Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09

Title: Revitalising understandings of the importance of consent in the reproduction of quality regimes in Scottish Further Education

Paper presented at the 27th International Labour Process Conference 06-08 April 2009 at the Apex International in Edinburgh

Neil Etherington Motherwell College of Further Education and University of Strathclyde

Abstract The adoption of a business process governance model in Further Education (FE), which supports the macro drive for economic and political prosperity, has spawned a transformation in working arrangements. Subsequently, there has been a proliferation of quality mechanisms accompanied by official advice and scrutiny on how to address quality processes in FE institutions contextualized by a public audit regime (Audit Scotland, 2004).

The paper is intended to build on earlier work (Etherington, 2006; 2007; 2008), which illustrates how the development and consolidation of the quality regime in Scottish FE has been in the context of enhanced models of accountability and governance. The quality regime has become a legitimating framework to propel state transformation with regime characteristics, demands, impacts and acceptance levels explaining consolidated regime formations (Etherington, 2008).

Moreover, this paper focuses on an aspect of the quality regime, whereby ongoing efforts by state and corporate agencies to consolidate quality regimes in FE rely on convincing professionals of the efficacy of approaches that denounce factory type logic. Therefore, Self-evaluation (as a quality process), which fosters notions of continuous improvement, enhancement, ownership, empowerment and self regulation, can be interpreted as a combination of market, bureaucratic, technical and ideological control devices through the manufacturing of consent (Burawoy, 1979). Hence, it is possible to consider how the development of quality processes can revitalise understandings of the importance of consent in the reproduction of quality regimes.

Introduction The extensive, evolving and emerging forms of external scrutiny, in the Scottish Further education (FE) since incorporation in 1993 have been symptomatic of an increasing indirect supervision of public service delivery using audit, inspection and regulation. A catalyst has been the adoption of corporate managerialist policies as a consequence of market based reform (inter alia Randle and Brady, 1997; Gleeson and Shain, 1999; Loots and Whelan, 2000; Alexiadou, 2001; Avis, 1999, 2002 & 2003; Mather and Seifert, 2003). Later commentary acknowledges that New Labour administrations (from 1997) have appeared to consolidate the expansion or ‘explosion’ of the audit mechanism (Power, 1997) due to a perceived lack of confidence in service delivery or robust performance management, which in turn has exposed professional autonomy to quality mechanisms (Etherington, 2008). Hence, managerial modes in the education sector has unveiled a thin culture weak basis of professionalism in FE (Robson, 1998, 2004) and in doing so facilitated a shift from practising professionals to, ‘auditors, policymakers and statisticians’ (Davies, 2003, p, 91) whereby measurement is integral to performativity (Avis, 2003).

In Scotland, following recommendations from the Crerar Review (The Scottish Government, 2007), to reduce the burden of audit, recent official advice (SFC, 2008b) and reinventions of the quality framework (HMIE, 2008b), has tended to shift the focus towards institutional models of quality with an emphasis on accountability through ownership. In doing so, a stronger and specific emphasis has been placed on measuring the impact of teaching on learning. Subsequently the profile and effectiveness of Self-evaluation as a specific form of assurance and continuous enhancement has been raised.

The paper follows up on the findings of earlier case study fieldwork. In doing so, a critical realist philosophy acknowledges the space people occupy within the quality regime is important and this research also accepts agents contribute to the recreation and reproduction of pre-existing structures as part of the interplay between structures and agents. Data findings are interpreted through a multi-levelled conceptual framework, which engages a Neo- Marxist theoretical focus on labour process and the nature and meaning of management work, managerialism and regime consolidation.

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The outcomes of the research assists in making sense of Self-evaluation, which suggests a more consent based model, through stressing and reinforcing the idea of an evolving, internalised institutional regime although questions the veracity of official interpretations that new models of quality will be less exacting on professionals.

This paper begins with the background policy context and brief overview of the literature and documentary sources informing notions of quality and Self-evaluation. The second section examines how the consolidated regime interpreted through multi-levelled conceptual framework facilitates an understanding of control and consent. The third section utilises ideas of demands, impacts and acceptance and supports the contention that: 1. Self-evaluation as a quality process is part of a consolidated yet contested regime in Scottish FE. 2. Control and consent are fundamental factors in the reproduction of audit cultures facilitating assurance and enhancement. 3. Scope for resistance is often manifested in forms of pragmatism within the regime.

Background policy context and review of literature The removal from local authority (April 1993) propelled a radical change in the governance, purpose, organisation and culture (Alexiadou, 2001) of FE institutions in line with a ‘contracting–out state’ (Ainley, 1995). The predilection of quality in colleges has been rapid since incorporation characterised by regimes (Etherington, 2008). Also, New Labour administrations modernisation of public services has continued, underpinned by neo-liberal philosophy (Mooney and Poole, 2004: Mooney and Scott, 2005) and far from abandoning policies of the New Right has in many ways radicalized them (Callinicos, 2001).

Currently the Scottish Further and Higher Education Funding Council (SFC) controls funding of colleges. Whilst Scotland’s 39 incorporated colleges spent £626 million in 2006/07 the Funding Council was responsible for financing colleges; £438 million of revenue grants, with £67 million in direct support for students e.g. bursaries and childcare (Audit Scotland, 2008) they also have a statutory duty to ensure and promote quality. The quality function is tendered through a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education in Scotland (HMIe), who inspect and report on quality in the FE sector, on behalf of the funding body. The SLA is worth over £1.2 million in 2008/09, (SFC, 2008c).

The role and purpose of quality is usually encountered in the FE literature as part of a, market logic (Elliott, 1996), being a feature of managerialism, although defining quality is contested amongst FE professionals suggesting an amorphous concept, whereby meaning is bound up in power relations (Etherington, 2008). Hence, definitions of quality vary (fit for purpose), although are commonly associated with high standards as a benchmark, but can mean different things. The earlier contribution of Halliday (1994, 1997 & 2003) assists in grasping that factory or service models of quality provide a difficult fit in education, FE due to an economized appreciation and application (standards and practice), based on value judgements of efficiency and effectiveness.

Other contributors (Reeves, 1995; Avis 1996 & 1999; Elliott, 1996; Ainley and Bailey 1997; Randle and Brady 1997; Gleeson and Shain 1999; Alexiadou, 2001; Mather and Seifert, 2003) tend to illustrate quality somewhere in the mix of financial and budgetary rigor, quantitative performance indicators, market orientation and public accountability being a distinct feature of managerialism in the context of New Public Management (NPM). Therefore, quality systems with procedural frameworks embed notions of bureaucratic control and conformity, illustrating non-compliance. In the absence of empirical work (more generally across the UK and specifically in Scotland) there has also been a tendency to rely on official reports, documents and papers to understand quality in FE. Policy approaches have influenced Scottish FE (as a provider of education and training) linked to the economic and social needs of Scotland (Lifelong Learning strategy, Scottish Executive, 2003) with changed funding, new award frameworks and a consolidation and development of quality models – good management being the instrument of delivery.

Whilst the funding mechanism for FE has evolved since incorporation (characterised as post- incorporation Scottish Office Education and Industry Department (SOEID), post incorporation Scottish Further Education Funding Council (SFEFC), with a merged Scottish Further and Higher Education Council (SFC) from October 2005) the pace and level of scrutiny in the sector has often been manifested in the shape of audit or quality initiatives. Moreover, what Halliday describes as an, ‘overriding concern with efficiency and quality procedures in FE’ (2003, p, 633), evolving steadily up to the formation of the Scottish Parliament (1999) has continued to remain a sector norm. Underpinning the management of public services has been New Labour’s obsession with measurement (Corby and White, 1999), with a focus on quality and targets (Clarke et al, 2000) which have been accentuated and intensified. Hence, the macro drivers of new public management instil the normative glue for FE (being target driven), but in doing so, trace a blending of control systems based on adherence to strict procedures with evaluative quality regimes. However, target driven environments and more audit, appear to result in a reconstitution of organisational and working priorities (Clarke, 2004).

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The initial focus on quality of the Funding Council from 1999 was to more adequately reflect, meet with and address, one of the four Ministerial priorities (Quality Improvement and Modernisation), following various Audit Committee criticism about the efficacy of performance indicators in Scottish FE (Audit Scotland, 2003), but also later that the Council was “dragging its feet” (The Scottish Parliament, 2004) in delivering key initiatives. Also, whilst the recent report Improving Scottish Education 2005-2008 identifies ‘high quality learning and teaching’ as a strength in the SFE sector, measuring impact, target setting and systematic evaluation are considered as aspects for improvement (HMIe, 2009). Consequently, revised external quality arrangements for Scotland’s colleges are intended to reflect new thinking within the HMIe, SFC and colleges inferring a ‘lighter touch’ style quality in Scottish FE (HMIe, 2008b) suggesting, a tension-free, consolidated regime. However, the inference that the official structures of quality are somewhat benign is misleading (Etherington, 2007).

Earlier work on quality improvement through self-evaluation at institutional level in the Scottish FE sector identifies that quality assurance is moving from an inflexible technical base towards a more cultural emphasis, suggesting self-regulation (Laird, 2002). Official reports refer to Self-evaluation as: “one of the cornerstones of quality in Scottish colleges” (HMIe, 2007, p 4) being a key process to improve continuously on provision, Moreover, Self-evaluation is considered as well embedded in Scottish institutions (HMIe, 2007) and being a central activity in the evaluation of teaching and college functions through assessment of what is done well but also identifying any weaknesses and addressing through action plans (SFC, 2008b). However, whilst the recent report Effective Self-Evaluation Reporting in Scotland’s Colleges (HMIe, 2007) comments on the positive improvement in colleges’ reporting and evaluation, critique focused on reports not being evaluative enough, particularly on outcomes. Likewise, the challenges for the college sector have been set to include; more systematic measurement, target setting and systematic evaluation (HMIe, 2009). From external scrutiny, attention has been turned towards institutional operations with an increasing emphasis on governance and accountability. Official interpretations link quality assurance (checking mechanism) and enhancement with quality culture, high quality learning and student engagement being features of the regime (HMIe, 2008b).

Whilst such arrangements imply that colleges and not the Funding Council bear responsibility for the ownership of quality they are constituted by clear expectations on how effectively institutions adhere to SFC guidance and defined schedules (SFC, 2008b) leaving little room for added value.

The aforementioned scenario implies consolidated degrees of consent in the system. However the post Fordist empowerment discourse is contested (Hodkinson, 1998; Etherington, 2008), suggesting more neo-Taylorist outcomes in reality. The struggle around consent is by no means clear and often clouded by official discourse, although important to an understanding of the quality regime in FE.

Interpreting events within the consolidated regime: a conceptual framework The work is rooted in a multi-levelled conceptual framework, which acknowledges both the location of state professionals (‘criterion of rationality’ or logic, which governs relations) (O’Connor, 1973, 1984; Habermas, 1976; Offe, 1975, 1976, 1985, 1992) and accepts a structured antagonism and the control imperative in the employment relationship, through a critical labour process application (Braverman, 1974; Friedman, 1977; Edwards 1979; Burawoy 1979) providing an important framework for the study of work organisation and its links to wider society. The inevitability of bureaucracy is questioned (Thompson and McHugh (2002), whilst a structured antagonism in the FE workplace requires forms of co-operation and consent, with compliance.

Earlier work (Etherington, 2006), prioritized bridging the current lacunae in FE debates, by defining and considering quality in the context of a regime, assisting more reliable assessments about the potency of quality audits as mechanisms of control and consent in Scottish FE institutions. The conceptualization of the regime begins by looking for what Ackroyd and Thompson describe as, ‘categories of conduct, rules and procedures’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999, p, 75). Also, the wider literature on public management (Pollitt, 1993; Farnham and Horton, 1996; Clarke and Newman, 1997) provides scope for locating the idea of a quality regime, within macro regime drivers. (1997). ‘Regime’ provides a framework for understanding organisational transformation with the significant themes of bureaucratic control, consent and resistance being contextualised in state evolution. Likewise, the role of quality is interpreted and coincides with regime formations as traditional (self-control), disruption (rationale to monitor), transformation (tool of managerialism) and consolidated (regulation and evaluation) (Etherington, 2007; 2008).

Therefore, with some reworking of Clarke and Newman’s (1997) derived regime categories configuring the internal modes of operation and enhanced by Ackroyd and Thompson’s (1999) dimensions of regime regulation evidence

3 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 illustrates that despite the prominence of the public audit regime, as part of a common sense discourse, matters are contested by agential projects.

Familiar themes of control are also evident in the assessment Smyth et al, (2000, p 39-46), make of teachers, with various mechanisms having a significant impact on professionals. Furthermore, Reid’s (1997, 2003) analysis of teachers in the Australian education sector illustrates ‘control regimes’ as mechanisms of power. For Reid (1997), embedded in educational settlements are systems and strategies, which justify a hierarchy of control. It is precisely because teachers are told how to teach and subjected to forms of evaluation incurring strategies of compliance and consent that state education is littered with ever changing control regimes as mechanisms to enforce and maintain control. Despite pressure to conform to the changing control mechanisms management does not go unchallenged.

Derived regime categories of Clarke and Newman (1997), enables the mapping process of structures in quality regimes it does little to expose the micro politics of events. Also, the task of interpreting consolidated regimes is more straightforward by understanding the relationship between control, consent and acceptance. Exposing categories of conduct, rules and procedures becomes an arena for defining acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. Quality is considered as a regulatory regime, with conformance and non-conformance factors built into the construction of regulation. Therefore, management is in a position of authority and has the power and discretion to define behaviour.

Accordingly, given the placement of quality audits within this context an appreciation of regulation is necessary. In keeping with Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), they identify low trust and high trust regimes associated with high and low regulation (FE having the appearance of being highly regulated through the mechanisms of quality). Nevertheless, professionals could construe high regulation for a lack of trust, with subsequent erosion into more low trust regimes.

Whilst control strategies are a useful lens, they are not all-inclusive one, to examine Self-evaluation in the context of quality regimes. To concentrate solely on control and envisage FE as an over-controlled environment is something other commentators have critiqued (Gleeson and Shain, 1999). Hence, self-regulating agents, and so, controlling themselves (Thompson 1989, p 153), through the generation of consent (Burawoy, 1979 and 1985). Consequently, we can examine the framework of informal rules and work patterns associated with Self-evaluation, because some informal working processes can be envisaged as a way of coping with working practices. Subjective consent as part of consensual relations is influential when constructing the invisibility of corporate power in eliciting co-operation from workers, who consent because they consider it in their interest (Burawoy, 1979).

The success of quality policies in FE organisations with the embedding of corporate culture could hang on regimes, which rely less on regulation through control systems and more on consent with an emphasis on self-evaluation. Certainly, where professional workers operate within a framework of normative rules and specifications of values and behaviours suggest ‘controlled autonomy’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999, p 89), being a more appropriate term for such regimes. There is a clear appreciation of Friedman’s (1977) managerial strategies of control, yet room is created for resistance because agents are not simply docile, but on the contrary, defend their autonomy. The FE quality audit systems are legitimated and incorporate the dialectic of the work effort bargain between actors in the organisation. Moreover, winning hearts and minds through ideological means is considered as integral in regime compliance. In saying this, the consolidation of quality in regimes, due to making agents auditable, suggests it is also contested as a consequence of managers interacting with the self-organisation of professionals in FE (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). Also, by examining further informal factors of bureaucracy, to be found in Gouldner (1954), these events in the quality regime are salient when assessing the effects a system of bureaucratic control and rules clashing with the value systems of employees work.

Research Findings The findings are underpinned by a critical realist philosophy enhancing an appreciation of data against a wider social, political and economic backdrop of how quality audits have impacted on professional authority. The main body of fieldwork began in June 2003 and was completed in June 2005 (sixty-six semi-structured interviews -119 respondents) in three FE institutions: College A, College B and College C, with managers and lecturers through individual and group based sessions, supported by notes from observations and documentary evidence. Original fieldwork has been consolidated from 2005 (ongoing) through use of documentary evidence and the attendance at meetings in College B and another FE institution, which has been used to consider the development of the Self- evaluation model. Briefly, the research questions were designed to gain an insight into, and map out, quality regime features, operations, impacts and acceptance. This snapshot of Self-evaluation concentrates on the particular organisational groups: corporate agents (senior managers as structural modellers) and primary agents; middle managers (curriculum management with teaching responsibilities), plus lecturers (classroom practitioners) because

4 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 being clear about the scope for agency often depends on the affiliation and position of actors within the regime, which is complex.

Self-evaluation as control and consent in the consolidated regime

Having explained how regimes become established in Scottish FE (Etherington, 2006), further work (Etherington, 2007) confirmed what agential projects (to use a term from critical realism) are manifestly involved in initiating, establishing, diffusing, reproducing, yet also resisting the regime. Making agents auditable has become valid and legitimated through a public audit framework as an evolving consolidated regime (Etherington, 2008). Nevertheless, Self-evaluation is central to the development of institutional quality cultures (HMIe, 2008b; 2009) with consent at the heart of such processes. The following represents findings from the research contextualised by new arrangements for managing quality in Scottish FE.

Corporate Agents Managers are cast as agents of; ‘obligation’, ‘translation’, ‘persuasion’, ‘regulation’ and pragmatists, reflecting their affiliation to the regime. Managers translate policy initiatives, whilst attempting to generate institutional support for official versions of quality. However, managers can be, ‘challenging agents’ when protecting their own institutions from perceived unnecessary criticism or scrutiny, although to say they resist official versions of quality is to exaggerate events.

Regulatory control: externalities and impacts on internal management structures and agential projects Regulatory control implies forms of discipline and the findings suggest a motivational force for the increase in audit is the external ‘public audit regime’ that encourages institutional accountability, in a highly regulated sector. Nevertheless, the Crerar Review (The Scottish Parliament, 2007) recommends a need to reduce the audit burden with an outcome of greater devolved responsibility. Such a prognosis has underpinned more recent Funding Council guidance (2008b) and is embedded in the new HMIe external framework on quality arrangements, which are purported to reflect new thinking with an ‘overall lightening of external scrutiny’, proportionate approaches, professional dialogue and user focus (HMIe, 2008b, p 3) Such developments illustrate a shift whereby from incorporation a multiplicity of audit is considered a burden. A senior manager (College A) reports on, ‘the 365 day audit’, and of being ‘hamstrung by external agendas’. Moreover, the costs of audit demands are estimated by a senior figure (College B) as being: ‘twenty- five percent of your organisation at least’, with institutions ‘audited to death’. Many managers feel that the investment in quality is not cost effective or results in improved academic standards.

The position of managers with Self-evaluation means that on one level they are agents of obligation being subject to external guidance from the SFC, yet instrumental in the formation of institutional frameworks that capture the essence of the quality regime. Recent guidance from the SFC attempts to: “gain a clearer formal understanding of the arrangements by which the governing body of each college ensures accountability for quality” (SFC, 2008b p 6). Therefore there is now an increasing emphasis for the board of management of each college to produce a ‘baseline statement’ which describes quality arrangements. The shift in attention places an onus on institutions to “bear more responsibility for, and ownership of, the quality of educational provision” (SFC, 2008b p 5). Hence, the role of executive and non-executive members of the board is more clearly defined, although in practice it will usually be managers (as corporate agents of translation) who drive the process in the formulation of documents and processes within an institution. So in initiating, establishing and diffusing institutional regimes corporate agents are involved in actively cultivating control and consent, with new arrangements focusing on attainment targets and data used to inform good practice. Also, acronyms abound in the adoption of ‘new’ language and processes, which reflect the principles of quality. Examples include; CLIP (College Leading Innovative Practice), SLIP (Sector Leading Innovative Practice) and SLEEC (Student Learning Enhancement & Engagement Committee) being symptomatic of creating a culture of quality and attempts to engage consumers/students.

Structured arrangements compliment the generation of evidence and facilitates making the auditee auditable at all levels.

There is no doubt that it [the quality function] takes up an enormous amount of time and resources meeting all these external requirements and to produce the evidence crucially because you can be doing things but you can’t prove it and its hard to produce the evidence, that’s a problem really.

A senior manager in College B refers to the new arrangements in terms of, “if it can be measured we measure it”, whilst another in College B comments “we have no option but to adhere to external guidance”. Therefore

5 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 institutions have to demonstrate they are taking effective action to comply with HMIe during annual engagements or external reviews.

Also, evidence from the recent Improving Scottish Education, report by HMIE on inspection and review 2005-2008 (2009) identifies that the focus and challenges for the FE sector will be to measure impacts, set measurable targets. More scrutiny also means managers being tasked to motivate staff towards effective internal review and Self- evaluation. Despite the HMIe framework stressing a professional dialogue with institutions and agents, further evidence illustrates otherwise. In the new round of inspections, college feedback indicates that ‘HMI interactions are not following the dialogue format but taking the “colleges should……” approach’ (Convention of the Principals of Scotland’s Colleges, 2009) in prescribing actions and outcomes.

Internalising ideological control and consent: impacts of Self-evaluation The findings illustrate that Self-evaluation has become the key quality process to drive forward continuous improvement using performance criteria indicators as a method of assessing whether colleges are performing to a standard interpreted by the HMIe. Whilst being more consent based, Self-evaluation is rigorously systematic and is developing a requirement for better use of data and in doing so, capturing notions of good practice. The new external arrangements for inspection and review devolve responsibility towards colleges to nurture a quality culture.

The perception of some managers is that Self-evaluation is an external initiative, but could be effectively utilised as a process tool for engineering control and consent. More generally, various respondents report favourably on the impacts of Self-evaluation although are predominantly dependent on agency status in college hierarchies. A senior manager (College C), explained the nature of the shift in perception, which suggests Self-evaluation is becoming more embedded in institutional quality frameworks as part of an ‘evaluative’ consolidated regime.

The big impact of quality audits initially is to standardise approaches and to get people used to the idea of audit…As time has gone on, I think we [the institution] have got much closer to that, and we’ve got much more of a reflective profession than we had.

Nevertheless, a perception exists that despite Self-evaluation being more progressive, there is confusion over the meaning and processes of audit. Likewise, the notion of audit disappearing is a fallacy and fails to appreciate how processes are being reinvented and reshaped to reflect new thinking in the sector. New arrangements are encouraging a proliferation of policies, committees and teams at institutional level with quality issues being more prominent on meetings agenda. Structures and processes in College B include the Performance Review Programme to look at cross college issues and performance indicators and student outcomes, being tied to the Self-evaluation process. Also, the Performance Indicator Team to improve the profile of performance. Much of the new developments are underpinned by strategies to improve e.g. the Quality and Enhancement strategy of colleges. The form of quality is changing to more effectively tie in Self-evaluation with college processes, although the time expended on quality type activities is not diminishing rather, things are being done differently.

Agents of persuasion Whilst college managers have the job of translation, evidence exists to suggest that improvement agendas require different approaches by managers to include forms of persuasion in the diffusion and reproduction of the regime. In an attempt to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of staff, quality is sold as a development opportunity. The positive impacts of Self-evaluation are associated with more emphasis on ownership of processes by professionals, to improve the service to students. However, a senior manager in College A, reports that unless institutional ownership and engagement are definitive outcomes, the Self-evaluation process is limited to quality assurance audits.

The difficulty with the framework [Self-evaluation] is, unless it is internalised in a college and actually becomes part of the colleges’ own philosophy, it’s simply seen as the way that the HMI rate you when they come in.

The notion of a culture of reflective practitioners implies that the tentacles of Self-evaluation are being naturalised within institutions’ as regimes become more evaluative, although still focused on the managerialist arm of budgetary rigour. Evidence suggests that the impact of Self-evaluation is heavily influenced by the SFC Guidance and subsequently what HMIe requires of colleges rather than how colleges see their own professional development. In short, reflective practices have been made more auditable, through the operationalising of internal management systems to support external requirements, with colleges and agents being ‘taught to report’. The key principles of quality: high quality learning and outcomes, student engagement and quality culture reflect the NPM agenda with a significant emphasis on audit and the consumer. The impression of autonomy fails to acknowledge that colleges are

6 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 measured on compliance to SFC guidance and will be unlikely to add value due to time and other constraints or priorities as a Manager (College C), confirms: “If it’s not needed by the Funding Council it will not get done”.

The meaning of quality is therefore encapsulated by a series of audit routines, which is not too dissimilar to the views of Power, (1997) on the harnessing of regulatory programmes to quality management. Notions of evaluative quality merely take the sharp edges off events and securing consent at institutional level by senior managers (corporate agents) creates some form of dilemma. Convincing employees of the merits of continuous improvement programmes, despite further increases in workloads is problematic in practice. Senior managers are obliged to conscript and persuade other agential projects to assist in regime diffusion and reproduction. Some evidence exists of quality teams being established using hybrid professionals i.e. practitioners to drive and develop techniques of persuasion. More recently the creation of posts e.g. Quality Enhancement managers are intended to support practitioners and coincide with a softer message of cultural improvement.

For some managers, the process of Self-evaluation is a straightforward tool of bureaucratic control, using education to elicit certain levels of consent from more junior staff and embed an audit mentality. A manager (College A) reports, [As] a management team we’ve got to be almost educating them into realizing the purpose of all of this… it’s a staff development issue, the purpose of audits”.

Other managers are critical of the HMIE approach, which effectively focuses on quasi-technical systems to manicure the auditee, rather than the development of creative practice. One senior manager (College C) is clear on the type of impacts the HMIe has on the classroom experience for both practitioners and learners: “The HMI’s don’t look at teaching and learning positively, which stifles innovation”. The findings suggest that the real impact of the HMIe is as auditors directing the embedding of college rituals, which are externally condoned.

Some managers consider HMIe as being ‘political puppets of the Funding Council’ or ‘government agents’ (Manager College B). Likewise, more critical agents consider that Associate Assessors (college managers used to assist full-time HMI’s) are merely messengers, spinning the official party line of Self-evaluation at the expense of developing a more creative student experience. Such examples reflect bureaucratic control, whereby career advancement serves to muzzle professional debate. So, career becomes a form of control as promotion prospects are built around the quality regime.

The systems and internal formation of quality are clearly part of the institutional pressures for the quality regime to produce reassurance to management, particularly in the harmonizing of assurance and improvement models. Also (and more importantly for institutions) that arrangements for quality reassure and embody levels of confidence for the SFC and HMIe whereby structures and processes are fit for purpose. The most recent HMIe external arrangements have replaced grades with confidence statements (is confident/has limited confidence/is not confident) related to high quality learning and teaching, high quality outcomes, learner engagement and the enhancement of a quality culture (HMIe, 2008b, p 30). Also, managers apply the lever of professional pride to generate consent and ensure conformance.

Agents of regulation: articulating disciplinary control A view also exists that various checks and balances are sensible and necessary to regulate lecturer autonomy. The rationale for adherence is detailed by a manager from College C.

Yes, they have to be [controlled] particularly with a curriculum, which on the whole isn’t externally assessed… If people aren’t keeping to the procedures then somebody has to come from above and say “do it” because otherwise the whole system loses credibility.

Some managers accept that corporate quality affords opportunities for more punitive translation, demonstrated as a potential disciplinary device with dissenters regarded as being disloyal and fearful of change. Hence, using regulation, measurement and monitoring processes, in the name of a better customer service, is a vehicle of enforcement. Regulation is established through hierarchy and operationalised by using non-conformance labels to bring recalcitrant staff into line by the Quality unit in College C (viewed by managers and others as the ‘College police’ or ‘Gestapo’).

Further evidence exists of a senior manager (College A) manipulating Self-evaluation as a tool to define and identify non-performance, to institute disciplinary measures (if necessary) in the name of customer service.

As a manager, I do have as any college would have, members of staff who I’d like to perform better um… and the quality system enables me to generate evidence to either instigate that development or either get

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them out the door umm… all of that is to the benefit of the students so that we’re not delivering a poor product.

Another senior manager also referred to perceived dissenters in terms of, ‘The Taliban’, to signify resistance to post incorporation discourse and practice. This understanding of dissent being politically motivated coincides with the view that quality is one way of embarrassing professional staff into action.

Managers are keen to advocate consent based models, characterized by empowerment, although the underpinning foundations of quality systems in FE appear to be a rigorous attention to systems. However a change in language is being adopted as part of an attempt to create a more acceptable face to Self-evaluation and other quality processes but in doing so establish a quality culture. A senior manager in College C comments that:

We used to use words like ‘non-conformist’ which I hated, now we’ve started using positive words like ‘compliance’ you know, so the language changes a lot with quality, but I thought ‘non-conformance’ was a dreadful word it was like being in the army and you know stuff like that. It didn’t suit our culture at all.

To further consolidate institutional adherence, to the quality agenda, some managers advocate a ‘can do’ cultural approach, whereby everything is possible when it comes to accepting and meeting regime demands associated with the flexible nature of the work effort bargain in post-incorporation FE. A manager in College C remarks: “We don’t think of things [related to quality] in terms of resistance but constraints on people’s time” because professionals will conform due to self-regulation and “they do it because they appreciate a reason for it”.

Managers have reservations, about the ‘general drain on time’, whilst new arrangements place an emphasis on corporate actors (in the context of leadership and enhancement) to demonstrate how successful managers are in the motivation of staff, engaging in professional reflection and nurturing teamwork (HMIe 2008b). The rhetoric now eulogises professional dialogue both with and within establishments, suggesting ways of diluting potential conflict between agents or generating an impression that outcomes are negotiated.

Primary Agents Middle managers are responsible for managing the day to day delivery of the curriculum and likewise the maintenance of standards in that process. However, due to a lack of ownership and less influence on structure modelling middle managers are cast as agents of ‘obligation’ and ‘compliance’. A corporate agent (College B) comments that: “Curriculum Leaders or Senior lecturers are the engine room of curriculum development”, although modernisation is placing agents in a position whereby “CL’s are at the end of their tether”. Middle managers are tasked with a remit to maintain and promote quality as ‘brokers’ with limited or no authority but ‘swamped’ by the volume and intensity with very little downtime. Nonetheless, some middle managers are agents of ‘pragmatism’ in demonstrating that the regime can be circumnavigated through searching for loopholes.

Ideological control: impacts of Self-evaluation on consent and levels of intensification Middle managers are drivers of the Self-evaluation process, implementing the policies and design at a micro level. Findings reveal that consent and commitment is apparent amongst some agents because they feel that the ethos of being able to evaluate professional practice is useful and progressive. Also, subscribing to quality is part of a strategy for career enhancement, which also serves to subjugate agential projects to bureaucratic control. Nevertheless, respondents are experiencing significant levels of expansion and intensification of workloads.

Middle managers construct written reports from across a whole range of courses, leading to an enormous amount of additional and repetitive work. However, some respondents welcome the benefits of ownership with Self- evaluation, when meaningful debate can take place amongst professionals at course team level, described by a middle manager as, “a nice exchange of information”. Nonetheless, agents report that evaluation has always been a feature of provision, but now everything is about ‘statistics and measurement’.

Despite some respondents being fairly positive about the concept and ethos of Self-evaluation, there is a significant majority of middle managers who think differently. On the one hand quality ownership suggests self-regulating agents (autonomous), but in translation outcomes clearly demonstrate significant levels of intensification in the work effort bargain. The additional work burdens mean that some middle managers are increasingly utilising their free time to complete reporting processes. Evidence illustrates that evaluative processes are submerged in resource allocation conflicts and a middle manager (College C) is vitriolic in stating: “[We] naturally regard this stuff in a sense as war”.

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Other middle managers illustrate that the impact of Self-evaluation means structured arrangements requiring an increased level of paper exercises related to performativity. A middle manager (College C) describes the workload in the following terms:

Known as the downside of the [names the college] approach to it [quality] is that it’s [quality] entirely paper driven, there is a huge amount of paperwork… I personally, and most of us here, feel that is a huge burden.

Whilst senior managers consider a rationalisation of report writing to be an improvement, middle managers have a perception that work reduction is not an outcome or is unlikely to become a reality despite official rhetoric of lightening the burden of audit. The workload on the surface looks clearer, but in reality the ‘doing’ of the activity is merely resulting in differentiated work tasks, with similar if not more intensity focused on measuring impacts.

Some middle managers regard presentations on the outcomes of Self-evaluation as a voice to engage with senior management, although others consider the process as ‘additional homework’ and a ‘regulatory exercise’ with no “real engagement”, as one put it. Playing to the rules of the game is considered as a particular approach in coping with such demands, although results in obligation and conformance.

Brokers without authority Middle managers across colleges regard classroom observation (a further development of the HMIe inspired Self- evaluation) on one level, as a contribution to the debate on the reflexive practitioner. However, middle managers are faced with the classroom observation initiative being under-resourced, being in contradiction to the Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS) trade union position on observation and lacking more senior management support to effectively operationalise and implement policies. Whilst being aware of the external influence of the HMIe in trying to introduce observation, middle managers are often placed in the position of being local brokers by senior managers at a college level. Having noted these points, evidence suggests local causation factors influence matters with observation as one outcome in the approach to the evaluation of learning and teaching.

Middle managers are faced with the immediate problems associated with selling the quality message to other groups, and in doing so generating levels of consent at a team level. In College A, middle managers feel they negotiate a position with lecturers over compliance with observation models. However, a middle manager (College A) suggests brokering skills are needed to assuage resistance. “Yes, some people feel threatened by the appraisals [classroom observation], it varies… in my area, teachers are very much behind closed doors”.

Further, there is also an acknowledgement by another middle manager (College A) that their own position as a broker lacked authority:

It’s my lot that are resisting, I think it’s a political thing, I would say they just don’t want to get involved in classroom observation unless they are forced into it and because the college won’t make the decision to make it definite they are not volunteering.

Other evidence also suggests that in areas where team teaching is common practice middle managers accept the principles of observation and are more able to persuade lecturers of the value of the exercise. Having said this, examples exist where middle managers and lecturers are positively predisposed to the idea of observation but time constraints prevent implementation. The position of middle managers in the quality regime is exemplified by classroom observation, being brokers without authority, unable to effectively establish regime structures, associated with Self-evaluation which hampers reproduction of the regime. Whilst middle managers have certain obligations to further the quality culture in colleges, this coincides with increased levels of scrutiny and accountability associated with their own position suggesting the most acute manifestation of the auditor/auditee interplay in the regime.

Further, a middle manager (College C), comments on their own position constituted by regulatory control: “Powerlessness and powerlessness but we feel disempowered even further as a consequence of various initiatives.” This position is further characterised by one respondent from College C who comments: “We’re the thin slice in the thick sandwich”, squeezed from above by corporate agents and from below by other primary agents (lecturers). Another middle manager is quoted in relation to new organisational arrangements for evaluating learning and teaching, saying: “my heart sinks (on hearing of certain autocratic approaches in another department) … the creation of overkill will produce resentment and lassitude and the volume factor is a real danger”

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Agents of pragmatism – control and consent A middle manager in College C provides a rational for conformance, noting that some non-conformance is a part of the system but is disguised as part of a game between more senior management and others.

You would get some non-conforming…Too many non-conformists is a kind of you know it’s a default kind of thing but you wouldn’t actually have to do one because you would actually be breaking the effective rules. A bit like in a Soviet factory where you pretend to do work and they pretend to give you a wage you know you are hardly going to say let’s come up with another arrangement. So you are not going to say, ‘oh we are not going to agree with this’. You just potentially agree to everything and there is a substantial degree of non-conformant activity.

Several variants of agential accommodation are in evidence as some agents are prepared to play a game (Burawoy, 1979) in terms of career advancement and as a coping mechanism applying considerable amounts of emotional labour to ‘keep a face up’. Forms of bureaucratic control (Smyth et al 2001) merge with levels of consent as agents envisage events in their interest, although regime outcomes are still reproduced. Likewise, frequent accounts of ”reeling out set phrases” to speed up Self-evaluation report writing illustrates subversion but also exposes a skills drift whereby new skills tend to be of a low- level administrative nature. Repetitive low level report writing is a feature of work for middle managers suggesting forms of deskilling exist similar to that identified by Mather and Seifert (2003). Also, holding back or manipulating data to avoid further scrutiny are examples where policies are subverted in an effort to manage the contradictions of the quality regime. A middle manager (College C) comments:

…there are also procedures, which we are aware of at various times and all too regularly we are avoiding and we have to avoid in meeting other targets. So, I mean retention [of students] is one of these key issues… effectively what you are doing is well burying realistic paperwork.

Certainly, threads of Gouldners (1954) mock bureaucracy are evident, as bureaucratic rules and regimes that clash with the value systems of employees are subverted. Some middle managers agree to the demands of the system but then make a conscious decision not to do particular tasks, which are not pursued by management for various reasons, despite knowledge of the recalcitrance. Essentially poor outcomes have external implications for all concerned.

Lecturers As primary agents lecturers are subject to a variety of externalities and as with other aspects of professional obligation Self-evaluation means an encroachment on autonomy. New arrangements focusing on individual performance infer more scrutiny with an affiliated or additional workload. Whilst inaction is one outcome ‘quality’ as a common sense corporate business process concept is difficult to challenge (see Avis, 2002; 2003) although lecturers do not accept that such a philosophy added to a meaningful classroom experience for students (see Randle and Brady, 1997).

Market and technical control: sources of intensification and extensification The contractual framework changed with the marketisation of FE with one outcome being an increase in the amount of time spent in the classroom (up to and over 24 hours contact), which means less room to accommodate additional tasks. A lecturer in College A comments:

If we go back to all this ‘quality’, filling in all these forms in and having the meeting that we have you just don’t have the time to prepare for your classes and the short notice that you’re given doing these classes. We’re producing a new course for next year and have had no time to develop it and there’s no time given to getting the resources together… no development time is given … this just means more intensive work.

One outcome is of lecturers having less control of delivery, ‘teaching to assessment’ to cope with the pace and volume of work. Also, curriculum modernisation, results in extensification and intensification of working practices.

Quality for many lecturers is an audit process, whether in the context of checks on teaching materials or evaluating the success of programmes. A lecturer in College B comments:

Quality is about slavish adherence to irrelevant procedures, doing whatever is necessary to avoid criticism from outside agencies regardless of whether this has a positive effect on the students or anything else.

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Bureaucratic and technical control expressed as outcomes equate to an intensified ‘Taylorised’ curriculum increasingly harnessed towards measurement and devolved scrutiny at micro level. Continuous improvement processes require significant professional investment, with evidence emerging of lecturers delivering courses in twenty-five percent less time but still expected to add value and improve quality standards. Added value is at a premium but a focus for external scrutiny, which is being compounded, by new quality arrangements seeking to encourage best practice.

Further intensification for lecturers is a realistic expectation because the work effort bargain is subject to being continually violated. There is more awareness of quality issues amongst lecturers, but also more involvement, often as a consequence of devolved responsibility, requiring participation i.e. not opting out. A lecturer in College A comments: “My job has totally changed in the last five years, there’s more paperwork and moderation”. Similarly, another colleague (College A) reports on the impacts of increased administration:

I wouldn’t mind filling in meaningful figures, it’s the meaninglessness of them that is frustrating… Is this going to improve quality? Because half the time I don’t think it does. I’d rather improve the quality in the classroom instead of filling in several sheets… I rarely get feedback from these sheets.

Manufacturing control and consent with assurance to evaluation: Winning Hearts and minds through ideological control Despite general demands on lecturers, many consider that management across colleges are making attempts to ‘win over’ staff to cultural change. Notions of this type of involvement have conditions attached to them, which are compliance orientated. The attempts to spread a quality culture are characterised by ‘Quality Weeks’ or ‘Quality Days’ as part of corporate continuous professional development and more recently focus group participation in an attempt to preach the merits of a new ‘professional dialogue’ (HMIe, 2008b) and shape common sense ideas about how to approach quality. A lecturer in College A explains:

The idea here is not aggressive it’s about conquering your heart and minds these days, that you constantly have these happy family e mails from the Principal or that the idea that organisations are not in conflict and were all working together towards a common goal… It’s not the aggressive management style it’s the softly softly were all a team approach that causes most resentment’.

Many lecturers comment that the idea of evaluation is positive (something informing professional practice), but impacts are manifested in paper driven exercises that discount the notion of being reflective. Several elements are palpable in the findings. On the one hand, lecturers comment that Self-evaluation is a team exercise, where lecturers get together to, “look at PI’s [performance indicators] and negotiate a grading’- so we are all involved in that as well”, as one lecturer put it. Yet similar responses to those of middle managers are forthcoming about the time consuming nature of the exercise. However, most lecturers are not involved writing reports up unless they are contributing to course reports, which are aggregated into a Self-evaluation report. Nevertheless, whilst new arrangements require a team approach to evaluating learning and teaching, there is a substantial focus on individual lecturer performance at unit level with outcomes analysed using quasi technical quantitative approaches.

Respondents report that the process of Self-evaluation impacts adversely because it is an ‘unnatural exercise’, which is poorly resourced in terms of time allocation. Lecturer affiliation to the quality regime means that performance is being evaluated in a vacuum as a lecturer in College B exemplifies: “There are certain areas [i.e. the curriculum] where we can’t really control things to improve them, there are things where we are constrained really in lots of different ways”. The impact of Self-evaluation on lecturer’s time commitments is that teaching is regularly put to one side or curtailed, to accommodate meetings and other displacement activities. A lecturer (College A) reports: “Now sometimes the teaching of classes is the kind of thing I’m trying to fit in”.

The findings reveal traditional lecturer autonomy is being undermined, which means that the powers to self-regulate are restricted by official evaluation processes. New methods of evaluating learning and teaching are being instituted, with evidence to suggest lecturers are being forced to adopt a preferred tick box corporate approach or write an extensive written report. A lecturer reports on the rationale of a corporate agent (at a meeting to discuss the evaluation of learning and teaching), commenting: “I need to tick boxes for the HMI”. Evidence also exists that lecturer submissions in the Self-evaluation process, are subject to being altered either by middle managers, or further on in the process by corporate agents. The purpose of intervention in documentation is to give the right impression, or use the language format (being taught to engage), expected by either more senior personnel or external agencies i.e. the HMIe. Subsequently, for many lecturers Self-evaluation is as a ‘phoney’ process, manipulated for external audit purposes, which delivers an unnatural picture of what happens in colleges.

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Agents of pragmatism and resistance: ‘Not playing the game’ The development of Self-evaluation, (through full-scale classroom observation) emerges and continues as an increasing source of tension for lecturers, representing a serious violation of the work effort bargain. The underlying purpose of observation is considered by the majority of lecturers as having an external programmatic structure that is constituted in making professionals more auditable (reconfiguring the auditee).

The most active examples of classroom observation are evident in College A, where despite lecturers acknowledging observation, as a professional, reflective activity, which could have some benefits real tensions exist due to a lack of investment. Such pressure violates an already strained work effort bargain. A lecturer in College A states: “I’d quite like it if I had time I really love watching people teach… its not going to take off if you don’t get time to do it”.

The views on observation signify challenges to professional autonomy alongside a lack of trust about how the process and information is managed by corporate agents. A majority view of lecturers is that management commitment extends to an audit level to meet HMIe requirements. Also, some respondents feel that information from classroom observations could be used in disciplinary cases, with line managers choosing to identify weaknesses in the performance of individuals. Lecturer responses to classroom observation in College A ranges from inaction to a straight refusal to become involved in any associated activity. A lecturer comments: “There is a general suspicion the morale is low and the overall ‘goodwill factor’ has gone and people are very suspicious of it, that’s the bottom line”, whilst another adds: “people are keeping one eye on what has happened elsewhere and they are worried about that it is potentially judgmental”.

Furthermore, classroom observation provides an example of a frontier of control in the classroom, whereby lecturers envisage infringements by management as an affront to professional autonomy. Decisions on delivery methods can be manipulated by managers to suit in an effort to drive wider quality initiatives by capturing ground at the point of delivery. However, despite concerted resistance rhetoric from lecturers this is not entirely successful and often depends on the type of pressure exerted by line managers. For some areas in College A, agents simply refuses to be involved, although there are examples where some progress is being made by managers to persuade lecturers to engage in formal classroom observation. A lecturer in College A exemplifies the levels of acceptance, but also how management attempts to make the process more attractive to respondents:

Yes [resistance to] ‘peer observation’, which they have now renamed as ‘tandem observation’ to make it sound less threatening and the union have boycotted it… We’re just refusing to do it… People are very suspicious of it.

Furthermore, the underpinning motives of classroom observation, the fear of, “appraisal by the backdoor”, as one lecturer put it, rather than being a purely personal developmental exercise appears to be part of a wider external regime agenda to regulate performance. Also, a union officer (College A), reports: “There are concerns that it will be used in some way against them”.

Corporate agents in colleges want to make the discourse sound less threatening and build a consensus around self- governance and self-regulation. A softer approach by management, to both the activity of observation and reporting procedures is an example of an attempt to win ‘the hearts and minds’ of lecturers. The result of management trying to introduce less threatening initiatives means that some observation takes place informally. However, where this is the case lecturers are keen to stress that they look for ways pragmatic ways to frustrate the rules, whilst appearing to conform and comply with the policy initiative. So forms of aesthetic commitment are not necessarily converted into action. Likewise, the complexity and time commitments necessary to make the exercise of classroom observation appear valid and credible are utilised by lecturers to stall full implementation.

Evidence also reveals variable stages of development of classroom observation. Yet new arrangements for external review acknowledge that observation is one method amongst others in the evaluation of learning and teaching (HMIe 2008b). Such outcomes perhaps signify that inaction and resistance amongst lecturers to full implementation in colleges has had some success. Nevertheless, all the factors combined make it very difficult for lecturers to accept the way the regime has evolved. The state of affairs is summed up by a lecturer in College A: “I don’t get as much enjoyment out of it now… I’m being pushed in a direction I don’t want to go. I want to improve my class rather than improve an audit”.

The sentiments in the above account are not uncommon, and exemplify the level of disenchantment over the drift in the work-effort bargain from across the lecturer groups. The outcome is that many lecturers are unwilling to accept the status of auditee, rather than professional practitioner. The current scenario for many lecturers is creating a

12 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 contested field, with a consistent tension being asked to write and speak in a forced language, (different from normal usage ‘quality speak’), when addressing course reports and quality matters. As with quality assurance, enhancement appears as a concept that will continue to be operationalised to support the audit function.

Discussion and conclusion The prognosis from the research further illustrates that official versions of quality can lead to taken for granted assumptions about the nature of bureaucracy, professionalism, the manifestation of control and the reproduction of consent and resistance in organisations. To be specific, whilst agential projects are manifestly involved in initiating, establishing, diffusing, reproducing, yet also resisting the regime revitalising understandings of the importance of consent is a fundamental in regime success. However, for many, evolving quality processes are part of an evolving extensification and intensification of roles as part of ‘performative culture’ (Avis, 2003). Therefore, this paper does not share the earlier optimism of other contributors to the FE debate who suggest more positive outcomes (Laird, 2002); a dilution in managerialism (Gleeson, 2001) or that corporate and primary agents ultimately share common realities (Loots and Ross, 2004).

The findings generally illustrate that corporate agents are investing a degree of effort in ensuring as many people as possible share the quality values of the organization. Such events have been compounded by new arrangements which have placed institutional review with Self-evaluation as the main instrument to dig deeper at institutional levels. Whilst evidence suggests external economic control, this is not matched by a similar emphasis on external cultural control. Nevertheless, corporate agents do consider that Self-evaluation is a tool to engineer consent, as it constitutes a mechanism with which to consolidate and reshape regime support.

Ownership of quality, through Self-evaluation, is considered (by senior managers) to be a vehicle for altering the nature of relationships, rules and practice feature in assurance-based models. Hence, corporate agents are keen to encourage other regime citizens to internalise the principles of continuous improvement, signifying how individual and group consent is necessary for evaluative practice to flourish.

For others in the regime i.e. middle managers (as primary agents), Self-evaluation continues to intensify workloads due to a specific logic of administration, which embeds forms of quasi-technical control. The ‘totalising’ impact of quality does provide scope in other areas as some respondents envisage career-building strategies emanating from involvement in quality initiatives. Nevertheless, such strategies are central to subjugating agents to forms of bureaucratic control. Work intensification, associated with Self-evaluation and more regulated forms of bureaucracy also produces clashes with work – life balance due to unmanageable workloads.

Moreover, detachment from structural modelling means primary agents are subject to the forms of evaluation against intensified working practice. Self-evaluation has become a focus for additional meetings, increased scrutiny over performance indicators and a vehicle to institute forms of discipline. The impact on professional autonomy are in keeping with labour process analysis suggesting that classroom activities are increasingly being made more auditable against a backdrop of direct control. Such devices include; tighter curricular models, redesigning delivery and forms of deskilling (Mather and Seifert, 2003), which are Taylorist in nature. Perceptions of Self-evaluation demonstrate contrived notions of teamwork, supplemented with controlled discretion (Friedman, 1977; 1990), which suggest more indirect control as an attempt to harness support through the manufacturing of consent (Burawoy, 1979). However, work practices are constituted as task autonomy, being largely fragmented and broken down into a series of mundane audit maintenance activities. Outcomes cultivate ‘pragmatic’ rather than principled professionalism because agents devise mechanisms ‘to cope’ or ‘get by’.

Therefore, the higher trust consent models of quality (associated with Self-evaluation) appear to be being overlaid on a low trust environment. Accordingly, corporate agential failure to convince practitioners of the benefits of an economized quality, are resulting in management deploying more indirect forms of control. Such developments, have witnessed a dubious re-labelling of primary agents as managers of learning, with the achievement of targets signifying good professional practice. Also, new arrangements on focusing on Self-evaluation, does not mean a lighter burden, but a shift in shape and form. The audit culture is cast by many respondents as creating a culture of low-level report writing, where data falsification is an open secret, but a necessity to avoid further external scrutiny. Such a scenario has applications to Burawoyan notions of ‘making out’, but is also reminiscent of how forms of representative and mock bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954) are constructed in organisations.

Self-evaluation appears to suggest a more consent based model, which stresses and reinforces the idea of an evolving internalised institutional regime. Perhaps it is possible to speak of consolidated evaluative regimes with features of self-regulation although, violations of previous shared language traditions means establishing a status quo through embedding specific regime values, whilst having some success is proving somewhat difficult. The

13 Neil Etherington ILPC Edinburgh 06-08.04.09 notion of a new professional dialogue in quality arrangements can also be considered as a ‘Trojan horse’ given an inference exists that outcomes are negotiated although dependent on degrees of conformance and institutional adherence to Funding Council guidance. Such outcomes, also contest notions of the hegemonic dominance of the quality regime within the educational settlement.

Subsequently, a comprehensive empirical appreciation underpinned by a critical theoretical framework, questions the validity of ideological discourse and success stories, which are somewhat at odds with the practice of agents engaged in quality type activities. Currently the prospect of a tighter financial settlement (in the coming years) plus risks from reductions from other sources of funding are likely to present a series of challenges to colleges (Audit Scotland, 2008). Such a scenario is likely to further enhance quality as a legitimating technology for organisational change. Hence, rather than empowerment and cultural embeddedness, associated with ‘winning hearts and minds’ as outcomes, this paper suggests saturation in the work-effort bargain as a consequence of official attempts to further consolidate a deficit regime.

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Robson, J., Bailey, B. and Larkin, S. (2004) ‘Adding Value: investigating the discourse of professionalism adopted by vocational teachers in further education colleges’, Journal of Education and Work, Vol. 17, No. 2 June. Sachs, J. (2001) Teacher professional identity: competing discourses, competing outcomes, Journal of Education Policy, Vol. 16, No 2. Scottish Executive (2003) ‘Learning through Life, Life through Learning’, Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, Stationery Office. Scottish Executive (2004) ‘A Changing Landscape for Tertiary Education and Research in Scotland’ accessed at: http://www.scotish executive.gov.uk/consultations/education/cltes-02.asp. Scottish Executive (2005) Learning to improve: quality approaches for lifelong learning, Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, Stationary Office. Scottish Funding Council (2007) Joint Quality Review Group (JQRG) Minutes of meeting SFC/07/38 Agenda Item 5.5 23 February. Scottish Funding Council (2008a) Quality, Edinburgh: Scottish Funding Council. Accessed at www.sfc.ac.uk. Scottish Funding Council (2008b) Circular: Council guidance to colleges on quality SFC/33/2008, June. Scottish Funding Council (2008c) Service Level Agreement between the Scottish Further Education Funding Council and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education for the period 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2009, Edinburgh: Scottish Funding Council. Scottish Funding Council (2008d) Circular: Efficient Government, SFC/43/2008, August. Scottish Funding Council (2008e) Facts & Figures, Edinburgh: Scottish Funding Council, August. The Scottish Government (2007) The Crerar Review: The Report of the Independent Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and Complaints Handling of Public Services in Scotland, Edinburgh: Crown Office. The Scottish Office (1998) Quality Matters: Quality Improvement through Self-evaluation, Edinburgh: Stationary Office. The Scottish Parliament (2004) Audit Committee Criticises Scottish Further Education Council for “Dragging its feet” Committee News Release CAU 003/2004 Thursday 18 March. Thompson, P. (1989) The Nature of Work, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan. Thompson, P. (1990) Crawling from the Wreckage: The Labour Process and the Politics of Production in Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (Eds) Labour Process Theory, London: Macmillan.

Neil Etherington Contact: Motherwell College: Tel. 01698-232227 email [email protected] University of Strathclyde: email [email protected]

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