Bmf Annual Conference 2008

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE POLOKWANE ANC CONFERENCE AND THE PROGNOSIS OF THE 2009 ELECTIONS1

Professor Shadrack B. O. Gutto

Director & Chair: Centre for African Renaissance Studies University of South Africa (UNISA); Professor Extraordinaire, Faculty of Humanities, Tshwane University of Technology;

1. At Polokwane: Rowdiness and indiscipline of “disciplined members of the movement”; manifest attempts at cheating and attendance by improperly mandated delegates; allegations of bribery; alliances of disparate interests into camps; intolerance and intimidation; the victory of the Zuma camp and acceptance of the outcome of the elections

2. At Polokwane: The seeds of disunity and not unity planted?

3. Creation of “two centres of power” in December 2007 for purposes of eliminating “two centres of power” after the 2009 elections [Union Building (Government/State: Mbeki/Motlanthe) and Luthuli House (ruling party/ANC: Zuma)

4. The failing grand strategy by the new ANC leadership to find extra-judicial “political solution” to ANC President Jacob Zuma’s criminal legal problems: think tanks, study groups, including the failed attempts to infiltrate and use the Native Club, amongst others, and the use of the “arms deal” in the process

1 Notes for a presentation at the BLACK MANAGEMENT FORUM (BMF) ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SANDTON CONVENTION CENTRE, 16TH – 17TH OCTOBER 2008 under the theme “THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TRANSITION ON THE ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE”

1 5. Manifestations of disunity and intolerance at ANC provincial meetings and meetings of the ANCYL – including alleged manipulation of elections and violence

6. The inkwenkwe “boy” leader at Polokwane (the erstwhile President of the ANCYL Fikile Mbalula) is forcibly (and probably illegally) made “a Man” at 37 in Philippi, Western Cape, with the coercive help of Tony Yengeni and others

7. The ouster of President Mbeki by the ANC: plethora of “reasons”, some conflicting (e.g. explanations by the S-G and the Treasurer General); some cabinet members resign; installation of the “transitional President”, Kgalema Motlanthe, and the cabinet reshuffle

8. Clumsy constitutional gymnastics to regularize the re-call after the fact (neither a “removal” nor a “vote of no confidence” on the President and the cabinet by the National Assembly) – President Mbeki’s resignation to create a “vacancy” saved the country worse crisis

9. Party versus its Government and State Institutions: Dismantling NPA’s DSO and Parliament’s rubber-stamping compliance; attacks on judiciary as “counter-revolutionary”; threatening public violence and un-governability; the confused and confusing judgment with political overtones of Nicholson J and its opportunistic use as one of the primary reasons for ousting President Mbeki (Gwede Mantashe, the ANC-SG’s explanation) and subsequent legal developments

10. Near victory for Mbeki’s much maligned “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe and how South Africa’s domestic political contestations within the ruling party (the ANC) led to forestalling and near sabotage of conclusion of the Zimbabwean Government of National Unity Agreement – negative impact on South Africa’s standing and leadership role in SADC and the AU

11. South Africa’s domestic political contestations within the ruling party (the ANC) and the embarrassing last minute none-

2 show of President Mbeki at the UN General Assembly – negative consequences for South Africa’s leadership of the African Agenda, especially the reform of multilateral institutions of global governance such as the UN Security Council

12. South Africa’s domestic political contestations within the ruling party (the ANC), the weakening of functioning of government and the appalling dereliction of effective leadership in managing the heightened criminal xenophobic/Afri- phobic/Negro-phobic violence against peoples from African countries and unfortunate South African citizens “who look like them” – very serious dent on South Africa’s leadership role on the continent and the African Diasporas

13. The last minute postponement of what would have been a historic pan-African renaissance event, the African Union- Diaspora Summit, barely two weeks before its hosting by the government in October 2008 in Johannesburg

14. Voices of concern: Dr Allan Boesak, Arch Bishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, etc

15. The “divorce papers” and de facto split in the ANC; the ANC and the self-declared ANC Conventionists – predictions on what will happen on November 2 at the national convention?

16. Intensified purges of rebel or “disloyal” members of the ANC

17. 2009 Elections:

- Will the “ANC Conventionists” participate as a separate registered political party in opposition to the ANC and other opposition parties? This is very likely; - The IEC and the security agencies and law enforcement institutions need to be very alert and prepared to contain violence during the campaigns and during the election - The Conventionists do appear to have the potential to attract a significant portion of votes from the traditional ANC

3 constituencies as well as constituencies of the other political parties; - They will probably not emerge from the elections as the biggest party – the ANC is likely to still occupy this position – but they will not be a fringe party; they may actually emerge as the second biggest party after the ANC; the opposition size will increase in parliament and provincial legislatures – and perhaps two or three provinces may fall to combined opposition parties - South Africa’s political landscape would have undergone major changes of a permanent nature - The ANC might need to forge co-operation arrangements with other political parties; - Policies will change – although not significantly in the direction envisioned by the SACP and COSATU; the core of the leadership elected at Polokwane is a mixed bag of emerging Black bourgeoisie and those from the poor and the “left” – however, the neo-liberals in the ANC and the economy as a whole who hold economic power will continue to assert influence on national economic policies and direction - After the elections, the dust will settle and the country will require greater multi-partisan strategies of governance - The country will need to work hard to regain its regional and international leadership role