Andreoni , James (1995), Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness Or Confusion

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Andreoni , James (1995), Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness Or Confusion

Andreoni , James (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?’, 85(4) American Economic Review, 891-904. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118238 Bates, Robert H. 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