Canadian Economic Growth and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854

CANADIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1854

M.N.A. Hinton, Fellow, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

When a nation binds itself by treaty … to exempt the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of all others, the country … whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great advantage from the treaty. – Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

Introduction

The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 is on the short-list of topics that continue to fascinate Canadian economic historians. A precursor of the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, the

Treaty created a preferential free trade area in natural or primary products - such as wheat, oats, barley, timber, fish, and coal - that lasted just over 11 years (1855-1866) between the primary-product and export-based small open economy of the Province of Canada, now

Ontario and Quebec, and four other much-smaller open economy Atlantic provinces of British

North America (BNA) and the much larger, more protected, and less trade-based economy of the United States.

Signed on June 5, 1854, the Treaty went into effect region-by-region as it was ratified by the legislatures in the 6 separate regions to which it applied, first in BNA between July and

December in 1854 and then in the United States in March 1855 (Haynes 1892, p. 18).

Negotiated skillfully by Lord Elgin, who had been appointed by the British government to act on behalf of BNA, the Treaty also settled a long-standing fisheries dispute, allowing American and British North American fishers to use each other’s coastal fisheries north of Florida within the 3 mile limit, ended export taxes on American timber sent down from Maine on New

Brunswick’s Saint John river, and, finally, allowed American and British North American ships access to the waterways and canals of the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence without extra duties.

The operation of the Treaty coincided with a period of great prosperity for pre- confederation Canada. Current dollar GNP grew at 7.3 percent a year in the 1850s, constant dollar GNP at between 3.5 and 4.6 percent a year (depending on the price index used to deflate current dollar GNP). Not until the turn of the twentieth century would Canada grow faster.

How much of the economic growth of the Province of Canada, the largest and richest province of BNA, can justly be attributed to the operation of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854?

The Conventional Answers

Three different answers can be found in the literature. The conventional answer of contemporary writers, typically, was that the Reciprocity Treaty explained the lion’s share of

Canada’s economic growth before Confederation. For example, “[t]he prosperity of Canada during the past 10 years,” wrote Hayes (1865, p. 3), “has been largely dependent upon this enlightened measure;” And Larned (1871, p. 6) wrote “an extraordinary impulse of advancement was given to the provinces, particularly Ontario by the operation of this treaty.”

This simple story was rejected by Shortt (1914), Taussig (1919), Saunders (1936),

Masters (1937), Mackintosh (1940), and Jones (1946), the first generation of professional economic historians to study the Treaty. The growth of trade between the United States and the Province of Canada, they observed, did grow rapidly under the operation of the Reciprocity

Treaty. In the first full year of the Treaty’s operation Canada’s exports of Reciprocity goods to the U.S. rose from $8.4 million in 1854 to $16.5 million in 1855. Imports experienced a more marked increase from $1.9 million to $7.7 million. Ignoring the final year of operation, when the U.S. announced the Treaty would abrogated and goods were rushed across the border to escape the reintroduction of duties, Canadian exports of reciprocity goods to the U.S. peaked in 1860 at $18 million and imports reached their peak two years later, in 1862, at $14.4 million.

No simple answer, they argued can be given to the question of how much of this growth can be attributed to the Treaty and how much to other causal factors because there were a great many other factors at work and these other factors were important. For example, the 1919 United States Tariff Commission report on Reciprocity and

Commercial Treaties, chaired by Frank Taussig, and advised by a young Jacob Viner, summed up the impact of the Treaty this way: “In the eleven years of Reciprocity the aggregate trade between the two countries increased approximately threefold; 52 per cent of the trade of the

Provinces was with the United States. From being a matter of minor importance to the United

States, the trade with British North America, under the treaty, became second, in order of importance, to the trade with Great Britain. To this growth … various factors contributed, [the report lists railroad building in Canada and the US, a massive capital inflow from Britain to finance railway building in BNA, the mid-Victorian boom in Britain, BNA and the US population growth in the US and BNA, the settlement of Canada’s and America’s old wests, the Crimean

War, the Civil War and greenback inflation in the US ] but it is impossible to escape the conclusion that to the treaty must be attributed a large part of the growth, and that both countries benefitted therefrom.”

This new conventional wisdom, in turn, was swept away in a flurry of cliometric papers by Professors Officer and Smith (1968 and 1970) and Ankli (1970 and 1971) that appeared some 40 years ago. Applying Jacob Viner’s trade creation and trade diversion theory of customs unions Officer and Smith (1968, p. 599) argued “the treaty cannot conclusively be said to have benefitted [central] Canada;” “reciprocity alone did not appreciably increase Canadian trade;” and “what increase did occur contributed to a new pattern of trade which was not entirely beneficial from the standpoint of Canadian [economic] welfare. From these conclusions Professor Ankli (1971) “did not differ greatly, … the welfare gain,” he claimed, though positive, “… could not have been large.”

While it has been said (Norrie, Owram, and Emery, 2008, p. 155) economic historians continue to “debate” or are (Hart, 2002, p. 52) “divided” about the impact of the Treaty on

Canadian economic growth there is remarkably little debate or division among economic historians today. Only one paper by Gerriets and Gwyn (1996) has been published in the journal literature since Officer and Smith and Ankli laid down their new learning, which deals with a different question, the impact of the Treaty on the province of Nova Scotia, the results of which do not challenge Officer and Smith and Ankli’s main findings.

Another Answer

But were Officer and Smith right in their fundamental conclusion that “the treaty cannot conclusively be said to have benefitted [central] Canada?” Nowhere in their paper did they explicitely lay out the economic model on which they based this conclusion nor, as Ankli pointed out did they provide hard evidence to support their claims.

The model they appear to have had in mind is a Johnson-type of customs union model in which trade diversion may have taken place. Consider the Canadian market for imports of reciprocity goods. Canada’s excess demand curve is downward sloping. Before the Treaty imports are available from the U.S. and Britain, the rest of the world, in perfectly elastic supply at their competitively determined border price plus the Canadian tariff. Canada imports all of its reciprocity goods from the low cost producer. If Britain is the low cost producer, after the coming into effect of the Reciprocity Treaty Canada will switch the source of its imports from

Britain to the US. Canadian economic welfare will fall if the Harberger triangle gain in consumer surplus by the fall in the price of imports under the Canadian excess demand curve is less than the increased border price of US over British imports multiplied by the quantity imports. And it will rise if the Harberger triangle gain is more. A similar possibility for increased or decreased economic welfare for the US exists when we examine the US market for imports of Reciprocity goods.

There are two main problems with this model. First, as Ankli argued, Canada was probably the low cost supplier of reciprocity goods to the US not Britain and similarily the US was probably the low cost supplier of reciprocity goods to Canada not Britain. To list the goods freed under the Treaty is to drive the point home. It must have cost a great deal more for Britain to supply Canada or the US with wheat, flour, coarse grains, timber, fire wood, and costly to transport or perishable goods such as coal, ores, horses, cows, pigs, poultry, eggs, and fruit than it was for Canada or the US to supply one another.

Second, given the small size of the Canadian market it seems more reasonable to model the Canadian excess supply curve of Reciprocity goods as upward sloping rather than perfectly elastic and the American excess demand curve for Reciprocity goods as highly elastic.

If we make both of these changes to Officer and Smith’s model we get a significant change in the way the Reciprocity Treaty operates. In the Canadian market for imports of

Reciprocity goods the ambiguity of the Treaty’s impact vanishes. Before the Treaty the

Canadian excess demand curve for Reciprocity goods is downward and given a perfectly elastic

US excess supply curve at the low-cost competitive US border price plus the Canadian tariff,

Canada buys all of its imports from the US and none from Britain which is the high cost producer. After the Treaty the price of reciprocity imports falls in Canada by the full amount of the Canadian tariff and Canadian economic welfare rises by the Harberger triangle formed under the excess demand curve. The rise in Canadian welfare will be greater the higher is the tariff and the higher is the elasticity of demand. Algebraically this increase in welfare can be written as:

½ · R · E · t / 1 + t

Where:

R is the customs revenue Canada collects on Reciprocity goods E is the Canadian elasticity of excess demand t is the Canadian tariff on Reciprocity imports

On the export side the change is even more dramatic. In Officer and Smith’s model the

Canadian supply curve was assumed to be perfectly elastic and as a result Canada experienced no welfare gain. In my model, assuming British imports are priced out of the market and

Canada is the low cost producer, the Canadian excess supply curve is upward sloping and the US excess demand curve for reciprocity goods is perfectly elastic the welfare gain may well be substantial.

Before the Treaty the US tariff reduces the price Canadian receive for exports of reciprocity goods by the full amount of the tariff and exports are consequently less. After the

Treaty the elimination of the tariff raises price and the quantity of exports to the US. Economic welfare to Canada rises both by the Harberger triangle formed above the Canadian excess supply curve and by the amount of customs revenue formerly collected by the US government on Canadian reciprocity imports.

Algebraically this gain can be written as:

R' + ½ · R' · E' · t'

Where:

R' is the customs revenue the US collects on Reciprocity goods E ' is the Canadian elasticity of excess supply t' is the US tariff on Reciprocity imports

The Difference the New Model Makes

To get a better sense of the difference the new model makes I construct a partial equilibrium measure of the welfare gain produced by the Reciprocity Treaty for the year 1853. This is a counterfactual exercise that holds constant demand and supply conditions that so disturbed

Canadian and US markets in the 1850s and simulates the impact of the introduction of

Reciprocity on Canadian measured consumer and producer surplus. Given our model how much did Canadian consumer and producer surplus and therefore Canadian GNP increase?

The exercise was carried out using Canadian government statistics on imports and exports of Reciprocity goods with the United States which give a detailed , commodity by commodity, breakdown of imports and exports by geographical origin and destination. US statistics do not allow as ready identification of the trade freed by the Treaty. It is accepted that the export data may be less accurate than the import data but it is not clear the export data in fact was less accurate. All values which were originally reported in Halifax Currency, unit of account, were rounded to the nearest pound and converted to US gold dollars at the

rate of $4 to the pound.

Table 1 gives an overview of the trade freed by the Treaty. Clearly as our model

suggests Canada stood to gain more than the US from the Treaty The US Walker tariff which

averaged 23.2 percent on Reciprocity goods was well over twice the Canadian tariff on

Reciprocity goods which averaged 9.1 percent. Also the Canadian export trade with the US in

reciprocity goods ($8.6 million) was significantly larger than the duitable Canadian import trade

($1.2 million).

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the dollar value of the Canadian welfare gain for imports,

exports, and both imports and exports for a broad range of possible values for the elasticities

of Canadian excess import demand and excess supply.

The results are both expected and unexpected. On the import side (see Table 2) the

gain as one might expect is small. The Province of Canada’s tariff was relatively low on primary

products. Given an excess demand elasticity of 1, for example, I calculate a gain only $8,500,

which is very small relative to Canadian GNP. In 1851 Firestone’s estimate for GNP in BNA is

$169 million. It is well understood that this estimate is too high. Reducing it by 0.833, which is

the ratio of the Urquhart project’s estimate of Canadian GDP to Firestone’s estimate of GNP in

1870 and multiplying it by the ratio of the population of Ontario and Quebec to BNA in 1851

(0.756) an estimate of the Province of Canada’s GNP of $106 million is obtained. A gain of

$8,500 is less than one-tenth of 1 percent of estimated GNP. The estimates on the import side

suggest Officer and Smith and Ankli are right and the Reciprocity treaty was relatively

unimportant.

But on the export side (see Table 3) the story is very different. The gain is relatively

large. Looking at the combined effect on both the import and export side (see Table 4) I

estimate that the Treaty increased central Canadian output by between 2 and 3 percent, for Table 1 Trade in reciprocity goods between the Province of Canada and the U.S. in 1853

Value, customs Industry Group revenue & tariff rates Agricultur Forest Fishing& Mining Other Total of goods traded1 e trapping Imports into Canada Duitable [$] 942,432 63,872 59,592 126,588 34,036 1,226,8802 Free [$] 330,044 46,440 0 0 0 376,484 Total [$] 1,272,476 110,312 59,952 126,588 34,036 1,603,364 Customs revenue [$] 93,841 6,568 7,493 3,164 851 111,917 Average ad valorem Canadian Tariff [%] 9.96 10.28 12.50 2.50 2.50 9.12

Exports from Canada Total [$] 6,003,328 2,430,828 157,508 58,400 21,364 8,671,4282 Customs revenue[$]3 1,250,541 717,004 31,502 11,680 1,068 2,011,795 Average ad valorem U.S 20.8 29.50 20.00 20.00 5.00 23.20 Tariff [%]

Notes:

1 All values expressed in U.S. gold dollars

2 These values do not agree with the values reported by Officer and Smith [1968, p.600]. for discussion of differences see Table 5

3 Estimated from tariff schedule

Source: See text Table 2

The welfare gain to the Province of Canada on imports

Welfare gain assuming elasticities equal to: Industry group 0.25 0.5 1.0 1.5 5.0 10.0 Agriculture [$] 1,922 3,843 7,686 11,528 38,428 76,854 Forest [$] 87 175 349 525 1,747 3,494 Fishing & trapping [$] 104 208 416 624 2,081 4,162 Mining [$] 10 19 39 58 193 386 Other [$] 3 5 10 16 52 104 All industries [$] 2,126 4,250 8,500 12,751 42,501 85,000

Note: All welfare gain on the import side is achieved through the elimination of deadweight loss

The welfare gain to the Province of Canadaon exports

Welfare gain assuming elasticities equal to: Industry group 0.25 0.5 1.0 1.5 5.0 10.0 A. Welfare gain due to reallocation of resources Agriculture [$] 32,800 65,660 131,323 196,982 656,607 1,313,213 Forest [$] 26,581 53,163 106,326 159,489 531,630 1,063,261 788 788 1,575 3,150 4,725 5,751 31,502 Mining [$] 292 584 1,168 1,752 5,840 11,680 Other [$] 7 13 27 40 133 267 All industries [$] 60,498 120,995 241,994 362,988 1,209,961 2,419,923 b. Total welfare gain due to reallocation of resources and rent transfer from the U.S. Total gain [$] 2,072,293 2,132,790 2,253,789 2,374,783 3,221,756 4,431,718

Total welfare gain on imports and exports to the Province of Canada

Welfare gain assuming elasticities equal to: Industry group 0.25 0.5 1.0 1.5 5.0 10.0 A. Welfare gain due to reallocation of resources Agriculture [$] 34,752 79,503 138,989 208,510 695,035 1,390,067 Forest [$] 26,668 53,338 106,675 160,041 533,337 1,066,755 Fishing & trapping [$] 892 1,784 3,566 5,349 17,832 35,664 Mining [$] 302 603 1,207 1,810 6,033 12,066 Other [$] 10 18 37 56 185 371 All industries [$] 62,624 135,246 250,474 375,739 1,252,462 2,504,923 b. Overall welfare gain due to both reallocation of resources and rent transfer from the U.S. Overall gain [$] 2,074,419 2,147,041 2,262,269 2,387,534 3,264,257 4,516,718

Source: Calculated from Tables 2 and 3 Table 5

Comparison of trade statistics of the Province of Canada for 1853 employed in this study to those reported by Officer and Smith [000’s of dollars]

Total value reported Item This study Officer and Difference Smith A. Imports Reciprocity goods from: U.S. 1,603 1,281 + 322 Rest of world 654 657 - 3 Total 2,257 1,938 + 319 Non-reciprocity goods from: U.S. 10,179 10,499 - 320 Rest of world 19,545 19,543 + 2 Total 29,724 30,042 - 318 All goods from: U.S. 11,782 11,780 + 2 Rest of world 20,199 20,200 - 1 Total 31,981 31,980 + 1 B. Exports Reciprocity goods to: U.S. 8,671 8,696 - 25 Rest of world 9,874 10,524 - 650 Total 18,546 19,220 - 674 Non-reciprocity goods to: U.S. 265 340 - 75 Rest of world 3,202 2,452 + 750 Total 3,466 2,792 + 674 All goods to: U.S. 8,936 9,036 - 100 Rest of world 13,076 12976 + 100 Total 22,012 22,012 0

Note: Figures in “This study” column have been rounded from dollars to thousands of dollars. Therefore the sum of the columns may differ from the total

Source: This study; Canada, Province of, Tables of Trade and Navigation 1853, Department of Finance, Quebec, 1854. Officer and Smith, 1968, p. 600] elasticities ranging between 1 and 5, of the Province of Canada’s GNP. Looked at in another way the total welfare gain represents an increase of between 4.5 and 6.6 percent of the

Province of Canada’s total primary industry value added. These results, I believe, suggest that the Reciprocity Treaty was far more important than economic historians now typically think.

Conclusion

Professors Officer and Smith, and Ankli, I submit were wrong about the Reciprocity Treaty.

A simple partial equilibrium neoclassical trade model is used to simulate the impact of the

Treaty on Canadian GNP. Canada is assumed to be small open economy for which the US sets the price of primary products and the UK sets the price of manufactures. It is argued that little if any trade diversion took place under the Treaty because Canada and the US were natural trading partners and high transport costs on the long distance movement of primary products made each region the others lowest cost trade partner. In agreeing to the treaty the US suffered because it gave up its power to extract rents from Canadian primary product producers by imposing tariffs on the trade between the two regions. The basic economic impact of the treaty is argued to be an increase in the price received by

Canadian primary product export producers and the consequent transfer of rents previously collected as customs revenue by the United States to Canadian producers. I estimate that the static efficiency gains of the Treaty to Canada increased Canadian output by between 2 and 3 percent of the Province of Canada’s GNP or looked at differently between 4.5 and 6.6 percent of the Province of Canada’s total primary industry value added.

My estimates support the old “classic” view, Officer and Smith rejected, that the

Treaty was a significant cause of Canadian growth before Confederation. Ankli was on the right track in disputing Officer and Smith’s claim that trade diversion wiped out much of the gains from trade under Reciprocity, but he did not go far enough. In markets for natural products Canadian and US farmers, fishers, lumber and timber traders and miners were most likely the low cost producers, British and other exports from outside the preferential trade area being priced out of the US and Canadian markets by higher transportation costs. Using the trade figures for the Province of Canada in 1853 in a counterfactual test, I show that if the Reciprocity Treaty had been in effect the elimination of US tariffs on Canada’s exports of Reciprocity goods to the United States, many of which were as high as 20 percent ad valorem, would have transferred roughly $2 million in customs revenues from the US government to Canadian producers in increased rents or producer surplus. Select Bibliography - Secondary Literature

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