Socio-Economic Factors Impacting Fertility Preferences and Fertility Behaviours in Shanghai
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Socio-economic factors impacting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours in Shanghai
Erin Kennedy Submitted August, 2010 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my parents Joan and Vern Kennedy, my brother Ryan Kennedy and my boyfriend Sheng Hao for their continued support, constant belief in me and unconditional love. I would like to thank Kjell Nilsson and Fan Li Zhu for the opportunity to be the first student to complete a double masters’ degree from Lund University and Fudan University. I would also like to thank my advising professors, Professor Li Zhang and Professor Max Koch, for their guidance. Finally, I have been lucky enough to have had additional professors providing feedback and encouragement throughout my academic career and for this I must thank Professor Frank Tester, Professor Ho Hon Leung and Professor Cheng Yuan.
2 ABSTRACT
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to explore the current factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai among the first single-child generation who are now entering into their childbearing years. In order to gain a more clear understanding of fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai the following areas were explored in an attempt to discover the institutional/policy variables and the socio-economic variables that are impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour: the number of children preferred by the participants, the actual number of children had or planned to have by the participants, the age or time of having a first child, the factors affecting a participant’s fertility preference and fertility behaviour, and the desired future direction of the family planning policy.
Considering that single-child couples are now allowed to have two children in Shanghai, discovering the number of children preferred by a couple and the actual fertility behaviour are initial indicators of the affect the family planning policy has had on fertility preference and fertility behaviour. The age or timing of having a first child is an indicator of the impact of new socio-economic opportunities that may be affecting an individual’s fertility preference and fertility behaviour. Discovering the factors that are affecting the participant’s fertility preference and fertility behaviour will bring to light the socio- economic and cultural variables that may be impacting fertility within Shanghai.
Method: Ethnographically grounded. In-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted while using semi-structured questions. The questions focused on the following areas in an attempt to discover the institutional/policy variables and the socio-economic variables that are impacting fertility preference: the number of children preferred by the participants, the age or time of having a first child, the factors affecting a participant’s fertility preference, and the desired future direction of the family planning policy.
3 Participants were recruited through the use of two strategies; first, a convenience sampling method, and second, a snowball strategy. These methods were decided to be the most effective due to the sensitivity of some of the topics discussed and the cultural tendency to not want to openly discuss some political topics, particularly with strangers. These strategies allowed me to utilize my personal relationships as sources for finding participants and being referred to other potential participants. The selection requirements of potential participants included: (1) those who identify themselves as Shanghainese or having lived in Shanghai for at least five years. (2) A second group was formed as a comparison group; the majority of people in this group were not Shanghainese but had been living in Shanghai for a minimum of two years. (3) Those that have stake-holds in Shanghai either through a business operation that supports their livelihood, through birth or through family ties; (4) those who are of the targeted generation of 24-35 years old.
Results: Socio-economic development has brought opportunity, responsibility and pressure. All participants discussed money, time and filial piety as being the main factor for deciding how many children to have. The re-occurring financial impacting factor discussed by all male participants was the responsibility of buying a home prior to marriage. The re-occurring financial impacting factor discussed by all male and female participants was the responsibility of filial piety, taking care of their parents. There was a gendered response when discussing the issue of time, as more women than men discussed a concern for having enough time for career development, time for one’s self and child care time if they had more than one child.
Conclusion: Socio-economic factors have replaced the institutional/policy factors in regards to their affect of fertility preference and fertility behaviour. In order for socio- economic development to continue there needs to be an increased focus on creating social safety nets that will assist the single-child generation in balancing there new responsibilities. Fertility preferences and fertility behaviours in the midst of the ever progressing socio-economic development that is taking urban areas in China by storm are of particular interest when considering the potential course of future social and economic development. Within the results there is evidence that institutional/policy factors are no
4 longer the dominating factors that are impacting the participants’ fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Within urban areas in China, particularly Shanghai, the fact that fertility rates have dropped below the level of re-generation is causing alarm for social scientist, demographers and population policy officials. As Shanghai is the most progressive and developed city in Shanghai, if this city is not able to maintain its quality population in the face of development, concern needs to be raised regarding the future development of the rest of the country.
5 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... 2 ABSTRACT...... 3 CHAPTER 1...... 8 INTRODUCTION...... 8 Motivation for Research...... 10 Shanghai’s current family planning policy...... 11 PURPOSE...... 16 Thematic Questions...... 17 Why Shanghai?...... 19 Limitations...... 20 CHAPTER 2...... 22 BACKGROUND INFORMATION...... 22 The creation of China’s One-Child Policy...... 22 Current status of China’s Family Planning Policy...... 23 The development of the new “tradition” of buying a home in Shanghai...... 28 1949-1978 Public housing allocation...... 29 Public housing allocation and the population policy...... 30 Results of public housing allocation...... 30 New housing policies...... 31 The development of the new tradition of buying a home...... 33 Housing investment system...... 34 Housing management system...... 34 Social and commercial housing...... 34 Compulsory savings for housing...... 35 Housing finance and insurance...... 36 CHAPTER 3...... 38 LITERATURE REVIEW...... 38 Effectiveness of the one-child policy:...... 38 Fertility behaviour and fertility preferences...... 39 Factors affecting fertility preference...... 40 Correlation does not imply causation: The case of contraception...... 41 The case of mortality decline...... 43 The case of socio-economic development...... 43 Lowest-low total fertility rate...... 45 Sex Preference...... 47 A time for change: the ongoing debate about the future of the family planning policy...... 49 Fear of a latent baby boom...... 49 The window of opportunity for change...... 50 CHAPTER 4...... 54 METHODOLOGY...... 54
6 Participant recruitment...... 55 Participant populations...... 55 Group A...... 56 Group B...... 57 Issues in doing research in China:...... 57 CHAPTER 5...... 61 RESULTS...... 61 Fertility preference and fertility behaviour...... 62 Group A: Preferred number of children...... 62 I want one child...... 62 I want two children but…...... 63 Money gets you around the one child policy...... 64 The one child policy is limiting me...... 65 Group B:...... 67 I want more than one child...... 67 Sex preference of children...... 68 Group A:...... 68 I want a girl...... 68 I want a…it doesn’t matter...... 69 Group B:...... 69 I want a boy...... 69 Age or time of having first child...... 70 Group A and Group B...... 70 Factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour...... 71 Purchasing a home...... 72 Group A:...... 72 It’s tradition!...... 72 It’s a condition for marriage...... 72 It’s a man’s duty...... 74 Housing and fertility behaviour...... 76 Group A:...... 76 Group B:...... 77 Filial Piety...... 77 Group A:...... 77 Group B:...... 78 Time...... 79 Group A:...... 79 Group B:...... 79 The future of the family planning policy...... 80 Group A:...... 80 A change in focus...... 81 Group A:...... 81 CHAPTER 6...... 83 CONCLUSION...... 83 Contribution to knowledge...... 84 REFERENCES...... 86
7 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION China’s family planning policy has successfully decreased the population by half of what it was 20 years ago (Merli and Smith, 2002; Wang, 2005). Although it is commonly thought that the one-child policy is responsible for this decline in population, the majority of the population decline occurred prior to the 1979 one-child policy. It was under the later-longer-fewer ( 晚 稀 少 wan xi shao) campaign of the 1970’s that lead to the majority of China’s decrease in population (See Figure 1) (Merli and Smith, 2002; Peng 2004).
Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate (Mean number of children born per woman) in China, 1969 to 2004.
(Source: Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1172)
8 The one-child policy was most successful in prolonging the decreased population (Peng, 2004). Having survived the extremist enforcement of the one-child policy and now able to look back at the impact of both the later-longer-fewer family planning campaign and the one-child family planning policy, researchers are left questioning the effectiveness and necessity of the one-child policy. Particularly in light of the latent effects of the one child policy that are now being experienced by the first single-child generation and their aging parents. One of the major effects of the one child policy is a rapidly increasing aging population. With fewer children being born to balance out and replace the aging population, China is headed towards an aging population crisis. It is due to the combination of the rapid decrease in birth rate and the increasing life expectancy that has resulted in the increased percentage of elderly people (Hesketh et al, 2005). This is particularly true in urban areas wherein the one-child policy was most strictly enforced. Within urban areas approximately 10% of the urban population is 65 years old and older; it is thought that within the decade this percentage will rise to a level of 15%. By 2025 it is predicted that within the urban population the aging population at and above 65 years old will reach a level of 20% (Peng, 2004; Wang, 2005). If fertility rates remain around 1.3 children per couple among urban Chinese, it is predicted that 35% of the urban population will be 65 years and older (Wang, 2005). Shanghai, the most socially and economically developed city in China is also the fastest aging city in all of China, with 13% of the cities population being 65 years and above (Peng, 2004). Consistent with its aging population, Shanghai also has the lowest total fertility rate (TFR) in all of China. Shanghai’s TFR is below replacement levels, its negative growth rate began in 1993 and has continued to decline reaching -2.4 in 1997 (Peng, 2004).
China is an “aged society” and this is of particular concern to the first single-child generation because with the implementation of the one-child policy many of the traditional sources and institutional sources of support for aging parents have been either removed or lost (Wang, 2005). Retirees were once upon a time able to rely on work units for financial support into their greying years, however with the opening of the market and the reformation towards a more capitalist society, work units have been abandoned leaving the current aging population with little financial support (Wang, 2005). Within
9 urban areas, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the aging population to meet their daily needs on the small pensions they are given, as these pensions do not account for the rapid inflation in the cost of living. China’s aging population has a low standard of life and limited social safety nets (Wang, 2005). As socio-economic development continues, being able to survive off of the subsidies provided by communes and work units is a passing reality; the socialized pension system put in place to support China’s aging population is seriously under funded (Wang, 2005). It is estimated that the liabilities of the pension program are equal to “125 to 150 percent of the current GDP.” (Wang, 2005, p. 5) The financial as well as the physical and emotional burden of supporting the aging population is quickly falling on the backs of China’s first single-child generation. It is thought that the urban Chinese couple’s experience of aging will be more serious than the rural experience of aging (Wang, 2005). This is particularly true for Shanghai as Shanghai is the most socio-economically developed city in China, making Shanghai’s experiences of low TFR’s, fertility preferences and fertility behaviours, as well as the responsibility of caring for one’s aging parents the petree dish for exploring future fertility and aging trends that other parts of China may begin to experience as socio- economic development continues to spread throughout the country.
Motivation for Research Motivation for this study has stemmed from two main points of entrance into the China’s society and culture: an ethnographic curiosity and arising themes in the literature of Chinese academics and China specialists. First, an ethnographic experience of living in China from February 2009 to August 2010 provoked the curiosity of what the similar aged first single-child generation is currently experiencing as well as the realization of what daily life in Shanghai feels like, smells like and tastes like along with the physical, mental and emotional tolls daily life in Shanghai costs an individual. During this period, involvement within the Chinese culture and more specifically the local culture of Shanghai has included employment, academic study, involvement in local clubs and activities, festivals, weddings, traditional and communal dinners as well as the development of linguistic understanding and cultural cohabitation, making my ethnographic knowledge a more complete and integrated experience. In order to ensure
10 my life style was similar to that of my participants I limited my monthly budget to mimic that of my participants and ensured I used public transportation and local eating habits to provide a more realistic daily experience. Having lived similar lives as the participants in this study I was able to consciously understand their experiences as well as physically feel the emotional stress and strains the participants endure on a daily basis. Comprehending the daily experiences of the participants in light of the political, social, and cultural environment that exists in present day mainland China, is something that can only be achieved through the process of submitting oneself to the those same experiences over an extended period of time.
Second, motivation for this study developed from arising themes in the literature of Chinese academics and China specialists. Having the opportunity to study under many of the Chinese scholars who are at the frontend of social, political and development research in China I have had the privilege of being exposed to the leading and developing focus of research in China; particularly in the area of population policy and the impacts of the family planning policy. As will be discussed in the literature review, like a rock dropped into a pond, the long-lasting ripple effect of the family planning policy continue to be experienced today. The waves of the indoctrinated family planning policy have rippled out to impact socio-economic areas of life for the residents of Shanghai, such as fertility preference, fertility behaviour, long-term care for aging parents, the creation of financial burdens, and time constraints; even the housing market in Shanghai has been impacted by the population policy. As it will become evident in the literature review, the social- economic issues impacted by the family planning policy are some of the key research areas that are being discussed in the academic world. Motivation for this research developed from the combination of having the opportunity to work with participants of the first single-child generation and to listen to their personal accounts of the impact of the family planning policy on their lives while at the same time being able to have direct dialogue with the academics who are at the forefront of researching the continued developmental issue of the population policy.
Shanghai’s current family planning policy
11 Among its registered population, Shanghai has been experiencing a total fertility rate (TFR) well below the level of population regeneration since 1993. Considering that under the 2004 Family Planning Policy modifications, Shanghai registered residents are able to choose to have a second child provided that both partners are from single-child families it appears that the most recent family planning policy modification of 2004 has had little affect on Shanghai’s population in terms of sparking an increased growth within its registered population.
Focusing on the period of 2009 to 2010, in the metropolis of Shanghai, the first single- child generation has now been educated and has entered into the workforce. Deng Xiaoping’s Family Planning Policy, commonly known as the One Child Policy, has prolonged the reduced population. Population reduction is most evident in the cities of Shanghai and Beijing (Peng, 2004). Within the most developed and economically progressive city of Shanghai, social, political and economic factors are working above and beyond the family planning policy and are influencing how many children a couple will have. New determining factors are creating a new experience of population control within Shanghai; one that goes beyond the rule of the government, and directly affects the first single-child generation. The factors affecting a couples’ decision to procreate and the long-term implications and affects of these new deciding factors on Shanghai’s registered population, and potentially China’s population, have yet to be determined and have yet to be fully experienced.
For the purpose of this paper fertility preference refers to the preferred number of children an individual wants to have. Fertility behaviour refers to the number of children an individual will actually have. Both fertility preference and fertility behaviour are affected by institutional/policy variables and/or socio-economic variables. There is evidence questioning the impact of the one-child policy on individual fertility preference (Hesketh et al., 2005). Table 1 highlights the fertility preference among Chinese women according to age, residence and educational level. From this table it is evident in 1998, at the time of publication, among the college educated urban participants a preference for having one child was in the majority. However, it should be noted that because this data
12 was published in 1998, it is unclear how the current socio-economic environment is affecting fertility preferences. As will be discussed later, fertility preference may not have changed over the years, however, fertility behaviour has historically been affected by the different family planning policies.
Table 1: Preference among 39,600 Chinese Women for Number of Children, according to Age, Residence, and Educational Level.
(Source: Sun, 1998 as cited in Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1174)
Considering that within urban areas, there was already a fertility preference for having fewer children as well as the fertility behaviour of having smaller families prior to the implementation of the one-child policy; the one-child policy has in fact had little impact on urban Chinese’s fertility preferences and fertility behaviours (Hesketh et al, 2005; Wang, 2005). Susan Greenhalgh (1990 and 1992) attributes this decline in fertility preference and fertility behaviour to the decollectivization and economic reform wherein the motivation to have more than one child, particularly if the first born child was a boy, was weakened. Merli and Smith (2002) consider the fertility decline experienced in China and specifically in urban areas to be the result of “rising levels of education and increasing economic activity and market integration” (p. 570), all of which are considered to be standard fertility experiences that are shared in other low-fertility countries (Merli and Smith, 2002). Furthermore, when considering fertility preferences and fertility
13 behaviours it is commonly thought that “economic systems and social values” may have been more important in the continued fertility decline than the one-child policy (Wang, 2005). From these ideas it becomes evident that the main population policy researchers focusing on China are attributing China’s decreased fertility preferences and fertility behaviours to a mix of socio-economic factors that move beyond the traditional view that China’s family planning policy is the sole contributing factor to the changes experienced in fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Such Socio-economic factors being discussed in the academic world include: economic reform and the opening of China’s market, increased levels of education and the development of economic systems and new social values.
The one-child policy was introduced in 1979 as a short-term family planning policy with the purpose of creating a small-family culture (Hesketh et al., 2005). In an open letter from the central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (1980), it was stated that the one-child policy was designed to change after a 30 year period wherein the “population problem” would became less severe. Urban China has now entered into the era wherein over population is no longer a problem, in fact population is so low in Shanghai that adverse effects of the one-child family planning policy are now coming to the surface and are impacting the first-single child generation’s fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. How these adverse effects of a low population, such as negative TFR and a growing aging population, are dealt with will determine future socio-economic developments within China. Institutional and socio-economic variables impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour today is something that needs to be explored for the purpose of further understanding future fertility trends within China.
It should be noted that although the family planning policy of 1979 is commonly referred to as the one-child policy this policy has cultural, ethnic and geographical variety in terms of the number of children allowed per woman (See Table 2 and Figure 2). For the purpose of this paper the current family planning policy will be referred to as the one- child policy; however it should be noted that there are exceptions to the rule of one-child under the one-child policy.
14 Table 2: Comparison of various local family planning regulations, 1990’s
(Source: Details of provincial family planning regulations are available at www.cpirc.org.cn; Peng, 2004. p.136).
Figure 2: Number of children per couple allowed by China’s multi-policy fertility regime
(Source: Wang, 2005, p. 3)
15 PURPOSE The purpose of this study was to explore the current factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai among the first single-child generation who are now entering into their childbearing years. In order to gain a more clear understanding of fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai the following areas were explored in an attempt to discover the institutional/policy variables and the socio-economic variables that are impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour: the number of children preferred by the participants, the actual number of children had or planned to have by the participants, the age or time of having a first child, the factors affecting a participant’s fertility preference and fertility behaviour, and the desired future direction of the family planning policy.
Considering that single-child couples are now allowed to have two children in Shanghai, discovering the number of children preferred by a couple and the actual fertility behaviour are initial indicators of the affect the family planning policy has had on fertility preference and fertility behaviour. The age or timing of having a first child is an indicator of the impact of new socio-economic opportunities that may be affecting an individual’s fertility preference and fertility behaviour. Discovering the factors that are affecting the participant’s fertility preference an d fertility behaviour will bring to light the socio- economic and cultural variables that may be impacting fertility within Shanghai.
Fertility preferences and fertility behaviours are explored within two different socio- economic populations in Shanghai. The two populations share a common age range but there were distinct differences in the population’s income, education levels and urban/rural upbringing. By holding the participants age range as a constant we are able to see the effects of the manipulated variables, socio-economic status and education, on the participants’ fertility preference and fertility behaviour. In looking at two different socio- economic groups that share the same are range we are able to identify differences in the
16 impact of institutional/policy variables and/or socio-economic variables on fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
This study attempted to fill in a gap in the existing literature and provide a more up-to- date view of the fertility preference and fertility behaviour under the continued one-child family planning policy in modern day Shanghai. As it has been noted in other research, there is a limited amount of information that looks at the issue of whether the coercive family planning policy has affected fertility preference (Freedman, 1997). In addition, this study looked to provide an understanding of the current experiences of the first single-child generation who are now entering into their childbearing years and has attempted to understand their experiences of navigating the more economically developed society of Shanghai while still living within national family planning policies that affect all of China. In attempting to understand current experiences an ethnographically based method was applied. Previous research does not take into account the daily experiences of the first single-child generation and it is believed that fertility preferences and fertility behaviours within urban China can not be fully understood unless the environment in which these preferences are being developed is fully understood and experienced.
Thematic Questions Factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour were divided into two general areas of variables: Institution/Policy variables and Socio-economic variables. Institution is identified as organised and regulated systems that operate in the basic areas of societal life such as government institutions which organize laws, policies and state power, religious institutions, border institutions which organize the distribution and allowance of goods and services, and institutions that transmit knowledge such as schools and universities. Policy is identified as the social policies put into place by the government institution. For the purposes of this study the institution/policy variables that were focused on included the family planning policy and other government initiatives geared towards the change or control of the population. Other institution/policy variables include the removal of social security nets such as government-guaranteed employment and assigned housing. Socio-economic variables are identified as demographic factors related
17 to the socio- economic status of an individual such as level of education, income, housing, age, and residence identity. For the purpose of this study socio-economic variables include cultural, economic and social variables, such as new economic opportunities, careers, purchasing a house, and family responsibilities of caring for one’s parents. Based on the examples provided to describe the thematic variables explored within this study, it is obvious that the two thematic variables of institution/policy and socio-economic are highly inter-connected. One variable is not exclusive of another. Instead, each variable explored within this study is connected to multiple institutional or policy variables as well as socio-economic and cultural variables. It is due to the interconnected nature of the variables that there is no one single factor that is impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour; instead it is a multitude of interconnected factors that are affecting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. The identified factors that are impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour do not stand alone, but are instead deeply rooted and stem from the interconnected relationship between institution, policy, social, economic, cultural and environmental factors that layer together creating the current experiences of fertility preference and fertility behaviour. The interconnectedness of the factors impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour is evident in the development of the new tradition of having to purchase a home before marriage. It is through the institutional/policy historical development of the housing policies in combination with the present day socio-economic pressures of having to purchase a home prior to marriage that the new tradition of having to purchase a home before marriage is impacting current fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. In order to better understand the impacts of past polices in the development of present day socio- economic factors the historical development of housing policies and their present day impact on fertility preferences and fertility behaviours are examined in-depth in the Background section. Because the purpose of this study was to explore the current factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai it was necessary to separate the institution/policy variables from the socio-economic variables. By doing so current factors that are affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour were allowed to come to light as independent variables, unclouded from previous assumptions that the
18 one child policy was the only variable that had an impact on fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
In determining fertility preference this study accords with Ronald Freedman’s (1997) work on the affect of family planning policies and fertility preferences, wherein fertility preferences were observed as participants indicating how many children they considered to be the desirable number for their own families and whether or not participants felt that they wanted more children than the family planning policy or socio-economic variables would allow for. In order to determine the socio-economic variables that are impacting the participants decision for how many children to have, questions explored the following areas: new economic opportunities and the importance of a career, family responsibility and the role of providing for one’s parents, the new tradition of needing to buy an apartment or house before marriage, the desired age or timing of the first birth, and the time required for parenting, career and self.
Additional questions surrounding the participant’s feelings towards the family planning policy and thoughts on the future development and direction of the family planning policy were also discussed.
Why Shanghai? Shanghai has been selected as the focus city for this study because Shanghai has reached socio-economic levels of development that are ahead of the rest of China. Thus, Shanghai’s experiences of development may be reflective of the experiences other cities will have in the near future. In terms of the family planning policy, Shanghai is a special case within China because although the family planning policy continues to exist there are multiple exceptions to this rule. Such as if both individuals in a relationship are from single child families they can have two children within their relationship. Furthermore, it is acceptable for a couple to have two children if there is at least a seven year difference in the children’s birth ages. Such exceptions to the rules exist within Shanghai because since the late 1990’s Shanghai has reached a total fertility rate (TFR) of below 1 for registered Shanghai residents (Peng, 2004). This means that Shanghai has rapidly
19 declined its population growth to the point of where it is no longer regenerating itself1. In response to this, the local government has decentralised its population control policy for Shanghainese residents who come from single child homes. In accordance to the 2004 Shanghai Municipality family planning policy modification, Shanghainese registered residents may choose to have a second child provided that both partners of a married couple are themselves from single-child families. Furthermore, there is evidence that the government is no longer the main influence when it comes to family planning. Within Shanghai, it is apparent that new influences are affecting fertility preference among Shanghainese residents. Hypothesized influences impacting fertility preference include the following socio-economic factors: Financial pressures, the affordability of children, the new tradition of having to purchase a home before marriage, time constraints and the sole responsibility of having to care for aging parents as an only child, know as the 4:2:1 phenomena. In terms of the development of the rest of China, Shanghai serves as one example of the direction social, political and economic development could possibly take within China proper. This also holds true for the development of, and changes to, existing government policies, such as China’s one child policy.
Limitations It is important to note that this study has been limited to the region of Shanghai and includes a relatively small sample set. Although the information extracted from the interviews is qualitative and in-depth, the experiences expressed by the participants can not be considered representative of the greater Shanghai population. Furthermore, although I went to great lengths to overcome cultural boundaries and language barriers, and an ethnographic method did allowed for closer relationships to be formed, trust to be built and a deeper understanding of the culture to be had, it cannot be certain that answers given were not at times modified to adhere to political ideological national thought. As nationalistic thought is at times so indoctrinated that the ability to speak openly and form one’s own opinion is difficult for the individual regardless of the audience. To the best of my ability I was conscious of my own indoctrinated western thinking and attempted to
1 It is important to note that it is registered Shanghai residents who have a TFR of below 1. This TFR is exclusive to Shanghai identification card holders and does not include migrant labourers of Shanghai reidesnts, a population the makes up % of the total Shanghai population.
20 “check my assumptions at the door” in an attempt to attain the participants views. There were times when opinions expressed were so contrary to my original thinking that some understanding of the opinion expressed may have been lost in the cultural translations and interpretation. Finally, it is important to note that some of the literature referred to is five to ten years old. Considering China’s fast paced development this makes some of the literature irrelevant in present day China. However, this research is attempting to update the literature, particularly literature available in English. Currently there is some more up- to-date literature; however, much of this literature remains in either traditional or simplified characters. Unfortunately my reading abilities are not yet up to the challenge of translation. In an attempt to get around this, I made an effort not to make reference to particular data that may be outdated and attempted to ensure that when ideas were presented they continued to appear to be reflective of present day ideology.
21 CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION In order to identify factors that are affecting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours within Shanghai it is necessary to understand the current family planning policy within China and Shanghai and Shanghai’s unique demographic experience. In doing so, a better understanding of how and why fertility preferences and fertility behaviours are being impacted will be possible. However, first I would like to provide a brief introduction into the makings of the one-child policy.
The creation of China’s One-Child Policy During the 1970’s when population research was returned to the domain of science in China, there were multiple parties at work formulating a nation-wide population policy that would rein in China’s population growth and assist China in achieving its development of the four modernizations – industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology (Greenhalgh, 2003). Although, there were some groups that took into consideration the social and cultural impacts a population policy may have on its people, during this period of time, quantitative science and close government connections were of the most importance in deciding on which group’s population policy would be indoctrinated nationwide. In the end it was a group of three natural scientists and one economist who were all heavily interested in control theory, and had their own personal interests in mind when developing their population control theory, who became the frontrunners in the quest for a new population policy (Greenhalgh, 2003). Being well connected to the government officers in power, the group lead by Song Jian, achieved the dominant position, and it was their one-child population policy that would rip though the country creating a host of long-term side-effects. It was due to China’s obsession with
22 science during the 1970’s, that a population policy that did not actually consider the people it would be implemented onto was put into affect. It was also due to this scientific obsession that other population policy methods, which practiced more gradual methods of population reduction and took into consideration cultural preferences for male children and the possibility of the creation of an increased aging population, were cast aside due to the lack of quantitative evidence (Greenhalgh, 2003). A policy that was to deal entirely with people was allowed to be created without ever considering its impact on an individual person, as people were de-humanized and turned into simple numbers that could be calculated and charted, allowing for quantitative science to take the lead in a humanistic area.
Current status of China’s Family Planning Policy The current status of China’s Family Planning Policy is something of debate as there is evidence alluding to change as well as conflicting evidence insisting on maintaining the status quo of the one child per couple policy. As discussed earlier the family planning policy is not as clear cut as its more frequently used name, the one-child policy, would have us believe. As noted in Table 2 there is evidence of geographical and ethnic exceptions to the one-child rule. The following is a discussion on the current status of the family planning policy and an attempt to provide a clear understanding of the current population policy and how this policy will be interpreted and used within this paper. Within the Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China in Chapter III Regulation of Reproduction, Article 18 the following is stated:
The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be made. Specific measures in this regard shall be formulated by the people's congress or its standing committee of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government (UNESCAP, 2002).
23 Article 18 implies that the one-child per couple continues to be in effect however, requests for a second child may be granted depending on the provincial or regional government’s decision provided that this ruling is still within the guidelines of the Central Government.
This study focused on Shanghai and used mainly Shanghai residents as its targeted population. Due to the targeted population of Shanghai residents within this study it is necessary to take a closer look at the municipal of Shanghai and establish Shanghai’s interpretation and application of the family planning policy. In doing so we will gain a clearer definition of the family planning policy that will be used throughout this study.
On December 31, 2003, the Shanghai Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission ruled that as of April 15th, 2004 the following family planning policy conditions would become effective within the municipality of Shanghai:
Article 25: If neither party of a couple have had a child before their marriage, the said couple may give birth to another child after the first one, providing they meet one of the following conditions:
(1) Both the husband and wife are single child;
(2) The first child is identified as disabled due to non-hereditary reasons by medical identification agencies of disabled child at municipal, district or county levels, and there is little possibility that the child will grow up into an individual with normal working ability;
(3) One party of the couple is identified by proper agencies as disabled due to non-hereditary reasons, which affects work and makes him or her unable to take care of himself or herself in daily life;
(4) One party of the couple is a handicapped soldier of Degree 2, Class B or
24 above;
(5) One party of the couple has been working in the fishing industry as a fisherman on the sea for over five consecutive years; (6) One party of the couple holds the Municipality’s rural household registration and either party is single child;
(7) The wife holds the Municipality’s rural household registration and has no brothers but sisters who each have only one child, and the husband lives in the wife’s home to support the elderly. (Standing Committee of Shanghai Municipal. 2003. Online)
Focusing on the first condition in Article 25 it appears that within Shanghai, provided that both partners within a marriage are from single-child homes and that both partners are childless before entering into the marriage, a couple may choose to have a second child. Article 25 also stipulates in condition 6 that at least one of the partners within the couple must hold a Municipal household registration, making them a part of the registered Shanghai ID holding population.
Further evidence is apparent in the United Nations Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) Refugee Review Tribunal research response of October 4th, 2005 wherein it posed the question of “What was the one child policy situation in Shanghai at the time of the second birth, and what is it now?” (UNHCR Refugee Information Online, 2005) The response documented an article dated April 13th, 2004 from China Daily, a state run news and media source as reporting the following on the new Shanghai population and family planning regulation:
Shanghai, China’s largest city is set to implement a new population policy beginning Thursday that will make it a bit easier for certain locals to have a second child.
25 The new Shanghai population and family planning regulation, which was approved by Shanghai People’s Congress late last year, stipulates that a husband and wife who both are single children themselves can have a second child.
The new policy also cancels a four-year interval period between the first and second child, which was set down by old provisions.
Originally, only a couple in a second marriage could have another child if one of the spouses did not already have one. The new regulation removes such a prerequisite. It means a newly organized family can have one more child even if the couple have children from earlier marriages.
Under the old regulation, if one member of a couple in rural areas is disabled to such an extent that it affects his or her labour capabilities, the family can have a second (Yong, Da 2004)
This article provides evidence that the 2003 revision to the family planning policy within Shanghai was released to the public and put into affect by 2004. This article highlights that if both partners are from a single-child home than they may have a second child.
The UNHCR (2007) sites the changes made to the family planning policy within Shanghai in an additional Refugee Review Tribunal research response of September 3rd, 2007. This article responds to the questions of: “How strictly is the one-child policy implemented in Shanghai?” The response documented an adjustment being made to the one-child policy in 2001 wherein in urban areas couples could have a second child if both partners were only children:
Exceptions to the one-child-per-couple rule, whereby eligible couples can have a second child, include but are not limited to the following cases. In urban areas since 2001, if both husband and wife are themselves single children, they are permitted to have a second child. Ethnic minorities are allowed two or more
26 children. Families who have a child with mental or physical disabilities are sometimes allowed a second child. (UNHCR. 2007)
This qualification of the one-child policy cites a change that occurred in 2001. Although government documentation has not been found to back this up, it is at least apparent that when considering the previous evidence changes have occurred to the family planning policy within urban areas, specifically within Shanghai.
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) sited the Regulations on Family Planning of Shanghai as allowing for a second child to be born to a family of single-child parents to be in effect as early as December 10th, 1997. This modification of the family planning policy is apparent in Article 12 of the following:
Article 12 Couples who meet any one of the following conditions can have a second birth:
1. The first child is diagnosed of having non-genetic defects and unable to grow up to be a normal labourer; 2. Both parties are only child in their family; 3. Both parties are returned overseas Chinese and live in China for less than six years; 4. Ethnic immigrants who get a second birth permit before moving to this city from local family planning authorities above county level and are already pregnant; 5. Remarried couples with the total number of children from previous marriages being only one. (UNESCAP, 1997)
This provides evidence that modifications to the one-child policy have been in existence long before information was made readily available to the public as seen in the China Daily article of 2004. Because modifications to the family planning policy in Shanghai do not appear to be readily available to public prior to 2004 for the purposes of this study we
27 will refer to modifications of the family planning policy within Shanghai that allow for a couple to choose to have a second child to have come into effect as of 2004.
Modifications to the one-child policy within Shanghai now allow for a married couple to have a second child provided that both partners are from single-child homes. This policy modification that was put into affect in 2004 has been documented in Municipal government documents of Shanghai, and made accessible to the public via the State run news source China Daily. For the purposes of this study it will be assumed that within Shanghai a married couple can choose to have a second child provided that both partners are from single-child homes and that at least one of the partners is a registered resident of Shanghai. Furthermore the date of this revision will be referred to as 2004; although the modification was approved December 31 2003, the family planning policy modification was not put into effect until April 15th, 2004.
The development of the new “tradition” of buying a home in Shanghai In an attempt to illustrate the interconnectedness of institution/policy factors and socio- economic factors that are impacting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours in Shanghai the historical development of housing policies and the development of the new tradition of having to purchase a home prior to marriage are examined in-depth. Within China, and more specifically within urban residential areas, control over the housing-sector has been an area that has experienced the extreme transitional developments that have coincided with the different governmental ideologies. Transitioning from Mao’s ideologies wherein housing was the responsibility of the state, and therefore controlled by the public-sector, to more modern times wherein housing is now considered a private affair and is controlled by individuals and developers. However, regardless of whether housing is public or private the government has had a strong hand in deciding the fate of the housing sector. Even today, when housing has become a commercialized commodity, the state continues to play a role in creating and manipulating the housing market into what it is today. Within this section I will discuss the evolution of the housing sector within urban China from public, to private, and to increasingly commercial, along with the policies that promoted these housing transitions.
28 1949-1978 Public housing allocation During the period from 1949 to 1978 China’s Socialist system provided urban residents with publically funded housing (Davis, 2000). The state took control of the rental sector and abolished the private building and private purchasing of housing through state ideologies, dictating that private home ownership was to be criticised as a capitalist action (Wang and Murie, 1996). The criticism of the private housing sector allowed for the state to take control of the majority of the rental and the building of houses. Within the realm of China’s Socialist ideologies providing housing via the public-sector became a part of the welfare system, thus beginning the allocation of housing. Within the public- sector it was believed that those working for the state must also be taken care of by the state (Wang and Murie, 1996; Wang 1995). The Socialist ideology and the anti-Capitalist propaganda allowed for the state and public institutions to become the main sources of housing for urban residents in China.
The results of the Socialist style of housing control include the public-sector controlling the majority of urban housing. According to Wang and Murie (1996), between the years 1949 and 1990 87.4 per cent of the 2.23 billion square (sq) meters (m) of housing that was built in Chinese urban centers were built by public and collective sectors. The remaining 12.6 per cent was built by individual families and the private sector (Wang and Murie, 1996). Moreover, housing plans were planned in accordance with sectors of economic development. For instance, as economic projects were set up, and the workforce needed in an area increased, housing was also a necessary part of the public- sector’s planning. This left public institutions in charge of building, maintaining, managing and allocating housing for workers and families who were involved with the related workforce (Wang and Murie, 1996). Public institutions had complete control in distributing housing to its employees, rental agreements were foregone and the only real requirement for gaining access to public-sector housing was need (Wang and Murie, 1996). The public-sector not only allocated people their housing but large government
29 subsidies were provided in order to maintain low rental costs. The government was paying 5-6 billion RMB in housing maintenance, allowing for the average rent during the periods of 1949 to 1990 to account for only 2-3 per cent of an urban Chinese’s total household income (Wang and Murie, 1996). However, the excessive subsidising and control over housing allocation proved to be a downfall as the era of the Cultural Revolution came to a close. This will be discussed further within this paper.
Public housing allocation and the population policy According to Wang and Murie (1996), housing shortages have been a common and consistent experience throughout the Communist government. Mao believed in building a nation based on the People as Power2 population discourse. The People as Power discourse is a part of a nationalist agenda wherein there may be an increased need for labourers, soldiers, or settlers (Yuval-Davis 1997). During the 1950’s China experienced a rapid increase in urban population due to Mao’s People as Power population ideology as well as an increased rural to urban migration. This increased urban population led to an increased investment in the public-sector, however housing was never able to keep up and meet the needs of the increased population (Wang and Murie, 1996). The government preferred to invest in the areas of production and failed to recognize the need to invest in the area housing production and consumption (Wang and Murie, 1996). The increased urban population and lack of housing resulted in overcrowded living situations and a general housing shortage, both results which remained to be serious problems throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution. According to Wang and Murie (1996), up until 1976 urban Chinese lived with an average of 3 sq m of floor space per person. Regardless of the increased housing built following 1978, urban households continued to live with an average of 4 sq m of personal floor space in their homes. As discussed in a paper by Sun (1994) that was presented at the 6th International Research Conference on Housing in Beijing, this average of 4 sq m of personal floor space continued to be found in 1994 (Sun 1994 as cited in Wang and Murie, 1996)
Results of public housing allocation
2 The People as Power Discourse depends on increased and continuous population growth to ensure the “future of the nation” (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 29).
30 Like many of the other necessities of life, the Chinese Socialist government failed in its ability to accurately supply and invest in a sufficient amount of housing for its urban residents. Falling short, and failing to invest sufficiently in housing, the government proved to give priority to the development of other economic sectors rather than to its people who relied on the public-sector for both work and housing. In addition to the government’s short fallings, there was extreme corruption in the distribution of housing due to the limited availability of housing. Furthermore, housing allocation did not take into account the tenants needs, size of family, or income (Wang and Murie, 1996). Status and power gained one access to improved living conditions, thus leading to corruption and the unfair distribution of housing (Wang and Murie, 1996; Zhou and Logan, 1996). Due to a housing shortage, overcrowded living space, corruption in housing allocation, excessive payment for housing maintenance, and no private need to invest in housing the Chinese government was faced with some serious problems in the 1980’s which led to housing provisions.
New housing policies Starting in 1979, new housing policies have been created and introduced to commercialize the public-housing system (Wang and Murie, 1996). In 1980, Deng Xiao Peng announced the opening of the housing market to private investors with a speech that stated that the act of purchasing, building and owning a home should be the right of the urban residents (Huang, 2002; Wang and Murie, 1996). It was from this speech that the private housing market began to take form. Reforms of the housing policy include the state promoting the privatisation of housing by encouraging the sale of public-housing to either the current tenants or other independent organisations (Huang, 2003; Wang and Murie, 1996). In addition to the selling of the public housing, rental housing was transformed into a more lucrative business for private housing owners.
With the reform of housing policies the government also began to implement protective laws to support the development of the private housing transition. According to Wang and Murie (1996), beginning in 1983 the Government created supposed guarantees to protect private property rights, an action that encouraged the investment in private
31 housing. However, the legitimacy of such State Council guarantees is something of great debate when considering the multitude of forced relocation stories that exist, occurrences wherein private home owners took their land deeds to the courts and instead of receiving justice and guaranteed protection, received beatings, abductions, criminal accusations and sentences, and the destruction of their property (Pan, 2008).
Further economic reforms were initiated in 1988. Working under the title of the Ten Year Reform Strategy, residents were encouraged to buy their houses, housing financial arrangements were created, and within the public-sector rent was restructured (Wang and Murie, 1996). The results of this Ten Year Reform Strategy include the public housing sectors initiating plans to privatise their housing by selling to existing tenants and other employees (Wang and Murie, 1996). An increased number of houses were also built by the public and private sector. It would seem that as soon as there was money to be gained from the housing market, thanks to the opening up of this market to the private sector, the issue of housing shortages began to find its resolution.
The transition from public housing provided by the state and other industries to private housing was a transition that was tested in Housing Experiments in Yantai before being extended to other urban areas. The purpose of these Housing Experiments was to learn how to most effectively commercialize the entire housing production process (Wang and Murie, 1996). By commercializing the entire housing production process from building materials, to construction, to advertising, to selling, to purchasing, and to maintaining, the private housing industry proposed to be a highly lucrative economic opportunity. In order to achieve this highly lucrative housing industry the Housing Experiments needed to provide a method of successfully ending the relationship wherein people and employees solely relied on the state and their employer to meet their housing needs. Considering that the state was paying an average of 5-6 billion RMB in housing maintenance, the Housing Experiments initially focused on weaning the public off of the use of the public housing (Wang and Murie, 1996). This required the government to provide opportunities for tenants to become more involved in the housing production process, particularly in the areas of the purchase and maintenance of the public housing-sector (Davis, 2000). One
32 method included increasing the rent of public houses to help to cover the cost of maintenance, while at the same time providing “housing subsidy tickets” that had the limited use of only being for housing consumption (Wang and Murie, 1996). These housing subsidy tickets were the first currency transformation that forced the allocation of money to be used in the new and developing market of privatized housing. This is something that continues to be seen but in the form of compulsory savings, something that will be discussed further on.
The long-term goals of the Housing Experiments were to reach a point wherein the housing market could be a self-supporting, stable, industry that did not require the support of the state or other public industries (Wang and Murie, 1996). Government funded housing subsidies were to be phased out, with the idea that individual salaries would increase sufficiently enough to cover the cost of housing needs (Wang and Murie, 1996). As housing subsidies were phased out people were to become less reliant on the state for housing. There was to be a divorce between employees and their employers and a separation in responsibilities by both parties. The state and the public institutions were to no longer be responsible for their employees housing. Throughout the 1980’s the Housing Experiments were gradually extended to the rest of the urban areas within China. The spread of these experiments brought about the National Housing Reform Implementation Plan, wherein the commercialisation of housing was to develop within the guidelines of a “socialist planned market economy” (Wang and Murie, 1996). Here, it becomes apparent that Socialist China was working hard to gain from a Capitalist natured commercialised housing market. However, maintaining China’s Socialist ideologies within the housing market was necessary, not only to maintain the states core ideologies, but also to maintain control over the housing market. Chinese Socialism has also allowed for the government to maintain control over the methods of promotion of the private housing market; allowing for the transition from state costly public housing to lucrative private housing to be a rapid nation wide transition.
The development of the new tradition of buying a home
33 The current methods used to promote the private purchasing of housing remain to be compliant with Chinese Socialist ideologies and allow for the state to maintain control over the private housing market. The idea is that the people are weaned off of the direct support of the state and, by becoming home owners, people become supporters of the state. In order for the private housing market to be successful in China, the government has had to teach its people how to become home buyers. This requires education, the creation of a purchasing desire, and creation of a purchasing capability. Along China’s transformation to a private housing nation the state has implemented specific methods of creating new generations of housing purchasers. The following is a discussion of some of the methods and systems implemented by the Chinese government.
Housing investment system The first method used to promote private housing purchases is to have an initial sharing of the housing costs by the state, local government, work unit and the individual (Wang and Murie, 1996). However, with time the sharing will become less equally divided and the individual purchaser will become the main contributor. The purpose of this is to create a shift in the housing responsibility wherein the urban citizen becomes the major contributor to their housing costs (Wang and Murie, 1996).
Housing management system A second method of encouraging private home ownership is to reform the housing management system. Here, housing management is transferred to non-government entities, such as property developers and management companies who are developing along the new privatized housing production chain (Wang and Murie, 1996). This frees up local governments from the responsibility of managing housing and moves the urban residents into taking on more responsible roles within the housing production industry.
Social and commercial housing As mentioned earlier Socialist ideologies remain a part of the private housing sector, something that is apparent in a third method of privatizing housing. Social housing continues to exist but is limited within the large commercial zones. Social housing mainly
34 exists in areas where land has been allocated for reduced cost living. These areas are not commercially valuable and so for the time being are allowed to exist as social housing. According to Davis (2000), there was a significant difference in peoples’ abilities to purchase commercial and social housing. Most early home buyers purchased the housing unit they were already living in at a subsidised cost (Davis, 2000). This was because the price of commercial real estate was out of the reach of most urban residents if they did not have overseas financial connections (Davis, 2000). Moreover, in Shanghai in 1990’s only about 5-10 per cent of Shanghai residents could afford to buy commercial housing, whereas 40-50 per cent of Shanghai residents could afford to purchase their current apartments (Davis, 2000). The shift of the welfare good of public housing into private housing did allow for many residents to become home owners.
Compulsory savings for housing The fourth method of promoting the purchase of private housing is an aggressive tactic known as compulsory savings for housing. This method was initiated in Yantai, solidified in Shanghai and has now become a national policy (Wang and Murie, 1996). This policy is aggressive because it requires “all urban residents in employment to save part (5 per cent in 1994) of their salary through the work unit as long-term housing savings” (Wang and Murie, 1996). Furthermore, private and public employers deposit a similar monthly amount in the employee’s bank account (Wang and Murie, 1996). Forced salary savings for the sole purpose of supporting the privatized housing market is an example of how the Chinese government remains to be in direct contact and control in the support and development of the private housing market. Furthermore, the bank account wherein this forced savings is allocated is managed through the employer, and can only be accessed by the employee for the purpose of housing development when there is an approved housing need (Wang and Murie, 1996). The purpose of this method is to “accumulate housing development finds and gradually increase households’ purchasing power by limiting spending on other consumer goods such as household electronics” (Wang and Murie, 1996). Not only does this allow the state to ensure that the privatization of housing will be a successful economic endeavour, it continues to leave the purchasing power in the hands of the employer. Thereby completely negating the states supposed
35 promotion of supporting the individual to achieve individual purchasing power and become a contributing part of the commercialized housing industry. Through this method it becomes evident that the choice to enter into the private housing market and becoming a home owner is not an individual choice, it is in fact a decision that the state has made for its people in an attempt to support the growth and development, and the economic benefits of having a private housing market. In this example it is evident that the state has not left the purchase of housing up to the individual, it has instead continued to assign housing to the individual based on their salary and income capabilities. The individual can only use the money allocated for housing for just that, housing. With the increase in the cost of renting individuals choose to become home owners out of default, perhaps individuals believe that they are making a conscious decision, however, with a portion of their salary automatically being allocated towards the cost of housing there is little decision making left to be made. The government is implementing the plan of purchasing a home into individuals’ future plans. By allocating a per cent of wage for the purchase of a home, the government is implementing a perfect system wherein people will need to take out long-term mortgages, as their salary is not high enough to put down a large down payment, or full payment on a house. Making mortgages a necessity, something that will be discussed further in the next method.
Housing finance and insurance The fifth method of creating a society of individual purchasers involves the area of housing finance and insurance. In order to separate itself from its role as public provider, the state has developed a finance and insurance system that allows for other infrastructures to become monetary providers (Wang and Murie, 1996). In order to finance the construction of private housing and to make the purchasing of housing available to a larger population, the banks are playing an increasingly important role in funding (Wang and Murie, 1996). Mortgages are arranged to provide access to the private housing market and insurance for investors. However, mortgages are becoming more than just an option; they are quickly becoming a need. Due to the increasing costs of renting, the idea of long-term renting is becoming an unfavourable option for employees. The most logical solution is to invest in one’s own home, however, salaries are not yet
36 high enough to provide a large enough safe buffer zone. For example, if someone were to take out a mortgage and then failed to be able to maintain payments due to job market instability, they are most likely going to fail to make mortgage payments and possibly risk losing their home. If individuals are forced to take out a mortgage as the only option for being able to buy a home, then they are continuing to be reliant on the state in the form of the banking system, leading to the identification of a false belief of independence from the state. Instead individuals continue to be both reliant and supportive of the state because of the need to take out a mortgage. Furthermore, this method allows the government to continue to dictate the areas of spending, thus allowing the government to develop economic areas of its choice.
37 CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW Since the purpose of this study is to explore the factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai it is necessary to provide theoretical grounding in the areas surrounding the impacting factors that affect fertility preference and fertility behaviour. A review of the literature includes a look into the following areas of discussion: The effectiveness of the one-child family planning policy, the relationship between the fertility behaviour and fertility preferences, factors that are affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour, lowest-low total fertility rates, development of sex preferences, and finally a look into the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of China’s family planning policy
Effectiveness of the one-child policy: In discussing the factors that have impacted the fertility decline there is debate as to the effectiveness of the one-child policy in actually decreasing China’s population. Consider that the majority of the population decline occurred during the 1970’s when the more voluntary wan xi shao (晚稀少), “later-longer-fewer”, policy was in effect. This policy occurred prior to the implementation of the more destructive one-child policy of 1979. The “later-longer-fewer” policy encouraged later childbearing, greater spacing between children, and having fewer children in total. During the period of 1970 to 1978 this policy was responsible for halving the total fertility rate from 5.9 to 2.9 (Merli et al., 2002; Greenhalgh, 2003; Hesketh et al., 2005; Hesketh and Zhu, 1997; Wang, 2005).
According to Feeney et al. (1993), Merli and Smith (2002), and Wang (2005), the one- child policy accounted for little fertility change during the 1980’s. Following the later- longer-fewer policy, it was not until the further development of the markets and the institutional and socio-economic changes and opportunities associated with the market
38 reforms of the 1990’s that brought the next gradual decline in fertility (Wang, 2005). See Figure 1.
It is thought that the socio-economic changes and attitude changes towards fertility preference may have been more important factors affecting the fertility decline than the catastrophic one-child policy (Bongaarts, 1992; Bongaarts, 2008; Freedman, 1997; Hesketh et al., 2005; Wang, 2005). Furthermore, the fertility decline in China is consistent with factors affecting low fertility in other parts of the world which are also experiencing increased levels of education, increased economic activity and market reforms (Goldstein et al., 2009; Merli and Smith, 2002). Due to the ineffectiveness of the one-child policy and its highly damaging impacts on women and female children the necessity of the one-child policy is questioned (Merli and Smith, 2002; Sen, 1997). This policy is viewed as being “not just heavy-handed and unethical, but also unnecessary.” (Merli and Smith, 2002)
Fertility behaviour and fertility preferences China’s one-child family planning policy has been effective in changing the reproductive behaviours of the majority of its population. However, the family planning policies ability to change fertility preference remains to be seen. According to a study in Shanghai that explored how many children a couple would like to have, the study found that even in the urban area of Shanghai, where the TFR has been pushed down to below replacement levels under the guidance of the one-child family planning policy, fertility preferences were found to be inclusive of wanting to have 2 children if it was allowed by the family planning policy (Freedman, 1997). Further evidence of a sustained fertility preference for two children was discussed by Wang, 2005, who found that despite family planning policies, a preference for two children in urban areas has remained more or less unchanged over the last quarter century (Merli and Smith, 2002; Wang, 2005). See Figure 3.
39 Figure 3: How many children do Chinese women prefer?
(Source: Wang, 2005, p. 9)
Freedman’s (1997) and Wang’s (2005) data is somewhat dated and not inclusive of current economic development and increased housing prices in Shanghai which may be playing a more integral role in determining a couple’s fertility preference. Within this study, fertility preference in lieu of population policy will be examined and updated data will be provided. The consistency in fertility preference despite outside pressures of the family planning policy indicates that the one-child policy was unsuccessful in impacting fertility preference, and that the impact of the one-child family planning policy was limited to only changing fertility behaviour.
Factors affecting fertility preference
40 Factors affecting the decreased fertility preference may be due to the increased access of contraceptive methods, mortality decline and/or socio-economic development (Freedman 1997).
Correlation does not imply causation: The case of contraception The goal of the one-child policy was to create a small-family culture (Hesketh et al. 2005). Freedman (1997), suggests that although the one-child policy did not affect fertility preference it did have an indirect “feedback effect”, of increasing peoples desire to have a smaller family. This indirect feedback effect was achieved through the use of contraceptives. Contraceptive services were in demand before the one-child family planning policy came into effect (Freedman, 1997). The family planning policy met the people’s demand by providing contraceptive methods to couples. However, the contraceptive methods used were limited and often forced. In a recent study approximately 80% of women stated that they had no choice in the contraception method used and simply accepted the method of contraception provided by the family planning worker (Hesketh et al., 2005). See Figure 4 for the most commonly used methods of contraception among Chinese women from 1982-2001. According to Hesketh et al (2005), the one-child policy was dependent on “universal access to contraception and abortion.” (p. 1171) The use of contraception is approximately 87% of all married Chinese women (Hesketh et al., 2005).
Figure 4: Trends in the use of contraceptive methods among married Chinese women, 1982 to 2001.
41 (Source: Yin (2003) and Yang (1994) as cited in Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1171)
It is thought that, through the experience of using contraceptives and observing that contraception use results in a smaller family, the desire to have a smaller family may have developed. However, the one-child policy is not responsible for creating the desire to have a smaller family. According to research, the desire for a smaller family existed before the inception of the one-child family policy (Greenhalgh, 1994; Merli and Smith, 2002; Wang, 2005). This is apparent in Figure 3, wherein the number of children preferred by urban women showed little change over the course of 20 years. Within urban areas, such as Shanghai, the small-family culture was already in existence before the one- child family planning policy came into effect. Under the more voluntary later-longer- fewer policy of the early 1970’s Shanghai had an already existing low birth rate. Couple the low birth rate with an already existing desire to have fewer children and the prerequisites of achieving a small-family culture had been met (Qu and Hesketh, 2006). This is an indication that the family planning policy did change women’s fertility preferences to wanting fewer children, but instead offered women access to contraceptive methods so they could have a way of maintaining an already low fertility preference (Freedman, 1997). The family planning policy does deserve credit for providing a widely accessible method of achieving a smaller family, by making contraceptive methods available, the necessary tool for achieving a preferred smaller family was finally available (Freedman, 1997). This is an example of an indirect impact on fertility
42 preference that the family planning policy may be credited to have had. In reality, the fertility preference of two children did not change; it is just that the family planning policy offered a method of controlling fertility through the use of contraception, thus aiding couples to have fewer children. Although there is evidence that in urban areas the small-family culture existed prior to the one-child family planning policy, China’s family planning policy continued to aggressively push the fertility behaviour well below replacement levels and the individual preference of having two children. In the creation of the one-child policy there were no studies utilized that considered actual fertility preference. As the family planning policy is currently in a stage of development it is necessary to consider the fertility preference and the fertility behaviour of individuals so a family planning policy that represents the needs of its people and provides accurate support while at the same time supports continued state development may be achieved. This research aims at hearing the voices of individuals who are being directly impacted by the current family planning policy as well as socio-economic variables that impact their fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
The case of mortality decline Research suggests that mortality decline in China has assisted in couples achieving the fertility preference of two children per couple (Freedman, 1997; Wang, 1996). It was found that by the 1980’s most educated Chinese couple’s fertility preference involved having two surviving children (Wang 1996). The problem was that ensuring that a couple had two surviving children often meant that a couple had to have more than two births (Wang 1996). As life expectancy continues to increase in China the need to have multiple births in order to ensure the survival of two children disappears, allowing Chinese families to achieve their preferred fertility levels of two children. With the introduction of the one-child family planning policy in 1979, this policy interrupted the widespread fertility preference of two children, thus interrupting the most important social institution in China, the family (Wang 1996). As debates about the future direction of the family planning policy ensue it is necessary to understand the reasons behind fertility preference and fertility behaviour. An ethnographic study provides a look into
43 this reasoning as without a full understanding of the cultural experience, reasoning for behaviour and preference will be lost.
The case of socio-economic development According to Wang (2005), it needs to be considered that socio-economic development, including economic systems and social values, may play a more prominent role in the continued fertility decline than the one-child family planning policy. The removal of government guaranteed employment and work unit housing resulted in the removal of the social security net (Wang, 2005). Without this net economic security also disappeared leaving individuals solely responsible for attaining employment and housing. This resulted in an increased cost of childbearing as couples are now responsible for providing housing for their children. An increased cost of childbearing has resulted in a decrease in fertility rates based on the affordability of raising a child (Wang, 2005). As employment and housing benefits were phased out in the cities, this resulted in increased financial strain and decreased economic security, causing childbearing to be more expensive and less secure. Without the knowledge of the development of local traditions such as having to purchase a home before marriage researchers can never understand the full experience of financial strain individuals are living under. A strain, which is now causing the sex preference of children, in Shanghai, to change from a preference for boys to a preference for girls. This is a due to girls now costing less, as a home must be provided by either the man or his family before a marriage is agreed upon. Without the full awareness of the meaning of socio-economic development for the individual and placing this meaning in the context of cultural traditions it is not possible to fully understand the reasons behind the continued fertility decline in Shanghai. An in-depth qualitative analysis of the current daily experience of the first single-child generation is necessary in order to fully comprehend the reasons behind their daily and life choices such as employment and the decision to purchase a home, and how these decisions impact fertility preference and fertility behaviour. By understanding the entire picture it is more likely to accurately predict population growth trends, and thereby create a family planning policy that supports the entire needs of the individuals.
44 Socio-economic development has also brought new economic opportunities which leads to the possibility of increased incomes (Wang, 2005). The first single-child generation has now entered into the workforce and is increasingly putting their energies into developing their careers (Wang, 2005). This is causing a delay in the age of marriage and a further delay in the age of first childbirth. By pursuing economic opportunities and developing one’s career, people are decreasing their fertility opportunities and inadvertently choosing a lower fertility preference.
A final factor of socio-economic development and its association with a lower fertility preference has to do with increased competition. With the development of an open market and the abolishment of assigned work units’ people are now in direct competition for employment opportunities. However, this competition begins well before an individual enters into the workforce; this competition begins in the early days of school. Competition for quality education, entrance into universities and then entrance into the workforce causes parents to have to invest more finances and time into the education of a child (Wang, 2005). Again, this places increased financial burdens on parents and results in a decreased fertility preference due to affordability.
The socio-economic factors of increased economic opportunities and the desire for career development, the necessity to support one’s self as there are no longer social security nets, and the increased competitiveness for education and employment culminate to create increasingly strong socio-economic factors that impact fertility preferences and fertility behaviours in young Chinese couples today. These factors have been in affect since the 1990’s and are more often the reasons why couples forgo the option of having a second child (Wang, 2005). Acknowledging and incorporating these factors into future family planning policies will assist in creating policies that actually support the people and the continued development of the nation.
Lowest-low total fertility rate A low total fertility rate (TFR) is not a term that is frequently used when discussing China and its population. However, within the city it is most commonly used to showcase
45 China’s drive to a more developed status. Shanghai is experiencing a phenomenon among its registered population that is characteristic of lowest-low population experiences that have occurred in countries within Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe as well as East Asia during the period of 1989-2008 (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene, 2009). Between 1989 and 2008 lowest-low fertility was experienced for greater and lesser periods of time and to different degrees below the 1.3 mark of lowest-low TFR within the following countries: Lithuania, Russia, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldovia, Armenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, East Germany, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore (Goldstein, et al., 2009). During the period of lowest-low TFR each individual country was experiencing a social, political and economic ebb and flow of development that resulted in a lowest-low TFR that lasted in accordance with the specific social, political and economic climate.
Within Shanghai’s registered population, Shanghai has been experiencing a negative fertility growth since 1993, wherein the TFR was 0.78/1000 and as of 1997 the TFR reached -2.4/1000 within Shanghai’s registered population (CPIRC, 1999). This places Shanghai in the category of “lowest-low fertility”, a term coined by Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002 and 2006) and Billari and Kohler (2004) and used within Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene’s (2009) article that explores demographic reversals of lowest- low fertility and the factors that explain observable changes (Goldstein, et al., 2009). Lowest-low fertility is used to describe a period of time wherein the TFR of a population is below 1.3. Characterizations of lowest-low fertility include: “a rapid shift to delayed childbearing, a low probability of progression after the first child (but not particularly low levels of first-birth childbearing) [and] a ‘falling behind’ in cohort fertility at relatively late ages.” (Kohler et al., 2006, p. 99, as cited in Goldstein, et al., 2009, p. 663) Delayed childbearing, increased periods of time between births, and having fewer children are indicators consistent with Greenhalgh’s (2003) term wan xi shao ( 晚 稀 少 ), meaning later-longer-fewer, used to describe the one child policy family planning policy implemented by Deng Xiaoping. Shanghai was forced into a status of lowest-low TFR because of the quick change to the family planning policy of 1979 that has limited most
46 families to having one child. However, the reasons for why Shanghai continues to maintain its lowest-low TFR is a topic for discussion as there are two main camps of explanations, among researchers, Bongaarts (2002), Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002 and 2005), and Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa (2006), as to why lowest-low fertility may prove to be persistent. The first theory relies on the “persistence of tempo-induced declines in TFR and their potential future consequences.” (Goldstein et al., 2009, p. 666) Postponement of fertility and continued spaced births results in continued birth rate declines as well as further declines in fertility preference and desired family size (Goldstein et al., 2009). One suggestion for the future development of the family planning policy within China suggests that the policy relaxes to allow for each couple to have a total of two children provided there is a spacing of five years between each birth (Hesketh et al., 2005). This method continues to utilize birth spacing which may result in continued tempo-induced declines, however, it allows for all couples to have two children which may encourage a lowest-low TFR recovery. It is thought that this family planning policy modification would result in a projected TFR of 1.7 for the next two decades. It is also thought that such a policy relaxation with the birth tempo qualifier would also help to balance the sex ratio and reduce pressures that the current single-child generation will experience in having to care for two sets of parents and their own child (Hesketh et al., 2005). In accordance with Goldstein et al. (2009), Hesketh et al. (2005) future family planning policy relaxation would theoretically continue the low-fertility rate; however, there would be a slight recovery from a lowest-low TFR to a low TFR of 1.7.
The second explanation for continued lowest-low fertility focuses on the socio-economic and cultural conditions of lowest-low societies (Goldstein et al., 2009). Socio-economic and cultural conditions that are not advantageous for childbearing include societies with “low levels of gender equity in the family and a strong reliance of individuals on family networks in countries where families are expected to support their own members and where universal welfare systems are less developed” (Goldstein et al., 2009, p. 667). With the removal of social systems of support such as assigned work units, assigned housing and the ability to rely on the state for a retirement pension, the Chinese population now has to become self-reliant in finding employment, purchasing housing,
47 supporting one’s child as well as one’s aging parents. The financial burdens and investment of time people now endure, particularly in the cities, are consistent with the findings of the impacts of socio-economic and cultural conditions that are reported to maintain a low fertility rate. Within urban China, in the age of socio-economic development and opportunity the financial and time constraints that coincide with socio- economic development are limiting individuals’ abilities to have more than one or two children. This is particularly true in light of the decreased social safety nets available for the aging population. The aging population now has to rely more heavily on their children for financial support and an investment of time for care.
Sex Preference Within urban areas the number of children desired per couple has remained relatively consistent; however, sex preference is changing (Greenhalgh 1994; Qu and Hesketh, 2006). Greenhalgh (1994) found that by the 1990’s the sex preference for two sons had been replaced by the preference for one son and one daughter. Further indicators of the exclusive sex preference for boys shifting to include a new preference for girls is evident in the National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey of 2001, wherein it was found that new thoughts of the ideal family consisted of one boy and one girl (Hesketh et al., 2005; CPIRC, 2001). Sex preference for girls is not yet the normal; however, there is growing evidence that this may become a future trend.
The reason for a change in sex preference, relates to some of the impacting factors believed to be impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour. In the case of sex preference, there is a recent growing preference for female children because of the high costs associated with raising male children. Since the abandonment of social and work unit housing, the individual is now responsible for meeting his or her housing needs. This has developed into the new cultural tradition of having to buy a home before marriage. Often the purchasing of an apartment is left to the responsibility of the sons parents, making male children more expensive (Greenhalgh, 1994; Merli and Smith, 2003).
48 An additional explanation for the shift in sex preference is the growing sense that a daughter will be more supportive and helpful for her parents as they age (Greenhalgh, 1994; Merli and Smith, 2003). This factor is also related to the impacts affecting fertility preference. Due to the sharp decrease in population caused by the family planning policy, there is now a rapidly growing aging population who has only one child to rely on for support. Support for elderly parents extends far beyond emotional and psychological support. In transition towards a society increasingly focused on market reforms and economic development extensive cuts to government social security nets have resulted in limited care available to China’s aging population (Wang, 2005). Again, associated to the extension of work units, the current aging population is left with limited pensions and access to adequate health care; making this aging population extremely vulnerable and dependent on a single child for financial support. The necessity to provide increased support for aging parents is one factor that is impacting fertility preferences, as young couples realize the extent of the care and support they will solely be required to provide for their parents, the idea of having a second child may become financially burdensome. Factors impacting sex preference of children includes the increased cost of sons because of the new tradition of having to buy a home before marriage and the increasing sense that a daughter will provide care for aging parents.
It is evident that the factors impacting sex preference are inter-related with the factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
A time for change: the ongoing debate about the future of the family planning policy In considering the future of the family planning policy there are two camps of thought: The fear of change and the need to change in order to ensure continued socio-economic development.
Fear of a latent baby boom As discussed earlier, the one-child family planning policy was heavy handed and effectively only changed fertility behaviour, not fertility preference. Because fertility preference has remained intact and is reported to be at a level of 1 to 2 children in urban
49 areas, a fear of a possible latent baby boom in the event of a relaxing of the family planning policy is on the mind of the government. Its inability to squelch a latent demand for children is something of concern for the current government and the future of the family planning policy (Merli and Smith, 2002). The Chinese government has reason to be concerned as there is evidence indicating that the one-child policy has pushed fertility practices to yield numbers below what is preferred by the general population when considering how many children a couple would like to have. Peng (2004) discusses that the concern of a latent baby boom is due to the steady increase of women who are reaching a reproductive age. There is concern that the single-child cohort of the 1980`s will soon marry and have children, a relaxation of the one-child policy could result in the doubling of the total population (Peng, 2004). It is suggested that any major policy changes should wait until 2010, as to allow for a more gradual age structure adjustment (Peng, 2004). Considering that 2010 has arrived and the relaxation of the policy has been limited to the allowance of a second child provided that both parents are from single- child families, there appears to be a delay in the policies ability to keep up with the population development of urban Shanghai. There is also debate regarding whether policy changes should be implemented to the entire population or be applied to specific populations at different periods of time (Peng, 2004). However, there is further evidence to indicate that a slight increase in the TFR, the feared latent baby boom, may actually be the solution to finding a balance for supporting the increasing aging population and feeding the decreasing labour population thereby sourcing continued economic development. If the government hesitates to change, it is thought that the low population could hinder future socio-economic development due to a top heavy aging population and an under populated upcoming labour/workforce population (Wang, 2005). The result would be an inability to provide support for the aging population as well as an inability to continue economic development due to a low population within the workforce.
The feared latent baby boom is an irrational fear as studies focusing on fertility preference within urban areas in China show that approximately 35% of women want one child and 57% of women would prefer two children (Hesketh et al. 2005). One to two children does not qualify as a baby boom. Moreover, considering the socio-economic
50 factors that are more effectively maintaining a low birth preference, the government’s procrastination for change to the family planning policy out of fear of a spike in the population is unfounded.
The window of opportunity for change According to Peng (2004), the one-child policy has accomplished its objective of slowing down population growth in China. Originally put in place as a temporary solution to population growth, the one-child policy was only meant to be in effect for 20 to 30 years. Having reached a low fertility level, developed a new economic environment, realized the preference for a small-family culture of 1 to 2 children, and re-orientated birth control away from coercion and towards service wherein couples have access to more contraceptive choices, Wang (2005), considers the current climate to be providing a good opportunity to begin to phase out the family planning policy. Wang (2005), claims that China has reached a window of opportunity for change, which began around 2005, and it is thought to last for approximately 10 years. As China’s economy continues to develop it is believed that China will experience a period of demographic crossover wherein the labour force will decline due to low TFR, the aging population will increase and the ability to both support and continue on with economic development will be hindered due to the increased burden of the aging population and decrease in the labour force (Wang, 2005). Increasing financial pressures will be placed on single-child adults to support four aging parents and one child; this is known as the 4:2:1 phenomenon (Hesketh et al., 2005). The demographic crossover is unavoidable, however the family planning policy in place can have a direct affect on the impact this crossover will have on social and economic development (Wang, 2005). For instance, a relaxing in the one-child policy, to allow for two children, could aid in making the crossover more gradual by decreasing the aging population and allowing for a less rapid decline of labour available for the workforce (Wang, 2005). Relaxing the family planning policy would result in less financial pressures on the single-child generation and provide alleviation from the 4:2:1 phenomenon. Furthermore, a relaxing of the family planning policy will relieve the government of the burden of having to police birth control, allowing for finances to be re- distributed into other areas of social assistance need (Wang, 2005). In the absences of a
51 relaxing of the family planning policy there is growing concern for women as they age. As discussed, aging women will face the bleakest outlook if policy changes are not made; aging women will experience the most sever lack of familial support and government financial assistance during their last years (Wang, 2005). The lack of familial support and government aid available to women is something that needs to be addressed as soon as possible and is an area the will be directly affected by the relaxing of the one-child policy, as this will at the very least allow for an increase in familial support available to aging women.
According to Leung and McDonald (2006), within traditional Chinese culture, there is a strong influence of filial piety, wherein parent-child relationships create a feedback of reciprocal care. Parents care for their children when they are young and as parents’ age, children take on the care giving role. Filial piety, when left to a single child can create extra financial, physical and emotional pressure on the single-child generation. This added pressure may have an impact on fertility behaviour and fertility preference, as caring for one’s parents needs to be factored into the time and money equation.
What would change look like? There is a general consensus within the literature that a relaxing of the family planning policy is necessary. As stated earlier, the one-child policy was designed with an expiration date. As that date quickly approaches and socio-economic factors become more president determining factors in fertility preference and fertility behaviour, the need for policy change becomes increasingly evident. One suggestion for the future of the family planning policy includes an allowance for two children provided there is five years of spacing between births (Hesketh et al., 2005). Following this suggestion would yield a TFR of 1.7 over the course of the next 20 years. According to Hesketh et al. (2005), allowing for two children with a set birthing tempo in place would assist in normalizing the sex ratio and reducing the 4:2:1 phenomenon.
Family planning modifications are in the works, as multiple provinces and municipalities are now allowing for specific populations to have two children (Peng, 2004). This is an
52 indication that “a natural transition towards a two children per family norm will be gradually put in place.” (Peng, 2004) However, seeing as how it was announced in 2002 that no fundamental changes would be made to the family planning policy, but that certain areas of the policy may be relaxed, these modifications are occurring quietly, possibly to allow for the government to maintain its sense of control (Hesketh et al., 2005).
The government has a great challenge ahead, as no government has successfully been able to raise fertility once it has declined to levels below replacement levels, people can be forced to have fewer children but it is not possible to force people to have more children (Wang, 2005). With this in mind as socio-economic development continues in China and people gain more freedoms that result from wealth and globalization, the family planning policy is becoming increasingly insignificant for well educated, wealthy urbanites who have multiple methods of getting around the family planning policy should they choose to do so. For the majority of the people living in urban areas socio-economic factors are increasingly becoming more important instruments in affecting fertility preferences. It would appear that regardless of whether the family planning policy is ready to change, factors outside of the family planning policy have already begun to more prominently affect fertility preferences and fertility behaviours in urban areas. In planning the future of the family planning policy it is crucial that the social, individual, cultural and human impact of future policies be taken into account. The method of ethnography and in-depth qualitative studies are necessary in order to understand the entire social, political, economic and developing environment such future polices will be taking place in. This will assist in development of the population as well as the continued development of the state.
53 CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY Since the purpose of this study was to explore the factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour in Shanghai among the first single-child generation who are now entering into their childbearing years, the best method for examining this was an ethnographic approach. According to Bentz and Shapiro (1998), an ethnographic approach allows for the exploration of “the life, behaviour, attitudes, and concepts of a particular cultural or social group” (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998; Leung & McDonald, 2006). Furthermore, in her attempt to understand the makings of the one-child policy Susan Greenhalgh (2003) utilized a method that included ethnography as well as in-depth qualitative interviews. In doing so, the importance of understanding not just the participants but also the daily life environment the participants endure has been brought to light for researchers all areas of social science. In-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted while using semi-structured questions. The questions focused on the following areas in an attempt to discover the institutional/policy variables and the socio-economic variables that are impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour: the number of
54 children preferred by the participants, the age or time of having a first child, the factors affecting a participant’s fertility preference, and the desired future direction of the family planning policy.
Interviews ranged in time, lasting from 30 minutes to 2 hours. With the participants consent the interviews were voice recorded and in 10 cases when the participants did not feel comfortable having their voices recorded, handwritten notes were taken during the interviews and more in-depth notes were compiled directly after the interview concluded to ensure that the greatest detail of the interviews was captured. The interviews were conducted in English and Mandarin depending on the participant’s language preference and ability. In interviews where Mandarin was the dominant language a translator was used in order to limit language barriers and misunderstandings. All interviews were translated into English and then thematically analysed based on the purpose of this research study and by using content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Leung & McDonald, 2006; Singleton & Straits, 1999).
Participant recruitment Participants were recruited through the use of two strategies; first, a convenience sampling method, and second, a snowball strategy. These methods were decided to be the most effective due to the sensitivity of some of the topics discussed and the cultural tendency to not want to openly discuss some political topics, particularly with strangers. These strategies allowed me to utilize my personal relationships as sources for finding participants and being referred to other potential participants. The selection requirements of potential participants included: (1) those who identified themselves as Shanghainese or having lived in Shanghai for at least five years. (2) A second group was formed as a comparison group; the majority of people in this group were not Shanghainese but had been living in Shanghai for a minimum of two years. (3) Those that have stake-holds in Shanghai either through a business operation that supports their livelihood, through birth or through family ties; (4) those who are of the targeted generation of 24-35 years old.
Participant populations
55 This study focused on the experiences of two different target populations. All of the participants shared the selection requirements of being within the age range of 24-35 years old at the time of the study. The two populations came from different backgrounds, Group A was either Shanghainese, had set roots in Shanghai for at least 5 years, or had a stake-hold in Shanghai through employment, investment or family. Participants in Group B had been living in Shanghai for a minimum of two years; however the majority of these participants came from rural backgrounds and had the experience of having siblings. The two participant populations had different socio-economic status’ (SES). Differences in SES were identified by the participants’ level of monthly income and their level of completed education. Participants from population A all worked at a multinational corporation. These participants all made a minimum salary of 5000RMB per month, and had at least completed a bachelor’s degree level of education from a credited university. Having achieved a post-secondary degree, in accordance with UNESCO, population A has achieved a high level of education. Participants from population B worked in the food service industry at local restaurants or café’s. Population B made a salary ranging from 1500RMB – 2500RMB per month and had completed either high school or a maximum of two years of studies at a local college close to their hometown as their highest level of education attained. A total of 25 participants were willing to assist in this research.
Group A There were a total of 15 participants in population A: 8 men and 7 women. Three of the participants reported having either a brother or a sister. Of these three participants 2 were born prior to the 1979 one-child policy and the other remaining participant’s parents were divorced resulting in a half sister. It is important to note that Chinese people of the single- child generation often report having multiple brothers and/or sisters; this is because the words for brother and sister are extended within this single-child generation to include cousins. For the purposes of this study the term siblings, brothers and sisters, is limited to a biological sibling wherein a brother or sister shares the same parents, unless noted otherwise. Of the total participants in group A, 7 were married, and one married couple had both spouses participating in this study. The married participants included 3 men and
56 4 women. One of the married participants reported having a child. Only the married participants reported themselves as being homeowners, the remaining 8 unmarried participants reported themselves as not being homeowners. Of the 8 unmarried participants 4 out of the 5 men lived at home with their parents, the one male who did not live at home rented an apartment. Two of the women participants were unmarried, non- homeowners. One of these women lived at home with her parents, while the other woman rented her own apartment. Twelve of the participants reported themselves as being Shanghainese, and the remaining 3 participants reported themselves as being from the countryside, but all 3 participants have lived in Shanghai for 5 or more years. All of these participants will be able to qualify for Shanghai residency status in the near future. All of the participants in group A had at least a Bachelor’s degree level of education.
Group B There were a total of 10 participants in population B; 4 men and 6 women. Of the total population none of the participants were married, however 2 men and 5 women reported themselves as being in serious committed relationships. 7 of the 10 participants were from rural hometowns, 3 participants reported themselves as being Shanghainese and having Shanghai identification. The remaining 7 participants reported themselves as having come from the countryside or smaller cities. These 7 participants have lived in Shanghai for at least 2 years, however none of these participants have Shanghai residency status and it was undetermined if they would be able to qualify for Shanghai residency. It is important to note that because these 7 participants do not have Shanghai residency status, they may not benefit from the current family planning policy within Shanghai. However, the reported fertility preference and fertility behaviour of these participants is still relevant to this study because it provides additional experiences of fertility preference and fertility behaviour within a different SES group. Even if their fertility preferences can not be met under the current family planning policy, their fertility preferences are in existence.
57 None of the participants in Group B had children, and none of them were homeowners. Of the men, 3 of the 4 participants reported that they lived at home, while one male participant reported that he rented a room in an apartment. Although all 4 male participants were from rural hometowns, 3 of them lived with their parents because their parents had also come to Shanghai for work. Of the women, 3 of the 6 reported that they lived at home while 3 participants reported that they lived with other family members.
Issues in doing research in China: Conducting research in China comes with some challenges, particularly when the researcher is a “lawoai” or foreigner. Being a foreigner who is conducting research creates obstacles to overcome but also allows for opportunities that may not be available to native Chinese researchers. The following is a discussion on the potential challenges met within this study and how these challenges were overcome. The challenges to be discussed include: language barriers, cultural misinterpretation, gaining the trust of participants, receiving earnest responses, and accessing accurate data (Manion, 1994). Learning the local language is a necessity in order to gain a better understanding of the culture. If the local language can not be learned then an attempt at the language needs to be made in order to create some connection with participants. In the case of this study, a basic level of Mandarin was used. In situations wherein the majority of the interview was to be conducted in Mandarin a local translator was utilized.
Cultural misinterpretations will occur within cross-cultural research. However, the extent to which these misinterpretations affect research results is dependent on the in-depth knowledge and living experience of a culture. Ethnographic research was the chosen method for this research because it provided the best opportunity to become immersed in the culture so a more full understanding of the culture could be gained. Participants within this study were people who I either worked with on a daily basis or visited frequently at local restaurants and café’s. By working with the participants and visiting them frequently at their places of work, a familiarity was gained and the ground work was laid for creating trusting relationships. An ethnographic research method also allowed me to better explore the attitudes, behaviours and concepts of the Shanghai
58 culture and observe my participants interaction with their surroundings and culture (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998; Leung & McDonald, 2006). Misinterpretations were avoided as much as possible by asking questions and encouraging participants to further explain their opinions. I believe that being a foreigner in this situation may have worked to my benefit because participants did not expect me to understand their culture and so they were more forthcoming with explanations, opinions, and values. It appeared that the participants within this study were eager to educate me in regards to their culture, and personal experiences. The eagerness of the participants to teach me about their life experiences and culture resulted in them opening their lives and homes to me. I was invited into their homes to meet their families and speak with their parents and grandparents. I was also invited to participate in two of my participants’ weddings. The participants did not limit themselves to just telling me about their culture, they invited me to become actively involved in their culture and daily lives. As much as I observed my participants, my participant observed me, making frequent inquiries about my culture and life. Cultural misinterpretations were avoided as much as possible by becoming actively involved with the culture.
Gaining the trust of the participants developed from being actively involved in their daily lives. I allowed the participants to see a consistency in me through my actions and I was conscious to answer all inquires into my life openly and honestly. I actively listened to my participants and in the early stages of our relationships I asked them questions that were along a similar level of closeness that they would use when talking to me. As relationships formed I informed my participants of a study I would be embarking on, making the general information openly known to my co-workers and the staff at frequented establishments. When it came time to recruit participants the people I approached were already aware of my interest in fertility preferences in China, as well as the reasons for conducting my research. Participants at the multinational corporation, where I worked, were initially contacted first by a personal email introducing my research topic and asking if they would like to contribute to my research by sharing their experiences with me. Participants from the local café’s and restaurants I frequented were invited to participate via a face-to-face invitation. In order to encourage a sense of trust I
59 informed all participants at the beginning of the face-to-face interviews of the purpose of the research, how the information shared would be used, the importance of confidentiality between myself and the participant, highlighting that only I would know their identity and that the information they shared with me would only be used for the purposes of only this research study. I also informed the participants that they were in no way obligated to answer the questions, that they had the right to decline answering a question and terminating the interview at any moment without any objection from myself. I had the participants confirm that they understood their rights. Consent was mandatory for the use of the voice recorder, and I informed the participants that written notes were an option at anytime if they felt uncomfortable with being recorded. Being able to discern if earnest responses were being received required acute observation of the participants, a sound judge of character, and a vast knowledge of cultural experiences to be able to discern a participant’s earnestness and comfort. It is important to note that all of the interviews conducted with group A happened away from their place of work. However, the interviews conducted with participants in group B were conducted at the participant’s place of work. In comparison of the two groups a general observation is that the participants in group A were more forthcoming with their answers, while participants in group B were sometimes hesitant or provided shorter, less in-depth answers. Two reasons for the differences in group responses could be due to the location of the interviews or the fact that I had created closer relationships with the participants in group A thereby having gained more trust from this group.
Accessing accurate data within China is a challenge that many researchers face. There is evidence of underreporting or giving misleading answers in order to conform to government polices and nationally dictated thought. According to Merli and Smith (2002), studies show that Chinese women often underreport their fertility preferences in order to conform to politically correct fertility behaviours. Difficulty in achieving accurate data is apparent as Wang (2005) has stated that there has been a “collapse of a credible government birth reporting system.” (p. 1) Hesketh et al., (2005), confirms the lack of credibility in statistics provided by the Chinese government when he says:
60 “ The collection of population statistics in China is known to be subject to manipulation to conform to family-planning regulations, since the process is over- seen by officials who are often unwilling to uncover any violations of the rule.” (p. 1172)
Due to the questioning of credibility and accuracy of official reports and recoded statistics, I believe that the most successful research method is one that utilizes quantitative statistics but references this data with qualitative in-depth interviews, thereby allowing for a more complete picture of the official and unofficial experiences that exist within the same culture.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS Fertility preferences and fertility behaviour in the midst of the ever progressing socio- economic development that is taking urban areas in China by storm are of particular interest when considering the potential course of future social and economic development. Within the results there is evidence that institutional/policy factors are no longer the dominating factors that are impacting the participants’ fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Within urban areas in China, particularly Shanghai, the fact that fertility rates have dropped below the level of re-generation is causing alarm for social scientist, demographers and population policy officials. As Shanghai is the most progressive and developed city in China, if this city is not able to maintain its quality population in the face of development, concern needs to be raised regarding the future development of the rest of the country.
The first single-child generation is now faced with new factors that are affecting their fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Factors that affect this generation’s fertility
61 preference and fertility behaviour stem from the two general categorical variables institutional/policy related variables and socio-economic variables. As this generation navigates its way through the socio-economic developments and family planning policy modifications, new opportunities as well responsibilities are found to impact fertility preference and fertility behaviour. The fertility preferences and fertility behaviours of this original generation of single-children, as found in this study, provides the first evidence of the impacts of social, economic and cultural development on a single-child population in China. The fertility preferences and fertility behaviours resulting from the socio- economic and family planning policy developments are examples of the fertility and population trends that may be found in other cities in China as development progresses throughout the country.
The interviews explored the following areas: Fertility preference and fertility behaviour, the preferred childbearing age, political/institutional factors and socio-economic factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour, and the desired future direction of the family planning policy. Participant responses have been thematically organized and within each area an analysis is provided.
It should be noted that Group A refers to the higher SES urban group of participants. Group B refers to the lower SES more urban/rural group of participants.
Fertility preference and fertility behaviour Group A: Preferred number of children Within Shanghai, the literature places the current preferred number of children by women just under 1.5 children per woman (Wang, 2005). This places Shanghai below levels of re-generation. In answering the question of how many children are preferred, 12 of the 15 participants from group A responded that they want to have one child. In further questioning if the respondents would want to have more children if money, time and the family planning policy were not a factor these 12 respondents confirmed that they would only want one child. Reponses from these 12 participants included the following:
62 I want one child “I’m an only child, and I think being an only child is good because you get a lot of attention and don’t have to share your parent’s attention.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, recently married)
“All of my friends are having one child, it’s what we [Shanghainese] are use to…its normal for us to have one child….I can’t imagine having more than one child…two or even three children is just…wow…no I can’t imagine that!” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, recently married)
“I want to focus all of my love and attention on one child; I can give this child so many opportunities if there is only one.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, single)
“I just want to keep my head down and eat my rice…I don’t want to do anything different that might make people look at me.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, in committed long-term relationship)
From these three examples fertility preference and fertility behaviour are being decided based on consistency of experience, wherein the single-child adult wants his/her child to have a similar childhood and parenting experience. Identifying with the social phenomenon of being an only child and being limited to the experience of being an only child is also apparent. Furthermore, a sense of wanting to fit in with one’s peers and a sense of belonging appears to have been developed around the social experience of being a part of the one-child generation. This is most evident in the final quote wherein the participant openly said that he did not want to draw attention to himself by having more than one child. This is an example of self-monitoring and self-censoring, both qualities the one-child policy attempted to ingrain into the single-child generation so that a “voluntary” small-family culture could be created. It appears that the participant’s experience of receiving the majority of the attention in the family is carrying over into their desires for their children to receive the majority of the parent’s attention and
63 resources. There is an assumption that if all resources are invested into one child then the child will have more opportunities in life and therefore a better quality of life.
I want two children but… Examining the three respondents from Group A who indicated that they would want to have two children there appears to be some disconnect between fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
The respondent who was a single-child and qualified to have two children initially indicated that she wanted to have two children, however clarified that although she wanted to have two children, she would probably only have one child.
The participant explained her answer with the following:
“I want to have two children, because I think it is lonely for only one child. And maybe we, single-children are selfish, so I think it’s nice to have a brother or sister….but I don’t think I could afford to have a second child because I want to work. I’m still young and want to wait for a few more years before I have children. Shanghai is expensive, I don’t think I have time for two children, I think a good quality of life is easier with one child.” (Group A, female, single)
This participant acknowledges possible loneliness as a single-child as the reason for wanting two children, However, she then takes a more realistic perspective on her fertility preference indicating career goals, expenses and time as factors that are impacting her fertility behaviour.
Two other participants responded that they would want to have two children. These two respondents are unique because both have siblings as they were born prior to the one- child policy. These two respondents were the youngest in their families and grew up with at least one sibling. Both respondents are male and married. Because these two participants are not from single-child homes they do not qualify to have a second child of
64 their own. Both males shared different perspectives on their fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. In order to maintain confidentially these two participants will be referred to as Didi 1 ( 弟弟 1) and Didi 2 (弟弟 2)3, thereby acknowledging that both participants are the younger brothers within their families.
Money gets you around the one child policy Didi 1 (弟弟 1): Held a high position within the company. This male was in the highest income bracket of all of the participants interviewed. The following is his opinion on his fertility preference and the impact of the current family planning policy on his fertility decisions:
It is important to grow up with a brother or sister. It teaches you so many things, like how to share, without a sibling people are selfish. My sister and I are very close; I want my children to have the same experience. I feel it is important.
In response to the impact of the current family planning policy on his ability to have a second child the participant had the following to say:
There are ways around the policy; it’s not a big deal. If I want to have a second child I will leave the country and have the child in Hong Kong or Singapore. Then we will return with two children. I can also pay the fine for having a second child. If people want a second child there are ways around the policy. It is a human right to have a second child.
This respondent’s experience of growing up with a sibling has impacted his fertility preference towards wanting to have two children himself. In regards to the impact of the family planning policy, it is evident that this participant is within an economic bracket that allows him some financial freedom to go above the policy and achieve his desired fertility preference in spite of the dictated fertility behaviour that is being imposed on him. Unfortunately, for the majority of the population, having the financial ability to not
3 Didi (弟弟) means younger brother.
65 be limited by the family planning policy is not the realty of the majority of Shanghai’s population. However, this could be an indication of fertility trends to come as socio- economic development continues and more wealth is gained by the general population. As Hesketh et al. (2005) suggests that the socio-economic changes have brought some freedoms that result from wealth and globalization. The opening up of the market and society to outside influences is beginning to have an impact on the population’s fertility preferences. As seen in the above participant’s responses, financial wealth is providing this participant with more fertility freedoms.
The one child policy is limiting me Didi 2 (弟弟 2): Had seniority within the company but held a lower position within the company than Didi 1 (弟弟 1), placing this participant at a slightly lower level of socio- economic-status. This participant already had one child. This participant shared a similar fertility preference as Didi 1 (弟弟 1); however, due to the lower income this participant had a different experience of the impact of the family planning policy on his fertility preference. Didi 2 (弟弟 2) expressed an overt disdain towards the family planning policy and its impacts on his fertility behaviours. The following is his opinion on his fertility preference and the impact of the current family planning policy on his fertility decisions:
I think it’s a good thing to have a brother and sister…I think it’s a lot of fun to live together and play….I’m very angry that I can only have one child, its not a free country and there are many limitations…there is nothing I can do….the only think I can do is leave the country and migrate to America or Canada…to another country.
Didi 2 (弟弟 2) expresses his lack of freedom within China and his inability to meet his fertility preference of having two children. Later in the interview Didi 2 (弟弟 2) credits “life pressure and economic pressure” and needing a “good income, environment and house” to raise more children. He also expresses that it is necessary to have more time, and finances to support a larger family. Financial pressures and the time investment of
66 raising children are re-occurring themes within this interview. In addition to the family planning policy, finances, having to buy an apartment and time are also discussed as being impacting factors on this participant’s fertility behaviour. Didi 2’s ( 弟 弟 2) experience of the one-child policy suggests that his fertility behaviour is impacted by both institutional/policy variables and socio-economic variables.
Both Didi 1 (弟弟 1) and Didi 2 (弟弟 2) suggested that fertility preferences and fertility behaviour should be an individuals freedom or right, however, due to a lower income Didi 2 (弟弟 2) is more limited in being able to achieve his desired fertility preference.
Group B: I want more than one child Group B demonstrated more variety in their responses. Considering that 7 of the 10 participants in group B were from the countryside, growing up, these participants had a very different family planning policy experience than their Group A counterparts. This is because 7 of the 10 participants from Group B, who were also from the countryside, all had at least one sibling. Fertility preference among the 7 countryside participants resulted in the majority wanting to have 2 to 3 children. Explanations for the preferred number of children went as follows:
“I want one boy and one girl, this is the best. Later I will return to my hometown where I have more support…it’s easier to have more children in the countryside. Shanghai is too expensive.” (Group B, female, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 3 years)
“I’m from the countryside so I can have more than one child. I want to have 3 children, but I will probably only have one child…I can give a good quality life to one child…I can make sure my child goes to a good school if I have one child.” (Group B, female, single, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 3 years)
67 The first response shows a fertility preference for two children and the method of achieving this fertility behaviour is by returning to the countryside where there are more social networks of support and the cost of living is cheaper. The second example shows a desire to have more than one child but in reality this participant’s fertility behaviour will be decided based on the level of quality life she can provide for a child. The participant expressed the importance of an education for a child and that by having only one child, a quality education could more likely be provided.
One participant from Group B, who was from the countryside and had grown up with an older sister, stated very directly his reasons for wanting only one child:
“ I want the child to have a good quality of life…more children would be a burden to the children and to me and my lifestyle. Less children means more time and money for me so I can also enjoy my life.” (Group B, male, single, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 3 years)
Even though this participant could have more than one child within the confines of the family planning policy, socio-economic factors of providing a quality life, and having enough time and money so he can also enjoy a good quality of life are impacting his fertility behaviour.
Sex preference of children Group A: I want a girl Among the participants in Group A, there was explicit evidence of a change is preference of the sex of children. The one-child policy forced to light the cultural preference for male children. This was made evident in the increased cases of female infanticide, abortion of female fetus as well as the abandonment of female children. The result of the one-child policy and China’s cultural preference for male children is a serious abnormal sex ratio of male to female children (Peng, 2004). However, this study found evidence of
68 the sex preference of children to be changing to either no preference between male and female children or an increasing preference for girls. From Group A, 8 of the participants reported having no preference of whether they had a male or female child; 6 of the participants reported having a preference for having a female child and one participant reported having a preference for having a male child. The reasons for wanting a female child were as follows:
“Girls are cute and easier to raise, you can spoil a girl and treat her well…show her all the best things in life so when she gets married she will choose someone who can give her even more than I did.” (Group A, male, single)
This participant highlighted that there are different ways of raising a boy or a girl and showed a preference for wanting to raise a girl so he could spoil her and hopefully make sure she marries into a more rich family than her own.
“Girls are cheaper, if you have a boy you’ll have to buy him a house before he gets married…that’s a lot of money, houses in Shanghai are very expensive.”(Group A, male, Shanghainese, married)
This participant noted the cost of boys as being his deciding factor for preferring girls; particularly the cost of having to buy a home for the child before he can get married. The first single-child generation not only needs to worry about purchasing a house for themselves but they also need to save money for a son’s house in the future.
I want a…it doesn’t matter The majority of the respondents who replied that they did not have a preference in the child’s sex replied with an answer consistent with the following:
“It doesn’t matter if I have a girl or boy.” (Group A, female, single)
Group B:
69 I want a boy Group B, showed some differences in their responses towards sex preference of a child in comparison to their Group A counterparts. Because the majority of the participants within this group preferred to have more than one child, there answers reflected a preference for wanting to have both a boy and a girl, when pressed to decide between a boy or a girl, approximately half decided that they had no preference where as the other half showed a slight preference for boys:
“ I want a boy and a girl…if I had to choose, I don’t know, I don’t think it matters…I think having a brother or a sister is important, but if I can only have one child then I don’t care if it’s a boy or a girl.” (Group B, female, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 4 years)
“It doesn’t really matter if I have a boy or girl, but maybe a boy would be more fun. I can do more things with him…” (Group B, male, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 2 years)
“I think boys need a lot of attention and they are stronger so they will have more opportunities in life to make a good quality life… if I had only one child I’d want a boy.” (Group B, female, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 4 years)
Preference between having a boy or girl was less clear among participants in Group B compared to their Group A counterparts. Perhaps this is because most of the participants in Group B are planning on having more than one child, and therefore sex preference of the child plays a less important role.
Age or time of having first child Group A and Group B Delayed childbirth is one method of reducing the population as seen in the later-longer- fewer campaign prior to the 1979 one-child policy. All of the participants from both Group A and Group B discussed wanting to delay having children. Group A had a
70 minimum delayed childbearing age of 28 years old and Group B had a minimum delayed childbearing age of 26 years old. The difference in minimum age of having a first child could be related to socio-economic factors such as Group A having attended school longer and entered into the work force at a later age than participants in Group A. Also, because participants in Group A were residents or at least permanently based in Shanghai these participants may have more opportunity and desire to develop their careers. In comparison, Group B was made up of a majority of rural participants who planned on returning to their hometowns after working for a period of time in Shanghai. The more transient nature of Group B may result in less of a focus on developing a career in Shanghai, thereby decreasing the period of time needed for career development before having a first child. Finally, because Group A had completed more education their entrance into the workforce was delayed, although Group A was making a higher salary than Group B, Group A would need a longer period of time to save money for a house or childcare costs because the cost of living in Shanghai is higher than in rural areas. Also, due to a later graduation date Group A began to earn and save money at a later age than Group B. Socio-economic differences may lead to a delayed age of first childbirth and therefore an overall lower TFR.
Factors affecting fertility preference and fertility behaviour Socio-economic development has brought both opportunities and responsibilities; both of which have an impact on fertility preference and fertility behaviour. The majority of the participants from both Group A and Group B mentioned the following socio-economic factors as having an impact on their fertility preference and fertility behaviour, note the gender differences: All participants discussed money as being the main factor for deciding how many children they will have. The re-occurring financial burden brought up by male participants was having to buy a house, this was apparent among the urban and rural participants of Groups A and B. However, this factor was more thoroughly discussed within Group A as it has become know as a “Shanghai tradition” to purchase a home before marriage. The re-occurring financial burdens brought up by all male and female participants was having to take care of their parents, again this concern was also present in both groups of participants, however, Group A participants expressed more
71 concern and anxiety towards having to take care of their parents than participants in Group B. One reason for this could be because the majority of participants in Group A were single-children; where as the majority of participants in Group B had at least one sibling to share the responsibility of taking care of one’s parents. Furthermore, the cost of living is higher in Shanghai; participants from Group B who reported that they would be returning to their hometowns will have a lower cost of living and possibly more social support from other family member to aid in the caring of their aging parents. In group A more women than men discussed time as being a factor that affects their fertility preference and fertility behaviour. This included time to spend with the child and personal time for one’s self. Group B participants also mentioned time being a factor impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour, however, this factor was less prominently discussed and there was less gendering of this response.
Purchasing a home Group A: The majority of this section is focused on Group A, because there was consistent mentioning of how purchasing a home was a “Shanghai tradition”. This new tradition of purchasing a home before marriage is recorded as being very prevalent on the minds of the participants in Group A. The necessity of buying a home and the cost associated with buying a home in Shanghai is thoroughly detailed in the following:
It’s tradition! Of the participants within this study 100% stated that buying a home was a necessary requirement before marriage and starting a family. The participants described this requirement of buying a home before marriage as either a tradition, a “Shanghainese tradition”, or a “Chinese tradition”. When I pressed further about the roots of this tradition I received one of two responses, either the participants replied by again reiterating that it was a “tradition” or more specifically a “Shanghainese tradition” or a “Chinese tradition”, or the respondents replied by saying that they didn’t know why it was a tradition to buy a home before marriage. One participant responded by saying the following:
72 “I don’t know why it is our tradition, but I do know that if I don’t buy a house before marriage my girlfriend will never marry me.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, in a long-term relationship)
It’s a condition for marriage This statement elicited further questioning into owning a house as a condition of marriage. Of the 8 men interviewed in Group A, all of them indicated that it was necessary for them to own a house before marriage. They also all confirmed the above statement that no woman would marry them if they could not provide a home before marriage. One man elaborated by saying that:
“ Not only will my girlfriend not marry me but her parents wouldn’t let her marry me if I could not provide a home for us.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, in a long-term relationship)
“No girl will marry you unless you have a house. I have dated my girlfriend for three years…I found an apartment I could afford but she didn’t like it so I have to keep saving for a better one.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, in long-term relationship)
I asked this participant if he and his girlfriend would consider renting an apartment before purchasing one and he replied with the following:
“I live at home so I can save more money, if I rented an apartment my girlfriend would never agree to marry me and I wouldn’t be able to save as much money. She might leave me for someone else because it would take longer to buy an apartment.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, in a long-term relationship)
From this, there appears to be a social pressure to own a home before marriage. This pressure acts like a social ranking qualifier in determining if someone is adequate for
73 marriage. Having the economic ability to afford private housing suggests an economic ability to provide for one’s family. The ability to purchase a home before marriage becomes an important economic ranking tool for the woman and the woman’s family. It is apparent that the tradition of purchasing a home goes beyond the current young adult generation that is preparing for a committed long-term relationship and extends into older generations. This is particularly interesting considering that the older generation most likely received their home via public housing allocation. How the new tradition of needing to buy a house before marriage entered into their realities is something that needs to be looked into further. It’s a man’s duty I asked the male and female participants if they would consider sharing in the cost of buying an apartment. The responses showed that gendered roles exist in the purchasing of a home and the setting up of a home. All of the male participants stated that they would not consider sharing the cost of buying an apartment. Despite having to take on the responsibility of buying an apartment and the extra financial pressure this responsibility brought, the male participants did not show any desire in sharing this responsibility. One male participant made a statement that clarified the roles of a relationship and buying an apartment:
“It’s the man’s job to buy the apartment, maybe his family can help him if he’s lucky. I have friends whose parents bought his apartment, but it is always the man’s job to have the apartment first, before he can get married. The woman and her family can help with decorating and furniture and stuff, but they don’t buy the apartment. Most families with sons try to save money for the son to buy an apartment.”(Group A, male, Shanghainese, married)
Of the 7 women interviewed in Group A all, but one woman, confirmed that a man must provide a home before they would agree to marriage. One woman confirmed the reasoning of duty or role of the man to provide a house when she said:
74 “It’s the man’s job to provide a house before marriage. How can I trust that a man would be able to provide for me and my family if he can’t buy an apartment? My parents would disagree with my marriage if he couldn’t buy a home.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, single)
Two women who were married stated the following:
“I knew I was ready to get married when my husband bought a house and we decorated it together. My family helped to pay for the decorations and furniture, but it is my husband’s job to take care of the house, I mean to buy the apartment.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, married)
“Buying a house is his job (laughs), I don’t have to worry about that…but my parents will help to pay for the decorations…I guess he has to buy the house and I have to decorate it.” (Group A, female, married, lived in Shanghai for 6 years and married to a Shanghainese man)
When I questioned the female participants if they would consider sharing in the costs of the apartment all of the women, with the exception of one, deflected this job to the men. The women did confirm that they could help out with the decorating and furniture, and 5 of the 7 women stated that it was the woman’s family’s responsibility to provide furniture. From the statements, it is apparent that there are gendered roles being assigned by family, society, peers, and being played out by each individual. Of all of the participants, only one woman, who was unmarried and rented her own apartment, suggested a different idea in terms of purchasing housing.
“I think its okay if a couple shares the expenses of the house. Housing is expensive, and maybe it’s better if the couple waits and saves up together.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, single)
75 When asked to elaborate on how her parents might feel about the breaking of the new tradition the participant responded by saying:
“My parents aren’t rich so they can’t afford to help me, I don’t think they would expect a husband’s parents to pay for a house if they also can’t contribute. I don’t think my parents would care, I support myself so they don’t say what I can do or can’t do.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, single)
This woman was the only participant to site a source of independence and freedom that came from her ability to support herself economically. Possible factors that may result in her different opinion include the fact that she was not Shanghainese and had grown up in the countryside, and had to work extremely hard to gain her current position of employment. Also, this participant supported herself and lived independently of any family support.
Based on the interviews it is apparent that the new tradition of needing to buy a home before marriage is rooted in multiple areas: social, generational, gender, and economic. There is no one clear source that tells the root of this tradition, but regardless of the root the tradition of needing to buy a home before marriage is deeply intertwined within society. This tradition has become a condition for marriage as well as a social economic ranking tool of financial stability and predicted ability to support one’s family. Furthermore, this new tradition has taken on gendered roles further establishing this tradition into the nether realms of society. Now this new tradition requires men, women and their families to continue to act in accordance with their gendered roles, agreeing to the socially organised order of how to plan one’s relationships and future family. Finally, this new tradition of having to buy a home before marriage has crossed the boundaries of generations, establishing itself among generations who were raised on the ideologies of public housing sectors providing for the people. If nothing else this new tradition has rapidly established itself as a social requirement.
Housing and fertility behaviour
76 Having the added pressure of having to purchase a house before marriage is impacting fertility preference and fertility behaviour:
Group A: “There’s so much pressure now to buy a house in Shanghai…its our tradition.… and housing is really expensive here…so I have to save money for a long time….I live at my parents house so I can save money…then after I buy my house I have to start saving for an apartment for my son…If I have one. That’s why I only want one child” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, single)
Group B: I have to buy an apartment before I can get married…that’s why I will go back to my hometown....Shanghai is too expensive. In my hometown my family can help me to buy an apartment. (Group B, from the countryside, lived in Shanghai for 5 years, single)
Having to save money for a home delays the age at which a couple can get married, thereby further delaying the age at which a first child can be born. Additional pressures of having to save money to help one’s son, if the child born is male, add additional financial pressures on the couple, all of which impact the couple’s fertility behaviour.
Filial Piety Other financial factors affecting the participant’s fertility behaviour include the future concern of having to support their aging parents. This concern was shared by both male and female participants. However, Group A expressed the concern of having to take care of their parents more frequently. Group A expressed more anxiety towards the additional financial pressure of caring for their parents would bring to them. Group B also expressed a concern for caring for their aging parents; however the additional financial pressure this may bring was not discussed to the same extent as their Group A counterparts.
Group A:
77 “In Shanghai there is so much pressure, I have to think of my parents’ future when I plan my future. I have to save money for their future too, so I can’t spend so much money now…Now my parents are healthy and ok, but I don’t know what will happen later so I have to be prepared.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, married)
“I want my parents to have a good life when they’re old. I will help them more when they’re old, this is my duty, I’m their only child. So we have to pay back our parents.” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, married)
“I worry about my mom in the future because she is all by herself…my dad is remarried…I will take care of my mom, I’m her only son…I don’t want to have kids if I can’t afford to take care of my mom.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, single)
The added financial pressure of having to take care of one’s parents is on the minds of Group A, there expressions of concern are closely connected to their reality of being only-children and is impacting their fertility preference and fertility behaviour.
Group B: Group B was less forthcoming with the financial pressures of having to care for their aging parents. From the following discussions it is evident that having siblings relieved some of this filial piety pressure:
“I’m not so worried about my parents in the future, they’re still healthy and my brother can help too.” (Group B, female, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 2 years)
“ In my hometown we have lots of family around, many people to help out…I have more support and opportunities for a better quality life in my hometown. If I
78 go back to my hometown I can take better care of my parents” (Group B, male, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 4 years)
Social networks appear to be important in the countryside wherein some of the pressures of having to care for one’s aging parents may be relieved due to the resources and opportunities available to draw upon. Such social networks may also be present in Shanghai; however, such networks were not mentioned in the interviews with participants from Group A.
Time The issue of time, having enough time to care for children, having enough time for one’s self and having enough time for a career were factors mentioned by participants when discussing their fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Group A’s discussions surrounding time were gendered in that more women than men mentioned the issue of time. Group B mentioned the issue of time as a factor impacting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours less than Group A. However, when time was mentioned within Group B it was less gendered and discussed by both male and female participants:
Group A: “I only want one child because I want to have enough time to spend with my child. If I have two children I don’t think I will have enough time for both children…I don’t think I will have time for myself. I want a career and time for my self…I think this is important.” (Group A, female, from the countryside but married to a Shanghai man, living in Shanghai for 8 years)
“I think two children would take too much time and energy. I want my one child to have all of my attention. If I have two children I think I will be too busy” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, single)
79 The idea of having time to one’s self is a sign of development because these women are realizing that they have the opportunity to take on multiple roles that go beyond being a mother. Socio-economic development has brought new career opportunities and the idea of developing a career is becoming more common within Shanghai. Career development and finding a balance between caring for children and having a work life are factors that are beginning to enter into the minds of the participants in Group A.
Group B: The idea of being able to provide a good “quality” life was a re-occurring theme in within group B. A good quality life was wanted for the participant’s future child or children as well as for themselves; thus, bringing in the factor of time into the equation of fertility preference and fertility behaviour. “If I have more than one child then I won’t have a good quality of life. I want to be able to do the things I like too.” (Group B, male, from the countryside, living in Shanghai for 2 years, single)
Having the time to enjoy personal interests is a factor that is impacting fertility preferences and fertility behaviours, perhaps the idea of having time to peruse personal interests is a result of socio-economic development.
The future of the family planning policy When discussing the importance of the one-child family planning policy and the future of this population policy, the majority of the participants in both Group A and Group B agreed that the family planning policy was necessary. Both groups acknowledged that China had a large population and this population was either impacting development or would be difficult to support in the future. The majority of the participants agreed that some form of family planning policy was necessary. Furthermore, the majority of the participants mentioned that they would like to see a relaxing of the one-child policy to allow for more children, at least two children was the general consensus. Although some participants expressed feelings that their human rights being limited by the family planning policy, the majority concluded that they would be satisfied if they had the
80 option to have two children. Even if they were not going to act on the fertility option of having two children, the participants felt that the option of having two children seemed to be more in line with there fertility preferences.
Group A: Participants who grew up as only children made comments of having a single-child as being natural and part of their tradition and important for ensuring a good quality of life. One participant explained this natural decision to have one child in the following manner:
We have to control the population, because it is getting bigger and bigger….I feel that the [policy] is quite reasonable….in Shanghai the living standard is quite high, so you have to make more money, especially if you will have the children….in Shanghai the average person has to buy a house and a car, especially a house before marriage, but the average income in Shanghai is not so high, but on the other hand the housing, especially a new one will cost a lot of money, so you have to prepare a loan for the house…in order to ensure that you have a good quality life I feel like the one-child policy is important. My understanding is that most people in Shanghai would seldom have a second child…because we all know the situation in Shanghai, with the working pressure, and it is such a great city but there are also many challenges and opportunities that come so its important to be well prepared for challenges that might come. So people will only want to have one child so they more time in their career to prepare for the challenges in the future….challenges like time for a baby, education, taking care of their parents… (Group A, male, Shanghainese, married)
This participant expresses an awareness of the challenges of the future, mainly being financial pressures that will come with having to buy a home, pay for the education of a child and provide support for aging parents. A good quality of life means finding a balance between all of these pressures. In this participant’s opinion the one-child policy assists in finding this balance and does not feel limited by the policy. In this example the participant’s fertility preference matches his fertility behaviour. However, there is
81 consistent mentioning of the pressures and challenges of the future which are impacting the participants fertility preference, but there does not appear to be any discontent towards the institutional/policy and socio-economic variables that are responsible for the creation of his fertility preference.
A change in focus The participants from both group A and Group B agreed that the family planning policy was necessary, however there were some suggestions for a change in focus by the government to better support the developing concerns and sources of stress for the participants. Group A was more forthcoming with responses so this section focuses on their responses. The following is what the participants had to say: Group A: “Maybe the policy should focus on supporting us so we can give more support to our families.” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, single)
“…in order to ensure that you have a good quality life I feel like the one-child policy is important. My understanding is that most people in Shanghai would seldom have a second child…” (Group A, female, Shanghainese, married)
“Even if the policy relaxes the pressures of living in Shanghai continue to exist…I think the policy should help to take away some pressure…” (Group A, male, Shanghainese, single)
Participants thought that extra support would be good to take away some of their socio- economic stress. Instead of focusing on changing the population perhaps better supporting the current population should be the new focus of family planning policies.
82 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION Within a society with institutionalized political power, the use of population science to create a desired population, for the purpose of the development of human wellbeing, harmony and efficiency, has gained attention since French philosopher Michel Foucault identified population science’s role in the development of a nation, particularly the use of population science in the creation of a capitalist society (Foucault, 1978; Greenhalgh, 2003). Within present day Shanghai there appears to be new socio-economic factors that are impacting the population’s fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Socio- economic development has brought opportunities as well as responsibilities to the first single-child generation. Much of the responsibilities the state shouldered for generations, such as assigned work units, provided housing, retirement pensions, and social welfare nets have now been abandoned by the state and passed on to the individual. In picking up the slack and providing financial and social safety nets for one’s family, fertility preferences and fertility behaviours have been impacted. The result within this study is that participants have voiced financial, time, and filial piety concerns of how to adequately provide for one’s family while at the same time take advantage of the opportunities socio-economic development provides. Fertility preference remained to be
83 at or around one child. In cases where more children were wanted, the reality of providing a quality life for the child and one’s self impacted the participant’s fertility behaviour. In the cases of the participants who were coming from more rural backgrounds, their experiences of having grown up with children seemed to encourage their fertility preferences to include having more than one child. However, their ability to have more than one child was dependent on the fact that they would be returning to their rural hometowns wherein life is more affordable. Along with the shifting of social responsibilities from the state to the individual there appears to be a shift in the level of impact on fertility preference and fertility behaviour. Originally, it was thought that fertility preference and fertility behaviour was dictated from an institutional/policy perspective, this is no longer the case as socio-economic factors are now playing the dominant role in dictating participants’ fertility preference and fertility behaviour. Socio- economic factors such as money, time, filial piety, and career development are more commonly impacting individuals’ fertility behaviour.
Contribution to knowledge This study has provided further knowledge and information on the factors that are currently impacting individuals’ decision on how many children to have in light of the more socio-economically developed city of Shanghai. Through the use of an ethnographically grounded study a true sense of the daily stresses an individual faces in Shanghai has come to light. With this we have gained a further insight into the all encompassing socio-economic factors that are now impacting individuals’ fertility preferences and fertility behaviours. Shanghai’s experiences in fertility growth serve as indicators of what other developing cities may experience in China. By understanding Shanghai’s experience, the family planning policy can be adapted to meet the current fertility preferences and behaviours of urban residents. Most importantly this research sheds light on the growing pressures felt by single-child adults. Instead of the government continuing to focus on the family planning policy and control of the population, it is now time for the focus to shift to providing social safety nets that will provide increased social security. In doing so, some of the pressure felt by the single-child generation will be lifted as they will have social security nets to rely on if
84 necessary. People’s attention has shifted from having large families to having smaller families so they can develop a career and achieve a higher quality of life within the socio- economically developed city of Shanghai. The government needs to keep up with this shift in focus so that it can better support its people. By doing so, socio-economic development can continue to flourish, as the people creating these developments achieve a sense of security and safety within their daily lives. It is important that changes occur within a timely manner, because China truly is in its window of opportunity in terms of development. If social support for the population is not created and the TFR is allowed to continue to fall then the development China has achieved thus far will be lost due to a low population that cannot support its national development nor care for its growing aging population. A balance must be achieved, one that takes into consideration the people who make up the nation and the intricate way in which the people, the culture, the environment and the society all work together to create China’s national development. It is time for China to take into account its actual people in its calculations and do away with its obsession with purely quantitative scientific approaches towards development. China is a nation obsessed with numbers, particularly monetary numbers, and unless people begin to factor into China’s national development strategies it will be its lack of care for its numerous population that will obstruct China from attaining a state of sustainable development.
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