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Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Sealift 1AC...... 2 Advantage One: Power Projection...... 2 Uniqueness Ext...... 8 TSV Solvency Ext...... 15 Advantage Two: Economy...... 18 Uniqueness Ext...... 21 Shipbuilding K/T Economy...... 25 C17s?...... 28 Solvency...... 29 AT: Civilian Fill In...... 34

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The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment for medium sized high speed sealift capability. Advantage One: Power Projection

In an era of persistent conflict, we need smaller sized forces. Headquarters of the Department of the Army 10 Headquarters of the Department of the Army, “The Operations Process, Field Manual 5-0,” March 2010 PERSISTENT CONFLICT 3-18. In the 21st century, several global trends shape the emerging strategic environment and exacerbate the ideological nature of current struggles. These trends present dilemmas as well as opportunities. Such trends include— � Globalization. � Technological diffusion. � Demographic shifts. � Resource scarcity. � Climate changes and natural disasters. � Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. � Failed or failing states. 3-19. The collective impact of these trends makes it likely that persistent conflict will characterize the next century. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Conflicts will erupt unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and endure for extended periods. In a dynamic and multidimensional operational environment, design offers tools vital to solving the complex, ill- structured problems presented by persistent conflict. EVOLVING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 3-20. Although the essential nature of conflict is timeless, its character reflects the unique conditions of each era. Conflict is invariably complex because it is fundamentally human in character. As such, conflict is characterized by uncertainty, chance, and friction. Design provides additional tools necessary to understand this environment and to mitigate the adverse effects of complexity on full spectrum operations. As modern conflict evolves, it is characterized by several key factors: � Conducted between and among diverse actors, both state and nonstate, with the former frequently acting covertly and the latter sometimes acting through state sponsorship or as a proxy for a state. � Unavoidably waged among the people. � Increasingly unpredictable and sudden, with the potential to expand rapidly into unanticipated locations and continue for unexpected durations. � Increasing potential for spillover, creating regionally and globally destabilizing effects. � Waged in transparency. � Increasingly likely to include hybrid threats, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities adapting to counter traditional advantages. FUNDAMENTALS OF DESIGN 3-21. Today’s operational environment presents situations so complex that understanding them—let alone attempting to change them—is beyond the ability of a single individual. Moreover, significant risk occurs when assuming that commanders in the same campaign understand an implicit design concept or that their design concepts mutually support each other. The risks multiply, especially when a problem involves multiple units, Services, multinational forces, or other instruments of national power. Commanders mitigate these risks with collaboration and by applying the design fundamentals: � Apply critical thinking. � Understand the operational environment. � Solve the right problem. � Adapt to dynamic conditions. � Achieve the designated goals. Apply Critical Thinking 3-22. Commanders ensure that superiors and subordinates share a common understanding of the purpose behind intended actions. Initial guidance provided by a higher political or military authority may prove insufficient to create clearly stated, decisive, and attainable objectives in complex situations that involve political, social, economic, and other factors. After commanders conduct a detailed study of the situation, they may conclude that some desired goals are unrealistic or not feasible within the limitations. These limitations stem from the inherent tension that often exists among different goals, historical tensions in the local population, interactions of different actors seeking to improve their own survivability and position, and limited resources and time available to achieve the mission. One can never fully understand the dynamics of a conflict in advance. Well-intentioned guidance without detailed study may lead to an untenable or counterproductive solution. 3-23. Design helps mitigate the risk associated with guidance that does not fully account for the complexities of the operational environment by using a critical and creative approach for learning, innovation, and adaptation. Design helps to clarify objectives in the context of the operational environment and within the limits imposed by policy, strategy, orders, or directives. This does not imply that commanders can arbitrarily disregard instructions. If, however, they receive unclear guidance or consider the desired conditions unachievable, commanders engage in active dialog. Dialog clarifies guidance and enables commanders to offer recommendations to achieve a mutual understanding of the current situation and the desired end state. Design can assist commanders in leading the top-down/bottom-up approach at all echelons. Understand the Operational Environment 3-24. Design challenges leaders to understand the impact of their decisions and actions on the operational environment. (See chapter 1.) Gaining a deeper and more thorough understanding of the operational environment enables more effective decisionmaking and helps to integrate military operations with the other instruments of national power. In an environment characterized by the presence

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 2 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, such understanding is essential to success. In this context, human variables, interactions, and relationships are frequently decisive. Military force may be necessary to achieve national policy aims, but, by itself, force proves insufficient to achieve victory in these situations. More importantly, leaders and Soldiers must recognize the relationship between the character of conflict and the approach one takes to effect changes in the operational environment. 3-25. Developing a thorough understanding of the operational environment is a continuous process. Even though this understanding will never be perfect, attempting to comprehend its complex nature helps identify unintended consequences that may undermine well-intentioned efforts. Deep understanding reveals the dynamic nature of the human interactions and the importance of identifying contributing factors. Leaders can gain this understanding by capitalizing on multiple perspectives and varied sources of knowledge. Intelligence knowledge generated as part of the intelligence process contributes to contextual understanding of the operational environment. (See FM 2-0.) Design encourages the commander and staff to seek and address complexity before attempting to impose simplicity. Solve the Right Problem 3-26. Commanders use design to ensure they are solving the right problem. When commanders use design, they closely examine the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict in the operational environment. From this perspective, they can identify the fundamental problem with greater clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. Design is essential to ensuring commanders identify the right problem to solve. Effective application of design is the difference between solving a problem right and solving the right problem. Adapt to Dynamic Conditions 3-27. Innovation and adaptation lead to capitalizing on opportunities by quickly recognizing and exploiting actions that work well while dismissing those that do not. Adaptation does not rely on being able to anticipate every challenge. Instead, it uses continuous assessment to determine what works and what does not. Adaptation occurs through the crucial process of assessment and subsequent changes in how one approaches problems. In the military domain, adaptation demands clearly articulated measures of effectiveness. These measures define success and failure along with after-action reviews that capture and implement lessons at all echelons. 3-28. Effective use of design improves the ability to adapt. Adaptation in this sense involves reframing the situation to align with new information and experiences that challenge existing understanding. Through framing and reframing achieved by iterative collaboration and dialog, design provides a foundation for organizational learning and contributes to the necessary clarity of vision required by successful commanders. Achieve the Designated Goals 3-29. If the link between strategy and tactics is clear, the likelihood that tactical actions will translate into strategic success increases significantly. For complex, ill-structured problems, integrating and synchronizing operations to link sequences of tactical actions to achieve a strategic aim may prove elusive. Through design, commanders employ operational art to cement the link between strategic objectives and tactical action ensuring that all tactical actions will produce conditions that ultimately define the desired end state. As understanding of the operational environment and problem improves, design adapts to strengthen the link between strategy and tactics, promoting operational coherence, unity of effort, and strategic success. LEADING DESIGN 3-30. Commanders are the central figure in design. Generally, the more complex a situation is, the more important the commander’s role is in design. Commanders draw on design to overcome the challenges of complexity. They foster iterative collaboration and dialog while leveraging their collective knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to achieve success. Design supports and reinforces the application of battle command, supporting the commander’s ability to understand and visualize the operational environment. 3-31. The practice of design is not exclusive to a particular level of command. Design can apply to all levels, depending on the context and circumstances. However, given the complexity of the operational environment, the need for design at lower echelons often increases as brigades and battalions contend with the challenges of shaping environments and conducting operations over extended periods.

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Medium roll-on roll-off, or RORO vessels are key to power projection. We’ll isolate three internal links First is large vessels – the majority of our current fleet can’t access ports – kills power projection. Hilberg 10 Erik E. Hilberg, Major in the US Army, recognized by the Department of Logistics and Resource Operations of the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) as the Major General James M. Wright Distinguished Master Logistician for Intermediate Level Education class 2009-02, “Does the United States’ Strategic Mobility Program Support the Needs of Operational Commanders?,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010 The historical case studies of Somalia and Haiti indicate that the United States’ strategic mobility program relies too heavily on its large cargo vessel fleet, specifically the large-medium speed roll-on roll-off vessel. The notional case studies of Nigeria and Kenya portray a similar theme. In fact, when the United States Army’s Surface Deployment Distribution Command studied African ports, they found only four out of twenty-nine ports that fit all of their criteria for large vessel discharges. The criteria were depth, access to roll-on roll-off ramps, and container cranes. Ten of the ports were deep enough to allow the discharge of the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel.110 All of those ports were in either South Africa or Northern African nations with the exception of Senegal and Ivory Coast, which are West African nations. The twenty-nine ports came from an aggregate of twenty-one countries. The study simply looked at berth length and draft; there are still concerns whether a large medium-speed roll-on roll-off could sail into the approaches to many of those ports.111 The United States does not have the right mix of ships to quickly project power and then subsequently receive, move, and integrate that equipment back into their respective units. The missions in Somalia and Haiti tie directly to the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update’s identification of the need for medium sized roll-on roll-off vessels that can access the majority of the world’s ports. 112 Despite their experiences in Somalia and Haiti, the United States based the majority of its surface fleet projection development in the form of the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel. The need for the medium sized roll-on roll-off fleet has direct links to today’s changing nature of conflict and the re-stationing of forces to the continental United States. The changing nature of conflict and the re-stationing of forces have increased the need for strategic lift, especially sealift. The need to project power quickly is increasing while the capability remains stagnant and low in the list of priorities. The need to deploy smaller sized forces of brigade, division, or single corps size to engage in limited warfare is likely to grow.113 The ability to project that type of force in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy, and after action reviews of previous conflicts has not advanced with regard to sealift despite routine identification as a requirement. In this regard, sealift fails to support the emerging needs of future operational commanders. Obviously, commanders desire flexibility when deploying a force, not constraints that limit their potential options.

Second and third are adaptation and large joint logistics over-the-shore vessels – current success is contingent on weather and infrastructure – medium RORO vessels solve and allow for commander flexibility – that’s key to power projection. Hilberg 10 Erik E. Hilberg, Major in the US Army, recognized by the Department of Logistics and Resource Operations of the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) as the Major General James M. Wright Distinguished Master Logistician for Intermediate Level Education class 2009-02, “Does the United States’ Strategic Mobility Program Support the Needs of Operational Commanders?,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010 Recent history has proven that the United States military has historically focused on fighting large-scale wars while avoiding complex or ill-structured smaller scale scenarios such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. The historic inability to balance the military’s capabilities across the entire spectrum of potential conflict is a continuous flaw in United States war planning. The same debate applies to strategic sealift; the majority of the United States’ investment focuses on extremely large ships that can only conduct missions to developed ports. However, the Department of Defense’s strategic mobility program requires the balance that shallow draft medium sized vessels can provide. This mix of capabilities provides the flexibility that operational commanders desire when trying to incorporate the elements of operational art and design into their campaign planning. The United States should maintain an emphasis on joint logistics over-the-shore operations since it is a proven national level capability and asset that provides flexibility at the operational level. The Haiti case study shows the critical role the United States Transportation Command plays in ensuring the conduct of joint annual training and readiness exercises. The importance of the command hosting the annual joint logistics over-the-shore exercise was a critical lesson learned from Operation Unified Response. However, the Somalia case study proves that joint logistics over-the- shore has limitations, especially in areas that are prone to high sea states. The argument that the existing capabilities of the large vessel fleet combined with joint logistics over-the-shore can solve all berthing issues only works in certain scenarios. Those scenarios require fair weather and developed infrastructure. An improved medium sized fleet would enhance joint logistics over-the-shore efforts. Reducing the depth of lighterage points and the length of causeways has the potential to mitigate weather challenges during joint logistics over-the-shore missions. Medium-sized shallow draft vessels are likely to lessen the reliance on joint logistics over-the-shore or shorten its duration of employment during conflict. Another benefit is that many vessels would be relieved from lightering duties, which would enhance the potential for expanded throughput operations at sea, or on inland waterways. This type of scenario would enhance an operational commander’s range of options once in a theater of operation. Such options enhance the ability to incorporate the elements of operational art. By meeting or exceeding the scientific or mathematic requirements a scenario requires the ability to conduct the art portion of the deployment process expands significantly. This is where successful employment of the elements of operational art and design best occurs at the operational level. What is often missing is the initial opportunity to employ those elements.

Power projection prevents several scenarios for global nuclear war Kagan 07 Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, August-September 2007, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 6 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 7 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Uniqueness Ext US military lacking in strategic mobile transportation Hickins, Major in US military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, Major in military, Nov. 2010, "Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military's Weakest Link” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec02/MS813.htm According to the National Defense Council Federation, the top 10 potential conflict areas likely to involve the United States are Afghanistan, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Years of budget constraints, force downsizing, and the steady withdrawal of U.S. forces from overseas bases have eroded the options available to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and unified commanders to meet challenges to U.S. security effectively. After glancing at a map, the question that leaps out is, "How can power be projected into these potential conflict areas in a timely manner?" High-speed sealift, a technology available commercially today, could help solve this strategic mobility dilemma. A major problem facing the United States is its inability to project land power into or within a theater of operations at the speed and tempo required. This strategic transport problem limits a combatant commander's ability to deter conflict, respond with enough land power to prevent escalation of a crisis, or defeat opponents quickly and decisively if required. It limits the Army's ability to get into a fight and sustain it. The relevance of the Army hinges on strategic airlift and sealift. High-speed sealift puts a powerful tool back into the combatant commander's toolbox, vastly enhancing his ability to resolve a crisis. In short, high-speed sealift will fill the gap in strategic deployment capability that currently limits the joint force from reaching its full potential to deter and defeat future opponents. The 2000 Army Science Board study, "Technical and Tactical Opportunities for Revolutionary Advances in Rapidly Deployable Joint Ground Forces in the 2015- 2025 Era," found that a highly lethal and survivable force incapable of rapid deployment is not relevant in a power- projection Army. Conversely, a highly deployable light force with limited lethality and survivability is not likely to deter a determined foe. Rapid projection of joint forces and their continued sustainment are the critical capabilities underpinning the ability of U.S. forces to respond effectively around the globe. During the most recent conflicts involving U.S. forces, moving forces and supplies into and around the theater quickly was a major problem. Throughout the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, U.S. forces encountered problems with deploying ships to the Balkans quickly. During Operation Desert Shield, 82d Airborne Division troops from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were deployed rapidly but with so little firepower that they were referred to jokingly as a "speed bump." And in Somalia, ships loaded with equipment were unable to offload because no ports in the area could accommodate them. Thus, operations were delayed. Since the end of the Cold War, the centerpiece of the U.S. defense strategy has been power projection. Power projection is the ability to deploy U.S. forces rapidly and effectively and sustain them from multiple, dispersed locations. By complementing overseas presence, power projection strives for unconstrained global reach. Global power projection provides national leaders with options they must have to mitigate potential crises. In October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced his vision of a future in which the Army would field lighter, more lethal, less logistically demanding, and more deployable forces than the current Army of Excellence. The bad news is that, no matter how much the U.S. military is transformed to become lighter, more lethal, and more agile, its forces still cannot be deployed to most of the projected hot spots in the world in a timely manner. The current Defense transportation system cannot support the Army's strategic mobility requirement to be able to move a medium brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days, which limits the options available to the unified commanders. Each leg of the strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and pre- positioning) depends on the other, but each has inherent weaknesses.

Current army intra-theater sealift capabilities are insufficient – new army intra-theater sealift must increase its capabilities. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The Army has the intra-theater requirement to transport forces, equipment, and sustainment in support of combat operations and other National Military and Security objectives. To this end, new Army intra-theater sealift capabilities must be developed as an essential 2 component of the future force. The current Army watercraft fleet is reaching the end of its economic useful life, has an old design, and its speed does not enable it to meet the Army’s new deployment timelines6. The future force must be capable of deploying a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after wheels up (APOE or SPOE). It must be able to build a force into a warfighting division on the ground within 120 hours, and assemble 5 combat divisions in theater in 30 days. The demand on strategic mobility assets to accomplish this mission is overwhelming. Additionally, the increased demand to move forces by intra-theater lift and sustain them in a timely fashion will require new capabilities.

Current Army watercraft has shortcomings in speed, survivability, passenger capacity, and self- containment. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The current number and capabilities of the current Army watercraft fleet do not possess the required operational characteristics to provide future force commanders responsive and 4 agile intra-theater lift. The MRS-2005 cited previously revealed significant shortfalls in the total number of vessels. The fleet of 6 LSVs and 35 LCU-2000 were built with an Economic Useful Life (EUL) of 25 years. The LSV fleet will begin to reach its EUL in 2013 with only 2 LSVs remaining as viable assets. Likewise, the LCU-2000 fleet will reach its full EUL by 2018. This combined loss represents 95percent of the Army’s near-term intra-theater sealift capacity and almost eliminates the ability to conduct intra-theater lift missions to include JLOTS operations. The loss of this capability will place an extreme demand on air intra-theater assets. While this fleet’s life could be extended, the design will not allow the addition of passenger space to allow concurrent lift of equipment with troops. Another shortcoming of the current fleet is its speed – 10 knots. This slow speed does not provide responsiveness and agility envisioned for the future force under the Army Transformation plan. The 10-knot speed also puts the crew at risk in a flat bottomed vessel with a bow ramp because this speed is too slow to evade adverse weather conditions which produce extreme sea states. Neither the LSV nor the LCU-2000 is designed to carry passengers. Therefore, the current fleet lacks the ability to deliver a combat ready force. The personnel assigned to the equipment the fleet would carry into a combat zone would have to use another intra-theater transportation mode to marry up with their combat systems. Additionally, the current fleet requires external materiel handling equipment (MHE) such as port cranes, floating cranes, or container handling equipment (CHE) to load/unload containers or palletized cargo. This shortfall increases the support required at both the upload and discharge ports. Programmed improvements for the current fleet are focused on vessel reliability and maintainability not speed, survivability, passenger capacity, or self-containment. The vessels’ design prohibits these improvements, essentially making them economically unsuitable for modification to support interim and future force capabilities 21. Therefore, current Army watercraft cannot meet the Army’s Transformation objectives.

Roro ships have yet to be perfected Global Security, no date No date, “RO-RO [Roll-on / Roll-Off]”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ro-ro.htm Roll-On/Roll-Off(Ro-Ro) shipping system involves the direct driving-on and driving-off of cargo. The Ro-Ro method enables shippers to load cargo on the chassis, trailer and "low-boy" at the plant or warehouse site, transport the vehicles to embarkation points and have them loaded directly onto the vessel. By rolling cargo on board these vessels and rolling it off at its destination, shippers can reduce the number of times their cargo is handled. The inherent disadvantage of Ro-Ro is the waste of cargo carrying capacity due to undercarriage and all-around clearance requirements. Although the degree of packing may be reduced for Ro-Ro shipments, keep in mind that the cargo will travel aboard an oceangoing vessel and will be subjected to all the hazards of an ocean voyage. These special ships usually have 10 to 12 cargo decks, and two of these are mainly reserved for transportation of heavier cargo. The heavy-load decks have to be placed relatively high on the level of the deck above the machinery space if it is located in the afterbody, and thus relatively high, which is not a good solution as regards the stability of the ship. On the heavy-load decks or on some parts thereof containers may also be placed which have to be brought aboard the ship either on wheeled pallets, in which case the pallets remain on the ship, or by special trucks. The containers are placed in stacks of 1 to 2 layers on the decks. For functional loading and unloading, space is required for drive lanes, openings in transverse bulkheads, sides and decks. The ship has to be equipped with a heavy stern ramp, stern gates, and in general with 1 to 2 side ports. The transverse bulkheads must be provided with openings, and they have to be specially reinforced and equipped with remote controlled actuators. The cargo decks must have openings and be equipped with hoistable drive-lane ramps, of which some are fixed, some hinged or hoistable. In most cases there are also a few lift platforms of articulated type for handling cargo between two decks. The highest decks can be divided by means of hoistable car decks. There are also car decks which are hinged to the side bulkheads and which can be turned by means of actuators into the operating position. All in all, the structures must have a great number of openings and they must be reinforced, there is a lot of bulky equipment, fixed or moveable, in these areas, and space has to be reserved for drive lanes. There are generally 2 to 3 longitudinal pillar rows on the decks, to reduce the hull weight, but at the same time to create restrictions as to the positioning of vehicles and cargo. The vehicles are driven within the ship using their own engine power. Because of exhaust gases the ventilation system of the ship must be exceptionally effective. A large number of ventilation ducts also splits the deck areas. The total weight of vehicle carrying ships is also relatively heavy. The vehicles

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 9 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 themselves are homogeneous, light transport goods, the stowage factor being on an average four to five times higher compared with container and general cargo. In a pure car carrier the weight of car cargo represents about 40 to 50% of the dead weight of the ship, while in PCTC-type ships it is only about 20 to 25% of the dead weight. In all circumstances, a considerable quantity of ballast water has to be transported to ensure the stability of the ship, in the most unfavourable cases the amount thereof exceeding the weight of the vehicle cargo. As a result, more engine power is needed, unnecessary fuel is consumed; besides, the shipping company does not gain anything from transporting "dead water ballast". The deck houses are located on the uppermost deck, and so are the life-boat stations. The vertical center of gravity of the ship structure being high has been a limiting factor in utilizing the space vertically. In conventional techniques the construction design in the cargo spaces is based on steel plate deck reinforced with stiffening girders. The total thickness of such a local construction may be 200 . . . >450 mm and the plate thicknesses of fixed light-weight car decks are 5 to 6 mm at the minimum, exceeding considerably the local-strength thickness required by the cargo. In a plate field of a deck there are lower beams in each frame space and high frame girders at sparser intervals. On the edges of deck openings and drive ramps there are high, strong stiffening beams. Hoistable or turnable platforms are of lighter construction, shipyard specific, and constructed in accordance with generally known concepts. Such structures also require space either in the roof or on the walls; in addition, actuators need space. Ships adapted to transport wheeled vehicles are usually provided with a single deck only, as in a Ferry. Occasionally there is more than one deck, but the ship will then have to be equipped with lifts or internal ramps for moving the vehicle from one deck to another. Ships for the transportation of new passenger cars have been designed with multiple decks and internal ramps permitting the stowing of the cars about in the same manner as in a parking house. The manoevering of these comparatively light cars is much easier than the manoevering of heavy loaded vehicles or container transporting trucks, so it is acceptable that a car performs sharp turns inside the shipe. With heavy loads that must be avoided. To facilitate a rapid loading and unloading it is desirable that the ship be provided with at least two ramps located at about the same level, so the operations in any part of the ship will not be influenced by differences in height between the ship and the quay. The cargo carrying portion of the ship, which is provided with at least two decks, is subdivided into fully separated cargo volumes, formed as straight, blind alleys emanating from lobbies arranged inside the ramps. To permit access to the individual decks a longitudinal section through the ship, between two lobbies, will show that one deck is inclined upwards while the other deck is inclined downwards from the opposite lobby. Out of consideration for the ship's safety it is desirable that the cargo carrying portion of the ship be subdivided into separate compartments, which is difficult to attain if the ship is provided with internal ramps, permitting communication between different decks. To facilitate loading and unloading short travelling distances within the ship should be endeavoured, and as the loaded units usually are very heavy, sharp turns should be avoided. To permit rapid handling the ship should have at least two access ports, each with a communication ramp, and it is essentail that these are located at about the same level, so they may be simultaneously served from the same quay. The current ship types have weaknesses in loading flexibility. Placing different kinds of customer-specific batches of different sizes on a number of fixed decks and partly on hoistable decks or drive ramps prolongs the loading phase and does not always succeed satisfactorily. The control of batches to be unloaded at a particular port may also lead to new intermediate loadings there. These problems are hard to eliminate using the current basic concept. Such ship types exert global sea traffic on all sea routes. To facilitate firm fastening of wheeled cargo, the fixed structures of a ship have to be appropriately constructed; separate fastening equipment and plenty of manual work aboard are also needed. The basic decks of the ships are dimensioned for shaft and wheel loads of heavy wheeled cargo, whereby the local strength of the decks is on an average 8 to 20 times higher than is required by a load of passenger cars and vans. Units moving on wheels are secured on a horizontally loaded vessel, in particular semitrailers, rolltrailers and cassettes are secured on a ro-ro vessel, by using different chains, webbings and wires, by means of which each cargo unit is fastened to the deck of the vessel. One problem in using chains, webbings and wires for lashing the cargo unit to the deck of the vessel is that, when these are used, the unit lashed to the deck together with lashings and the deck structure does not necessarily always form a continuous structure of sufficient strength, which might result in the shifting of cargo in the cargo space in case the number or the quality of lashings is inadequate. A problem with these known lashings is also that the lashing is done by hand, which is in itself rather expensive and time-consuming. The vessel and the cargo unit are usually parallel, in which connection the forces which are caused by the movements of the vessel and which are directed at the cargo are greatest in the transverse direction, which means that transverse securing is very important when cargo units are lashed to the vessel. Safety factors are also important, and when chains, webbings, wires, etc. known from prior art are used, one problem is that it is possible to fit them in a wrong manner, in which connection the lashing does not necessarily fulfil the function set for it. In addition to chains, webbings, etc., a trestle, or a trailer horse, is used in connection with securing of semitrailers, the wheelless end of the semitrailer being supported by means of the trestle for the time of transport on the vessel. Semitrailers are conventionally provided with their own legs, by means of which the wheelless end can be supported ashore, but these legs do not alone sustain the load which is directed at them from the unit and its cargo during sea transport as a result of the movements of the vessel, and thus said trestle or equivalent is needed for support of the semitrailer during sea transport. The trestle is usually made of steel and it is placed manually under the wheelless end of

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 10 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 the semitrailer. Hitherto known modes of installation of gas turbine engine powerplants in such vessels have involved use of the superstructure to support exhaust silencers, air intakes and their associated ducting at a high level, producing funnel- like structures which add top weight to the ship and increase wind resistance. This approach has also required intrusion of engine air intake ducts and exhaust ducts into otherwise revenue-earning deckspace above the two hulls. Further problems have been that there have been large pressure losses in the ducting associated with high level intakes, together with aerodynamic disturbance of the air flow into the compressor of the gas turbine engine. The shape of conventional car carriers makes them very susceptible to wind pressure, which causes leeway, that is, sideways drift of a vessel. In 2003 a new wind resistance-reducing design for pure car carriers (PCCs) was registered with the Japanese Patent Office. The technology, applied to vessels since March 2003, was developed in cooperation with Universal Shipbuilding Corp. The vessel's bow is aerodynamically rounded and beveled along the bow line to help reduce pressure from headwinds. The upper deck has cargo space (called the garage deck) to maximize load capacity. The vessel also has different levels, with square cut corner sections, all along the sides of the vessel at the top of the garage deck, which help reduce pressure from sidewinds. The design effectively reduces leeway caused by wind pressure. As a result, the design improves both fuel efficiency, which in turn reduces emissions of CO2, NOx, and SOx in vessel engine exhaust, and speed. More than a year of voyages by PCCs of the new design proved, as expected, that the design reduces leeway, improves speed, and results in an annual fuel efficiency improvement exceeding 5% over similar PCCs of conventional design.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 11 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Current RORO ships are very popular but not very safe Chopra, ‘11 Karan, second officer/writer at Marine Insight, experienced Mariner, Dual Certificate Holder (Engine and Deck), 2 nd Officer for more than seven years on almost all major types of vessels, 12/19/11, http://www.marineinsight.com/misc/marine-safety/8-reasons-that-make-ro-ro-ship-unsafe-to-work-on/ A ro-ro vessel is one of the most sought after cargo ships to work on. Providing both cargo and passengers carrying capabilities, ro-ro ships reaches ports more frequently and have shorter voyages. The flexibility, speed and the ship’s functionality to blend with other transportation modes has made it popular among seafarers. However, there are things that make ro-ro ships dangerous to work on. Ro-ro ships have been criticized for a number of reasons, mainly because of one single reason – safety of the ship. Safety being the primary concern of ship owner, operator, and seafarer, lately ro-ro ship has become less famous to work on. We bring you eight reasons that make ro-ro ship is a bit dangerous to work on as compared to other ships. 1. The Problem of Stability If a vessel maintains its stability at sea then it is safer to sail. However, the problem with the RO-RO ship is its design, which includes cargo in upper decks and accommodation at even higher levels. Even a minor shift of cargo in the ro-ro vessel can become a major threat to the stability of the ship. Similarly, hull failure leading to flooding can result in capsize of the vessel in no time. The effects of wind and bad weather on high accommodation can also disturb the ship’s stability. 2. Low Freeboard In Ro-Ro ships which carry only cargo, the general arrangement of cargo access door is close to the water line. In the event of listing, the door can get submerged leading to high chances for ingress of water inside the ship which will lead to capsize. 3. Cargo Access Door As discussed above the effect of listing of the ship leads to ingress of water if the cargo doors are open or damaged. One weak point of ro-ro vessel is that sometimes the cargo door itself is used as a ramp which makes the ship more vulnerable to damages. 4. Lack of Bulkheads The subdivision of ro-ro ship from inside lacks from the transverse bulkheads, leading to lower water tight integrity when water ingress or flooding takes place. Lack of bulkhead also leads to spreading of fire more quickly as no subdivision is present to contain the fire. 5. Location of Life Saving Appliances (LSA) When a ship is to be abandoned, life raft and lifeboats are used to leave the ship as soon as possible. The location of lifeboat and life rafts on ro-ro ships is usually very high, which makes it even difficult to lower them at sea especially when the ship is listing. 6. Weather condition Another reason which acts externally on the Ro-Ro vessel is the rough weather, which may result in reduction in the stability and cause heavy rolling of the ship. Heavy rolling has lead to capsizing of ships in the past. 7. Cargo stowage Cargo stowage is very important operation on Ro-Ro vessel for any loose cargo (trailer, cars etc.) can give rise to a chain reaction leading to heavy shift in cargo position. The trucks and trawlers loaded on board also carry cargo inside them and any shift of that cargo can also lead to listing of the ship. 8. Cargo Loading It is very difficult to have a sequential loading of cargo as cargo arrives on terminals at different intervals and due to lack of time on port. This further leads to uneven cargo distribution, something for which nothing can be done about. Lack of proper cargo distribution has been the reason for several ship accidents in the past.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 12 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Sealift capabilities need work Hickins, colonel in Us military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, colonel in US military, March 2010, "Strategic Mobility” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr10/spectrum_strategy_mobility.html Sealift, the second triad leg, is designed to get the bulk of the needed equipment to the area of operations between 10 and 30 days after callup, and it is the primary means of sustaining the fight. Sealift capability comes from three sources: Government-owned ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to DOD, and ships operating in commercial trade. As with airlift, the current number and capabilities of the fleet do not meet projected requirements. MRS–05 requires 10 million square feet of organic DOD sealift. It calls for 19 fast sealift ships (FSSs), LMSR ships, and 330 other ships plus contracts to meet the requirements. Currently, the Navy owns or charters 120 ships. Of the 120, 82 are in the Military Sealift Command active force and 38 are in the Ready Reserve Force. Only 28 of the 120 ships are medium speed or higher. The Military Sealift Command owns 8 FSSs, which can travel in excess of 30 knots, and 20 LMSR ships, which can travel at speeds up to 24 knots. Together, all 8 FSSs can transport nearly the equivalent of a mechanized division (200 C– 17 payloads) from the CONUS east coast to Europe in less than 6 days or to the Persian Gulf in 18 days. The LMSRs can transport the equivalent of 500 C–17 payloads up to 12,000 nautical miles at 24 knots. Just like the airlift leg of the mobility triad, the sealift leg looks great on paper and briefs well until proper analysis is done. During the Gulf War, three out of the eight FSSs were late and a fourth broke down en route. The first wave of ships only averaged 23 knots versus the expected 33 knots, adding 5 days to the transit time. The Ready Reserve Force fared much worse, with only 25 percent of the ships deploying on time and 50 percent over 5 days late. During the second phase of activation, an additional 26 Ready Reserve Force ships were activated; only 4 were on time, and over half of them were more than 10 days late.25 The problems continued after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 when a Ready Reserve Force ship failed to make its deployment time after numerous crewmembers walked off the ship. Over the last 20 years, the Government-owned fleet has been modernized somewhat with the purchase of 20 LMSRs and the procurement of a new logistics support vessel (LSV). However, these ships are slow and only account for 25 percent of the total fleet. And the fleet is not young. The average Ready Reserve Force ship is over 37 years old.

Speed is needed to improve Navy Hickins, colonel in Us military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, colonel in US military, March 2010, "Strategic Mobility” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr10/spectrum_strategy_mobility.html Each leg of the mobility triad has deficiencies. Airlift requirements outnumber capabilities. The utility of sealift is degraded by lack of access to ports, inadequate port capacity, poor conditions of facilities at seaports of embarkation and debarkation, and the age of the U.S. fleet. Land-based pre-positioned equipment is not positioned correctly, takes a lengthy amount of time to arrive in theater, and is depleted. The United States needs a bridging strategy that delivers viable solutions to the combatant commanders. DOD could pursue many options in solving the strategic mobility dilemma. The first is to do nothing. According to the 2006 QDR, strategic mobility has no problems and many analysts would point to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to prove that point. But they would be wrong in their choice of examples because the current fights are not expeditionary fights. So what other options are possible to address the problem? To fix airlift, either capabilities must be increased or requirements reduced to match current capabilities. The airlift fleet has already gone through extensive modernization with the retirement of the C–141, the procurement of the C–17, and the upgrades to the C–5. Short of buying more airframes, the United States cannot do much more to increase its airlift capabilities, so the best option to fix airlift is to use the other legs of the triad to mitigate the airlift shortfalls. That being said, the United States still needs to consider the future needs of airlift and pursue the development and procurement of future platforms, such as the global range transport, ultra-large airlifter, C–17 aircraft with a payload/range extension program, and super short take-off and landing aircraft. The United States also needs to continue to pursue the acquisition and development of future sealift platforms like the shallow draft high-speed ship (SDHSS), monohull fast sealift ship, and other high-speed Navy vessels.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 13 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Speed is needed to improve Navy Hickins, colonel in Us military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, colonel in US military, March 2010, "Strategic Mobility” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr10/spectrum_strategy_mobility.html Until technology allows the United States to move forces from CONUS to anywhere in the world in less than 7 days, regardless of SPODs and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), forward positioning of equipment is the key. The way to fix the mobility triad is to take the holistic approach. The United States cannot fix each leg of the triad, but by focusing on intratheater lift and positioning of the pre-positioned equipment, the United States can use the strengths of each leg to fix the whole. A current off-the-shelf capability can provide a bridging strategy until future platforms become attainable. That capability is the high-speed catamaran. Coupling the catamaran with APS and positioning them in the different combatant command areas of responsibility (AORs) would provide a force that a combatant commander could rapidly deploy. It would also provide organic intratheater lift capability once the vessels discharge the APS, and that would decrease the airlift requirements. The catamaran would provide a platform to rapidly deliver aid supplies during natural disasters without using warships, which can send the wrong message to those in need. The current commercial off-the-shelf theater support vessel (TSV) is also an option for bolstering sealift capability. A recent example of a TSV-type capability was demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Spearhead, a commercial fast shallow draft ferry that the Army was leasing from an Australian firm, moved the 101st Airborne Division’s military police from Djibouti to Kuwait, making the 2,000- mile trip in 2½ days. An LSV would have needed 10 days to make the voyage and could have only transported equipment, requiring the troops to fly separately. In 2003, the Army conducted a port study of CENTCOM and PACOM AORs to examine the accessibility of 282 ports in 26 countries. An LMSR can only access 27 percent of these ports because of its draft of 9.1 to 10.5 meters. The TSV, however, can access 74 percent of the ports because its draft is between 4.6 and 6 meters. The high-speed catamaran would also provide access to more austere ports, thus limiting the area-denial options that potential adversaries would have. If we look back at World War II and the Inchon landings in Korea, the United States has had to conduct forced entries before without the use of ports. Why do we now discount that possibility? During the Vigilant Warriors 01 wargame, U.S. and allied forces employed a mixture of current lift assets and promising future concepts. Of all current and future airlift and sealift capabilities, the SDHSS and the TSV most significantly affected force closure rates because of their speed, throughput capability, and capacity. The SDHSS and TSV were the only platforms that could sufficiently deliver troops and equipment to bring immediate combat power to bear. While in transit, commanders were able to conduct en route mission planning and receive intelligence updates. The TSV provided transformational capability and operational maneuver of Army formations. Since the TSV can carry approximately 7 times as much as the C–17 and 24 times as much as the C–130, it had the added benefit of reducing intratheater airlift requirements elsewhere in the theater. I propose acquiring enough high-speed catamarans to carry four BCTs. Each combatant commander would have a BCT afloat that could rapidly deploy to an intermediate staging base to marry up the equipment with troops deployed out of CONUS, and each of the sets could be mutually supporting if the crisis called for more forces. For example, the PACOM set could move quickly to the CENTCOM AOR if needed and vice-versa. The strategic mobility triad has many weaknesses. Waiting for future platforms is not the answer. This dilemma must be analyzed holistically as a joint problem. It is not a single service problem and, therefore, cannot be approached as one. Strategic mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces to the proper place in space and time in order to allow the combatant commander to deter, de-escalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. The 2006 QDR’s statement, “Extensive investments in cargo transportability, strategic lift, and pre-positioned stocks over the past decade have yielded military forces capable of responding to a broad spectrum of security challenges worldwide,”36 is at best misleading and at worst wishful thinking. Eighty percent of all countries have borders on a coast, 80 percent of the world’s capitals lie within 350 miles of a coast, and 95 percent of the world’s population lives within 500 miles of a coast.37 Currently, the United States cannot move significant ground forces to crisis areas in a timely manner. The most recent National Security Strategy states that either host-nation or allied APODs and SPODs will be used to quickly move forces into a crisis area. Many of the countries involved in past crises or that have a high potential for future crises (such as Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Yemen, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, China, Korea, Taiwan, Georgia, Sudan, East Timor, Venezuela, and Cuba) border the world’s oceans and are in remote, unimproved areas of the world. Half of these countries sit astride strategic waterways, and their locations could impede the United States and its allies. If the United States had to engage any of these countries militarily, the combatant commander would need all the assets that the mobility triad has in order to respond. If the United States wants to continue to provide the world with political, economic, informational, and military leadership, it needs the ability to send military forces into the numerous trouble spots throughout the world. The United States cannot afford to rely on host nation or allied support. Nor can it rely on limited air transport and slow sealift to get our forces to the crisis area. The United States must stop paying lip service to the shortfalls in our strategic mobility triad and leverage the available technology and create a truly inter-dependent and complementary mobility triad that is critical for operational and strategic success.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 14 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 TSV Solvency Ext TSV is key to forward deployment and we have the tech now Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security 2011 (Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security, "Theater Support Vessel (TSV) CONOPS", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tsv.htm) The TSV will, initially, augment and then replace selected legacy watercraft such as the LCU-2000 and several variants of Army floating craft that were conceptualized and built in the 1970s - 80s to support a forward deployed heavy force. The TSV will be optimized to support operational movement and maneuver of interim and objective forces while continuing to provide support to current heavy forces. The TSV will be a platform built using existing technologies that have been developed in the commercial market place. Military utility will be further enhanced by integrating existing commercial & military technologies to improve vessel productivity, survivability and supportability. The Theater Support Vessel (TSV), the Army's future watercraft, is an essential element for the Future Forces. It will provide commanders high-speed, intra-theater sealift mobility that is not limited to major ports. The TSV will maximize rapid intra-theater sealift to provide the warfighter the capability to operationally move and maneuver combat ready forces and follow-on sustainment. The Army intended to acquire the Objective Theater Support Vessel (OTSV), which is required for the intra-theater movement of troops and military equipment. Military equipment includes troops (passengers), rolling stock, containers and pallets, which are not on trailers. It will have the ability to operate out of minor ports, which are too small for large commercial cargo vessels and shall have its own organic cargo handling capability. The TSV must be able to self-deploy long distances without cargo and be built to commercial standards, supplemented as needed with military requirements, such as structural requirements beyond the minimal normally required for vehicle fast ferries.

The TSV’s size allows it to access many more ports, providing commanders with greater operational flexibility. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The significance of increasing port access in areas as volatile as Korea is key to providing commanders flexibility. LMSR capable ports are well known in Korea and are prime targets for conventional, unconventional, and potentially nuclear attack by the North Koreans. JLOTS operations in Korea west coastal areas are not practical due to high sea state conditions. Shallow draft vessels expand access options greatly and provide the commander the flexibility required for future forces while giving a potential enemy many more access points to counter. This table indicates that the TSV can access about 74 percent of the 282 ports studied because its draft is between 4.6 and 6 meters. A LMSR can access only 27 percent of these same ports due to its draft of 9.1 to 10.5 meters. Also noted within the study was the length consideration. A TSV with a length of 121 meters (397 feet) can access 92 percent of these ports. Since depth limits TSV access to 74 percent of the ports, depth is the limiting factor. The TSV nearly triples the number of ports available to the combatant commander greatly increasing operational flexibility.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 15 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The TSV has much greater capability and functionality than the Army’s current intra-theater watercraft. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The Army’s current fleet of intra-theater watercraft has been optimized to transport current heavy forces in the traditional JLOTS bare beach operations and will not meet the needs of the transforming Army. Most significantly the difference between current Army watercraft and the TSV is that the TSV will transport combat ready units within a theater eliminating the need for RSOI of soldiers, vehicles and equipment within the battle space. This is a tremendous leap ahead in capability and goes a long way to reducing the in-theater logistics footprint. The TSV also reduces the need for weather dependent JLOTS operations because it can access many more ports than strategic sealift. Unlike the current Army watercraft fleet, the TSV provides the commander intra-theater movement and maneuver of combat ready unit sets within the Joint Operational Area (JOA) from intermediate staging bases (ISB), from sea bases, and from in-stream discharge. This capability allows the commander to pick the time and place to initiate action and thereby seize and hold the initiative. The TSV’s capability mitigates the enemy’s anti-access strategy because it can deliver combat units simultaneously through multiple points of entry denied to strategic shipping. The current commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) TSV has the following capabilities: · Average Speed: 40+ knots · Self Deployment Range: 4726+ Nautical Miles @ 40 knots · Intra-Theater Movement & Maneuver Lift of Intact Unit Sets: 350+ Troops plus Gear · Cargo Space: 25-30K Square Feet · Cargo Tonnage/Delivery Range: Up to 1,250 Short Tons (17 M1A2 Tanks)/1000 Nautical Miles31 A C4ISR suite will be an integral part of the TSV. This will give the deploying unit the capability to receive real-time intelligence updates. Units will be able to also receive change of mission orders, collaboratively plan with headquarters and forward elements, and conduct rehearsals while en route to the entry point. Most importantly, a C4ISR package will provide the command and control necessary to manage the critical early entry piece of deployments when changes to plans are most likely. Current Army watercraft do not have a C4ISR capability. A recent example of a TSV-type capability was demonstrated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The Spearhead, a commercial fast, shallow draft ferry being leased from and Australian firm by the Army, moved the 101st Airborne Division’s military police from Djibouti to Kuwait, making the 2,000-mile trip in two and a half days. The LSV would have needed 10 days to make the voyage and could only transport equipment, requiring the troops to fly separately. The LSV has only a bow ramp which limits its up/download capability while the TSV will have an astern M1A2 capable ramp with an up to 45-degree slewing angle capability.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 16 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The TSV has much greater capability and functionality than the Army’s current intra-theater watercraft. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The Army’s current fleet of intra-theater watercraft has been optimized to transport current heavy forces in the traditional JLOTS bare beach operations and will not meet the needs of the transforming Army. Most significantly the difference between current Army watercraft and the TSV is that the TSV will transport combat ready units within a theater eliminating the need for RSOI of soldiers, vehicles and equipment within the battle space. This is a tremendous leap ahead in capability and goes a long way to reducing the in-theater logistics footprint. The TSV also reduces the need for weather dependent JLOTS operations because it can access many more ports than strategic sealift. Unlike the current Army watercraft fleet, the TSV provides the commander intra-theater movement and maneuver of combat ready unit sets within the Joint Operational Area (JOA) from intermediate staging bases (ISB), from sea bases, and from in-stream discharge. This capability allows the commander to pick the time and place to initiate action and thereby seize and hold the initiative. The TSV’s capability mitigates the enemy’s anti-access strategy because it can deliver combat units simultaneously through multiple points of entry denied to strategic shipping. The current commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) TSV has the following capabilities: · Average Speed: 40+ knots · Self Deployment Range: 4726+ Nautical Miles @ 40 knots · Intra-Theater Movement & Maneuver Lift of Intact Unit Sets: 350+ Troops plus Gear · Cargo Space: 25-30K Square Feet · Cargo Tonnage/Delivery Range: Up to 1,250 Short Tons (17 M1A2 Tanks)/1000 Nautical Miles31 A C4ISR suite will be an integral part of the TSV. This will give the deploying unit the capability to receive real-time intelligence updates. Units will be able to also receive change of mission orders, collaboratively plan with headquarters and forward elements, and conduct rehearsals while en route to the entry point. Most importantly, a C4ISR package will provide the command and control necessary to manage the critical early entry piece of deployments when changes to plans are most likely. Current Army watercraft do not have a C4ISR capability. A recent example of a TSV-type capability was demonstrated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The Spearhead, a commercial fast, shallow draft ferry being leased from and Australian firm by the Army, moved the 101st Airborne Division’s military police from Djibouti to Kuwait, making the 2,000-mile trip in two and a half days. The LSV would have needed 10 days to make the voyage and could only transport equipment, requiring the troops to fly separately. The LSV has only a bow ramp which limits its up/download capability while the TSV will have an astern M1A2 capable ramp with an up to 45-degree slewing angle capability.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 17 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Advantage Two: Economy

The shipbuilding industry is dying – investment is key to solve. Wood et al 04 Robert Wood et al, Captain in the US Navy, Timothy Hale, Colonel in the US Air Force, Kevin Nally, Colonel in the US Marine Corps, Patrick Harmand, Captain in the French Navy, Marius Danielescu, Commander in the Romanian Air Force, Rick McQueen, Commander in the US Navy, William S. Larese, Lieutenant Colonel, Norbert Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel, Jerry Chastain, Lieutenant Colonel, Quintin Hartt, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force, Douglas Wild, Lieutenant Colonel, Paul Bergeron, works in Office of the Secretary of Defense, John Meyer, works in Dept. of the Navy, Dennis Padilla, works in Dept. of the Navy, Donna Busbin, works in Dept. of the Army, Mark Montroll, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Keith Johnson, Captain in the U.S. Coast Guard, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Brett Chandler, Commander in the Royal Australian Navy, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, “2004 Shipbuiilding Industry Study,” The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, 2004 Shipbuilding is one of the oldest industries in the world. Developed countries rely on a capable shipping industry to promote commercial interests abroad. Sea transportation now accounts for over 80 percent of world trade.v During the past two decades, world trade by sea has continually increased: 3.3 billion tons of cargo in 1980, to 4.3 billion tons in 1995, to a projected 5.5 billion tons in 2010.vi Today, over 95 percent of U.S. imports and exports are transported via the sea.vii Sea- borne transportation remains the cheapest way to move large quantities of commodities over long distances. In response to these trends, a vast overseas capability for shipbuilding has emerged and continues to grow, and the U.S. domestic commercial shipbuilding industry is losing market share. Within the world’s shipbuilding market there was a 137 percent increase in the number of commercial ships being built between 1988 and 1998.viii Today, U.S. market share equates to less than one percent of the global market of ships produced as measured in gross tonnage.ix China, Korea, and Japan are three of the top commercial shipbuilding countries within the global market; the U.S. and European markets continue to decline due to the explosive expansion of the Asian shipbuilding industry.x U.S. commercial shipbuilders continue to find it more and more difficult to compete within the global environment. One reason for the loss of market share is that foreign shipyards are directly supported by government subsidies. Because they control the bulk of the new commercial ship orders, foreign yards are able to reap the cost lowering benefits from economies of scale. Today, there are only four tankers under construction within two U.S. shipyards (two each), while the large overseas yards like Hyundai have an order book of 70 ships this year and continue to receive orders for construction to the point where they can’t deliver on new orders until 2008.xi Additionally, labor costs in China are so low that they can build an entire ship for less than the United States can purchase the materials alone. Finally, because U.S. yards have generally not been able to invest capital at the same levels as their rival overseas yards, the margins of efficiency and productivity between the two continue to grow even more disparate.

TSV would revitalize the economy. Ronis 03 Shiela R Ronis, Ph.D. is Director of the MBA/MSSL Programs at Walsh College, President of The University Group, Inc., participates in many programs at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University, formerly chaired at ICAF the Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, founded and directed the Institute for Business and Community Services at The University of Detroit, “Army will deploy faster with Theater Support Vessels,” National Defense; 88, 599, pg. 28, October 2003 There is still another reason to consider the building and employment of the TSV. The US shipbuilding industrial base is in trouble. More than 60 shipyards have gone out of business in the last 40 years, eliminating over 200,000 jobs. The number of U.S. flagged cargo ships has fallen from 2,644 in 1948 to 351. Only 128 of these are ocean-going and only three nations have fleets with an average age older than American fleets. The U.S. share of the world shipping market has plummeted, from 43 percent in 1950 to 4 percent today. Foreign companies carry 97 percent of all cargo between U.S. and foreign ports. The last U.S. flagged merchant ship was built in 1992.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 18 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The shipbuilding industry is key to the economy and power projection – 95% of commerce and key to supplies. Wood et al 04 Robert Wood et al, Captain in the US Navy, Timothy Hale, Colonel in the US Air Force, Kevin Nally, Colonel in the US Marine Corps, Patrick Harmand, Captain in the French Navy, Marius Danielescu, Commander in the Romanian Air Force, Rick McQueen, Commander in the US Navy, William S. Larese, Lieutenant Colonel, Norbert Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel, Jerry Chastain, Lieutenant Colonel, Quintin Hartt, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force, Douglas Wild, Lieutenant Colonel, Paul Bergeron, works in Office of the Secretary of Defense, John Meyer, works in Dept. of the Navy, Dennis Padilla, works in Dept. of the Navy, Donna Busbin, works in Dept. of the Army, Mark Montroll, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Keith Johnson, Captain in the U.S. Coast Guard, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Brett Chandler, Commander in the Royal Australian Navy, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, “2004 Shipbuiilding Industry Study,” The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, 2004 The national security of the United States is highly dependent upon the maritime industry. We have historically been dependent upon ocean-borne commerce, and that commerce has always required robust Naval protection. The shipbuilding industry is a key component, and has been designated as part of the nation’s key/critical infrastructure. The reasons are obvious when we look at the maritime impact upon both the commercial and military viability of the U.S. Water-borne shipping is key to the economic stability and growth as 95 percent of U.S. international commerce travels via the sea.xxviii Historically, we have committed to the building and sustainment of a capable naval force to protect these vital commercial interests. Whether defending our global commerce from the Barbary Coast pirates in the 1800s, or performing international Freedom of Navigation missions ensuring our ability to carry on commercial trade and military operations through internationally agreed sea lanes, a strong Navy and Coast Guard have always been essential pieces of our national defense infrastructure. The ability to project American power around the world is dependent upon sea power. Roughly 95 percent of sustainment supplies for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) transited to the Middle East via sealift and this level of support is to be expected for future long-term contingencies.xxix Commercial shipping sources and the government-controlled fleets of Military Sealift Command and the U.S. Army provides the preponderance of immediate fast sealift, afloat pre-positioning, and Ready Reserve capabilities. The need to sustain a powerful fleet of carrier battle groups has been proven by the need to project power ashore from secure and independent bases, and the vast number of non-combatant evacuations of U.S. and foreign nationals from global “hot spots” over the last 50 years. The need for the U.S. to maintain a strong maritime industry and naval force structure is undisputed. However, we believe some significant policy changes must be implemented to maintain this national asset.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 19 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Economic decline causes global nuclear war Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8 Aaron Friedberg, prof. of politics and IR at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, and Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, visiting scholar at the Witherspoon, 10/21/08, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” http://online.wsj.co...4012352571.html

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership. Are we up for the task? The American economy has historically demonstrated remarkable resilience. Our market-oriented ideology, entrepreneurial culture, flexible institutions and favorable demographic profile should serve us well in whatever trials lie ahead. The American people, too, have shown reserves of resolve when properly led. But experience after the Cold War era -- poorly articulated and executed policies, divisive domestic debates and rising anti-Americanism in at least some parts of the world -- appear to have left these reserves diminished. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on World Affairs found that 36% of respondents agreed that the U.S. should "stay out of world affairs," the highest number recorded since this question was first asked in 1947. The economic crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 20 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Uniqueness Ext U.S. military threatened by looming budget cuts Trion writer for Bloomberg Business, 2011 By Roxanna Trion, writer for Bloomberg Business, Nov. 9 2011, "U.S. Military Chiefs Warn Budget Cuts Will Cancel Weapons", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-09/u-s-military-chiefs-warn-budget-cuts-will-cancel-weapons.htm Nov. 2 (Bloomberg) -- The chiefs of the U.S. military said they may have to end new weapons programs, close bases and cut civilian personnel starting as soon as next year if Congress allows about $1 trillion in defense cuts during the next decade. The heads of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, in testimony today before the House Armed Services Committee, joined Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in warning against the reductions. Cuts of up to $1 trillion might force the Marine Corps to cut personnel levels below what’s necessary to sustain “even one major contingency,” Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos said in his statement to the committee. The Navy may decrease by as much as 25 percent its procurement and readiness accounts if a special congressional committee fails to produce an alternative to automatic reductions, according to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert testimony. The Army would “eliminate almost all” modernization programs and consider consolidating and closing bases “commensurate with force structure reductions,” Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno said in his testimony. Army Secretary John McHugh told reporters earlier today that half of the defense cutbacks would be taken out of procurement of weapons and equipment. ‘Jobs Go Away’ “We probably have to take some 50 percent of that out of so-called modernization accounts,” McHugh said during a breakfast with reporters. “Those are real jobs in the defense industry,” he said. “If those programs go away, those jobs go away. So while I’d like to think that the supercommittee and our overseers in Congress will take a broad perspective, clearly the impact of these cuts on the economy ought to be part of the consideration.” A 12-member supercommittee is about three weeks away from its Nov. 23 deadline with no agreement in sight on spending cuts and increased tax revenue. The supercommittee, set up by the Budget Control Act, is seeking a plan for at least $1.2 trillion in deficit-reduction measures. If Congress doesn’t pass a deficit-cutting plan by Dec. 23, across-the-board spending cuts to domestic and defense programs would start in fiscal 2013. The Pentagon claims the cumulative impact would be $1 trillion through 2021, starting with the fiscal 2013 budget. ‘Trying to Frighten’ Analysts such as CATO Institute’s Benjamin Friedman urged caution in assessing the military’s warnings. “The services are special bureaucracies and they are trying to frighten us into preserving their budgets,” Friedman, a budget analyst, wrote in an e-mail. CATO, a policy center in Washington, supports reduced government spending. Congressional Budget Office Director Douglas Elmendorf told the supercommittee in Oct. 26 testimony that defense spending accounted for about 4.7 percent of gross domestic product -- the highest relative level since 1992. CBO estimates the automatic cuts would lower defense budgets by about $882 billion total through 2021, or a 16 percent decrease against current projections. Analysts’ Numbers Analysts Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Russ Rumbaugh of the Stimson Center, policy groups in Washington, said if the automatic, government- wide cuts occurred, the fiscal 2013 budget would be reduced to about $472 billion, or the equivalent of the fiscal 2007 budget adjusted for inflation. The number would remain “near that level for the following eight years,” Harrison wrote in a report today. A cut triggered by the so-called sequestration process would reduce spending 14 percent in inflation-adjusted terms from a 2010 peak, he wrote. Still, the reduction “seems modest” compared with the post-Cold War drawdown that saw spending drop 34 percent from the fiscal 1985 peak, Harrison said. “A decline in the base budget of this magnitude -- returning to the same level of funding as FY 2007 -- does not have to be a disaster,” Harrison wrote in a separate e-mail. Rumbaugh said in a report that the U.S. since 2001 has spent roughly $1 trillion on procurement and “the military services used that funding to modernize their forces.” New Equipment Bought The Air Force over the decade bought 98 percent of its planned Lockheed Martin Corp. F-22 jets, 62 percent of Boeing Co. C-17 transports, 81 percent of planned General Atomics Co. Predator armed drones and nearly 50 percent of its desired Northrop Grumman Corp. Global Hawk surveillance drones, Rumbaugh wrote. The Army bought 100 percent of its planned General Dynamics Corp. Stryker wheeled vehicles, and 94 percent of desired BAE Systems Plc Bradley Fighting Vehicles, according to Rumbaugh’s figures. The Navy and Marine Corps said their services are critical in carrying out U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. “Rising powers are rapidly modernizing their militaries and investing in capabilities to deny our forces freedom of action in vital regions such as the Asia-Pacific,” Greenert said. The Marines are the only service capable of land attacks from the sea, Amos said in prepared testimony. “If the nation lost its amphibious capability, it would have to pay for another service to provide it,” he said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 21 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The shipbuilding industrial base is dying – competitiveness is down – international subsidies. Wood et al 04 Robert Wood et al, Captain in the US Navy, Timothy Hale, Colonel in the US Air Force, Kevin Nally, Colonel in the US Marine Corps, Patrick Harmand, Captain in the French Navy, Marius Danielescu, Commander in the Romanian Air Force, Rick McQueen, Commander in the US Navy, William S. Larese, Lieutenant Colonel, Norbert Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel, Jerry Chastain, Lieutenant Colonel, Quintin Hartt, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force, Douglas Wild, Lieutenant Colonel, Paul Bergeron, works in Office of the Secretary of Defense, John Meyer, works in Dept. of the Navy, Dennis Padilla, works in Dept. of the Navy, Donna Busbin, works in Dept. of the Army, Mark Montroll, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Keith Johnson, Captain in the U.S. Coast Guard, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Brett Chandler, Commander in the Royal Australian Navy, Faculty at The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, “2004 Shipbuiilding Industry Study,” The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, 2004 In a five month long study of the shipbuilding industry, the 2004 Shipbuilding Industry Study Seminar of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University was tasked to determine the status—the strengths and weaknesses— of this key strategic industry. In the studied opinion of this group of mid- and senior level Department of Defense (DoD) officers and civilians, and two distinguished foreign military officers, it is time to signal an alarm for U.S. shipbuilding. Although able to provide the minimum new construction, repair and maintenance of the Naval forces to support the current National Security Strategy, this national industry, as a whole, is in peril. Based upon historic comparison, industry definition and current condition analysis, examination of government goals and roles, and the study of current industry issues within both the commercial shipbuilding and the government shipbuilding sectors, a bleak picture is painted. The commercial industry has lost the ability to compete in all but a few niche markets, and both the commercial and government sectors continue to maintain, and pay the price for, uneconomical overcapacity. The shipbuilding industry around the world is protected and subsidized. American shipbuilders bemoan the subsidies and other financial support given to foreign shipyards by their nations. The leadership of most of the U.S. shipyards say they can’t compete in the global market, citing the need for additional government subsidies to counter their international rivals. Even the United States, a leading nation for free market enterprise in the world and vocal advocate for free trade, is not immune from protectionist actions in support of its shipbuilding industry.

Commercial shipyards unable to compete ICAF (International College of the Armed Forces) staff, 2002 By ICAF staff, (International College of the Armed Forces), March 2002, "Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/March/Pages/Shipbuilding4125.aspx The U.S. shipbuilding industry designs and builds sophisticated military vessels, yet remains uncompetitive in the commercial shipbuilding market. The major yards are unable to compete internationally due to the industrial policies, greater efficiency and lower labor rates in other countries. The U.S. shipbuilding industry represents just 1 percent of the world market for ocean-going commercial vessels, a substantial portion of which is due to the Jones Act. This legislation requires that all vessels operating between U.S. ports be U.S. owned, U.S. operated and U.S. built. The commercial outlook for U.S. shipbuilders is bleak. They are unable to compete on the global commercial market due to high material and labor costs as well as lower productivity. Labor costs are kept artificially high by continued union resistance to employee cross-training and shipyard reluctance to invest in automated production tooling. Second and third tier shipyards, meanwhile, continue to compete effectively in niche markets on both the domestic and global market. To make the industry more competitive, the U.S. government should promote what U.S. shipyards do best—military vessels and small/medium commercial vessels. This will require further consolidation of the military industrial base and a stable procurement plan.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 22 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 American Shipyards lagging behind ICAF (International College of the Armed Forces) staff, 2002 By ICAF staff, (International College of the Armed Forces), March 2002, "Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/March/Pages/Shipbuilding4125.aspx Even the most cursory review of world shipbuilding statistics and forecasts reveals a major cause of concern for the survivability of America’s shipbuilding industry. During the last two decades, world trade by sea has continually increased: 3.3 billion tons of cargo in 1980, to 4.3 billion tons in 1995, to a projected 5.5 billion tons in 2010. Current levels of ship construction for the past few years and forecasts through 2010 are for 1,500 to 2,000 ships. The building of ships worldwide has increased every year for the last 10 years, or 137 percent from 1988 to 1998. At the same time, cargo vessel market shares have changed dramatically. Western Europe has declined from 33 percent to 18 percent, while South Korea has increased from 1 percent to 29 percent. The largest share of the world total has been held by Japan at over 39 percent. Together, Japan and Korea hold two-thirds of the total world production. Continued facility modernization and improved labor force productivity are required to compete. The results of increased productivity is readily apparent in Japan, where market share has been preserved, even though the $57 per hour wage rate far exceeds that of a $25 per hour in Europe and $15 per hour in Korea. The United States suffers from high labor rates caused by low rates of productivity. Overseas shipyards build ships more efficiently and are able to keep material costs low due to volume production and efficient production processes. The U.S. shipbuilding industry faces a number of challenges, including a changing U.S. Navy fleet, excess capacity, increased competition from non-traditional players, increased pace of technology insertion, funding fluctuations that challenge workforce retention, industry shortage of qualified technical resources and an aging workforce.

US Navy is changing, bad news for shipyard economy ICAF (International College of the Armed Forces) staff, 2002 By ICAF staff, (International College of the Armed Forces), March 2002, "Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/March/Pages/Shipbuilding4125.aspx The Navy acquisition budget for the past eight years has been insufficient to meet fleet replacement schedules. The build rate needs to double (to 12 ships per year) to sustain fleet size at 305 vessels. The same situation, however, can be seen in a different light. A Navy report sent to Congress in June 2000 showed that construction rates within the 2001- 2005 period (average 7.8 ships per year), combined with a similar rate through about 2012, can sustain between 305-315 ships. This report also shows that rates of 10-12 ships per year will be needed between 2013 and 2026 to sustain a 301 to 315-ship fleet. The Deepwater acquisition program of the U.S. Coast Guard is scheduled to begin production in 2003. It could include as many as 40 new vessels and service life extensions of others, representing significant work for the industry. Budget efficiencies can be achieved with stable, high rates of production using multiyear procurement appropriations. Excess Capacity—Worldwide shipbuilding prices are at historically low levels. Attempts to strike a balance between excess capacity and preservation of the industrial base will be the focal point of discussion should a new round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) be authorized by Congress. Funding spikes—Unsteady and unpredictable government procurement practices are forcing shipyards to compete based on short-term initiatives. Funding uncertainty creates an unsteady work environment that causes skilled labor to seek employment in other industries.

Shipyards are facing shelf-life expiration ICAF (International College of the Armed Forces) staff, 2002 By ICAF staff, (International College of the Armed Forces), March 2002, "Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/March/Pages/Shipbuilding4125.aspx The current nationwide average age of shipyard production workers is 42.1 years, maritime professionals 43.5 years and administrative workers 45.1 years. This trend indicates that the shipbuilding industry is quickly reaching a crisis situation, as replacements are not readily available. International dimension—The downturn in commercial shipbuilding orders and a dwindling U.S. Navy fleet have led to significant reductions in the shipbuilding industry workforce. The pressure to further reduce the workforce through mergers and downsizing of the shipyards is being mounted in the hope that the industry will adopt policies that would make it competitive. This approach may not yield the desired results without considering the requirements of the international customers. Because of this posture, the policy of restrictions on technology transfer to potential customers is implemented with the negative effect of driving such customers to European and Asian shipyards, where the technologies are made available to them.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 23 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Excess capacity may lead to untimely demise ICAF (International College of the Armed Forces) staff, 2002 By ICAF staff, (International College of the Armed Forces), March 2002, "Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/March/Pages/Shipbuilding4125.aspx Excess capacity continues to cause industry instability. In particular, redundant capabilities in public and private shipyards warrant further consolidation or closure. Near exclusive reliance on Department of Defense contracts by private shipyards has stifled the required investment and innovation necessary to compete in the commercial markets. However, with increased government support of foreign military sales, shipyards could make profitable use of their current excess capacity. The U.S. government is responsible for supporting an adequate naval force and reserve shipping capacity for times of national emergency. Towards that end, two agencies have leading roles: the U.S. Navy for military vessels and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) for commercial interests. MARAD needs to be committed to capitalizing on existing niches, vice attempting to salvage an entire industry replete with inefficiencies and inabilities to compete on a global scale. The “Big Six” shipyards collectively have up to 40 percent excess capacity. This capacity is expensive, and its associated maintenance costs are being absorbed by existing ship construction contracts. Maintenance of that over-capacity has been accomplished through increased overhead charges from each of the major shipbuilders. The policy of competition for the purchase of naval vessels is no longer viable. The existing bilateral monopoly must be recognized for what it is and steps must be taken to achieve cost savings through reduction of excess capacity. The government should give shipbuilders incentives to eliminate unnecessary redundancy and achieve greater efficiencies in construction and design. In the commercial shipbuilding arena, the United States is simply not competitive in the construction of large vessels. Government subsidies, inexpensive labor and efficiencies of scale have enabled Asian shipbuilders to swallow up the large ship construction market. The United States is, however, competitive in the smaller inland and coastal vessel construction arenas. The U.S. government should pursue these niche markets.

Shipbuilding industrial base is dying – all statistics are down. Ronis 03 Shiela R Ronis, Ph.D. is Director of the MBA/MSSL Programs at Walsh College, President of The University Group, Inc., participates in many programs at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University, formerly chaired at ICAF the Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, founded and directed the Institute for Business and Community Services at The University of Detroit, “Army will deploy faster with Theater Support Vessels,” National Defense; 88, 599, pg. 28, October 2003 There is still another reason to consider the building and employment of the TSV. The US shipbuilding industrial base is in trouble. More than 60 shipyards have gone out of business in the last 40 years, eliminating over 200,000 jobs. The number of U.S. flagged cargo ships has fallen from 2,644 in 1948 to 351. Only 128 of these are ocean-going and only three nations have fleets with an average age older than American fleets. The U.S. share of the world shipping market has plummeted, from 43 percent in 1950 to 4 percent today. Foreign companies carry 97 percent of all cargo between U.S. and foreign ports. The last U.S. flagged merchant ship was built in 1992.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 24 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Shipbuilding K/T Economy Shipbuilding creates jobs and draws investments Department of Transportation Maritime Administration 12 Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, "Shipbuilding and Repair", 2/2/12 http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Shipbuilding.pdf U.S. shipyards play an important role in supporting our Nation’s maritime presence by building and repairing our domestic fleet. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding and repair industry also has a significant impact on our national economy by adding billions of dollars to U.S. economic output annually. The industry purchases components produced by other industries located throughout the U.S. In 2006, capital investments in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry amounted to $270 million. Over the six-year period from 2000 to 2005, a total of $2.336 billion was invested in the industry. The commercial shipbuilding and ship repair industry is a pillar of the American skilled labor workforce employing nearly 40,000 skilled workers. Aker Philadelphia is a recent success story for the American shipbuilding industry. Not too long ago, the land where Aker now stands was a closed U.S. Navy shipyard. Today Aker is scheduled to deliver six vessels with a combined value of $700 million, and has a backlog of up to another 11 vessels worth in excess of $1 billion. The shipyard went from zero jobs in 1997 to a workforce of over 1,300 employees today. Since the mid 1990’s, the industry has been experiencing a period of expansion and renewal. The current expansion is largely market-driven, backed by long- term customer commitments. The new assets are much different and more productive than those they replace. For example, articulated double-hull tank barge units (ATB’s) have replaced single-hull product tankers in U.S. coastal trades, new duel propulsion double-hull crude carriers have replaced 30+ year-old, steam propulsion single-hull crude carriers in our Alaska/West oil trades. The new crude carriers are larger, faster, more fuel efficient and have a four-fold increase in pumping capacity over the vessels they replaced. Almost $5 billion worth of double hull construction and conversion work will take place by 2015 to meet the double hull requirement under Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

Shipbuilding industry is vital to the economy Economy Watch, ‘10 6/30/10, “Shipbuilding Industry, Shipbuilding Sector”, http://www.economywatch.com/world-industries/shipbuilding-industry.html The shipbuilding industry is involved in the construction and modification of ships. This is carried out in a specialized facility called a shipyard. The industry builds ships for commercial as well as military purposes. The world shipbuilding industry is largely dominated by Asian players, such as South Korea, China and Japan. In 2008, South Korea’s production level was higher than that of the entire world combined. The nation’s top shipbuilding companies include Hyundai Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering and Samsung Heavy Industries. The world's biggest shipyard (operated by Hyundai) launches a new vessel every four days. The shipbuilding industry is worth $100 billion (Bloomberg report, December 2006). The industry is vital to the economy as it supports trade and other ancillary services.

The ship building industry is vital to the economy EconomyWatch is the largest online economics community in the world. Every month, close to one million users come to the site, read our newsletters, come to our Facebook page or follow us on Twitter., 30 June 2010, "Shipbuilding Industry, Shipbuilding Sector", http://www.economywatch.com/world-industries/shipbuilding-industry.html The shipbuilding industry is worth $100 billion (Bloomberg report, December 2006). The industry is vital to the economy as it supports trade and other ancillary services.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 25 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The shipping industry is necessary for global trade, which in turn is good for the economy Stopford, ’09 Martin, economist, Lifetime Achievement Award, holds a position on the Board of Directors of Clarksons PLC, regularly quoted The Economist, Financial Times, Bloomberg and Lloyd’s List, 2/4/09, “Maritime Economics” page 44 So that brings us to the end of the Westline. From the early sea trade in the Lebanon 5,000 years ago, the line has now arrived at China, and is heading through SE Asia to India, the Middle East, Central Asia, Russia and eastern Europe. The shipping industry has a unique opportunity to study its commercial history, and there are many lessons which we could draw, but three stand out. The first is the central part which shipping has played in the global economy. At every stage in its development, sea transport has figured prominently, and the shipping industry, with its distinctive international flavor, has played a central role. Second, the basic economics of the business have not changed all that much over the years. The messages gleaned from the Mesopotamian Maritime Code, the Roman bill of lading or even Captain Uring’s exploits in the eighteenth century all tell the same story of a business driven by the laws of supply and demand. The ships, technology and customers change, but the basic principals of maritime commerce seem immutable. Although there is continuity in the economic model, the circumstances can change with remarkable speed. The break-up of the Roman Empire; the voyages of discovery in the sixteenth century, steam and the colonial system in the nineteenth century, and the mechanization of shipping in the second half of the twentieth century all dramatically changed the world in which shipowners operated. In the process, shipping today has become more than ever before an integral part of the process of globalization. Third, shipping prospers during periods of political stability when the world is prosperous and stable. For example, we saw how the Mediterranean trade prospered when the Roman Empire provided safe passage, and declined when the Pax Romana broke down in the third century. Similarly the stability provided by the European empires from 1850 to 1950 created a framework in which the liner and tramp system could operate. Then a new period of globalization in the post-Bretton Woods era following the Second World War did the same sort of thing and once again the shipping business had to adapt. So the lesson is that the starting-point for any future analysis is not economics but the geopolitical environment and where that is going. But change was not always gradual. The step changes in knowledge and technology were often followed by longer transitional periods as the commercial infrastructure was developed to put the changes into practice. As a result, revolution was softened into a more gradual evolution. Thus the voyages of discovery at the end of the fifteenth century took just a couple of decades, but it took centuries for the new global commercial trading system to grow out of them. Similarly, the transition from sail to steam started in the 1820s but it was almost a century before steamships had completely taken over merchant shipping from sail. More recently, containerization started in the 1950s but it was 25 years before its full potential as a global transport system was felt in world trade. So although change is sudden, the implementation of change is often a long and tedious business. Pulling all this together, our task as maritime economists is to understand where we are at any point of time, so that we can see where things might go next. We must also understand the evolutionary nature of change. The die may be cast, but it is often many years before the real consequences of change become apparent. Today we are in a phase of transition created by globalization which is, in its own way, as revolutionary as the voyages of discovery five hundred years ago. In this chapter we examined how shipping developed over the last 5,000 years. It turns out that today’s trade network is just a snapshot taken as the world economy creeps jerkily along its evolutionary path. The pace is suually too slow for contemporaries to see the trend, butt fromm a historical perspective the progress is evident. The central role of shipping in this process was obvious to early economists such as Adam Smith, who recognized that shipping offers the transport needed to promote economic development. Indeed, shipping, trade and economic development go hand in hand. We divided the history of trade into three phases. The first started in the Mediterranean, spreading west through Greece, Rome and Venice, to Antwerp, Amsterdam and London. During this phase a global trading network gradually developed between the three great population centres in China, India and Europe. At first this trade was by land and was slow and expensive, but when the voyages of discovery opened up global sea routes in the late fifteenth century, transport costs fell dramatically and trade volumes escalated. The second phase was triggered by the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century. Innovations in ship design, shipbuilding and global communications made it possible for shipping to be conducted as a global industry, initially through the Baltic Exchange, whilst reliable steamships and technical innovations such as the Suez Canal made it possible for liner companies to operate regular services. For the next century trade grew rapidly, focused around the colonial empires of the European states and the framework of sea trade was radically changed. The lesson is that shipping is constantly changing. It is a business that grew up with the world economy, exploring and exploiting the ebb and flow of trade. Today it has become a tightly knit global business community, built on communications and free trade. Perhaps that will change. But it is hard to disagree with Adam Smith that, whatever the circumstances ‘such therefore are the advantages of water transport that…this convenience opens the whole world to the produce of every sort of labour.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 26 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The ship building industry is vital to the economy National defense industry, the industrial colleague of the armed forces, Spring 2011, "Final report ship building industry", http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2011/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding-2011.pdf The US shipbuilding industry generated $19.1B in revenues in 2010. Recent studies show a shipbuilding industry multiplier effect of 1:4 bringing the total domestic economic impact to approximately $76B. The defense segment of the industry comprises $12.5 billion, 66% of the industry's overall $19 billion in revenues; the remainder of the industries' revenue is within the commercial segment. Figure 2 below depicts the defense shipbuilding supply chain economic contributions per state. In 2009. 21 states had at least $500 million worth of USN shipbuilding business.

When prioritizing SOC (social overhead capital) investment, maritime industry takes precedence Kwak et all, ‘04 Seung-Jun, Department of economics, Korea University, Seung-Hoon Yoo, School of economics and Business, Hoseo University, Jeong-In Chang, 6/2/04, “The role of the maritime industry in the Korean national economy: an input-output analysis”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X04000570 “Marine Policy” Volume 29, Iseue 4, July 2005, Pages 371-383 Table 3 and Table 4 show the forward and backward linkage effects of all sectors, respectively. Two important results can be seen. The first is that the forward linkage effects of the maritime sectors are lower than those of other sectors, which means that when economic activities are booming the maritime sectors are less stimulated by overall industrial growth than other sectors. In other words, maritime sector is not influenced much by business fluctuations and is a vital input to national existence. The second is that the backward linkage effects of maritime sectors are higher than those of other sectors. This implies that the maritime industry has greater impacts in terms of investment expenditures on the national economy than other sectors. That is, the maritime industry has a relatively strong capacity for pulling in other industries. Therefore, it has a low forward linkage effect, a high backward linkage effect and can be placed in the final manufacture classification. The results of this study can suggest useful implications for marine policy in Korea. The figures on sectoral impacts of maritime investments from the demand driven model can be interpreted as benefits which ensue from maritime development projects. Policy decisions as to whether to conduct a proposed maritime development project or not could be deduced from an examination of costs and benefits associated with such an optimal mix. From the result of production-inducing effects, we could see that the major production-induced sectors transferred from primary and secondary industries to service industries such as ‘real estate and business services’ and ‘finance and insurance’. This reflects that the cost of these sectors play a great part in the production costs of the maritime industry. Inter-industry linkage effect analysis can provide implications on the structure of the four marine sectors. Comparison of the strengths of the linkages for the sectors in a single economy provide one mechanism for identifying key or leading sectors in that economy and for grouping sectors into spatial clusters. For example, the results of this study indicate that the maritime industry may have more strength in absorbing products of related industries, rather than being used as an input by other industries. The backward linkage effects of ‘fishery and marine products’ and ‘shipbuilding and other marine sectors’ are increasing and are higher than other sectors in 1998. This implies that the maritime industry has greater impacts in terms of investment expenditures on the national economy than other sectors and the maritime industry has a relatively strong capacity for pulling in other industries. The results of the supply-driven model may provide valuable information on the economic effects of maritime industry supply shortages. They can be used not only in setting economic reliability standards in maritime industry production, but also in determining pricing and management strategies. Thus, maritime supply has direct and indirect effects on production activities of other sectors. Especially, the effects of maritime sector supply shortages are quite important since the maritime industry, which is a SOC, generated great effects on other maritime-consuming sectors. Inter- temporal comparisons of total production effects with SOC sectors, which is the sum of supply shortage effects and production-inducing effects, are reported in Table 9. The table shows that each maritime industry sector plays a leading role compared to other SOCs, especially in ‘harbor’ and ‘shipbuilding and other marine sectors.’ This indicates that new public investments in maritime industry sectors may have priority over other SOC sectors.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 27 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 C17s? TSV’s are cheap Hickins, Major in US military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, Major in military, Nov. 2010, "Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military's Weakest Link” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec02/MS813.htm According to military sources cited in Marc Strass' 20 November 2000 article in Defense Daily, the "Army Wants 14 High- Speed Catamarans to Speed Intra-Theater Lift." The proposed theater support vessel (TSV) would be approximately 394 feet long and equipped with engines that could transport 1,250 short tons in 25,000 to 30,000 square feet of deck space. It would have a sustained speed of at least 40 knots and be able to survive sea states of more than 5 feet. The TSV would have a range of 7,000 nautical miles unloaded and 1,000 nautical miles loaded. Two TSVs would be able to carry an SBCT battalion of troops with accompanying LAVs; seven TSVs could transport an entire SBCT. The TSV is expected to cost between $65 and $85 million each compared to the 1995 price tag of $309 million for an LMSR.

TSV’s would lessen number of costly airlifts Hickins, Major in US military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, Major in military, Nov. 2010, "Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military's Weakest Link” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec02/MS813.htm Use of the TSV would permit simultaneous deployment or employment of ground forces. It would take the burden off strategic airlift as the only means to move troops and equipment quickly. Fully loaded, the TSV's draft would be only 12 feet, which would allow a combatant commander to use significantly more ports within his area of responsibility. A TSV fleet, coupled with joint logistics-over-the-shore capabilities, would give a combatant commander an unprecedented ability to project land power ashore, bypassing ports altogether if necessary. Then the combatant commander could conduct operational maneuver and converging operations, compel an enemy to fight in multiple directions, and much more. Success in such operations still would depend, of course, on secure air and sea lines of communication, both inside and outside the joint operational area, and protection from air, surface, and subsurface threats.

TSV’s would lessen number of C-17’s needed Hickins, Major in US military, 2010 By Kenneth Hickins, Major in military, Nov. 2010, "Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military's Weakest Link” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec02/MS813.htm Sixty percent of the world's politically significant urban areas are located within 25 miles of a coastline; 75 percent are located within 150 miles. The cost of procuring enough C-17s to provide adequate airlift to these areas is prohibitive. (In fiscal year 1998, a C-17 cost $236.7 million.) The TSV will cost roughly one-third as much as a C-17 and have a cargo- carrying capacity 12 times greater. The bottom line is that the United States currently cannot move significant ground forces to a crisis area in a timely manner without resorting to technology such as high-speed sealift. The United States continues to be the world's sole superpower and the world's paramount source of political, economic, information, and military leadership. As such, it must be able to project forces quickly into trouble spots around the world without the restrictions of limited air transport and slow sealift. Therefore, the U.S. military must leverage available technology and invest in high-speed sealift. High-speed sealift, combined with airlift, conventional sealift, and pre-positioning, has the potential to create a synergistic effect and can be the key to operational and strategic success

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 28 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 Solvency RoRo expands sealift capabilities Military Sealift Command, Military Sealift Command operates approximately 110 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and move military cargo and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces and coalition partners. May 2012 (Military Sealift Command, Military Sealift Command operates approximately 110 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and move military cargo and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces and coalition partners. "Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs)", 6/25/12, http://www.msc.navy.mil/factsheet/lmsr.asp) Military Sealift Command's large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ship, or LMSR, program significantly expands the nation's sealift capability for the new millennium. All of the LMSRs have been prime movers of U.S. military equipment during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nineteen large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships have been built or converted at U.S. shipyards. The LMSRs offset the shortage of militarily useful transport ships available in the commercial sector - a growing concern as U.S. forces overseas depend increasingly on power projection "Forward ... From the Sea."Most of the LMSRs are named after Medal of Honor recipients. The exceptions are USNS Bob Hope (T-AKR 300) - named in honor of entertainer Bob Hope - and USNS Fisher (T-AKR 301) - named for Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher, who committed their lives to improving the quality of life for members of the U.S. armed forces. The Fisher House Program, established in 1990, has provided temporary quarters for families of patients receiving medical care at major military and Veterans Affairs medical centers.

Each LMSR can carry enough supplies for 20,000 troops Military Sealift Command, Military Sealift Command operates approximately 110 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and move military cargo and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces and coalition partners. May 2012 (Military Sealift Command, Military Sealift Command operates approximately 110 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and move military cargo and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces and coalition partners. "Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs)", http://www.msc.navy.mil/factsheet/lmsr.asp) Features: The eight large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships, or LMSRs, can carry enough ammunition, food, water, fuel, equipment and other supplies to sustain up to 20,000 troops of an Army 2x2 heavy armored brigade and the 6th Brigade Afloat for up to 15 days. The ships carry vehicles and equipment to support humanitarian missions, as well as combat missions. The new construction vessels have a cargo carrying capacity of more than 300,000 square feet, equivalent to almost eight football fields. In addition, LMSRs have a slewing stern ramp and a removable ramp which services two side ports making it easy to drive vehicles on and off the ship. Interior ramps between decks ease traffic flow once cargo is loaded aboard ship. Two 110-ton single pedestal twin cranes make it possible to load and unload cargo where shore-side infrastructure is limited or nonexistent. A commercial helicopter deck was added for emergency daytime landing. Background: The need for additional military sealift ships was identified in a congressionally mandated study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1990s. The Mobility Requirements Study focused on Department of Defense transportation during the Persian Gulf War. It highlighted the urgent need for greater sealift capacity to transport military equipment and supplies during wartime and other national contingencies.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 29 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 TSV offers maximum rapid sealift and operational maneuvers to war fighters Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security 2011 (Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security, "Theater Support Vessel (TSV) CONOPS", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tsv.htm) Theater Support Vessel (TSV) is a high-speed, shallow draft vessel which utilizes the most advanced COTS technologies in a military unique platform. TSV is rapidly reconfigurable to support joint mission requirements. TSV provides Joint Combatant Commanders a multi-modal, multi-purpose platform. TSV delivers 16 C-17 equivalent loads. TSV delivers troops and equipment together; thereby reducing or eliminating reception and staging in theater of operations. The Theater Support Vessel (TSV), the Army's future watercraft, is an essential element for the Future Forces. It will provide commanders high-speed, intra-theater sealift mobility that is not limited to major ports. The TSV will maximize rapid intra- theater sealift to provide the war fighter the capability to operationally move and maneuver combat ready forces and follow-on sustainment.

TSV is capable of defending itself from attacks Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security 2011 (Global Security, is a none profit organization that publishes recent news about the current global security, "Theater Support Vessel (TSV) CONOPS", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tsv.htm) The vessel characteristics include: interoperability, container handling (load/unload 20' ISO containers, 463L pallets and PLS flat racks), rolling stock cargo handling, shallow draft, sea keeping, intra-theater lift capability/operational range, self- deployment, port accessibility, the ability to pass through the Panama Canal, vertical replenishment and an option for a helicopter deck. It appeared that the Draft Purchase Description as of June 18, 2003 intended to limit the responses from industry to milti-hull catamaran type vessels, based on the length requirement of 121 meters. The limitation of the vessel length to 121 meters was based on a 2002 "Worldwide Port Survey" in which 282 ports in the US Central Command and US Pacific Command areas were analyzed. The TSV shall be capable of defending itself against a small boat(s) attack. The TSV shall also have the capability to detect by bearing missiles that are RF, IR or Laser guided. These capabilities will be accomplished through a series of crew served weapons/remotely controlled weapons and missile warning system(s). The SPS self-defense capability is limited to very close range and interaction weapons (small arms and .50 caliber machine gun). Additional detection and engagement range (detection at 10 miles, and engage at 2-4 miles) may be needed to protect the crew and 354 troops that will be on-board the TSV. The TSV shall have a Threshold average transit speed of at least 36 knots for a round trip of 625 nm each way. The Objective is the same as threshold except, each leg length is 1,250 nm; Average speed is 50 knots. A vessel designed to meet the threshold requirements will require 30%-40% of the horsepower and fuel required to meet the objective requirement; and a completely different structural approach. The resulting initial investment and life-cycle cost of these vessels might differ by several orders of magnitude.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 30 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 TSV offers high speed vessels for the Navy Trauth et al 05 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Stephen R. Trauth et al, U.S. Army, Retired, is Senior C4ISR Systems Engineer, Assurance Technology Corporation. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Georgia, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Germany, and Korea. Colonel James C. Barbara, U.S. Army, Retired, is the Executive Director, Systems Integration, Assurance Technology Corporation, and the C4ISR System-of-Systems Architecture Facilitator for the Theater Support Vessel (TSV). He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Boston College and is a graduate of the Army War College and the Defense Acquisition University. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS. Patrick A. Papa is the Deputy Foreign Military Sales Program Director, Kuwait Management Office. He received a B.B.A. from the Detroit Institute of Technology. Christine Maluchnik is the Systems Acquisition Manager for TSV-1X, Spearhead, and the Technical/Transition Manager for the TSV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program. Donald R. Paskulovich is the Assistant Product Manager for the TSV Technical Management Office and the Test and Trials Manager in the Joint High-Speed Vessel Program. He received a B.S. from Wayne State University. Kerry B. Riese is a Systems Acquisition Manager for the high-speed vessel X-1 Joint Venture and TVS-IX Spearhead. LTC Ralph L. Pallotta, U.S. Army, Retired, is a project manager and systems engineer in the CECOM Special Projects and Homeland Defense Office. He received a B.S. from Clarkson College of Technology and an M.S. from Fairleigh Dickinson University December 2005, "Army Transformation at Sea: The New Theater Support Vessel", http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/march_2006/3_06_2.html) The Army's new Theater Support Vessel(TSV) is a rapidly developed response to the transformational operational maneuver and sustainment demands of force-projection operations. The TSV is a fast-moving, shallow-draft vessel that can simultaneously move troops and their equipment together as combat-ready units within theater and deploy them with little or no reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) activities at undeveloped ports. The TSV also provides followon sustainment through joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations. Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom highlighted the need for maneuver-force and logistics transformation. To respond quickly to threats around the world, the U.S. Army must field high lylethal, deployable units and the sustainment forcesto move and support them. The speed at which forces must deploy and be available for battle changes the paradigm of moving troops separately from their containerized equipment and then remarrying them and unpacking and reorganizing equipment at the destination port. While the separate inter theater movement approach will still exist, the concept of intra theater maneuver of combat-ready units (troops and equipment together) provides the theater commander with an operational capability to bypass defended or major ports and inject combat power anywhere. Evolving force-projection doctrine requires inserting combat-ready units by air and sea into undeveloped theaters of war to gain and maintain the operational initiative. By design, the TSV can rapidly maneuver a combat-ready force over operational distances, provide continuous Battle Command On-The-Move (BCOTM), and facilitate insertion and operational sustainment of the force once ashore.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 31 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 TSV offers high speed vessels for the Navy Trauth et al 05 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Stephen R. Trauth et al, U.S. Army, Retired, is Senior C4ISR Systems Engineer, Assurance Technology Corporation. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. from the University of Georgia, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS), Germany, and Korea. Colonel James C. Barbara, U.S. Army, Retired, is the Executive Director, Systems Integration, Assurance Technology Corporation, and the C4ISR System-of-Systems Architecture Facilitator for the Theater Support Vessel (TSV). He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Boston College and is a graduate of the Army War College and the Defense Acquisition University. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS. Patrick A. Papa is the Deputy Foreign Military Sales Program Director, Kuwait Management Office. He received a B.B.A. from the Detroit Institute of Technology. Christine Maluchnik is the Systems Acquisition Manager for TSV-1X, Spearhead, and the Technical/Transition Manager for the TSV Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program. Donald R. Paskulovich is the Assistant Product Manager for the TSV Technical Management Office and the Test and Trials Manager in the Joint High-Speed Vessel Program. He received a B.S. from Wayne State University. Kerry B. Riese is a Systems Acquisition Manager for the high-speed vessel X-1 Joint Venture and TVS-IX Spearhead. LTC Ralph L. Pallotta, U.S. Army, Retired, is a project manager and systems engineer in the CECOM Special Projects and Homeland Defense Office. He received a B.S. from Clarkson College of Technology and an M.S. from Fairleigh Dickinson University December 2005, "Army Transformation at Sea: The New Theater Support Vessel", http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/march_2006/3_06_2.html) The TSV is a truly transformational capability that enhances Army and joint deployment, employment, and sustainment. In anticipation of future production and fielding, the CONOPS for this exciting capability will be further developed during various theater exercises.5 As a result of jointly sponsored experiments, the Marine Corps now requires a high-speed connector to support expeditionary maneuver warfare doctrine and ship-to-objective maneuver CONOPS. The Navy’s Transformational Roadmap for Seabasing also demands high-speed, shallow-draft vessels. Therefore, the Army’s management of the TSV is transitioning to the Joint High Speed Vessel Program led by the Navy. This combined approach will foster greater support for the program and is an economy of-scale for production and sustainme

Theater Support Vessels will allow faster army deployment Ronis, writer for National Defense, 2003 By Sheila Ronis, writer for National Defense, October 2003, "Army Will Deploy Faster With Theater Support Vessels” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/October/Pages/Army_Will3744.aspx It’s a little known fact that the Army has as many boats as the Navy—about 300. They perform different functions, however. The Army’s vessels provide strategic logistics and force projection, especially intra-theater. The lighter platforms include mechanized landing craft, utility landing craft, logistics support vessels, the LARC LX amphibian, miscellaneous small harbor boats (J boats) and amphibious re-supply cargo modular causeway systems. Floating utility systems include small tugs, large tugs and pusher tugs. Other vessels include floating machine shops, barges, cargo barges, derrick and floating cranes. The Army also is developing a new ship, called the Theater Support Vessel. The service already has leased a high-speed vessel, called TSV-1X Spearhead, which deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. “The TSV possess more transformation potential than any other system currently in development as it will change not only the way the Army deploys, but will change the way the Army and the Joint Task Force fights,” said Col. Genaro Dellarocco, Army program manager for force projection, combat service, combat service support. “Specifically, the TSV allows us to go into shallow areas and land almost anywhere,” he said. “It carries its infrastructure with it, and with the anti-access port strategies of our enemies, it is an essential tool for the future.” Employing the TSV is an “anti-access area denial risk mitigation” strategy since “port denial is one of the most likely early scenarios,” according to the Defense Department’s Mobility Requirements Study. Dave Crum, a program official at the Combined Arms Support Command, told an industry briefing that “the TSV mission is to rapidly self deploy to a joint operations area and provide operational and tactical level intra-theater sealift of forces (personnel and equipment).”Twelve TSVs in one theater could move an entire Stryker brigade in one lift. With six TSVs in two geographically different theaters, two brigades could be moved in two lifts. The exact number of TSVs to be procured is yet to be determined. The Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the TSV request in April 2003. Not limited to major ports, the TSV will operate in austere and degraded environments without losing effectiveness, because of its shallow draft capabilities. The vessel can move more than 40 knots fully loaded (current logistics support vessel speed is 10 knots). Its capacity is 1,250 short tons with a range of 4,700 nautical miles at 40 knots with a light load. Its sea state is 7+ survivable with a wave height up to 40 feet. Ship operators can conduct en-route mission planning with on-board joint interoperable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 32 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 The SDHSS and TSV have the greatest capacity to improve Army watercraft equipment. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College During the Vigilant Warriors 01 wargame, the U.S. and allied forces employed a mixture of current lift assets and promising future concepts. Of all current and future air and sea lift capabilities, shallow draft high-speed ships (SDHSS) and the Theater Support Vessel (TSV), because of their speed, throughput capability, and capacity most significantly impacted force closure rates. SDHSS and TSVs were the only platforms that could deliver troops and equipment together in sufficient size to bring immediate combat power to bear. Additionally, while in transit, commanders could conduct en route mission planning and receive intelligence updates. The TSV also did not require a large fixed port because it could discharge its combat power at ports with 15 foot depths, greatly increasing the number of ports it could utilize without losing efficiency. The TSV provided transformational capability and operational maneuver of Army formations. An additional benefit realized in the wargame was since the TSV can carry approximately 7 times as much as the C-17 and 24 times as much as the C-130, it had the added benefit of reducing intra-theater airlift requirements elsewhere in theater.

The TSV could be used for both the Marines and the Army. Crowley ‘04 Joseph Crowley, U.S. Army Colonel, May 19 2004, “Does the Army Need the Theater Support Vessel? If So, How Many?” , DTIC, U.S. Army War College The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is also studying the utility of using a High-Speed Shallow-Draft Vessel for its future operational requirements. A review of both programs determined they are very similar. The fast-ferry vessels currently leased by both services are of similar type, have similar characteristics, capabilities, and are envisioned doctrinally to be used in much the same way. This Army Marine Corps Board (AMCB) 3-Star Review agreed that the services must proceed toward a joint program. They further determined that while the services’ missions are different, the hull form is very similar. This indicates the potential to design a ship with a high degree of modularity to support the Marines as well as the Army, Navy, and SOCOM missions. The AMCB also discussed using the TSV to support the Navy’s concept of Sea Basing. Both services believe Sea Basing will be a crucial future Joint military capability for the U.S. The board saw the TSV as a high priority development program to interface with the operational needs of sea bases. The AMCB recommended developing a Joint Program Office, evolve a common Operational and Organizational plan, and provide a single interchangeable material solution. Requiring the TSV to become a “Joint Program” also fits the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) initiative of making the Army a more “Joint” service which is relevant and ready. The CSA wants to leverage new programs so that the services are more interdependent. The CSA’s intent is better served by developing the TSV for both the Marines and the Army.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 33 Sealift Affirmative DDW 2012 1 AT: Civilian Fill In Civilian fill in fails – doesn’t meet the Jones Act. Hilberg 10 Erik E. Hilberg, Major in the US Army, recognized by the Department of Logistics and Resource Operations of the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) as the Major General James M. Wright Distinguished Master Logistician for Intermediate Level Education class 2009-02, “Does the United States’ Strategic Mobility Program Support the Needs of Operational Commanders?,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010 The argument that civilian economy can fill the sealift void much like the United States Air Force’s use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) contains numerous flaws. To start with, the Maritime Administration and Military Sealift Command possess the nation’s largest fleet of United States owned and operated roll-on roll-off vessels. There are currently fourteen commercial roll-on roll-off ships operating within the United States that meet the criteria of the Jones Act. Jones Act vessels are those vessels that operate under a United States flag, have ownership by United States citizens, and were constructed in the United States or salvaged and rebuilt in the United States. 119 The Jones Act or Merchant Shipping Act of 1920 specifies the criteria to conduct trade or to carry goods between United States ports. Six of those fourteen vessels are under active contract with the Military Sealift Command. Fifty-three more commercial roll-on roll-off vessels operate under the United States flag. 120 The majority of those vessels are under some form of contract with the Military Sealift Command. This is through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), the sealift equivalent of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. 121 In addition to the Jones Act, the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904 states that 100% of military cargo is to move by United States flagged vessels.

Civilian fill in fails – terrorism concerns and foreign flagging. Masciulli 02 Jason L. Masciulli, captain in the US Air Force, “Implications for the Defense Transportation System in a post-September 11th world: New challenges for the DTS in the war on terrorism,” Defense Transportation Journal 58. 4, pg. 14-16, August 2002 Faced with the new threat environment, Military Sealift Command (MSC) may need to re-evaluate the use of foreign- owned and foreign-flagged carriers. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 26.58 percent of the total cargo moved via ship went on a foreign-flagged carrier (Matthews & Holt, 116). The DoD should and must be concerned with the security of these ships. Further, ports where the ships sail from may be rife with terrorist operatives and sabotage is certainly possible. For example, a ship used to carry strategic resources could be sabotaged, loaded with a weapon of mass destruction, pirated, or scuttled at sea by a crew that is sympathetic to terrorists, or by a crew of terrorists themselves. Years of neglect have left the US merchant fleet in a precarious situation. Many other nations have lower taxes and fees and fewer regulations on merchant vessels than the United States (Morris & Moran, 1996). As a result, ocean carriers flag their vessels under a foreign flag. To compound the situation, American maritime unions have priced themselves out the market (Morris & Moran, 1996). As might be expected, ocean carriers use foreign crews, as opposed to using American mariners, because they are less expensive. It may be beneficial in the post-9/11 environment to provide incentives to carriers who flag their ships under US registry. Also, it would be beneficial to give incentives for companies to become US-owned. In this way, the US gains more control and improves security of shipping assets since they would be based in US ports. If the ships are US-flagged, American maritime unions may need to re-evaluate their costs, or the ships should be crewed by non-union members. The US needs to re-evaluate using foreign-owned and foreign-- flagged carriers for strategic deployments. Matthews and Holt in So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, make an excellent point that is brought upon future operations and foreign-flagged carriers:

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