Editors’ Note: This is one of six discussion papers on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict commissioned to three Armenian and three Azerbaijani authors by Conciliation Resources as part of its “Karabakh 2014” project, funded by the UK government Conflict Prevention Pool through the Consortium Initiative and presented in London at a meeting on July 10, 2009 by the authors. Conciliation Resources will publish updated versions of the papers in the autumn and is planning a series of round tables to discuss them in the region.

KARABAKH 2014: A forecast on power sharing and power transformation By Rashad Shirinov

1. Introduction

Recent developments around the Nagorny Karabakh (NK) conflict have opened up windows of opportunity for all sides to engage in a genuine peace-building initiative. The optimism and recent enthusiasm comes largely from the developments appearing lately on the global scene, major elements of it being the new US administration’s decision to improve damaged relations with Russia, , and Iran. As the situation around the South becomes more favourable, the major powers have decided to invest more into the resolution of regional conflicts.

Matthew Bryza, US co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group stated that the meeting of Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in Prague on 7 May brought new positive developments in the peace process, something qualitatively new during his tenure as a co-chairman.1 Ilham Aliyev, in his interview to the Russian ITAR-TASS news agency and Rossiya TV channel talked about the necessity of providing security for population of Nagorno-Karabakh. He said: “We understand Armenia’s wish to have a land connection with NK. We see no problem in that. An effective solution of Lachin corridor issue is possible and this should not worry people who currently reside there and Azerbaijanis, who will settle there in the future”.2

In this forecast analysis I would like to elaborate on possible scenarios assuming a peace- treaty is signed later this year or possibly in 2010. I would like to focus on domestic power

1 Exclusive interview with Matthew Bryza (in Azeri), Radio Liberty, 8 May 2009; http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1623751.html 2 Ilham Aliyev on Lachin Corridor (in Azeri), Radio Liberty, 19 April 2009; http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1611659.html

- 1 - structures, sources of decision and policy-making and their capacity to take conflict resolution forwards or backwards. As we are all aware, signing a peace accord is an important step but only the beginning of a complex process called conflict resolution.

The paper assumes that non-governmental pro-peace forces are weak and immature, and that civil society or people’s diplomacy are not in a position to influence the signing of a peace treaty. Thus, the only way that a peace treaty could possibly be signed is through the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and mediation efforts of the international community. That means, by themselves, societies are not motivated enough to bring about or trigger any significant change in terms of conflict resolution. However, I would like to stress that this does not mean they will not resist a settlement they disagree with and any unacceptable move could spur a wave of discontent, disobedience, and even resistance. Furthermore, after signing an accord, a broad range of issues related to confidence-building, social transformation (including transformation of power relations), physical infrastructure building, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and various other issues needs to be addressed.

In this article, first of all, I would like to identify possible “peace-makers” in Azerbaijan by specifying what sources, institutions and actors would be the most appropriate to address the above-mentioned problems after the peace treaty is signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I will make a stakeholder analysis and will also look at the possibilities of a broader coalition of pro-peace forces and organizations, for some kind of “peace and reconciliation movement,” emerging within Azerbaijani society. So far, this has not been the case, although smaller civil society initiatives have taken place across the border.

Secondly, I would also like to identify possible “trouble makers” for the peace process, actors, and forces that could oppose the peace agenda and would declare “justice” and not “peace” as a primary goal.

My final objective will be to consider these stakeholders within a possible scenario of post- conflict development. Along these lines I will also try to look at this from the perspective of the liberal theory of democratic peace. The theory suggests that democracies do not fight each other as the political elite as well as citizens on both sides possess the skill to manage conflicts and establish contracts, which in turn requires an ability to make compromises.

2. Stakeholder analysis

Stakeholders that could influence the post-war reconciliation process in Azerbaijan vary across the political spectrum, and across social as well as generational divides. The following stakeholders can be identified in Azerbaijan: Civil society groups and NGOs

Since the 1990s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been involved in cross-border initiatives between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Almost all conflict-resolution and confidence-building projects in the region have been supported by international sponsors mainly from Western Europe and the USA. Since initiatives between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides were viewed by their governments negatively, initial projects took place

- 2 - more within a regional South Caucasus framework, also including Georgia. This format was logical, since conflicts also exist in Georgia. The reason why these groups have become important was that they saw that they could attract financial resources to their NGOs using a peace-building agenda and international cooperation. This is what I would call the “commercialization of peace”. We cannot say that all the groups had a genuine interest only in peace, since at some point NGO work started to become a sort of business activity aimed at channelling funding into the solution of goals set by regional partners. However, some genuine peace supporters exist and in a more favourable environment they could turn into catalysts of positive post-conflict developments.

Certainly every classification could be open to misrepresentation, but we can still identify two civil society groups to be addressed if we want to elaborate on possible peace actors: - The older generation raised and educated during Soviet times, when the Soviet Union was a place where ideology of “friendship among nations” dominated. It was an ideology, which resembled modern western ideas of tolerance and social cohesion. Among these groups is the Russian-speaking intelligentsia, including scholars and artists; - Youth groups, student movements, and youth NGOs involved in cross-border cooperation, supported by international organizations. Although the majority of young people are still sceptical about the possibility of peace and many feel aggressive towards the “enemy”, over the last few years a special youth agenda with local and international support has been implemented among active civil society youth groups. Youth civil society groups are probably the most dynamic part of Azerbaijani and Armenian societies and they use every opportunity to travel and engage in international projects and attend international events where they can meet each other within various formats, although not necessarily to discuss peace between the two nations per se.

In general, if the peace process continues and the governments embark on a path of making an ongoing commitment to people and processes that may take years to come to fruition, civil society organizations will emerge as organizations equipped with the tools of multi-track diplomacy. As mentioned above, two groups are really important: the older intelligentsia and young pro-western groups. Civil society organizations (CSOs) will be engaged in both: in cooperation across the border as well as the facilitation of transformation inside their respective societies. Moreover, equally important is that civil society initiatives possess more flexibility in selecting actors and involve social groups, which so far have had no role in the formal peace process – the internally displaced population in Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians.

Of course, this is going to happen only if governments agree on basic principles of solution and that they are committed to peace. The positive development is that the governments have actually started to realize that second track diplomacy can be instrumentalized as a useful tool. This happened for the first time in June 2007 when a delegation comprised of prominent university rectors from Baku, headed by Azerbaijani ambassador to Russia, Polad Bulbuloglu, visited NK and Armenia. The delegation met senior officials in both Armenia and NK. The visit to Armenia and NK was a testing of the water and confirmation that the Azerbaijani authorities can be in charge of various types of initiative towards conflict settlement. In July 2009 this initiative was repeated by Polad Bulbuloglu with the Armenian ambassador to Russia, Armen Smbatyan.

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There is also a fresh new initiative by the Helsinki Citizens Assembly South Caucasus Network, which brings together civil society representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan and both communities in NK (Armenians and Azerbaijanis). The participants of the process do not act as formal sides, but rather as independent civil society members on various sides of the conflict divide. It is labelled the “Civil Minsk Process”. Moreover, the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan also seem to be aware of the format and they are watching the process carefully. All in all the authorities appear to be more tolerant towards second track initiatives than previously. The fury directed towards civil society activists contacting Armenians or visiting Armenia and NK, who used to be immediately labelled as “traitors”, has lessened nowadays. It looks like the government might be able to instrumentalize second track diplomacy thereby gaining legitimacy for whatever efforts it will be making regarding the conflict settlement.3 However, it is more likely that Azerbaijani authorities would involve pro- governmental or governmental people (such as Ambassador Bulbuloglu) in the process.

The ruling party and opposition in Azerbaijan

The situation with political parties is more complex as they claim the support and legitimacy of bigger audiences. Currently, the positions of the ruling elite and opposition political forces on Karabakh more or less coincide. The recent situation with the possible opening of Turkish- Armenian border caused dissatisfaction equally on both sides. In general, the ruling elite and political opposition compete over the Karabakh issue, but this competition involves more discussions on the failure of the authorities to “restore territorial integrity,” rather than talks about mistakes in the peace negotiations.

Both sides employ the rhetoric of historical justice. The only difference is in priorities. As the ruling elite is more concerned with security and sustainability of the political establishment, it is more prone to give higher priority to the issue of Karabakh. As the question of Karabakh is a hot topic in internal politics, the government has instrumentalized it extensively to gather support at election campaigns. In the 2005 parliamentary elections the opposition’s discourse on the necessity of extending political and economic freedoms and achieving greater democracy and human rights in the country was confronted with the ruling elite’s heavy emphasis on Karabakh during the campaigning period.

In addition, the Karabakh issue is a delicate matter that could really unite the majority of Azerbaijanis. And this is where the government tends to be extremely cautious with steps towards solution of the conflict, since any mistake might be very damaging for it. Certainly, the opposition doesn’t want to lose that competition to the ruling party.

The fundamental question however, is: “What is going to happen if the ruling elite takes up the challenge of agreeing on the Basic Principles and even signs a peace accord?” Perhaps the attitudes of opposition parties will be irreconcilable with any such outcome and strong criticism of government for selling out national interests can be expected. On 14 May opposition forces organized a “Karabakh Forum” in Baku, which was attended by the majority of opposition political parties. At the Forum all the opposition forces expressed great concern regarding the government’s almost secret negotiations on Karabakh and some of the

3 Personal communication with Erkin Gadirli, participant in the Civil Minsk Process.

- 4 - participants agreed that the issue is about Azerbaijan’s making undesirable compromises vis- à-vis Armenia.4

Although a peace agreement is negotiated by lawyers and signed by elites, it is also a political document, having a real impact on people’s lives. Therefore, its success or failure depends on the seriousness of negotiators to sell any agreement to their constituencies and to deliver on any concessions and reforms. In this regard, selling the agreement to local constituencies could become a problem for the Azerbaijani government in terms of legitimacy. Thus, it is possible that the ruling elite could start thinking about dialogue with the political opposition, something they have not done for quite a long time. Generally, the strategy of the government is to deny the opposition any legitimacy, explaining this by the fact that there are no major problems in Azerbaijan and therefore the opposition does not have real support or a “social base.”

Media and public opinion

The media has always been vital in maintaining public awareness over the NK conflict. Some TV channels, like ANS TV, make a special emphasis on patriotic sentiments. The internet is slightly more balanced as different sources can distribute their information on the web.

There are contradicting opinions as to what public opinion really believes about the Karabakh conflict. Certainly, many people feel very responsible and nationalistic about this. Undoubtedly, NK is a burning issue in Azerbaijani politics and politicians and the media addresses it more or less on a daily basis. However, although NK is the most sensitive and delicate theme to be discussed in Azerbaijan, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the issue is a high priority on the daily agenda. The memories of the war and related enmity and rivalry come to the surface during specific periods when both sides believe that they should re- establish damaged self-esteem and national pride. This is what happened during the Eurovision song contest, when an Armenian presenter smuggled in and showed images of a monument from Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Public TV in response deleted Armenia’s voting number from the screen, which rendered voting for Armenia from Azerbaijan impossible.

It seems that the individuals are more preoccupied with social and economic problems rather than NK conflict in their day-to-day life, although opinion polls always suggest otherwise, partly because people could feel more patriotic with this kind of prioritization of problems. In other words, it seems that there is a paradox here and although NK is the most important problem nationally, perceived through individual lenses, the situation could be explained better according to democratic peace theory, which assumes that a majority of the people always carry a heavy burden of any conflict and its consequences and therefore they are not interested in renewed violence and bloodshed. Having said that, it is worth repeating that feelings related to ethnicity and national pride are perhaps the most unpredictable and are easily inflamed in conflicts.

3. A peace scenario: Azerbaijan as a “wealthy peacemaker”

4 Yeni Müsavat , 15 May 2009.

- 5 - Let us now consider a possible scenario for domestic developments in Azerbaijan if the Basic Principles are agreed to in 2009. First of all, it is important to mention that the possible agreement on the Basic Principles document opens up a completely new picture that is definitely going to influence the domestic context in both countries. While the government will be in need of peace-building initiatives, it will start promoting and seeking help from the groups and organizations possessing the capacities of multi-track diplomacy. Civil society organizations, youth groups and NGOs, academia and intelligentsia will, amongst others, embark on the path of second track diplomacy to build confidence and help improved relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as between NK and the Azerbaijani authorities.

As Azerbaijan’s claims for respect of territorial integrity are satisfied, the autonomy of Karabakh becomes a topic for discussion. The government of Azerbaijan will feel obliged to engage in the process of power-sharing as Nagorno-Karabakh is “returned”. The key concept here is the status of Karabakh, which has always been the most intractable issue. Different suggestions and formulations have emerged in the past. The option most widely discussed has concerned possible autonomy for Karabakh with the possibility of holding a referendum after some time. Further in the peace process, it appeared that this approach did not find the support of the parties. Later, a different approach was chosen – to discuss other issues without considering the status of NK for the time being.

Two questions are key for us to understand this process. First of all, what does the term “autonomy” mean (or “highest autonomy”) and what would be the government’s negotiation tools with NK as well as with major stakeholders in the process, including the political opposition, civil society and media? As the Basic Principles reportedly propose, NK would have a sort of “interim international status” – basically de facto what it now possesses – while the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is not disputed and ultimate status would be defined by referendum later.

Basically, the clause related to a popular vote after some period of time is a very important one. If Azerbaijan agrees to that, it will automatically shoulder the burden of convincing the population of NK that Azerbaijan, to put it simply, is a better place to live than Armenia. This will again put pressure on the Azerbaijani political establishment to open up to more economic and political freedoms.

Yash Ghai suggests that “autonomy is a device to allow an ethnic group or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over important affairs of concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers, which are the common interest of both sections”.5 The important issue here is what “common interests” are shared between the Azerbaijani and NK authorities and populations.

A high level of autonomy for Karabakh would definitely lead to two types of issues. These include, firstly, domestic structural issues with the constitution of Azerbaijan and relate to power sharing. As we also know, autonomy arrangements divide power and contribute to constitutionalism as they emphasize the rule of law and the role of independent institutions. Although after the referendum that put an end to term limits for the presidency the authorities

5 Timothy D. Sick. “Power-sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions”. In Contemporary Peacemaking, edited by John Darby and Roger MacGinty. Palgrave MacMillian Ltd, 2003.

- 6 - in Azerbaijan feel more confident than before to sell a peace deal to the society, it will still require a great deal of internal discussion and negotiations.

The second type of issue will be related to the relations between the authorities of Azerbaijan and Karabakh autonomy, where the Azerbaijani government will be obliged to make itself more attractive to NK, which will most likely turn out to be an unwilling negotiating partner. The Azerbaijani government will have to demonstrate that it has something to offer to NK and also to persuade NK to accept its offers. This is the point where these two issues are connected logically, for to have solid position on negotiations Azerbaijani government will have to draw support from different layers of the society. Also, coming back to the “common interests” of both NK and Azerbaijani people and authorities, economic interests would be perhaps a very good incentive for both sides. By involving NK in various regional economic projects Azerbaijan will indeed act as a “wealthy peacemaker”. This will be another opportunity for the government to open economic opportunities on both sides of the conflict and contribute to dynamic trade and economy.

The autonomy of Karabakh would require more respect, discussion and compromise on behalf of the Azerbaijani government. Of course, it is not for the first time that Azerbaijan will have autonomy inside the country. The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic has been another autonomous entity for a long time, but especially during the independence period. However, it is a completely different case, in which ethnic difference plays no role.

This would be a test for the Azerbaijani ruling elite as it has little culture of political power- sharing. Starting from 1993 the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party has repeatedly enjoyed majorities in the government and the Milli Majlis, the parliament of Azerbaijan. Although in 1995 several opposition representatives were allowed into the parliament, during more recent elections their number gradually decreased. At the present time only about five or six members of parliament are considered genuinely to be members of the opposition and their activity inside the parliament is challenged. In October 2008 Ilham Aliyev was elected as a president of the country in an environment of almost no competition as major opposition parties boycotted elections. Later in March 2009 the ruling party decided to amend the constitution and eliminate term limits for presidency allegedly to prevent intra-elite struggle for power and guarantee continuation of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency after 2013. The reasoning behind that was the shared understanding that Ilham Aliyev is a candidate who satisfies all the different power groups inside the elite.6

Moreover, power is not shared within different branches of the government either, as the executive branch enjoys much greater competencies than the legislative and judicial branches. Therefore, Karabakh’s “return” would create serious challenges to Azerbaijani ruling party in terms of “digesting” such a big political and legal entity into the system. And obviously there are no signs of government’s preparedness to face these issues. This could create big differences in positions between government and opposition as political parties would demand less rights for Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenians in any renewed constitution.

6 However, a prominent lawyer and the co-founder of Republican Alternative Public Union, Erkin Gadirli, pointed to a detail that, in fact, this new amendment cannot be applied to Ilham Aliyev but to the next elected president as the constitution has been amended after Ilham Aliyev was elected in October 2008. (in Azeri http://erkin13.blogspot.com/2009/04/post-referendum-bzi-qeydlr.html).

- 7 - The opposition would have better chances to take up this initiative and mobilize around the cause. The biggest question, of course, is how Azerbaijani government is going to technically arrange autonomy and share power with Nagorno-Karabakh and what does “highest autonomy” mean?

So, in the best case scenario, to mitigate domestic tension and reach consensus it will be necessary for the government of Ilham Aliyev to offer dialogue to his political rivals, because in this situation what the government needs is the support of a broader spectrum of political forces, civil society and media. It will be a painful step as there has not been experience of the president engaging in any kind of talks with the opposition after he came to power in 2003. There was a practice used by former president Haydar Aliyev to engage opposition in parliamentary discussions on Karabakh during sensitive times to share the burden of tough decisions. The current government will gain points by using this or a similar format, which will be relatively less risky since the opposition is very weak and there is a big probability that it will accept the offer. It is important to add here that the idea of dialogue between opposition and government is a topic for discussion that comes up from time to time. It has always been brought up by the opposition forces and international organizations (such as the OSCE) and rarely by the government itself. Due to the obvious lack of interest on the ruling elite side, these initiatives have not turned into something meaningful. Moreover, it has never taken place between first figures of political parties (including President Aliyev), but rather on the lower level. Therefore, it is quite possible that if President Aliyev offers a deal to the opposition, the latter will be very much willing to accept an offer and discuss the future of Karabakh with the ruling elite.

Another aspect of domestic tension could be public opinion. In this case, the government should take into account that, as mentioned above, the majority of Azerbaijanis would support a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Although it would be challenging to redesign the government’s information policy, multi-track diplomacy will be a good tool to promote new agendas and policy. Prominent public figures, artists and intellectuals promoting a peace agenda can also work as an effective tool. Trips to the other side will reinforce confidence among societies. Also the government might build a new concept of patriotism by stressing the importance of the return of territory and peace, instead of having displaced people living in unbearable conditions for the last 15 years.

4. A second scenario: Autonomy fails, a “cold peace”

A second scenario might develop around the failure of power-sharing arrangements between the Azerbaijani government and the NK authorities, or insurmountable tensions within Azerbaijani society and the political opposition.

The problem with power-sharing guarantees is that they are not very durable. Timothy D. Sick argues that “a key figure of power sharing – the mutual veto, whereby decisions are taken with the widest possible consent and only with a near consensus – often leads to the use of political blackmail. Unable to get consensus governance stagnates and policy-making drifts; the result is a “cold peace”, in which the parties do not continue to employ violence, but neither have they embarked on a serious process of reconciliation”.

- 8 - So, this kind of situation is possible if the government of Azerbaijan does not do its homework in terms of coming up with a workable model of constitutional arrangements, or if NK decides to put more pressure on the Azerbaijani government in the negotiations over the content of the autonomy. This leads to the situation where both sides reject compromise and the peace process is stuck again.

Another cause of stalemate could be Azerbaijan’s inability or failure to deliver economic or financial support that it might promise to NK. As a result of the international financial crisis that countries of the region have also experienced, and possible cuts in oil production after 2010, there might be growing incapacity for the government to contribute to economic sustainability of Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government is forecasting an almost 10-fold decline in the country’s GDP growth. In 2009-10 the country will reach the peak of oil production (around 65 million tons a year), which will start reducing from 2011. The next peak in oil and gas sector is expected after 2012 when Phase 2 of Shah Deniz Gas Project is launched.7

If mismanaged by the government, this decline might turn into social discontent that could be used by opposition to gain more legitimacy. The authorities could be blamed for mismanaging oil revenues and spending it on NK, while Azerbaijanis suffer from the financial crisis. The displaced population in Baku could be central to this kind of social frustration.8 Also, if political opposition in Azerbaijan is not satisfied with the deal and feels that it had not participated properly in the decision-making regarding status and related issues, it can mobilize the electorate against the government using these arguments.

Admittedly, oil is a good trigger for escalation of the conflict and/or stalemate, not only because decline in revenues could cause disadvantages for stakeholders. Oil revenues can be a very good motivation for hawks in Baku to push for a military solution of the conflict. This thinking might be triggered by self-confidence that Azerbaijan has recently gained as a result of the implementation of big multinational projects and revenues gained from those initiatives. Moreover, whether it is the result of increase or decrease in oil production, the ruling elite could be divided over the means and ways of resolving the NK conflict. The difference between hawks and doves is not so obvious now, but it can become more visible should a crisis occur in relationships between Azerbaijan and an autonomous NK. Hawkish attitudes could cut across political divides and be mutually reinforced by the government and part of the hawkish opposition, thereby creating hostile attitudes in society towards a re-demonized enemy. The media could fuel this tendency very easily.

However, regardless of the motivations of different actors, it is highly improbable that those motivations could result in ultimate war, as any war would be disastrous for the economic interests of the Azerbaijani elite. Also, as oil revenues increase and are predicted to go down relatively soon, there is a growing interest on behalf of the international community to help mediate conflict settlement sooner as opposed to later.9 Therefore the parties thinking about

7 Azerbaijan has seen quite pessimistic medium-term forecasts with GDP growth reducing, hypothetically, to 3.5%, http://abc.az/cgi-bin/wnews_one.cgi?nid=18713&lang=eng 8 Michael Cohen. “The effect of oil revenues on transition economics: the case of Azerbaijan”. Geopolitics of Energy, Volume 28, Number 6, June 2006 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Azerbaijan/images/GoE_Jun06%20(last%20article%20only).pdf 9 Cohen, “The effect of oil revenues”.

- 9 - military solutions would not antagonize international efforts since it might well negatively reflect on the image of the country.

The failure of power-sharing could backfire on the relations between Azerbaijani authorities and the opposition. An unsuccessful experiment in the “culture of contracting” might reverse this tendency and force the authorities to discontinue the dialogue efforts started with the opposition in order to gain more legitimacy vis-à-vis NK autonomy. If the Azerbaijani authorities do not see any reason for gaining support domestically they will be more inclined to disregard the opposition and will reverse the possible democratization process.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to address the internal politics of Azerbaijan and the possibilities that domestic actors have to influence the peace process. The analysis addresses the problems of power transformation as the source of peace-building. It tried to respond to the hypothesis that without transformation of existent power structures, ultimate conflict resolution is impossible. Power-sharing between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was at the centre of the analysis. As it turns out, this is going to be a serious matter that could transform the relations not only between Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku, but also between Azerbaijani government and wider domestic actors, such as political parties and civil society groups. However, a failure of power sharing can reverse every positive development in the entire process.

Civil society efforts in the form of multi-track diplomacy will be an important catalyst for peace, if the agreement between leaders is achieved. There are positive developments currently indicating that the governments might be interested in that.

Another important conclusion to draw is that oil revenues will increasingly play a greater role in the conflict resolution process. Oil production’s fluctuation is an important factor defining responsibilities and the willingness (or reluctance) of the parties to get engaged into the peace-building process. The impact of economic and financial crises connected with oil production might be a factor influencing the attitudes of Azerbaijani government, society, and political parties towards NK. Also NK’s attitude towards Azerbaijani government might be also contingent upon economic advantages that the latter could offer.

In conclusion, the central point in this scenario building for Azerbaijan is that the state needs to transform its institutions and to evolve into a state that is capable of dealing with a minority- autonomous region. A failure to make this transformation will reverse the entire peace process.

Rashad Shirinov studied International Relations at Baku State University and then did an MA in Political Science and International Relations at Bosphorus University in . In 2007 he was FCO Senior Chevening Fellow at the University of York, UK. In 2007-2008 he visited Monterey Institute of International Studies to earn a certificate in WMD non-

- 10 - proliferation. He has worked for the OSCE and IFES in Baku and is currently employed as political party program officer with the US National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Azerbaijan.

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