Armenia's Foreign Policy Between European Identity and Eurasian
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DOI: 10.12797/9788376386706.19 aram terzyan Armenia’s foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian integration On September 3, 2013, the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, announced Armenia’s decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union and contribute to the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Subsequent ratification of the treaty on joining the EEU by Armenian Parliament (signed in Minsk on October 10, 2014), irreversibly determined “Eurasian” constraints of Armenia’s foreign policy. The President invariably hailed the decision as a rational one emphasizing its security implications as well as economic incentives for Armenia.1 Needless to say, this step inexorably rendered Armenia’s long-desired foreign policy agenda for further pro- motion of the Association Agreement with the EU unfeasible. Evidence indicates that the question as to whether the Eurasian path was prede- termined or there was a margin of possibility for Armenia to opt for the Association Agreement was placed at the core of increasingly intensifying debates. It is worth not- ing that prior to the decision Armenia’s political elite was persistently questioning the insightfulness of country’s membership into the Customs Union given a handful of obstacles ranging from lack of common border to country’s tangible progress under the tutelage of the Eastern Partnership. On various occasions both the President and Prime Minister along with other leading officials invariably stressed that lack of common border with the Customs 1 President Serzh Sargsyan at the Plenary Session of the Pace Responded to the Questions Raised by the Members of the Parliament, 02 October 2013, at http://www.president.am/en/ interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2013/10/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-answered-the-ques tions-of-PACE-members, 10 June 2015. 248 Aram Terzyan Union poses insurmountable obstacles to Armenia’s participation in it.2 Namely, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan explicitly pointed out that there was no precedent of entering the Union with no common borders. 3 Discourse analysis of Armenian Presidents’ foreign policy speeches convincingly illustrates the very high emphasis placed on European integration which was associ- ated with prosperous, peaceful, free and democratic path of development. Impor- tantly, the European integration was invariably referred to as Armenia’s civilizational choice which catalyzes the homecoming to the European civilization and its cultural realm. Upon joining the European Neighborhood Policy President Kocharyan ex- pressed confidence that the initiative brings Armenia back home – to the European family, stressing that Armenia irrefutably seeks full-scale European integration.4 His successor Serzh Sargsyan in his 2012 speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foun- dation affirmed: “For us, Armenians the European system of values is intimately close… Since the reestablishment of our independence in 1991, we had not only reas- serted our sovereignty but also obtained historic opportunity to rediscover Armenia’s European road of development.” 5 The President tended to attach particular significance to the Eastern Partnership as a new impetus and new quality to the reforms for creating a more harmonious and prosperous European realm without dividing lines. He expressed confidence that intensifying cooperation with the European Union, and implementation of ambi- tious programs in the framework of the Eastern Partnership would serve as an ardent catalyst for democracy promotion and regional cooperation in the South Caucasus.6 In essence, the promotion of the Russian-led Customs Union has a great deal to do with the upgraded wave of EU-Russia competition and the latter’s desire to further thwart European integration in the sphere of its privileged interests. Moscow’s per- manent calls on the EU to stay away from its “near abroad” were reinforced by fierce counter-efforts in the wake of the remarkable promotion of Association Agreements. Fairly, Armenia’s abrupt move away from the EU and towards Russian-led Customs 2 President Serzh Sargsyan Met With the Representatives of the Mass Media, 18 March 2013, at http://www.president.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2013/03/18/President-Ser zh-Sargsyan-press-conference, 2 April 2015. 3 Customs Union not necessary for Armenia – PM, 4 April 2012, at http://news.am/eng/ news/99883.html, 10 May 2015. 4 Armenia to Deepen Cooperation With EU Within Neighborhood Policy, 16 May 2005, at http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/politics/news/13311, 27 April 2015. 5 Speech by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 07 March 2012, at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2012/03/07/news-124, 25 February 2015. 6 Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the EU Eastern Partnership Second Summit, 30 September 2011, at http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2011/09/30/ news-111, 22 February 2015. Armenia’s foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian integration 249 Union was indicative of further escalation of EU-Russia relations. Nevertheless, put- ting aside this broader geopolitical context, a question arises as to whether when faced with the dilemma of European and Eurasian paths a small state like Armenia has a margin for manoeuvre. It should be emphasized that the decision was hailed as rational and absolutely essential across Armenia’s political leadership pointing to its positive implications for Armenia’s military and energy security, long-term economic incentives coupled with hypothetical benefits in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution7. Research convincingly illustrates that one of the core driving forces behind the September 3rd decision emanates from traditional security challenges and volatile re- gional environment. Armenia remains subject to blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan coupled with the latter’s intensified efforts at expanding its military spending on the basis of its oil and gas revenues to get the settlement it wants over Nagorno-Kara- bakh. In this hostile environment Russia is unequivocally perceived as an indispens- able strategic ally and a security guarantor in Armenia’s political thinking and public consciousness given Russian-Armenian security relations. Unsurprisingly, there was no marked opposition to Armenia’s membership into the Customs Union from the Armenian society, most other political parties and the government. Remarkably, the latters tended to consistently emphasize the security implications of the decision for Armenia claiming that the country irrefutably needs to further deepen strategic part- nership with security provider Russia in all possible spheres. 8 It is worth noting that the perception of Russia and Armenian-Russian part- nership has experienced drastic ups and downs since the collapse of Soviet Union. Russia’s deep-rooted portrayal as Armenia’s “savior” was profoundly challenged in Armenian strategic thinking in the wake of Soviet Union’s gradual dissolution. The latter marked a major shift away from “imperial” Russia and a move towards the no- tion of independent statehood. This gradually gathered speed in the later stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh movement. Interestingly, Armenia’s traditional pro-Russian orientation received its share of condemnation by the first President of Armenia Le- von Ter-Petrosyan along with other prominent public figures and politicians urging to give up on delusional and self-destructive reliance on Russia and re-nationalize Armenia.9 In essence, in the early stages of the national movement its leaders targeted 7 Edward Nalbandyan: Armenia’s EEU Membership is of Strategic Importance to the RA, 14 March 2015, at http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=716D3A30-CA47-11E4- 99FD0EB7C0D21663, 20 April 2015. 8 Ruling party says Customs Union decision meets Armenia’s national interests, 6 March 2013, at http://www.armenianow.com/news/48249/armenia_ruling_party_customs_union_russia, 14 March 2015. 9 A. Mirzoyan, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History and Geopolitics, New York 2010, p. 28. 250 Aram Terzyan “imperial” Russia as the core impediment to Armenian independent statehood seek- ing to give rise to nationalist sentiments. Nevertheless, facing a bunch of ordeals unleashed by the devastating war against Azerbaijan and severe hardships of transition, Armenian political elite was forced to further rely on Russia as a recipe for addressing security threats mostly posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. It is worth noting that initial outright anti-Russian propagan- da started to diminish shortly afterwards the restoration of Armenian independent statehood. Unsurprisingly, along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as one of the original signatories of the 1994 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia clearly determined Russian-led security policy con- straints. The set-up of the 102rd Russian Military Base with its around 4,300 troops, 80 tanks, and over 100 pieces of artillery in the second largest city of Armenia Gy- umri in 1996 marked a substantial shift in Russia-Armenia security relations. In fact it inexorably predetermined “Russia-first” choices in Armenia’s foreign policy given the high emphasis placed on Armenia-Russia military cooperation both within the CSTO and bilateral partnership as a silver bullet to military threats stemming from Turkey and Azerbaijan. The military pact signed between Armenia and Russia in August 2010 extended lease on military base until 2044. 10 President Sargsyan has invariably