Transformation of ECOWAS As a Security Apparatus and Its
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Transformation of ECOWASas a Security Apparatusand Its Implications in Ghana’s Political Orientation, 1990-2000 JOSHUA DAPAAH-AGYEMANG * ABSTRACT The transformationof the Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS) froman economic integration scheme toa politicalsecurity scheme andits implicationsin Ghana politicalorientation was bornout of the unanticipated changes ofthe post-1990ssub-regional civil conicts andes- pecially afterthe endof the ColdWar. This history gave Ghana an opportunitywithin ECOWAS’transformation from economic integrationto politico-security organization. In this connection, Ghana’s foreignpolicy took a new turnaffecting the whole West African sub-regionthat was precipitatedpartly bythe Liberiancivil war.My principalargument is that de- spiteGhana’ s adoptionof purposeful isolationism in the early 1980s,the followedtrends ofevents ofGhana foreignpolicy, atleast onthe sub-regionallevel, isareection ofinternal and external factors such as the transformationof ECOWAS secu- rity apparatusdue to con icts in some member states, butnot the leadershipstyle ofthe government. Therefore, in orderto apprehendthe reasonbehind the dynamics ofGhana’ s foreign policychange andadjustment, in particularGhana’ s strategies andperception of its interest in the sub-regionallevel, onehas toconsider anumberof crucial factors such as the political * Department ofPolitical Science/ International Relations,University ofHelsinki, SF- 00014Helsinki, Finland. Africanand Asian Studies, volume 2,no. 1 also availableonline Ó 2003Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden see www.brill.nl Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 4 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² andeconomic milieuin which ECOWAS is engaged,vis-à -vis Ghana’s government actions. I.Introduction:Background and Problems Peace,security, and con ict management arethe centerof the cur- renttransformation of the EconomicCommunity of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS)as a sub-regionalorganization aimed for economic integration topolitico-security integration. Modeled after the EuropeanUnion, the ECOWASseeks topromote regional development througheconomic and diplomaticcooperation among its member states. The end ofthe Cold Warhas seen an increasingproliferation of violent intra-statecon icts in Africa,and in particular in the West Africansub-region, often with de- bilitatingconsequences on lives andinfrastructure and with collapse of stateapparatus (Adedeji 1999; Francis 1999; Mazrui 1998:233-244; Vogt 1999:295-322).This is evident insecurity, peace building, con ict manage- ment,peacekeeping (Aning1999; 2002; Adekeye 2002;James 1998)and regionalintegrative methods. Kennes 1999;Hix 1999;Bach 1999:152- 166;Rosamond 2000; Christiansen 2001; Francis 2001 have analyzed the experience andperformance of ECOWAS during the pastyears. ECOWAS,established in 1975 among fteen (later sixteen in1977) states ofWest Africa(see tableone for membership), is perhaps the most visible andcertainly the moststudied of the currentexperiments inre- gionalintegration in the sub-SaharanAfrica (Uka 1983;Ojo 1980:571- 604;Bach 1983:604-632;Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991:45-69). Since inde- pendence,most African integration schemes have been the platformfor the “pursuitof wealth and enhanced nationalprosperity rather than by the issuesof war and security” (Gambari 1991:3). On hispart, Olatunde Ojohas arguedthat the formationof ECOWAS in 1975 was driven by twoimportant considerations: regional security and economic development (1980:571).ECOWAS was conceived as a means towardeconomic inte- grationand development intendedto leadto the eventual establishmentof aneconomicunion in West Africa,enhancing botheconomic stability and relationsamong member states. Twenty-seven years afterit was launched as a traditionalcustoms union-orientedintegration scheme, ECOWAShas nowbecome a multi- facetedregional integration scheme equippedwith political and security mechanismsdesigned to meet the challenges beyondthose presented by atariff-harmonizationorganizations. This peace, security and con ict management resultingfrom various sub-regional con icts — Liberia(1990- 1997),Sierra Leone (1993-2000),and Guinea Bissau (1998-1999) — gave Ghana an opportunityto change itsisolationism in the 1980sto active Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 5 ² regionalparticipation in the 1990s.The sub-regionalcon icts led tothe formationof a militaryalliance, code-named — ECOMOG (ECOWAS Cease-re Monitoring Group) in 1990.ECOMOG wasestablished initially onan adhoc basis as a multinationalpeacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-enforcement,and was the rstsuch group to be established by a sub-regionalbody. In the post-ColdWar world where large parts of the globehave losttheir former geopolitical importance, a normof “ subsidiary” seems tobegaining strength according to whichregional and sub-regional organizationswill be the “rstresult” for problems transcending national borders,leaving the “internationalcommunity” to deal only withthose problems,which cannot be solvedat a lowerlevel (O’Brien 2000:57).The studyand practice of regionalism, both in the oldand the newversion, have attractedgrowing interest in interrelated analytical andpolicy realms asglobalization and differentiation have likewise increasedin the nal decadeof the twentiethcentury (Boå s, Shaw, and Marchand 1999:879). In supportingregional integration, the issueof economic versus political aspectsof integration cannot be separated. At the same time,economic integrationcan have importantpolitical consequences; for example, it canhelp tostabilize the politicalregime in some countries. According toWalter Kennes, “the chances ofsuccess for regional integration increase when the politicaland economic bene ts complement each other.Regional integrationcan contribute to regional peace and security” (1999:31). The aimof this paper is to analyze the evolutionand transformation ofECOWASduring 1990-2000 and its implications in the case ofGhana. Ishall arguethat Ghana’ s purposefulisolationism in the1980s to active ECOWASpolitics during the 1990swas as the resultof the regional securityenvironment due to the violent conict in three neighboring states andthe endof the ColdWar. This is done by analyzing howcivil conict in neighboringstates and con ict management via ECOMOG led tothe changingof Ghana’ s foreignand security policy and how these choiceswere made. This development raisesthese questions:What factors impactedthe changingof Ghana’ s foreignpolicy? What factorsaccount for the resolve security,and the active participationof ECOMOG operation? Toattemptto answerthese questions,the articleis divided into four parts. The rstis introduction: background and problem. The secondsection containsthe historicalbackground of ECOWAS, Ghana andits foreign policyguidelines and the approachesand methodology used in writingthis paper.Part three examines the aimsand objectives and the principlesand institutionsof ECOWAS. Part four analyses Ghana’s politicalorientation inthe 1990sand the concludingremarks. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 6 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² II.Ghana and Its Foreign Policy Guidelines At rstglance, Ghana has comefull circle. At independence in March 1957,it wasregarded as the jewel inthe BritishAfrican’ s ColonialCrown. Its politicalstatus was enhanced bythe active continentalrole played by its rstpresident Kwame Nkrumah. Though this was dramatically offset by his (failed)socialist economic policies and subsequent political and economic events thatplugged Ghana toan economicand political quagmire for several decades. Ghana lies atthe heartof a region,which has been leadingsub-Saharan Africametalworking mining, sculpture, and agriculture. Contemporary Ghana takes itsname fromthe ancientKingdom of Ghana, someeight hundredkilometers to the northof present-day Accra, which ourished upto the eleventh centuryAD. One ofthe greatSudanic states which dominatedAfrican history, the Kingdomof Ghana controlledthe trade betweenthe miningareas to the southand the Saharatrade to the north. AncientGhana wasalso the focusfor the exporttrade in Saharan copper and salt. The comingof Europeans altered the tradingpatterns, and the focus ofeconomic power shifted to the West Africancoastline. The Portuguese came rst,seeking the sourceof the Africangold. The Portuguesesaw that Africalaid too far inland for them toreach; but in Ghana (formallyGold Coast),they founda regionwhere gold could be obtained and exported alongestablished trade paths from the interior.Their fort at Elmina (“ the mine”) wasthe rstin a series offorts along the GoldCoast designed torepel the otherEuropean seafarers who followed in their wake, all- strugglingfor their share of the protable Gold Coast trade. In duecourse, however, slaves replacedgold as the mostlucrative trade alongthe GoldCoastal area, with the Europeanslave buyersusing the forts andadjoining buildings for their own accommodation and protection, as well asfor storing the goods,mainly gunsand gunpowder, which they wouldbarter for slaves. Someof the fortswere also used for keeping newly acquiredslaves pendingthe arrivalsof the shipssent tocollect them for the “New World”for the plantationfarms. The historyof the variousforts graphicallyexpresses howthe variousEuropean trading nations fought for gold,ivory and later slaves. By the nineteenth century,the Britishhad won controlof the GoldCoast coastal trade from the otherEuropean states andremained there until1957. On 6March1957, Gold Coast achieved independenceand