Mikheeva (2014), this contributed to the problem of alcohol addiction becoming prevalent among workers. According to her, this gave rise to the image of “Donbas alcoholics” which is quite common in Central and Western Ukraine. As a result of ethnic differences, there were often clashes between groups. Especially notable are the massacres of Jewish people by Donbas miner workers (Friedgut, 1987; Wynn, 2014). Because of the developed systems of underground mines, Donbas region became the best hideaway for former prisoners and revolutionists. As a result of its predominantly business orientation Donbas was quite separated and was not strongly influenced by political agenda of Russian Empire. It has got the reputation of important, but difficult to organize region (Kuromiya, 2015). In Soviet times Donbas was called: a “union’s stronghold”. It was one of the most essential centers of metal and coal industries. Kuromiya (2015) suggested that in Soviet time Donbas continued serving as a useful hiding place for many people. This was one of the reasons why Moscow did not consider Donbas a trustworthy region. Even during the period of the Russian Revolution it appeared to be difficult for Bolsheviks to organize Donbas workers for an action, since many of them were used to anarchy and did not necessarily have strong political preferences. As a part of the Soviet Union, Donbas inherited a reputation of being an essential industrial center with “uncontrolled workers”. The special concern of Kremlin was about engineers and representatives of “educated workers” who gave rise to the “Shachty Trial”11 in 1928. Unfortunately this case triggered the mass exportation and liquidation of educated workers in Donbas as well as the collectivization in agrarian sector. During the process of collectivization12 the industrial cities of Donbas became a

11 A show trial of three engineers accused in collaboration with former mines’ owners in Shachty town. 12 Stalin’s policy concerning the collectivization of agricultural sector in the end of 1920s and the beginning of 1930s. 26 shelter for many peasants who were deprived of their land. Kuromiya argued that the region suffered the most in the period of Stalin’s Great Purge (1936- 1938) because of Stalin’s suspicions of Donbas as a region with its reputation of being a hideaway. After World War II, many Russian teachers and doctors were forced to move to Western Ukraine by the Soviet rulers in order to Russify the Western population (Kordan, 1997). In the 1960s-70s Donbas was not serving as a “shelter” anymore, but was still attracting migrants. The region continued being the most urbanized among other Ukrainian regions (Kuromiya, 2015). In his work, Kuromiya (2015) described that the difference between Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity was blurred at this time. Cultural similarities and language closeness made it difficult to distinguish Ukrainians and Russians. Even the surnames were adjusted in order to be accepted in the Soviet society (many surnames became Russified). However, there were still structural differences in language preferences: in the traditional agrarian sector the working language was Ukrainian, while in industrial cities most people spoke Russian. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the 24th of August, 1991, Ukraine received independence as state (with Kyiv as its capital). In 1991 the majority of Donbas residents voted for Ukrainian independence. However, the following economic crisis and inability of Kyiv to reform economics sharply changed the moods of Donbas inhabitants. In 1991-1998 miners organized multiple massive strikes (Horban & Kotsur, 2012). They protested against economic policies of the ruling government. Workers were not satisfied with the growth of prices and were demanding certain economic benefits. The laborers demanded not only economic and political benefits, but regional autonomy of Donbas. At some point the strike was taken over by the local elite of Donbas (usually mine directors) and an agreement was reached, although it turned out to benefit the elite instead of the workers. These strikes strengthened the idea of Donbas being “against” the rest of Ukraine (Borisov, 2000). The second

27 president of Ukraine, Kuchma was pretty much supported by Donbas. In the period of his rule, the unity of workers’ unions was broken and many industries were privatized. This lead to the appearance of the so-called “Donbas clan” or business and political elite which dominated the region (Kuromiya, 2015). The tensions between East and West were mainly due to economical and political differences. However, it also had an ethnic dimension which further amplified the division between East and West, especially the emphasis on nationalistic West. The narratives about East and West were the most actively used by politicians during the Orange Revolution of 2004 (Kuromyia, 2015; Kuzio, 2010). Political preferences are very often regional in modern Ukraine. Moreover, as a result of East-West political narratives – people were more secure about voting for their “own candidate”. For instance, the candidate of one region is usually receiving the highest number of votes. As Osipian & Osipian (2012) described that from the elections between 2004 and 2010 (both presidential and parliamentary) there is a clear tendency towards the locality of the candidates, the “own” candidate received 65-80 percent of all votes, while the “alien” candidate from different region received only 35-20 percent. The same authors also observed that election managers and politicians often used strategies that emphasized the contrast of West-East concepts. In summary, Donbas represents a region with high ethnic diversity as a result of labor migration in the 19th-20th century, although the main ethnic groups represented in the region are Ukrainians and Russians. As Kuromiya (2015) described, it is difficult to differentiate Russians and Ukrainians in the region. As a result of active Russification policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and the high frequency of mixed marriage, it has become rather difficult to draw a clear border between these two ethnic groups. On the other hand, the agrarian sector has been less Russified (Karacsony et al., 2014). A bright illustration of this would be that villagers are communicating in either the Ukrainian language, or “Surzhyk”, a mix of Ukrainian and Russian

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(Karacsony et al., 2014). The unique history and circumstances of Donbas development contributed to the separation of the region, giving rise to a specific “Donbas ethnic identity”. The narratives of political elite emphasizing the ethnic differences of Western and Eastern Ukrainians, contributed to this evident separation. According to Karacsony et al. (2014), the ethnic divisions in Ukraine exhibit a “multilevel regional structure formed in the course of a long historical development and reflecting the nation-forming attitudes of Ukrainians” (p.130). In local and international conflicts, elite have been observed to utilize the complex ethnic history of regions as an instrument for obtaining power and resources. Furthermore, the actions of the elite can reshape and restructure the way people ethnically identify themselves. The case of Ukraine is not about clear international ethnic divisions, but rather about specific local ethnic identities. These were formed throughout the complex history and were often strengthen by political actors, who used the differences in their election campaigns. Due to the complex history, political divisions, Soviet past and mixed marriages, many of the citizens of Donbass are actually able to activate any of several identities, depending on the situation.

Section 3.4.4 The conflict in Ukraine 2014-2016 The ongoing conflict in Ukraine was fueled by the protests in the end of 2013. The protests were first of all against the decision of Yanukovich to withdraw to sign the Association with the EU in a week before the planned meeting. The demonstrations were initially located on the main square of Kyiv. This narrow area at the main Kyiv square Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence square) was hosting the Orange revolution in 2004 and after this Maidan started being associated with all kinds of demonstrations (Metzger et al., 2016). The demonstrators were mainly pro-European young people. They were prepared for a long and difficult, but peaceful struggle for the European future. In the end of

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November, the authorities made a decision to end the protest using special police forces. The attempts to end the demonstration only increased the number of protesters. This confrontation between government forces, opposition and demonstrators fueled armed interventions and death of more than hundred people, thousands became wounded. As a result, protesters and opposition won the fight and the former president Yanukovich left the country. During these developments, anti-Maidan protests were organized in support of the ruling power of Yanukovich. People who supported the anti- Maidan protest had mainly pro-Russian views. There is a strong evidence that Russian people participated in the protests. Similar pro- and against- European movements took place in many major cities of Ukraine. The movements against EU direction of Ukraine and Maidan protests were prevalent in Eastern and Southern regions. I have mentioned earlier that there was always local aspect in political arena that influenced general public. Yanukovich was representing Eastern part of the country and when he was gone, the tensions and distrust towards the former opposition was even more strengthened in Eastern and

Southern parts of the country. In April 2014, Mikheeva (2014) conducted a survey in Donetsk which showed strong ambiguity of public opinions. It was revealed that people were more trusting of Ukrainian than Russian media. However, the Russian narrative of “banderivtsi” was also quite popular. Often, in the blanks of the survey Oksana and her team noticed references to banderivtsi, to be precise 60% of respondents were afraid of nationalists in Western Ukraine. Another interesting finding was the fact that the same respondents supported both pro- Russian and pro-Ukrainian demonstrations. This is also reflected in the analysis of Kuromiya (2015) who described ambivalence of Donbas political preferences. The survey mentioned by Oksana Mikheeva (2014), took place in April, right after the Russian-supervised referendum in Crimea and its annexation (16th

30 of March 2014). Following Crimea referendum, in two of Eastern regions (Donetsk and Lugansk oblast) there were also organized referendums. In Donetsk, the Donetsk People’s Republic was proclaimed on April 7 and Luhansk People’s Republic on the 27th of April. Contrary to what happened in Crimea, Russia did not aim to annex regions. Consequently, the future of the self-proclaimed republics was either to become an autonomy as a part of Ukraine, or to proclaim independence. The confrontation between newly formed government and separatist forces in Donetsk/Lugansk regions turned into armed conflict in April 2014. The conflict has been characterized differently by various sources: as a purely civic conflict by Russian and pro-Russian sources, or as an international Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict by Ukraine, the US and others. In this thesis I would regard the conflict as the one that comprises both characteristics of a civic and an international one, since there are certain facts that support both statements. The conflict in Ukraine does not resemble ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians in Donbas, even though many people from Russia moved to there from Russian Empire and later Soviet Russia. On the later stage, especially in summer 2014 the protests and clashes turned into aggression of Russia. At the same time, many local Donbas people were fighting on both sides: Ukrainian and as it is called in the East of the side of “levy”. The most acute conflict became in summer 2014 when the majority of the IDPs were moving.

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Section 4. Results and analysis Section 4.1 The change of the experience of ethnicity as a result of the conflict and mobility process In this section I will explore how my respondents experience ethnicity, how they describe their surrounding and what changed in their views as a result of the conflict. I will also focus on how one ethnicity among others available becomes activated during the conflict or mobility process. I describe how this change was experienced by people with different views and migration trajectories. Furthermore, I look in what way the life in the new surroundings influences the experience of ethnicity. Throughout centuries different regions in Ukraine were experiencing diverse cultural and historical influences. This is one of the aspects that was used by elites in constructing the difference between Western and Eastern Ukraine, Donbass and other parts of Ukraine. These “East” and “West” constructions became one of the main drivers of the conflict. During my fieldwork, I did not directly ask my respondents about their ethnic identity, but I did ask them about their views on the conflict, about their experiences of living in new surroundings, and how the relationship with their relatives and friends who stayed is being developed. Later in the talk, some of them shared how they perceived themselves and whether it changed during the conflict. I am not able to present all twenty two narratives in detail, but I will rather attempt to show the most representative cases among them.

Section 4.1.1 Political and ethnic identities of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine In this subsection I will discuss how in the beginning of the conflict and in following mobility process, the political attributes of the IDPs’ self- identification evolved. In the Background section I emphasized that often political identity is coupled with ethnic self-identification in Ukraine. Moreover, voting preferences often have regional character. Nevertheless, since the

32 conflict is directly linked to political agenda, it affects the view and consequently self-identification in ethnic terms. Tania, housewife from Donetsk, openly identified herself as Ukrainian. “The problem is that people in Donetsk13 were mixed. They spoke only Russian, no one was obliged to speak Ukrainian. All Russian was cultivated, everything was mixed. People did not identify themselves as Ukrainians. I remember that when I was a child, we had people originated from different countries in our house. On the third floor lived – Moldovans, on the first – Kazakhs. For instance, the grandma of my husband was sent to work to Altay (Russia) and she stayed there. Her daughter, my mother in law, left Russia in her student age and started living in Luhansk. She spoke Russian in Russia, here everything was Russia as well, no one forced her to speak Ukrainian, how can she identify herself with Ukraine? No one speaks Ukrainian. For instance, in our district, for 100 000 inhabitants there were only 2 Ukrainian schools. I decided to put my children in Ukrainian school, I also can easily speak Ukrainian. My mom was Ukrainian, she came to Donetsk to study and married here.” Despite the Russian origin of her family, Tania perceives herself as Ukrainian. Having several available identities in the beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainian ethnic identity became especially relevant not only for her personally, but for her husband as well. Moreover, she indicated that was politically active. During one of elections14, she was an election monitor from Yulia Timoshenko’s party15. When the conflict started, Tania decided to migrate to peaceful Ukrainian regions, she did not consider the variant of moving to Russia. She found some contacts of people (unknown) who organized the housing for IDPs. She went to Kyiv and then to a small village in Chernigiv region where there was organized

13 Historical reference: she is talking about migrants who came to Donbas to work at mines (see the Background section). 14 She did not specify parliament or president 15 Yuliya Timoshenko represent a famous political figure of independent Ukraine. In 2004, during Orange Revolution – she was in coalition with Yushchenko that opposed Victor Yanukovich “Party of Regions” 33 a camp for IDPs. Her husband joined the family later. “I do not support the government now. The social help is small, the attitudes in the governmental organization towards us are not respectful as well. They do not care about us at all” – shared Tania. Although her position is pro-Ukrainian, it is not pro- governmental. To be more precise, it rather became apolitical in the process of migration. The center for IDPs she lived in was sponsored by the nongovernmental foundation and the founder of the organization had openly pro-Russian position. Tania identified herself as Ukrainian from the beginning, and in her descriptions there was clear that she did not separate political and ethnic identities. Moreover, she was politically active. Nevertheless, from her narrative it is evident that this politicized self-identification shifted towards the definition of “Ukrainian” ethnicity that is fully separated from the government support. This separation was especially emphasized during her life in the IDPs center and in Kyiv. If in Tania’s story the change of ethnic self-identification or rather reconstruction of Ukrainian identity emerged during her life in the center for IDPs and in Kyiv, for Lidia it began in the beginning of the conflict. Lidia is a history teacher. Lidia described that: “I have always considered myself Ukrainian, and my parents” .She stayed during the acute stage of the conflict in Lenine, her home town. Lidia describes that for a long time their town was under Ukraine: “Ukrainian army hold quite a big part of Luhansk region, but there still was a small isthmus, and instead of thinking about how to get this isthmus, the Ukrainian commanders just decided to leave this huge territory, we felt betrayed. We were waiting for Ukrainian army to free us, but they left.” She further states that: “For me it is surprising how local authorities allowed it to happen. Why in Kharkiv they stopped? Why everything here was covered by someone? I do not understand. Still, as for the ordinary people, I feel that everything appeared as a reaction to Maidan. People wanted to show off. Local officials started

34 spreading the gossips that banderivtsi are coming to kill you all. It was so extreme, that once we got a call in our school from the city council and were ordered to put children in the school bus because there will be “clean up” soon.’’ Lidia described that although the majority of people she knew had a pro- Russian position, there were still “normal people”, who supported Ukrainian army. They understood that the “war is between high officials, not between people”. Lidia tried to separate the government, politicians, businessmen and ordinary people. She calls “normal people” the ones who supported Ukrainian army, even feeling disappointed in high commanders. She attempted to separate

Ukrainian ethnic identity and trust in political officials. In described above cases women had pro-Ukrainian and pro- governmental position that was changed in the process of migration, as Lidia stressed “we were waiting until the Ukrainians would free us”. At the same time some of the IDPs I spoke with became disappointed in their “Donbas clan politicians” such as, for instance, Yanukovich. We were sitting in a small kitchen and chatting with three IDP women. As mentioned in the background section, Donbas identity and West-East dichotomy became especially emphasized during the Orange Revolution of 2004. At some point, Natalia from Stachanov, 33 (Luhank region) quite emotionally stated: “Girls, you know what?! I am mad at Yanukovich”. I did not expect such a confession, so I asked her why she is mad on the former president. - (Natalia) Well, I spoke with people who know very well the abilities of riot police, they could have just drive them (protesters) out from Maidan. - (Me) But they tried, and it even strengthened the protests. - (Natalia) They did not try hard enough. This sudden confession of Natalia shed a light on how people from Donbass perceive politicians from Donbas as “their people”. Natalia got disappointed in Yanukovich, but at the same she was quite negative towards the new

35 government. She also did not support the local city hall of her hometown. She stated: “I did not go to the referendum, I told everyone not to go – it was stupid. People thought that Donbas is feeding Ukraine, but I know for sure that our town receives lots of subsidies. I worked in the city hall.” At the same time, she openly identified herself as Ukrainian. Her understanding of Ukrainian ethnicity was not patriotic or national, she also did not specify that her relatives were Ukrainian. She described herself as “apolitical Ukrainian”, and to call herself

Ukrainian seemed natural, since she was brought up in the country. In both cases we can see that in some way people softened the ethnic borders by omitting strong political aspects which were prevalent for a long time in ethnic self-identification of Ukrainians. From the background section it became clear that ethnic self- identification can be linked to political preferences of people (Himka, 2015). In the process of conflict development and mobility, I observed the opposite very clearly in 8 out of 22 of my respondents. These IDPs attempted to separate ethnicity and political views. From their narratives it became clear that in this way they tried to preserve their Ukrainian ethnicity even after being disappointed in politics.

Section 4.1.2 Emergence of “ethnic limbo” in IDPs’ narratives Not in all cases people identified themselves as “Ukrainians”, even being disappointed in politics. A story of Kristina (40, Donetsk) is very representative in this case. The woman was working for twenty years as a teacher of arts in the local children center. She stated that all problems have started with Maidan. People, according to the respondent were divided in two camps. Her nuclear family was openly pro-Ukrainian and her husband joined Ukrainian army shortly after the military operations in the East had started – this fact she did not tell me right away, but closer to the end of the talk. Kristina did not hide her position, but was still quite careful in sharing it. She described: “I was not so

36 active in social nets,16 but my friend was. She even had to leave because it was not safe to stay in Donetsk for her.” It was noticeable that in case of Kristina, her ethnic identity was highly politicized. To support Ukraine and be Ukrainian in her case meant to support Maidan and the government, to be patriotic. When I asked about her position considering the sides of the conflict, she answered: “I used to be pro-Ukrainian, now after two years it has changed” . On my question “Why?” she further states: “If both Ukrainian and Russian media told us the truth, I could judge the situation. Many of my friends became disappointed. Ethnically I am Russian, my parents are Russians ethnically. At the same time I regard Ukraine my motherland, I grew up here”. There were several ethnicities available to Kristina. During the conflict, politicized Ukrainian ethnicity became more salient in the beginning of the conflict and one of the reasons for this could be “ethnic Russian identity” that was inherited by her parents. She refers to her “ethnic Russian identity” as something primordial, something she possesses but cannot change. At the same, Kristina associates herself with Ukraine, since it is her motherland. Due to such interplay of ethnicities in her narrative, Kristina does not have one particular ethnicity she associates herself with at the moment. At the same time, she does not call herself Ukrainian, because for her ethnic means either – inherited or political. When she shared her Russian ancestry she did so very carefully, and even with disappointment. She does not appeal to the fact she grew up in the country, has Ukrainian citizenship. Kristina experienced the conflict between “inherited” and

“chosen” ethnic identity that basically led to “ethnic limbo”.

Section 4.1.3 The emphasis on Donbas origin In the background section I described that the history of Donbas and the place the region took in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union influenced the construction of the “Donbas identity”. In this subsection I explore how this

16 She meant active in describing her pro-Ukrainian political views 37

“Donbas ethnicity” revealed itself during the conflict, mobility process, and adaptation to the new surroundings. One of my respondents, Yuriy (30) from Antracyt, appealing to the diverse ethnic history of Donbas – described: “How did people view themselves before the conflict? Well Donbas is a region where 120 different ethnicities are represented. We were just living in Ukraine and everyone considered it being normal. The only thing was that people who had never visited Russia or had only seen the large Russian cities, and had all of their information from TV thought that Russian citizens are prosperous.” He further stated that: “I cannot say that in Donbas the people were patriots, no one loved or hated Ukraine. I do not think people in Donbas did really consider themselves Ukrainians. Only sport united people. We always felt that we are Donbas, we are hardworking people. Many people had soviet mentality. If people knew how their soviet aspirations would end - they would never sign for this chaos. Now, the ones who were for the separation try to justify themselves saying that we are building the republic. A small percent of people believe in this republic. People do not care now, they just want to work and to get paid” The ethnic diversity, Soviet nostalgia, cultural, and physical closeness to Russia contributed to the emergence of “Donbas ethnicity”. Moreover, as I mentioned in the historical background, after the Orange Revolution, the difference was emphasized and became even more salient. Furthermore, as Lidia mentioned, often local elite (city hall, education, deputies) was supporting the idea that Western Ukrainians and new government are about to kill people from Donbas. This was also strengthened by Russian TV programs (see

Hutchings & Szostek, 2015). Yuriy also mentioned this in the interview: “When Ukrainian army became active in Slaviansk and when the airstrikes begun, people found confirmation of their fears. At this moment people started referring to Ukraine as other, because they did not see Ukraine

38 protecting the territory, but rather attacking them. People in my town believed Ukraine wants to destroy the inhabitants of Donbas. And even the ones who were for Ukraine before, they changed their minds. It was brain washing. All Ukrainian broadcasting was banned and people got only Russian news. I have never thought that the war can be actually happen in this town. Moreover, I could not believe that Donbas citizens can ever be politically active.” Here it is clearly seen how people experienced the separation propaganda and at some point, from “everyone considered it is normal to leave in Ukraine”, people started referring to Ukraine as “other”. Yuriy also reflects historical reputation of Donbas as “politically inactive region” (see the background section). No one from my respondents shared pro-Russian views openly, but at the same time, some of my respondents voted at the referendum. They described to me that they voted for autonomy of the Donbas as a part of Ukraine. At least four of my respondents referred to the autonomy. Here it goes back in the construction of difference between the Donbas and other Ukrainian regions, and the use of this difference by both Russian and Ukrainian political elites and media. To understand what exactly was called “autonomy” in the referendum questions, I found pictures of the referendum bulletin. There was nothing about autonomy, and especially as a part of Ukraine. But there was a question about the Donbas being a self-sustaining republic. People interpreted the questions differently, considering their political and ethnic self-identification. In some cases the decision to vote at referendum had economic motivations as well. Among those four cases, people did not identify themselves with the new Ukrainian government, Maidan. Moreover, as was already described they emphasized their Donbas identity during the interview, and this was one of the reasons why joined the referendum. After two years of the conflict, my respondents changed their ideas about the separation of the region, and disappointed in local elite of DNR/LNR. There is a clear difference between the

39 preferences of older and younger Donbas residents concerning the separation of Donbas. Younger population represent my respondent in their thirties. They were emphasizing the autonomy of Donbas as a part of Ukraine, whereas older population (parents of my respondents) who voted at the referendum often had Soviet nostalgia. Natalia (33) from Stachanov shared her experiences about the referendum in her town: “People went to the referendum as it was a huge celebration. Believe me, I thought all these grandmothers and grandfathers are dead, but no, they wore their best suits and were extremely happy. People are nostalgic about Soviet Union. Russia is associated with Soviet Union and it seemed for them that if they are with Russia, they will return back to Soviet Union. Also, some people were attracted to Russian pensions that are higher than Ukrainian ones. They did not understand that the referendum was about autonomy, there was nothing about the separation of Ukraine.” Even when people did not vote on the referendum and did not support the separation in the beginning, throughout the interview they often emphasized their Donbas ethnicity. To illustrate these conclusions, I will return back to Lidia’s story, history teacher from Lenine, she described to me: “Mentality in all regions of Ukraine is different. In the East we are family- and work-oriented. It is interesting, but I speak with people from the Donbas more here in Irpin, it is so easy to speak with them, maybe we have common mentality”. Lyubov from

Kramatorsk town also shared: “People told me that when Yanukovich was the president, there was stability, the currency was stable. Here in the Donbas we like stability. We are hardworking people.” In the similar way as separation ethnicity from the political identity, for people who were mentioned above Donbas ethnicity became not only the reason to vote at the so-called referendum, but also a way to explain the difference in views with host communities and Western Ukrainians. Also, in case when they

40 do not associate themselves with the community they live in, Donbas identity becomes the most salient.

Section 4.1.4 The change of ethnic self-identification among those who stayed in the conflict affected areas As was described in the background (Section 3.3), the ethnic differences in Ukraine have predominantly regional character and we can see it from the way certain regions of Ukraine can be identified as a separate ethnic group (e.g. Donbas). Nevertheless, in the beginning of the conflict the Russian as well as Donbass ethnicity became prevalent, and as my respondents describe the activation of Russian ethnicities was quite rapid. To illustrate this rapid change,

I will provide the situation shared by Inna (Luhansk, 49): “Actually, there are Russian people in Luhansk, some people have relatives or ancestors who were Russian. But what is funny is that suddenly they started thinking about themselves as they are Russian, they never thought about it before. Larisa, my colleague suddenly became Russian as well. One year ago, she shared with us her impression about going to Western Ukraine. She described how friendly people were to her, that she liked everything. Now she is telling me that Westerns are banderovci are going to kill us.” Although, as was highlighted in the background section, the regional ethnic differences between Ukrainians were emphasized in political agendas and media17 for a long time, the actual activation appeared to be quite rapid from the perspective of IDPs I interviewed. As Chandra (2012), Kalyvas (2008) described: riots and conflicts might trigger such activation and make it more rapid. Usually, activated Russian identity also becomes politicized. Being Russian or pro-LNR/DNR automatically assumes that the person has hostile attitudes towards Ukraine, and especially Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, throughout the conflict development, views of the “stayers” were also changing.

17 Both Ukrainian and Russian media 41

As Maya (33) from Dsderzhynsk described: “People do not identify themselves with anyone - they are just tired”. Valentina (Makeevka, 59) also noticed a change among her acquaintances who stayed in Makeevka. Before they often referred to Ukrainian people as “Nazi”, “Banderivtsi” (see Section 3.). When Valentina visited Makeevka last time she noticed that her friends do not use such expressions anymore. From Yurily’s narrative described above, it also became clear that there is also a reverse change, people who considered themselves Ukrainians and supported Ukrainian side of the conflict changed their views in the process of the conflict development. Throughout the narratives’ analyses, it became evident that there were several different ethnicities available to IDPs, but still not all of them became especially salient as a result of the conflict. Moreover, the ethnic self- identification in the beginning of the conflict differed from the way people identified themselves after two years.

Section 4.1.5 Donbas “Resettlers” ethnic identity In the process of adaptation to the new surroundings, IDPs might experience social exclusion, discrimination, and create a circle of acquaintances among IDPs. In case of Ukrainian IDPs, they are often referring to themselves and by people they encounter as “resettlers”. There are several reasons that lead to the emergence of this construction among my respondents. First of all it is disappointment in Ukrainian government, Russian policy and the elite of self - proclaimed DNR/LNR as I described above. Secondly, it can be the problems with relatives and friends whose political views and ethnic self-identification might differ, especially with the ones who stayed in the conflict affected area. The “ethnic limbo” or “ethnic confusion” also influences the construction of new ethnic identity. Finally, one of the main reasons is the process of adaptation to the life in host cities and communities.

42

From the theoretical section it became clear that the ethnic group can be identified differently in different societies (Wimmer, 2008). The way people are perceived by others might differ from self-identification. Consequently, even though IDPs might consider themselves Ukrainians, it does not necessarily mean they are referred in the same way. From my own encounter while doing the fieldwork in Ukraine, I noticed that in my surrounding people refer to IDPs as “resettlers”. You can hear this term in public transport, when people discuss IDPs and often IDPs use the term to present themselves. One of my respondents told me: “We have a special Russian accent, I feel I am being recognized on the streets”. Although the term “resettlers” is not always used in a discriminative way, the problem of IDPs discrimination in Ukraine is quite urgent. During my interviews I came to the conclusion that there are two levels of such discrimination: (1) organizational (government structures, employers, education system); (2) personal interactions. Twenty one from twenty two respondent referred to organizational discrimination. First of all, as I mentioned above it is the discrimination in governmental organizations, especially in the ones that are responsible for the IDPs registration. People described that they have to stay in long lines, their homes are inspected18, and not always the treatment of the governmental centers personnel is respectful. Furthermore, there are some problems with registering children in kindergartens and schools, Yulia from Yasinovataya (30) shared: “there are some problems with putting children to the kindergarten. So, once I attempted to put the child in the kindergarten. Everything was okay until they saw my passport – right after this I was told that they do not have places”. Also, majority of my respondents described difficulties with finding a job. If the person has a passport with an official registration in Donetsk and

18 IDPs receive social help, but to be able to receive it, their addresses are being checked. Inspector visits the houses of IDPs and not always the treatment of the inspector is respectful. 43

Lugansk, or any other conflict affected area of Eastern Ukraine, job offers are often rejected. Lyubov (26, Kramartorsk) is a graphic designer, recently she had sent her CV and portfolio to one company in Kyiv. After some time she was invited for the interview, everything went fine, but at some moment, when she provided her passport with Kramatorsk official registration - she was immediately rejected. As another IDP Natalia from Stachanov (33) described: “My husband tried to search for a job in supermarkets, even though he is history teacher, but no one wanted to take him. He agreed even to be a loader, but no one proposed him to become the one. They never told explicitly that the rejection is due to the fact we are from Donbass, but when they saw our documents after the interview – we were told to wait and have never got a call.” This attitude contributes to the creation of a separate “resettlers” group and strengthens personal discrimination. Oksana from Luhansk (37) described her experience in the center for IDPs: “The relationship between people was good, because all people were “ours”, from Donbas. In the end of our stay, we felt the personnel became tired of us. I even heard how they refer to our Donbas men as “alcoholics”, believe me, during my stay in this village Ladenka, I did not meet any sober men! How can they say something like this?” Oksana refers to the stereotypes of Donbas people being “alcoholics” that I described in the Section 3.3. Moreover, from her descriptions it is clear how she draws the between “them” - the personnel of the sanatorium where she stayed, and “us” -

Donbas resettlers. The descriptions and experiences of personal discrimination among IDPs are quite diverse. Some people felt welcomed and got a lot of assistance from host cities residents, especially people who were part of a church. For them it was easy to enter new communities. Nevertheless, all my respondents regardless their religious beliefs experienced discrimination of some kind. As Oksana (30, Luhansk) described: “The overall attitude is good. Our neighbors are very nice to us, they help with cloths and children toys. But at the same time, I

44 encountered people who told me that we deserved everything because we screamed: Russia, Russia! I did not scream anything”. IDPs were often personally accused in the demonstration organization and even war. This personal accusation according to my respondents was the most acute and touching. The attitude of the government, employers and ordinary people, affects the separation of IDPs in the host cities. Also, all of my respondents described that their surrounding and friends are mainly also “resettlers”. According to them, it was much easier to communicate with “resettlers” as they shared the burden of war and similar problems. On my question: “Do you feel as Kievlianin ?” (in Russian - Kyiv person) - In majority of the cases, I got the response that: “No, I do not feel home here”. At the same time, people also do not feel home in their home towns, cities. Oksana (Luhansk,30) described that she feels as stranger in Lugansk. She described: “People meet you as strangers. Even my mother started calling Ukrainians “naciki” 19. She screams: “You are for Ukraine, and you do not know what they did to us!”” The “border line” between DNR, LNR and Ukraine also strengthen the separation of IDPs. Long lines, bribes, costs make it very difficult to cross the borders. Even though there is no official border line, there is still the experience of the border. Inna from Lugansk described to me: “When I go home, I enjoy my house, I am nostalgic…but when I start talking to people, I understand that I am an alien here. When we enter Ukraine – I feel relief. Contrary, in the bus I heard absolutely different, people who live there (LNR,DNR) – they feel this relief after crossing the border with DNR.” In the narratives I often encountered that people address the place where they come from as “there”, they mostly do not use expression “at home”. At the same time host city inhabitants are referred to by IDPs “they” as well. Simultaneously, IDPs describe people who are also “resettlers” as “us”. This

19 nazi 45 contributes to the development of a new identity. In the previous section I described that in some cases people used Donbass identity becomes more salient. It is important to specify that when people described their Donbass origin, they did not identify themselves with newly created republics, but rather with the Donbass as one region in the past. The relationship between people who stayed also contributes to separation of IDPs’ in one group. As Nastia (30) from Pervomaisk described: “The propaganda is so strong there! If you come home to take some things, people asked where have you been, why didn't you protect DNR? ” In one family there could be different views and understanding of the situation. Moreover, since many elderly relatives stayed during the acute stages of the conflict, the things they went through and the absence of any other information than the Russian media broadcasting, built the wall between them and the relatives who left. In most cases my respondents made a decision to avoid the topic of who is guilty and what side to support. As Oksana from Luhansk (30) described: “Well, we decided to talk with my mother just about the weather and my son”. Especially, it is relevant for older people, parents of my respondents.

Inna, to who I referred earlier described a similar case of her mother: “My mother thinks that LNR is very good. Almost communism. Every time I call her she describes how LNR is flourishing. The problem is she can hardly leave the house, she is quite sick. My husband is on the contrary – very patriotic. As for the relationship with my mother, well we do not agree on things. Once we quarreled and then decided not to touch sensitive topics.” In this way people are becoming strangers in both host communities and home towns. This leads to the emergence of “resettlers identity”. Since the conflict is ongoing and experiences of IDPs are fresh enough, it is still possible that in the long term they will assimilate more in the host cities.

46

Section 4.1.6 Ethnographic notes from the field: “It is just Europe trying to atone for their sins” To describe and illustrate the views of IDPs and their experiences of West and East, I decided to include some of my ethnographic observations in the analysis. I mentioned in the methodology section that I have spent a week with a family which helps IDPs in Kharkiv. This family organized a daily center for IDPs which is based on the local Baptist community. Since I joined all the activities organized by the center, I had the opportunity to observe interactions between volunteers and IDPs, and between IDPs themselves. Some IDPs described that although they did not feel at home in the city, they did feel welcomed and at home in this particular church community. Vasiliy, the head of the program described to me: “we wanted to make them feel like home here, it is the place where people can talk, receive help and hang out”. The time spent in the center and the work of Vasiliy’s family assisted me in approaching IDPs and even in organizing meetings with them in their homes. In this subsection I will describe an episode from the center’s life which illustrates East-West relationship and the way people view this dichotomy. We were sitting in the living room with Vasiliy, his wife, and their child. Suddenly Vasiliy got a call, after the call he said: “At least pastor is on our side”. I took the courage and asked what exactly does he mean by this. “It is a long story, but did you see some posters in the room this morning?” - I replied that I did not, but I heard about them from some of “resettlers”. Then, Vasiliy and his wife told me the story of the posters. Once, there was no food packages in the center, and no money to buy them. Vasiliy and Irina were quite desperate, since there were people who needed assistance and were waiting to receive help. In this stressful time, Vasiliy received a call from Volyn region. The woman on the phone asked about the work of the center and Vasiliy shared that everything was failing: no money, no food packages - nothing. The woman calmly asked him to wait for couple days and she would call again. In two-three days the

47 woman called back and told Vasiliy that they are sending a truck with 12 tonnes of food for his center in a week. Since the ones who came to the center were mostly women, Vasiliy asked whether their husbands could come to help in unloading the car. Most of the husbands agreed and even canceled their job to be able to help Vasiliy. For several reasons, the car was too late and the men got more and more nervous. At the same time it was a great opportunity to get to know more about the life of IDPs from the perspective of men. While waiting for the truck, men had time to share their impressions and attitudes to the situation in the East and West. As Vasiliy described, many people thought that the food packages are coming from the West and sponsored by the EU “to atone sins for what they did in Donbas” this was how one of the men described his attitude. When the car arrived, people started unloading the packages. Among big potatoes bags, men found small wraps made by “chustky”20. In this wraps there were small packages that included apples, pickles, tomatoes - it was evident that some old village grandmothers shared with them products they harvested on their gardens (see pic.1).

20 Village scarf in Western Ukraine 48

Picture 1. Products that were sent from Volyn region As Vasiliy described, something had changed in these men when they realized it was not Europe that atoned the sins, but people who want to help, more precisely - people from Western Ukraine. After some time, “resettlers” approached Vasiliy and asked how could they thank people who helped them. Vasiliy decided that IDPs themselves can think about what is the best. The group of the most active women came to the conclusion that the most valuable gift to do something handmade can be the most suitable present. This is how the posters were created (see Pic.2). In some of the posters the topic of Ukraine as one whole was uncovered.

49

Picture 2. One of the posters that associates people who helped IDPs with angels.

Moreover, when Vasiliy saw the enthusiasm of IDPs in their preparation of the posters and proposed to organize a small trip for IDPs to Western Ukraine to meet people who helped them. Even though IDPs had mostly pro-Ukrainian position, they still viewed Western Ukrainians as “other” or even as “enemies” . Moreover, the geography of the hostile West shifted from Galicia regions towards Kyiv as a heart of Maidan. It is interesting to see how IDPs I interviewed that moved to Kharkiv view the Western regions and how they are changing their views. This change is represented on the very local level. The posters that were made by IDPs and their children showed how on the local level people managed to overcome stereotypes. As can be seen from the poster presented on the picture 2, from enemies and nationalists Western Ukrainians became “angels”, who are helping them. It was interesting that people also chose the topic of Ukraine being one whole, since some of the my respondents who actively participated in poster

50 drawing process were also voting for the separation of Donbas at the referendum. This rapid transition through the local encounter of people from two regions assisted in facilitating the national idea of Ukraine as one country contrary to Donbas being a “unique region”.

Section 4.2 The role of ethnic self-identification in the migration process of

IDPs from Eastern Ukraine In this section my main focus will be to show how ethnic self- identification influenced mobility. If in the previous section I described the evolution of the ethnic self-identification in the process of mobility due to the armed conflict, here I will emphasize on what role ethnic self-identification played in decision making process of IDPs concerning such mobility. I have already discussed that in case of internal displacement as a result of armed conflict there are several mobility stages. Usually, the first stage is spontaneous and is perceived by IDPs as temporary. The next stage will be relocation: might be temporary or permanent. It is also possible that IDPs will return to the so-called “grey zone”21. During each stage, IDPs make choices that are influenced by many factors but never are determined by these factors (Van

Hear, 1999. 2004; Faist, 2000 )

Section 4.2.1 The first stage of mobility Majority of my respondents were postponing their leave and then made spontaneous decisions. As Maya (32) described: “At one moment I just took a small bag and put all things I have just ironed in it. Then I went to the bus station, I did not know exactly where I was going, I had to go away from that place”.

Lena (33) from Luhansk also shared that:

21 A conflict affected area, where the fights can start in any moment, or are still ongoing 51

“I took the last train that was going to Kharkiv. I did not have even the ticket, so we paid the trainman to take us. It was difficult to leave since my parents are very sick. I chose Kharkiv since it is familiar place, I have some acquaintances, just not to feel lonely, but I did not really have someone there.” Similar descriptions I heard consistently. In most of the cases people did arrange where to go, but sometimes on the way, most of the time during the last day before the decision to leave was made. Here we can see the confirmation of Muggah’s (2003) ideas about “spontaneity” of migration decisions in the acute conflicts. Nevertheless, there are several circumstances that could make the decision more spontaneous or on the contrary – planned. First of all, children became this drive factor. Families with small children were trying to arrange their move when the danger became subjectively close: some were waiting until the neighbor's house was shot and some started leaving after the first pro- Russian protests and “referendum” took place. In both cases children were the main reason to move from conflict-affected areas. As Tatiana (37) from Luhansk described: “When I saw my child who was laying on the floor I understood I do not want her to experience this. At one moment we understood that we probably have to go, parents refused to go.” The perception of the conflict as temporary has also its influence on mobility decisions and spontaneity of such decisions. The fear to leave apartments, elderly parents, routine could push people to stay. Also, often the wives with children were sent first and only later the husbands would join. The role of ethnic self-identification in mobility decisions of the first stage is not always the most essential, since people are concerned the most about safety, especially for their children. Nevertheless, sometimes safety due to the openly Ukrainian self-identification can be the reason to leave the territory of the self-proclaimed republics and this can also influence the possibility of return. One of my respondents, mentioned that her friend had to leave Donetsk, because she was openly identifying herself as Ukrainian. My close friend from

52

Donetsk, who was very active in organizing social help for IDPs was forced to leave due to the his opened pro-Ukrainian position. He described that his name was put in a so-called “death list” of DNR. All IDPs among my respondents shared that there is a danger of being openly Ukrainian in the region. When people are silent and do not share their views, it is possible to survive. On the opposite, when the person is openly identifying her/himself as Ukrainian, and even more politically supports Ukraine – it can cost life. In this case Ukrainian self-identification is coupled with safety in the process of decision-making. The people who represent public professions, such as teachers, journalists, and policemen create an especially vulnerable category in terms of the public expression of ethnicity. I will describe this category in detail in the further section. It is important to mention that some IDPs fled from territories that were controlled by Ukraine or became under Ukrainian control. In these cases the safety motivation accompanied the decision to move, but when the territory became relatively peaceful, IDPs chose to stay in host cities, especially young people. Lyubov (26) from Kramatorsk had several motivations to migrate: (1) safety - the decision to move in a particular moment was quite spontaneous; (2) economical reasons - she comes from a relatively small comparing to Kyiv city and the career perspectives there are limited. Therefore, herself and her brothers and sisters decided to stay. In cases, when in the beginning of the conflict Ukrainian self- identification became the most relevant for IDPs, then even in acute danger the variants of going to Russia were not considered. Anna from Donetsk (33) described: “I am Ukrainian and have always supported Ukraine. When everything started, people seemed to be happy. I told everyone that we won’t be able to live here if this pro-Russian protest will become worse. I left only in 2015, I stayed for quite a long time in the city. Shooting were quite far from my house in summer, but in the center they started shooting. When I finally crossed the border with DNR – I felt so free.” At the same time IDPs who identified

53 themselves as “apolitical Ukrainians”, were considering more options. Natalia from Stachanov told me that her sister moved to Russia. As Natalia’s described her sister was “apolitical”, and she got a job in Russia and moved there right away. Also, according to my respondents, many of their friends did go to Russia to ask for asylum, but among my respondents’ acquaintances and friends who went to Russia, almost all returned back to the conflict affected territories, or moved to Ukrainian cities. Moreover, many people who identified themselves with Russia (usually parents of my respondents) preferred to come to peaceful Ukraine during acute stages of the conflict and right after to return back. One of the reasons is perception of the conflict as something temporary. People stayed at the places of acquaintances, friends. Furthermore, IDPs preferred to move on short distances, they were migrating to neighboring cities or even districts where the shootings were less dangerous. As Yulia (30) from Gorlovka described: “First we moved to Artemovsk to my parents, then they started shooting there as well, we moved further.” Even in case when IDPs decided to move further – they still perceived migration as temporary. Spontaneity in decisions and temporary perception of migration was one of the reasons why people with pro-Russian and pro-LNR/DNR views moved to the peaceful Ukrainian regions. While I was still living in Ukraine, one family from Donetsk region, stayed in the dormitory of one educational center next to my house. I met the daughter of the family and she told me that people here treat her very badly, there are many nationalists and she can’t wait till the time when she will finally move to Russia. Later, people from the center told me that the brother of the girl is fighting on the side of DNR.

Section 4.2.2 Social networks in the initial and relocation stages of mobility During the first stage of the conflict, availability of social networks is very important. Although the social networks, and especially family ties are

54 important in the process of migration, they are often used during the initial stage of migration. My respondents described that relatives are a good support in the beginning, but if you abuse their hospitality – the relationship might become worse. As Oksana, 37 from Luhansk shared: “My sister went to Khmelnickiy, to our mother’s relatives. Two families would be too much for them, so I was thinking about other options.” Also, very often relatives might feel obliged to accept IDPs. As IDPs described to me – relatives are the option, but temporary and often not the best one. Moreover, as can be seen from the previous sections, political views and even ethnic identities differentiated and this led to conflicts in families. Especially in the beginning of the protests. As Oksana further shared: “Everything has started from Maidan. Some people supported it and some people did not support it. When this all started, my husband felt that probably we would have to leave, I did not believe. At first, I sent my husband and my son to my husband’s sister. I still had some work to be done, so I stayed for one more months. I had bad relationship with my husband’s sister, so I could not go there.” 22The problems in the relationship was so extreme, that when the conflict became more acute, the woman sent her child and husband to the sister-in-law and herself moved to the seaside. One of my respondents, who settled in Kyiv earlier, and hosted Oksana’s family for some time, described that the conflict between sister-in-law started during Maidan. The sister-in-law was an active protester, whereas Oksana had pro-Russian position. Later, she took her son and went to the IDPs camp in the old sanatorium where the mothers with children were accepted. During this time, her husband and child were accepted in the family of the sister-in-law. Here we can see that in case of close relationship: brother, nephew the kinship overcomes identity and ideology. In the interview Oksana does not explicitly identify herself with Russia or LNR, but consistently referred to Donbass as a “unique” and “special” region. The

22 as was explained by the host family where IDPs stayed for a week, these relationship were caused by different political views and different ethnic self-identification in the family. 55 use of social networks and especially kinship in some cases can be weakened by ethnic self-identification. Another similar case happened with Natalia (Avdeevka, 26). She gave birth to the child in 2014, when the conflict became quite acute in Avdeevka, her husband (policeman) had sent her to their relatives in Mariupol. Natalia stayed there one month. The relatives were extremely pro-Russian, Natalia had different views and this always provoked quarrels, so she could not stay there anymore and decided to return. She was unable to return to Avdeevka right away, so she spent one week in Volnovacha at friends’ house and one week in Donetsk in the house of parents-in-law. Her parents-in-law were not enthusiastic about her stay and she returned to Avdeevka, despite the danger. In this case

Natalia was unable to take full advantage of social networks.

Section 4.2.3 The decision to stay in conflict affected-areas The mobility trajectory of the older population as well as their ethnic self- identification is different from the younger population. Basically in all cases, the parents of the IDPs I interviewed stayed in the conflict areas or returned shortly after the acute stage of the conflict ended or stayed. The reasons of stay differed. In the beginning of the protests and referendum. Many older population, nostalgic about Soviet Union were actively supporting separation. In her research report Mikheeva (2015) also mentioned this fact. I cited earlier Inna’s description about her mother, who was watching only local TV and did not leave her apartment. The elderly woman thought that “communism is returning” (Inna’s words). Moreover, despite the nostalgia about Soviet Union, parents of my respondents were much more attached to their property and life in the familiar surroundings. Considering the strong cases, when ethnic self-identification shaped the decision to stay, one of my respondents Inna (Luhansk) shared a case when the godparents of her child had different opinions and identified themselves

56 differently. The wife had a strong pro-LNR position and did not want to leave Luhansk. Meanwhile the husband identified himself as Ukrainian and wanted to move to Kiev. Despite the plight circumstances the family lived in - they did not leave Luhansk. Furthermore, even when the husband got a job offer in Kiev, because of the wife’s position - the family rejected the offer.

Section 4.2.4 Further mobility stages, consideration of permanent stay A chemistry teacher from Luhansk, Tetiana (37) made migration decisions considering her ethnic self-identification. For a couple of months, her family stayed in their summer house in the Luhansk suburbs. When the shootings appeared to be unbearable, the family decided to leave. They moved to Kharkiv, settled down, and got a stable job. Still, as Tatiana describes: “this city is full of Soviet (Kharkiv), I suffocated. I could not live there. Something changed in me rapidly, I could not stand anything that is Soviet after everything we went through”. After a year of life in Kharkiv, family moved to Kyiv. Tetiana further describes me her impressions: “You know, here people speak Ukrainian during the classes and the breaks. I feel much better here, it is like a sip of fresh air! ”. This case serves as a bright illustration of how ethnic identity can play much more important role on later stages of mobility, when people consider not temporary, but permanent stay. In both first and further migration stages, children played a role in migration decisions. Among safety reasons, economic considerations, fear – the children pushed to IDPs to decide what school to choose, what language will children use in school. Since, there were not so many Ukrainian speaking schools, only minority of Donbas residents preferred their children to study in such schools. Nevertheless, for majority of my respondents the change of the school language was not a big problem. But in one particular case of Oksana, who seemed to have quite pro-Russian views was searching a Russian language school for a child in Kyiv. They decided first to look for a school, and only after

57 this for apartment to rent. It is important to note, that Russian speaking classes and schools represent minority in the city and it is difficult to find ones. The school preferences in host cities and in home towns often show the views of parents who are choosing the school for their children. Valentina had a very pro-Ukrainian position, and put her grandchild to Ukrainian school. One of the reasons why she decided to stay in Kharkiv was: “My grandchild does not want to return, because all her friends left. Moreover, my child was studying in a Ukrainian school, and now everything is in Russian. She told me: how can I study in Russian? I will never return to Makeevka, unless it will become a part of Ukraine.”

Section 4.2.5 The return stage Even when IDPs return, their ethnic self-identification can also influence the decision to move forward again. My respondents described that many of their friends and family members at some point decided to return to the areas affected by the conflict. Especially since it was difficult to find job and the housing was too expensive. Lena from Lugansk told me that: “Many of my friends went to Russia or to Ukraine. Those who went to Russia, all returned. - Why? - I do not know exactly, but they thought it would be easier there, apparently not.” Yuriy (30) from Antarcyt, described that he had returned in his home town for two months. He and his wife were full of ambitions about their life in the home, as Yuriy described: “Well, I had a lot of ambitions, I thought that this situation can be very useful in helping people around me”. Nevertheless, after some time family decided to move back to Kiev region, since their future child was going to be born. All IDPs I spoke with would be happy to return, but only if the life was possible there. Even though the life in Ukraine might be difficult and people experience discrimination, or do not share the pro-Ukrainian views, they still chose to stay for children. Also depending on the profession, it is more or less

58 difficult to come back to the grey-zone or to Donetsk, Lugansk republics. If the IDPs was taking public government positions such as: teachers, policemen, doctors, journalists the return becomes impossible, since there is an inner conflict between imposed ideological values of Donetsk and Lugansk Republics and real beliefs and ideas of IDPs. Moreover, for such people ethnicity can play one of the major roles in their decision-making process. In the next section I will discuss five narratives of the workers of public spheres.

Section 4.2.6 Conflict between imposed and real values among IDPs involved in public spheres In this section I will describe several narratives of people who have public sphere professions such as teachers, policemen, and journalists. During my fieldwork, I encountered several people who had to move to the other regions of peaceful Ukraine because of their beliefs. First of all I will discuss the case of Lidia (26, Lenino) to whom I also referred in the first section. She was graduated as a history teacher exactly before the time when the conflict in the East became acute. Since she received governmental scholarship that paid of her studies, she was obliged to work for the government for three years. To be closer to her house, she decided to accept a job offer as a social pedagogist. She was also a class leader of the third grade children in the primary school. In our talk she openly identifies herself and her family as Ukrainian. Nevertheless, during acute stages of the conflict she made the decision to stay in her town. As

Lidia described the situation: “I worked for a year in school (2014-2015). Since I was leading a class in the primary school, I did not want to leave the children behind. Many of my students were in the town during the acute stage of the conflict in 2014, and I felt quite bad leaving them. We had very warm and nice relationship. For them it would be very difficult if I went away. When my town became under LNR, we

59 had to continue working, it was difficult. But the first year, I did not feel any specific ideological influence. The books were the same, nothing had yet changed. In the end of the year it became more extreme, we were ordered to prepare school meeting in the mornings to honor the memory of opoltchentsi23. I started feeling quite uncomfortable about having double standards, I could not go against my beliefs. So I decided to leave. I felt more secure about my parents, because the front line became further.” In this case the personal aspirations and beliefs went against the new ideology of self-proclaimed republic. This internal conflict between the self- identity and imposed values pushed this girl to move. Lidia also mentioned the salary was hardly paid during this year. It was evident in this situation that the personal views and aspirations played the main role in her mobility process. Also, since she was graduated as history teacher, she would not be able to find a job without going against her principles and ethnic self-identification. While people who do not need to publicly acknowledge their position can live silently in the self-proclaimed republics, in the case of such public professions it turns to be impossible. Among other representatives of the public sphere, I had a talk with a household consisting of journalists, more precisely: the husband was the PR manager of a TV channel and the wife was working there as reporter. In the beginning of the conflict, according to Yuriy, people were able to openly share their positions. It was not always easy, but possible. As he described his ideas: “Concerning my personal experience, once my wife was making a small broadcast about whom to believe: Ukrainian or Russian media. The director did not like it, since it appeared that at that point people trusted Ukrainian media more. Someone informed LNR officials about this broadcast and they started searching for my wife. We managed to escape. Often, people who did not have

23 Opolchenie (Home guard from Russian) - this is a military unit that was formed by foreign mercenaries and Donbass inhabitants to fight with Ukrainian government 60 the same opinion as LNR were taken to “podvals”24 and tortured. Later, it just became the way of resolving the personal business between people.” It is important to specify, that even though it was dangerous to share your opinion, it was possible to live in the occupied territories. Nevertheless, at some point, people of public professions had to decide whether they are able to become a part of LNR and DNR ideology. This was one of the important point in their decision-making process concerning future migration. Another case was already mentioned in previous chapters and it is a narrative of the chemistry teacher from Lugansk. As I described above, openly identifying herself as Ukrainian, the teacher did not feel comfortable in the “Soviet” Kharkiv. Also, once living in Kharkiv, during the first truce25 the family attempted to return back to Lugansk and even to start working in the school. Tatiana worked in this school for 20 years. Once back in Lugansk, she spent only two weeks working in the school and this is how she described the experience: “One time we returned to Lugansk and we thought we could stay. We stayed for 2 weeks. It is difficult to leave parents behind, that is why we returned. I even started working again in my former school. There was a feeling that everything was not mine anymore, that people are different. I understood that nothing keeps me there even after 20 years of working. Can you imagine? The teacher of Economics who prepared students for national competitions believes LNR can survive. I just cannot believe it! Some of my colleagues also decided to leave.” There was no explicit danger comparing to the journalist case, but once again we notice the conflict between new system values and people who support these values and the ones who believe in the opposite. Moreover, the education spheres is usually the most vulnerable towards the ideology. Nevertheless, not

24 Torture place called in Donbas, “podval” from Russian - basement 25 Minsk Protocol, September the 5th. 61 always there can be possibility or courage to leave. For instance, the pro- Ukrainian friend of one of my respondents, who under some circumstances decided to stayed in Makeevka described that her grandchild is from the family who identify themselves as Ukrainians. This friend of Valentina (Makeevka) described her the impressions of the grandson about studying in a DNR school: “My colleague called me and shared that her grandson stayed there in Makeevka and goes to the 7th grade, he is 13 He told that they are taught to be against Ukraine, that everything is against. Nevertheless, the boy knows that at home everyone is pro-Ukrainian. The boy is so confused that he told his grandmother that he hates all of this! My colleague had nothing else to say him than to be silent.” This case illustrates that some people are not obliged to share their views in public it makes it possible to live. Nevertheless, children experience conflict between the beliefs of the family and the ideology imposed in the school. The last case presents the a policeman that was proposed to fight on the side of DNR. The story was described by the wife of him. “When I and our small son were heading to Crimea, my husband was still working. We had Ukraine at this time. Then suddenly Ukrainian commanders took away all weapons from the policemen and my husband as well. At some point there were only four policemen with a weapon. In the night, unknown men with machine guns captured the building. The policemen were shown a small door to the back yard and they were ordered to leave the place or to talk to the men with guns. After this event, I told him to join me immediately. He took his belongings, and left.” In this situation, as a former Ukrainian policeman, the husband of Yulia had to either accept the rule of DNR and fight on their side, or to leave the place. The man decided to leave. First he joined his wife in already annexed

Crimea and then they moved to Kharkiv.

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All four narratives described the representatives of public professions for whom ethnicity and beliefs were important in making the decision to move. Since the conflict began with an ethnic element, especially in the period of pro- Russian protests and riots, and further armed conflict, people of public professions had to make choices considering the side they support. These choices directly influence their further mobility in case they want to develop professionally. Not in all cases, the choice not to support LNR or DNR automatically was translated in considering themselves Ukrainians or in supporting Ukrainian government. As was discussed above, it can lead to so- called ethnic limbo, where people being disappointed in both sides create their self-identification borders, or separate in a new ethnic group.

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Section 5. Discussion and Conclusion The aim of this research was twofold. Firstly, I aimed to study how ethnic self-identification can evolve over the course of an armed conflict and the associated migration flows. Secondly, I intended to examine what role ethnicity plays in the mobility decision-making of IDPs in Ukraine. In order to understand ethnicity formation I adopted a constructivist approach (Nagel, 1994; Wimmer, 2008; Chandra, 2006; Barth, 2000). According to constructivists, every individual can possess several ethnicities. In my work, I focused on when the relevant ethnic identities increased or decreased in salience during the conflict and pre-conflict situations in Ukraine (e.g riots, protests; van Hear, 1999; Faist, 2000). In order to understand what role ethnicity can play in migration processes, I applied a framework of three different mobility stages (initial, relocation, and return) derived from the work of van Hear (1999) and Faist (2000). The role of ethnicity was studied in the context of migration choices of IDPs corresponding with each of these three stages. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine serves as an interesting case study in which mobility and ethnicity can be studied together. There was an explicit ethnic element to the development of the conflict. The conflict has a very clear time course since it started abruptly in 2013 and has been continuing ever since. This made the case of Ukraine especially useful for studying the dynamic relationship between ethnic identity and migration process of IDPs. My study unfolded in two main directions, namely (1) how ethnic self-identification is affected in the process of conflict-related mobility, and (2) what role ethnicity plays in migration decisions of IDPs.

Research question 1. The evolution of ethnic self-identification Concerning the evolution of ethnicity, I observed that the conflict, or more precisely the pre-conflict situation (riots and protests) triggered rapid activation

64 of particular ethnicities, such as Ukrainian, Russian, or more specifically, Donbas. One respondent (Inna) described how her colleague discovered her own Russian roots and became extremely hostile towards Ukrainians in general, and Western Ukrainians especially. The Donbas region has always been ethnically diverse (in the cities) and difficult to control (Kuromiya, 2015). In independent Ukraine, the difference between Donbas and other regions was often emphasized by political elite in order to get support in local and national elections (Osipian & Osipian, 2012). The physical and cultural closeness to Russia contributed to the formation of the “Donbas ethnicity”. In the beginning of the conflict, during the anti-Maidan protests, this Donbas identity became especially relevant. Some of my respondents reported that their Ukrainian identity had become more salient. In many cases these activated ethnicities were highly politicized, as people associated ethnicity with their political preferences. This political orientation (and in some cases acute Ukrainian patriotism) reshaped ethnic boundaries, and made the person who is commonly perceived as an “ethnic” Russian become Ukrainian and vice versa. This finding corresponds with Kalyvas (2008) who described that during the conflict, certain attributes of ethnic boundaries, and even non-ethnic characteristics, enable individuals to “pass” into a new ethnic identity (like in case of my respondents, Kristina). Non-ethnic dimensions such as political preferences, make it easier to identify oneself with a different ethnicity. Ethnic self-identification was changing throughout the conflict development and mobility. In the beginning of the conflict, ethnicity was associated with political preferences and history of the Donbas region. Interestingly, over the process of mobility and conflict development ethnicity became less connected to politics. Some IDPs started identifying themselves as “apolitical Ukrainians”. This change occurred when IDPs became disappointed in political leaders of both sides of the conflict, but meanwhile wished to preserve their ethnic identity.

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We can also notice the change from “apolitical ethnic self-identification” towards a “patriotic Ukrainian identity”. One of my respondents, Tatiana (a chemistry teacher from Luhansk), was especially representative in this respect. Throughout the conflict development and mobility process, Tatiana started feeling “more” Ukrainian. Donbas ethnicity also became less linked to the support of the formation of the separate republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. At least four IDPs, who had voted for the separation of Donbas region earlier, shifted their views concerning the separation and used their Donbas ethnicity to justify their actions. They often emphasized how “unique” the region is, especially in terms of being hardworking. The disappointment in political elite and army officials led to the experience of ethnic limbo in one notable case. This respondent, Kristina, mentioned that she was from Russian descent but had always cherished being a citizen of the nation of Ukraine. Her views had been strongly pro-Ukrainian before. However, through extreme disappointment with the Ukrainian government and army, she became detached. At the time of the interview, she described she did not associate herself with any ethnicity at all. The ethnic self-identification among those who stayed in the conflict- affected areas also changed, according to my respondents. From strong pro- Ukrainian views and Ukrainian identities, people became much more oriented towards the newly formed republics. This was a result of anti-Ukrainian propaganda, narratives about Ukrainians “who want to destroy the Donbas region”, and disappointment in Ukrainian army forces and the government. One of the respondents described how her friends changed in the opposite direction, they went from being extremely positive about the Luhansk and Donetsk

Republics, to much more neutral positions. In some cases, the difference in views and ethnic self-identification between family members who stayed in the conflict-affected areas and those who moved out influenced their relationship and created a gap between them.

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This gap together with other factors contributed to the creation of new Donbas “resettlers” group. Among other factors that influenced this newly emergent ethnic identity are: organizational and personal discrimination in the host societies, the quarrels and misunderstanding in the families or friends who stayed in the conflict affected areas, the experience of the “border line” between Ukraine and DNR/LNR, the circle of acquaintances mainly consisting of IDPs. The development of the Donbas “resettlers” group can become a subject of the further research, especially regarding long term adaptation strategies (e.g. separation vs assimilation of the group). In his article “Ethnic Defection in Civil Wars”, Kalyvas (2008) noted that even when ethnic division causes the eruption of the conflict, it does not mean that the identities remain stable, the way people are identifying themselves in ethnic terms can also change. This statement corresponds with my own research findings described above. Moreover, Kalyvas (2008) suggests that civil wars are dynamic and can shape behavioral expressions of ethnic identities. It is evident that the conflict was provoked by the emphasis on Donbas, Soviet, and Russian identity in the East of Ukraine. Simultaneously, the conflict can change the initial self-identification of people. Kalyvas (2008) also suggests that ethnic boundaries in civil conflicts can become either softened or hardened. In the Ukrainian case, the ethnic boundaries experienced were also reshaped. For instance, the “pass” to Ukrainian ethnicity was adjusted by IDPs, who separated the understanding of “being Ukrainian” with patriotic Maidan movements and political preferences. Conversely, “ethnic Russians” became patriotic Ukrainians. Although Kalyvas (2008) pointed out to the important theoretical insights that assist in analyzing my own data, his analysis was mainly focused on ethnic defection. Ethnic defection is a process, when people who presumably represent one ethnic group start fighting against their co-ethnics. Despite the different focus of his work, there is a certain correspondence between his theoretical, quantitative empirical material presented in the paper and the

67 findings of my own research as was discussed earlier. Nevertheless, comparing to more theoretical and general approach of Kalyvas, who studied mainly ethnic defection process, in my research the main focus was individual experiences of IDPs in terms of ethnic self-identification dynamics. Moreover, I argued that not only the conflict itself might influence the dynamics of ethnic self-identification but the mobility process caused by the conflict. The mobility process in the acute stages of the conflict, adjustment to new host cities, discrimination or acceptance, relationship with relatives and friends who identify themselves differently, also contribute to quite a rapid change in views and ethnic self-identification among IDPs. These findings support the dynamic and constructivist approach to ethnicity development. Constructivism can also be combined with a situational use of ethnicity. The situational use of ethnicity was observed when IDPs expressed slightly different positions while talking to me or their friends. I had only one representative case of such a situational usage of ethnicity – Oksana from Luhansk, who had pro-Russian views, but did not explicitly expressed them to me. To study situational ethnic self- identification, more time and interviews with the same IDPs are required. Another interesting finding of my study is about how the perception of Ukraine as a whole can be captured through the interaction of people from Western and Eastern Ukraine. In my ethnographic notes, I described the story of the small day-center for IDPs in Kharkiv that received humanitarian help from the Western part of the country. In the beginning hostile towards Westerners IDPs, changed their position after receiving assistance. This change was reflected in the posters that IDPs prepared for inhabitants of Volyn region. Some of the IDPs who were active in the preparation of posters voted for

Donbas separation at the referendum.

Research question 2. The role of ethnicity in the decisions of IDPs

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Among my respondents, I observed notable cases of IDPs for whom ethnic self- identification played an important role during at least one of the stages of mobility. The influence was the weakest during the initial stage of mobility. According to Muggah (2003), the first stage is usually spontaneous, people are fleeing from acute violence and perceive their migration as temporary. That is why ethnic self-identification might play a smaller role in the initial decision- making process. Nevertheless, if a person openly and publicly identifies him/herself as Ukrainian on the territory of the self-proclaimed republics of DNR/LNR, it becomes life threatening to reside on this territory. In such cases, ethnic self-identification combined with safety considerations becomes the main motivation for the mobility process. In my theory section I discussed how ethnicity might shape the decisions of migrants on each level of mobility analysis proposed by Thomas Faist (2000). Consequently, this public ethnic self-identification will represent the first micro-scale level in his mobility analysis. My findings showed that the representatives of public professions such as teachers, journalists, and policemen are affected the most by their ethnic self- identification and sometimes ideological preferences. This choice is made when their personal values and identities do not fit the ideology of Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Four of my respondents decided to migrate due to the conflict between their identity and ideology of the self-proclaimed republics. The risks connected with Ukrainian self-identification was more relevant for the IDPs who fled territories of LNR/DNR territories. Among those of my respondents who left the territories controlled by the Ukrainian army, there was no risk of public self-identification as Ukrainian. The IDPs who were fleeing from the territories controlled by Ukraine during acute stages of the conflict, were often referring to safety and economic reasons for their mobility, rather than emphasizing ethnicity.

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On the first stage of migration, social networks usually play an important role in migration decision-making process. However, the difference in political and ethnic terms between IDPs and their families can make it impossible for them to live under one roof. In the most extreme cases, IDPs did not even consider staying with their relatives. Van Hear (2000) emphasized that in mobility process, social capital available to migrants can be transferred to financial capital and vice versa. In the Ukrainian case, we observe how ethnic self-identification reduces the availability of family networks. In such cases people preferred to use organizational help (volunteering organizations, state IDPs camps). Since politicized ethnic self-identification weakened the use of social networks, this indicates how ethnicity shapes the decisions of IDPs on the meso-scale level according to Faist (2000). Considering the further migration stages (e.g., relocation), there was only three cases when ethnic self-identification played one of the major roles in the decision making process. Tatiana, the teacher from Luhansk, did not feel comfortable in Kharkiv, because in her perception it was “too Soviet”. In all other narratives, ethnic self-identification was coupled with economic and safety reasons. All of my respondents who had children, did not see the future of their children in the self-proclaimed republics, and did not want their children to be raised in the schools with anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Van Hear (1999) argued that even in acute conflicts, migrants do have choice regarding their migration trajectory. Therefore on each stage of their migration biography, the opportunities can either decrease or increase. As mentioned before, Van Hear did not specify the possible factors that might influence the choice. In our case ethnic self-identification might represent one of such factors. Moreover, van Hear discussed that the choice to stay in the conflict-affected territories is also a choice. In my results section I discussed the case of the family where husband and wife identified themselves differently in ethnic terms. Since the wife was supporting LNR/DNR and did not consider

70 herself Ukrainian, she was against moving and the husband in order to save the relationship decided to stay with her, although he considered himself Ukrainian. Comparing my finding to the most recent studies about IDPs’ mobility and motivations, it is worth mentioning the study of Oksana Mikheeva and Victoria Sereda. In 2015 these authors published the results of the research project called: “Ukrainian IDPs: main reasons and strategies of resettlement and adaptation problems”. The authors studied both Crimean and Eastern Ukrainian IDPs in five Ukrainian cities. Comparing to my study, the research of Mikheeva and Sereda has a bigger scale and more general research question. Although, the study of Mikheeva and Sereda covers a bigger number of respondents and Ukrainian regions, the results appeared to be largely in agreement with my own. Concerning the place of ethnic identity in decision making-process, it was found that in majority narratives of Crimean IDPs the ethnic self-identification of Ukrainians and Tatar was the main reason of moving towards Ukrainian cities. Whereas, as for IDPs from Eastern Ukraine, the motivations appeared to be quite diverse. In agreement with my results, it was mentioned in the study report of Mikheeva and Sereda (2015) that people who publicly identified themselves with Ukrainians and were active in social nets were threatened by DNR/LNR officials and had to leave in order to escape the “death lists”. Mikheeva and Sereda (2015) also mentioned that one of the main motivations to leave the conflict-affected areas was children. In my study I came to the similar conclusions. Even though the researchers did not divide the migration trajectory in stages, they did confirm the practice of IDPs to “postpone the leave” during the initial migration decision. Mikheeva & Sereda also mentioned that IDPs perceive the first stage of migration as temporary, and this finding corresponds with my own results. Moreover, the researchers mentioned that patriotic or national (ethnic) considerations rarely play an important role in the choice of place for resettlement. In my research I found the

71 evidence of the fact that ethnic and national identity in some cases plays an important role in mobility decision-making. A bright example are cases of Tatiana and the couple who decided to stay in the conflict affected territory because of the wife’s pro - LNR position. However, in most of my respondents` cases, especially during the first stages of mobility, ethnic identity did not play a major role in the decision-making process. The results of Mikheeva and Sereda (2015) are largely in agreement with the results presented here. However, there are some discrepancies. Firstly, their respondents reported that they restricted themselves to a narrow social circle of IDPs due to their fear to share their attitudes with people who support a different side of the conflict. My respondents reported something different, because they strongly preferred to interact with fellow IDPs, completely regardless of their position in the conflict. At least in four cases I interviewed IDPs who know each other, but hold different positions. Secondly, Mikheeva and Sereda mentioned personal and organizational discrimination of IDPs and how this affects the perception of “national belonging”. People who considered themselves Ukrainians became “Donbas resettlers”. My findings show that it is not only the discrimination that influence the separation of IDPs in the separate group, but also their disappointment in political leaders, and the share of similar social situation with other IDPs. This can lead to the so-called ethnic limbo, or even to the creation of the new identity, such as the “Donbas resettlers”. Finally, the main differences between the findings of Mikheeva and Sereda and my own is the fact that the results of Mikheeva and Sereda have a rather descriptive character. The findings do illustrate the motivations of IDPs but are not placed in relevant sociological theories. My research can serve as a basis for more specific analytical focuses. Despite the differences in terms of theoretical approach, research questions, and sample sizes between this research and that of Mikheeva and Sereda, the correspondences are striking. Overall, this greatly contributes to the robustness and validity of my findings.

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The study of the ethnic identities among IDPs in Ukraine and the role of ethnicity is the decision-making process contributes to both mobility theories and constructivist approach to ethnicity. Moreover, it serves as a platform for future studies. Options for future studies would be, for example, to research the difference in migration decisions and ethnic self-identification between Crimean and Eastern Ukrainian IDPs, or to study further adaptation strategies of “Donbas resettlers group”. Finally, these findings can also be compared cross-nationally, for example, by analyzing the similarities and differences between IDPs in

Georgia and Ukraine.

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Annex Table 1. Age, destination, and occupation of the IDPs Respondents Year of Host city Home city Family Profession, occupation before the birth or situation conflict age 1. Oksana 30 Irpin (Kyiv Luhansk Family of Worked as a post office operator region) three, husband and a small 3 years old child 2. Tatiana 37 Kharkiv,Kyiv Luhansk Family of Tatiana – chemistry teacher three, teenage Husband – electronic engineer child 3. Lyubov 26 Kyiv Kramatorsk Single Freelance graphic designer

4. Tania 26 Irpin Lenino Single History teacher, teacher in a primary school 5. Yurij 35 Irpin Antracyt Married, has PR manager, wife – journalist a newborn child 56 Kharkiv Avdeevka Has adult Entrepreneur 6. Aliona children, widow 7. Anna 33 Irpin Donetsk Married, no Husband – works in Poland, she – children financi

8. Oksana 1979 Kyiv Luhansk Married has a She – manager at the storages and son husband worked at gas station.

9. Tania 37 Kyiv Donetsk Married has She – housewife, husband – three children advertisement manager 10. Kristina 40 Irpin Donetsk Married, has husband – solder (Ukrainian a child army), she is teaching arts. 11. Lena 33 Kharkiv Luhansk Single, child Lena was working in the bank

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12. Valentina 1956 Kharkiv Makeevka Single, cares Pensioner, used to work as for a accouter, restaurant. grandchild 13. Inna 39 Kharkiv Luhansk Married, has Tailor 6 children Husband – guard 14. Natasha 35 Kharkiv Stachanov Married, two Worked in the city council, smack husband – history teacher children 15. Yulia 30 Kharkiv Gorlovka Married, has Entrepreneur, husband – n/a a child 16. Olga Around Kharkiv Gorlovka Married has Housewife, husband – has his own 40 two children car service station 17. Maya 32 Kharkiv Dzderzhynsk Brings up a Drama director, worked at the child alone children center 18. Yulia 30 Kharkiv Yasinovataya Married, has Banker, husband – policeman a small son 19. Natalia 26 Kharkiv Avdeevka Married, has She is a housewife, husband – a small son policeman 20. Larisa Around Kharkiv Popasnaya Single, has Used to work at the local market. 60, not adult children specified 21. Svetlana 46 Kyiv Luhansk Married, two Housewife, husband – children businessman

22. Anastasia 30 Kharkiv Pervomaysk Married, has n/a a small child

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