Iatg Saferguard Training Modules

IATG LESSON PLAN MA20 – AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION EXERCISE EDITION 1 – MAY 2012

IATG SAFERGUARD TRAINING MODULES MODULE MA20 – AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION EXERCISE – DATA SHEET

AMMUNITION REQUIRING DISPOSAL:

Total Qty Direction from Current location of Serial Nature (Rounds / Source of ammunition Comments Force Commander ammunition items) Stingers are from a batch which was found to be defective due to a Stinger ground to air To be disposed of by Initial UN deployment 1 manufacturing fault. They have missiles 2 missiles Site A American military stock been sentenced as unserviceable, but safe to move.

To be gifted to the Initial UN deployment 2 Rd 9mm Ball 100,000 rds Site A Danish Government stock

Found by troops in an History and details of this Old factory, approx 20 propellant cannot be traced. Site 3 Artillery propellant 600 tonnes old decommissioned miles from Site A closed 6 years ago. Propellant ammunition factory. was in a light structure ESH. Abandoned ordnance, Approx 75 tonnes all up weight. various calibres from Ammunition seized by Old abandoned local Many items are not specifically 20mm cannon UN forces at various storage site which is identified. There is no technical ammunition to 105mm 4 data, nor hazard data sheets, for artillery shells, and 75 tonnes abandoned storage sites under UN security and these items. Items are various high explosive and during operations control. Approx 45 considered as safe to move by landmines and against rebel forces. miles from Site A. road. grenades

1 IATG LESSON PLAN MA20 – AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION EXERCISE EDITION 1 – MAY 2012

Total Qty Direction from Current location of Serial Nature (Rounds / Source of ammunition Comments Force Commander ammunition items) Old abandoned local Ammunition seized by 155mm artillery storage site which is UN forces at various Good condition with technical 5 ‘bomblet’ 4000 shells under UN security and abandoned storage data. (submunition) shells control. Approx 70 sites. miles from Site A.

2 MA20 – AMMUNITION DESTRUCTION EXERCISE

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - AMMUNITION:

1. Stinger missiles: The American Government have stated that they are not prepared for Stinger missiles to be demilitarised by any company outside of the USA due to American regulations. The American Government have also stated that if you decide to destroy them by Open Detonation, they want an American technical observer to be present at the disposals for verification purposes. They cannot guarantee a suitable individual to be available for at least 3 months as they have very few military resources in this country. They have however offered to take the missiles from Site A on Tuesday next week, using an American military truck, transport these two items to an airfield, and then fly it back to the USA on an American military flight. These two missiles can then be returned to the manufacturer for rework. They would then be returned to the American ammunition stockpile for training use.

2. Rd 9mm Ball: The UN Force Commander has identified that only 3,000 rounds of 9mm Ball ammunition have been fired. The Force Equipment Table has therefore been adjusted, meaning there are 100,000rds of 9mm ammunition surplus to Force requirements. The Danish Government expressed an interest in this ammunition for use at training by Danish troops. There is a Danish contingent on the UN deployment. The Danish Government therefore approached the Force Headquarters and this ammunition will be gifted to the Danish Government. A convoy of Danish Military trucks will arrive at your depot next Wednesday to collect the pallets of ammunition.

3. Old artillery propellant: The history and details of this propellant cannot be traced. There is no technical data for this material. It was clearly intended for use in manufacturing artillery propelling charges, but for some reason was never used. It has been stored in cardboard tubs with cardboard lids. The site closed 6 years ago so they are least that old. The propellant was in a light structure ESH with no ventilation. This was apparently quite damp and cold in winter, but hot in summer. There is the opportunity to send trace samples of the propellant back to the United Kingdom for laboratory analysis to identify the chemical composition. The paperwork and arrangements are likely to take approximately 1 month from now, and the laboratory results could be anywhere between 1 and 4 weeks after that.

4. Abandoned ordnance, various calibres/types: This stock was found during operations against the rebel factions, as well as searches of abandoned ammunition storage sites. There was a quantity of unstable ammunition and this was dealt with through emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) activity at the time as these items were not safe to move or store. This does however leave 75 tonnes (all up weight) of various natures with no technical data. The EOD team have certified these items as safe to move by road, for a maximum of 40 miles, for the sole purpose of transportation to a disposal site. You may contact the EOD Team commander to discuss this limitation and explore other opportunities for transportation if you really want to.

5. 155mm artillery ‘bomblet’ (submunition) shells: These shells were found at several abandoned sites. It is thought they were gifted by an unidentified country, even though there are no gun systems to fire them. The items and packaging are in good condition and have what appears to be a complete data pack with them. The EOD Team commander has obtained the complete technical data pack (including technical drawings and Hazard data Sheets) from the manufacturer. There is international legislation against the use and stockpiling of cluster munitions.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - INFRASTRUCTURE:

1. There is demolition ground approximately 10 miles from Site A and 55 miles from the UN secure storage site where the abandoned stock of various calibres is held. This has been upgraded by the UN Force to include a concrete burning pad with permanent metal ‘propellant burning trays’ on them. The pad can be hosed down with water as there is a simple water containment gulley around it. A contract is in place with a local contractor (whose quality and environmental credentials have been approved by the UN Force) who will remove and properly dispose of the waste water and material. This is suitable for 10 tonnes of propellant per ‘burn’, and there is scope to conduct 2 open burns per day in this way. You are not to use any other location for open burning of propellant unless in an emergency and under EOD control. The cost of destroying the propellant in this way is negligible as you can utilise UN personnel and materiel. The cost of the contractor is covered under a higher level enabling agreement which comes from a different budget to yours. You should be aware that there, thus far, been no real Open Burning activities at this site and it will also produce a significant quantity of smoke in addition to the solid waste and waste water. The site is available for your exclusive use, as of now.

2. This demolition site also features a demolition ground for Open Detonation. This has been used sporadically for the last 15 years and there is local opposition because of the noise. The source of discontent is that the local military used to use this area for trials and demonstrations to visiting dignitaries, so the noise was seen as frivolous and unnecessary. There was also concern about the smoke being blown over the local village when the wind was in a southerly direction. There is a demolition limit (ie per demolition pit) of 150kg NEQ. There are 4 pits that may be used at the same time. There is scope to do a detonation in the morning, and a detonation in the afternoon. This means the total daily NEQ that may reasonably be expected is 1.2 tonnes. This may. For planning purposes, be taken to equate to approximately 1.8 tonnes all up weight per day. The cost of Open Detonation is cheap in terms of utilisation of an UN EOD team and UN soldiers as extra labour for this task. There is however a relatively high cost of donor charges, detonating cord and detonators. There is also a potential reputational issue if the noise pollution is not managed properly with the local community. The site is available for your exclusive use, as of now. This site is 30 miles from the old factory where the old propellant is located.

3. The EOD team commander has advised the UN Force Commander that there is insufficient material and labour (especially skilled labour) to realistically conduct the destruction of the 155mm submunition shells in this country. National Governments are highly reluctant to accept these items into their military facilities. This is because they are concerned about contravening the Dublin Convention on the use and stockpiling of submunitions.

4. The old factory (where the old propellant is located) has a flat concrete truck park which is well away from the buildings at the site. The perimeter is somewhat overgrown with bushes and small trees. A local contractor can be engaged to clear this vegetation for nominal cost.

5. The old abandoned storage site (where the abandoned ammunition of various calibres is stored) does not have an appropriate location for conducting Open Detonation there. There are no obvious uninhabited, secure, open spaces within 40 miles of the site.

6. There is no industrial demilitarisation capability within the country. There is no funding to establish an industrial demilitarisation site either.

INDUSTRIAL DEMILITARISATION OPTIONS:

1. You have foreseen that a possible method of disposal for the 155mm bomblet shells is demilitarisation. You do a little research and you identify that there are two likely companies which might be suitable for this task. No contractual or proper commercial activity has taken place yet. You are just trying to get a feel for the problem and the solutions. The information you find is:

a. There is a company in Scandinavia who can take the munitions down an old mine and destroy them by detonation in this deep mine. The waste solid material is generally left down the mine. The company can demonstrate that it complies with all legislation, including environmental legislation, and has a full array of certification for environmental, quality and safety management. Shipping will take approximately two weeks by sea, however the ammunition can be detonated and therefore destroyed within 1 month of arriving at the site. The company can organise the transportation, including the shipment paperwork and licences. The rough costs are likely to be:

Project management costs: Euro 25,000 Shipping: Euro 750,000 Storage: Euro 40,000 Pre-processing (packaging removal): Euro 30,000 Destruction: Euro 30,000

b. There is a company in Poland that can demilitarise the items by mechanically dismantling the shell body assembly and removing the individual bomblets. These can then be remotely defused in a new, hi-tech machine. The fuzes can then be heated in a car bottom furnace. The bomblet bodies can then be frozen by cryo-fracture and crushed into fragments. These fragments can then also be burned in a car bottom furnace. The residue it then taken to a scrap metal dealer for a relatively low sum as the residual material is no particular suitable for recycling there, although it will be disposed of in accordance with national environmental legislation. . The company will not manage or otherwise arrange shipment. The rough costs are likely to be:

Project management costs: Euro 15,000 Shipping: Euro 750,000 (based on research into previous possible solution) Storage: Euro 10,000 Pre-processing (packaging removal): Euro 10,000 Pre-processing (fuze removal): Euro 40,000 Destruction: Euro 560,000

EXERCISE TASKS:

1. Devise a draft proposal to the Force Commander detailing a preferred method, and a fall- back method, for disposing of the stock in the data table.

2. The Force Commander particularly wants to know about any compromises to maintaining ALARP risk management, how this may be mitigated, and if there are still otherwise potentially ‘unacceptable’ risks that need to be considered further. He might need to personally accept the risk of some activities if they are not ALARP.

3. The Force Commander is keen to suitably dispose of any ‘ACTO’ type ammunition as soon as possible.

4. The Force Commander is interested in environmental impacts although this is a lesser priority than safety management.

5. The Force Commander is keen to do all activities using UN assets in this country to limit costs and administrative burden. Detail what activities, if any, cannot be done like this.

6. If you have to use a foreign demilitarisation contractor, provide some indicative estimates to the Force Commander regarding time, costs, administrative burden, and environmental impacts.