China S New Concept of Security Retrospective & Prospects

China’s “New Concept of Security” – Retrospective & Prospects

David M. Finkelstein

Prepared for the National Defense University Conference The Evolving Role of the People’s Liberation Army in Chinese Politics Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, 30-31 October 2001

Introduction Many thanks for the opportunity to be here today and present some thoughts on China’s “New Concept of Security.” When Mike Marti asked me to speak on this topic I readily accepted. As the weeks rolled on I finally paid attention to the assignment. I realized I was to be part of a panel entitled “PLA Modernization: Goals, Doctrine, and Strategy.” I then had two delayed-fuse reactions: first, I’d rather be speaking on PLA doctrine or strategy, and second, what possible relevance does this topic bring to a conference focused on the PLA. On the first count, it’s just as well I am off the beaten path. There is likely nothing much I could add to the presentations of my fellow panelists. I look forward to their comments and I am certain I will learn a lot. At the same time, given the events of 11 September, a retrospective on China’s “New Concept of Security” may not be all that irrelevant in the larger scheme of things. I have used the word “retrospective” in the title of this essay because the conference organizers asked me to revisit a topic I have written about before, back in 1999. And, as some of you may remember, a seminar on this topic was held at the CNA Corporation in October 1998. What I would like to do today then is four things. First, go back and review just what the “New Concept of Security” is all about. Second, offer some views that attempt to explain why I think Beijing came out with it. Third, talk to the military dimensions of the concept. Fourth, assess whether this concept is viable, and finally, place it in the context of current and future world developments.

Background to the “New Concept of Security”

Many China watchers first came upon the “New Concept of Security” in the context of the July 1998 defense white paper, China’s National Defense. The concept was featured in the very important first section entitled, “The International Security Situation.” I have extracted the section on the new concept below for your reference and review.

1 China’s New Security Concept

1. 1. The relations among nations should be established on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

  Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty   Mutual non-aggression   Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs   Equality and mutual benefit   Peaceful coexistence

These are the political basis and premise of global and regional security. Each country has the right to choose its own social system, development strategy, and way of life, and no other country should interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way or under any pretext, much less resort to military threats or aggression.

2. 2. In the economic field, all countries should strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, open up to each other, eliminate inequalities and discriminatory policies in economic and trade relations, gradually reduce the development gaps between countries, and seek common prosperity.

Such steps can form the economic basis of global and regional security. Maintaining a normal and sound economic, trade, and financial order calls for not only a perfect macro-economic management system as well as a sound system of economic operations, it also calls for strengthening regional and international economic contacts and cooperation, so as to jointly create a stable and secure external economic environment.

3. 3. All countries should promote mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation, and seek the settlement of divergences and disputes among nations through peaceful means.

These are the realistic ways to guarantee peace and security. Security is mutual, and security dialogues and cooperation should be aimed at promoting trust, not at creating confrontations, still less at directing the spearhead against a third country or infringing upon the security interests of any other nation.

Excerpted from “China’s National Defense,” pp. 6-7. Released by Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 27 July 1998.

Frankly, nothing in the concept is very new or extraordinary. It seemed back in 1998, and for me still is, merely a repackaging of China’s time-honored “Five Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence” and China’s discovery of what most other developed nations already understood: to wit, that economic security is just as important as military security.1[1] What was compelling about the “New Concept of Security” at the time was the context in which it was trotted out. China was clearly leaning forward in the international community to offer an alternative vision, however vague, of how nations should pursue

1[1] The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” were originally articulated by (then) Premier Zhou Enlai; first during the Geneva Conference on Indochina (1954-1955), and subsequently (and most well remembered) at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Nations in April 1955.

2 national security in the post-Cold War world order. This was clearly not in line with Deng Xiaoping’s oft-quoted dictum that in international affairs China should “keep a low profile and never take the lead.” So my interest in the concept began with my own questions as to whether we were about to see a fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy behavior because it was during this period that Jiang Zemin was globe trotting to create numerous “strategic partnerships.”2[2] Although many first encountered the articulation of the “New Concept of Security” in the defense white paper, this was not the first time it was put forth. Indeed, the defense white paper merely capped off more than a year and a half of clarion calls throughout the Asia-Pacific region by high-level Chinese foreign policy and defense officials for such a new alternative concept. For example,   In their Joint Statement at the conclusion of their April 1997 summit, Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yelstin called for a “new and universally applicable security concept”.   In December 1997 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen outlined and explained the “New Concept of Security” during activities marking the celebration of ASEAN’s 30th anniversary.   In February 1998 Defense Minister Chi Haotian called for the establishment of a “New Concept of Security” in a speech in Tokyo to the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), and in a talk presented to the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies during his visit to Canberra. Conceptually, there was not, nor is there today, anything in the concept that one would feel compelled to take issue with. But from an American perspective, what has been troubling about the “New Concept of Security” is the packaging that has been used to promote it. Time and again it has been stated that the “New Concept of Security” is an alternative to the “Cold War mentality” of “some nations” that continue to rely on military alliances and “military blocs” to secure or promote its interests. It does not take much of a stretch to fill in the blanks. And at the time the new concept was trotted out, back in 1997 and 1998, one read much more about what China was against rather than how China planned to operationalize this alternative international system. This is still the case. And as you recall, the use of the concept as a rhetorical vehicle to castigate US foreign policy and security policy reached fever pitch in the Beijing’s October 2000 defense white paper. Overall then, starting with the April 1997 Sino-Russian Joint statement and continuing through the defense white paper of October 2000, Beijing has felt a need to argue the merits of the “New Concept of Security” by juxtaposing it against thinly-veiled or openly direct criticisms of United States foreign policy mechanisms or specific US security policies. In effect, Beijing accuses the US of perpetuating a security system that will prove inherently dangerous and destabilizing both regionally and globally.

2 [2] The question of whether Chinese foreign policy initiatives in the late 1990s were reaching too far from Beijing’s traditional interests was one of the issues hotly contested in Chinese analytic circles during the great “peace and development debate” of 1999. See Finkelstein, China Reconsiders its National Security: The Great ‘Peace & Development Debate’ of 1999, (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, December 2000).

3 This tact will likely continue to detract from serious consideration of the essence of the concept, especially in the US, if it continues to be perceived as nothing more than another rhetorical device with which to attack US policies.

Why the “New Concept of Security”?

Explaining why Beijing promulgated the “New Concept of Security” is very much tied to Chinese security concerns throughout the mid- to late 1990s, many of which persist today.

First, Beijing’s call for a “New Concept of Security” is an indication of China’s dissatisfaction and frustration with the unfolding international system.

China’s much-hoped-for multipolar world has not come about with the end of the Cold War as Chinese international relations theorists had been predicting. Instead, what they more and more face is an increasingly globalized world with an increasingly strong and dominant superpower—the United States. In as much as China continues to declare in many foreign policy statements that it will work to create a multipolar world, the “New Concept of Security” provides a framework for political, economic, and security relations in a future multipolar world order. This framework has been missing from previous Chinese prognostications about the movement of the international order toward multipolarity. The concept, therefore, serves as a theoretical device.

Second, and related to the first point above, the “New Concept of Security” was quite clearly a direct Chinese reaction to policies and actions by the United States that were perceived as threatening by Beijing; especially Washington’s strengthening of its military alliances.

The concept continues to serve as a counter argument to the US assertion that East Asia’s economic prosperity—past, present, and future—is a direct result of the peace and stability that is underwritten by the forward presence of US military forces and US military alliances. Second, at the time, the concept was a clear reaction to the movement to expand NATO into Eastern Europe, which began in 1995, as well as to NATO’s interventions in the Balkans. It was also a reaction to Chinese concerns that the Partnership for Peace was encroaching into Central Asia—onto China’s doorstep. The US Atlantic Command’s combined military exercise with Kazakhstan and Russia—CENTRAZBAT 97—evinced tremendous concern among Chinese security analysts at the time. Third, the “New Concept of Security” was a reaction to Beijing’s assessment that in the long term the US would maintain its primacy as the sole military superpower by developing and fielding advanced defense technologies. Hence, many of Beijing’s verbal attacks on the US TBMD and NMD programs are often couched in terms that argue that developing these systems “run counter” to the aspirations of many countries that want to see an end to the “cold war mentality.” Next, the “New Concept of Security” was likely China’s response to the Clinton- Hashimoto Joint Statement in April 1996 and the promulgation in 1997 of the US-Japan

4 Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. This point, admittedly, is very tentative, but the timing between the two events does suggest the possibility of linkage.

Closer to home, when first issued, the “New Concept of Security” constituted a concerted attempt by Beijing to present a kinder and gentler face within the region, especially in Southeast Asia.

In discussing the “New Concept of Security” with PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials over the past couple of years there is universal agreement among them that, at least from an MFA perspective, a critical target audience for the new concept was the nations of Southeast Asia. We recall that the new concept was first formally enunciated at the 1997 ASEAN meeting. There was good reason for Beijing to be proactive in the region. Throughout the 1990s, some Asian nations began to view China’s growing national power and Beijing’s perceived regional aspirations with increasing suspicion and concern. These concerns arose from Beijing’s actions in the Spratly Islands, its claims in the South China Sea, and China’s apparent willingness to threaten military force as it did in the Taiwan Strait in 1995/1996. All this was exacerbated in some regional quarters by Beijing’s minimal defense transparency. Chinese officials were likely taken aback by the united front among ASEAN states when, at the Hangzhou Conference in 1995, Southeast Asian ministers protested China’s actions at Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. As a result, the “New Concept of Security” was offered to the region as part of a larger diplomatic effort to debunk the (so-called) “China threat theory.” Other actions taken by the PRC included:   Capitalizing on its favorable image as a “responsible actor” during the Asian financial crisis,   Acting in concert with the “Nuclear Club” countries to condemn the South Asian nuclear detonations,   Heralding its “strategic partnerships” around the globe, th   Grandstanding about its decision at the 15 Party Congress to demobilize another 500,000 troops from the PLA,   Taking modest but welcome steps toward defense transparency as characterized by the publication of the July 1998 defense white paper and China’s participation in multilateral Track I and Track II security forums, and,   Agreeing in principle to take part in talks aimed at establishing a “Code of Conduct” in the South China Sea. These, then, are the three main reasons I see as explaining why the new concept was offered in the first place. Let us turn, now to military issues.

The Military Dimension

Conspicuously absent from the formal articulation of the “New Concept of Security” is a military dimension. At best, it only states that nations should not “resort to military threats or aggression.”

5 This absence of a formally articulated military dimension likely led to some head scratching within the PLA; especially given the fact that Defense Minister and CMC Vice Chairman General Chi Haotian was one of the most audible voices calling for a new international security order. Even today General Chi makes references to it common stock in his publicized comments to visiting foreign defense officials. The first order of business for the PLA when the new concept was articulated was to publicly show its political support for it. Consequently, on 23 December 1997 the editorial department of Zhongguo Guofang Bao held a seminar to discuss and laud the “New Concept of Security.” As least as publicized, the seminar did little other than to applaud the new concept, declare it another indication of the correct leadership of Jiang Zemin the third generation of CCP leadership, denounce Cold War security arrangements, and assert how proud the PLA was that “China is the first to advocate a new security concept and a new peacekeeping mode in the world."3[3] The next day, 24 December 1997, Jiefangjun Bao carried a lengthy signed article (with an editor’s note to preface the importance of the new concept) based on the premise that the world must get out of the “shackles of Cold War mentality.” As the author went through the explanation of the new concept for the readership, at least half was devoted to the political and economic dimensions of the new concept. But there was an attempt to define the role of national military establishments, although extremely weak, self-serving, and aimed, obviously, at propagandizing the greater Chinese military readership. From the viewpoint of military security, the security concept requires: The military force shoulders the important mission of defending a state’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, resisting foreign aggression, and safeguarding state unification. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen army building, develop armaments, and reform military organizations. The defense policies and military strategies of all countries should be defensive, be based on avoiding conflicts and wars, preventing crises, and checking the escalation of conflicts. The military forces of all countries should play a role in the broader scope such as cracking down on terrorism and drug trafficking, rescue work, and humanitarian aid. All countries should not and are not allowed to pursue the doctrine of military interference and resort to military force at every turn. The military cooperation and munitions trade between countries should be based on the principle which is “not aimed at any third party.”

The article later goes on to acknowledge the following types of activities for national military establishments:   Peacekeeping operations (which, it is argued, are now in danger because certain countries are using them as the excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries),   Security dialogues,   Confidence building measures,   Security consultations, and

3[3] Niu Junfeng, “Cultivate New National Security Concept, Advocate New Peacekeeping Mode; Zhongguo Guofang Bao Holds ‘New Security Concept and 21st Century National Security Mode’ Seminar,” Jiefangjun Bao, 26 December 1997 (FBIS).

6  4[4]  Security agreements based on mutual benefit. And that’s about it. I cannot claim I have read all there is to read about the military dimensions of the “New Concept of Security” in the Chinese literature. But to date, I have seen nothing that gets any more granular than the points outlined above. As recently as September 2001 Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai made reference to the concept in a speech on China’s national defense. His remarks are not any more specific about the role of the military than the two articles already cited which written almost four years earlier. … China advocates a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination at the core, and stands for the promotion of multilateral security and security cooperation, including effective international arms control and disarmament on the principles of justice, reason, comprehensiveness and equilibrium through dialog and negotiations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the strengthening of economic cooperation.5[5]

What all of this suggests to me is that the “New Concept of Security” is much more a political and economic construct than a military construct. It suggests that the role of the PLA will be to engage in its usual role of support to foreign policy through all of the military diplomacy mechanisms it usually employs. It seems to suggest that the “New Security Concept” was not a PLA initiative and that the Chinese armed forces had to play a bit of catch-up ball to figure out where they fit into the greater scheme, if at all. To a large extent one senses from various PLA articles and through the speeches of its leadership that the PLA believes the role it had already been playing in foreign military diplomacy and its participation in international peacekeeping efforts was already appropriate to the newly articulated security concept. I would add that Chinese foreign military diplomacy around the globe is quite extensive and way beyond the scope of this essay. For an overview of this subject I would refer readers to Ken Allen’s and Eric McVadon’s 1999 monograph, China’s Foreign Military Relations and my own paper from the same year entitled Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United States. On the topic of PLA participation in international PKOs, I would refer the reader to Bates Gill’s and James Reilly’s 2000 article in Survival (Autumn, 2000) entitled, “Sovereignty, Intervention, and Peacekeeping: The View From Beijing.” I think that readers will be surprised by the statistics in the Allen-McVadon and Gill-Reilly papers. Is The “New Concept of Security” Viable?

4 [4] Li Qinggong and Wei Wei, “The World Needs a New Security Concept,” Jiefangjun Bao, 24 December 1997 (FBIS). 5 [5]Chen Jing: "Xiong Guangkai Elaborates on Two Characteristics of China's National Defense Policy," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 11 September 2001 (FBIS).

7 Is Beijing’s call for a “New Concept of Security” viable? Alternately stated, is this new concept going to gain enough traction that it is going to shape the greater international post-Cold War security system? The answer is simple: certainly not. For several reasons:   First, as mentioned earlier, there is very little in the concept that is actionable. The new concept is little more than a set of principles. Admirable principles in the main, but principles bereft of a framework around which to build a serious alternative international security structure.   Second, the packaging of the concept has been too heavily laced with anti-US rhetoric. While many countries will find the principles attractive “in principle” many are not going to be disposed to sign onto a construct that has taken on an anti-US flavor. The exception, of course, will be those nations that already oppose the US.   Third, at least three of the five major poles in China’s multipolar world order— namely Japan, Western Europe, and the United States—seem to have their own ideas about what the post-Cold War order should look like. And the fourth pole, Russia, is now straddling both sides of the fence, as a result of the events of 911.   Fourth, those nations in Asia that are convinced that the presence of US military forces is a stabilizer in the region are not going to be talked out of it by Beijing. Indeed, US defense relations with Australia and Japan have strengthened in the past couple of years, and some Southeast Asian nations, Singapore for one, are eager to be accommodating to that presence.   Fifth, NATO is not going to disband. If anything it has been strengthened by the PKOs in the Balkans and the invocation of Article 5 pursuant to the attack on the US in September 2001. Moreover, NATO remains quite attractive to current non- members in Eastern Europe, some in Central Asia and, potentially, Russia itself. And in spite of the ambivalence of some European nations over the US National Missile Defense program and US-European frictions over the “Euro Corps,” security relations on both sides of the Atlantic remain strong.   Finally, it has been a little over three years since I first encountered the “New Concept of Security,” and I must say that in retrospect it appears less and less to have been intended to actually replace the larger international order than intended to shape China’s peripheral security environment.

Is The “New Concept of Security” An “Empty Concept,” Then? Is the “New Concept of Security” a meaningless initiative, then? No, not entirely. In fact, in an ironic twist of circumstance there is one region of the world in which the concept is being given form, where it is in the process of being operationalized, and in which new security policy precedents are taking shape—even for China. It is in the very region of the world that rivets our own attention at the moment. That region, of course, is Central Asia. And I refer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formally established in June 2001; an outgrowth of the “Shanghai Five” group originally consisting of China, Russia, Kyrgizstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. With the establishment of the SCO, a sixth member, Uzbekistan, joined the group. The original “Shanghai Five” established their group in 1996 for the express purpose of:

8   Working out peacefully their extent border disputes,

  Instituting military confidence building measures among their respective armed forces in the border regions, and

  Cooperating and coordinating cross-border security due to the terrorist, separatist, and criminal activities that had been plaguing each in the border areas.6[6]

With the creation of the SCO, the prospect of security cooperation among the members is growing. Decisions have been made to establish an anti-terrorism center in Bishkek, and the possibility of combined military exercises to secure the border areas has been under consideration since at least June 2001. This is simply unprecedented for China. For one thing. This is the first time in the history of the PRC that Beijing is a formal signatory to a multinational organization the primary purpose of which is security. Second, if the SCO countries actually do conduct a combined military exercise, it will be a big first for the People’s Liberation Army. We shall have to wait and see. But beyond these first two points, this is the first time that the

Key Events for “Shanghai Five” & Shanghai Cooperation Organization

  1996 (Shanghai): Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Sphere in Border Areas.

  1997 (Moscow): Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border

Areas.

  1998 (Astana): Meetings to finalize 1996 and 1997 agreements on border issues.

  1999 (Bishkek): Meetings to finalize 1996 and 1997 agreements on border issues.

  2000 (Dushanbe): Meetings to finalize 1996 and 1997 agreements on border issues. Dushanbe Declaration promulgated.

  28 April 2001 (Moscow): Meeting of Shanghai Five Foreign Ministers.

6[6]   And of14 course, June the 2001 creation (Shanghai): of the “Shanghai Meeting 5” offered of Defense the collateral Ministers benefit of of countering Shanghai what Five was Plus perceivedUzbekistan. in both Beijing and Moscow to be tentative moves on the part of the US to achieve some degree of presence in Central Asia. For example, US military engagement activities in the region were early on focused on Kazakhstan due to concern over extent stockpiles of former Soviet nuclear fissile materials, and  I have already 15 June made reference 2001 (Shanghai): to the CENTCOM Shanghai exercise Treaty CENTAZBAT-97. on Cracking In the case Down of Tashkent, on Terrorism, the USSeparatism, Central Command and Extremism.had been building (Also ties known to the Uzbekas Shanghai military sinceConvention. at least 1995. Decision See C.J. to Chivers, establish a “Longcounter Before terrorism War, Green center Berets in BuiltBiskek Military to combat Ties To “terrorism,Uzbekistan,” separatism,The New York and Times extremism.”, 25 October Will 2001,also p. look 1. at possibility of future combined military exercises among SCO members.)

  15 June 2001 (Shanghai): Declaration of the Formation of the “Shanghai Cooperation . Organization.”

9 Key Events for “Shanghai Five” & “Shanghai Cooperation Organization

PRC has taken the lead, an active role, in the creation of a multilateral security organization. The “Shanghai Five” and its successor, the SCO, has been and continues to be hailed by the Chinese as the very epitome of what the “New Concept of Security” is supposed to be about. As they see it, the SCO is primarily about security, but has political and economic components. It is about mutual security and working out differences amicably. It is about enhancing collective security “without being aimed at a third party.” In short, Beijing is pointing to at least one instance in which the “New Concept of Security” can arguably be said to have taken form.7[7] But even here, the PRC has not been content to showcase the SCO and the “Shanghai Spirit” on its own merits. Some “Shanghai Five” joint statements have been “shanghaied” by Beijing to condemn various US policies, such as the US TBMD program, and to rally support for the sanctity of the 1972 ABM Treaty and all that it implies for the US NMD program.8[8] It is difficult to accept at face value that the governments in Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Astana feel that a transfer of US TBMD to Taiwan or its “spread” to the Pacific could pose a threat to their national security interests. This is unfortunate because if one stands back from the polemics there actually is a case to be made that the SCO is a unique form of post-Cold War international security cooperation. At the same time, let us consider what this particular “success” for the “New Concept of Security” tells us about the concept in a larger framework.   First, the “New Concept of Security” did not take hold in the primary region in Asia for which it was originally intended---Southeast Asia.9[9] This is probably because the US presence (political, economic, military, cultural) is too strong and affinities in the region for many US security policies are considerable. This also probably the case because some nations in Southeast Asia view China as the potential problem to stability, not its potential solution. Moreover, the countries in this region have no common set of overarching security concerns that draw them together—and in some cases they have extent security differences; hence the utility of the US as “honest broker.”

7 [7] For articles by Chinese analysts that view the SCO through a “New Concept of Security” lens see: Xu Tao, “Promoting the ‘Shanghai Five’ Spirit for Regional Cooperation,” in Contemporary International Relations (Beijing: CICIR), Vol. 11, No. 5, May 2001, pp. 14-24, and Xia Yishan, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization As I See It,” in Foreign Affairs Journal (Beijing: Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs), No. 61, September 2001, pp. 8-13. 8 [8] See the Dushanbe Statement of the Shanghai Five (July 2000) for statements opposing the spread of TBMD to the Pacific, the sanctity of the ABM Treaty, opposition to so-called humanitarian interventions outside of UNSC auspices, etc. 9 [9] One of the chief intellectual architects of the new concept admitted with some chagrin the failure of the concept to take root in Southeast Asia, but he argued, somewhat defensively, that the SCO had salvaged the concept. Interview, October 2000.

10   Next, let us argue for the moment that the “New Concept of Security” does work in at least one region of the world: Central Asia. How to explain this? First, all of the countries in the region agree they share a common security problem: the vulnerability of their borders and what the Chinese term the “three evils” of "terrorism, splitism, and fanaticism." Second, Central Asia is a region where for the most part (at least before 911) there was precious little US presence with a big “P” (political, economic, military). Third, and related to the previous point, it is a region where China and Russia are the dominant powers. And fourth, it is one region where some countries see China as a potential solution to concerns about a lingering (pre-independence) Russian hegemony.

Concluding Comments

About The “New Concept of Security”

First permit some concluding thoughts, a recapitulation really, of my evolving views about the larger issue of China’s “New Concept of Security.”   First, so far, the “New Concept of Security” does not seem to have had much of an impact around the globe as an alternative international security architecture. This is primarily because it is a set of principles that are in search of actionable suggestions. The principles are fine but how are the nations of the world expected to execute them?   Second, the “New Concept of Security” has not had the greatest impact where it was originally intended ---among the countries of Southeast Asia.   Third, the anti-US packaging that the new concept is often wrapped in detracts from it. This is too bad. In theory, the principles should be appealing. Especially in these troubled times. It is, however, a bit ironic that the very concept that is supposed to replace the “Cold War mentality” is often propagated in rhetoric that recalls Cold War “wordsmanship” between the US and the Soviets. The packaging smacks too much of a “zero-sum game” theoretical competition.   Fourth, we can speculate that the “New Concept of Security” will have limited influence beyond the Chinese periphery. It will probably accrue supporters in principle in the greater developing world (Africa, Latin America, perhaps the Middle East), but such support will more than likely go no further than lip service agreement to the principles in the concept. Where the US or some of its key allies and supporters (NATO and beyond) have a presence and commitment (not merely military but political and economic) the concept will have difficulty accruing any gravitas.   Fifth, the “New Concept of Security” will continue to be invoked by Chinese leaders in meetings with foreign officials and at international gatherings—it has become symbolic of China’s desire to be viewed as a serious world player. And, even if theoretical, it represents Beijing’s need to attempt to shape the international security environment as it becomes more and more enmeshed in the global political economy.

About The “New Concept of Security” in the Wake of 911

11 The events of 911 have underscored the key weakness of the “New Security Concept” as originally formulated. The new concept is, in the main, a preventative formula. It offers ways in which nations should conduct their relations to avoid conflict or, in the worst case, to resolve security differences. It does not offer much in the way of what should happen when political relations and negotiation break down. The “New Concept of Security” was not meant to address security threats from non-state actors, although the entire “Shanghai Five” (and SCO) framework has evolved quickly to specifically address such threats. It may turn out that the events of 911, and especially the US’s and the international community’s response to them, will define post-Cold War international security relations in ways none of us, not even the Chinese, could have imagined. The wide-ranging international cooperation and support the United States is enjoying from some quarters around the globe was hitherto difficult to imagine. It may just be that another “new concept of security” is de facto starting to unfold which is not necessarily at odds with the principles in the original Chinese version. But, ironically, if the international response and realignments due to 911 do in fact serve as a the basis for a new concept of international security, then it will have occured because of what the US did, not China’s enunciation of a need for new principles. There is every reason to hope that Beijing will want to be a key partner in the post-Cold War international security environment that is unfolding. The October 2001 declaration of Presidents Bush and Jiang in Shanghai to seek a cooperative and constructive relationship is a hopeful first step.