What Works to Reduce Mass Violence

BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE –ACTION GAP!

THE AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT ON HOW TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Benjamin C. Hoffman

i i TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

PART 1. INTRODUCTION...... 1

1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY?...... 2 2. SYNOPSIS OF WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE...... 6 A Definition of Political Violence...... 6 Key Findings...... 6

Major Concerns...... 8 Key Assertions...... 9 Formula for Effectiveness...... 9 Direct Implications...... 10 For Peaceworkers...... 11 For Scholars...... 11 For Policy Advisors...... 11 For Donors...... 12 For Politicians...... 12 For the Public...... 13 For the Media...... 13

PART II: THE FINDINGS...... 14 ......

3. WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW...... 16 Where, When and What has Worked...... 21 Countries With Major Political Violence...... 24 The Knowledge-Action Gap...... 25

4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS...... 27 On the Causes and Dynamics of Political Violence...... 27 On What Works to Prevent Political Violence...... 31 A Framework to Prevent Political Violence...... 36 On How to Make Mediated Peace Agreements Sustainable...... 37 Miall’s Framework for Successful Settlements...... 42 On Post-violence Peacebuilding...... 42 Lund’s Framework for Post-violence Peacebuilding...... 43

5. WILL ANYONE SAY WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE?...... 46 Significant Concerns...... 47

6. WHY WHAT WORKS, DOESN’T...... 49

i 8 Big Concerns...... 49 1. The Nature of the Beast...... 50 2. The Wrong Objective...... 50 3. The Political Naivety of Conflict Resolution...... 52 4. Inadequate Conflict Analysis...... 54 5. Conflict Resolution’s Failure to Communicate Effectively...... 55 6. Inadequate Coordination of Effort...... 60 7. Institutional Shortcomings...... 61 8. United States’ Unilateralism...... 62 The Women’s Perspective – The Concern that Isn’t...... 64

PART III: THE ASSERTIONS...... 66

7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP!...... 68 Nine Major Obstacles...... 70 Formula for Effectiveness...... 71 Establish Violence Reduction as the Objective...... 71 Know What Works...... 72 Educate for Violence Reduction...... 72 Organize to Do What Works...... 73 Evaluate Performance...... 74

8. ACTIONS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE...... 75 1. Organize Immediately for Continuous Learning...... 75 a). The International Academy for the Reduction of Political Violence...... 75 b). Evaluate Performance...... 76 c). Educate Professional Practitioners...... 77 2. Collaborate Now to Reduce Political Violence...... 77 a). Violence Prevention...... 77 b). Mediation to End Warfare...... 77 c). Post-violence Peacebuilding...... 77 d). Lobby for the Reduction of Political Violence...... 78 3. Fund for Effectiveness...... 79

ENDNOTES...... 80 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 89

ii Acknowledgements

I would gratefully like to acknowledge the support, contributions and professional assistance that made this study possible.

First and foremost, many thanks to Mr. Milton Lauenstein who provided financial support for me to conduct the study as a Senior Fellow at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. More than this, Milt was spiritually and intellectually engaged in the study throughout. He challenged me to determine “what works to reduce political violence” and to make the study practical, specifying actions that might be taken now to reduce violence. I will forever be grateful for Milt’s challenges in the name of peace.

I would like to thank Professor Eileen Babbitt for welcoming me back to Fletcher, where I had graduated years ago. Eileen understood and supported my efforts to produce a report that was short, sound, and practical. Her colleagues at Fletcher, Ellen Lutz, Hurst Hannum, and Jay Herlihy provided additional support and made the Fellowship a most rewarding experience.

While a great amount of documentary research built the base for my study, the heart of it was the interviews I conducted with twenty-one authorities in the fields of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. They gave candid assessments and helped me sharpen my focus on practical actions to reduce political violence. I thank them much for their time, confidence, wisdom and generosity.

Several colleagues reviewed the report at different stages. I would like to thank Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford and Mr. Richard Price at the University of Victoria, Ms. Elizabeth Weinreb, Columbia School of Journalism, and Mr. Jeff Mapendere, The Carter Center.

My research assistants were Ms. Amanda Kim, The Fletcher School, who carried out financial analysis, quickly and thoroughly; Ms. Sally Gates, who researched the women’s perspective and provided copy editing; and my son and close associate, Mr. Evan Hoffman, whose professional assistance was matched with the same passion I have for ending violence.

Last, but not least, I must thank my wife, Ann, not only for her never-ending support of my work but because she re-directed early drafts of the text away from an academic voice to make it action-oriented. And, as with most other projects, she provided technical assistance in word processing.

PART I. INTRODUCTION

PART I INTRODUCTION 1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY?

1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY?

The goal of this study is to provide practical ideas that will result in a significant reduction in political violence. To provide practical ideas, I have tried to determine from among all those activities in peace work and conflict resolution, “what works”, what is not effective, and what is needed. I have entitled my report “Bridge the Knowledge-Action Gap!” to emphasize the urgent need for those in the field of conflict resolution to find the means by which they can compel action that will indeed reduce violence and bring more peace into the world. I assert that there is enough technical knowledge now to significantly reduce political violence. Conflict resolution practitioners, however, must learn the art of making a compelling argument for peace. They must obtain political commitment to action. And then they must take coordinated action on the basis of best practice. The field of conflict resolution must organize to do this, to deliver effective services, and to learn as it goes forward. Otherwise, all we can hope for is incremental reductions in violence; indeed, the level and severity of political violence may get worse.1

For some reason it seems that I have always been swimming at the deep end in the pool of human relations - the violent end of the pool. I have been a prison guard, a correctional administrator, a parole officer, a therapist working with men who abuse women, a mediator positioned between the Roman Catholic Church and men who were abused by Christian religious, a mediator between governments and oppressed people, a mediator between warring states, and between states and rebels. After a full thirty years of work dedicated to the reduction of violence, to the search for justice and peace, I wanted to stand back and make a comprehensive assessment of efforts to reduce violence.

Trained at one time to negotiate with prison hostage takers, then as a mediator, my experiences in conducting peacebuilding work in war zones had led me to confess that I no longer practiced mediation as it is taught in mainstream institutions. The sacred liturgy is that mediators are neutral; they have no decision-making authority; they are non-directive, they should not offer solutions to the parties in dispute; they do not negotiate with the parties; and they are impartial with respect to the outcome of the mediation.

The world I inhabit is a world where coercive power is a central element, where the mediator is active in driving for an agreement because the goal of peace is itself the prime motivator. I am not impartial with respect to the outcome. I am partial to peace. Indeed, I discovered throughout a decade of work in the peacebuilding trenches, from Bosnia to Indonesia, that I was breaking all the rules of mediation in the pursuit of peace. As the CEO of an institute that trained mediators, I felt compelled to confess. I confessed that I violated the basic tenets of mediation. I negotiated with the parties whose conflict I was trying to mediate; I urged them to take the path to peace. I offered solutions when they were stuck. I was directive, ensuring each side had a good chance to express its grievances. I did all these things that mediators are typically taught not to do.

I noted at the time of my confession that many people who had been motivated by the goal of social justice had also put their faith in mediation. Rather than making a compelling case for human rights, or expending their efforts on building more equitable and just societies, they chose to place themselves between opposing sides and contending views. They had given up their role as advocate and had shifted to that of mediator. They, like I, wanted to be peacemakers. They,

2 PART I INTRODUCTION 1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY? like I, chose the field of conflict resolution. We would not take sides; instead, we would offer a set of facilitative skills, hoping to bring about a just solution, that which was negotiated by the parties with our assistance. Some of us emphasized the dictum “trust the process”, believing in the power of facilitative techniques.

Yet I sensed a level of frustration among mediators. Their services were not being used often enough. Mediation was being relegated to a “touchy-feely” process suitable for “easier” disputes. Often the more powerful party in a dispute declined invitations to seek a resolution through mediation, preferring to prevail in other ways. When they did come to the mediation table, they continued to dominate, playing power games at the table and away from it between mediation sessions. Facilitative mediation was not able to compensate for power asymmetries.

Furthermore, I had learned that nonviolent conflict resolution training, a veritable phenomenon sweeping across Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was inadequate in countries which now exhibited sharp ethnic cleavages and clear discrimination of some groups by others. Structural violence, whether the denial of minority language rights, or in the harsh form of exclusion from opportunities and basic services, including shelter and water, cannot be ameliorated only by acquiring interpersonal communication skills and techniques which require good-faith negotiations to resolve conflicts. Huge power imbalances must be corrected substantively for justice to be felt.

I had begun to doubt the working assumptions of the young field of conflict resolution.

Recently, as Director of the Conflict Resolution Program at The Carter Center, I was privileged to act as President Carter’s personal representative in a number of cases of emerging violence and full scale wars. We were intent on bringing an end to the brutal nineteen year old civil war in Sudan. To do this I concentrated my efforts in Sudan and Uganda. President Carter had mediated the Nairobi Agreement in 1999, a peace accord between Uganda and Sudan. My job was to lead efforts to implement it. We saw it as a building block for peace in Sudan and in the region, generally. Among other tasks, I mediated talks between Uganda and Sudan at the political, humanitarian and security levels. We had also hoped to help bring an end to the war in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda. That insurgency was a factor in the Sudanese civil war and it was a blight on the Acholi people in northern Uganda.

After four years of effort, I was personally able to witness the ongoing success of the Nairobi Agreement: Sudan and Uganda are on much better terms. The Carter Center was also effective in playing a role to bring the warring sides in Sudan to the table for peace talks. But we failed in our efforts to end the war in northern Uganda. It has now become a humanitarian nightmare. Of course, even the successes may erode, as peace in that region is a very fragile thing. But two out of three cases of having been effective in reducing violence is a notable accomplishment. One might think that conflict resolution, and mediation in particular, are faring well.

Yet my own sense was that to end a war one must bring the warring parties “kicking and screaming” to peace. Transforming power from violent to peaceful forms is not an easy thing. And I had begun to feel, overall, after thirty years, that the goal of a significant reduction of

3 PART I INTRODUCTION 1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY? violence in the world is a pipe dream. I needed to undertake this study to come to some resolution in my own heart and mind. I was not prepared to spend forever on it either. I wanted to cut to the chase. If there are useful and new things that can be said now on how to reduce the incidence and severity of political violence, I wanted to find them out and get them into circulation.

The study began with a literature review of a broad body of thought on the subjects of war and peace, with a focus on existing large-scale evaluations and lessons learned studies on the effectiveness of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Once this information was synthesized, a discussion paper was produced. That paper was used as a background document for conducting interviews with leading authorities in conflict prevention, mediation, and post-violence peacebuilding.

To identify who I should interview I established a set of categories that would represent the range of expertise needed to build a solid, contemporary body of findings upon which assertions could be made with confidence. I wanted to talk to leading scholars, practitioners, policy advisors, political actors who work for peace in the world, and people who fund peace and conflict resolution activities. And I wanted to ask each of them pointed questions that I had developed over the course of my background research.

The key questions posed to these authorities were:

1. Do you agree that there is a knowledge-action gap in the field of conflict resolution? That is, practitioners know enough technically, now, to be more effective in reducing the incidence and severity of political violence, but the challenge is to put that technical knowledge in motion.

2. Given that there is policy on prevention at the key organizations (i.e., the UN and regional bodies) and some well established early warning mechanisms, what really is needed to make prevention of violent conflict a viable option?

3. Credible scholars argue that the incidence and severity of political violence is on a downward trend. Do you agree? Do you predict further significant reductions in armed warfare? Why, or why not?

4. It has been proposed that the field of conflict resolution needs an independent, integrated interdisciplinary theory to guide it. Do you agree? Is this a pressing concern?

5. You know all of the conflict resolution tools and techniques, and how they are used in various situations. Are any of these simply not effective?

6. What does work?

7. If you were able to shape the direction of the field of conflict resolution to make it more effective in reducing political violence in the world, in what way would you direct it?

4 PART I INTRODUCTION 1. ON WHAT AUTHORITY?

Most of the people I interviewed were also challenged with other questions, tailored to their particular expertise and professional experience. All were told that they would not be quoted, so as to encourage maximum candor and to enable me to write a composite view. It is upon the basis of these various methods of inquiry that I assert that this is “the authoritative statement on what works to reduce political violence”.

It is from these authorities that I identified major concerns facing the field and gleaned insights about what is needed to bridge the gap between existing knowledge and action to reduce violence. I’m sure that none of the people I interviewed, all of whom gave so generously, will agree with everything they find here. I do hope, however, that each will see her or his contribution to a composite view of what works to reduce political violence.

The twenty-one authorities who were interviewed are:

 Ms. Mary B. Anderson, The Collaborative for Development Action Inc.  Mr. Andrew Carl, Director, Conciliation Resources  President Jimmy Carter, Nobel Peace Laureate  Ambassador Alan Goulty, UK Special Representative for Sudan  Ms. Melanie Greenberg, Visiting Scholar, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies  Dr. Fen O. Hampson, Director, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  Dr. Judith Herman, Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School  Dr. Mark Hoffman, Lecturer in International Relations, Dean of Undergraduate Studies, London School of Economics  Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies, Syracuse University  Lieutenant Colonel David Last, PhD., Professor, Royal Military College of Canada  Mr. David Lord, Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee  Dr. Edward Luck, Director, The Center on International Organization, Columbia University  Dr. Alastair McPhail, Head of the Sudan Unit , FCO/DFID, UK  Mr. Joseph Montville, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies  Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Director, Africa Program, CSIS  Sir Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the United Nations  Dr. Gordon Smith, Executive Director, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria  Ms. Patricia Smith Melton, Executive Director, PEACE X PEACE  Mr. Charles R. Snyder, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State  Dr. Necla Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy  Dr. Sarah Harder President, National Peace Foundation, Washington, D.C.

5 PART 1. INTRODUCTION 2. SYNOPSIS OF WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

2. SYNOPSIS OF WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

I present here a synopsis of the findings of my research and the interviews I held with leading authorities. Their assessments, views, and prescriptions informed my goal of presenting practical ideas that can be implemented now to reduce political violence. At the end of the text I set forth a number of initiatives which can be taken by key conflict resolution and peacebuilding organizations, including the US Institute of Peace; the Washington-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution; The Carter Center; the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee; the European Platform for Conflict Prevention; the Reducing Political Violence Action Group and private foundations that provide funding for conflict resolution and peace work. The implications for different readers are specified here.

A Definition of Political Violence

Political Violence is both direct violence (the use of force) and structural violence (institutional, policy and procedural practices which exclude, injure, and perpetuate injustice on people) used by states and groups to achieve their objectives.

Key Findings

1. Evaluation of conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities is weak, but a defensible assessment of the field is possible.

2. Violent political conflict is on a downward trend. The trend is short, some 5 years; nevertheless: from 90-99 there was an average of 26 wars per year, in 2000, there were 25; in 2001 there were 24, and in 2002 there were 21.

3. New international policies to contain internal wars are evolving; international actors have in the past decade engaged more frequently and directly in prevention.

4. There is a convergence of views on the causes and dynamics of political violence, on what works to prevent political violence, on how to make mediated peace agreements sustainable, and on post-violence peacebuilding.

5. Political actors responsible to intervene, that is the UN Security Council, regional organizations, and state actors do not act often enough, early enough, or for long enough in cases of political violence.

6. 925 Billion dollars per annum is spent on war efforts throughout the world and 80 Billion dollars on peace efforts. That is, for every $1 Million spent to reduce political violence, $11.4 Million are spent on waging it. Between 1945 and 1990 the UN peacekeeping budget, at its height, was only 0.3 % of global military expenditures.

7. Prevention works. Arguably it is more cost-effective than peacekeepers and war.

8. The effectiveness of violence prevention can be improved through better risk assessment; and both diplomatic and security options must be part of strategic planning from the outset.

9. Mediation has been used in as few as 10% of the cases of civil war between 1900 and 1989. It is, however, becoming more popular.

10. The process aspects of mediation are well known and appear to be executed reasonably well by different mediators.

11. Nevertheless, too many mediated peace agreements break down.

12. Mediated peace agreements break down because they are “orphaned” by the international community; and it has been speculated that they break down because the underlying issues in dispute were not appropriately dealt with by the mediators. What these underlying issues are is open to study. There is controversy over whether the need to address deep historical wounds is one of these; indeed, that it is the profound underlying issue relating to sustainability.

13. Post-violence peacebuilding is effective to a level approaching 50% of the cases.

14. Technical knowledge of how to go about post-violence peacebuilding exists (the elements and their order). Coordinated activity on the ground needs improvement. Conflict analysis should be improved so that it is ongoing, more comprehensive and directive of needed program changes; and the skills of peacebuilding workers should be improved.

15. I give prevention a “pass” grade; Track I mediation a “fail”; and post-violence peacebuilding a “qualified pass”. The authorities I interviewed were more tentative, but optimistic overall. The glass of effectiveness is seen as “half full”.

16. The clear finding on what works is that tailor-made interventions are required in each case. Multi-level, multi-actor, comprehensive, integrated interventions are prescribed.

17. There is a reluctance to say, explicitly, what is not effective. Some of this reluctance relates to the complexity and idiosyncrasy of political violence. Virtually all conflict resolution activities may work in certain cases: it depends.

18. Two conflict resolution activities found not to be effective in the direct reduction of violence are training in nonviolent conflict resolution for grassroots people in war zones; and informal dialogue processes that do not have the potential of direct impact on the conflict. The skills obtained in training are often not transferred to political actors instrumental in the conflict and capable of having an impact on peace. Likewise, Track Two dialogues that have the wrong participants and/or lack linkages to elites and potential high-level peace processes are not directly effective.

19. The women’s perspective is absent in current discussion as is the engagement of women in all aspects of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

20. The gains of conflict resolution activities in making the world are being eroded by the USA’s unilateralist approach to foreign policy.

Major Concerns

Taken together, there are 9 Major Concerns facing the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding:

1. The nature of the beast – the legitimacy of violence remains a parameter working against peace;

2. The wrong objective – there is a misplaced emphasis on the resolution of conflict for those who wish to reduce violence in the world;

3. The political naivety of conflict resolution practitioners – many peace and conflict resolution workers are both soft-hearted and soft-headed , and therefore less effective in the hard-nosed world of political violence;

4. Inadequate conflict analysis – conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners fail to analyze conflict in a comprehensive, sophisticated, and timely way, thereby impairing risk assessment, intervention and program design, and course correction as conflict dynamics change;

5. Conflict resolution’s failure to communicate effectively – lacking good analysis and political skills, including peace advocacy skills and tools, conflict resolution practitioners fail to mobilize political actors, war lords and potential peace lords, to take action leading to peace;

6. Inadequate coordination of effort – interventions suffer for lack of integrated, multi-level, multi-actor collaboration; the field is not organized to plan, work and learn together;

7. Institutional shortcomings – despite policy and some mechanisms to prevent violence there are serious structural flaws in the UN and its regional organizations that impede the creation of the needed political will to take action;

8. United States’ unilateralism - the escalating US-led “war on terror” is narrowing the space for the resolution of political violence through integrated, measured responses under the auspices of the UN and other multilateral bodies. As the space narrows, and the use of violence as the tool of choice increases, violence in general is likely to rise. That which is feared most will be created by the current reaction to fear.

9. The failure to engage women in peacemaking - just as their voice is not heard in the chambers of power, their perspective would have gone un-remarked here except for a deliberate effort to determine whether and how women can contribute to a significant reduction in political violence.

Key Assertions

1. Conflict resolution practitioners know enough, now, to be more effective in reducing the incidence and severity of political violence.

2. There is a knowledge-action gap. The gap is between a) having the technical knowledge ( imperfect as it is, but sufficient to be useful) and b) getting more political actors (those who care and those who don’t) to act on that knowledge.

3. Knowing the “it” of conflict resolution is inadequate to having “it” applied. The task is at another level. It is a political task, not a conflict resolution technique or knowledge deficiency task per se. It is a task of moving leaders to act.

4. The impasse, the gap itself, is “lack of political will”.

5. The knowledge-action gap must be bridged to improve the record of violence reduction.

6. How to create the will to prevent killing , to stop it when it has started, and to build sustainable societies in the aftermath of violence is the crucial challenge for the field now.

7. Assembling and putting the best knowledge of what works into the hands of results- oriented people is part of the answer. How to make leaders who care but have competing demands move a back-burner issue to the front-burner is another part of the answer. How to get leaders who don’t care to care, and to act on that is a major part of the answer. How to get organizations which do care and are active to work together more effectively is yet another part of the answer.

8. The skills and capacity required now to increase the effectiveness of conflict resolution by bridging the gap include political advocacy and organizational collaboration to insist that knowledge be acted upon.

9. The gap must be bridged in specific cases, and across the universe of cases. Conflict resolution practice has come of age, technically, but is underutilized. Practitioners are politically naive and must act now to strengthen their abilities to get traction.

Formula for Effectiveness

Taken together, these assertions produce a Formula for Effectiveness:

1. Establish Violence Reduction as the Objective - The goal is peace; the prime objective to achieve peace should be the reduction of violence. While there are many paths to take, various disciplines, methods and techniques to be applied, a passionate commitment to reduce violence will sharpen the focus of the enormous effort currently being expended on conflict resolution and peace work. It will help set priorities among competing needs, help align effort, and help measure results.

2. Know What Works - Knowledge of what works should be known by any responsible person or organization that sets out to do conflict resolution and peace work. Failure to know what works obviously lessens effectiveness; action based on lack of knowledge may make things worse, adding unnecessary costs in lives and resources; it undermines the credibility of the field.

3. Educate for Violence Reduction - There is need for a more politically realistic curriculum in “Applied Peacemaking” that focuses on the objective of reducing violence to achieve the goal of peace.

4. Organize to do What Works - There are some umbrella organizations such as the Washington-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, the European Platform for the Prevention of Conflict, and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. With facilitation provided by these types of coordinating bodies, funding proposals could be mounted jointly and comparative advantage emphasized in the division of labor. Improvements could be made immediately in the areas of risk assessment and formation of small collaborative teams that work together to advocate for action in identified cases, pressing the UN Security Council and appropriate regional entities to act, and working in concert with credible actors including nongovernmental organizations based in the country in question.

5. Evaluate Performance - A culture of systematizing the generation of knowledge, of educating practitioners on the basis of empirically tested “best practices”, of performance review, and of continuous learning does not exist in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Many of the elements needed to build that culture and give form and substance to it do exist. The time has come to make it happen

Direct Implications

In the last section of this text I propose a number of initiatives which may taken now to implement the “formula for effectiveness”. To do this, I call upon the following organizations: The Carter Center; the Washington-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution; the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee; the European Platform for Conflict Prevention; the US Institute of Peace; the Reducing Political Violence Action Group and private foundations.

In addition to these initiatives, here are some of the direct implications of this study for individuals:

For Peaceworkers

 Switch your emphasis from resolving conflict to reducing violence.  Improve your political violence analysis skills now.  Conduct analytically sound, well-informed political violence risk assessments.  Begin all preventive action early.  Design coordinated, multilateral and multidimensional violence reduction activities based on sound analysis that addresses the underlying structural causes of violence.  Keep security options on the table as part of a comprehensive strategy of violence reduction.  Place more emphasis on including women in all aspects of violence reduction.  Focus on obtaining political commitment to action.  Acquire peace advocacy skills.  Make compelling arguments for peace.  Keep intervention plans flexible as there are no fixed scenarios of political and military engagement.  Be prepared to remain engaged for long periods of time.  Include an evaluation component in your work.

For Scholars

 Develop new political violence analysis tools that lead to achievable violence reduction actions.  Conduct research on how to influence political actors to take action to reduce violence.  Conduct research on how crucial to sustainable peace is the issue of deeply held grievances.  Conduct research to identify core competencies required to be effective in violence reduction.  Conduct research to clarify the role and place of violence prevention activities and development work.  Design new curriculum grounded in best practices and methods to educate and train professional conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners.

For Policy Advisors

 Place your emphasis on Violence Reduction.  Engage the expertise of conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners in your policy development work.

 Design policy that is informed by research; clearly articulated; and capable of being implemented.  Know that the use of force will be necessary in certain cases.  Develop policies that are multilateral and multidimensional; including a women’s perspective.  Ensure that prevention projects address the underlying structural causes of direct violence.  Design policies options that include long-term engagement.  Design policies that are flexible as there are no fixed scenarios of political and military engagement.  Increase institutional capacity to handle more cases earlier, and for longer periods.

For Donors

 Fund activities that have an emphasis on Violence Reduction; not Conflict Resolution.  Place special priority on funding activities introduced early to prevent political violence.  Ensure that the prevention projects you fund address the underlying structural causes of direct violence.  Fund integrated multilateral and multidimensional activities that: are designed on sound analysis, include a security component; include the women’s perspective; and have an evaluation component.  Be prepared for long-term commitment of resources.  Publish and distribute successes and failures.

For Politicians

 Demonstrate leadership in breaking the legitimacy of violence and the stubborn belief that it is inevitable.  Emphasize to your constituency that political objectives can usually be effectively achieved with nonviolent methods.  Appeal to the public for support which will increase your capacity to address violence at home and abroad.  Work multilaterally and within the law to reduce political violence.  Choose to act more often, earlier, and for longer to better achieve the objective of reducing political violence.  Keep military options on the table, not as separate strategies, but as part of the comprehensive strategy of engagement.  Be prepared for long-term engagement and commitment of resources.

For the Public

 Take actions to reduce the legitimacy and glorification of violence.  Say “No” to illegitimate uses of violence.  Refuse to accept that violence is inevitable in human relations.  Support society to build skills and mechanisms for the nonviolent resolution of conflict.  Keep pressure on governments and leaders to have them intervene in cases of violent conflict.  Accept and support the legitimate use of force as a tool to stop violence so that peace may be built.  Put your financial and moral support behind long-term involvement when it is needed.

For the Media

 Take training in the analysis of violence.  Report on political violence in a responsible, informative, accurate, and balanced way.  Test that your reporting of the story:

Was more responsible because you:

 Provided a neutral forum for all sides involved  Used inquiry to attack the problem, not the people  Avoided simplistic representations of heroes and villains  Reported areas of agreement as well as disagreement  Maintained coverage by monitoring events through to conclusion and doing follow-up

Was more informative because you:

 Used information in an accurate and balanced way  Obtained views from all the parties involved  Used metaphors that fit, rather than escalatory or de-escalatory language  Reported it as it is

Enriched reader’s understanding because you:

 Identified the interests, values, objectives and limitations involved  Used questioning techniques that encouraged explanation and disclosure  Broadened the perspective from which the story could be viewed, probing for possible solutions.

13 PART II: THE FINDINGS

14 15 PART II: THE FINDINGS 3. WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW

3. WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW

There is enough known now to guide more effective planning and execution of efforts in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It is possible to reduce the levels of political violence in the world. The technical know-how exists. In fact, in Gurr and Hampson, and especially in Lund’s and Paris’ most recent work, whether the goal is to prevent violence, to stop the killing once it has broken out, or to re-build a war-torn society, there is a relatively high degree of specificity of who should do what, when, and how.2 That is, there is a convergence of views on what causes political violence, of what steps might be taken by governmental and nongovernmental actors to prevent it, of how the process of mediating peace accords should proceed and what should be included in the agreements, and of what steps need to be taken in what sequence to stabilize and re-build a war-torn society.

The goal, however, of being able to state categorically that a given intervention technique or another is certain to “work” in every case remains illusive. In fact, one of the clear findings is that tailor-made interventions are required in each case 3. It is nevertheless implicit within that assertion that certain activities in prevention, mediation, and post-violence peacebuilding do indeed work.4

This study will show that a perennial problem, the “lack of political will”, hobbles the effectiveness of well-meaning and competent people who strive to reduce political violence in the world. Peace activists and conflict resolution workers must confront and overcome hard- hitting criticisms if they are to bridge the gap between knowledge and effective action. Improved analysis of conflict is greatly needed, political forces impeding peace efforts must be addressed with new realism, skills and vigor. Efforts to prevent political violence, to mediate an end to it, and to re-build war-torn societies must be more integrated, nuanced, and sustained.

Despite it shortcomings, conflict resolution as a field of study and practice is judged to be of value; indeed, it is coming of age. Good intentions and technical know-how, however, are insufficient to the challenges it faces. It can not afford to not be dismissed as being “soft- hearted” and “soft-headed”. It functions in the world of politics often filled with actors who calculate the advantages of violence and peace in very narrow self-interested terms. Efforts to reduce political violence can neither be naïve nor unprofessional.

While the research findings reported here give reason for hope, and the practical measures which may be taken now to reduce the levels of political violence in the world point the way forward, a profound matter remains. Virtually all the people interviewed raised grave concerns about terrorism, and with it, the sense that violence is increasing. More pointedly, many take issue with the US administration’s response to terrorism, with the current US policy of unilateralism. The gains of conflict resolution are being eroded through this approach. The space for multilateral interventions sanctioned by the UN is narrowing. A course correction is needed in Washington to bolster the successful reduction in levels of political violence in the world, an empirical fact based on data up to 9/11.

But what is meant by the term “political violence”? What has worked to reduce it?

16 PART II: THE FINDINGS 3. WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW

For practical purposes, I view political violence as the product of factors, and actors. That is, objective conditions and people’s reactions to them combine to produce violence. Technically speaking, direct violence, that is, open hostility and killing are likely to occur when structural factors combine with more proximate, triggering factors. An example of a triggering factor is a flawed election process coming at a time when a certain group who has been marginalized within a state is looking to the election as a means by which it can enter the mainstream and have a voice in government. The flawed election triggers violence as a structural deficiency remains uncorrected. Another example of a trigger is the emergence of a leader who mobilizes a sense of grievance among an ethnic group, animating political conflict and inflaming violence. The leader mobilizes discontent on the basis of real or perceived grievance. These grievances are found in structural factors, such as economic marginalization, lack of minority rights, and so forth.

Asking precisely “what works?” to reduce political violence may seem preposterous given the complexity and scale of it. In any year, on average, there are some 20 to 30 wars being fought.5 Nine hundred and twenty five billion dollars US are spent annually for the purpose of killing one another in various forms of political violence. Eighty billion dollars US are spent annually for peace. That is, for every $1 million spent to reduce political violence, nearly $12 million are spent on waging it. Between 1945 and 1990 the UN peacekeeping budget, at its height, was only 0.3% of global military expenditures. Total military (arms) expenditure is 1 trillion USD annually and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are engaged in 85% of this weapons trade. Those responsible for peace provide the guns for war. The resource imbalance is not encouraging, and there is no indication that it will improve.6

The image of putting a tiny finger in a dyke to hold back a flood of violence easily comes to mind. It is tempting to run from the question, but as the saying goes, we can not hide. Violence is on the public agenda now perhaps more so than during the Cold War, if for no other reason than the fact that all of humanity has been touched by the events of 9/11 and the unclear but ever- present threat of terrorism. At the same time, after a full decade of introducing a great variety of conflict resolution services to prevent violence, to help stop the killing once it had started, and to re-build war-torn societies, a number of constituencies have begun to ask “what works”?7 Reflective practitioners, and individuals and institutions that fund their efforts have become more focused on the assessment of effectiveness:

 Does training people in nonviolent conflict resolution really make a difference to the intensity and duration of violence?

 Are informal dialogues between representatives of warring factions helpful in de- escalating hostilities and building the basis for peace?

 Is the use of force effective? If so, when; and how much is necessary?

 Does formal mediation provided by third parties result in sustainable peace agreements?

 Is a significant reduction in the amount of political violence in the world possible, based on what is known to be effective?

These questions could take the inquiry into philosophical depths that go well beyond the intent and scope of this study. We could get immersed in important perennial questions about the nature of war and peace, whether human beings are inherently violent, the nature of the state and the international state system, and so forth. Naturally, these questions do have an impact here. My goal, however, was to come to grips, succinctly, with questions whose answers will help the reader who has a professional interest in reducing political violence, now.

Indeed, I struggled with the question itself. Is the real task to reduce violence or is it to build peace? This is more than a question of semantics. The question has implications for the targets and timing of prevention efforts and for the nature and level of third party intervention when open hostility has appeared, and what is done after it has been arrested. One’s overall orientation does make a difference.

For example, those involved in conflict resolution and peace work can simplistically be divided into two groups. There are those who work for peace, justice and development; and those who work to prevent, contain, and resolve open hostility, direct violence, and war. Arguably, for the first group the goal is to create conditions of sustainable and just peace – that which has been characterized by Johan Galtung as “positive” peace. This is more than the absence of open hostility, which Galtung calls “negative” peace.8 This “positive” peace orientation requires a broad and long-term perspective. It aspires to the elimination of violence altogether – to the realization of peace writ large through the removal of social-political and economic structures of violence. It has a language and methods of its own. Its representatives are human rights advocates, peace activists, development experts, and some conflict resolution practitioners.

Peacekeepers, diplomats engaged in preventive diplomacy, and third party mediators tend to have a sharper, shorter-term focus. They enter the picture when violence is about to break out, or more likely already has. They strive to stabilize the environment, to make more immediately attainable adjustments in the situation so that killing is averted or minimized. They may mediate peace accords that do or do not have the ingredients of a sustainable peace.

It turns out that there is some convergence of these orientations, although significant issues remain when decisions must be made about taking action: the what, who, when and how questions come more clearly into focus.

Measuring success is obviously also a very different matter depending on the overall orientation. On the one extreme, can we measure when positive peace is achieved? On the other, is it enough to measure death tolls? For some, peace is a work-in-progress as humanity struggles toward justice for all; for others, stopping the killing and building a practical system of political governance that enables a society to function in relative peace is a respectable achievement.

In either case, measuring success remains a challenge. Evaluation of effectiveness of conflict resolution and peace work is in an early stage of development and much remains to be done to improve it. What is measured, when it is measured, how it is measured, and what is done with the results are all at issue.9

The inadequacy of evaluation in the peace and conflict resolution field makes it difficult to assert “what works” and what is not effective. Important questions become very difficult to answer with any degree of certainty. For example, what does one mean by “works”? Is it enough to delay violence and hope that circumstances change to avert it altogether; is it enough to reduce the number of persons killed had action not been taken? Is it enough to forge some sort of peace agreement that may break down in two, five or perhaps ten years because it lacks the ingredients required to produce a sustainable peace? Must efforts in peace and conflict resolution produce a sustainable, just peace where both direct and structural violence are removed before it can be said that the effort “worked”? There is also the question of generalizability of what works. Does ‘what works’ work in all cases? Or can we say that something definitely does not work, that it is a waste of money, time, and effort? Introducing the goal of achieving a “significant” reduction in violence further taxes existing methods of measurement. How much of a reduction is “significant”?

A defensible assessment of the field is nevertheless possible. There is a large body of research in this field, lessons learned exercises in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and some evidence of more structured program evaluation. This knowledge can be assembled and assessed. It can also contribute to practice on the ground, now. Indeed, apart from community-based peacebuilding efforts, where analysis is weak, it can be argued that research and evaluation and theoretical models are beginning to influence policy formation, risk assessment and early warning practices, and the analysis of conflict in specific cases of political violence.10

Virtually everyone I interviewed agrees that effort to prevent political violence should begin early; although I believe it is necessary to distinguish between deep structural work associated with development and more near-term efforts to avert violence in a case which has been identified at risk.11 Prevention is recognized as a political activity as it intervenes in the internal working of a state but I maintain that it should not be confused with development per se. Violence prevention interventions, although structural in nature, should therefore be discrete and they should be undertaken “relatively” early; that is, earlier than the current practice of one or two years before the predicted outbreak of direct violence.

A pragmatic consideration is the cost-effectiveness of any activity. As the former OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, has argued, peacekeepers are less costly than war, and prevention is less costly than peacekeepers.12 That may be a correct working assumption. I say “may” because prevention efforts directed at building the conditions of “positive” peace, of removing the structural and systemic factors that might lead to direct violence could be very costly. There is no body of evidence to support the assertion that prevention is cost-effective, despite the intuitive sense that it really must be. Prevention must be less costly than war, especially if it is understood to be relatively near-term activities that are directed initially at the triggers, so as to remove the conditions necessary for political violence to become manifest. Then development-type peacebuilding may begin.

Once the killing has begun and international efforts do commence, however, structural factors come into focus. It is not enough to do only those things that stop the killing, but also those things that will prevent its recurrence. The general consensus is that the underlying structural causes must be addressed to prevent the recurrence of direct violence. By addressing them, the

“conditions necessary” for political violence are removed, and arguably, the potential emergence of triggers, the “conditions sufficient”, will be neutralized. For example, those leaders who would otherwise arise to mobilize discontent no longer appear on the scene, or are ineffective if they do.

So it is that peacebuilders, often active after the period of open hostility, do those things that members of the peace, human rights, and development communities would wish to have done long before direct violence had ever broken out. Their orientation, services, and skills, applied in a “post conflict” phase are to “build peace” rather than “reduce direct violence”. Indeed, it is evident that those who have worked to restore peace in war-torn societies have raised the issue of the importance of prevention in the first instance, bringing them more closely into alignment with the orientation of the “front-enders”, the builders of “positive” peace.

Thus, the peace, development, and conflict resolution communities are merging to some extent, but a synthetic theory and integrated practice on the ground lag behind.13

There is no consensus among the authorities on what grade one should give to prevention, mediation, and post-violence peacebuilding.14 That is, whether each of prevention, mediation and post-violence peacebuilding should be given a “pass” or a “fail”. My assertion, based on my research findings, is that I would give prevention a “pass”, mediation a “fail”, and post-violence peacebuilding a “pass”. This met with some challenge from the authorities. Notwithstanding the common remark that it is virtually impossible to prove that prevention works, because you cannot prove a counterfactual, prevention is considered difficult to grade if one holds the view that grievance is at the root of violent political conflict: near-term efforts to remove “triggers” and “proximate causes” are thought to be inadequate in the long-term. It therefore stands to reason that time becomes a key variable in assessing whether prevention worked. Things change, and what arguably was prevented today may or may not be related to violence which emerges in three, five or ten years hence.

If mediation deserves a “fail” because mediated peace agreements break down, then perhaps it is not mediation that has failed but the real problem is failure of the international community to remain engaged. And if post-violence peacebuilding gets a “pass” it is only just a pass as the record is mixed. Indeed, it is because peacebuilding only barely “passes” that mediation is seen, in part, to do so poorly. Obviously, complexity (and the lack of rigorous evaluation) hampers unqualified judgment.15

For many of the authorities interviewed, the overwhelming concern is that those responsible, primarily states, and particularly the UN Security Council, do not choose to act often enough, early enough, or for long enough to better achieve the objective of reducing political violence. The disproportionate amount of funding directed to war efforts as compared to peace efforts reflects a systemic bias, producing a bitter reality for millions of innocent people caught up in violence. It also hobbles those who want to make the policy of prevention a reality rather than an empty slogan. When peace accords are reached through mediation, they are often “orphaned”.16

Indeed, a number of key characteristics of the international state system have been identified as both causes of political violence and also reasons why violence is only selectively (and often

20 PART II: THE FINDINGS 3. WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW inadequately) addressed by states. They are: state self-interest; the anarchic nature of the international state system; the preserve of states to act violently; the absence of an overarching international political authority; and the absence of enforcement capacity at the UN.17 These parameters are profound: they clearly shape the prospects for reducing, significantly, the amount of political violence. They may condemn humanity to perpetual violence.

Most of the authorities I interviewed, however, remain hopeful. Professionals, committed peacemakers, virtually all believe that progress is being made toward the objective of reducing political violence. The empirical evidence listed below supports their perception. There is a short-term downward trend in the incidence and severity of political violence, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary. This reflects success in prevention and intervention.18

Many of the authorities stated that terrorism and the USA’s recent unilateralism are very disturbing: political violence may be escalating after 9/11 and its new forms present serious new challenges.

The following list nevertheless illustrates full or partial success in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The cases are concrete examples that various violence reduction efforts – preventive diplomacy, negotiation, mediation - in most cases taken over years with the assistance of third parties, can produce peace or conditions suggestive of peace. And those who helped reduce violence and establish peace in each of them deserve proper credit. The list attests to the fact that political violence can indeed be reduced.

Where, When and What Has Worked19

Zimbabwe: 1980. A successful peace agreement was implemented chiefly by the United Kingdom.

Nicaragua: 1987-1995. A 3-staged peace process that led to a peaceful outcome. The first stage had five Central American presidents reach agreements on peace steps; the second stage was a political settlement; and the final stage was a series of disarmament and demobilization accords. The process involved the United Nations; OAS; Canada; European and Latin American countries and Jimmy Carter’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of State.

India-Darjeeling: 1988. The Grokhas had waged guerrilla war against the central government for a number of years then riots began in 1979 and tension continued until The Accord of Darjeeling was signed in 1988. This accord provided for an autonomous Grokha district around Darjeeling.

Lebanon: 1990. Syrian power interests compensated for the difficulties encountered in implementing a partially successful peace agreement. The agreement was negotiated without foreign mediators. Syria was the key implementer.

Liberia: 1990-1998. Great or regional power was a contributing factor in achieving the Abuja II Agreement. The key implementer was the Economic Community of West African States Cease- Fire Monitoring group led by Nigeria.

Yemen: 1990. North and South Yemen agreed to form a unified Republic of Yemen, thereby ending twenty years of tension, border disputes, civil wars, tribal conflicts, and ideological differences.

Cambodia: 1991. The permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council intervened in Cambodia by active mediation that resulted in the Paris Conference. This resulted in a peace agreement with a temporary ceasefire, political stability, and a return to economic growth.

Mozambique: 1992. A General Peace Agreement resulted in consolidation of peace, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers, creation and training of a new and unified army, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, holding of free and fair elections the result of which was accepted by all parties, and establishment of a genuinely democratic system.

El Salvador: 1992. Civil war broke out in El Salvador in 1980 after a coup. The UN intervened on request of the parties in 1990. By 1992 a peace agreement was signed in Mexico City, resulting in cease-fire, troop demobilization, military reform, disarming of paramilitary units, and creation of a national civil police force.

India-Tripura: 1993. The Memorandum of Settlement resulted in the end of hostilities between rebels and the government.

Palestine-Israel: 1993. The quasi-informal backchannel mediation of the Oslo channel conducted, sponsored, and hosted by the Norwegians provided a breakthrough in the mid-East peace process. It did not result in an agreement, but laid the groundwork and opened the door to direct talks between the parties.

Abkhazia: 1993. Conflict broke out in 1989 between Georgians and ethnic Abkhaz. UN- sponsored talks led to a ceasefire in 1993 and later an agreement to deploy a peacekeeping force in 1994. In 1998 full-scale war almost broke out; and at present there is a tenuous peace.

Haiti: 1994. The Carter-Nunn-Powell Mediation resulted in resignation of Cedras and return of Aristide who was ousted from power in a coup in 1993. There was a peaceful military takeover of Haiti by a multinational force, human rights abuses decreased, and political repression ended.

Gabon: 1994. An Accord de Paris was signed in 1994 after serious riots broke out in response to a fraudulent election.

South Africa: 1994. The parties created and signed a National Peace Accord on political reform with only a minimum of outside intervention and no formal external mediation process.

North Korea: 1994. Tensions between the USA and North Korea were de-escalated through the private diplomacy of former President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center.

Bosnia: 1995. The Dayton Agreement resulted in formation of a single Bosnian state, demonstrating a basis for the eventual end of the war by introducing force with diplomacy.

Croatia: 1995. Croatia signed the Dayton agreement. Then in 1995 it signed the Erdut Agreement with the Serbs to allow for elections and then in 1996 it signed the Agreement on the Normalization of Relations with the FYR that allowed for independence, sovereignty, equality of states, mutual recognition, and cooperation.

Ecuador-Peru: 1995. After a border dispute the Declaracion de Paz de Itamaraty was signed. Then in 1998 The Act Presdencial de Brasilia was signed to build on earlier agreements and establish a series of accords and memoranda related to border issues.

Guatemala: 1996. A civil war began in 1960 and continued until the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace was signed in 1996. This agreement triggered implementation of a series of previous agreements and bound them together into an agenda for peace.

Lebanon: 1996. The US negotiated a Lebanon-Israel ceasefire and creation of a monitoring group.

Tajikistan: 1997. A comprehensive peace agreement was reached and a national reconciliation commission was formed to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement through a transitional period. Nonofficial dialogue provided an impetus for formal negotiations leading to a peace agreement.

Namibia-Angola: 1998. Settlement resulted in Namibian independence. Cuban forces withdrew from Angola, South Africa withdrew from Namibia and Angola. Violence and polarized confrontation were removed by political settlement.

Ireland: 1998. The Good Friday Agreement, negotiated with international assistance led by former US Senator George Mitchell, resulted in an agreement endorsed by referenda, and elections to the local assembly were successfully held.

Congo (Brazzaville): 1999. A ceasefire agreement, known as the Agreement of Cessation of Hostilities, was reached between the government and the rebels.

East Timor—Indonesia: 1999. The Dili Peace Accord resulted in the cessation of hostilities and a referendum to decide if East Timor would choose special autonomy within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. East Timor became an independent state.

Western Sahara-Morocco: 1999. The Saharawi People’s Liberation Army launched a series of guerrilla attacks against Mauritania and Morocco until the UN proposed a truce, followed by a referendum that was scheduled for 1992. The referendum was stalled until UN Special Envoy James Baker brokered an agreement to reschedule it.

The Crimea: 2000. Interethnic conflict resolved peacefully through preventive efforts with participation by the UN, OSCE, and nongovernmental organizations.

Fiji: 2001. A non-violent political transition in a post-coup environment with participation of Commonwealth representatives and nongovernmental organizations.

Venezuela: 2003, The UN, OAS and The Carter Center are successfully managing a potentially violent challenge to President Chavez.

All of these cases give reason for joy. They demonstrate that where there is a will, and skill, a way to peace may be found. For peace to endure the will and the skill must be sustained. For some of these cases also demonstrate that success is sometimes only partial; and regression into violence is possible. Peace itself is not a static thing, but a condition of being in relationship without recourse to violence. This list gives us hope that peace can be achieved in even the most violent settings.

The following countries, however, are currently embroiled in major political violence. The list is too long; and it does not convey the human suffering and loss to humanity that each case entails. Despite the noted successes, there is no room for complacency.

Countries With Major Political Violence20

Algeria Angola Burundi Democratic Republic of Congo Eritrea-Ethiopia Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Colombia Peru Afghanistan India India-Pakistan Indonesia Myanmar Philippines Sri Lanka Russia Iran Iraq Israel Turkey

Can the list be shorted, intentionally, and significantly? Is enough known about the science and art of conflict resolution and peacebuilding to make a difference?

The short answer is “yes”. There is an emerging consensus on several key elements related to “what works”. Consensus is emerging on the causes and dynamics of political violence; on how to prevent it; on how to make mediated peace agreements sustainable; and how to do post- violence peacebuilding. This convergence of views, found in the literature and among the authorities interviewed, enables me to assert that enough technical knowledge in conflict resolution and peace work is known now to improve the record of violence reduction. The glass of effectiveness is half full. Yet, there is a knowledge action-gap. This can be described, simplistically, as follows:

The Knowledge-Action Gap

With respect to VIOLENCE PREVENTION Knowledge stipulates that action be taken relatively early on the basis of an assessment of risk to alter proximate and structural factors likely to cause political violence;

Whereas at present, action is not taken often enough, early enough or for long enough.

With respect to MEDIATION TO END ARMED WARFARE Knowledge stipulates that the warring parties should be convened, by using force if necessary to stop the killing, to assist them to negotiate a sustainable peace agreement by addressing the root causes of the violence;

Whereas at present, mediation is notably underutilized and when peace agreements have been reached, many break down.

With respect to POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILDING Knowledge stipulates that long-term multi-level support be provided to build the capacity to express and resolve conflicts nonviolently and to achieve conditions supportive of peace;

Whereas at present, efforts have not been sustained, many agreements have been “orphaned” by the international community and peace has eroded.

This gap between knowledge and action is serious. In order to look at practical ways in which this gap may be bridged, we need to be clear about what is, and what is not effective. This study summarizes the answers to these questions. Then I identify eight major concerns the authorities have which contribute to the gap between existing violence-reduction knowledge and appropriate actions. I offer a ninth concern, conspicuous by its absence in my interviews with the authorities. Then I offer general prescriptions on how bridge the gap.

Finally, I provide a list of practical actions that can be taken immediately to improve the effectiveness of efforts to reduce political violence. These actions are directed at key organizations active in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including: The US Institute of Peace; the Washington-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution; the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee; the European Platform for Conflict Prevention; The Carter Center; and private foundations which fund conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. The actions called for can be taken now within present resource levels.

26 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS

4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS

Consensus would be too strong a word. But the degree of convergence of views I found in the literature and among the authorities I interviewed is remarkable. Of course, there were some strong dissenting views, most notably on three issues: overall orientation to the task at hand (working for peace writ large versus working to reduce direct violence); on prevention (early deep structural interventions versus relatively near-term proximate interventions); and on sustainable peace (the salience of healing historical wounds).21

On so many technical “know-how” questions, however, when the discussion is stripped down to pragmatics, a notable convergence of views is evident. This convergence is presented here.

On the Causes and Dynamics of Political Violence

First, what is meant by “political violence”?

From my review of the literature I described political violence to the authorities as follows. Political violence is associated with political conflict – the perception of incompatible political goals and interests. This is related to perceived threats and failed expectations. Political violence has two principal forms: direct and structural. Two or more parties are in conflict over political goals. This political conflict may include direct violent responses, that is: various forms of armed conflict and behavior intended to do injury to others in the pursuit of political objectives. Direct violence may also be the result of structural violence. Structural violence is embedded violence. It is found in the social, political and economic systems governing the relationships of people. When those structures serve the political objectives of some and leave others to experience their reality as oppressive, that is structural violence. In that way, perceived violence begets violence.22

For the purposes of this study I chose to focus on direct forms of political violence. Concerned with killing, I asked this operational question: what works to reduce armed warfare? That is, what works to prevent open hostility and killing? Once war has broken out, can it be stopped? When a peace agreement is signed, how effective are efforts to prevent the recurrence of war? Are there things that should be done in specific ways so that violence is reduced more effectively? Are there some things being done that are simply not effective?

To the extent that there is a science of conflict resolution one would naturally expect that the causes of political violence would be known, and that the activities undertaken would be prescribed on the basis of case-specific analysis, diagnostics, and prognostications. As we will see, this science is developing. There is considerable grasp by scholars and scholar-practitioners of the classification, the causes, and the dynamics of political violence.23

Understanding political violence and how to address it is often described in the literature and by the authorities interviewed as an exercise analogous to understanding and treating disease. Efforts to categorize violent political conflicts are deemed useful, just as are efforts to categorize

27 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS and name certain types of disease. While it is unlikely that all disease will be eliminated, some types may be. So too with certain types of political violence. And clearly, just as certain individuals at risk of a specific disease may be able to prevent it, so too may a certain case of war be prevented. When prevention fails, just as invasive medical interventions are possible to arrest the disease, and recovery programs may be designed so that the patient does not fall victim to the illness again, so too with specific cases of political violence.24

The medical analogy however, has met with some concern. Questions are raised about what is symptom and what is cause; and whether a medical model can truly apply to political phenomenon. Furthermore, is a focus on conflict itself rather than on violence appropriate? This is a subject to which we will return. In any event, conflict resolution scholars place considerable emphasis on the causes and dynamics of conflict when they address the subject of political violence.

The causes of political conflict range from broad causal factors to subtle appreciation of more localized factors deemed relevant in specific cases. The broad causal factors, it might be argued, contribute to political violence writ large. They are those things that tend to cause political violence in general throughout the world. Whereas more localized psychological, social, political and economic causes provide for fine-tuned analysis in specific cases.

Among the broad casual factors are characteristics of the international state system, a global culture of violence, and the belief that violence is inevitable.

Peace scholars and deep structuralists maintain that a culture of violence pervades the world with ever increasing influence. The culture of violence, that which supports and legitimates violence of all sorts, is associated with the manufacture of consent. Publics are persuaded by adversaries that using violence to resolve a political conflict is necessary and appropriate. The legitimacy of violence cannot be underestimated as a cause for war; violence’s legitimacy is itself bolstered by a stubborn belief that violence is inevitable.25

In addition to these broad causal factors that give rise to the use of violence in cases of political conflict, more case-specific factors have been identified as potential causes. These tend to be taken into account by analysts and practitioners of conflict resolution. As we will learn, however, the absence of thorough and disciplined analysis across the practice of conflict resolution is a serious impediment to effectiveness in reducing violence.

The local, case-specific causal factors are: insecurity, inequality, private incentives, and perceptions. These factors operate together in various combinations to cause or exacerbate political conflict. As Gardiner so apply summed it up: “In other words, conflict emerges from a combination of underlying insecurity and inequality, colored by perceptions and acted upon by individuals with private incentives. Thus, neither underlying conditions nor human mobilizing actions alone are sufficient explanations, but rather both are necessary to describe the incidence of intrastate conflict”. 26

There is debate among analysts about which factors are more salient. One of the current debates is described as the “greed” versus “grievance” debate. One the one hand, political violence is

28 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS said to be caused most saliently by a people’s sense of grievance – associated with feelings of marginalization, neglect, injustice - the deep structural perspective. On the other hand, it is the predatory drives of leaders and the economic means of waging war that are considered to be the salient causes of political conflict. If one of these two contending views prevails, it may have a major impact on what should be done to prevent war, and how to intervene when violence has broken out. The predatory thesis might direct effort towards removing the handful of key economic factors associated with civil war perpetrated by rebels. It could also lead in the direction of efforts to “buy-off” predators - including the option of providing them with amnesty, or methods intended to “neutralize” them (perhaps by violent means), or to “arrest, convict, and punish” predators.27

The greed and grievance views converge, however, in what is required for post-violence peacebuilding. That is, the structural causes will have to be addressed as even predators give voice to grievances perceived or felt by their followers. Removing the predator alone will not be sufficient to achieve sustainable peace28.

It is fair to say that the various disciplines that concern themselves with political violence, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, international relations, international political economics, conflict studies, peace studies, and security studies have contributed to a diagnostically useful understanding of what causes political violence. They provide helpful insight into what causes political violence, both generally, and in specific cases.

There is also a relative abundance of activities that may be listed as efforts to prevent political violence, to stop the killing, and then to re-build war-torn societies so that they do not return to a condition of violence. Those activities that are provided by official representatives of organizations such as the UN and involve official representatives of the warring sides are known, collectively, as Track I conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. Those activities that are provided by nonstate actors and involve people from the warring sides who are not in an official capacity are called Track II activities. These activities are sometimes prescribed as responses to the causes of conflict; that is, they correspond to either broad causal factors or more local, case- specific factors.

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities are also associated in practice with what are generally held to be the dynamics of political conflict. This dynamic is popularly described as the “life cycle” of a political conflict. The life cycle of political conflict has three phases: a latent phase when it has not yet become manifest – open hostility and armed warfare have not broken out; an active phase marked by open hostility and which may escalate to armed warfare; and a post-violence phase. A simple depiction of the cycle with two axes, Time and Level of Intensity is as follows:

CONFLICT LIFE CYCLE

INTENSITY TIME

The popular conceptualization of conflict as a “cycle” has met with some criticism. Describing the dynamic of political conflict as a cycle which rises, once triggered, from a stage of latency, through time to elevated stages of contending behaviors and manifest violence, and then to fall through de-escalation and toward resolution is not altogether adequate. It has been criticized as too unilinear; it doesn’t really depict what happens in reality as complex political conflicts are multilinear; conflicts change over time; and they may never be fully resolved. They might more usefully be described as “spirals” rather than cycles. 29

So, types of specific political conflicts have been identified, causes seem to be generally agreed, and particular responses that may address the causes have been identified as well. Thus, the analytical elements of a science of conflict resolution as applied to political violence exist. Furthermore, the dynamics of conflict are also beginning to be understood. Sophistication is lacking here, however, when it comes to pragmatics. That is, predicting that a given political conflict will indeed turn violent, that it will move from latency to a manifest hostility is not a perfect science. Neither can it be predicted that a certain type of conflict resolution activity is certain to produce specific results. There is no guarantee that violence will be prevented or reduced – or that peace will endure.

Nevertheless, with less than a fully predictive science to guide them, conflict resolution and peace practitioners press on in their efforts to prevent political violence, to bring about peace where fighting has broken out, and to help rebuild war-torn societies. In doing this, whether they are official representatives of states, or work for the UN or regional organizations, or are employees of nongovernmental organizations or private citizens, they offer many services. The various activities described as conflict resolution and peacebuilding are undertaken during different phases of the cycle of conflict, although some are carried out throughout the whole cycle.30

Indeed, in just one effort to describe the activities that may be undertaken across the spectrum of conflict, no less than seventy-two different types of activities can be identified.31 In this example, these activities correspond to three categories provided as the causes of conflict:

Systemic factors that cause conflict, such as anarchy in the international state system;

Causal factors associated with states and societies, such as state collapse and religious extremism; and

Leadership and human agency factors, such as bad leaders and spoilers.

Among the seventy-two different activities are:

 power balancing, alliances and alignments;  rapid reaction force, military protectorates, arms embargoes;  diplomatic engagement, negotiated understandings;  financial aid;  minority rights protection;  administrative and political protectorates;  constitutional and electoral reforms;  civil society and institution building;  rule of law;  back channels, dialogue, mediation;  truth commissions, reconciliation, and reconstruction.

There is no shortage of well-intended activities in the field of conflict resolution.

But, what works?

On What Works to Prevent Political Violence

Violent political conflicts are not inevitable.

Indeed, the good news is that violent political conflict is on a downward trend. For the decade of 1990 to 1999 there was an average of 26 wars per year. In 2000, there were 25; in 2001 there were 24; and in 2002 there were 21.32 Admittedly, this trend is short-term, some five years in duration. And it might be argued that it is not the direct result of preventive activities; that is, it is idiosyncratic, unreliable, neither attributable to dedicated efforts to reduce political violence, nor indicative of real know-how in the area of prevention, and certainly not predictive of future levels of violence in the world.

According to Gurr, however, the downward trend is not an accident. In fact, he suggests we are witnessing the evolution of new international policies to contain internal warfare.

“Both the norms and practices of international response to internal war changed during the 1990s. Norms that prescribed international responsibility for managing internal wars were asserted more forcefully, reinforcing the perception . . . that internal wars posed a greater security threat than heretofore. And international actors did in fact engage more frequently and directly in preventive diplomacy, negotiated settlements of internal wars, and collective peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention. The net effect of international engagement is evident in the trends depicted at the outset of this chapter. Numerous internal wars have been contained or settled, as a less obvious, unknowably large number of other conflict situations has been defused short of open warfare.” 33 (underline added)

Gurr argues that principles of good practice in how to manage violent conflict have emerged. The UN and other regional organizations have policy on prevention. There have been dedicated

32 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS efforts to reduce political violence. There is a range of tools available, from preventive diplomacy to the use of force in conformity with international law34.

Three factors supportive of prevention identified by Gurr are summarized here:

 Implementing International Norms About Individual and Group Rights.

Standard-setting texts specify individual political rights and minorities’ cultural, economic, and political rights that the international community is obliged, in principle, to implement. Among them are the International Bill of Human Rights as well as agreements signed by member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the early 1990s. These texts are not binding, but they provide the legal basis for a political program that includes proactive advocacy of individual and group rights by individual states, regional organizations, NGOs and minority groups themselves.

 Promoting Institutions for Democratic Power-Sharing

Democratic institutions are the preferred domestic means for protecting group rights in heterogeneous societies and for pursuing political programs to redress inequalities. Within the context of democratic institutions, mutual accommodation is the optimal strategy for managing conflict between challenging groups that claim separate identities and interests. These preferences are both normative and practical. Normatively, the leading states in the international community operate on democratic principles and strongly support the establishment and continuation of democratic institutions elsewhere.

 International Engagement in Containing Internal Wars

The emergent norm is that international and regional organizations, and individual states, have responsibilities to mediate internal wars and to engage, using force if necessary, to check gross violations of human rights. . . . The UN Security Council has authorized fifty-two peacekeeping operations during the past half-century, fifteen of them current, and most of these aimed at containing armed conflicts within states. . . . (although) . . . There is little chance that an international cavalry will ride to the rescue of rebellious Chechens, Uighers, or Kashmiris. . . . .The principle of international engagement is and will continue to be constrained by realist considerations. . . . One further step in the evolution of international doctrine of engagement is acceptance of the principle that when authority and security have collapsed, multilateral force can be used to maintain international protectorates while civil governance is reestablished. In effect, this has happened in Kosovo and East Timor, but it is too soon to suggest that the precedents establish a general principle. . . . In fact political and military engagement has been sustained, more often than not, in most internationalized civil conflicts of the 1990s.35

Gurr also offers some of the major lessons for prevention learned thus far:

 The most effective strategies of engagement are usually those that are applied early, before the onset of armed conflict or gross violations of human rights. Prevention by political and diplomatic means is less costly than coercive intervention and reconstruction. The point is widely recognized by policymakers, observers, and scholars but not yet consistently acted upon. The problem is twofold. One issue is the lack of reliable and convincing risk assessments about crises that lie more than a year or two away. The second is that UN and major power policymakers focus most of their limited political and material resources on responding to immediate crises.

 The most effective kinds of engagement are both multilateral and multidimensional. The multilateral principle is well established with regard to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Less widely recognized is the principle that effective engagement requires collaborative planning among interested states to design strategies that integrate diplomatic, political, economic, and military moves.

 Strategies should be designed with fallback objectives. The first objective is to forestall violent conflict in high-risk situations. When prevention fails (or is not attempted), the second-best objective is to induce the warring parties to negotiate an end to conflict. If efforts to induce settlement fail, plan three should be to contain spillovers from armed conflict into neighboring states. Plan four is a peace enforcement mission, worth consideration where humanitarian costs and security threats are high. Successful peace enforcement missions, as suggested at several points above, presuppose a high degree of resolve (or political will) on the part of states that lead such missions and a long-term commitment of resources.

 Military options should always be on the table, not as separate strategies but as part of the metastrategy of engagement. The options range from coercive deterrence, to rescue and training missions, to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, to air and ground warfare. . . .

 There are no fixed scenarios of political and military engagement. There is always the risk that policymakers will learn the wrong lessons from a particular success or failure, using it as a simple guide about what (not) to do next time. ‘Next time’ in fact is likely to differ significantly from ‘last time’. . . . 36

The major impediment to prevention, however, as Gurr has noted, is realist considerations. It is not lack of know-how. Yes, there have been mistakes and there will be mistakes when it comes to intervening in violent situations. The fact that virtually all organs of the UN have adopted a policy of prevention, however, has not altered the criticism that action is not taken often enough, early enough and for long enough to prevent violence.

Is the major impediment to prevention a resource issue? Those interviewed say, “yes, partly”. They also point to the lack of quality risk assessment and the failure of peace activists to make compelling arguments that action must be taken. The conflict resolution community is not effective in its advocacy for peace. Political leaders whose commitment is needed to avert a war are not persuaded sufficiently to take action.

Those close to political actors, the policymakers, government advisors and bureaucrats working inside the state system also underline the issue of capacity and competing demands. They note that political actors operating on behalf of a state have only so much capacity to change the world from a violent to more peaceful one. Whether you are the Minister of Foreign Affairs in London or Oslo, or the Secretary of State in Washington, you will be able to attend only to a handful of cases. This is the reality even in a superpower.

For example, in the US State Department the various assistant undersecretaries of state may come to office with a personal mission to achieve three major accomplishments during their four year term. One of these may be to help end a war, or prevent one from breaking out. Other priorities may be trade relations, establishing alliances, and so forth. Then there will inevitably be a crisis, most likely taking attention and resources away from their initial peace agenda. If one assumes that there are five assistant undersecretaries of state in the US State Department, that means that human capacity in that great state would allow efforts to be dedicated to some 15 major initiatives over a four year period, 5 of which might be to reduce violence. The impact of a crisis, or of the US being engaged directly in war itself, can easily be imagined. Most of the 5 peace initiatives – of which again only 2 or 3 would have the Secretary of State’s personal attention - would be relegated to a back-burner. There, lower level staff would keep an eye on them and do what they could to keep any one of them from turning into a crisis.

This limited capacity scenario is presently exacerbated by the “war on terror”, homeland defence, and full scale US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many good intentions to reduce political violence are therefore relegated to a back burner.

So a pragmatic answer to why action is not taken often enough, early enough, or for long enough is capacity. Yet, some authorities insist that it can not be argued that there are insufficient resources available to states and to the UN to act more often. Yes, those who advocate action in a particular case must choose their cases well, and they must target state actors who are likely to be responsive. But the authorities agree: the real reason for inaction is a lack of political will37.

Therefore, both practical and realist considerations have a profound impact on the violence prevention agenda. What country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which is responsible for international security, is going to be very concerned about the struggle for democracy in Myanmar or an insurgency in northern Uganda? None, unless it is compelled to do so. Most political leaders are content to put a difficult decision off to another day, hoping it will go away or clarify in some manner to make taking a decision more palatable. It is not difficult to see how any government would adopt a policy of prevention but a practice of benign ignorance until push came to shove.

This conundrum points to the need to be more clear about what prevention is, and when it is appropriate to engage in it. Deep structuralists will argue that the work of transforming a culture of violence to a culture of peace, of removing structural violence that gives rise to direct violence, is the profound agenda. The authorities I interviewed are less inclined. They agree that at some point development assistance is just that, development assistance. Development is a long term, deep structural endeavor to raise the standard of living and prospects of people in less advantaged nations. It serves the peace agenda. But it is not violence prevention, per se. Prevention must be regarded and offered as a discrete set of activities intended to avert violent political conflict on the basis of an assessment of risk of violence.

When the UN or a regional organization does decide to put resources into prevention, as the OSCE, the OAS, and others have, technical know-how exists. Prevention can work.

Zellner, focusing on just one conflict prevention mechanism, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, asserts that: “Many observers regard the HCNM as the success story of the OSCE. . . . the high commissioner is an example par excellence of both a highly effective and cost-effective institution for conflict prevention”. Zellner credits the HCNM with having been active in fifteen countries, quietly, behind the scenes, making recommendations, being very effective. A similar account can be given to former US President Jimmy Carter, and a number of nongovernmental organizations would claim to have been effective in the task of violence prevention.38

There is a convergence of views on how to prevent political violence.

A Framework to Prevent Political Violence

 Adopt a policy on violence prevention;

 Have capacity to do risk assessment, conflict analysis, and early warning;

 Plan collaboratively to design strategies that integrate diplomatic (formal Track I and informal Track II), political, economic, and, if necessary, security measures;

 Engage early, quietly, before the onset of armed conflict or gross violations of human rights;

 Engage multilaterally, and multidimensionally;

 Start with activities that address the root causes of political conflict so that these conflicts do not erupt into armed violence;

 Strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of the communities, society and state at risk;

 Include a regional perspective to stabilize the neighborhood and create regional forces supportive of peace;

 If these measures are inadequate use sharper interventions including use of force, armed peacekeeping operations and related security measures intended to contain the violence, to arrest it, and stabilize the setting; and

 Remain engaged until risk factors are removed.

On How to Make Mediated Peace Agreements Sustainable

Mediation is generally defined as various forms of third party assisted negotiation. While mediation may be used as a preventive technique, introduced early, my examination of its effectiveness is as a tool to settle political conflicts when they have reached a stage of open hostility, including armed warfare. I focus on relatively formal efforts which engage official representatives of warring sides in negotiation talks.

Is mediation used often enough in cases of war? Is it conducted effectively? Most importantly, what works to make mediated peace agreements sustainable?

The record shows that from 1900 to 1989 mediation was used in as few as 10% of the cases of civil war.39 Bercovitch, a leading authority on international mediation, nevertheless asserts that “negotiations and mediations are at last beginning to emerge as the most appropriate responses to conflict in its myriad forms and to the challenge of building a more peaceful world”.40 The challenge of sustainability is a serious issue, however: a disturbing number of the agreements that are reached are not honored.

There are fewer questions about the process of mediation; that is, the technical mechanics of conducting a mediation are well documented and have largely been absorbed by those who practice it. That does not mean it is an easy task or that more knowledge is not required to improve the process with a view to achieving sustainable peace agreements. 41

Greenberg and Barton’s examination of the use of mediation and arbitration in twelve cases of contemporary deadly conflict provides deep insight into the mediation process. Their contribution to technical knowledge about what makes a good mediation process is reviewed here. Nine of the twelve case studies fall well within our focus on political conflict that has become openly violent, in some cases lethal (Abkhazia, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, South Africa, and West Bank/Occupied Territories).42

The major insights into the mediation process are:

1. Almost all the recent conflicts involve issues that during the Cold War would have been regarded as purely internal matters in which the participation of the international community would not have been welcome.

2. A mediator’s effort through the use of positive or negative leverage such as incentives and sanctions, including military force to impose an agreement on the parties, generally work only in the short term and do not lend themselves well to durable agreements and long-term reconciliation.

3. The United Nations played an important role in most of the cases studied, by providing the mediator, the forum, or implementing institutions necessary to the mediation effort, and has

generally been far more successful than regional organizations in bringing resolution to protracted conflicts.

4. The value added by the mediator was usually procedural rather than substantive, and the mediator’s most important contribution was frequently to provide a procedural or substantive framework within which negotiations could take place. Thus, the impartiality of the mediator was the characteristic most prized by the parties to the conflict.

5. The international law norms of sovereignty and self-determination can be mutually exclusive and are often bluntly defined; they frequently created a primary barrier to achieving agreement.

6. Although multiple channels of negotiation and shuttle diplomacy are useful and frequently required, face-to-face discussions between the actual parties - and the accompanying human interplay – almost always proved essential to an ultimately successful negotiation43.

Of particular importance at this time, however, is the distinction Greenberg and Barton make between process and results.

They remark: “ . . . one is impressed by the number of examples in which an apparently successful negotiation was, in fact, a failure at resolving the underlying dispute and resulted in significant backsliding on the ground: the Oslo Accords and the West Bank, Cambodia, the Arusha Accords and Rwanda, the Dayton accords and Bosnia”44. (underline added)

Yet, they temper this judgment as follows:

“In making any such an evaluation of a negotiation, it is important to consider the differing meanings that can be given to success and failure. Stalling disaster for a period is often valuable. In light of the real uncertainties of the world . . . one never knows how much worse things would have been were there no agreement”.45

So while their review gives a “thumbs up” to the degree of facility with which the mediation process is conducted, the long-term results are much more disconcerting. That is why I am moved to say mediation has “failed”.

Pressing issues pertain to the timing of mediation, the relationship of mediation and the use of force, ensuring that crucial issues in dispute are addressed, and providing sufficient long-term support to make the mediated peace agreement sustainable.

The timing of mediation in the life cycle of the conflict has implications for:

 the number of potential entry points (low level violence provides a large number of entry points vs high level of violence provides few entry points);

 the various types of barriers to entry;

 the opportunity for the mediator to exercise procedural control (which is influential in the success of a settlement);

 the correct combination of unified and coordinated third party assistance (sequenced multiparty initiatives vs simultaneous activities); as well as

 the nature of the mediator (NGO, scholar-practitioner, etc.). 46

Getting the timing right is not an easy matter, however. Bercovitch’s advice is that “the most propitious phase to initiate mediation at least of the formal kind – is about half-way through the life cycle of the conflict, and certainly after the parties’ own conflict management efforts have failed”.47 He also remarks that it is helpful when both sides in the conflict request the mediation and the level of violence is lower.

The concept of “ripeness” is implied in Bercovitch’s statement about timing. Zartman’s concept of “ripeness”, associated with a “mutually hurting stalemate” is very powerful, and controversial. Taken fully on board, the idea that a conflict is not ripe for resolution until the parties have reached a “mutually hurting stalemate” would consign all would-be peacemakers to sitting on the sidelines waiting for the call as warring groups kill one another until that time that they reach sufficiently high levels of pain without hope of prevailing on the battle field. Only then might they be prepared to talk their way to peace. But when has the conflict reached the half-way point? Conflicts wax and wane, they are multi-dimensional, they tend to spill over into neighboring states, and what fuels them are not necessarily only the interests and resources coming from the parties themselves. Virtually every dispute is “nested” in a complex set of actors, internal variables, and geopolitical pushes and pulls.

To be fair, Zartman’s concept of a mutually hurting stalemate should not be interpreted over simplistically and thereby consign mediators to passivity when the role of perception is critical. As Touval and Zartman remark: “Mediators can manipulate stalemates and crisis: they can use them and they can make them. If there is a recognized impending danger, mediators can use it as a warning and as an unpleasant alternative to a negotiated settlement. And if they (the parties) do not agree that a crisis exists, mediators can work to implant a common perception that it or a mutually hurting stalemate does exist.” They go on to note “It would be preferable if the need for a ripe moment could be combined with the desirability of treating conflict early, as sought in preventive diplomacy. To do this, mediators need to develop a perception of stalemate at a low level of conflict, or to develop a sense of responsibility on the part of a government to head off an impending conflict, or to develop an awareness of an opportunity for a better outcome made available through mediation. There are few examples, as yet, of mediators using such tactics successfully.” 48

The need for a multi-level, multi-actor approach is indicated by these real-life conditions. That is, efforts can be made to ripen a conflict, inducements to talk can be offered, less formal processes of dialogue designed to move the warring sides to formal peace talks may be required, and force may be used to arrest the violence and to create a window for mediation.

It is clear that a strategy of intervention in a violent conflict must consider both diplomatic and military tools.49 Mediation may therefore accompany the use of force, it may call for peacekeepers to stabilize the environment, or it may include arrangements for peacekeepers to enforce a peace agreement that has been negotiated through mediation. Helpfully, the international community is now more comfortable with UN Chapter VII interventions and is no longer compelled to wait for consent to intervene in serious humanitarian crises; and recent efforts to shift to a policy of “responsibility to protect” augur well.50

This does not mean that a peace agreement cannot be mediated without the use of force. Indeed a number have, and some have been accomplished without demanding that the parties themselves agree to a cease fire as a first step. Rather, as Crocker notes “ A final strategic lesson from past cases of intervention is that the most successful ones were based on understanding the connection between military power and diplomatic strategy. Diplomatic intervention in the realm of peacemaking is seldom effective, unless it either reflects an underlying balance of forces or is backed by certain elements of power and leverage capable of affecting that balance”.51 (Underline added).

Hampson helps to clarify the linkages between use of force and diplomacy. In his chapter “Why Orphaned Peace Settlements are More Prone to Failure” he writes:

“When should third parties use force to stabilize the political process and bring those elements that are intent on wrecking the peace process into line? There is no easy answer to this question. For each case when third-party force failed to achieve political aims (Somalia) one can also point to instances where, arguably, if force had been used early in the conflict and in a decisive fashion, tragedy might have been prevented (Rwanda)”. 52

Military intervention without diplomatic objectives and a means to achieve these is ineffective; and mediation that does not address the root cause of a conflict is likewise ineffective. This applies equally to cases when the cause of violence is said to be the political entrepreneurialism of a leader who activates ethnic identity as a ploy to set one group against others, or to a predatory rebel who likewise puts grievances forward as a guise for purely predacious motives.

Sustainability of peace agreements reached by mediation, however, remains a challenge. As Hampson notes:

“Outside interventions are typically more effective when third parties entrench and institutionalize their role in the peacemaking and peacebuilding process . . .This means that third parties must have enough resources and resolve to remain fully engaged in the negotiation leading up to the settlement and through the subsequent peace-building process. Settlements that fail have generally been ‘orphaned,’ because third parties either failed to remain fully engaged in implementing the settlement or were unable to muster the requisite level of resources, both economic and political, to build the foundations for a secure settlement.” 53

There is sympathy among those interviewed for the speculation that agreements break down because the mediators failed to have the parties address some of the difficult underlying issues in dispute. The authorities agreed that sometimes mediators will gloss over tough issues in their

41 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS pursuit of an agreement. For example, an issue such as the role of rebel troops in a new peacetime armed forces may be agreed in principle but important technical details may be deferred, unhelpfully, to the implementation phase. Likewise, important power-sharing arrangements may be given inadequate treatment.

More controversial is how crucial to sustainable peace is the issue of deeply held grievances. Specifically, what is the salience to long term peace of healing historical wounds relating to ethnic identity, recognition, and legitimacy in the social and political makeup of a country? What is adequate in addressing them? And if left inadequately addressed, are they a crucial cause of the breakdown of peace agreements? It seems clear that these are a large part of what are generally called the root causes of a conflict, although the manner to address them in a political accord and the way in which healing and reconciliation are to be achieved in any particular case seems to defy general prescriptions. Perhaps because this issue is so deep-seated and personal, it will always require particular remedies. More research is clearly required here.

Repeatedly, the authorities emphasized the need for coordinated, comprehensive action by third parties striving to mediate a peace agreement. They also agree that it is imperative that outsiders remain engaged to help make the agreed peace sustainable.

Miall, Rathsbotham, and Woodhouse offer a prescription in support of sustainable peace:

“In line with the necessity of a broad view, conflict resolution should concern itself not only with the issues that divide the main parties, but also with the social, psychological, and political changes that are necessary to address the root causes, the intraparty conflicts that may inhibit acceptance of any settlement, the context that affects the incentives of the parties, and the social and institutional capacity that determines whether a settlement can be made acceptable and workable. In other words, a multitrack approach is necessary, relying on interventions by different actors at different levels”.54

Lund, 55and Kaplan,56 and Paris,57 however, emphasize the vulnerability of war-torn societies that are brought to some degree of stability through outside efforts, when those efforts actually impose unsustainable change on the state. Change itself can overwhelm the peace being constructed. A strong hand executing a political and economic strategy is needed to help stabilize and guide a society to peace. Without that, reversals are quite possible. The cure can set the patient backward.

Bercovitch declares that mediation cannot be successful in each and every conflict. Wall, Druckman, and Diehl quoted in Bercovitch, state that “seldom is any intense conflict - in peacekeeping or civilian sectors – totally resolved by mediation. Rather, it tends to improve; it does not escalate; or it diminishes over the long run”. 58

So, is there a general prescription for effective mediation?

Miall, Rathsbotham and Woodhouse are quite specific about the elements of effective mediation, although they note that generalization is treacherous. 59

Miall’s Framework for Successful Settlements

 they should include the affected parties;

 settlements need to be well crafted and precise, especially as regards details over transitional arrangements;

 they should offer a balance between clear commitments and flexibility;

 they should offer incentives to the parties to sustain the process and to participate in politics (i.e., power-sharing rather than winner-take-all);

 they should provide for dispute settlement; and

 they should deal with the core issues of the conflict and bring about a real transformation.

Enough is known to improve the record of mediated peace agreements. Clearly, however, a piece of paper signed by warring parties and witnessed by the mediator is just the beginning. Long- term, effective post-violence peacebuilding becomes critical to violence reduction.

On Post-violence Peacebuilding

Lund reports that a number of comparative studies of peace agreements suggest that the record has been quite mixed. Yet his overall conclusion is more optimistic.

In addition to noting Hampson’s work, reported earlier, he cites the work of Sambanis and Doyle: “In the most comprehensive survey of post-conflict peacebuilding, Sambanis and Doyle look at 124 cases of civil war since 1945 to determine how many ended in peace and through what means. . . . they find . . . a success rate of about 43%.”60

That is, in 53 of the124 cases there was an absence of major or lower-level violence, and sovereignty was not contested two years after the end of the war.

He summarizes as follows:

“All in all, the cross-sectional and case study research briefly reviewed above hardly provides a ringing endorsement of the post-conflict peacebuilding done so far, but it does indicate that relatively effective peacebuilding has been implemented and can have positive results, at least in

43 PART II: THE FINDINGS 4. A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT WORKS terms of some effectiveness criteria. But it is only under certain conditions, and through applying various powerful means of influence, that peacebuilding can achieve the beginnings of sustainable peace. While the research does not give peacebuilding a high rating, it also shows how and where peacebuilding can get results when done in a strategic way and by consulting guidelines that policy research on similar cases provides”.61

Lund specifies that there is no simple, single blueprint to be applied in all situations, but that there are policy-relevant guidelines.

Lund’s Framework for Post-violence Peacebuilding

 “Assess the degree of difficulty of the conflict situation on the ground before deciding whether to commit to it, thus setting realistic situation-specific goals. This entails doing solid political, economic, social, and institutional analysis and consultation with relevant stakeholders, on an ongoing basis.

 Before initiating operations, establish a national plan or strategy that defines and gets agreement on end-goals and clear, explicit, and prioritized interim objectives for achieving them, along with benchmarks for assessing progress.

 At the same time, maintain flexibility, do contingency planning that looks to revising the strategy, and stay open to innovative risk-taking.

 Match what can be accomplished to the resources available. For example, UN missions should be clear to the Security Council if their marching orders realistically cannot be implemented.

 Create policy mechanisms or procedures that ensure that such planning and coordination occurs among the several essential parties, such as the UN, the World Bank, and the national government, and that establishes an optimal but feasible unity of command on the ground. These procedures should involve frequent meetings among these relevant organizations.

 Avoid donor competition by setting up coordination conferences.

 Maintain political support from major powers and international coalitions.

 Establish finite but appropriate periods as the time limits for missions, but expect to be committed for a number of years”.62

Having noted that these guidelines are about process or procedures for planning and decisionmaking (how things are done against what specifically is done in what circumstance) he does indeed offer substantive recommendations; that is, a compilation of what kinds of action should be taken and approximately when during the peace process.

The major points provided by Lund are:

 “Generally, get a real ceasefire before tackling other tasks.

 Specific incentives may be needed initially to entice the most powerful contending political leaders to support the peace process and to dissuade any to become ‘spoilers’.

 But avoid relying solely on negotiating power-sharing and elite compacts as the only means for creating a functioning government and sustaining peace, for their tendency may be to simply divide up a country’s spoils.

 Support is also needed to strengthen national policies and institutions early on, through establishing a state budget, budget support, civil service policies, and a tax system, so that a functioning sovereign government with financial, legal and administrative institutions can deploy resources to the public and act as a counterpart to the international community. The state apparatus must be strong enough to act as the venue and channels through which potential conflicts are prevented from escalating, even among the victors of a war.

 Policies and structures are needed to manage a country’s lootable natural resources and major forms of illegal commerce, and controls are needed over humanitarian aid so they do not become used to supply armed movements.

 There is also a need for some provisional central political decisionmaking structure that constitutes the government and provides leadership, but this entity should include new leaders and be subject to some interim representative process, although elections are not necessarily required.

 If the parties are not thus motivated, peacekeepers must employ more forceful measures to deter conflict and compel the parties to restrain the use of force.

 Concentrate resources early into demobilization and inducing armies to transform themselves into political parties and into security sector reform.

 Substantial resources are needed to ensure civil security and to enforce anticorruption laws and control crime by strengthening the police and judicial system.

 Consider using police instead of armies as early as possible for maintaining public security.

 Building up local capacity to monitor gross human rights violations appears to be a particularly cost-effective measure.

 Look beyond military operations early on to facilitate broader goals such as building institutions and developing human and social capital, such as through revitalizing the organizations and institutions of civil society, many of which have survived the war.

 Adjust the pace of implementing activities to the capacity of domestic institutions to handle the tasks and the economy to absorb the resources. Surges of outside money can distort the labor market and cause resentments. For example, introduce reconstruction funds gradually if warlords would otherwise capture them.

 Modulate the aid flow so that too much is not provided in the first years and too little in the later years. Special reserve funds may foster this.

 Focus resources on reconciling the major contending ethnic or other political groups with competing interests who could be mobilized to collective action.

 Do not expect economic development to occur quickly.

 Address the interests of neighboring governments in the conflict country and of diasporas, so they support the peace process, or at least do not subvert it”.63

Empirical research in post-conflict peacebuilding, like research applied to the other phases of political violence, has produced a workable set of procedural and substantive guidelines. The level of knowledge does not amount to detailed prescriptions; indeed, the nature of political violence renders rigid prescriptions impractical.

Post-violence peacebuilding, we see, is not about removing conflict from societies and states. It is directed at addressing the root causes of political violence, and assisting societies that are war- torn to build something new. The cycle of conflict does not in reality “cycle” a full revolution to return to where it began. And resolution of conflict, described as the attainment of the fully felt political and psychological resolve of those matters initially in discord, is a work in progress. A peace agreement that ignores the deep-rooted causes will not be effective in reducing violence. A peace agreement that strives to address those causes and is abandoned in implementation will not be effective in reducing violence. It can be seen that there is notable agreement on causes and responses to political violence.

There is less agreement, however, on what is not effective in reducing political violence.

46 PART II: THE FINDINGS 5. WILL ANYONE SAY WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE?

5. WILL ANYONE SAY WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE?

It is remarkable how difficult it was to have the authorities, even the most hard-nosed among them, declare that a particular conflict resolution activity or technique is not effective. The literature review had raised questions about the effectiveness of certain types of conflict resolution training and informal “Track II” dialogue processes. Only when I identified these apparently ineffective activities did those interviewed seem prepared to address the issue of what is not effective in reducing political violence.

Common perambulatory remarks included assertions that the complex nature of political conflict makes it difficult to draw causal connections: causality is multivariate, there is nothing deterministic about political violence. And evaluation is in a poor state of affairs, so we really can’t say with any degree of certainty that a particular activity is not effective.

So, I would ask: all these measures, from nonviolent conflict resolution training, to “peace camps” in the USA where Israeli and Palestinian children meet to learn about one another and overcome negative stereotypes so as to build the basis of peaceful relations, to various unofficial processes of contact and dialogue between people from both sides of a war divide may be effective?

The response?

They may.

Provocatively, I would prompt: they may be, but they may also not be. They may be a waste of time and effort. They may hold out false promises for people caught up in war.

Only then were some of the authorities I interviewed prepared to say that they had real questions about some activities, especially various forms of dialogue and conflict resolution training:

They questioned the effectiveness of providing nonviolent conflict resolution training to grass roots people in situations of violent political conflict. Structural violence and the actions of belligerents can not be finessed away; these soft skills don’t transfer to the war-mongers. This training might help in advance of open hostility when the recipients are likely to have a direct impact on the course of the conflict; and they are certainly necessary skills to provide to people when re-building a war-torn society and developing the capacity in that society to express and resolve conflicts nonviolently. But there are reservations about their effectiveness.

Indeed, the Confronting War booklet,64 written on the basis of numerous case studies and extensive consultation with peacebuilders, makes the strong assertion that conflict resolution tools and techniques that focus on effecting change at the individual/personal level that never translate into socio-political actions turn out simply not to be effective. It is not so much that such activities and programs directed at that level cannot be effective – if they have strategic linkages to the socio-political sphere – but experience shows that

47 PART II: THE FINDINGS 5. WILL ANYONE SAY WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE?

they very often simply sit there, disconnected from that level. They may make some individuals better off (know more, be more thoughtful, be more nonviolent) but they do nothing, at all, to stop overall violence or build peace.

The authorities also questioned informal, “Track II” dialogues that are not more intentionally tied to peace processes involving elites; those which do not have participants who can influence elites are of questionable effectiveness.

Again, Confronting War reinforces this criticism. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners have the techniques for conducting dialogues, doing training in consensus- building processes, establishing peace groups and so-forth, but lack the ability to discern whether and when to provide these services. They do not know how to analyze what is driving the conflict (in any particular context) and then to develop a reasonable, bold and effective strategy that addresses the drivers.

When the conversation moved away from efforts to identify specific conflict resolution and peacebuilding techniques that are not effective, the reluctance was gone. The inadequacy of evaluation was treated by the authorities as a given. Instead, with considerable urgency, a number of significant concerns relating to the ineffectiveness of conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities were identified.

Significant Concerns:

 Inadequate Conflict Analysis.  The Political Naivety of Conflict Resolution Practitioners.  Conflict Resolution Failure to Communicate Effectively.  Inadequate Coordination of Effort.  Institutional Shortcomings.  United States’ Unilateralism.

Failure to conduct adequate conflict analysis, that which one would assume is the peacemaker’s stock-in-trade, is a shocking shortcoming. That conflict resolution practitioners are politically naïve likewise seems counter-intuitive. After all, their job is to reduce “political” violence. As practitioners whose greatest contributions to peace are negotiation and mediation and nonviolent conflict resolution – all of which are anchored in communication skills – that these practitioners fail to communicate effectively is also a remarkable shortcoming. If efforts to reduce political violence are ineffective because analysis is inadequate, practitioners are naïve, and they do not communicate well, is it little wonder that there is no coordination of effort?

That there are institutional shortcomings is not surprising inasmuch as that concern seems to be perennial in almost every field of endeavor. Somehow, policy never gets acted upon the way it should; resources are almost always inadequate; organizational behavior is always peculiar, and

48 PART II: THE FINDINGS 5. WILL ANYONE SAY WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE? so-forth. Yet, ubiquitous as it may be, this concern has been registered as a serious impediment to effectiveness in reducing political violence. So has the present foreign policy of the USA. It is described by a number of authorities as unilateralist, a set-back for the gains made by the field of conflict resolution, and counter-productive to reducing political violence in the world.

On balance, poor analysis, inadequate coordination, and a failure to collaborate so that the comparative advantage of various actors engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is maximized may be the greatest impediment to effectiveness. Each of these is addressed in depth in the next chapter, “Why ‘What Works’, Doesn’t”.

49 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T

6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T

8 Big Concerns

The glass of effectiveness, as we have noted, is half full; but it is also half empty. The record is 50/50 – a mere “pass”. Yet I claim there is sufficient knowledge now to improve the record, that the field of conflict resolution has come of age, technically. Scholars, and scholar-practitioners are especially knowledgeable about what should be done by whom, when, and how to prevent political violence, to mediate an end to armed warfare, and to re-build a war-torn society. But that knowledge is underutilized. Indeed, one of the authorities interviewed suggested that theory was running ahead of practice. That is, not even those things that are known to be effective are being given a chance. More advances in theory development is not a pressing concern.

On the basis of what is known now, the record of reducing political violence in the world should be better. That is not to say that there is no need for more research and evaluation, theoretical breakthroughs, and a finer grasp of technical competencies. On the contrary, responsible practitioners and any respectable profession will always strive for improvements. In an area as important as mass violence and the pursuit of peace, these challenges are all the more important. Work on them is necessary and honorable. Some identifiable things, however, stand in the way of converting knowledge into effective action. There has to be an explanation for why “what works”, doesn’t.

Six major concerns have been identified by those interviewed. These concerns make knowledge of what works to reduce political violence less effective than it should be. I add two more: the nature of the beast, and the wrong objective. I include these here, in my findings, because they were sub-textual in my interviews with the authorities. That is, we talked all around them. I got the point, and have now named them. They are two more significant concerns relating to the effectiveness of efforts to reduce political violence.

So these are the “Big 8” reasons why “what works”, doesn’t:

1. The nature of the beast; 2. The wrong objective; 3. The Political Naivety of Conflict Resolution Practitioners; 4. Inadequate Conflict Analysis; 5. Conflict Resolution’s Failure to Communicate Effectively; 6. Inadequate Coordination of Effort; 7. Institutional Shortcomings; 8. United States’ Unilateralism.

1. The Nature of the Beast

The international state system is anarchic. There is no overarching political authority with enforcement powers. State leaders are responsible for pursuing state interests. In this pursuit, the use of force is their prerogative. Violence is the final arbiter in matters of the state. Furthermore, violence is often glorified; at the very least, many are resigned to it. That there will be another war is never really contested. That is, there is a habit that accepts war as legitimate and there are many people associated with war-making that are viewed as respectable, including weapons manufacturers65. In fact, 85% of the weapons trade in the world is conducted by actors from the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council. Those who are responsible for making peace provide the arms to wage war. 66

The world is also becoming increasingly fragmented and less orderly. The capacity for mass violence has extended beyond the state to rebels who believe that violence is the only means of achieving their objectives, to some predators for whom violence is way of life, and to terrorists for whom violence is their stock in trade.

The legitimacy of violence is the nature of the beast.

This is my assessment of the biggest obstacle to a significant reduction in political violence.67 Virtually everyone I interviewed implicitly acknowledged that it is the box within which efforts to reduce political violence must be undertaken. It is a fixed parameter, being chipped away in very tiny bits by those who try to strengthen the UN’s enforcement capacity; by those who try to bring rule of law to the jungle of violent political conflict; and by those who strive to transform a global culture of violence into a culture of peace.68

For now, however, it is reality. The task of reducing political violence is thus considerably surreal. That is, there will be times when the legitimate use of force is necessary to arrest the illegitimate use of it. Although using it illegitimately is embedded within present reality. Under these conditions a clear and focused objective, pursued with deliberate effort, is a paramount requisite for success in reducing the incidence and severity of violence.

2. The Wrong Objective

The field is called “Conflict Resolution”. Conflict, however, is not the enemy. Violence is. The objective of reducing violence is different from the objective of resolving conflict. Furthermore, the notion that all political violence can be addressed by the use of nonviolent means seems preposterous, given the nature of the beast. The legal use of force will be necessary in certain cases.

Whether conflict can, or indeed, should be fully resolved is another question. After all, conflict can draw attention to an injustice and to less serious differences of opinion or approach. Resolving the conflict may not even be the appropriate goal. Rather, correcting the injustice or accepting another point of view may be required. My concern is that placing the emphasis on

51 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T conflict (the conflict cycle, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding) does a disservice to the objective of reducing violence.

With an emphasis on conflict, the word “violent” is an adjective, used to describe a phase of conflict. It should be more helpful to think and talk in terms of violence as a noun. Then the focus would be on preventing violence, stopping violence, and post-violence recovery. Fully mature, peaceful democracies clearly have plenty of conflict in them. But they manage to get through most of the conflict without recourse to violence. They have the means by which conflict is expressed and resolved nonviolently. It follows that building that capacity in all societies is a credible objective. Yet, it should never be forgotten that these states have some form of enforcement, rule of law. Violence is not permitted within them, except by authorized agents of the state.

In the international sphere, a focus on conflict – its prevention and resolution - makes it easier to say that since all conflict will never be prevented, therefore all violence will never be prevented. This is precisely because violence is twinned with conflict in this context. If the emphasis were placed on violence, rather than conflict, the imperative of interdicting it would become more profound. The obstacles to doing so would become more clear. The means for overcoming them would more clearly come into focus.

In the domestic western context violence by a man against a woman is no longer tolerated – regardless of the conflict between them. Direct legal intervention to interdict his violent behavior is sanctioned. Why not in the international context? 69

Indeed, the increasing willingness of the UN Security Council to authorize Chapter VII interventions is encouraging. So is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.70

The Commission was formed in direct response to failures in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia. Action taken there was perceived as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, and poorly executed. Because there most likely will continue to be massacres, mass starvation, rape and ethnic cleansing, there was perceived to be a desperate need for agreed rules, an international consensus, to handle such cases.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the international community to address the problem, apart from UN Chapter VII provisions for intervention when there is no consent. The government of Canada responded by establishing a 12-member commission in September, 2000. It was asked to address a range of questions - legal, moral, political and operational - and to consult the widest possible range of opinion worldwide.

The report’s central theme is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The report aimed at providing precise guidance for states faced with human protection claims in other states. The nature and dimension of that responsibility deals with questions about who should exercise it, under whose authority, when, where and how.

The long-running debates in the UN General Assembly have seen supporters of intervention on human rights grounds opposed by defenders of state sovereignty. The Commission reframed the issue from the "right to intervene" to the “responsibility to protect”.

The advantages of this approach include:

 Those needing support are the focus rather than those considering intervention.

 Primary responsibility is with the state concerned and the international community acts only when that state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility.

 It includes responsibility to react, to prevent and to rebuild.

This means a shift in thinking about sovereignty, from control, to a dual responsibility which respects the sovereignty of states and the human rights of a state’s own people. The responsibility to protect implies duty to react when there is compelling need for human protection.

The objective of this study is to contribute to a significant reduction in political violence. This is not easily achieved when the objective is obscured by a misplaced emphasis on conflict. Reducing violence is the path to peace.

3. The Political Naivety of Conflict Resolution

Knowing the “it” of conflict resolution is not enough to have “it” applied. We have observed the gap between knowledge of what to do and doing it at all three levels: in prevention, in mediation to end armed warfare, and in post-violence peacebuilding. The knowledge-action gap exists at the case level and across the field of conflict resolution. That is, within cases, knowledge is not mobilized as effectively as it could be. The bridge between knowing what to do and doing it must be improved in specific cases of political violence. Furthermore, across the universe of cases, theory, policy, and tools to prevent or end violent conflict exist but they are not being applied often enough, early enough or for long enough to create the positive changes they are intended to have.

Part of the answer is the way in which practitioners are educated and trained to do peace work.71 And part of the answer is the way in which the field is organized to deliver its services. More technical knowledge alone, however, will not bridge this gap. How to create the will and commitment to prevent killing, to stop it when it has started, and to build sustainable societies in the aftermath of violence is the crucial challenge for the field of conflict resolution. The task is a political task, not a conflict resolution knowledge deficiency problem per se. It is a task of moving political actors who should be engaged, to take action.72

You might argue that if this is true, on the contrary: conflict resolution practitioners do have a knowledge deficiency. They may know the technical requirements for effective prevention,

53 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T mediation and post-violence peacebuilding but they lack an essential expertise that is incumbent upon them. That is the capability to influence political actors to take action. And those actors include both leaders directly involved in the violence; that is, leaders of warring groups, and those outside it who are needed to help end it. Conflict resolution practitioners need to know how to create the will to peace and how to turn commitment into action. In the case of war lords, and also in the case of outside leaders, heads of states, practical assessments must be made of the constraints and opportunities these leaders have with respect to choosing a path to peace. Their choice will depend on their pragmatic interests, on the apparent benefits to them. Conducting conflict analysis, forecasting obstacles to peace, including the commitment of leaders, and knowing how to overcome obstacles should be bread and butter competencies of those who practice conflict resolution.

A number of the authorities interviewed however, characterized conflict resolution practitioners as politically naive, especially those associated within the peace movement and those who developed their international practice on the basis of experience in domestic mediation. Indeed, some went so far as to say that members of the conflict resolution field are arrogant, “holier- than-thou” people who find politics, and political leaders, beneath them. This disposition and these attitudes were viewed as counterproductive to the effective practice of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. How could someone think that they could be effective by simply holding out their services, proselytizing peace, but refusing or being incapable of getting into the politics of the assignment, including nasty power struggles between self-serving war lords, and the cold political calculations by outside leaders of the payoff for engagement or inaction?

The discussion took me back to my own early lessons in power and its role in disputes. I recalled how ineffective mediation was when I lacked the capacity to address power imbalances, to hold leaders accountable for blatant abuses of each other, and to deny their impunity with respect to the process of mediation itself. I have long ago discovered that one cannot “finesse” away structural power imbalances and that some people who fight are quite prepared to use power abusively for their own self-interest. Clearly, technical knowledge is insufficient to be effective in reducing political violence unless that knowledge includes political acumen. Leaders make a huge difference to the course of events. Political leaders, whether war lords or peace lords, are motivated by practical calculations of self-interest and they trade in the currency of power. What compels some to choose violence to achieve their objectives, and what compels other leaders to move to interdict it must be grasped in theory and in action by those in the field of conflict resolution. Access to leaders and the ability to influence them is crucial.

Perhaps the lack of political savvy is the fundamental shortcoming to effective efforts at violence reduction. Skills in the art of persuasion, of demanding that more action be directed at the reduction of violence, and in making conflict resolution relevant to that objective are not apparent in the field of conflict resolution.

I believe this is the result in part of the way in which “international” conflict resolution, as a field, grew from efforts to settle disputes within western domestic contexts where rule of law was a given. Exporting techniques on how to facilitate a group discussions designed to build consensus, or to train people in nonviolent conflict resolution, from environments of relative stability and civility to environments where anarchy and the rule of the jungle obtain account for

54 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T some of conflict resolution’s ineffective performance. The assumption that these techniques would be relevant in cases of war implies a political naivety from the start. Indeed, my own experience is that indigenous community-based peace workers in war zones know the limitations of these western exports and know from personal experience that skills in the analysis of conflict, in political advocacy, and in how to organize to influence key actors to shift from war to peace are desperately needed.

4. Inadequate Conflict Analysis

With so many disciplines intersecting on the violence reduction agenda, diplomacy, international relations, and security among them, it is difficult to identify a set of core competencies for the field of conflict resolution. Furthermore, there are no standards of instruction in what is being taught, no agreed professional code of conduct, and no accountability as such. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to see why performance is uneven.

But it is shocking that the knowledge and skill to do proper Conflict Analysis is deficient in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

“What works” doesn’t because countries at risk are not identified with authority early enough; and conflict analysis has been criticized for failure to generate “enlarged” responses based on compelling arguments to act. Some risk assessments are descriptive, but criticized for being too narrow, simplistic. They may avoid controversial political analysis when those assessments implicate a state actor whose conduct is critical to peace efforts but whose known position is antagonistic to it. Pressing the point is considered too risky, counterproductive to action, even if the action which follows will necessarily be sub-optimal.

Furthermore, there is a plethora of small organizations that work in the field of prevention and early warning, as there are in the other realms of conflict resolution. Competition among them for funding is high and resource levels low. Even those organizations that know what should be done and wish to do more, struggle. Inputs to analysis from the country level are limited: accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness are short-changed.

Other risk assessments are more prescriptive but criticized for failing to make the link to action. The link between signaling an “alert” and acting on it is impaired in part because the precise steps needed to be taken by whom are not specified. Furthermore, the individuals and organizations that do the analysis tend to be separate from those that act, the interveners.

Rather, third parties must identify the political obstacles to peace and overcome them. These obstacles may be the key actors and structural factors in the conflict situation, and actors and dynamics in the regional or international community at large.

Balancing the task of advocating a violence prevention or reduction action and conducting that action has not been achieved by many actors in the field of conflict resolution. Indeed, as already noted and deserving more detailed discussion is the very real shortcoming of competency in peace advocacy.

Third parties must be informed by analysis that takes the big picture into account and identifies the factors standing in the way of peace. Then they must become advocates for peace. They must design appropriate processes to create pull and push factors in the direction of peace. When peace talks or peacebuilding activities do ensue, these must be informed by and engage the communities who in the end must own the peace. Peace agreements must also be “hard wired”; they must involve institutional changes that will make possible a sustainable, just peace by addressing the root causes of violence.

These tasks of identifying cases at risk, setting priorities, of advocating action, of designing processes leading to peace action, of conducting effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities all require sound, comprehensive and ongoing conflict analysis. The evidence suggests that this is not the case in practice today. The skills of conflict analysis are lacking in the field of conflict resolution.

The major criticism of inadequate conflict analysis is directed at organizations working on the ground providing conflict resolution and peacebuilding programs. Their analysis tends to be narrow and they fail to conduct the analysis on an ongoing basis. Relatively localized analysis which fails to take into account regional and international factors impairs responses. Poor analysis directs program efforts into channels that are simply irrelevant to the deeper and more profound dynamics of violence. “What works”, doesn’t because those who are to implement conflict resolution and peacebuilding programs do not know what is really required.

Assuming that what is needed is known, based on good analysis, and assuming that what is needed is being delivered, the next thing that is required is to measure the effectiveness of what is being done. As we have seen, evaluation in the field of conflict resolution is weak. Methodologies for evaluation, evaluation skills, technical assistance in conducing evaluations and in analyzing findings are inadequate. Furthermore, when something is judged to have worked in one case, the generalizability of “what worked” remains a challenge. Virtually everyone agrees that one size will not fit all, and that the complexity and idiosyncrasy of political violence make generalizations risky at best, harmful at worst. Yet, strategic guidance, the principles of intervention, the key elements of intervention, recommended sequences, cautions, and measures of effectiveness are reasonable expectations of the field.

5. Conflict Resolution’s Failure to Communicate Effectively

If the deficiencies in conducting high quality analyses of conflict were overcome, would the record of violence reduction be significantly improved? Why does what works “know-how” not get traction in more cases that are identified at risk?

One of the responses has been to look to policy as a way to bridge the gap. So the link from Knowledge to Action can be depicted like this:

What Works Knowledge------Conflict Resolution Policy------Violence Reduction Action

Policy, it was thought, would compel action because action would become embedded in “holy script”. Of course, the policy should be good policy: informed by research and congruent with the mandate and principles of the organization in which it applies; clearly articulated; and capable of being operationalized.

And this is where considerable effort has been directed in the past decade. Virtually every organization responsible for international security (i.e., the UN, EU, OAS) has a policy on prevention and on taking action when direct violence has broken out. And some good work is being done to improve policy by improving the quality of inputs to it, by improving the consultative process of making it, and by packaging it for decision-makers who need to know it and who should act upon it.

The International Development Research Centre, in particular, is presently undertaking a series of evaluations to help assess the link between research and the public policy process. Some elements of successful linkages are:

 Interaction between researchers and policymakers during the design of the research;  Participation of policymakers in the research itself;  Dissemination of research to policymakers in appropriate formats;  Building relationships between researchers and decision makers that last beyond the research project;  Public dissemination and debate of research findings;  Use of research findings by groups in society to encourage or advocate for change; and  Strengthening organizations in terms of their capacity to carry out public inquiry.73

Indeed, a number of those interviewed emphasized the importance of providing decision makers with realistic options based upon a very thorough analysis of the issues. I was told that policymakers in the UN and in national capitals need:

 A deep understanding of what the parties in conflict are after, and how much what matters, really matters;  Realism and modesty in what is possible; and  Guidance on the appropriate time to intervene.

But, as we have seen, even good policy it is not acted upon sufficiently. The Knowledge-Action Gap is not bridged by policy alone.

Another response has been to create mechanisms that ground policy in an institution’s structure. That is, create an office for early warning and prevention, for conflict analysis, and the like. In doing this, resources are allocated to a mechanism. Flesh and bones are given to the spirit of the policy. This looks like this:

Violence Reduction Knowledge ------CR Policy/Mechanisms------Violence Reduction Action

Presumably, putting money into the mechanism, and recruiting personnel who are competent to carry out the tasks involved should auger well for policy implementation. That is, the next time a

57 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T case is identified at risk, by professionals inside the organization, and in accordance with policy calling for early identification and action, action will result.

Not so. At least, not often enough.

The gap is not bridged by the creation of policy and new bureaus dedicated to the policy. These may be necessary but they are insufficient to bridge the gap.

A decade of creating policy and institutional mechanisms has also been accompanied by a parallel movement intended to overcome another obstacle to effective violence reduction action: state sovereignty. That is, efforts are underway to make the boundary of state sovereignty more permeable. For as one authority explained, the overwhelming tendency of state leaders is to deny that a problem exists; if they admit to a problem they claim that it will be resolved internally; and if it is not resolved internally they claim they will prevail. In real terms, that means state leaders do not want outside intervention and that they will use force themselves, if need be, to put down dissent.

The movement working to erode the boundaries of state sovereignty that obstructs timely intervention is found in initiatives such as the establishment the International Criminal Court, the concept (cum policy) of Responsibility to Protect, and a greater willingness at the UN Security Council to endorse Chapter VII interventions.

These are promising, and they give internationalists and peace activists hope. But the boundary of state sovereignty is stubborn, and the gap remains unbridged in too many cases currently on the books.

Another key element must be bridged to close the gap between Violence Reduction Knowledge and Action. The political will to act must be created and sustained. Call this element what you like: political leaders both inside the violence and those external to it who are needed to stop the violence must become engaged.

Any depiction of the chain of elements connecting Knowledge and Action must include this key factor, as follows:

Violence Reduction Knowledge--Policy/Mechanisms--Political Will-Violence Reduction Action

The best knowledge of what works will not be enough to bridge the gap. Very good policy with institutional resources to underpin it will not be enough. Violence reduction action will happen only when the political will to act has been created in political actors who have the executive control.

Now this applies in New York at the UN, or in Brussels at the European Union. And it applies in the war zone in northern Uganda today and in Colombia. In New York, leaders at the UN, in the Security Council, must be moved to give peace a chance. They must agree to take action, based on policy, and under-girded with adequate resources to make implementation effective.

In Uganda, the President must take a decision to give peace a chance. So must his rebel adversary.

Conflict resolution practitioners who want to bridge the gap, whether at the highest levels, or deep in a war zone, whether striving to prevent warfare or when mediating an end to it, must have the skills and tools to create in leaders the political will to act. They must be able to gain access to leaders with whom they make a persuasive case that compels the leader to take action. When an agreement is reached, and post-violence peacebuilding is underway, leaders, including those who want to spoil an agreement, must be engaged; their motivations understood, and their sometimes crass needs addressed in politically astute ways.

It is here that a major deficiency in conflict resolution is found. A failure to grasp the politics and communicate effectively with political leaders.

The authorities were clear that several key things are required to be persuasive, in a compelling way:

 Be focused;  Be realistic;  Be credible;  Speak the language of other fields;  Understand what motivates political leaders;  Have a strategy for success;  Engage the relevant audiences; and  Invest in the situation long enough to achieve your objective.

Again, the importance of triage is made clear. Decisions must be taken about which case(s) of political violence will be focused upon. Realism requires that there is a good grasp of the security environment and what options political actors are most able to embrace. Being seen to be credible is established on the basis of past effort, knowing the conflict, and having a professional approach.

It is helpful for conflict resolution practitioners to have a presence where leaders are found. That is, in Washington, DC., in London, and on the ground in Uganda, Colombia, and so-forth.

It is important to cultivate relationships with policy makers and government officials who may have influence on a leader’s choices.

Most importantly, however, is that political leaders are compelled to take action on the basis of their own calculation of the political imperative for doing so. Creating pulls and pushes to compel leaders is essential. This may require attracting media attention to the violence, creating public pressure, mobilizing political actors with influence, and clarifying to leaders the consequences for failure to act. And as already stated, this applies at all levels where conflict resolution and peace efforts are being undertaken.

As one authority put it: “The limitations and inadequacies of political actors must be understood. And the clever or amusing ways to compensate for these inadequacies must be found. Media and reporters who report mistakes can reveal policy errors on the ground and then adjustments in policy will occur. The need for hard-headed political analysis can not be underestimated. Treat policy as a huge beast of burden, and prod and push it so that it goes the way conflict resolution practitioners wish it to go. It is a multilevel process that requires many allies and partners and there are many tasks for each”.

UNU/INCORE’s 2003 study entitled “War Lords into Peace Lords: A Study of Local Leadership in Conflicted Societies” confirms that this applies in war zones too.74 While conventional wisdom tends to propagate the idea that there are “good” and “bad” leaders, INCORE’S study shows that leaders “are usually far from monochromatic and that their attitudes and behaviors are often determined by a complex and an often moving mosaic of interactional political, organizational, cultural, and historical events as well as personal characteristics that will determine how they will behave in different situations”. Sharpening the point, the study finds that leaders (war lords) changed only when they could see tangible benefits from the new system primarily for themselves and for their group.

UNU/INCORE’s study was conducted on leadership in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Having remarked that the study had found no leaders who had converted from “warlords” to “peacelords”, the authors noted that:

“In none of the countries studied did leaders provide the momentum to begin a (peace) process; they were either coaxed into settlements, or catapulted along as part of a process over which in the end they had little agency or control, but saw fit to acquiesce in order to maintain at least some element of power”.

War lords are motivated by calculations of self-interest, just as peace lords are. Leverage exerted by external states, by leaders of external states, and by international organizations in the conflict situations was crucial to moving war lords to peace. Understanding the psychology of political actors and determining what motivates them, and seizing them of the need to take action in the prescribed direction is requisite to effectiveness.

This repertoire of political analysis (as distinct from conflict analysis), peace advocacy skills, of marketing and selling violence reduction action, of identifying target audiences and of mobilizing pressures and inducements which persuade them to act is underdeveloped in the field of conflict resolution. It is typical of advocacy organizations and lobbyists; it is not inherent in the repertoire of those who hold themselves out as neutrals, the “mid wives” of peace and justice.

Conflict resolution can be criticized for being unclear about the terms and concepts it uses, that it is jargonistic; that its techniques and tools are less refined than they ought to be; that it fails to make its knowledge assertions clearly, and with authority. But these shortcomings are relatively trivial compared to the inability to move the right political actors at the right time.

And of course, being political animals, the attention and commitment of leaders will in most cases be only as much as that which satisfies their political needs. Conflict resolution must have

60 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T staying power, adapting on the basis of analysis to the changing dynamics of the conflict and to the changing cast of political actors who are key to success. Conflict resolution practitioners and peace activists must become more effective communicators to persuade leaders to act.

6. Inadequate Coordination of Effort

Ineffective organization accounts for a large part of why “what works”, doesn’t. Organizing for effectiveness is essential, yet the conflict resolution field is anything but organized. It is not organized to identify core competencies and ensure that these are taught to practitioners. It is not organized to signal early warning and make compelling augments that action be taken. It is not organized to execute action. It is not organized to measure the effectiveness of action. It is not organized to disseminate lessons from the field to others at that level. And it is not organized to send better questions back to the academy for further research.

Indeed, the conflict resolution field is comprised of individual entrepreneurs, “mom and pop” shops, church and faith-based groups, nongovernmental organizations, both based in war zones and from abroad, academic institutions, think tanks, centers and institutes of research, state- based, regional, and UN bodies, international nongovernmental organizations, and eminent persons dedicated to peace. They have very different world views, visions, values and missions. They seem to eschew coordination. They compete for limited funding and territory. And they seldom collaborate in any way.

For example, in Uganda today, where a brutal war in the north has created a humanitarian catastrophe, there is in the order of 3,000 nongovernmental organizations registered and operating in the war zone, all but 100 of which are local NGOs.75 To repeat, that is three thousand organizations! No one is entrusted with coordinating their efforts, or organizing them in any way to jointly have an impact on the reduction of violence.

In the USA, there are 30 nongovernmental organizations in the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution. They seldom strategize together on particular cases of political violence. They are not organized to collaborate or to complement one another's expertise.76 On the world stage there are some 10 large nongovernmental organizations that weigh in to mediate in cases of armed warfare. They do not collaborate in any real sense. Throughout the world there are some 20 large private foundations that provide funding for conflict resolution and peace work. They do not meet together to review successes and failures; to identify promising approaches, and to prioritize the cases to which they should direct their resources.

One authority interviewed for this study made a remark on this subject that resonated with that of many others. The remark was that organizations active in conflict resolution and peace work “dance with conflict”. That is, they do not do that which is really needed to end the violence. This applies to nongovernmental actors from outside the war zone and also indigenous community-based nongovernmental organizations living and operating in the war zone. They are driven by another imperative: agency survival. Even the people born and raised in violence

61 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T become habituated to it. Desperate for survival, dependent on outside funding, they too “dance with conflict”.

The imperative to survive leads peace workers to avoid the tough advocacy issues and interagency collaboration which is required to change the dynamic of the war. It leads them to change program direction mid-stream when funding for what they are designed and dedicated to doing begins to dry up. They find themselves doing whatever is the current “flavor of the month”. They dance the dance that the piper plays. Even those who want to remain engaged, those who have staff who are prepared to see their work through to the end, even at risk of life, must abandon their work. In a protracted civil war this becomes a way of life: the dance with conflict goes on, the partners changing from time to time, the people on the ground are left to live in violence.

Obviously, without organization and driven apart by an agenda to survive, duplication of effort, replication of mistakes, ignorance of successes, and even counter-productive, harmful action happens in far too many cases.

It may be unrealistic and even inappropriate to have any hope of organizing the many actors who inhabit this topsy-turvy world of peace workers and conflict resolution practitioners. Violence, however, can be significantly reduced only by well-informed and powerful action by influential actors. Appropriate coordination and complementary effort based on comparative advantage is urgently needed.

7. Institutional Shortcomings

One might have expected the authorities to echo the perennial lament heard in so many fields, from heath care to the environment: “not enough resources”. Whereby they mean there is not enough money to get the job done properly. In this case, when for every 1 million dollars devoted to peace-making 12 million are devoted to war-making, who would not be sympathetic.

But this was not a preoccupation. Indeed, the impression I got is that existing resources could be utilized more effectively through proper organization, at three levels: state actors, including the UN and regional organizations; donors and private funding organizations; and nongovernmental conflict resolution and peacebuilding organizations themselves. This is a topic to which I will return.

More importantly, resource capacity is not the real issue associated with institutional shortcomings. The authorities generally agree that there is enough money available now to reduce the amount of political violence in the world. As we have seen, the political will to mobilize those resources is lacking.77

And it is from this perspective that governmental and state institutional shortcomings are viewed. Reform of the UN Security Council to broaden the responsibility for security has been suggested as a way by which existing impediments to intervention may be overcome. The Security Council is described as a crisis management organization. As such, three of the most important areas of concern in the world today requiring multilateral preventive engagement, Kashmir, North Korea,

62 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T and the Middle East, don’t even get to the Council. Furthermore, the Council does not deal with thematic issues, such as human security, and other broader initiatives that are preventive. The predominance of the USA in shaping the agenda at the Security Council requires balancing; and its range of activities needs expanding. Some of this can be achieved in New York through effective lobbying inside the UN and in national capitals; some of it through regional organs where there is less big power dominance; and some of it by neighbors to a violent situation who have been encouraged and are supported in concrete ways to take action to make their neighborhood a safe one.

Giving flesh and bones to policy initiatives at the UN and in regional bodies will help bridge the Knowledge-Action Gap. That is, if resources have been pre-committed and there are competent personnel inside the UN, the EU and other regional organizations whose responsibility it is to act, then advocacy to take action is made that much easier. Sound analysis with realistic options for action would be produced more quickly, and with professional, trusted, authority. Champions to lead the charge would be in place within the key organizations, including those closest to the ground, in Nairobi, in San José and elsewhere. Reluctant external leaders whose involvement is critical to a violence reduction initiative would be more readily engaged, and they would have more institutional clout and ammunition to press for action.78

Creating a peacekeeping rapid reaction capacity would greatly enhance prevention and violence reduction efforts. This capacity may be developed at several levels; clearly, supporting a region to react promptly and professionally to problems within it will go a long way to overcoming a serious current institutional shortcoming. Knowing that a problem exists is the first step. Paying attention to it is the second. Deciding to act is the third. Having the capacity to act is forth. Acting effectively is fifth.

Finding the positive will to take these steps to overcome institutional shortcomings is a concern to the authorities I interviewed. These shortcomings are part of the reason why what works, doesn’t. Another persistent concern is placed at the doorstep of the United States of America.

8. United States’ Unilateralism

The concern is that US willingness to use force unilaterally undermines the gains made in international conflict resolution. Conflict resolution has sought reductions in violence through UN-sanctioned multilateral initiatives that enjoy broad international support. The USA’s current foreign policy re-legitimatizes the illegal use of violence and places too much emphasis on force compared to diplomacy.

The authorities recognize that US behavior is partly motivated by fear and the trauma which lingers after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The US has a strong tradition of fierce independence, a history of military use, and has little confidence that other approaches to conflict will provide the security it requires.

Nevertheless, US unilateralism and resort to force in the face of perceived threat is a concern as well because it is seen as escalatory. The authorities have no sympathy for terrorism, but as the

US becomes more insular and resorts to force projection it loses allies and creates sympathy in some quarters for reciprocal attacks from terrorists.

Furthermore, the US-led “war on terror” is described as having hardened attitudes, exacerbating hostilities between the “West and the rest”; and curtailed the freedom of civil society globally and at home. Decreasing multilateralism has removed many conflicts from the international agenda, and allowed unilateralist governments to undermine international efforts to intervene in political conflicts which should be addressed. Increasingly, all dissidents are conveniently, for some state leaders, being converted into terrorists. Just one example is Chechnya, where the Russian Federation has de-internationalized the conflict and gone so far as to cut off access to the republic for some agencies (i.e., the OSCE).

The overall result is a narrowing of space for the resolution of political violence through integrated, measured responses under the auspices of the UN and other multilateral bodies. As the space narrows, and the use of violence as the tool of choice increases, violence in general is likely to rise. That which is feared most will be created by the current US-led reaction to fear.

The data provided by Gurr, Marshall, and Wallensteen, as we have seen, show a downward trend in political violence up to 9/11. Is that trend over? Indeed, are those data now irrelevant? Will the terrorist attacks of al Qaeda and the US-led “war on terror” turn everything up-side-down, as it seems to be doing?

I was reminded by one person I interviewed that just five years ago the USA was not unilateralist. Indeed, another recalled the negative attitude of the Regan administration to the UN; and how in the end the US had to re-engage with the world. The response to 9/11 was described by many authorities as an over-reaction. The reaction has been more than the act itself warranted. Fear is the emotion that is being exploited by a small cabal in Washington who are nevertheless each day having to face the limitations of US unilateralism.

The West learned how to live with the East during the Cold War. Nuclear annihilation was a genuine source of fear. Mechanisms were developed to mange it. Means of dealing effectively with fundamental, extremist Muslims are thought also to be possible. But this will require that the US consider how its actions generate resentment and that it take a multilateral approach to perceived threats; an approach which respects international law.

It is precisely because the political violence data fluctuate that there is hope for less violence in the world. If the incidence and severity of political violence is not a constant, then there are things that can be done to reduce it. Other countries, Canada, Scandinavia and others are able to act constructively to reduce violence – and they need to be called upon and supported to do so. Citizens within the US need accurate information to critically assess their government’s security agenda and practice. The field of conflict resolution must now to be vigilant, be creative, and remain relevant in the face of US unilateralism.

The Women’s Perspective – The Concern that Isn’t

8 major concerns. That’s it?

No, there is a ninth concern that I register here. It is a concern by virtue of its absence in the discourse on political violence. It is the women’s perspective.

I will be the first to acknowledge that the authorities I interviewed were mostly men. My sample is skewed. Why should it be remarkable, then, that we found so little attention to a women’s perspective on political violence?

The problem, however, is deeper than this. It is more than methodological “sampling” error. Indeed, when the research for this study began, I assigned this task to one of my research assistants. Could she find evidence of something called a “women’s perspective”; what did it have to offer here?

Of course, it is common knowledge that 90% of the victims of political violence are women and children. The statistics on the amount of rape of women as a deliberate feature of waging war are staggering.

“Women’s bodies have become a battleground over which opposing forces struggle. . . . Women are raped as a way to humiliate male relatives, who are often forced to watch the assault. In societies where ethnicity is inherited through the male line, enemy women are raped and forced to bear children. Women who are already pregnant are forced to miscarry through violent attacks. Women are kidnapped and used as sexual slaves to service troops, as well as to cook for them, and carry their loads from camp to camp. They are purposefully infected with HIV/AIDS, a slow, painful murder”. 79

It is also common knowledge that in many war-torn societies it is women who often lead efforts to re-build, to bridge ethnic divides and start a process of healing and reconciliation. Women are known agents of peace.

We found, however, that there is indeed a women’s perspective on political violence. One authority responded:

“The women I know . . . have a definite perspective on political violence. It is organized by men and it is violent, and more women and children are victims than other men. I am also totally convinced that women at the peace table (UN Resolution 1325) with full representation and power are a powerful force in finding the way to peace. Women look to how to nurture the children and families and cultures. This breaks down into practicalities that give impetus to forgiveness over face and working together over dividing up”.

We were able to note how hard women are working worldwide to avert violence and bring peace about when war has broken out. We were able to note the unanimous passing by the UN Security Council in October, 2000 of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The resolution,

65 PART II: THE FINDINGS 6. WHY “WHAT WORKS”, DOESN’T echoed by the European Union, the OSCE and others, establishes that women should be included in all phases of conflict resolution – preventing, stopping, and recovering from war; and at all levels - from the grass roots to the highest offices of government. As well it emphasizes the need to view women as much more than victims, and acknowledges that unless women are at the table a full solution cannot be reached.

Yet, three years after Resolution 1325 was passed, women still have little access to power and peace negotiations. What further steps can be taken, and by whom, to implement UN Resolution 1325? Where, when and how can women make the fullest impact on violence reduction? Are women best placed in positions of political leadership?

Just as their voice is not heard in the chambers of power, their perspective would have gone un- remarked here except for a deliberate effort to determine whether and how women can contribute to a significant reduction in political violence.

Imagine the General Assembly of the United Nations. Picture the representatives of all nations of the world, sitting together in one big chamber. Picture their faces – black, white, and brown. Imagine if nearly every face was a woman’s.

Would a world lead by women be more peaceful?

One authority asserted that if 51% of the leadership on the world was women, there would be significantly less violence.

We should be concerned that UN Resolution 1325 has not been fully implemented. The failure to engage women in peacemaking must be overcome. Concrete action is needed to ensure greater attention to gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and post-violence reconstruction.

66 PART III: THE ASSERTIONS

67 68 PART III. THE ASSERTIONS 7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP!

When the Carnegie Commission Report on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict was released in 1997, someone asked one of the authors: “What is the bumper sticker?” - meaning what is the bottom line, the key message. The reply was “educate young women, employ young men”.

This study on how to reduce political violence has its bumper sticker too. It is . . .

“Bridge the Knowledge-Action Gap!”

7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLDEGE-ACTION GAP!

We live in a world organized on the basis of sociopolitical units called states. Political violence takes place between and within these states, all of which assert their sovereign right to non- interference; and all of which preserve the right to use force in the pursuit of their self-interest. The commitment of states to the articles of the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights tempers their use of force. Indeed, they have endorsed and developed policies to prevent violence, and to take action to bring an end to violence when it has broken out. Happily, most states do afford the people within them the contentment of living in conditions of relative peace, and the level of political violence is showing a downward trend.

Yet the promise of prevention is unfulfilled and violence remains a brutal fact of life for millions of people. The escalating US-led “war on terror” is narrowing the space for the resolution of political violence through integrated, measured responses under the auspices of the UN and other multilateral bodies. As the space narrows, and the use of violence as the tool of choice increases, violence in general is likely to rise. That which is feared most will be created by the current reaction to fear.

A great number of individuals, institutions, and organizations remain dedicated to the reduction of violence in the world, to the building of peace. The field of conflict resolution, however, is far from homogenous in its declared values and its composition. Despite this, a body of practical

69 PART III. THE ASSERTIONS 7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP! knowledge has been accumulated on how to prevent political violence, on how to mediate an end to armed warfare, and on how to re-build war-torn societies. This study is one effort to assemble key findings in these undertakings; and on the basis of those findings I have asserted that enough is known now to improve the record of violence reduction. Yet there is a gap between knowing what to do and doing it. That gap needs bridging. That is:

With respect to VIOLENCE PREVENTION Knowledge stipulates that action be taken relatively early on the basis of an assessment of risk to alter proximate and structural factors likely to cause political violence;

Whereas at present, action is not taken often enough, early enough or for long enough.

With respect to MEDIATION TO END ARMED WARFARE Knowledge stipulates that the warring parties should be convened, by using force if necessary to stop the killing, to assist them to negotiate a sustainable peace agreement by addressing the root causes of the violence;

Whereas at present, mediation is notably underutilized and when peace agreements have been reached, many break down.

With respect to POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILDING Knowledge stipulates that long-term multi-level support be provided to build the capacity to express and resolve conflicts nonviolently and to achieve conditions supportive of peace;

Whereas at present, efforts have not been sustained, many agreements have been “orphaned” by the international community and peace has eroded.

70 PART III. THE ASSERTIONS 7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP!

On the basis of interviews with twenty authorities I have identified nine major obstacles to overcome in bridging these gaps:

Nine Major Obstacles

1. The nature of the beast 2. The wrong objective 3. The Political Naivety of Conflict Resolution Practitioners 4. Inadequate Conflict Analysis 5. Conflict Resolution’s Failure to Communicate Effectively 6. Inadequate Coordination of Effort 7. Institutional Shortcomings 8. The United States’ Unilateralism 9. The Failure to Engage Women in Peacemaking

Directing effort at overcoming these obstacles seems to me to be the most practical way to have a near-term reduction in the incidence and severity of political violence. There are, of course, broader programs, either proposed or operating, which are directed at reducing, indeed, eliminating violence in the world. Some call for whole scale transformation from a predominant culture of violence to a culture of peace. Some focus on international legal regimes that will bolster intervention to stop violence and hold war lords accountable to the rule of law. Some recommend reform of the UN itself so that a truly representative body is charged with matters of security. Others seek to give the UN “hard-wired” capacity to move swiftly and effectively to prevent armed violence.

In all cases, these broad programs, and more particular initiatives, struggle to overcome what I have identified as the “nature of the beast”. They wrestle with the legitimacy of violence in the current international state system. They try to overcome the constraints to ameliorative action imposed by the principle of sovereignty and by narrow self-interest. They work toward order and civility instead of anarchy and impunity.

Overcoming the beast, the fixed parameter of international relations, is the perennial reality of those in the field of international conflict resolution. All of the authorities I interviewed seemed to accept it as something that may change in the future, but for now, it is a given. They were more concerned with what could be done now to improve the effectiveness of efforts to reduce violence and to build sustainable peace.

I contend that effectiveness of effort can be improved by acting on the following formula:

Formula for Effectiveness

 Establish Violence Reduction as the Objective  Know What Works  Educate for Violence Reduction  Organize to do What Works  Evaluate Performance

Establish Violence Reduction as the Objective

Whether you strive for peace writ large or you intervene with a sharp instrument to stop the killing, your goal of peace is challenged in the crucible of violence. Violence is the juncture at which all who strive for peace meet. Violence is incompatible with peace. Conflict is not. It is possible to live in a peaceful relationship and still be in conflict. Violence, however, is the abusive use of power to impose an outcome on someone else.

The goal is peace; the prime objective to achieve peace should be the reduction of violence. While there are many paths to take, various disciplines and methods to be applied, a passionate commitment to reduce violence will sharpen the focus of the enormous effort currently being expended on conflict resolution and peace work. It will help set priorities among competing needs, help align effort, help measure results.

The empirical evidence based on data which apply prior to 9/11 is that there is a downward trend in the level and severity of political violence in the world. With the current threat of terrorism and the US-led response to that threat, violence levels could go up. Precisely because these levels vary means that things may be done to change them. What will the level be in 2010? In 2020? In 2050?

It should be lowered, and lowered enough to give hope to humanity that the right things are being done to make the world a less violent, more peaceful place in which to live. If the right

72 PART III. THE ASSERTIONS 7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP! things are not being done, if root causes are not addressed; if predatory leaders are not neutralized; if deeply held grievances are not addressed, violence will result. The evidence will show how effective peace work and conflict resolution efforts will have been.

Know What Works

There are very few broad-based studies that assemble knowledge of what works in practitioner- friendly ways. This study, drawing on the more comprehensive work of Anderson, Lund, Miall, Gurr, and dozens of more focused studies concludes that there is enough knowledge of what works to improve the record of violence reduction. But the field is not organized to assemble and disseminate that knowledge. Indeed, several of those interviewed asserted that the conflict resolution field does not presently know what it knows.

Knowledge of what works should be known by any responsible person or organization that sets out to do conflict resolution and peace work. Failure to know what works obviously lessens effectiveness; it may make things worse, adding unnecessary costs in lives and resources; it undermines the credibility of the field.

My efforts to determine what does not work were more difficult. But I have been able to assertively question the effectiveness of some conflict resolution activities, to identify the need for more research, and to list a number of major concerns expressed by the authorities which relate to the effectiveness of efforts to reduce violence.

This knowledge should be updated regularly and packaged for different users (scholars, practitioners, political leaders, policy makers, donors and funding agencies, media representatives). There is an ethical and practical imperative to know what works, and to know what does not work.

Educate for Violence Reduction

Many universities and private institutions the world-over are delivering courses in conflict resolution and peace studies at the graduate level. All of these courses are rather similar in that they rely heavily on a standard pedagogy of research, lecture, and some practical skill training in group facilitation, negotiation, and mediation techniques. None is particularly well-grounded in prescriptive approaches based on currently determined “best practices”. The political analysis, peace advocacy, and peace process design skills required to bridge the knowledge-action gap are not deliberately addressed in the curriculum and instruction. Graduates are left to learn these on the job, leave the task to others, or it is left undone. This restricts performance: violence prevention and reduction is less than optimal. Valuable resources such as time and money are wasted or misdirected and lives continue to be lost.

Many of the sources cited in the literature review conducted for this study call for better training, the need to link academics and practitioners more closely, and improved linkage between knowledge and action. My interviews reinforced the importance of these needs. While policy is

73 PART III. THE ASSERTIONS 7. BRIDGE THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION GAP! noted as a potential bridge between knowledge and action, highlighting the important role of policymakers, practitioners must also be politically realistic and skilled at influencing decision- makers. No one has developed a full curriculum with the specific aim of providing practitioners with the knowledge and skills required to effectively reduce political violence by bridging the knowledge-action gap. There is need for a more politically realistic curriculum in “Applied Peacemaking” that focuses on the objective of reducing violence to achieve the goal of peace.

Organize to do What Works

The need to coordinate multi-actor multi-level activities undertaken to prevent violence, to mediate an end to warfare, and to re-build a war-torn society has been emphatically recorded in this study.

Yet actors in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding tend to eschew coordination. They are more receptive to the idea of collaborating to improve the complementarity of their efforts. But there are few examples of this in practice, and the principles and operational requirements of actually proceeding in concert are underdeveloped. In the peacekeeping environment, some training and applied effort has been explicitly directed at improving civil-military relations and if possible, cooperation in certain areas where the main objectives of security and humanitarian assistance/peacebuilding each are not compromised. And there are examples of prevention and mediation efforts that have been conducted by three or four principal agencies functioning as a “troika” and so-forth. The authorities, however, were unable to explicate the mechanics of these efforts, except to stress political ascendancy based on a mix of historical involvement, knowledge, and self-interest; comparative advantage; and good will at the technical level so that political actors are more effectively managed and less able to operate as opportunists or “lone rangers”.

There is a small literature being developed on this important subject and more effort there is clearly needed.80 More immediate, practical steps can be taken now to organize for effectiveness.

There are organizations that are known for their expertise and track record in prevention, in mediation, and in post-violence peacebuilding. There are some umbrella organizations such as the Washington-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution and the European Platform for the Prevention of Conflict and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. With facilitation provided by these types of coordinating bodies, funding proposals could be mounted jointly and comparative advantage emphasized in the division of labor. Improvements could be made immediately in the areas of risk assessment and formation of small collaborative teams that work together to advocate for action in identified cases, pressing the UN Security Council, appropriate regional entities, and working in concert with credible actors including nongovernmental organizations based in the country in question.

Donors and funding bodies could begin now to encourage collaborative undertakings, and evaluate the effectiveness of them.

Evaluate Performance

Notwithstanding the assertion that we know what works and what is not effective sufficiently to improve the record, now, of violence reduction, much remains to strengthen practice on the ground. While the idea of general models, and especially “cookie cutter” approaches to intervention were not favored by those interviewed, institutionalizing evaluation (or reflective practice) so as to improve the record of performance was endorsed.

Reality is that nongovernmental organizations active in peace work and conflict resolution, for agency survival reasons, must often refocus their programming to the “flavor of the month” as they compete for limited resources. Thus, they are catapulted from pillar to post with little or no time and money to spend on reflection of any sort, let alone systematic evaluation.

Even when donors and foundations require evaluations, and provide funds to conduct them, the results are not disseminated well. Evaluation results tend not to find their way in useful form to policymakers, and the greater community of conflict resolution practitioners seldom benefit from the experiences of others.

Indeed, the candid view is that virtually all those who do evaluate effectiveness (both donors and program providers), perhaps understandably, prefer not to share their failures.

A culture of systematizing the generation of knowledge, of educating practitioners on the basis of empirically tested “best practices”, of performance review, and of continuous learning does not exist in the field of conflict resolution. Many of the elements needed to build that culture and give form and substance to it do exist. The time has come to make it happen.

75 PART III: THE ASSERTIONS 8. ACTIONS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

8. ACTIONS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

I present here three initiatives that can be undertaken now by the organizations currently active in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding to reduce political violence. Furthermore, these initiatives can be taken within existing resource levels. In fact, the thrust of these ideas is that the missing ingredient is organization. But that does not mean that I call for more bureaucracy and less research. What is needed is more alignment of resources and effort, some structure to facilitate the effective delivery of service, and a new bravado within the field: a bravado to assert competency, to mobilize capacity, to admit and learn from mistakes, to build on successes, and to demand the political traction that is needed to have a significant impact on political violence.

Three broad initiatives to begin now, each containing practical components, are:

1. Organize Immediately for Continuous Learning 2. Collaborate Now to Reduce Political Violence 3. Fund for Success in Reducing Political Violence

In order of sequence, funding for success will be the first step needed. What must be funded, however, needs to be understood first. I therefore leave the discussion of funding for success to the end.

1. Organize Immediately for Continuous Learning a) The International Academy for the Reduction of Political Violence

There is a plethora of research centers, training institutes and so-forth active now in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. But the field is not organized to teach the best methods to reduce political violence and to learn continuously from practice. A new, virtual organization is needed now.

i) The United States Institute of Peace, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, the European Platform for the Prevention of Conflict, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution should jointly commission the Reducing Political Violence Action Group to facilitate the formation of a consortium of leading peace and conflict research centers to be known as The International Academy for the Reduction of Political Violence.

ii) The Academy should be funded for a five year term renewable on the basis of an evaluation conducted by the initial sponsors.

iii) The Academy should oversee the annual assembly and dissemination of “what works”, packaged for key audiences (practitioners, scholars, political leaders, funding bodies, policy makers, the media) in user-friendly forms.

iv) The Academy, building on the evaluation work undertaken by INCORE and others and with input from funding bodies, should agree on a Political Violence Reduction Evaluation Framework and disseminate it broadly.

v) The Academy should undertake a consultative process to establish an internally agreed Code of Ethics for Conflict Resolution and Peace Workers active in the field of political violence; publish and disseminate it.

vi) The Academy should identify core competencies required for effective violence reduction and distribute this widely to academic and training centers.

vii) The Academy should receive, analyze, synthesize and disseminate the results of evaluations conducted on projects in the field.

viii) The Academy should determine the key and pressing research questions and provide them to academic research community for study. b) Evaluate Performance

i) All projects in conflict resolution and peace work should have an evaluation component utilizing the Code of Conduct and Evaluation Framework developed by the Academy.

ii) Project managers should act now to institutionalize a culture of project evaluation, a habit of reflective practice.

iii) Those who fund projects should match the level of evaluation effort to the scale of the project, the competencies of executing agencies, and provide adequate resources for evaluation.

iv) The results of evaluation should be summarized appropriately at the funding source and conveyed to the Academy for synthesis and dissemination, including an articulation of key questions to which research activities should be directed in the academic and research community.

v) Conflict resolution and peacebuilding is hard work; it is not glamorous and often not visible to peers in the field let alone the public. Risks are necessary but often not encouraged or rewarded. Some means must be established by the Academy to identify and reward innovation.

77 PART III: THE ASSERTIONS 8. ACTIONS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE c). Educate Professional Practitioners

i) Every graduate level program in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding should include courses and skill development in the core competencies identified by the Academy. They should immediately incorporate courses that will produce less politically naive, more practically skilled practitioners whose training is based on current knowledge of “best practices”. Courses to be included are: conflict analysis; studies in violence; political analysis; women’s perspective on peace and violence; and effective advocacy.

ii) Using the media and other tools, the general public should be educated as well on what works, the key issues in specific cases, and means by which violence may be reduced.

2. Collaborate Now to Reduce Political Violence

Service providers active in each of the three main elements of violence reduction work (prevention, mediation, post-violence peacebuilding) can collaborate now to improve the effectiveness of their efforts. I recommend that an exercise of triage be undertaken by key collaborators in each of the three areas, so that cases are selected deliberately on the basis of comprehensive analysis and an assessment of appropriateness as determined by current knowledge of what works. a) Violence Prevention

A consortium of key organizations active in Early Warning and Prevention should be convened under the auspices of The Carter Center to identify three cases at risk and to plan and execute a comprehensive effort at intervention, engaging the UN, World Bank and appropriate regional and national state and nongovernmental actors. This effort should be evaluated and the lessons learned provided to the Academy for the Reduction of Political Violence for analysis and broader dissemination. b) Mediation to End Warfare

The current mediation to end the civil war in Sudan is being conducted collaboratively by the Kenya-based IGAD mediation team with participation by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Norway and Italy. A process and outcome evaluation of that joint effort should begin now and the lessons learned provided to the Academy for the Reduction of Violence for analysis and broader dissemination. c) Post-violence Peacebuilding

Re-building war-torn Sudan, assuming a peace agreement is reached, will be a multi-actor, multi- level long-term undertaking of enormous complexity. The UN Task Force (with participation of

78 PART III: THE ASSERTIONS 8. ACTIONS TO REDUCE POLITICAL VIOLENCE the UNDPA, UNDP, UNDPKO, key state and nongovernmental organizations, the World Bank and IMF) should oversee a collaborative effort that is under the direction of a Special Representative of the Secretary General. This effort should be evaluated and the lessons learned provided on an annual basis to the Academy for analysis and dissemination. (Other suitable cases included Liberia, and Guatemala.) d) Lobby for the Reduction of Political Violence

Success at the level of individual cases and success in raising the level of commitment and action to reduce political violence across the spectrum of cases is dependent to a large extent on getting political traction. The knowledge-action gap must be bridged. This requires practitioners to gain access to political actors, staying power, and a set of peace advocacy skills.

i) Organizations active in conflict resolution and peace work must make their presence felt now in political centers, national capitals, either through a direct presence, or representation through individual representatives or more federated entities such as the Washington, DC-based Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, the European Platform for the Prevention of Conflict and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee.

ii) A primer on effective means of lobbying for change should be developed by the Alliance for Internal Conflict Prevention and Resolution and partners for use by members of the conflict resolution and peace communities.

This user-friendly booklet should outline the principle strategies and techniques of lobbying and peace advocacy, including:

 Designing a campaign  Collaborating and networking for effectiveness  Funding advocacy efforts  Making a compelling argument  How to influence decision-makers  Managing special interest groups  Mobilizing the corporate sector  Maintaining relations with policy makers  Use of media  Lessons from other successes, including human rights, health and environmental lobbies

iii) The work of PEACE X PEACE to mobilize the participation of women, worldwide, in peace and conflict resolution efforts should be given dedicated funding by the USIP and key private foundations; and lessons learned should be provide to the Academy for analysis and dissemination.

3. Fund for Effectiveness

Donors and private foundations that fund conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities should be invited now by the Reducing Political Violence Action Group to:

i) Be informed of latest knowledge of what works, based on this and other key studies;

ii) To discuss the practical actions recommended here and in other key works; and

iii) To develop a forum for collaboration on the specific objectives of:

 Funding for the Academy for the Reduction of Political Violence for a five year term.  Contributing to the elements of an evaluation framework.  Establishing an internal mechanism for communicating areas of focus and priorities to one another and agreeing to a preferred method of collaborating on specific initiatives.

80 ENDNOTES:

81 1 There is a lesson to be learned from experience with domestic violence. Herman notes that in the realm of domestic abuse the severity is declining after thirty years, but this decline has come about as the result of concerted effort which has mobilized a number of factors. I will argue that the field of Conflict Resolution must also organize for effectiveness. Herman (2002 pg. 7) writes, “In this country it has taken three decades for the feminist movement to effect a significant change in public attitudes toward sexual and domestic violence. In each instance, it has been necessary to reframe public understanding of these crimes, so that they are understood not as episodic, impulsive acts of “passion” but as systemic efforts to keep women in a subordinate state. As awareness of domestic violence has increased, as more services and legal protections have become available, and as social tolerances for domestic violence has declined, it appears that more women are escaping sooner from violent relationships.

2 For Gurr and Hampson’s more general prescriptions on prevention, see Hampson and Malone, (2002) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System., for formal mediation process knowledge see Greenberg, Baton, and McGuinness, (2000) Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict; for the characteristics of successful settlements, see Miall, and Woodhouse, (2002, p. 76) Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia; and for a relatively detailed, sequenced prescription for post-conflict peacebuilding see Lund (2003) What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Charting Future Directions; and for a prescription for better peacebuilding, see Paris, “Wilson’s Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”(2001, Chapter 45) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict.

3Herman (2002 pg. 8). States the same with respect to ending domestic violence. “There is no one formula for ending the violence. There is considerable evidence, however, that appeasement does not work. Most perpetrators respond only to clear and decisive intervention by persons in a position of authority. This intervention may take the form of a civil protection order, police arrest, or, in the most serious cases, criminal prosecution.”

4 The degree of specificity about what needs to be done, when, and how does not make the work of reducing political violence formulaic. Neither in the literature reviewed for this study nor in the interviews conducted with the authorities is there any assertion that a “cookie cutter”, “one size fits all” approach is possible. Political violence is too varied and fluid to assume that intervening will ever be likened, for example, to a well-established medical procedure whose techniques are discrete, precisely sequenced, carried out under stable conditions and apply in all cases that diagnosis directs. Ongoing analysis of the violence, clinical judgments and dexterity in designing and executing comprehensive responses, and in applying particular techniques at the micro level will always be required. A certain amount of risk is inherent; failure is always a possibility. But some things are known to be effective under certain circumstances, and some things less effective, even counter-productive. 5 I have adopted the standard established by SIPRI; that is: 100 deaths per year constitutes “war”. See Eriksson; Sollenberg; and Wallensteen, (2002, Appendix 1A) Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, SIPRI Yearbook, 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Marshall, in his chapter “Measuring the Societal Impact of War” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System, however, asserts that “death counts are the least accurate and least reliable measure of the impact of warfare”. A simple accounting of the dead trivializes and distorts war’s impact on societal systems, violates statistical assumptions, and does a grave injustice to the full, humanistic analysis of war.” He therefore identifies the following impacts of direct violence which should form an assessment of war. Impacts on: human resources; population dislocation; societal networks; environmental quality; infrastructure damage and resource diversion; and dimensioned quality of life and nonreciprocal resource transfers. This list demonstrates the simplicity of the SIPRI definition of war which utilizes one hundred deaths per year. Wallensteen et. al. nevertheless draws a similar conclusion to Gurr and Marshall: political violence is on a downward trend.

6 The figures 925 billion USD on war spending and 80 billion USD on peace spending is an estimate developed for this study. Establishing categories of spending and allocating them to the appropriate column is not without controversy. The USA’s recent budget dedicated to “homeland security” is defensive in nature, yet includes aggressive efforts in a “war on terror”. Does this item belong to the peace or the war column? Reluctantly, I chose to assign it to the peace column and compensated slightly by rounding down the peace budget three billion from our estimate. For UN peacekeeping budget and total military expenditures see Galtung, Jacobsen, and Brand-Jacobsen, (2002) Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcen d.

7 Perhaps the peacekeeping community was the first to undertake what are called “lessons learned” studies and in 1991 some assessment of the relationship of peacekeeping to conflict resolution had begun. See Fetherston (1991) “The Problem Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution” in Peacemaking in a Troubled World, Berg, and Charters, (1994) Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution and Kenneth Bush began work on “conflict impact assessment” (1998) “ A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones”. In the aftermath of failures in Rwanda and Somalia greater attention was paid to the question of effectiveness. Both the donor community and practitioners became more reflective, culminating in more recent evaluatory initiatives. See Anderson, and Olsen (2003) Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners; Ball, and Spies (1998) Managing Conflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees; and Church and Shouldice (2002) The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play. 8 See Galtung (1990) “Violence and Peace”, in A Reader in Peace Studies, and (1991) Peace Research , Peace Studies and Peace as Profession: Three Phases in the Emergence of a New Discipline” in Peacemaking in Troubled Times; and Searching for Peace The Road to Transcend. Galtung is credited with being the grandfather of peace studies and emphasizes the structural forms of violence: while carrying out development work in underdeveloped nations he observed that even when intertribal open hostilities had come to an end there continued to be a persistent presence of violence being done to the population, emanating from social-political and economic structures and measurable in terms of infant mortality rates, life expectancy, disease, and the marginalization of groups. Thus the distinction between direct and structural forms of violence.

9 For a discussion of the relationship of theory and practice and the measurement of applied efforts see Levy’s (1996) chapter “Contending Theories of International Conflict: A levels-of-analysis Approach”, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict; and Clements (2002) in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia. For the most recent comprehensive assessment of the art and science of evaluation see Church and Shouldice (2002) The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play and INCORE’s website.

10 See Anderson and Olsen’s (2003) critique of conflict analysis at the community-based level in Confronting War. For a thorough discussion of prevention and policy see Hempson and Malone (2002) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System; and for a succinct discussion of the relationship between analysis, policy and intervention see Crocker’s (2001) chapter “Intervention: Toward Best Practices and a Holistic View”, in Turbulent Peace.

11 Whereas the practice of triage is called for by Cockell (2002) “Planning Preventive Action: Context, strategy, and Implementation” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System, virtually all of the authors stipulate that prevention efforts begin early, indeed quite early in cases identified at risk. A similar sentiment emphasizing comprehensive early interventions is found in Galtung et al (2002) and Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia.; and 2000, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold World. Only in the chapter contributed by Luck (2002) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System is there an opposing view. Luck is not sympathetic to early structural interventions. In his concern for practicality and immediacy of response, taking into account the limitations of the UN system, notably its lack of enforcement capability, he urges that a practice of triage be followed by the deployment of crisis intervention and conflict resolution techniques contained in the original notion of prevention and practiced by the UN and others for the past half century. The debate broadens when considering the notion of development. Is one not to distinguish between those activities in health, education, and economics that are longer term structural activities and those associated with violence prevention such as preventative diplomacy and sharper tools of intervention such as sanctions, arms embargos and peacekeeping force deployment? My own view is sympathetic to that of Luck’s and thus I suggest relatively near term interventions, noting Gurr’s concern (2002, pg. 57) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System that “there is a lack of reliable and convincing risk assessments about crises that lie more than a year or two away . . . (and). . . UN and major power policymakers focus most of their limited political and material resources on responding to immediate crises”.

12 See Zellner, (2002, pg. 10) “The OSCE: Uniquely Qualified for a conflict Prevention Role”, in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia.

13 We will return again and again to the critique that conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice lacks coordination or at the very least some organization so that the comparative advantage of various providers of these services are maximized. The criticism that the field lacks a synthetic theory is apparent in the literature, notably in Clement’s (2002) article, “The State of the Art of Conflict Transformation”, in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia and in Galtung’s (2002) contributions found in Searching for Peace. Yet, the authorities I interviewed with few exceptions were less concerned that the field needs more theory; rather it needs tools of immediate use to practitioners engaged in the assessment of risk, the analysis of conflict, the design of interventions and the measurement of results.

14 I have replaced the popular term “post-conflict peacebuilding” with “post-violence peacebuilding”. I view the term post-conflict as a serious misnomer; indeed I have been informed that it is really a euphemism, preferred in UN-speak as it is less direct and graphic than post-violence. But peacebuilding activities are generally said to take place after open violence has been arrested, a peace accord has been reached, and the re-building of a war-torn society commences. Elsewhere, I express my concern with an inappropriate emphasis, generally, on conflict and urge instead that preventing and reducing violence itself become the focus of efforts intended to achieve the overall goal of peace. 15 Note that my use of the term mediation refers to relatively formal efforts by third parties which engage official representatives of warring sides in negotiation talks. While the failure of the international community to remain engaged after a peace agreement has been achieved through official mediation is a well-documented reason for agreements to break down, we must also consider the possibility as asserted by Greenberg and Barton in (2000) Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. Failure to address the underlying issues in dispute is a significant reason for agreements to break down. If this is a salient factor then it also has implications for the grade which is given to post -violence peacebuilding. Lund (2003) in particular gives peacebuilding something approaching a qualified pass in his comprehensive assessment found in What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Charting Future Directions.

16 See Hampson’s (1996) chapter “Why Orphaned Peace Settlements are More Prone to Failure” in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict.

17 See the General Introduction to Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict where the editors note: “At the systemic level, it is worth remembering that much international conflict has structural roots. The existence of anarchy – that is, the lack of an overarching political authority – is the main reason for violent conflict.” Elsewhere, according to the Economist (July 1999) “the … the central reason why a state remains, for all the hopes of globalizers, the only unit capable of playing a clear-cut role on the world stage … (is) the state is still the chief wielder of organized armed force, of the means of killing the soldiers of other states with which it finds itself in unresolvable disagreement…A monopoly of organized killing power is the prime characteristic of the state as history knows it, and that monopoly remains largely intact.” See also Luck’s (2002) discussion of the UN’s Achilles heal, the lack of enforcement powers, in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System.

18 As will be discussed later in the text, the data showing a short term downward trend in political violence are pre 9/11. In From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System both Gurr and Marshall (2002) devote chapters to substantiating the claim that there is a downward trend. Gurr insists that it is not an accident and his argument supports my assertion that there is enough knowledge now to better reduce the incidence and severity of political violence.

19 This list has been complied from the following sources: Bell,(2000) Peace Agreements and Human Rights; Bercovitch, (2002) Studies in International Mediation; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2001) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World; Greenberg, Barton, and McGuiness (2000) Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousins, (2002) Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements; Ury, (2000) The Third Side: Why we Fight and How We Can Stop.

20 See Eriksson et al (2002) “Appendix 2A, Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2002, SIPRI Yearbook, 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

21 Those associated with the Peace and Conflict Studies community, arguably, might be described as focused on the global task of building peace writ large. They pay particular attention to structural violence and the transformation of a culture of violence to a culture of peace. See Galtung et al (2002) Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend. For an approach that recognizes the importance of structures to long-term sustainable peace and yet takes a shorter-term military interventionist focus, see Last (1997) Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations. For a perspective that has little sympathy for very early structural interventions and emphasizes quite short-term interventions see Luck (2002) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System. For an argument stressing the salience to sustainable peace of healing historical wounds see Montville, (1993, pp. 112-127) “The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution”, in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice.

22 While I maintain that the causes of political violence are an amalgam of “factors and actors”, to use Professor Kriesberg’s term, there is a debate on the relevant salience of the structural causes of violence. The Carnegie Commission’s 1997 report on Preventing Deadly Conflict emphasized the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict found in structural problems and this perspective became known as the “grievance” theory on the causes of political violence. Recently, led by the work of Paul Collier, a “predatory” theory has gained momentum. We will return to this briefly but I note here that Collier (2001) acknowledges that once a predator has activated “grievance”, perhaps only instrumentally to enhance the predatory agenda, these grievances must be addressed in any effort to build a sustainable peace. See Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict.

23 For a classification of sources of conflict and a comprehensive list of conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities see “Table 1. Illustrative Strategies for Managing Turbulent World” in the introduction to Crocker et al (2001) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict and for an illuminating discussion of the literature on conflict’s causes and trends see Gardiner’s (2002) chapter “Diagnosing Conflict: What Do We Know?” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System. For an analytical discussion of the dynamics of conflict see Kriesberg (2003) Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. For a discussion of the importance of war analysis in the overall analysis of political violence see Chapter One “The Persistence of War in Africa” in de Waal (2000) Who Fights? Who Cares?: War and Humanitarian Action in Africa .

24 See Hamburg (2002) No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict. See Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997, pp. 8-9) Final Report: Pathfinders for Peace, “Preventive action to forestall violent conflict can be compared to the pursuit of public health. Thirty years ago, we did not know precisely how lung cancer or cardiovascular disease developed, or how certain behavior, such as smoking or high-fat, high-cholesterol diets, increased the likelihood of contracting these diseases. With advances in medicine and preventive health care over the past decades, we have more accurate warning signs of serious illness, and we no longer wait for signs of such illness before taking preventive action. So too in the effort to prevent deadly conflict, we do not yet completely understand the interrelationship of the various factors underlying mass violence. We know enough, however, about the factors involved to prescribe and take early action that could be effective in preventing many disputes from reaching the stage of violent conflict. … This report seeks to demonstrate the need for a new commitment – by governments, international organizations, opinion leaders, the private sector, and an informed public – to help prevent deadly conflict and to marshal the considerable potential that already exists for doing so.” (underline added). See Galtung et al (2002), Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend and Sterling, (2002, page xiii): to “work for peace is to work against violence. We analyze its forms and causes, we predict in order to prevent, and we act preventively and decisively - all medical terms, since peace relates to violence as much as health does to illness."

25 See Ury, (2000) The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop, and Galtung et al, (2002) Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend for a discussion of how significant the belief that violence is inevitable is as an obstacle to peace. See Lebow (1987, pg 264) Between Peace and War, who contends “that war becomes more probable as it becomes more acceptable. When war is perceived as a disastrous outcome policy-makers will be correspondingly cautious about the risks they run”. . 26 See Collier (2001) “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy”, in Turbulent Peace.

27 See (2002) chapter “Diagnosing Conflict: What Do We Know?” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System.

28 Herman (2002 pg. 15) notes that, “…granting amnesty to perpetrators left unresolved the question of accountability. Like the perpetrators of sexual and domestic violence, the vast majority of offenders who filed amnesty applications felt entitled to power and did not regret their crimes. They confessed simply to avoid the risk of prosecution (Gobodo- Madikizela, 1999). Once they acknowledged the facts, they were acquitted of any further responsibility for either apology or restitution to their victims. It is hard to imagine satisfactory social reconciliation under such conditions.”

29 See Kriesberg’s (2003) Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution ,2nd edition, for the most current, comprehensive discussion of the dynamics of conflict, including his criticism of the model. Likewise, See Barnett, (2002) Blood on the Doorstep, the Politics of Preventative Action, who states that the lifecycle/stages of conflict model does not quite adequately capture the true complexities of conflicts. Therefore rigid application of interventions based only on the stage of the conflict are limited. What is needed is interventions that recognize the multi-leveled, fluid, and overlapped nature of conflicts. 30 See Hoffman (1998) Towards an Architecture for Peacebuilding: Restructuring Power in Political Conflict, Ph.D. Thesis, University of York, UK. Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding are identified as the three main Peace Functions. Track I and Track II activities conducted under each of these functions are mapped across the cycle, with Peacebuilding described as the “ubiquitous” function: peacebuilding activities take place at all stages of the conflict. 31 See “Table 1. Illustrative Strategies for Managing Turbulent World” in the introduction to Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict Crocker et al (2001).

32 See Eriksson et al (2002) “Appendix 1A, Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2001, SIPRI Yearbook, 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 33 See Gurr (2002, pg. 50-54) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System,.Gurr notes that part of the reason that successes are not known is the tendency for the media to report dramatic failures. How to engage the media constructively; indeed, how to use the media to bring a violent situation to the public’s attention and to pressure leaders to take action was a topic of many of my interviews. For some of the implications for media presented in the Synopsis section, I draw on earlier work I did on this subject with Rosemarie Schmidt at Network for Conflict Resolution, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

34 Herman (2002 pg. 11) notes that domestic violence can be stopped by the use of force only when, “… the bystanders finally took a clear and unambiguous stand in defense of the victims and intervened with sufficient force to contain the aggressors.”

35 See Gurr (2002, pg. 50-54) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System .

36 See Gurr (2002, pg. 57-58) in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System .

37 Herman (2002 pg. 9) states that lack of will translated loosely as apathy in the realm of domestic abuse prevents bystanders from intervening. “For bystanders who might wish to help stop the violence, several obstacles may present themselves. Apathy may be the most obvious impediment to action, but apathy may be a mask for ignorance, confusion, or fear. Bystanders may fail to recognize a pattern of coercive control and may tend to dismiss incidents of violence an unfortunate aberration or as a private quarrel for which both parties are equally to blame. The perpetrator’s denials and rationalizations are often convincing, especially when buttressed by claims of familial sovereignty. Bystanders are often deterred by the argument that the victim’s plight is simply none of their business.”

38 See Zellener, (2002) “The OSCE: Uniquely Qualified for a conflict Prevention Role”, in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia. See the Carter Center website www.thecartercenter.org. For a comprehensive discussion with case examples of successful nonviolent conflict resolution see Ackerman and Duvall, (2000) A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.

39 See Hampson (1996, pgs 534-535) in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict.

40 See Bercovitch, (2002) Studies in International Mediation.

41 In our discussion of why peace agreements break down, one of the authorities interviewed, a senior diplomat, acknowledged that part of the reason is that diplomats themselves lack the degree of sophistication in mediation techniques typically attributed to them. Part of the reason may also be the willingness, in the pursuit of an agreement, to gloss over tough issues. Clearly, research on the sustainability of mediated peace agreements is required.

42 See Greenberg (2000 )Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, page 367.

43 See Greenberg, (2000) Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. p. 344.

44 See Greenberg (2000, pg. 367) Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict.

45 See Greenberg (2000, pg. 367) Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict.

46 See Chapter Two “Multiparty Mediations and the Conflict Cycle: in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World and Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Osler and all, Pamela R., “Two’s Company But is Three A Crowd? Some Hypothesis About Multiparty Mediation” in Bercovitch, Jacob (ed.) (2002) Studies in International Mediation.

47 See Bercovitch (2002, pg. 19) Studies in International Mediation .

48 See Part I Multiparty Mediation: Concepts, Issues, Strategies and Actors in Crocker et al (eds.) (1999) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. See also Touval, and Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era”, in (2001) Turbulent Peace.

49 Herman (2002, pg. 10) notes that in the realm of domestic abuse. “One of the first studies of police intervention in domestic violence cases demonstrated that a policy of mandatory arrest was the most effective deterrent to further incidents of violence. (Sherman and Berk, 1984). I believe that such policies were effective because they were clear, simple, and consistent, and because they forced the police to take domestic violence seriously for the first time. Mandatory arrest policies provided a powerful antidote to ingrained police attitudes of ambivalence or frank sympathy for perpetrators. More recently, many advocates for battered women have argued that such policies are too inflexible, and should be modified to allow greater self-determination for victims (Mills, 1998). Clearly, any intervention that denies power and agency to victims is ultimately self-defeating. Intervention is most likely to be effective when it is based on a strong cooperative alliance between the victim and the intervening third parties.”

50 See Evans and Sahnoun (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

51 See Crocker et al (1996 pg 4) in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict.

52 See Hampson (1996 pgs 533-550) in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict. Also Herman (2002) in “Peace on Earth Begins at Home, Reflections from the Women’s Liberation Movement” in Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and Repair, makes an observation on peacekeeping based on the experience and evidence in the case of the battered women’s movement: “belatedly would-be peacekeepers discovered the same principles that have proven effective in cases of domestic violence. The violence stopped only when the bystanders finally took a clear and unambiguous stand in defense of the victims and intervened with sufficient force to contain the aggressors”.

53 See Hampson (1996, pp. 533-550) in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of Responses to International Conflict.

54 See Miall et al. (2002,pg 76) in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia.

55 See Lund’s (2002) chapter in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System.

56 See Kaplan (2002) Warrior Politics .

57 See Paris (2001) “Wilson’s Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post Conflict Peace Building”, in Turbulent Peace.

58 See Bercovitch (2002 pg. 159) in Studies in International Mediation.

59 See Miall et al. (2002, pg. 76) Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia.

60 See Lund (2003 pg. 30) What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Charting Future Directions.

61 See Lund (IBID pg.38).

62 See Lund (IBID pgs 38-39).

63 See Lund (IBID pgs 40-41).

64 See Anderson and Olsen (2003) Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners.

65 Herman (2002, pg. 3) states that the same is true of domestic violence. “While violence is necessary to establish and maintain a system of dominance, it is rarely sufficient. A well established system of coercive control aims to legitimate the power of the perpetrator, so that overt displays of force are rarely required. When dominance achieves legitimacy, the violence upon which it ultimately rests is hidden, minimized, or excused. Violence is also far more effective when combined with other methods of control.” She also states that, “even those [perpetrators of violence] who genuinely regret the violence generally feel entitled to control their partners, and view violence as a legitimate last resort.” (2002, pg. 12).

66 See Galtung et al (2002, pg. xiv) Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend “States were not created to bring peace to the world, but to satisfy ‘national interests’ as defined by their elites, if necessary by war. Peace has a lower priority, as seen clearly when we compare the size of their establishments for peace and war. Some states are predators and see their interests located outside their own territory – euphemistically called their ‘sphere of interest’. When states pretend to work for peace it is very often a way of solidifying their sphere of interest. And even if their efforts are honest, it is usually painfully clear how amateurish their endeavors.” 67 See Ury (2000, pg. 200) The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop He essentially agrees, declaring that humanity’s “biggest obstacle remains the fatalistic belief that fighting, violence and war are inevitable.”

68 See Hampson and Malone’s (2002) remark in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System, : “ . . . the Security Council has chipped away at arguments in favor of absolute sovereignty and has thus managed to expand the perception of what is legitimate relating to preventive action undertaken by the United Nations” See www.globalizationpw.org. Global Action to Prevent War (GAP) which describes itself as a coalition-building effort to stop war, genocide and internal armed conflict. It is a comprehensive program for “moving to a world in which deadly conflict is rare, brief, and small in scale – in other words, a program for working toward the abolition of war.” GAPW asserts that the means for ending organized violence already exists. The “world’s societies and governments already know how to stop the killing. What has been missing is a program for the sustained, integrated, worldwide application of their resources and knowledge.” What is needed is an integrated program, most of which would enhance and integrate the capabilities of the UN system as follows: strengthen multilateral means of resolving disputes, protecting human rights, and preventing armed conflict; reduce national military forces and replace them with modest UN peacekeeping enforcement forces in a phased process of disarmament; and promote the culture of peace. The time required to eliminate warfare? Three to four decades.

69 See Herman (2002) “Peace on Earth Begins at Home: Reflections from the Women’s Movement” in, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair.

70 See Evans and Sahnoun (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Barnett (2002) Blood on the Doorstep, the Politics of Preventive Action; Jentleson (2000) Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold World.

71 In addition to the discussion which follows on education and evaluation of performance in conflict resolution it is instructive to learn from a directly relevant experience within the field of humanitarian disaster relief work. The reader is referred to the Sphere Project, where using a collaborative process the Minimum Standards and Humanitarian Charter was designed as a tool for agencies to enhance the effectiveness and quality of their assistance. It describes core principles that govern humanitarian action, points out the legal responsibilities of states and warring parties, and offers a set of key indicators that inform different aspects of humanitarian action, from initial assessment through to coordination and advocacy as well as worker competencies and responsibilities. See www.spehereproject.org.

72 For an early discussion of overcoming the “warning-response gap” see George and Holl (1997) “The Warning- Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy”, Carnegie Commission on preventing Deadly Conflict; for a more recent effort that provides practical ideas on addressing the problem of lack of political will, see Jentleson (2000) Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold World; and for an examination of the motives and incentives of war lords, see UNU/INCORE (2003) WAR LORDS into PEACELORDS? A Study of Local Leadership in Conflicted Societies.

73 See Carden et al (2002) International Development Research Centre-Supported Research in the Public Policy Process: A strategic Evaluation of the Influence of Research on Public Policy.

74 See UNU/INCORE, (2003) WAR LORDS into PEACELORDS? A Study of Local Leadership in Conflicted Societies.

75 Information provided by the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Uganda.

76 To be fair, the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution has just embarked on its first effort to facilitate collaboration among three of its member organizations, each of which had a local NGO partner in the conflict region on which a coordinated conflict prevention initiative is being planned. Also, an ad hoc group, the Reducing Political Violence Action Group, based at the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, has launched an initiative intended to produce an integrated, collaborative approach to prevention. And of course, other coalitions of peace and conflict resolution organizations have worked together to plan advocacy initiatives. My point is that the field can not be characterized as a collaborative, strategically aligned one that coordinates efforts as a routine approach to its work; collaboration, joint strategizing, and integrated actions in specific cases of violence are the exception, not the rule.

77 See Kagan (1996 pp. 569-570) On The Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace who, however, stresses just how demanding (on states) efforts at peace are: “A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does.” His realist prescriptions call for vigilance, and the use of power in the service of prevention. Indeed, he asserts: “ Statistically, war has been more common than peace, and extended periods of peace have been rare in a world divided into multiple states. The cases we have examined indicate that good will, unilateral disarmament, the avoidance of alliances, teaching and preaching of the evils of war by those states who, generally satisfied with the state of the world, seek to preserve peace, are of no avail. “What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose. They must understand that no international situation is permanent, that part of their responsibility is to accept and sometimes even assist changes, some of which they will not like, guiding their achievement through peaceful channels, but always prepared to resist, with force if necessary, changes made by threats or violence that threaten the general peace. But this condition is not easy to achieve.” According to Kagan, the conviction to act, to use power to preserve the peace, is that which is required by those states concerned and capable, such as the USA.

78 The point that institutional shortcoming does indeed relate to an adequate level of resources being committed in advance to mechanisms, while perhaps not a crucial concern, was nevertheless mentioned by a number of authorities. The paltry sum allocated to the OSCE’s Office of the High Commissioner for Minorities, a clearly documented, effective mechanism, was given as a case in point; the failure of the UN to allocate adequate resources to the conflict risk assessment, early warning mechanism as called for in the Brahami Report was cited as another glaring inadequacy. See Hampson and Malone (2002) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System for a discussion of the Brahami Report. 79 See Rehn and Sirleaf, (2002) Women, War and Peace: An Independent Experts’ Assessment.

80 See Nan (1999 pp. 50-57)s Civic Initiatives. In ACCORD, 7. London: Conciliation Resources.(p.50-57). Available online at: http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/civic.shtml;Nan, S.A. (2000). Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax; Nan, S.A. (2002, March). Unofficial Conflict Resolution as a Complement to Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Georgian-South Ossetian Peace Process Highlighting ‘Track One and a Half Diplomacy’. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention; Nan, S.A. (2003). Intervention Coordination. Module of the Intractable Conflicts Knowledge Base. Available online at: www.beyondintractability.org.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Aall, P., Miltenberger, Lieutenant Colonel D and Weiss, T.G., 2000 Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.

Ackerman, Peter and Duvall, Jack, 2000 A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict. Palgrave, New York.

Anderson, Mary, B. and Olsen, Laura, 2003 Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Collaborative for Development Action Incorporated, Cambridge, Mass.

Ball, Nicole and Spies, Chris, 1998 Managing Conflict: Lessons From the South African Peace Committees. USAID Evaluation Special Study Report, No. 78.

Ball, N., 1996 Making Peace Work: the Role of the International Development Community. ODI, Washington, DC.

Barakat, Sultan and Hoffman, Benjamin, 1995 “Post Conflict Reconstruction: Key Concepts, Principles, Components and Capabilities”. UN International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies, UN Office in Vienna.

Barnes, Catherine, 2002 Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking. Conciliation Resources, London, United Kingdom (www.c-r.org).

Barnett, Rubin R., 2002 Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action. The Century Foundation Press, New York.

Bell, Christine, 2000 Peace Agreements and Human Rights. Oxford University Press.

Bercovitch, Jacob, 2002 Studies in International Mediation. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Bercovitch, J., 1984 Social Conflicts and Third Parties. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

Besier, Gerhard, 1990 “Peace, Understanding and Human Rights: A Conceptual Introduction”, Current Research on Peace and Violence, 4, 182-896. Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Finland, (pp. 182-190).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992 An Agenda for Peace. United Nations, New York.

Bunker, Barbara Benedict, Rubin Jeffrey & Associates, 1995 Conflict, Cooperation and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

Burton, John, 1987 Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook. University Press of America, London.

Burton, John, 1986 “Conflict Resolution as a Political System”, Working Paper 2. Center for Conflict Analysis, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.

Bush, Kenneth, 2001 Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Germany.

Bush, Kenneth D, 1998 “A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones”. Working Paper, IRDC, Vol. 1, Ottawa, Canada.

Bush, Kenneth D., 1996 “Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards A Developmental Agenda for Peacebuilding”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Special Issue. Bush, Kenneth D.1995 “Fitting the Pieces Together: Canadian Contributions to the Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies (Preliminary Version)”. A paper prepared for IDRC, Ottawa.

Bush, Kenneth D., 1995 “Towards a Balanced Approach to Rebuilding War Torn Societies”, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

Carden, Fred and Neilson, Stephanie with Deby, Denise; Earl, Sarah; Gillespie, Bryon; and Smutylo, Terry, 2002 International Development Research Centre-Supported Research in the Public Policy Process: A Strategic Evaluation of the Influence of Research on Public Policy. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997 Final Report: Pathfinders for Peace. Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Charters, D.A., 1994 Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution, University of New Brunswick, Canada.

Chataway, C., 1999 “The Evolution of Diplomacy: Coordinating Tracks I and II”, in Walter, D.A. (Ed.), World Order for a New Millennium: Political, Cultural and Spiritual Approaches to Building Peace, (pp. 139-146). St. Martin’s Press, New York.

Chayes, H., and Chayes, A., 1999 Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management. Kluwer Law International, The Hague.

Chernus, Ira, 1993 “Order and Disorder in the Definition of Peace”, Peace and Change, Vol. 18 No. 2, April, (pp. 99-125).

Church, Cheyanne and Shouldice, Julie, 2002 The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play. Incore International Conflict Research (University of Ulster & The United Nations University), Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland.

Crocker, Chester A.; Hampson, Fen Osler; and Aall, Pamela (eds.), 2001 Turbulent Peace: The challenges of Managing International Conflict. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

Crocker, C.A.; Hampson, F. O.; and Aall, P. (eds.), 1999 Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. USIP, Washington, DC.

Crocker, C.A.; Hampson, F. O.; and Aall, P. (eds.), 1996 Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

Curle, Adam, 1991 “Peacemaking-Public and Private”, Peacemaking in a Troubled World, (pp. 17-29).

Curle, Adam, 1990 Tools for Transformation: A Personal Study. Hawthorn Press, Stroud, United Kingdom.

Dallaire, Major-General Romeo and Poulin, Bruce, 1995 “Rawanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide”, Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring, (pp. 7-14).

Derman, William and Whiteford S. (eds.), 1995 Social Impact Analysis and Development Planning in the Third World. Westview Press.

Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Uganda. de Waal, Alex (ed.) 2000 Who Fights? Who Cares?: War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. Africa World Press Inc., Asmara, Eritrea. de Soto, Alvaro and del Castillo, Graciana, 1995 “Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador”, paper presented at First UN International Colloquium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Vienna. de Soto, Alvaro and del Castillo, Graciana, 1994 “Obstacles to Peacebuilding”, Foreign Policy, No. 94, Spring, (pp. 69-83). de Soto, Hernando, 1989 The Other Path: The Invisible Cultural Diversity and Peace: Visions for a New World Order. Bonn, Germany.

Diamond, L. and McDonald, Ambassador J., 1996 Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, 3rd ed. Kumarian Press, West Hartford, CT.

Dixon, William J., 1993 “Democracy and the Management of International Conflict”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March, Sage Publications Inc., (pp. 42-68).

Earl, Sarah, 2000 Outcomes and the Factors Which Influence Their Realization: A Synthesis of Forty-Two Completed Project Case-Studies. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

Enzensberger, Hans M., 1990 Civil War. Granta Books, London.

Eriksson, Mikael; Sollenberg, Margareta; and Wallensteen, Peter, 1990-2001 “Appendix 2A, Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, SIPRI Yearbook, 2002: Armaments, Disarament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Evans, Gareth and Sahnoun, Mohame, 2001 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, Canada.

Fisher, R. and Ury, W., 1978 International Mediation: A Working Guide. Harvard Negotiation Project, Cambridge, MA.

Fisher, Ronald, 1997 Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.

Fisher, Ronald, 1995 “The Domain of International Security and the Potential and Complementarity of Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding”. L.B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Canada.

Fisher, Ronald, 1992 “The Potential of Third Party Consultation as a Method of International Conflict Resolution”. Occasional Paper, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa.

Fisher, Ronald and Keashly, Loraleigh, 1991 “The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation with a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention”. Journal of Peace Research 28:1 (February), (pp. 29-42),

Fisher, Ronald and Keashly, Loraleigh, 1988 “Third party intervention in inter-group conflict: Consultation is not mediation”. Negotiation Journal, 4, (pp. 381-393). Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, 1997 The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention. The Hague.

Francis, Diana, 2002 People, Peace and Power. Pluto Press, Sterling, VA.

Galtung, Johan, 1991 “Peace Research, Peace Studies and Peace as Profession: Three Phases in the Emergence of a New Discipline”, in Woodhouse (ed.) Peacemaking in Troubled Times, (pp. 19-60-166).

Galtung, Johan, 1990 “Violence and Peace”, in Smooker, P.; Davies, R..; and Munske, B. (eds.) A Reader in Peace Studies. Pergamon Press, Oxford.

Galtung, Johan; Jacobsen, Carl G.; and Brand-Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof, 2002 Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend. Pluto Press, London and Sterling VA.

George, Alexander L. and Holl, Jane E., 1997 “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventative Diplomacy”. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Greenberg, Melanie; Barton, John H.; and McGuinness, Margaret, 2000 Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Maryland.

Gurr, Ted, 1993 Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflict. US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC.

Gurr, Ted, 1974 Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Hamburg, David, 2002 No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham.

Hamburg, David, 1999 Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict – Carnegie Corporation. New York.

Hamburg, David, 1999 Education for Conflict Resolution. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict – Carnegie Corporation. New York.

Hampson, Fen Osler and Malone, David M. (eds.), 2002 From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN State System. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder.

Havermans, Jos, 1998 “Chapter 9, European Union Opens Up to Conflict Prevention”, An International Directory – 1998 Edition. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, The Netherlands, (pp. 55-56).

Havermans, Jos, 1998 “Chapter 10, Peacebuilding is gaining Ground among National Governments”, An International Directory – 1998 Edition. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, The Netherlands, (pp. 57-61).

Havermans, Jos, 1998 “Chapter 11, NGO Networks claim Place of their Own”, An International Directory – 1998 Edition. Europe

Hill, Roger, 1993 “Preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping”, SIPRI Yearbook 1993, Oxford University Press, (pp. 53-65). Himes, Joseph S., 1980 Conflict and Conflict Management. University of Georgia Press, Atlanta, GA.

Hoffman, Benjamin, C., 1998 Towards an Architecture for Peacebuilding: Restructuring Power in Political Conflict. Ph.D. Thesis University of York, UK.

INCORE’s website ??

International Alert, 1996 Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation: Thinking About Conflict. International Alert, London.

Jentleson, Bruse W. (ed.), 2000 Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World. Carnegie Corporation of New York, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland.

Joint Warfighting Centre, 1995 Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA.

Jones, B.D., 2001 The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars, (IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation).New York: International Peace Academy.

Jongman, A.J. and Schmid, A.P., 1996 “Chapter 3: Contemporary armed conflicts: a brief survey (incl. world map)”, Prevention and Management of Conflicts. NCDO, Dutch Centre of Conflict Prevention, the Netherlands, (pp. 25-29).

June, Mareike and Wallis, Tim, 2002 Enhancing UK Capacity for Handling Conflict: the Rationale for a UK Civilian Peace Service. Peaceworkers, UK, London.

Kagan, Donald, 1996 On The Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. Anchor Books, New York.

Kaplan, Robert, 2002, Warrier Politics. Vintage Books, New York.

Kome, Penney and Crean, Patrick, (eds.) 1986 Peace: A Dream Unfolding. Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, Toronto.

Kriesberg, Louis, 2003 Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2 nd . Ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Lanham, Maryland.

Kriesberg, Louis, 1987”Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves”, Negotiation Journal, October, (pp. 374-386).

Kumar, Krishna and Rosenthal, Irving, 1998 Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building: A Case Study of USAID’s Middle East Regional Cooperation Program. USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 77.

LaRose-Edwards, Paul, 1996 UN Human Rights Operations Principles and Practices in United Nations Field Operations. Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs.

Last, Major David, 1997 Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations. The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Clementsport, NS.

Last, Major David, 1995 “Conflict Prevention and Internal Conflict: Theory and Policy: A Workshop Summary”, No. 8. The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa, Last, Major David and Vought, D. 1994 Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Last, Major David, 1993 “Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques”, Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Review of Armed Force and Society. Baltimore.

Lebow, Richard, Ned, 1987 Between Peace and War. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland.

Lederach, John Paul, 1997 Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

Ledarch, John Paul, 1995 Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.

Lederach, John Paul, 1994 “The Role of NGOs in Peacebuilding”. CIDA, May, Hull, Quebec.

Lederach, John Paul, 1991 Beyond Prescription: New Lenses for Conflict Resolution Training across Cultures. Commissioned by the Inter-racial and Cross-cultural Conflict Resolution Project, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, ON.

Lund, Michael, 2003 What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Assessing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Charting Future Directions. IDRC. Ottawa, Canada.

Lund, Michael, 2002 “From Lessons to Action” in Hampson, Fen Osler and Malone, David M. (eds.) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynn Rienner Publishers. Boulder, Colorado.

Lund, Michael S., 1996 Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.

Mack, Andrew, 1991 “Objectives and Methods of Peace Research”, Woodhouse, Peacemaking in Troubled World, (pp. 73-106).

McDonald, Ambassador J.W., 2000 The Track Not Taken: Personal Reflections on State Department Intransigence and Conflict Resolution, Harvard InternationalReview, 22, (3), 68-71.

Minow, Martha (ed.), 2002 Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair. Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, Christopher, 1988 “The Motives for Mediation”, New Approaches to International Mediation. Greenwood Press, New York, (pp.29-51).

Mitchell, Christopher, 1988, “Mediation in International Relations: An Evolving Tradition”, New Approaches to International Mediation. Greenwood Press, New York, (pp.1-15).

Mitchell, Christopher, 1981 The Structure of International Conflict. Macmillan Press Ltd., London.

Montville, Joseph, 1981 “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy”, Foreign Policy, winter 1981-82, (pp. 19-38).

Montville, Joseph, 1993 “The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution”, in Sandole and van der Merwe, Hugo Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, (pp. 112-127). Mouradian, Ann-Marie, 1998 “Like it or Not, troops are the new humanitarian workers”, Humanitarian Affairs Review, No. 1., Spring (pp. 44-48).

Nan, S.A., 1999 Civic Initiatives. In ACCORD, 7. London: Conciliation Resources(p.50-57). available online at: http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/civic.shtml.

Nan, S.A., 2000 Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Conflicts over Abkazia, south Ossetia, and Transdniestra. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax.

Nan, S.A., 2002 March Unofficial Conflict Resolution as a Complement to Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Georgian-South Ossetian Peace Process Highlighting ‘Track One and a Half Diplomacy’. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention.

Nan, S.A., 2003 Intervention Coordination. Module of the Intractable Conflicts Knowledge Base, Available online at: www.beyondintractability.org.

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 1993 Report: Collective Security: From Preventative Diplomacy to Peace Enforcement. Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

Pastor, Robert A., 1999 “More and Less Than it Seemed: The Carter-Nunn-Powell Mediation in Haiti, 1994” in Crocker, Chester A.; Hampson, Fen Osler; and Hall, Pamela (eds.) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington, D.C.

Patton, M.Q., 1978 Utilization-Focused Evaluation. Sage Publications Inc., London.

Pruitt, D.G. and Rubin, J.Z., 1986 Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement. Random House, New York.

Raman, Venkatta K., 1994 “Law, Politics and UN Enforcement of Peace”, Agenda for Peace Updating. Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada, (pp. 8-10).

Report of the Aspen Institute Conference, 1996 Conflict Prevention: Strategies to Sustain Peace in the Post-Cold War World. Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado.

Rehn, Elizabeth and Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 2002 Women, War and Peace: An Independent Expert’s Assessment. UN Development Fund for Women.

Rieff, David, 1996 “The Institution that Saw No Evil”, The New Republic, February 12, (pp. 19- 24).

Roehrich, R., 2003 Track One-Track Two Coordination: Influences of Political Realism and Political Idealism. Unpublished paper, George Mason University.

Rouhana, Nadim N., 1995 “Unofficial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray”, Negotiation Journal. July, (pp. 255-269).

Rupesinghe, Kumar, 1995 Conflict Transformation. St. Martin’s Press, New York.

Rubin, J.Z., 1986 “Opportunities for International Dispute Settlement”, Working Paper Series 86-5. Program on Negotiation, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA. Rubin, J.Z. (ed.), 1981 Dynamics of Third Party Intervention. Praeger Publishers, New York.

Ryan, Stephen, 1995 Ethnic Conflict and International Relations 2nd ed. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield, Vermont.

Ryan, Stephen, 1995 “Peace-building and Conflict Transformation”, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, 2nd ed. Dartmouth, Brookfield, USA, (pp. 129-152).

Ryan, Stephen, 1990 “Ethnic conflict and the United Nations”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, January, (pp. 25-47).

Sandole, D.J. and van der Merwe, H. (eds.), 1993 Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Manchester University Press, New York, USA.

Sandole, D.J.D. and Sandole-Saroste, I., 1987 Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications. New York University Press, New York.

Schelling, T., 1960 The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Schmid, A.P., 1996 “Chapter 4: Monitoring Conflict Escalation”, Prevention and Management of Conflicts. NCDO, Dutch Centre of Conflict Prevention, The Netherlands, (pp. 30-34).

Schrich, L., 2002, October Toward a New Era of Civil-Military Relationship: A Peacebuilding Perspective. Speech prepared from Civil-Military Dialogue Conference, Utrecht, Netherlands.

Shuman, M. and Sweig, J. (eds.), 1991 Conditions of Peace: In Inquiry. EXPRO Press, Washington, D.C.

Sisk, Timothy D., 1997 Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. USIP, Washington, DC.

Smooker, P.; Davies, R.; and Munske, B., 1990 A Reader in Peace Studies. Pergamon Press, Oxford

Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, 1977 Conflict among Nations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Stedman, John; Rothchild, Donald; and Cousins, Elizabeth (eds.), 2002 Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. International Peace Academy, New York.

Steifel, Matthias, 1994 “An Overview Report of the ‘Continuum Project”. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

Sponsel, Leslie E. and Gregor, Thomas (eds.), 1994 The Anthology of Peace and Nonviolence. Lynne Reienner Publisher, Benler, London.

Stremlau, John, 1996 Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations. A Report to the Carnegie Commission Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, New York.

The Carter Center @ http:// www.thecartercenter.org.

UNESCO, 1995 “The evolving concept of a culture of peace”, UNESCO and a Culture of Peace. UNESCO Culture of Peace Program. UNESCO, 1995 “Concept Paper: The Second International Forum on the culture of peace, theme: Transformation Towards a Culture of Peace”. UNESCO on the United Nations’ 50th Anniversary, Manilla, 26-31, November.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994 Rebuilding Wartorn Societies. Geneva.

UNU/INCORE, 2003 WAR LORD into PEACE LORD? A Study of Local Leadership in Conflicted Societies, University of Ulster, Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland.

Uphoff, Elisabeth, 1995 When the Shooting Stops: Helping Countries Rebuild After Civil War. MA Thesis, Cornell University.

Ury, William, 2000 The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop. Penguin Books, New York.

U.S. Department of State [DOS], 2002 “Integrating Track One and Track Two Approaches to International Conflict Resolution: What’s Working? What’s Not? How Can We Do Better?” . (2003, June 11).

Vasquez, John A., 1995 “Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction or Territoriality”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, (pp. 277-295). van Tongeren, Paul, 1996 “Chapter 2: The Role of NGOs in conflict prevention”, Prevention and Management of Conflicts. NCDO, Dutch Centre of Conflict Prevention, the Netherlands, (pp. 18-24). van Tongeren, Paul; van de Veen, Hans; and Verhoeven, Juliette (eds.), 2002 Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., Boulder, Colorado.

Van Tongerson, Paul and Galama, Anneke, (eds.), Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice. European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, the Netherlands.

Wallensteen, Peter and Solenberg, Margaret, 1995 “After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, (pp. 119-141).

Weiss-Fagen, Patricia, 1994 “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies - Research and Sources: A Bibliographic Essay”. United Nations Institute for Social Development & Program of Strategic and International Security Studies, New York, New York.

Williams, Sue and Steve, 1994 Being in the Middle by Being at the Edge: Quaker experience of non-official political mediation. Quaker Peace & Service, London in association with Sessions Book Trust, York, England.

Woodhouse, Tom, (ed.), 1991 Peacemaking in a Troubled World. Berg Publishers Limited, Oxford, UK