The Failure of Mandated Disclosure
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BEN-SHAHAR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011 11:53 AM ARTICLE THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE † †† OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER This Article explores the spectacular prevalence, and failure, of the single most common technique for protecting personal autonomy in modern society: mandated disclosure. The Article has four Parts: (1) a comprehensive sum- mary of the recurring use of mandated disclosures, in many forms and circums- tances, in the areas of consumer and borrower protection, patient informed con- sent, contract formation, and constitutional rights; (2) a survey of the empirical literature documenting the failure of the mandated disclosure regime in informing people and in improving their decisions; (3) an account of the multitude of reasons mandated disclosures fail, focusing on the political dy- namics underlying the enactments of these mandates, the incentives of disclosers to carry them out, and, most importantly, on the ability of disclosees to use them; and (4) an argument that mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve its stated goal but also leads to unintended consequences that often harm the very people it intends to serve. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................649 A. The Argument ................................................................. 649 B. The Method ..................................................................... 651 C. The Style ......................................................................... 652 I. THE DISCLOSURE EMPIRE: THE PERVASIVENESS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE ...................................................................................652 † Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. †† Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law & Professor of Internal Medicine, Universi- ty of Michigan. Helpful comments were provided by workshop participants at The University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown University, The University of Michigan, Tel- Aviv University, and the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and Cleveland. Financial support from the Olin Program at the University of Chicago and the Elkes Fund at the University of Michigan is gratefully acknowledged. (647) BEN-SHAHAR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011 11:53 AM 648 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 647 A. Three Paradigmatic Examples of Mandated Disclosure .......... 653 1. Terms of Credit .......................................................653 2. Informed Consent ...................................................655 3. Contract Boilerplate ...............................................657 B. Other Provinces in the Disclosure Empire ............................. 658 1. Financial Transactions ............................................658 2. Insurance .................................................................659 3. Health Care .............................................................661 4. Miranda Warnings ...................................................662 5. Goods and Services .................................................662 II. THE DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE .............665 A. The Three Paradigmatic Cases of Mandated Disclosure ......... 665 1. Terms of Credit .......................................................665 2. Informed Consent ...................................................667 3. Contract Boilerplate ...............................................671 B. The Failures of Other Mandated Disclosures ........................ 672 III. WHY MANDATED DISCLOSURE FAILS ..............................................679 A. Lawmakers ...................................................................... 679 1. Is Regulation Necessary? .........................................679 2. Is Mandated Disclosure the Best Form of Regulation? ..............................................................681 3. What Is the Proper Scope of the Disclosure Mandate? .................................................................684 4. Can the Quantity Problem Be Answered?..............686 a. The Overload Effect ....................................... 687 b. The Accumulation Problem ............................. 689 5. Can the Standard of Disclosure Be Articulated Effectively? ...............................................................690 B. Disclosers ........................................................................ 691 1. Interpreting the Mandate .......................................692 2. Assembling the Data ...............................................695 3. Implementing the Mandate ...................................696 4. Resisting the Mandate ............................................698 5. An Illustrative Vignette: The Clery Act .................702 C. Disclosees ........................................................................ 704 1. Disclosures and the World of Chris Consumer .....705 2. Acquiring Disclosed Information ...........................709 3. Understanding the Information ............................711 a. Illiteracy and Innumeracy ............................. 711 b. Making Sense of Information ......................... 716 4. Remembering the Information ..............................719 5. Analyzing the Information .....................................720 BEN-SHAHAR_FINALDOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011 11:53 AM 2011] The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 649 a. Coping with Complexity ................................ 720 b. The Mysteries of the Mind ............................. 723 c. Parsing Preferences ....................................... 724 d. Expertise ..................................................... 725 e. Decision Aversion ......................................... 727 IV. SOME UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE ............729 A. The Dubious Indirect Benefits of Mandated Disclosure .......... 730 1. An Agency Benefit? .................................................730 2. An Educational Benefit? .........................................732 3. A Greater Social Benefit? ........................................734 B. The Costs of Mandated Disclosure ...................................... 735 1. Implementation Costs .............................................735 2. Unintended Harms of Mandated Disclosure ........737 CONCLUSION: BEYOND MANDATED DISCLOSURE ..................................742 A. Simple Information .......................................................... 743 B. From Information Toward Advice ....................................... 746 INTRODUCTION A. The Argument “Mandated disclosure” is a regulatory technique that is much used but little remarked. It aspires to improve decisions people make in their economic and social relationships and particularly to protect the naïve from the sophisticated. The technique requires “the discloser” to give “the disclosee” information which the disclosee may use to make better decisions and to keep the discloser from abusing its supe- rior position. For example: You are shopping for a loan. Or told you need prostate cancer surgery. Or buying a computer online. Or under ar- rest and undergoing questioning. You have never faced this choice be- fore. It turns on information you do not know. Mortgagees, doctors, vendors, and police are experienced and have interests of their own. Mandated disclosure is supposed to give you information for ana- lyzing your choices critically and to choose optimally. Thus, truth-in- lending laws require your lender to highlight credit terms. The law of informed consent requires your doctor to describe prostatectomies, radiation, chemotherapy, and watchful waiting. Contract doctrine re- quires your vendor to reveal its contract’s terms, like warranties and mandatory arbitration. Miranda requires police to tell you your rights. Thus informed, you understand your choices well enough to make an BEN-SHAHAR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2011 11:53 AM 650 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 647 intelligent decision about your credit, your cancer, your computer, or your confession. Mandated disclosure is ubiquitous. Innumerable federal and state statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative regulations, and court rulings demand sometimes marvelously elaborate disclosures from businesses that issue car, student, or other consumer loans; mortgagees; home-equity lenders; credit card companies; banks accepting deposits; mutual funds; securities brokers; credit-reporting agencies; investment advisors; ATM operators; pawnshops; payday lenders; rent-to-own deal- ers; installment-sales vendors; insurers of property, health, life, cars or rented vehicles, self-storage facilities, and much else; car-towing com- panies; car repair shops; motor clubs; residential real estate agencies, developers, and landlords; time-share programs; sellers and lessors of mobile homes; membership camping facilities; providers of home im- provements, services, and repairs; home-alarm installers; vocational schools; traffic schools; agents selling electricity; immigration consul- tants; dog breeders and sellers; travel services and travel agencies; art dealers; police; doctors; hospitals; managed care organizations; colleges and universities; restaurants and other food establishments; halal-food dealers; and endlessly more. To say nothing, for example, of the com- mon law obligation to disclose information prior to a contract, or fed- eral and state campaign finance regulation, which the Supreme Court recently trimmed to little more than mandated disclosure.1 Mandated disclosure