Nul Points to Europe S Non-Proliferation Policy

Going Fishing: Can the new EU non-proliferation policies slow the dissemination of nuclear human capital?

Alisa Carrigan

PhD Candidate Department of War Studies King’s College London

Esteemed author and philosopher Henry David Thoreau once wrote, “The only cooperation which is commonly possible is exceedingly partial and superficial; and what little true cooperation there is, is as if it were not, being a harmony inaudible to men.”1 The hope is that a European nuclear non-proliferation policy was not the context for this statement. But the fear – expressed in this paper – is that his observation applies to humanity across the board, European nuclear policy included. In the current era of openness and international prosperity, Europe is living a double standard: having monetary unity, open borders and trade, whilst letting each member assume responsibility for creating and enforcing its own security policy. This means that the standards and emphases differ drastically from one EU state to another, based on differences in perceived threat, geographical region and willingness to commit resources to the security sector. Philip Gordon noted, “States pool or delegate their sovereignty in particular functional areas only if the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. In the area of foreign [and security] policy, because the gains of common action are not always obvious and do not accrue evenly to all members of the group, this condition is likely to be met only when national interests or government preferences have converged to the point where potential costs and risks of binding common action are low.”2 This creates a lowest-common denominator effect for European security policy, and that is a dangerous precedent to set. Burkhard Schmitt praised the European community for putting a “strong emphasis on working through various multilateral regimes and bilateral relations to constrain countries that present a risk.”3 And while this allows each state to decide what works best in its own context, a nuclear non-proliferation policy built on bilateral relations is akin to putting several fishermen on a boat, handing each of them a single fishing line and telling them to catch a school of fish, one at a time. If the fishermen do not work together to cast a tightly-woven net over the side, far too many of the fish will slip past. International security is a broad subject, and examining even numerous facets of Europe’s security policy-making would fill tomes. In order to remain brief, this paper

 Many thanks to Peter Zimmerman and Nicola Horsburgh for their comments and ideas on drafts of this paper. Additional thanks to Lyndsey McLean for her ESC-inspired thoughts on nuclear non-proliferation. 1 Henry David Thoreau, The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, Vol. 2 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), 79. 2 Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22, no 3 (1998), 77. 3 Burkard Schmitt, “The EU joining the CTR effort,” EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia, Chaillot Papers No. 61, June 2003, 11.

1 will focus on the nuclear non-proliferation regime – specifically on the dissemination of tacit and explicit nuclear weapons knowledge, elsewhere referred to as human capital4 – and the European Union’s role as one of the caretakers of that regime. It is my hope that the analyses in this paper may shed light on two issues: (1) problems in the nuclear non- proliferation regime in controlling dissemination of knowledge, and (2) how problems in the non-proliferation regime might be addressed, and what potential Europe possesses to become a stronger actor in the non-proliferation regime. The paper will proceed by examining the EU’s recent non-proliferation “policies,” which are generally centred on individual member states’ policy or individual member states signing on to agreements and treaties. This scattered non-policy will then be contrasted with the most recent changes in the EU’s attitude toward WMD proliferation in general and nuclear proliferation specifically. Taking into account the EU’s unique structure, the problems involved and potential for a common nuclear non- proliferation policy will be discussed. So why is the current EU policy ineffective, and what do policy makers hope to change with new ideas being put forth? Some EU members take non-proliferation seriously, and others don’t; the wide-ranging variance in security standards throughout the EU creates a unique issue that cannot and should not be addressed in a piecemeal manner as it is currently. The European Union is a unique entity in the international arena, but it must take a more active role in creating and enforcing non-proliferation standards amongst all of its members. The institution and enforcement of EU-wide non- proliferation standards will strengthen security, but the lack of same will continually spawn security threats as nuclear knowledge continues to disseminate through members of the union who are not as invested in security as they ought to be.

Tangled Fishing Lines: The European Union’s recent policy

There is, at the moment, an ongoing debate not only about the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy5, but whether or not there should even be a common security policy that requires all member states to coordinate their policies and standards. Ian Davidson makes the claim that since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, “Europe is not under any direct military threat.” So why should member states feel the need to sign on to a security policy when the threat is so vague and undefined?6 This may indeed be a valid argument when the entire spectrum of security threats is being considered, but in this case, the threat of nuclear proliferation is neither vague nor undefined; rather, it is a specific problem with the potential for very specific solutions 4 Human capital is broadly defined as those people who are involved in the creation of a nuclear weapons programme. Nuclear scientists make up only a small part of that cadre; a partial list of others involved includes chemists, engineers, metallurgists, computer systems experts, manufacturers and technicians. Obviously, some of these people play a slightly more important role in the creation of a nuclear weapons system than others, but to truly create and sustain such a weapons system requires heavy investment across the spectrum of human capital. 5 The policy is officially called the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP, in the 1991 Treaty of European Union. 6 Ian Davidson, “Correspondence: Assessing European Foreign Policy,” International Security23, no. 2, 185.

2 and policy actions. In considering the EU as the “very special political animal” that it is, we must also note that current EU non-proliferation policy must coexist “in a strange relationship somewhere between complementarity, competition, parallelism and at times even contradiction” with the non-proliferation policies of its member states. There are two main theories in literature about the EU that deal with the creation of supranational institutions. The first theory – called functionalism – emphasises the creation of the overarching institution and the transfer of power to that institution. As more people come to believe in the utility and importance of the new institution, its power expands and loyalties shift from the state to the supranational institution. The second theory – intergovernmentalism – focuses on the “lowest common denominator,” or the formation of an institution or policy that does not interfere with member states’ own policy or institutions but seeks simply to coordinate them.7 It is this intergovernmental approach that has dominated European politics for the past several decades; while the intergovernmentalists generally believe that “institutions cannot work unless common goals are shared,” the functionalists typically believe that the formation of common institutions or policy can help stimulate a cooperative mindset.8 Gordon also writes, “the prerequisite for the development of foreign and security policy integration is a convergence of the perceived interests of the main member states.”9 While it would be useful if Europe could create and adhere to a common security policy, perhaps the first step is a compromise between functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches to institution creation – creating common “sub-policies” for pressing issues, like that of nuclear non-proliferation. After all, states cannot realistically hope to eradicate nuclear knowledge,10 but they can attempt to slow its spread. Joseph Nye Jr. notes that the “horse (nuclear weapons knowledge) is out of the barn.” But far from letting that doom a common non-proliferation policy, Nye points out that it still matters “how many horses are out of the barn and the speed at which they run.”11 European policy makers should realise that they still have a large role to play in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, in part because two members of the EU possess nuclear weapons and in part because several other EU member states utilise nuclear energy technology in generating power. A sampling of the current non-proliferation efforts of EU member states are summarised in the table below. It is immediately clear that all 25 member states are, at least on paper, participants in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. All 25 states are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),12 usually considered the central component of the non-proliferation regime. All 25 states have also signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).13 Only two EU member states – Great Britain and France – are possessors of nuclear weapons, and those two and seven

7 Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22, no 3 (1998), 77. 8 Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22, no 3 (1998), 78. 9 Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22, no 3 (1998), 81. 10 Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons,” The American Journal of Sociology, 101:1 (July 1995), 44-99. 11 Joseph Nye, Jr. “New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy,” Science (29 May 1992), 1293. 12 “Signatories and parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” Accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt3.htm on 31 May 2004. 13 Information from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation website. Accessed online at http://www.ctbto.org/ on 7 June 2004.

3 other states possess civilian nuclear capabilities.14 In accordance with the norms laid out by the non-proliferation regime, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards apply to all of those states possessing either military or civilian nuclear capability. The export of nuclear materials or dual-use goods was, prior to 1995, supposedly subject to the London Guidelines and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export (COCOM).15 But “the result of a 1991 survey of members' export control lists was somewhat surprising; nearly identical lists should have been found…but the survey showed striking divergences” – as many as a third of the supposedly restricted items were not on various members’ lists.16 Because of the discrepancies discovered under the COCOM arrangements, European Community export lists were “harmonised” in 1992, though there was continued contention over the contents of the new list. In 1995, the Wassenaar Arrangement took over where COCOM left off, though not without its share of critics.17 Like the dual-use export policies before it, Wassenaar did little more than provide an updated list of controlled items, because under the Arrangement, “The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item [remains] the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.”18 A majority of EU states are also members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,19 which sets further export controls for member states and frequently updates a “trigger list” of dual-use goods that might be used in building a nuclear weapons programme. In looking at the various treaty commitments that influence EU states’ non- proliferation policy (see the chart in Appendix 1 for a summary of the above discussion), the wide variation in standards is already evident, and these treaties and groups focus mainly on controlling movement of fissile materials and the actual goods that might be used to construct a nuclear weapons programme.20 But as the 1990s wore on and post- Soviet nuclear proliferation raised international awareness of the danger of “loose nukes,” most governments and international organisations seemed to overlook the potential threat that the dissemination of human capital – or both tacit and explicit nuclear weapons knowledge – posed. There are, however, a few initiatives in place – the U.S.-led Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, among others – that also attempt to slow the 14 “Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2030,” The International Atomic Energy Association. Accessed online at http://www.iaea.org on 31 May 2004. 15 “Testimony of Dr. Stephen Bryen for the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate,” on 9 July 1998. Accessed online at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/980709sb.htm on 10 June 2004. 16 Harold Muller, “Europe’s Leaky Borders,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1993), accessed online at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/j93/j93Muller.html on 31 May 2004. Though the discrepancies may not have been large (most states omitted only an item or two off the COCOM list), it is more the principle in this case that there were international rules but they were not being followed by participant states. 17 Joseph Cirincione, ed. Repairing the Regime (London: Routledge, 2000). 18 “The Wassenaar Arrangement.” Accessed online at http://www.wassenaar.org/welcomepage.html on 31 May 2004. 19 For a full list of NSG members, see the Nuclear Suppliers Group website at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/. Accessed on 29 May 2004. 20 Treaties like the NPT do explicitly forbid the transfer of nuclear weapons knowledge (see Article IV-1 and IV-2), but most allow for and even encourage the transfer of peaceful, or civilian, nuclear knowledge.

4 proliferation of human capital from nuclear states into potential proliferants by partnering Soviet nuclear scientists with Western scientists on projects and ensuring they received a salary.21 (For purposes of clarity, references to CTR in the remainder of this paper should be understood as the parts of the CTR programme that focused on movement of nuclear human capital, and not on fissile materials.) European states have been heavily involved in the non-proliferation regime and CTR activities – the list of programmes that EU member states contribute to in Russia is a long one, and the EU was the “largest provider of economic and technical assistance to Russia” between 1991 and 2000.22 But because the EU has yet to implement a Union- wide stance on stopping nuclear proliferation – taking the intergovernmentalist rather than the functionalist approach – the efforts of individual states involved have been much less cost-effective, and generally less effective than they might have been if there was an EU-wide non-proliferation policy. When open borders allow for the free movement of people and agreements like the Wassenaar Arrangement and the NSG allow states to set their own standards for export controls, there is simply too much variance across the Union to call the current policy an effective one. A prime example of the problems that beset European non-proliferation policy was highlighted when news of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Kahn’s “nuclear network” came to light in February 2004.23 According to news reports, Kahn built Pakistan’s nuclear programme in part with components supplied by a British corporation based in Dubai – and some of those same components were later sold by Kahn to Libya. Though the Britons involved denied any wrongdoing, an investigation into their role in the proliferation is ongoing.24 German, Swiss and Dutch officials have also begun investigating some of their citizens for potential involvement as well.25 Both a British-owned company and a German supplier are under investigation for sending nuclear weapons components overseas to Libya. Could an EU non-proliferation policy have prevented this? Not necessarily, but having all of its member states on the same page regarding what can be exported and what role its citizens are allowed to play in such transactions might have raised red flags sooner. The “nuclear network” also exemplifies that while most European states adhere to the basic non-proliferation regime – the lowest common denominator policy – very few members, outside of the European representatives in the G826 are involved politically or

21 “Cooperative Threat Reduction,” Defence Threat Reduction Agency. Accessed online at http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_index.html on 31 May 2004. 22 Burkard Schmitt, “Quantitative Assessment,” EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia., Chaillot Papers No. 61, June 2003, 25. 23 Raymond Bonner, “World Briefing: Nuclear Network Inquiry,” The New York Times (6 April 2004). 24 See the BBC article, “Scientist sent uranium to Libya,” accessed online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3505875.stm on 3 June 2004. Peter and Paul Griffin – the British citizens under investigation – claimed that everything they sold to Kahn was legal. If their sales were legal, then the UK and EU need to look at tightening export controls further (especially on companies that are based in the EU, but manufacture and export out of a non-EU state, as in this case). If the sales were not legal, then how does the EU prosecute the offenders and prevent similar events from occurring again? 25 Ian Traynor, Owen Bowcott and John Aglionby, “Atomic secrets: Customs examines British link in nuclear parts trade,” The Guardian (5 March 2004). 26 The G8 is the Group of Eight major industrial democracies. In 1975, the leaders of the six major industrial democracies – the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan – began meeting to discuss economic and political issues. Canada joined the group in 1976, and Russia was informally included in the G7 in 1991. Russia was added permanently in 1998, and European Community was first

5 economically in CTR-type schemes to slow proliferation of human capital or fissile materials. And even those G8 members have yet to follow through on their promised fiscal contribution to the Russian CTR programme. The Economist reported of the June G8 summit that “George Bush will again be pressing his allies…to find more money for a ten-year, $20 billion project agreed two years ago to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological materials and know-how from the former Soviet Union from [spreading]. America has chipped in its $10 billion half-share, the Europeans and Japan are still $3 billion short of theirs.” Then The Economist asks the question that is perhaps sensationalist but still relevant: “Given the awful cost of failure, why the delay?”27 While the programme can be sustained for a limited time with the money that has already been given, the continued lack of economic and political support within Europe will not allow for its expansion into other regions (like the Middle East and Indian sub-continent), and may eventually lead to its discontinuation altogether. Michael Quinlan writes, “It is unlikely that other European nations – notably EC entry candidates – would welcome the addition of nuclear matters, with all their domestic and international sensitivities and divisive potential, to the already difficult and heavily laden agenda…”28 One hopes that Quinlan’s prediction turns out to be incorrect, but even in the face of a constantly changing international security threat, very few EU states seem to be willing to band together to create and enforce a common non-proliferation policy.

Casting a Net: Can the new ideas make a difference?

In examining the EU’s non-proliferation policy over the past decade or so, several problems have emerged – export controls were not in harmony, some states were less dedicated to the non-proliferation regime than others were, etc. However, in the past twelve months, the EU and several of its member states have begun taking steps – in part of their own volition and partly in conjunction with new U.S. non-proliferation initiatives – to enhance their nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Two of those ideas – the Basic Principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of WMD and the European Security Strategy (also called the Solana Paper) – ably convey the new emphasis EU policy makers are placing on WMD proliferation. And while both offer some concrete solutions to some proliferation problems (export controls) they still tend to overlook the role of human capital. The Basic Principles for an EU strategy against Proliferation of WMD dates back to April 2003.29 It recognises the continued threat that is posed by WMD proliferation and seeks to lessen that threat by implementing a series of short- and long-term measures. The short-term ideas, which are summarised within the document and also outline expected timeframes and budgetary requirements, include:

 Adoption of a firm engagement for the promotion of the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements; included in the 1977 summit. 27 “The big clean-out: progress, but is it enough?” The Economist (3 June 2004). 28 Michael Quinlan, “The future of nuclear weapons: policy for Western possessors,” International Affairs, 69, no. 3, 495. 29 From the “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Accessed online at http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/eu/eu0603.pdf on 3 June 2004.

6  Rapid ratification and implementation by all Member States and acceding countries of the IAEA Additional Protocols;  Provide the IAEA with adequate budget increase for implementing its safeguard tasks;  Make the EU a leading co-operative player in the export control regimes;

 Promoting a further strengthening of the information exchange in the regimes, in particular with respect to sensitive destinations, sensitive end-users and procurement patterns.30

When viewed together, this short-term action plan is quite comprehensive, and each of the ideas listed is, on the surface, a step in the right direction. The short-term action plan addresses the weaknesses in the current iteration of the regime in the EU and lists some concrete ideas for filling in the gaps exposed, which is something that other non-proliferation documents fail to do. But even with its specific focus, the action plan is flawed for two reasons: first, it is reactive and not pre-emptive, because it focuses on areas that policy makers already know to be problematic and fails to address other proliferation threats that are considered to be peripheral (like the continued proliferation of human capital). The one idea that does address human capital proliferation and transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge is the final bullet point, that which would promote further strengthening of information exchange in respect to procurement patterns. Unfortunately, the EU is reliant on “political agreement by member states” to achieve this heightened information exchange and it seems unlikely to get all member states coordinated in a timely and effective fashion if they are simply contributing of their own volition.

Another issue with the above action plan is that the EU seems intent on working through and expanding the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, while many critics would argue that the current regime and documents like the NPT are, at their core, too vague and need to be restructured or replaced with counterparts of a stronger tenor, especially in limiting movement of supposedly-peaceful human capital.31 While some of the additional measures that states are now adding to the regime – like the Proliferation Security Initiative32 – will probably aid in the enforcement of non-proliferation norms and prosecution of those who facilitate nuclear proliferation, they are not yet a legally binding part of the regime, and they should be. One analyst comments, “By adopting the Action Plan member states have given the EU a strong mandate to support their national strategies for combating WMD proliferation. The model is one of ‘soft’ co-ordination at the EU level with implementation via member state channels from national legislation and export controls to threat reduction programmes.”33 But it is clear that any EU policy

30 From the “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Accessed online at http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/eu/eu0603.pdf on 3 June 2004. 31 Joseph Cirincione, ed. Repairing the Regime (London: Routledge, 2000). 32 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was established by the U.S. in a 2003 speech at the G8 summit. Since then, some 60 states have expressed support for the PSI, which aims to support the non-proliferation regime by increasing international cooperation between law enforcement, military and intelligence services. See the “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles,” at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm. 33 “European Security Review,” Isis Europe, July 2003. Accessed online at http://www.isis-europe.org.

7 or international initiative is still seen as subsidiary to the non-proliferation policy of an individual member state, whatever that policy may be. If this were not the case, then why is the adoption of a common EU policy related to criminal sanctions for illegal export or brokering of WMD-related material a long-term goal of the Basic Policy?34 Probably because the EU would be unable in the short term to generate union-wide support for such a far-reaching measure. The Basic Policy and action plans for its implementation are fundamentally good ideas for establishing a tighter EU non-proliferation policy, even with the above noted flaws. But will this policy be supported by the entire community where similar ideas have not been? If coupled with the ideas and overall attitude found in the European Security Strategy, perhaps they might be.

The European Security Strategy opens by breaking down the main threats facing not only Europe but the international system at large today; weapons of mass destruction are at the forefront of these threats. The paper continues by addressing the strategic objectives that Europe must consider, and concludes by considering the policy implications for Europe. The tone is generally quite realistic, and the Strategy does not attempt to water down Europe’s importance in the international arena: “The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”35 A part of that responsibility, according to Solana, is support for international norms. “We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. [Additionally], preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.”36

The Strategy outlines four ways that the EU might use its collective influence in achieving a more secure world, all of which mirror suggestions made in the Basic Principles. By increasing its activity on the international stage as a single body and taking advantage of the potential military capabilities that the EU supports, and by adopting a more coherent foreign and security policy that is supported by all EU members and working closely with other partners (like the United States), a more secure Europe might be achieved, even in the face of mounting pressures and threats to that security.37 In keeping with these ideas, the EU recently decided to use its considerable economic clout and announced that any new or renewed trade agreements with non-EU states would have to include a non-proliferation clause.38 Additionally, to strengthen non-proliferation

34 From the “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Accessed online at http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/eu/eu0603.pdf on 3 June 2004. 35 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” The European Security Strategy. Delivered at Brussels on 12 December 2003, 2. 36 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” The European Security Strategy. Delivered at Brussels on 12 December 2003, 9-11. 37 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” The European Security Strategy. Delivered at Brussels on 12 December 2003, 11-13. 38 This clause was first a part of the Barcelona Declaration, which called on the EU’s Mediterranean partners to help stop WMD proliferation. The state to which it was applied in this case was Syria, as Syria is a member of the Euro- Mediterranean partnership. See “The Barcelona Declaration” at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm. Accessed online on 11 June 2004.

8 efforts and maintain a good working relationship with the United States (as suggested in both policy papers), the European Community promised a billion dollars to the U.S.’s “10+10 over 10” CTR programme, and was joined by the UK, France and Italy in contributing.39 Hopefully, the expanded contribution to CTR will do two things: cause more states and the European community in general to realise the important role that CTR programmes play in limiting dissemination of human capital; and allow for the expansion of CTR from the former Soviet Union to include other known or potential proliferant states like India, Pakistan and Israel.

Both the Basic Policy and the European Security Strategy present the security challenges that face Europe currently, and offer broad and specific solutions. Unfortunately, those solutions generally continue to depend on member states perceiving a great enough threat to wholeheartedly implement stricter non-proliferation policies, and those stricter policies still do not restrict the dissemination of human capital to the extent that they will have a substantial effect.

The One That Got Away: Can good ideas become a reality?

After examining the past and present incarnations of the European non-proliferation policy, it becomes clear that WMD proliferation is finally being taken seriously by the EU and both the EU and its member states realise the need to combat such proliferation. The movement from member-driven initiatives to those initiated and financed by the EU itself has been slow, but such movement is finally taking place, and it is important that it progress beyond the idealistic phase into reality. As one scholar said of the EU’s recent policy efforts, “the EU needs to show that it can not only reach consensus on a more robust approach on paper, but that it is also willing to put it into practice.”40 Quinlan agrees: “The notion of making progress…must involve the creation of institutional, legal or political mechanisms to promote and implement common perspectives or actions.”41 With the release of the Basic Principles and Solana Paper – which contain good ideas for a broad, far-reaching non-proliferation policy – the EU is taking a step in the right direction, especially concerning dissemination of human capital. For the first time, these strategies, in conjunction with the U.S.’s new non-proliferation initiatives, begin to address the serious threat posed by dissemination of explicit and tacit knowledge. And by criminalizing the acts of people who smuggle nuclear weapons knowledge or violate export controls, we might begin to discourage potential proliferators from their course of action. On a global scale, the EU needs to push for the expansion of CTR-type programmes. While continuing CTR assistance to scientists and technicians in the former Soviet Union is a positive step, both the EU and U.S. need to begin assisting other states with nuclear weapons or undefined nuclear capabilities in the creation and implementation of non-proliferation policy. This may mean giving economic assistance

39 Cristina Chuen et al, “The 10 Plus 10 over 10 Initiative,” accessed online at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020812.htm on 10 June 2004. 40 Karl-Theodor Guttenberg, “The National Security Strategy and the Evolving European Security Strategy: Consequences for the Transatlantic Relationship.” Transcribed talk given at the Capitol Hill Club, Washington D.C., 2 December 2003. 41 Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,” International Security, 22, no 3, 82.

9 to scientists in Pakistan to keep them from selling their weapons knowledge or ensuring trade as long as a state like North Korea adheres to export controls and allows IAEA inspections. The new strategies do begin to address these ideas, but after a long history of each member state creating its own policy based on its own perception of threat, the EU needs to work toward balancing the contributions of all its members, so that every member is invested in an EU-wide non-proliferation policy. As the threat of WMD proliferation grows, many states are jumping on the non- proliferation bandwagon. But for European states to be successful in implementing and enforcing their tough new policy ideas, they must begin to work together to stop proliferators – to spread a net rather than using single fishing lines – instead of allowing such a varied response among EU member states to nuclear proliferation.

Appendix 1: Table of European Nuclear Non-Proliferation Commitments, 1990s-Present

10 Civil Nuclear – Indicates the state possesses a nuclear power programme. NPT –Indicates the state is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. CTBT – Indicates the state has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. G8 Member – Indicates the state is a member of the Group of 8. NSG – States who are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Wassenaar – States who have signed onto the Wassenaar Arrangement.

EU Member Civil NPT CTBT G8 Member NSG Wassenaar State Nuclear Austria X X X X Belgium X X X X X Cyprus X X X Czech Republic X X X X Denmark X X X X X Estonia X X Finland X X X X France X X X X X X Germany X X X X X X Greece X X X X Hungary X X X X Ireland X X X X Italy X X X X X X Latvia X X X Lithuania X X Luxembourg X X X X Malta X X Poland X X X X Portugal X X X X Slovakia X X X X Slovenia X X X Spain X X X X X Sweden X X X X X The Netherlands X X X X X United Kingdom X X X X X X

References

“The Barcelona Declaration” The European Union Website. (11 June 2004).

11 “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative. (3 June 2004).

Bonner, Raymond. “World Briefing: Nuclear Network Inquiry.” The New York Times. 6 April 2004.

Chuen, Cristina et al. “The 10 Plus 10 over 10 Initiative.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative. (10 June 2004).

Cirincione, Joseph ed. Repairing the Regime. (London: Routledge, 2000).

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (7 June 2004).

“Cooperative Threat Reduction.” The Defence Threat Reduction Agency. (31 May 2004).

Davidson, Ian. “Correspondence: Assessing European Foreign Policy.” International Security 23:2 (1998): 193-198.

“Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2030.” The International Atomic Energy Association. (31 May 2004).

“European Security Review.” Isis Europe, July 2003. (3 June 2004).

Gordon, Philip. “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy.” International Security, 22:3 (1998): 74-100.

Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor. “The National Security Strategy and the Evolving European Security Strategy: Consequences for the Transatlantic Relationship.” Transcribed talk given at the Capitol Hill Club, Washington D.C., 2 December 2003.

MacKenzie, Donald and Spinardi, Graham. “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons.” The American Journal of Sociology, 101:1 (July 1995): 44-99.

Muller, Harold. “Europe’s Leaky Borders.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. (31 May 2004).

The Nuclear Suppliers Group. (29 May 2004).

Nye, Jr., Joseph. “New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy.” Science (29 May 1992): 1293-1297.

12 “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles.” The United States Department of State. (3 June 2004).

Quinlan, Michael. “The future of nuclear weapons: policy for Western possessors.” International Affairs, 69:3 (July 1993): 485-496.

Schmitt, Burkard. “Quantitative Assessment.” EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia. Chaillot Papers No. 61, June 2003.

Schmitt, Burkard. “The EU joining the CTR effort.” EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia. Chaillot Papers No. 61, June 2003.

“Scientist sent uranium to Libya.” BBC News. (3 June 2004).

“Signatories and parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The Federation of American Scientists. (31 May 2004).

Solana, Javier. “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” The European Security Strategy. Delivered at Brussels on 12 December 2003.

Thoreau, Henry David. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, Vol. 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1906.

“The big clean-out: progress, but is it enough?” The Economist. 3 June 2004.

Traynor, Ian, Bowcott, Owen and Aglionby John. “Atomic secrets: Customs examines British link in nuclear parts trade.” The Guardian, 5 March 2004.

“The Wassenaar Arrangement.” (31 May 2004).