Andreoni , James (1995), Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness Or Confusion

Andreoni , James (1995), Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness Or Confusion

<p> Andreoni , James (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?’, 85(4) American Economic Review, 891-904. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118238 Bates, Robert H. 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Wilson (2008), ‘An Experimental Investigation of Hobbesian Jungles’, 66(3-4) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 669-686. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.011 Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2003), ‘Was Mancur a Maoist? 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