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Georgian Abkhaz Youth Dialogue Workshop

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Georgian Abkhaz Youth Dialogue Workshop Editors’ Note: This is one of six discussion papers on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict commissioned to three Armenian and three Azerbaijani authors by Conciliation Resources as part of its “Karabakh 2014” project, funded by the UK government Conflict Prevention Pool through the Consortium Initiative and presented in London at a meeting on July 10, 2009 by the authors. Conciliation Resources will publish updated versions of the papers in the autumn and is planning a series of round tables to discuss them in the region. KARABAKH 2014: A forecast on power sharing and power transformation By Rashad Shirinov 1. Introduction Recent developments around the Nagorny Karabakh (NK) conflict have opened up windows of opportunity for all sides to engage in a genuine peace-building initiative. The optimism and recent enthusiasm comes largely from the developments appearing lately on the global scene, major elements of it being the new US administration’s decision to improve damaged relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran. As the situation around the South Caucasus becomes more favourable, the major powers have decided to invest more into the resolution of regional conflicts. Matthew Bryza, US co-chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group stated that the meeting of Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in Prague on 7 May brought new positive developments in the peace process, something qualitatively new during his tenure as a co-chairman.1 Ilham Aliyev, in his interview to the Russian ITAR-TASS news agency and Rossiya TV channel talked about the necessity of providing security for population of Nagorno-Karabakh. He said: “We understand Armenia’s wish to have a land connection with NK. We see no problem in that. An effective solution of Lachin corridor issue is possible and this should not worry people who currently reside there and Azerbaijanis, who will settle there in the future”.2 In this forecast analysis I would like to elaborate on possible scenarios assuming a peace- treaty is signed later this year or possibly in 2010. I would like to focus on domestic power 1 Exclusive interview with Matthew Bryza (in Azeri), Radio Liberty, 8 May 2009; http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1623751.html 2 Ilham Aliyev on Lachin Corridor (in Azeri), Radio Liberty, 19 April 2009; http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1611659.html - 1 - structures, sources of decision and policy-making and their capacity to take conflict resolution forwards or backwards. As we are all aware, signing a peace accord is an important step but only the beginning of a complex process called conflict resolution. The paper assumes that non-governmental pro-peace forces are weak and immature, and that civil society or people’s diplomacy are not in a position to influence the signing of a peace treaty. Thus, the only way that a peace treaty could possibly be signed is through the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and mediation efforts of the international community. That means, by themselves, societies are not motivated enough to bring about or trigger any significant change in terms of conflict resolution. However, I would like to stress that this does not mean they will not resist a settlement they disagree with and any unacceptable move could spur a wave of discontent, disobedience, and even resistance. Furthermore, after signing an accord, a broad range of issues related to confidence-building, social transformation (including transformation of power relations), physical infrastructure building, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and various other issues needs to be addressed. In this article, first of all, I would like to identify possible “peace-makers” in Azerbaijan by specifying what sources, institutions and actors would be the most appropriate to address the above-mentioned problems after the peace treaty is signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I will make a stakeholder analysis and will also look at the possibilities of a broader coalition of pro-peace forces and organizations, for some kind of “peace and reconciliation movement,” emerging within Azerbaijani society. So far, this has not been the case, although smaller civil society initiatives have taken place across the border. Secondly, I would also like to identify possible “trouble makers” for the peace process, actors, and forces that could oppose the peace agenda and would declare “justice” and not “peace” as a primary goal. My final objective will be to consider these stakeholders within a possible scenario of post- conflict development. Along these lines I will also try to look at this from the perspective of the liberal theory of democratic peace. The theory suggests that democracies do not fight each other as the political elite as well as citizens on both sides possess the skill to manage conflicts and establish contracts, which in turn requires an ability to make compromises. 2. Stakeholder analysis Stakeholders that could influence the post-war reconciliation process in Azerbaijan vary across the political spectrum, and across social as well as generational divides. The following stakeholders can be identified in Azerbaijan: Civil society groups and NGOs Since the 1990s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been involved in cross-border initiatives between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Almost all conflict-resolution and confidence-building projects in the region have been supported by international sponsors mainly from Western Europe and the USA. Since initiatives between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides were viewed by their governments negatively, initial projects took place - 2 - more within a regional South Caucasus framework, also including Georgia. This format was logical, since conflicts also exist in Georgia. The reason why these groups have become important was that they saw that they could attract financial resources to their NGOs using a peace-building agenda and international cooperation. This is what I would call the “commercialization of peace”. We cannot say that all the groups had a genuine interest only in peace, since at some point NGO work started to become a sort of business activity aimed at channelling funding into the solution of goals set by regional partners. However, some genuine peace supporters exist and in a more favourable environment they could turn into catalysts of positive post-conflict developments. Certainly every classification could be open to misrepresentation, but we can still identify two civil society groups to be addressed if we want to elaborate on possible peace actors: - The older generation raised and educated during Soviet times, when the Soviet Union was a place where ideology of “friendship among nations” dominated. It was an ideology, which resembled modern western ideas of tolerance and social cohesion. Among these groups is the Russian-speaking intelligentsia, including scholars and artists; - Youth groups, student movements, and youth NGOs involved in cross-border cooperation, supported by international organizations. Although the majority of young people are still sceptical about the possibility of peace and many feel aggressive towards the “enemy”, over the last few years a special youth agenda with local and international support has been implemented among active civil society youth groups. Youth civil society groups are probably the most dynamic part of Azerbaijani and Armenian societies and they use every opportunity to travel and engage in international projects and attend international events where they can meet each other within various formats, although not necessarily to discuss peace between the two nations per se. In general, if the peace process continues and the governments embark on a path of making an ongoing commitment to people and processes that may take years to come to fruition, civil society organizations will emerge as organizations equipped with the tools of multi-track diplomacy. As mentioned above, two groups are really important: the older intelligentsia and young pro-western groups. Civil society organizations (CSOs) will be engaged in both: in cooperation across the border as well as the facilitation of transformation inside their respective societies. Moreover, equally important is that civil society initiatives possess more flexibility in selecting actors and involve social groups, which so far have had no role in the formal peace process – the internally displaced population in Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians. Of course, this is going to happen only if governments agree on basic principles of solution and that they are committed to peace. The positive development is that the governments have actually started to realize that second track diplomacy can be instrumentalized as a useful tool. This happened for the first time in June 2007 when a delegation comprised of prominent university rectors from Baku, headed by Azerbaijani ambassador to Russia, Polad Bulbuloglu, visited NK and Armenia. The delegation met senior officials in both Armenia and NK. The visit to Armenia and NK was a testing of the water and confirmation that the Azerbaijani authorities can be in charge of various types of initiative towards conflict settlement. In July 2009 this initiative was repeated by Polad Bulbuloglu with the Armenian ambassador to Russia, Armen Smbatyan. - 3 - There is also a fresh new initiative by the Helsinki Citizens Assembly South Caucasus Network, which brings together civil society representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan and both
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