Wikileaks and the Afghanistan Threat

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Wikileaks and the Afghanistan Threat

WIKILEAKS AND THE AFGHANISTAN THREAT

By Mohammad Abdullah Gul

1. Introduction On 25th of July 2010, The New York Times (1) carried an explosive story of some 92,000 classified Pentagon documents having passed into the hands of Wikileaks, a Sweden based whistlerblower website headed by Julian Assange and dedicated to world peace.

Ostensibly, the leak sent shock waves in the US Administration not just for the sheer volume of the leaked material but also because the revelations could significantly affect the course of war in Afghanistan.

The documents comprised a host of field intelligence reports initiated by covert sources, combat units and Afghan Intelligence, National

Directorate of Security (NDS). Much of the plethora of documents is a compilation of assorted reports known as “collation” in the intelligence craft. Such stuff is not deemed to be intelligence until it is sifted, corroborated and analyzed for its value, authenticity of the source and plausibility of information. The documents cover the period from years 2004 to 2009. Irrespective of other negative aspects of the leak it reflects poorly on Pentagon’s efficiency that such a large array of reports remained unprocessed for so long.

2. Dubious Veracity Wikileaks have so far revealed 77000 documents of which 180 reports, mostly originating from Afghan

Intelligence pertain to the dubious role of Pakistan, its Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) and especially, of retired General Hamid Gul who headed the ISI in the crucial years of Afghan Jihad during the Soviet

Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. Gen Gul earned a legendary reputation as the architect of Soviet defeat and ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan. He was once a darling of the US strategists and the intelligence big-wigs hat later became a bitter critic of the post-Reagan policies of the US. He routinely charges America of betraying the Afghan nation and causing General Zia ul Haq’s plane crash in which dozens of Pakistan’s top military hierarchy were lost. He also claims that the 9/11 was an inside job and openly supports the Afghan resistance against what he describes as the US led occupation of

Afghanistan not dissimilar to that of the Soviet Union. Gen Gul on his part has repeatedly refuted the charges against him on various

International Media Channel (Aljazeera, CNN, BBC etc) (2) and labeled the reports as “preposterous”, “fictional” and deliberate

“disinformation” to demonize him and the ISI in an attempt to find scapegoat for the US military’s failures in Afghanistan. Gul also offered in his interviews to travel to America to face the charges in a court of law or be heard by the US Senate/Congress provided he is granted the

USA visa which has been denied to him since May 2001. Earlier, the US had moved the United Nation Security Council (3) in 2008 to have him placed on the international terrorist list. He was saved by China who blocked the move by applying ‘technical hold’ for lack of proof. Pakistan

Government also strongly rebutted (4) the Wekileaks reports regarding

ISI’s double role in the Afghan war. Interestingly, a Pakistani official source has revealed on condition of anonymity that US defence officials had informed their Pakistani counterparts not to take any notice of the

Wikileaks days before the New York Times story hit the headlines.

3. Human Rights Abuse and Poor Military Discipline Remaining documents out of 77000 reports released by Wikileaks so far cover a vast spectrum of excesses and human rights abuse committed by the

US and NATO forces. They depict a harrowing tale of atrocities against innocent civilians. No less than 20,000 fatalities have been document.

The callous disregard of Geneva Convention as also the US laws are heart-rending. Task Force 373 (5), a secret force stands out as the most trigger–happy, ruthless bunch soldiers who seem to have exceeded every limit. It is not clear whether this force was ever authorized by the

US Congress. If not, it will cast a very adverse light on the Pentagon, raising questions whether Pentagon (or a certain element of it) has really turned into a “rouge” set up the conduct of TF 373 in Afghanistan has been certainly roguish and reprehensible. 4. Questions to Be Answered Wikileaks are still holding back some

15,000 documents. There are tremendous pressures of the US

Administration to block their release or at least expunge the identity of the sources and other culprits lest their security be jeopardized.

The whole sordid affair of the Wikileaks leaves abbegging many a thorny question and points to the yawning cavities in the US system of defence and intelligence. The more glaring ones are:

a. Is the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) overly dependent

on security contractors and largely amateurish Afghan

Intelligence?

b. Is there an attitudinal conflict between policy makers on

Afghanistan i.e. winning hearts and minds and the ground

operators bent upon systematic and willful alienation of the

proud Afghan people?

c. Does a dichotomy really exist between the stated position

on Pakistan as the frontline ally without whose support victory can not be perceived and the real perception of its

role as a double crosser, playing both ways? Or is it inspired

by extraneous influences who would wish to drive a wedge

in the US-Pak relations?

d. How will the leaks impact on the US – Pak and Pak – Karzai

Government relations?

e. How will it affect the war in Afghanistan and determine its

outcome?

f. Were the leaks deliberate and purposeful a la ‘My Lai’ (6) in

Vietnam which set in motion the public demand for

withdrawal?

Each of the above queries warrants a separate analysis.

5. Applied US Intelligence Methodology. The mammoth US intelligence set up has over the years shown deficiencies, fissures and failures. If the glaring ones like 9/11, Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (7), failure to capture the most wanted terrorists are not enough evidence of the inherent flaws, the Wikileaks have exposed them to the core. Human Intelligence (humint) department of the US is well known to have suffered from protracted neglect; beside, poor funding and absence of a cogent cause to inspire enthusiasm. As a corollary, it became necessary to supplant security contractors for regular and disciplined operators. Most of the security contractors were former employees of the CIA, FBI and other agencies who thieved on old-buddy cronyism. Their only motivation was and still is money.

They are a tired and lack-lustre who mostly rely on paper “milling,” a term used in intelligence parlance for producing make – believe reports. Bulk of the reports on Pakistan is the handiwork of the Afghan

Intelligence which is infested by the communist diehards still looking to avenge their humiliation at the hands of Pakistan and the ISI. To top it all, the Indian Intelligence (RAW) has established a strong field intelligence network in Afghanistan. Their insidious influence on Afghan

Intelligence to malign Pakistan is an open secret. 6. Conflicting Attitudes. Task Force 373 uses tactics and methods which run counter to the explicit purpose of the military high command. Close to a hundred thousand (105 thousand by some accounts) security contractors have proved to be loose cannons. They disregard the operational instructions, in pursuit of quick results to earn more dollars. It was a disaster ab initio to mix mercenaries and burnt out intelligence veterans with regular troops. The architects of this harebrained idea would rule the consequences of their folly.

7. Dichotomy Between Policy and Posture. The US and NATO’s stated position on Pakistan- a frontline state in war against terrorism- is an euphemism. In reality, Pakistan has always been suspected to be either doing less than it could or, worse still, it is in complicity with some of the Taliban factions actively engaged in fighting the US and

NATO troops in Afghanistan. No wonder therefore that each category and tier of the US leadership from Bush to Obama continued to press

Pakistan to do more add nausiam. While analyzing the nature and extent of Pakistan’s cooperation, one must bear in mind the circumstances of Pakistan’s recruitment in this war. It was literally

‘press-ganged’ to board the American warship. It was assumed wrongly by the Pakistan leaders that the war would be a short, swift retribution which would end in couple of months. They failed to fathom the latent and long term intentions of the Bush Administration’s war hawks. It was only after the Karzai Government was foisted on Afghanistan, as a result of the Bonn dispensation and induction of India, an arch rival of

Pakistan, in the Afghan game that the Pakistan authorities realized the faux pass of giving in to the US demands unconditionally. They felt cheated but could do little to redress the situation at this stage. Pervez

Musharraf’s quick surrender to the US dicktat had left Pakistani nation and its institutions dazed and bewildered. They stood torn between the demands of the US agenda and the national ethos. The military and the

ISI were hard put to maintain equilibrium. Drone attacks by the CIA in

Pakistan’s tribal regions and clandestine deployment of the US Special

Forces and the Security Contractors inside Pakistan further exacerbated the frayed sentiments. To the common masses, from where most of the soldiery is drawn, it was somebody else’s dirty war which Pakistan had to fight under duress. It redounds to the credit of the Army and the ISI that there was no serious breach of discipline. But to expect an enthusiastic and wholesome participation in these conditions would be asking for the moon.

8. Possible Impact on US-Pak Relations. That the invaders would fail in Afghanistan was almost axiomatic for even the elementary student of the Afghan affairs and who would be better educated on this subject than the ISI. Should ISI not have maintained liaison with the real soul of the Afghan people, which is manifest in the national resistance symbolized by the Taliban? Let no one be duped into believing otherwise! But material support to the Resistance is quite another matter. With the US snoops all over Pakistan, logged deep into its systems, such an audacity cannot even be imagined, save by the

Pentagon stalwarts. The US policy towards Pakistan is characterized by ‘blowing hot and cold’ and described aptly though insultingly by Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton as ‘Carrot and Stick’ doctrine to keep Pakistan on the leash and aligned with the US objectives. This seems to have worked reasonably well for America. Pakistan has been held to the course by first promoting a dictator and then imposing a truncated democracy on the country through an externally brokered deal called the National

Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). America’s whip hand, however, began to test the limits of the national tolerance after the Bombay attacks when the US started openly to promote India’s brow beating tactics against Pakistan on unsubstantiated charges. Following Obama’s 1st

December 2009 policy speech the US attitudes have began to shape differently. It is now less belligerent and often placatory. There is also a perceptible shift in the policy from dealing with Government(s) to addressing the people of Pakistan. This is a healthy change indicative of a possible focus on the ‘exit strategy.’ Recent floods in the country have further enhanced the need for a fresh approach. Currently, the over riding American concern seems to be: to create environment for a graceful exit from Afghanistan while safeguarding its core interests while making room for India in post withdrawal Afghanistan; secondly, to thwart a populist ground-swell in the wake of the catastrophic deluge in Pakistan which will inevitably be anti-American in nature. How can these objectives be achieved with the help of a tottering and largely dysfunctional democracy in Pakistan will be a daunting challenge for the American policy makers.

Pakistan and the US need each other for their own good reasons but India Is the ‘stick-in-the-mud’ and it will remain so until the Kashmir is put out of the way.

As far Pak-Karzai Relations, President Karzai began to lean towards Pakistan after Obama’s 1st December 2009 speech (8). To show his altered preferences he fired his Pakistan-Hater intelligence Czar,

Amrullah Saleh. After Wikileaks however Karzai came out with his inner self when he demanded of Americans to bomb Pakistan out. But it was only a storm in the tea cup which simmered down rather quickly.

Perhaps the Americans whispered the same gospel in his ears as they did for Pakistan: “don’t take it too seriously.”

9. Outcome of the War and Underline Purpose of The Episode. It would be a bit early to pass a value judgement but there are unerring similarities between ‘My Lie’ (9) in Vietnam and Wikileaks of Afghan war. Lt William Calley and Capt Ernest L. Medina’s misconduct then and

TF-373’s misdemeanor now reflect the same propensity – frustration spawned by failures. How close are the parallels of General

Westmoreland’s demand more troops and Gen Stanley A. McChrystal’s urge for the surge, Intelligence failures, search for scapegoats –

Cambodia then and Pakistan now. It’s an uncanny matching of the scenarios, a rebirth of tragedy that was Vietnam. Afghanistan is a wrong war at a wrong place against a wrong enemy. Not a single

Afghan has to-date been found involved in terrorism out of the war zone. ‘Reversing Taliban’s momentum’ was not the original aim. At this stage, it would be like defeating the Afghan nation–mission impossible.

The initial goal was to disperse Al-Qaeda and capture or kill Osama Bin

Laden (10). All the western intelligence sources believe Osama Bin Laden is not in Afghanistan or at least not in the Southern part of Afghanistan where much of the US and NATO forces are committed. Leon E. Panetta says there are no more than 60 to 100 Al-Qaeda operators in this part of the world. That many may be present in any of the European countries. Reality is that Al-Qaeda has long since boomed out to the

Red Sea area and in close proximity of their strategic ‘centre of gravity’, the Middle East.

The hard truth is that the war in Afghanistan is a lost cause for

America. The problem is how to convince the Pentagon and the self- indulgent, bigoted lot of neo-cons who would not let reason get the better of their unrealistic ambitions. Obama’s heart is in the right place though. He knows he came into the Oval Office on the promise of change. He was aware of the stumbling blocks on his way to change. As a master Chess player he let the Pentagon have its say (two surges since his take over) but asked for results. Pentagon merely reinforced failure and could not deliver.

Marja (11) (Operation Moshtarak) was a unmitigated disaster and

Kandhar operation is a non-starter. One block in the way of Obama’s march to objective has been effectively removed. Wikileaks given the full rein will remove the other. Already the antiwar opinion has climbed to 62% (12). Publication of 15000 remaining documents is bound to whip up a public debate reminiscent of the Nixon years. A “Moratorium” (13) may well be in the offing thanks to Wikileaks. Is Obama playing Nixon?

If yes, Wikileaks is a gift of nature to him. Or, did he manage the gift?

Whatever, be the case drawdown from Afghanistan is likely to begin on the dot, if not earlier. Conventional wisdom commands… cut the losses!

References: (1) New York Times 25th July 2010 by Mark Mazzetti, Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt & Andrew W.

Lehren

(2) General Hamid Gul on Aljazeera Network, CNN, BBC etc 25th, 26th, 27th & 28th July 2010

(3) UN 1267 Committee, The NEWS (Pakistan) 7th December 2008

(4) 25th July 2010 , 27th July 2010, 4th August 2010 DAWN, The NEWS

(5) Davies, Nick 25th July 2010. Afghanistan war logs The Guardian. Wekipedia

(6) Department of the Army (the Peers Report Vol I-III) 1970, The My Lai Massacre: Seymour Hersh

1969

(7) Iraq survey group final report (WMD), Goldenburg Suzanne (2nd December 2008) Guardian, US

Senate Select Committee 05-08-2010.

(8) 1st December 2009 US Military Academy at West Point

(9) Four Hours in My Lai Capt Ernest L Medina (Peers Report) The Omissions & Commissions,

Democracy World.

(10)20th August 1998 by Clinton Administration 66 Cruise Missiles were launched by US Naval Ships

in Arabian Sea, 14th- 16th August 2007 by George W. Bush Administration.

(11)February 13th 2010 Operation Moshtarak

(12)Politics Daily, Polls Watch August 6th 2010

(13)October 15th 1969 (BBC) Millions March in US Vietnam Moratorium.

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