Operational History

The Persians existed as a major global empire under different dynasties all throughout the ancient and medieval ages until the advent of Islam. Following the Muslim takeover of the Sassanid Empire in the second half of the 7th century, Iran came under Arab control until a number of Persian dynasties began to challenge the Arabs two centuries later. By the time the Persians had weakened the Abbasid Empire, Turkic and Mongol invaders also seized control of Persian lands from the 11th thru 14th centuries. All throughout this time, the Persians were, however, able to retain their ethno-linguistic identity. In fact, the Arab dominated Abbasid caliphate also underwent a certain degree of Persianization.

The hybridization of Persian culture and the rise of the Shia to a great degree led to the emergence of a Persian Shia state in the early days of the 16th century with the establishment of the Safavid Empire. Since then Persia and later on modern Iran has witnessed the rule of several other dynasties – Afsharid, Zand, Qajar, and Pahlavi. Finally, in 1979, the Islamist dominated revolution swept away the monarchy and established an Islamic (Shia) republic. The post-revolutionary political order of the last 28 years has consolidated the Persian/Shia character of the Iranian state, and despite their desire to emerge as leaders of the Islamic world, Iranian nationalism remains very strong among the country’s ruling elite.

Another key hallmark of Iranian history is that it has not experienced European colonialism although the British and Russians did establish their spheres of influence. This coupled with the fact that the Persians have a long history as a global power has driven modern Iranians to pursue great power status. Until very recently they had not been able to realize this because of the vulnerability of their western border, which has been a problem for them since the days of the Safavids. Back then the Ottoman Empire posed a geostrategic threat and in more recent times this threat manifested itself in the form of Baathist Iraq – the eight-year Iran-Iraq war being the prime example.

The Iranians have therefore known that the only way in which they could provide for regime and national security was to solve the problem of their western flank. Moreover, doing so would also facilitate their aims of becoming a regional hegemon and global player. The sixty percent Shia majority in Iraq over which the Iranians maintain considerable influence are an asset that could be used to further these goals. This is where the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ouster of the regime of former President Saddam Hussein provided an historical opportunity for the Iranians to advance their goals.

Another key Iranian geopolitical reality is that it is anomalous state within the Middle East on account of two reasons. First, it is ethnically Persian in an area dominated by Arabs. Second, even from a religious point of view, it is a minority entity because it is a Shia majority country in a region where the majority of the Muslims are Sunni. Both these two factors complicate not just its quest for regional dominance but even its national security concerns. As a matter of fact, national security for a state like Iran, can not be realized without establishing regional spheres of influence. Operational Principles:

1) Collaborate with enemies to achieve certain state objectives. 2) Support proxy non-state actors. 3) Making use of indigenous resources. 4) Taking advantage of geopolitical opportunities as they arise. 5) Using the Shia sectarian card where necessary. 6) Reaching out across the sectarian divide by supporting certain Islamist and other radical forces. 7) Forging economic ties with a host of states in order to prevent the creation of an international consensus.

This is why Iran played a major role in the creation of the Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah in the early 80s and since has been nurturing the Islamist group. Beyond these two large constellations of Shia within the Arab world, Tehran also maintains close ties with Shia communities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other states as well. While on one level backing fellow Shia has been a tool of Iranian foreign policy, radical Islamism has allowed the Iranians to reach out across sectarian lines and gain influence among Sunnis as well. Furthermore, supporting radical visions such as anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment has allowed Iran to gain further influence among the Arab and Muslim masses.

Its status as an oil exporting country has allowed Iran to underwrite all these projects as well as develop itself economically and militarily. The tactics of alignment with fellow Shia, backing radical Sunni Islamists, supporting anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli agendas and befriending other anomalous entities has allowed Iran to also forge the strategic alliance with Syria. Perhaps the most rudimentary and underlying operational principle the Iranians utilize is their shrewd political acumen, which allows them to take advantage of geopolitical openings. It is this ability which has allowed them to seize opportunities as they arise and deal with challenges.

A key example of this is the cooperation against al-Qaeda that Tehran provided to the United States (behind the scenes) in the wake of the Sept 11 attacks. Assisting the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan created the conditions in which the two sides worked jointly to effect regime change in Iraq. Additionally, the Iranians were able to use their influence among Iraqi Shia groups and the quagmire faced by U.S. troops in the wake of the Sunni and jihadist insurgencies to their advantage. Tehran has also adroitly maneuvered with regards to the controversy surrounding its nuclear ambitions. Iran has utilized the nuclear issue to secure gains in Iraq and vice-versa. Not only has it prevented the United States from pursuing an aggressive policy on the nuclear issue, Tehran has kept the international community divided.

Realizing the weakness of the U.S. position it refused to settle for the degree of influence in Iraq that it was being offered in June 2006 when the Sunnis agreed to give up al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the power-sharing arrangement had been finalized. As a result we saw Iran encourage Hezbollah to attack an Israeli military patrol, which led to the summer war in Lebanon. The Iranians were able to demonstrate both to the United States and Israel their ability to create problems for both should either decide to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Iranians used the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict to divide the Arab world to enhance its sphere of influence from the Persian Gulf to the Levant and assert its role as a player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Shifts in Operational Principles

Iran has employed a variety of the afore-mentioned operational principles as the situation has demanded and as such there is no discernible pattern in accordance with which the Iranians have moved from one set of principles to the other. That said, the Iranians have displayed the capacity to engage in surprise moves when they perceive the opposing side as weak. Conversely, Iran steers clear of the brink when it is faced with an overwhelming challenge. In the case of the latter, they engage in complex negotiations whereby they don’t have to completely abandon their position and are able to sustain the means to come back later and revive their efforts towards the goal in question.

Currently, Tehran is in the process of a behavioral shift given the post-Sept 11 global environment. The problems faced by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to embolden Iran in that it has the upper hand in Iraq and can continue to push ahead as regards its nuclear ambitions. Moreover, it feels it has the opportunity to emerge as a regional hegemon given the divided nature of the Arab world and the relative internal weakness of Israel in the wake of the conflict with Hezbollah.

Enablers and Constraints

There are a number of elements that constitute as the enablers for Iran, which include its oil resources, proxy non-state actors, alliance with Syria. Similarly there are a number of forces that can act as constraints to Iranian ambitions. These include the United States, Israel, Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, Iraqi Sunnis, and jihadists.

Threats to U.S. interests

The U.S. move to effect regime change in Iraq and the subsequent difficulties that Washington faces in Iraq given the Sunni insurgency, the rise of jihadism in Iraq, and the sectarian violence have altered the balance of power in the region. The rise of the Shia in the Iraq has not only allowed Iran to emerge as a major power but it has also led to the rise of Shia and other forces in the region. In essence it has altered the balance of power in the region to where traditional U.S. allies – the Arab states has been weakened.

Scenarios

There are two broad possible outcomes as far as Iran’s expansionist ambitions are concerned: 1) It is able to avoid punitive international sanctions and/or military action and successfully achieves its goals of becoming the dominant force in the Middle East. 2) Sanctions and/or military actions contain Iran’s bid for regional hegemony.

Resort to the use of WMD:

Given Iran’s operational history and preferred operational principles, it will only resort to the use of WMD in a situation where it is faced with a significant threat. In this respect, there are two levels of threats that Iran could face:

1) First, Iran could face threats to its expansionist aims. 2) Second, Iran faces threats to regime or national security.

In the case of the first scenario t is unlikely to engage in the use of WMD. However, if faced with a threat to the survival of the regime or state because it faces a superior military force it could resort to the use of existing WMD assets (chemical weapons). This would most likely be against U.S. or Israeli military forces. As for the nuclear option, it will remain a tool of furthering its geopolitical goals because it will be sometime before the Iranians are able to acquire the capability to harness the technology to where it will be able to fashion a bomb.