Transformation of ECOWASas a Security Apparatusand Its Implications inGhana’ s Political Orientation, 1990-2000

JOSHUA DAPAAH-AGYEMANG *

ABSTRACT The transformationof the Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS) froman economic integration scheme toa politicalsecurity scheme andits implicationsin Ghana politicalorientation was bornout of the unanticipated changes ofthe post-1990ssub-regional civil conicts andes- pecially afterthe endof the ColdWar. This history gave Ghana an opportunitywithin ECOWAS’transformation from economic integrationto politico-security organization. In this connection, Ghana’s foreignpolicy took a new turnaffecting the whole West African sub-regionthat was precipitatedpartly bythe Liberiancivil war.My principalargument is that de- spiteGhana’ s adoptionof purposeful isolationism in the early 1980s,the followedtrends ofevents ofGhana foreignpolicy, atleast onthe sub-regionallevel, isareection ofinternal and external factors such as the transformationof ECOWAS secu- rity apparatusdue to con icts in some member states, butnot the leadershipstyle ofthe government. Therefore,in order to apprehendthe reasonbehind the dynamics ofGhana’ s foreign policychange andadjustment, in particularGhana’ s strategies andperception of its interest in the sub-regionallevel, onehas toconsider anumberof crucial factors such as the political

* Department ofPolitical Science/ International Relations,University ofHelsinki, SF- 00014Helsinki, Finland.

Africanand Asian Studies, volume 2,no. 1 also availableonline Ó 2003Koninklijke Brill NV,Leiden see www.brill.nl Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 4 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ²

andeconomic milieuin which ECOWAS is engaged,vis-à -vis Ghana’s government actions.

I.Introduction:Background and Problems Peace,security, and con ict management arethe centerof the cur- renttransformation of the EconomicCommunity of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS)as a sub-regionalorganization aimed for economic integration topolitico-security integration. Modeled after the EuropeanUnion, the ECOWASseeks topromote regional development througheconomic and diplomaticcooperation among its member states. The endof the Cold Warhas seen an increasingproliferation of violent intra-statecon icts in Africa,and in particular in the West Africansub-region, often with de- bilitatingconsequences on lives andinfrastructure and with collapse of stateapparatus (Adedeji 1999; Francis 1999; Mazrui 1998:233-244; Vogt 1999:295-322).This is evident insecurity, peace building, con ict manage- ment,peacekeeping (Aning1999; 2002; Adekeye 2002;James 1998)and regionalintegrative methods. Kennes 1999;Hix 1999;Bach 1999:152- 166;Rosamond 2000; Christiansen 2001; Francis 2001 have analyzed the experience andperformance of ECOWAS during the pastyears. ECOWAS,established in 1975 among Ž fteen (later sixteen in1977) statesof West Africa(see tableone for membership), is perhaps the most visibleand certainly the moststudied of the currentexperiments inre- gionalintegration in the sub-SaharanAfrica (Uka 1983;Ojo 1980:571- 604;Bach 1983:604-632;Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991:45-69). Since inde- pendence,most African integration schemes have been the platformfor the “pursuitof wealth and enhanced nationalprosperity rather than by the issuesof war and security” (Gambari 1991:3). On hispart, Olatunde Ojohas arguedthat the formationof ECOWAS in 1975 was driven by twoimportant considerations: regional security and economic development (1980:571).ECOWAS was conceived as a means towardeconomic inte- grationand development intended to leadto the eventual establishmentof aneconomicunion in West Africa,enhancing botheconomic stability and relationsamong member states. Twenty-seven years afterit was launched as a traditionalcustoms union-orientedintegration scheme, ECOWAShas nowbecome a multi- facetedregional integration scheme equippedwith political and security mechanismsdesigned to meet the challenges beyondthose presented by atariff-harmonizationorganizations. This peace, security and con ict management resultingfrom various sub-regional con icts — Liberia(1990- 1997),Sierra Leone (1993-2000),and Guinea Bissau (1998-1999) — gave Ghana an opportunityto change itsisolationism in the 1980sto active Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 5 ² regionalparticipation in the 1990s.The sub-regionalcon icts led tothe formationof a militaryalliance, code-named — ECOMOG (ECOWAS Cease-Žre Monitoring Group) in 1990.ECOMOG wasestablished initially onan adhoc basis as a multinationalpeacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-enforcement,and was the Žrstsuch group to be established by a sub-regionalbody. In the post-ColdWar world where large parts of the globehave losttheir former geopolitical importance, a normof “ subsidiary” seems tobegaining strength according to whichregional and sub-regional organizationswill be the “Žrstresult” for problems transcending national borders,leaving the “internationalcommunity” to deal only withthose problems,which cannot be solvedat a lowerlevel (O’Brien 2000:57).The studyand practice of regionalism, both in the oldand the newversion, have attractedgrowing interest in interrelated analytical andpolicy realms asglobalization and differentiation have likewise increasedin the Žnal decadeof the twentiethcentury (Boå s, Shaw, and Marchand 1999:879). In supportingregional integration, the issueof economic versus political aspectsof integration cannot be separated. At the same time,economic integrationcan have importantpolitical consequences; for example, it canhelp tostabilize the politicalregime in some countries. According toWalter Kennes, “the chances ofsuccess for regional integration increase when the politicaland economic beneŽ ts complement each other.Regional integrationcan contribute to regional peace and security” (1999:31). The aimof this paper is to analyze the evolutionand transformation ofECOWASduring 1990-2000 and its implications in the caseof Ghana. Ishall arguethat Ghana’ s purposefulisolationism in the1980s to active ECOWASpolitics during the 1990swas as the resultof the regional securityenvironment due to the violent conict in three neighboring statesand the endof the ColdWar. This is done by analyzing howcivil conict in neighboringstates and con ict management via ECOMOG led tothe changingof Ghana’ s foreignand security policy and how these choiceswere made. This development raises these questions:What factors impactedthe changingof Ghana’ s foreignpolicy? What factorsaccount for the resolve security,and the active participationof ECOMOG operation? Toattemptto answerthese questions,the articleis divided into four parts. The Žrstis introduction: background and problem. The secondsection containsthe historicalbackground of ECOWAS, Ghana andits foreign policyguidelines and the approachesand methodology used in writingthis paper.Part three examines the aimsand objectives and the principlesand institutionsof ECOWAS. Part four analyses Ghana’s politicalorientation inthe 1990sand the concludingremarks.

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II.Ghanaand Its Foreign Policy Guidelines AtŽ rstglance, Ghana has comefull circle. At independence in March 1957,it wasregarded as the jewel inthe BritishAfrican’ s ColonialCrown. Itspolitical status was enhanced bythe active continentalrole played by its Žrstpresident Kwame Nkrumah. Though this was dramatically offset by his (failed)socialist economic policies and subsequent political and economic events thatplugged Ghana toan economicand political quagmire for several decades. Ghana lies atthe heartof a region,which has been leadingsub-Saharan Africametalworking mining, sculpture, and agriculture. Contemporary Ghana takes itsname fromthe ancientKingdom of Ghana, someeight hundredkilometers to the northof present-day Accra, which  ourished upto the eleventh centuryAD. One ofthe greatSudanic states which dominatedAfrican history, the Kingdomof Ghana controlledthe trade betweenthe miningareas to the southand the Saharatrade to the north. AncientGhana wasalso the focusfor the exporttrade in Saharan copper and salt. The comingof Europeans altered the tradingpatterns, and the focus ofeconomic power shifted to the West Africancoastline. The Portuguese cameŽ rst,seeking the sourceof the Africangold. The Portuguese saw that Africalaid too far inland for them toreach; but in Ghana (formallyGold Coast),they founda regionwhere gold could be obtained and exported alongestablished trade paths from the interior.Their fort at Elmina (“ the mine”) wasthe Žrstin a seriesof forts along the GoldCoast designed torepel the otherEuropean seafarers who followed in their wake, all- strugglingfor their share of the proŽtable Gold Coast trade. In duecourse, however, slaves replacedgold as the mostlucrative trade alongthe GoldCoastal area, with the Europeanslave buyersusing the forts andadjoining buildings for their own accommodation and protection, as well asfor storing the goods,mainly gunsand gunpowder, which they wouldbarter for slaves. Someof the fortswere also used for keeping newly acquiredslaves pendingthe arrivalsof the shipssent tocollect them for the “New World”for the plantationfarms. The history of the variousforts graphicallyexpresses howthe variousEuropean trading nations fought for gold,ivory and later slaves. By the nineteenth century,the Britishhad won controlof the GoldCoast coastal trade from the otherEuropean states andremained there until1957. On 6March1957, Gold Coast achieved independenceand the name ofthe countrychanged to Ghana. Ghana was the ŽrstBritish colony in West Africato gain independence, and on the 1 st ofJuly 1960,Ghana becamea Republic.Shortly after independence, the countryexperienced several militarycoups and remained under military Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 7 ² rulefor much of the perioduntil 1992, when a“new”constitution was introducedfollowed by parliamentaryand presidential elections. Ghana has madea remarkabletransition, one that is often misrepre- sented asa movement frommilitary to democratic rule. The authoritarian regimeof Jerry John Rawlings led —ProvisionalNational Defense Coun- cil(PNDC) — wasone that came to power with a populistrevolutionary agenda,but was soon forced to switch directions and adopt liberal western normsfor, Ž rst,the economyand later, the politytoo. Ghana has enjoyed three sets ofmulti-party elections since the transitionbegan of varying degreesof freedom and fairness. Overall, the trendseems tobe positive. Regimes arelikely tobe most responsive to pressure in those areas that they arethe mostvulnerable. In Ghana’s case,it was the need toaccess international owsof capital as a means ofrestructuring and diversifying acommunity— dependent,and thus highly vulnerable economy.Inter- nationalŽ nance iscrucial today for the maintenance ofeconomic and politicalstability in Ghana andhence will,to a greatextent, continueto shapethe likely roleof the military.Transition away from authoritarian ruleis more likely tobe unopposed — andeven sponsored— bythe regimewhen itisgoingto threaten the inuence orsecurity of key Žgures withinthe regime. The broadobjectives of Ghana’ s foreignpolicy include maintaining friendlyrelations and cooperation (Asante 1997:29-30) with all countries thatdesire such cooperation irrespective of ideological considerations, on the basisof mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.Ghana’ s foreignpolicy is closely linked toits national security, economicand human rights. An example ofGhana’ s interestin regional cooperationand integration, the countryenthusiastically endorsed in 1963 and1975 the formationof the Organizationof African Unity (OAU) —(AfricanUnion-2002) and the EconomicCommunity of West African States(ECOWAS) respectively. Ghana, in1990, played a signiŽcant sub- regionalrole in West Africathrough its participation in the ECOMOG,a peacekeeping forcethat was deployed to Liberia during the country’s civil war.The intervention that gave Ghana an opportunityto play an active rolein the ECOWAStransformation to securityapparatus.

III.Theoretical Perspectives What methodologyor theories can give usinsights into the experience of the ECOWAStransformation to security integration and its implications inGhana politicalorientation? The mostobvious place to look for relevant theoriesis in the politicalscience literatureon political and economicintegration. Most of this literature is institutionalist-functionalist andneofuntionalist in orientation; that is, it focuses on the processby Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 8 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² which“ politicalactors in several distinctnational settings are persuaded toshift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center,whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing nationalstates” (Haas 1958:16). Pan-Africanistsand ECOWAS scholars (Aning 1999; 2002; Ojo 1999; Francis2001; Vogt 1999; Adenji 1993; Zartman 2000) have focusedon howto explain the newmomentum and energy inthe ECOWAS,re ected inthe adoptionof the sub-regionalsecurity program. This is dominated by twocompeting theoretical interpretations: neo-functionalist and function- alistperspectives or what some scholars have referredto as “ functionalist- institutionalisttheory of cooperation”(Keohane 1992:4).Much of the func- tionalistand neofunctionalist literature of the 1960sis not very helpfulin understandingeconomic integration efforts in the developingworld (Lind- berg& Scheingold1971; Haas 1964; Pentland 1973). Functionalists have positedthat succession cooperation among independent states on “ techni- cal”issues can spill over into areas that are more political, such as security, providingkey elites withbeneŽ ts or the expectationof beneŽ ts that derive fromintegration and a learningexperience ofeffective internationalcoop- eration,which predisposes them tofurther cooperation (Keohane 1984:46; 1992:4).The latter, that is a critiqueof structural critique realism (Waltz 1979;Keohane 1986),contends that international institutions affect state behaviorby changing their “ cooperationof self-interest” (Keohane 1992). Institution,it is argued, is a forumfor closer integration among states. Consequently,the behavioror actions of state are affected or shaped by the institutionalnorms, practice and procedures that they have acquires overa periodof time. This pivotal theory was that over time the insti- tutionswould create a webof interdependence in, which nations became ensnaredand in which the only choiceis continuing integration (McCall 1976:9).The functionalist-institutionalisttheory generates aplausiblein- dependentvariable — thatis ECOWAS institutions — foranalyzing the transformationof the ECOWAS.By pointingto ECOWAS institutions, someof which have playeda visible role,especially the Executive Sec- retariatand the Mediationand Security Council in the transformation, thistheory provides a farmore plausible explanation to the transformation thanthe othertheories in the article. The neo-functionalistview emphasizes the internaldynamics in the ECOWASsystem, whichdistanced itself from the ratherdeterministic notionof integration characteristic of early neo-functionalism.Within the neo-functionalistcurrent, Transholm-Mikkelson (1991) has appliedclassical neo-functionalismin a case studyof the newEuropean Community (EC) momentumin the 1980s.He showsthat the conceptsof functional, political,and cultivated spillover are helpful when tryingto account for Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 9 ² the newEC dynamism,while stressing that neo-functionalism is only apartialtheory of European integration. Robert Keohane andStanley Hoffman(1991), on the otherhand, offer only aconditionalsupport for neo-functionalist.In arecentcontribution, they arguethat the expansion ofcommunity tasks dependsultimately on the bargainsbetween major government.But after such a bargainhas been made,community tasks can befurther expanded as a resultof linkages amongsectors as articulated inthe theory.This amounts to recognition that the conceptof spillover remainsuseful for the studyof regional integration. What Hoffmanseems tobe implying is that, internal dynamics were underestimated in his own earlierworks (cf. Hoffman 1966). But at the same time,Keohane and Hoffman(1991), stress that spillover only becomeoperative under speciŽ c conditionssuch as the wave ofviolence thatswept the ECOWASsub- regionin the 1990s. Thisis largely correctinsofar as reference ismade to that particular strandof neo-functionalism that was skeptical about supra-nationalism. However,some of the laterwork in this area has begunto examine the experience ofeconomic and political integration in developing countries andemphasize the roleof economic costs and beneŽ ts from integration inthe successof integrative schemes (Nye 1970:796-834and Mytelka 1973:326-350).In analyzing politicalintegration, the absenceof any integrationsense ofregion,“ securityanalysis tendsto polarizebetween the globalsystem level onthe onehand, and the nationalsecurity of individual stateson the other”(Buzan and Rizvi 1996:4). These differentemphases andthe changingnature of global politics are the principalsources of the recentefforts at “ securityrevisionism” (Pentland 1993:53-83; see alsoNye 1990:227).Because ofits pivotal place in the discipline,security as Barry Buzanput it, has becomea hotly “contestedconcept” (1983:6). Asa conceptin international politics, its meaning does not greatly divergefrom this ordinary conception. I willdeŽ ne integrationsimply asa processinvolving anetworkof cross-national institutions, practices, processes,norms and procedures through which members and actors of differentstates, bound by their claim to a commongeo-cultural identity, consciouslyendeavor to initiate and institutionalize a patternof collective problem-solving.Two issues of these deŽnitions are worth emphasizing. The Žrstis the claimamong participants to acommongeo-cultural identity. Thiselement isimportant in distinguishing integration from “ regime”. Integrationembodies not only institutions,norms, rules and practices — orwhatin Krasnerianterminology may becalled a regime(Krasner 1983) —butalso a claimto acommongeo-cultural identity. Second, integration isa humanendeavor geared toward a collective problemsolving, and like any suchhuman endeavor, it is inherently susceptibleto the cycle of Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 10 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² optimismand pessimism, or whatMohammed Ayoob calls “the precarious balancebetween success and failure” (1991:268). This underscores my processapproach to integration in using them toanalyze the case of Ghana, whichshould enable ustorecognize the phenomenonas a “broad zoneof transition” in which actors might “ crossand re-cross several times intheirrelations with each other”(Deutsch 1957:33).

IV.Objectives, Principles, andInstitutions of ECOWAS General Objectives and Principles The 1975ECOWAS Treaty, also known as the Treatyof Lagos, was re- placedby a revisedTreaty of ECOWAS, which was signed by the headsof statesand government on 24July, 1993 in Cotonou, Benin Republic.The Treatyrecalls the protocolon non-aggression signed in Lagos on 22April 1978.As mentioned earlier, ECOWAS was established as a vehicle for economiccollaboration, but it has increasinglybecome involved incon ict management.As early as1976 a treatyof Non-Recourse to Aggressionwas signedfollowed in 1978 by a non-aggressionprotocol among themselves, andin 1981 by aprotocolon Mutual Assistance on Defense (MAD).Only inthe 1990s,however, did ECOWAS venture intothe unchartedwaters of actualcrisis management. 1 What spurredthis development wasthe effec- tive breakdownof the statein Liberia, threatening to destabilize the region asa whole.This led Žrstto the establishmentof a StandingMediation Committee(SMC) and, second, to the creationof a regionalpeacekeeping force(euphemistically labeled ECOMOG) deployedto Liberia, but with aUNmandate(Aning 1999). The new treaty, also known as the Treaty ofCotonou, is the primarylegal instrumentthat forms the constitutional basisof the Community.The newtreaty, unlike the Treatyof Lagos, is moregrandiose in envisioning ECOWAS as part of a widerproject of AfricanEconomic Community when itdeclared that the “contractingpar- ties”hereby re-afŽrm the establishmentof the EconomicCommunity of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) and decide that it shall ultimatelybe the sole economiccommunity in the regionfor the purposeof economic in- tegrationand the realizationof the objectivesof the AfricanEconomic Community. 2 The creationof ECOWAS was in large measure a resultof Nigerian diplomacy(Ojo 1980:604; Bach 1983:605-623).From the early years ofindependence, the Nigeriangovernment had supported the ideaof an AfricanCommon Market. Thisidea was inevitably putaside during

1 http://www.ecowas.int/sitecedeao,1993. 2 Treaty ofECOWAS, Article 2(1)http:/ /www.int/sitecedeao/english/stat-1.htm. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 11 ² the civilwar in Nigeria (1967-1970), between the secessionistbreakaway republicof Biafra and the remainingNigeria. In the wake ofthat con ict, however,the Nigerianhead of state General YakubuGowon made economicintegration a cornerstoneof his regional diplomacy. In addition tobelieving inthe economicimportance of integration for the region, General Gowonwished to reduce his country’ s isolationfrom other West Africancountries, to regain and expand its in uence, and to reduce the inuence ofFrancein the region.The French hadsupported Biafra during the Nigeriancivil war while Cô te d’Ivoirehad recognized Biafra. Both Franceand the Côte d’Ivoire were uneasy aboutthe potentialeconomic andpolitical in uence ofNigeria in West Africaand were hoping that breakup in Nigeria would limit that in uence. Nigerian businessmen also supportedthe creationof ECOWAS, seeing itas providing them with opportunitiesfor expanding their markets in West Africa. Accordingto the termsof the ECOWASTreaty, the majorgoal is to promotecooperation and development inall Želds ofeconomic activity forthe purposeof raising the standardof living ofits peoples, increasing andmaintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among itsmembers and to contributing to the progressand development of the AfricanContinent. 3 These economicactivities according to ECOWAS aimsand objectives are to be realizedby graduallyachieving the following speciŽc objectives:(a) tradeliberalization and harmonization notably by eliminationof all tariffand non-tariff restrictions on trade among the memberstates and the establishmentof a commoncustoms tariff and acommoncommercial policy toward third countries; (b) the abolition ofall obstaclesto the freemovement ofpersons, services andcapital betweenmember states, and (c) the harmonizationof the agricultural infrastructures,industrial, monetary and economic policies of the member states. 4 Thisstrategy is consistentwith the neo-classicaltheory of economic integration,since integration is to progress through trade integration and factorintegration to attain the ultimateaim of policy integration (Martin 1987:171-172).In actuality,ECOWAS was an attemptto overcome the isolationof most West Africancountries following the colonialperiod of post-independencenationalism. Less thana year afterthe founding,the headsof state of Nigeria and Togo proposed a formaldefense treatythat resultedtwo years laterin a Non-aggressionPact (NAP). This pact entered intoforce in September 1986. In July of1991, members agreed to a declarationof political principles, committing them touphold democracy

3 Treaty ofthe EconomicCommunity ofWest African States(ECOWAS) signed in Lagoson May28, Article 2(1). 4 Ibid,Article 2(2). Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 12 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² andthe ruleof law.Additionally, ECOWAS leaders adopted two important defense protocolsin 1978and 1981. These protocolscall formutual respect and non-interference in internal affairsof member-statesand the establishmentof a regionalmechanism for MutualAssistance in Defense (MAD) matters.This bridges the widegap betweenthe member’s statesthrough economic cooperation and regional integration.Uniquely, however, these protocolsplace equal emphasis on threatsfrom without and within domestic Ž ssuresand Ž ssion.It states in Article4 thatECOWAS is compelled to intervene in“ internalarmed conict within any MemberStates engineered andsupported actively fromoutside likely toendanger the securityand peace in the entire community.”The protocolallows for legitimate intervention in internal affairsof member states, unlike the non-interventionclauses in the UN andOAU Charters.The ECOWASemerged as a post-Liberiapolity that,despite its imperfections, Ž rmly establisheda newform of democratic governanceat an intermediatelevel betweenthe organizationand the memberstates. Since the Liberiawar and other sub-regional con icts such asthe onein Sierra Leone andGuinea-Bissau (Adekeye 2002),politics inWestern Africahave been characterizedby the emergency ofa new politicalentity- the politico-security ECOWAS. In the courseof a process ofregionalintegration, the ECOWAShas graduallybecome an important factorin the domesticaffairs of states as well asin the relationsbetween them,especially betweenGhana andNigeria. Initially responsiblefor the regulationof speciŽ c sectorsof the sub- regionaleconomy (trade, custom union), over time the ECOWASinstitu- tionshave been entrustedwith responsibility over an ever-increasingrange oftasks.At the endof the twentiethcentury, these includedmonetary pol- icy,military defense, democraticgovernance, and the protectionof human rightsencroaching on what many regardas the core“ radical”creden- tialsas the “homeof coup leaders” to a wave of“ democraticleaders.” In line withECOWAS growing role in economic,political, and social regula- tion,West Africahas becomea greaterweight in international affairs for ECOWAS.With the East-West blocsnow history, an originallyWestern Africanproject has receiveda pan-Africandimension. Emphasizing the gradualnature of the integrationprocess also allows us to distinguish be- tween twodifferent processes at work in the courseof integration(Moravc- sik 1998). The Žrstof these isthe reformof the Treatiesand Protocols, which Ž rst establishedthe non-interferencetreaty (1978). The reformsthat led tothe defense protocol(1990) transform ECOWAS. In ECOWAS,supranational institutionswere created to oversee integrationin a numberof speciŽ c economicsectors. Gradually, their powers were extended, andever-wider Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 13 ² areasof economic and social regulation have becomethe responsibility ofthe ECOWASCommunity. With growingdemocracy among member statesand expanding competencies, member states progressively gave up theirveto overdecision-making via ECOWASParliament in order to ensureefŽ cient governance. None ofthe membershas veto power,but the electoralprocess is based on absolute majority of the members. 5 ECOWASnow takes decisionson awiderange of issues of direct relevance tothe widerpublic, but citizens are only indirectly,and imperfectly, empoweredto in uence these actions.As a result,the legitimacyof ECOWASinstitutional structure and individual policies are fragile, and oftenunder attack by member states. The emphasishas been more onencouraging free tradethrough progressive tariff reductions without the establishmentof an extensive centralbureaucracy. Economically, this methodof sub-regional cooperation has shownitself to beeffective; though politicallysuch ventures remainclose to established forms of inter-state relations.Political integration has somewhatgained momentum, and efforts atcreating a commonforeign and security policy have tendedto promise morethan they wereable to deliver. In discussingabout ECOWAS security transformation from economic topolitical integration in line withpower politics in ECOWAS, one thereforeneeds tobe clear about main issues involved inthis exercise. Forexample, toclaim that ECOWAS is imposing a decisionor a policy ona memberstate, or whether, on the otherhand, one member state may beable to block a decision,crucially depends on the decision- makingmechanism that is applicable in any given situation.ECOWAS possessesa very complexand some unworkable institutional machinery. Thiscomplexity, together with continuous change, over time, has spawned alively debateamong integration theorists. Among the contributionsto thisdebate are a variety ofapproaches, some of which are applications ofmore general theoriesof international relations: the literatureof both realismand interdependence has contributedto theorizing of integration (Lamy 2001:183-184).Scholars such as Rosamond (2000) have regarded ECOWASCommunity as sui generis —ina categoryof its own — and thereforein need ofthe developmentof dedicated theories of integration (Rosamond2000). The mostprominent among these has been neo- functionalismas indicated earlier in the paper,which sought to explain the evolutionof integration in terms of “ spillover” from one sector to anotheras resources and loyalties ofelites werebeing transferred to the kindof Europeanlevel (Haas1958).

5 ECOWASSecretariat (2000).Press Release No. 93/ 2000,Abuja: ECOWAS, 9 No- vember 2000(http:/ /www.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/pub-4-93-2k.htm). Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 14 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ²

Unlike the Treatyof Lagos in 1975 or any othertreaty of an African regionalorganization, the ECOWASTreaty of 1993 commits its mem- bersto the recognition,promotion, and protection of human rights, the principlesof “accountability,economic and social justice, and popular par- ticipationin development.” 6 Article4(j) — (2001)of the treatytakes the unprecedentedstep of enjoying signatories to promote and consolidate “ademocraticsystem ofgovernance in each memberstates.” 7 Evidence andabsence of democratic system has been the “recipe”of violent con- ictsin some state in the sub-region.The originalstrategy underlying the integrationprocess — touse economic means toachieve politicalintegra- tion— alsomeant thatthe ECOWASexternal relationsonly developed gradually.In fact,the explicitattempts to create an AfricanHigh com- mand(Nkrumah 1963) failed in the mid-1960s.It was this failure that partiallyinspired the integrationistleaders like YakubuGowon of Nigeria andGynassingbe Eyademaof Togo to adoptregional integration strategy. “The lesson wasnot lost on the proponentsof West Africanintegration in the early 1970swho sold the ideaof ECOWAS to their skeptical neigh- borssimply as amodest“ free trade”arrangement designed to enhance the economicdevelopment of the sub-region.” 8 Institutionsand Basic Statistics within ECOWAS The institutionsof the Communityin 1975 are: Executive Secretariat, ECOWASCooperation, Compensation and Development (knownas ECOWASFund) and West AfricanClearingHouse. The Authorityof Headsof State and Government in1977. The 1993ECOWAS Treaty ofCotonou established the followingprincipal organs: Council of Minis- ters,Community Parliament, Economic and Social Affairs Council and the CommunityCourt of Justice. The Mediationand Security Council (known asthe Mechanism) wasestablished in 1999. Table one shows ECOWAS Treatyand its institutions. Executive Secretariat The Executive Secretariatis elected fora four-yearterm, which may be renewedonce only. ECOWAS undergoing process of transformation has been the postof Ž nancialcontroller being scrapped, while two positions of deputyexecutive secretarieshave been createdfor economic co-operation

6 ECOWASExecutive Secretary Report2000, pp. 365-367. 7 Article 4ofthe ECOWASTreaty ofCotonou. 8 YakubuGowon, former NigerianHead of State (1966-1975) and the principalarchitect ofECOWAS,interview with the Daily Times,27July 1992, Lagos. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 15 ²

Table 1 The EcowasTreaty and Its Institutions

Organization EstablishedMembers MajorInstitutions EconomicCommunity 1975 1975 1975 ofWestAfrican States Benin, Burkina-Faso,Executive Secretariat, (ECOWAS) Ivory Coast,Gambia, Fund, West African Ghana, Guinea, ClearingHouse. Guinea-Bissau,Liberia, Mauritania, 9 Mali, 1977 Niger,Nigeria, The Authority ofHeads Senegal,Sierra Leone,of Stateand Togo Government

1977 1993 CapeVerde Islands Council ofMinisters, Community Parliament, Economicand Social Council,Community Court of Justice,Specialized Technical Commission.

1999 Mechanismfor Mediationand Security Council

Source:Department ofInformation, ECOWAS HQ. Abuja 2002. andpolicy harmonization respectively. The restructuringof the Executive Secretariatwas approved at the Summitin December1999. Conferenceof Heads ofState and Government TheConference, the highest authorityof ECOWAS, meets oncea year. The chairpersonis drawn from the memberstate in turn. Table four showsthe pastand present chairmen since the Žrstmeeting ofECOWAS Authorityin 1977. Ten outof the Žfteen memberstates have chairedthe Authority.

9 In December 28,1999, ECOWAS conŽ rms the withdrawalof Mauritania from the Group.The MauritanianPrime MinisterCheikh elAŽ a speakingfrom Nouakchott“ was quotedas having blamed the decisionof the lastECOWAS Summit inLome,Togo for his country’s action.The Community willlaunch asingleCurrency zoneby 2004. Mauritania ishowever, believed to be opposed to the singlecurrency move,insisting that this wouldundermine itssovereignty and local currency, the Ouquiyi.But that act,ECOWAS membershipnow stands at Ž fteen asfrom 2000(http:/ /www.Arabicnews.com/991228). Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 16 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ²

Table 2 BasicStatistics of ECOWAS

Members Population1) GDP2) Intra- Intra- regionalExports regional Imports ECOWAS 210million US$ 106.768bUS$ 20.1bUS$ 16.43b TOTAL Benin 2.79% 2.22% 1.89% 3.66% Burkina Faso 5.20% 2.43% 0.84% 2.85% CapeVerde Islands 0.22% 0.35% 0.03% 0.72% Côte d’Ivoire 7.40% 8.98% 20.57% 16.68% Gambia 0.59% 0.33% 0.14% 1.07% Ghana 8.84% 5.69% 14.45% 16.14% Guinea 3.26% 3.76% 3.25% 3.49% GuineaBissau 0.56% 0.18% 0.09% 0.38% Liberia 1.56% 0.46% 0.29% 1.06% Mali 4.53% 2.45% 2.71% 4.37% Niger 4.70% 1.83% 1.51% 2.58% Nigeria 50.59% 61.02% 47.86% 33.40% Senegal 4.26% 6.74% 1.96% 7.34% Sierra Leone 2.26% 1.10% 0.24% 1.00% Togo 2.06% 1.38% 1.17% 2.28%

1) Populationand trade Ž guresbased on 1997 data. 2) GDP basedon 1995data. Source:http:/ /www.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/pays/web

Table 3 Pastand Current Executive Secretariesof ECOWAS

Year Name Country 1977-1985 Dr. AboubakarOuattara Côte d’Ivoire 1985-1989 AlhajiMomodu Munu Sierra Leone 1989-1993 Dr. AbassBundu Sierra Leone 1993-1997 Mr.Edouard Benjamin Guinea 1997-2001 Dr. LansanaKouyate Guinea 2002-present Dr. MohamedIbn Chambas Ghana

Source:ECOWAS Secretariat, 2002, Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Žfth Sessionof the Authority ofHeads of State and Government, Dakar,Senegal, 20-21 December, Para. 56.

Mediation and SecurityCouncil Anextraordinary summit of the Authoritywas held inLome, Togo, in December1997. It sought to shift the emphasisfrom ad hoc con ict Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 17 ²

Table 4 Pastand Present Chairmen of ECOWAS Authority

Year Name Country 1977 GnassingbeEyadema Togo 1978 OlusegunObasanjo Nigeria 1979 LeopoldSedar Senghor Senegal 1980 GnassingeEyadema Togo 1981 SiakaStevens Sierra Leone 1982 MattieuKerekou Benin 1983 Ahmed SekouToure Guinea 1984 LansanaConte Guinea 1985 MuhammaduBuhari Nigeria 1986 Ibrahim Babangida Nigeria 1987 Ibrahim Babangida Nigeria 1988 Ibrahim Babangida Nigeria 1989 DawdaJawara Gambia 1990 BlaiseCampoare Burkina Faso 1991 DawdaJawara Gambia 1992 Abdou Diouf Senegal 1993 NicephoreSoglo Benin 1994 John Jerry Rawlings Ghana 1995 John Jerry Rawlings Ghana 1996 Sani Abacha Nigeria 1997 Sani Abacha Nigeria 1998 AbdulsalamiAbubakar Nigeria 1999 AbsulsalamiAbubakar Nigeria 2000 AlphaOumar Konare Mali 2001 AlphaOumar Konare Mali 2002 AboulayeWade Senegal

Source:ECOWAS Secretariat, 2001. Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Žfth sessionof the Authority ofHeads of Stateand Government, Dakar,Senegal, 20-21 December, Para. 60. resolutionprocedures to structuresthat are more permanent by establishing amechanismfor con ict prevention, management andpeacekeeping. Atthe meeting,consensus was achieved onthe establishmentof this mechanism.A technicaldocument, which outlined the modalitiesfor such amechanism,formed the basisfor an expert meeting inJuly 1998.The mechanismcame into force in 1999 after it was ratiŽ ed by the member states.The ECOWASmechanism, as itisusually called, establishes several institutions,organs and strategies, all withdeŽ ned responsibilities and aimsthat address the peaceand security situation in the sub-region. These include: 10 the Mediationand Security Council, which operates at

10 Source:Legal Affairs Department, ECOWAS,Lagos, July 2001. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 18 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² the level ofheads of state and government, ministers, and ambassadors, takingdecisions that impact on peace and security, including deployment ofmilitary missions. This is intended to prevent disputesfrom arising, escalatingto become violent andspreading across borders such as the ones inLiberia and Sierra Leone. a.The defense andsecurity commission, which is made up of defense chiefsand security technocrats who work out the technicalitiesof amilitaryintervention. The functionof this commission is to bring hostileparties to agreement withoutrecourse to the useof force. b.ECOMOG, which is now formally established as a multi-purpose standbyforce ready for immediate deployment. It is described as multi-purposein the sense thatit canassume one of several functions ofobservations, monitoring, and peacekeeping, example the kinds ofLiberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. It can be deployed forhumanitarian intervention or the enforcementof sanctions. It canalso undertake policing activities in order to control fraud and organizedcrime. The adhoc force will use force against one of the partiesto enforce an endto hostilities. c.An Early-Warning System, in the formof a regionalobservation network,has alsobeen created.Established within the Executive Secretariatand also in speciŽ c areaswithin the communityare observationcenters of bureau where data on states ranging across the economic,political, security and social sectors are collected and analyzed inorderto detect warning signals that may signifypotential conicts. This is consideredan importanttool in the early detection ofconict that should then informcon ict prevention strategies. d.Council of Elders is proposedin accordance with “ Africantradition” practiceto assume the rolesof mediation, conciliation, and negoti- ationin a situationwhere there areindicators of potential con ict. ECOWASCouncil of Elders is made up of thirty-two eminent per- sonsdrawn from within and outside the sub-region.Its mandate is essentially thatof prevention diplomacy. The Councilof Elders will beconstitutedannually bythe Executive Secretaryfrom an approved liststored in adatabank in the Secretariat. The Economicand SocialCouncil The provisionin the revisedTreaty of ECOWAS for the establishment ofthe economicand social council followed widespread concern in the early 1990sthat ECOWAS had veered awayfrom its original focus oneconomic development that had been consumedinstead by a single mindedpreoccupation with peace and security since its development of peacekeeping forcesin Liberia in 1990 (Adibe 1997:417). ECOWAS was Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 19 ² seriouslyaffected by a lack ofpolitical commitment by the memberstates anda resistanceto implement signed treaties. This is combined with insufŽcient Ž nancialresources in some member states. It was, however, mentionedthat the creationof the economicand social council could restoreinterest in cooperation and return the organizationback to its originalaim of economic integration. The CommunityParliament The declarationof the “New Worldorder” in the 1990scoupled with the endof the ColdWar saw a newwave ofelections and democratic gov- ernments acrossthe West Africansub-region. The inclusionof free market economy,democratic governance and the pressurefrom the westerndonor countriesand Breton Woods institutions gave wayto rapid regional inte- grationand development. In August1994, one year afterthe Treatyof Cotonou,ECOWAS member states adopted the ProtocolRelating tothe CommunityParliament in Abuja, Nigeria. The protocolrelating to the CommunityParliament came into force upon ratiŽ cation in March 2000 providedfor a 120-memberelected Parliament.Each member state is guar- anteed Žve seats inthe parliament,with the remainingseats allocatedon the basisof population (see Table5). In amove thatwill help consolidate westAfrica’ s edglingdemocracies, Oumarou Sidikou, the interimchair- manof the Parliament,in aspeech saidthat, “ the parliamentwould help to cement the ECOWASyoung democracy while also deepening the process ofregional integration.” 11 The Protocolstipulated that “ membershipof the Parliamentis throughelections by direct adult suffrage” for a Žve year term. 12 TheParliament, which is required to meet atleast twicea year, may sitin ordinary session for a “maximumperiod of three months.” 13 Fortwo decades since it was established in 1975, ECOWAS had operated withouta legislative organ.This was by nomeans anoversight.Rather, it reected the despoticpolitical structures of its constituent states. The re- birthof democratic movements andinstitutions across West Africaby the mid-1990s,coupled with external pressuresfor enabling environment for regionalintegration and development, the long-absenceof an ECOWAS parliamentcame to be seen asa desideratum.The Protocolalso provides thatthe Parliamentmay also“ meet inan extra-ordinarysession to discuss

11 SidikouOumarou, 2001: 2, ECOWAS Secretariat (2001),Abuja: ECOWAS, 2171/2001. 12 ECOWASSecretariat, 2000. Press Release No. 93/ 2000.Abuja: ECOWAS, 9 Novem- ber 2002. 13 ECOWASSecretariat, 2000. Press Release No. 93/ 2000,Abuja: ECOWAS, 9 Novem- ber 2000. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 20 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² aspeciŽc issueeither at the requestof the Chairmanof the Authorityor followinga writtenrequest by an absolutemajority of the members.” 14 TheCommunity Parliament, with its Headquarters in Abuja, was formallyconvened inBamako,Mali, in November 2000 by Alpha Konare, the then Presidentof Mali andchairman of ECOWAS Authority. As partof interim arrangements, the inauguralmembers of the Community Parliamentwere elected bythe legislaturesof member states or “ equivalent institutions.”The functionsof the Parliament,which possesses law-making powers,are, at the moment,mainly advisoryand consultative. 15 Its functionsinclude the following: 16 Discussingissues concerning welfare of ECOWAScitizens in furtheranceof the objectivesof integration. a.Promotion and deepening integration by providing a forumfor dialogue,consultation and consensus, particularly on issuesof human rightsand fundamental freedoms. b.Development ofcommon educational policy to meet international standards. c.Harmonization of existing systems andspecialization of existing universitiesin the Sub-region. d.Providing opinions on the interconnectionof the communicationand energy links betweenmember states and interconnection of telecom- municationsystems foran effective intra-communitycommunication system, especially inruralareas. e. AdvisingCommunity institutions on issues relating to scientiŽ c and technicalresearch, treaty review, community citizenship, social inte- gration,environmental policy,public health, youthand sports. In the processof actualizing these functions,and in preparation for exercisingits full legislative powers,the CommunityParliament, during itsŽ rstplenary meeting inAbuja in January 2001, elected asubstantive speaker,Ali Nouhoum Diallo of Mali, and thirteen committees to provide specializedleadership in several aspectsof ECOWAS integration. These committeesare as follows: 17 a.Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, Defense andSecurity. b.Law, Regulations, Legal andJudicial Affairs, Human Rights and Free Movement ofPersons.

14 ECOWASSecretariat, 2000. Press Release No. 93/ 2000.Abuja: ECOWAS, 9 Novem- ber 2000. 15 ECOWASSecretariat, 2001. Press Release No. 05/ 2001.Abuja: ECOWAS, 21 January2001. 16 ECOWASSecretariat, 2000. Press Release No. 93/ 2000.Abuja: ECOWAS, 9 Novem- ber 2000. 17 ECOWASSecretariat, 2001. Press Release No. 09/ 2001.Abuja: ECOWAS, 29 January2001. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 21 ²

Table 5 Membershipof the CommunityParliament

Memberstates Number ofSeats Allotted Benin 5 Burkina Faso 6 CapeVerde Islands 5 Côte d’Ivoire 7 Gambia 5 Ghana 8 Guinea 6 GuineaBissau 5 Liberia 5 Mali 6 Niger 6 Nigeria 35 Senegal 6 Sierra Leone 5 Togo 5 ECOWAS TOTAL 115*

* Althoughthe protocolstipulating the compositionof the parliament putits membership at120, this number fell byŽ vebecause of the withdrawalof Mauritania from the community bythe time the Parliament wasinaugurated in December 2000.Source: http://www.ecowas.int/citedeao/eng/

c.Rural Development. d.Transportation and Communications. e. Environmentand Natural Resources. f.Health andSocial Affairs. g.Education, Training, Employment, Youth and Sports. h.Economy, Finance andTrade. i.Industry and Mines. j.Energy, Technology and ScientiŽ c Research. k. Women’s andChildren Rights l.Tourism, Culture and Handicraft. m.Budget Control and Accounts. ECOWAShas achieved somesuccess (Ojo 1999). It has becomea regional diplomaticgathering. And this evolution may sustainit even inthe faceof itsfailure to realize its formal goals of economicintegration. There is, how- ever, avisible change tothe futureof ECOWASas it becomes more active inmediating regional disputes, particularly where concerted action among memberstates is involved (Zartman2000, Adedeji & Landsberg2000:162- 188).An example isthe ECOWASintervention force, ECOMOG in Liberia— 1990-1997,Sierra Leone —1993-2000and Guinea-Bissau Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 22 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ²

Table 6 AnOverview ofGhana inECOWAS

ECOWAS Ghana Population250 million 8.84% GDP106768Billions $ 5.69% Exportation20100 14.45% Importation16430 16.14%

Source:www.ecowas.int/ sicedeao/tradedata/ population,1997: GDP date1999.

1998-1999(Adekeye 2002,Adenji 1993:211-220; Olonisakin 1997.349). The on-goingpolitical scene underscoresall tooclearly the crucialimpor- tanceof the protocolrelating to the mechanismfor con ict prevention, management,resolution, peacekeeping andsecurity. Remarkable changes have occurredin West Africasince the signingof the ECOWASTreaty inLagos, just as the external environmenthas undergoneconsiderable changes.Numerous problems have been encounteredby ECOWAS in the enhancement ofthe processof regional integration in West Africa(Richard 1999).Among the mostimportant of the problemsare the politicalinstabil- ity andgovernance that have plaguedmany ofthe countries.The weakness ofthe nationaleconomies and their insufŽ cient diversiŽ cation. The failure toinvolve the civilsociety; the privatesector and mass movement inthe processof integration and the defective natureof the integrationalma- chinery incertaincases (Zartmanand Touval 1995). The following section willanalyze the implicationof the ECOWAStransformation in Ghana’ s politicalorientation. Ghana in ECOWAS and ItsPolitical Orientation Ghana isone of the early membersof the EconomicCommunity of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS), a sub-regionaleconomic organization. Since its creation,implementation of the ECOWASprotocol on trade has greatly enhanced intra-regionaltrade (see tabletwo) as well asGhana’ s statusas aneconomicforce in the sub-regionduring the 1990s. The overall statusof ECOWAS priority programs in Ghana isas follows:free movement ofperson’ s, free movement ofgoods, monetary cooperation,harmonization of economic and Ž nancialpolicies, protocol on communitylevy, payment ofcontribution, enlightenment ofthe publicand economicoperators on ECOWAS program. Ghana has abolishedentry visas andpermits for ECOWAS nationals and adopted and put into use the ECOWAStravel certiŽcate: ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme. With regard tothe priorityand putting into use of the harmonizedcustoms documents, the certiŽcate of origins, the customsnomenclature (HS) and the customs Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 23 ² declarationare all inoperation. The country has ratiŽed the protocolon the CommunityLevy andhas designateda nationalguarantor for transit operations.Ghana has removedbarriers of a monetarycooperation such as the requirementto pay bills at portand airport taxes inforeigncurrency. The Changing Foreignpolicy of Ghana in ECOWAS The changingforeign policy of Ghana wasborn out of the unanticipated changes ofthe post-1989world events andthe Liberiacon ict. The history gave Ghana achance withinECOWAS. In thisconnection, Ghana’ s foreignpolicy took a newturn affecting the wholeWest Africansub-region. My argumenthere isthat, despite Ghana’ s adoptionof isolationism in the early 1980sdue to economic and political handicaps, the followedtrends ofevents ofGhanaian foreignpolicy, at least onthe sub-regionallevel, isa reection of domestic and international factors, not the leadership style ofthe government.Therefore in order to apprehend the reason behindthe dynamicsof Ghana’ s foreignpolicy change andadjustment, inparticular why and how Ghana’s strategiesand perception of its interest onthe sub-regionallevel have been altered,one has toconsider a number ofcrucial factors such as the politicaland economic situation in which Ghana governmentoperated during this period. Ashortconceptualization of Ghana’ s foreignpolicy guidelines has alreadybeen discussedearlier in this paper. We starthere byanalyzing Ghana’s post-ProvisionalNational Defense Council(PNDC) relations to ECOWASand narrow it toitscurrent participation in an historicalcontext bylooking at the regionalpolitics surrounding ECOMOG. Nigerian (Yoroms1993) and Liberian (Tarr 1993) scholars have presenteddifferent andvarying perspectiveson the Liberiancon ict. In all these analyses, there has been asurprisinglack ofGhanaian perspectivesin the Liberian crisis,and Ghana’ s rolein the establishmentof the cease-Žre monitoring group-ECOMOG.This idea was conceived by, and credited to, Ghana (Ankomah1992:14). ForeignPolicy Change Theforeign policy question has been studiedboth from a nationalpoint ofview considering different nation-states foreign policy vis-à -vis the ECOWASCommunity and from another level relatingto the level of the actorECOWAS itself. Foreign policy changes canbe placed on a continuumindicating the magnitudeof the shiftfrom minor adjustment changes,through both problem and goal changes, to fundamental changes examined withrespect to four changes: a) Leaderdriven; b) Bureaucratic advocacy;c) Domestic restructuring and d) External shock(Hermann 1990:3-21).Hermann continues that change isa pervasive qualityof governmental foreignpolicy. Both the foreignpolicy and the international system perspectiveshave muchto contribute to our understanding of Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 24 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² change.Beginning withthe conceptof foreign policy, Hermann stipulates that“ itis a good-orientedor problem oriented program by authoritative policymakers.” With thisdeŽ nition, foreign policy can be viewed as subjectto at least fourgraduated levels ofchanges: a) Adjustmentchanges, b)Program changes; c) Problem/GoalsChange and d) International Orientation. The fourthlevel isrelevant tothisarticle but I willbrie y deŽne all the levels. Adjustmentchanges: changes thatoccur in the level ofeffort(greater orlesser) and/orin the scopeof recipients (such as reŽnement inthe class oftargets). What isdone, how it is done, and the purposesfor which it is doneremain unchanged. The secondlevel isthe Programchanges. It states thatchanges aremade in the methodsor means bywhich the goalsor problemis addressed. In contrastto adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative,program changes arequalitative and involve newinstruments ofstatecraft (such as the pursuitof a goalthrough diplomatic negotiation ratherthan military force). What isdone and how it is done changes, but the purposesfor which it is done remain unchanged. Third, Problem and GoalChanges. The initialproblem or goal that the policyaddresses is replacedor simply forfeited. In thisforeign policy change, the purposes themselves arereplaced. The fourthand the mostrelevant tothis study isInternational Orientation Changes. The most extreme formof foreign policychange involves the redirectionof the actor’s entireorientation towardworld affairs. In contrastto lesser formsof change thatconcern the actor’s approachto a single issueor speciŽ c set ofother actor’ s, orientation changes involve abasicshift in the actor’s internationalrole and activities (Hermann 1990:3-21). Thisstatement Žtsinto the patternof the Ghana’s politicalorientation duringthe 1990s.For example, the regionalcon icts in the ECOWAS sub-regionhave undergonepromising shifts toward con ict reduction as a resultof major changes inthe foreignpolicies of the involved partiesand the endof the ColdWar. On the nation,political level studyingactors can doresearch about security policy, defense policyand the foreignpolicy identitythat can affect change (Bourne& Cin2000; Wright 1998:1-22). These developmentsin both the theoryof practice of security involve, in somerespects, something of a shiftfrom the traditionalpreoccupation withnational security to a growingrecognition of the importanceof internationaland global security considerations as well asthe humanitarian implicationsof intra-state con icts (Baylis &Smith2001:273). In part, thiswas the resultof a shiftin discourse about security in the 1990s, butof equal if not greater signiŽ cance is the changinggeopolitical, economicand technological circumstance of the periodand acceptances thatmany nationalsecurity objectives can only beachieved through Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 25 ² broadercooperative action. Strategic calculations, which have asymbiotic relationshipwith the discourseon security in someimportant respects, are pushingstates increasingly toward greater cooperation. Several majorconcomitant issues occurred on 2-8 August 1990, which changedECOWAS traditional immobilism with respect to member states internalcrisis. The centralthesis inGhana’ s diplomaticposition on the Liberiancrisis was the need forcollective action.To this end, Ghanaian diplomatsbased in Accra were dispatched to other West Africancapitals todiscuss the issueof apossiblecollective scheme. 18 While the rootsof the conceptof collective securityreach back several decadesthrough a long seriesof proposals for maintaining international peace (Hinsley 1963:23), the centralidea has remainedthe same:the governmentsof all stateswould jointogether to prevent any oftheir member from using coercion to gain advantage,especially conqueringanother. It is, therefore, a factthat the foreignpolicy change relies massively onthe signiŽcant transformation, whichhas occurredin international politics during the lastdecade. Most ofthese theorieshave notbeen appliedin aWest Africancontext. Simply put,how can we account for the foreignpolicy changes thatoccurred withinthe PNDC 19 withrespect to its policies and relations with Liberia andECOWAS especially? In my view,these policieswere, to a large extent, followedby the NationalDemocratic Congress (NDC). Kjell Goldmanon the otherhand provided one of the lucidconceptu- alizationsof the dynamicsof foreign policy change, its precursors, and its limitation(Goldman 1988). According to Goldman, foreign policy change may occurin three distinctmanners, by adjusting to changes inthe ex- ternalmilieu, by knowledge (i.e. the alterationof policies in the wake ofpessimistic feedback), and through changes inthe domesticbalance of power,for example, when anewgroup with distinctive notions comes to power.Hermann on the otherhand, is interested in the sortof rudimentary transformation,which results when an existing regimedecides to move ina differentpolicy direction. In sharpcontrast to Goldman, Hermann differ- entiates foursources of change asmentioned earlier. They couldwork in single orin complex formations to create sources of change aspreviously indicated.His central thesis isthat,irrespective of that sort of combination, they cando so only throughan intervening decisionprocess or inhiswords “toeffect a change ingovernment foreign policy, agents mustact on the governmental decisionprocess (as the) decisionprocess itself can obstruct orfacilitate change” (1990:13). Walter Carlneas(1993:5-6) has criticized Goldmanand Hermann’ s frameworksfor not leaving roomfor actors and

18 West Africa,Liberia:The PlotThickens, 17-23September 1990. 19 The name ofthe Ghanaian politicalregime (1981-1992). Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 26 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² theirinnovative thinking,i.e. for foreign policy changes, which are not a reactionto negative orpessimistic feedbacks or alternating circumstances, butwhich are rather anticipatory and imaginative. My criticalanalysis of the theoreticalassumptions by Hermann, Goldman and Carlneas and the changes madeby the PNDCwith respect to its relation with some of the ECOWASmembers and external factorswere both imaginative and par- ticipatoryin the lightof what will follow regarding the secondcoming of Rawlingsin 1981. Thus,at the startof the “secondadvert” of Jerry Rawlings, successive Ghanaian governmenthad experimented “ witha diversityof foreign policy approachesrun[ing] the gamutof non-alignment, an avowedpro-western orientation,disengagement, external supplicationand purposeful isolation” (Chazan1984:94). The end result of suchextreme andinconsistent foreign policy uctuations,according to Naomi Chazan, resulted in the deteriorat- ingand waning of Ghana’ s “inuence internationallyand regionally and itsoriginal centrality replaced by marginality re ective ofa processof se- vere andrapid external deation” (1984:95). Rawlings came into power Žrstin 1979 and again in 1981. Even though,with the establishmentof ECOWAS,a sub-regionalframework for maintaining system stability,the coupd’ etathas becomeendemic and has increasinglybecome the tech- niquefor changing heads of state and government in the sub-region.Such actionscreate crisis situations in the sub-region,and it is the collective negative reactionto Jerry Rawlings initial take-over thatcharacterized his responsesto ECOWAS in the Žrstfew years ofthe PNDCregime. The sub-regionalleaders negative responseswere due to the fearthat Rawlings willexport his brand of radicalismto othermember states. In 1979,he ex- ecutedthree formerGhana headsof state and four Generals inthe Ghana Armythat received a lotof condemnation from the sub-regionalcivilian leaders,notably Nigeria and Togo. Even though,immediately after the sec- ondtake-over, the PNDCprofesses its dedication to the ideals,norms and principlesof the internationaland regional organization to which Ghana hadmembership. The newregime similarly emphasized its commitment tonon-alignment. The majorideological characteristics of Jerry Rawlings policyduring the revolutionera was between “ Cubanstyle socialismand Libyanhome-grown revolution cum holy war.” Despitethese statements,the PNDCexperienced diplomatic hostility andnegative responsesfrom Nigeria, Liberia, Cô te d’Ivoire,Benin, and BurkinaFaso. The ambassadorsfrom these countrieswere recalled. They wereaccused of harboring the Ghanaian politicalopponents. The closure ofborders,Nigeria’ s decisionto stop the supplyof oiland other petroleum products,and to cancel specialcredit facilities (Agyemang-Duah & Ojo 1990:299ff)re ect the degreeof political tension among these West African Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 27 ² nation-states.Such concerted negative regionalreactions made the PNDC governmentadopt “ apostureof deŽ ant isolationism” (Chazan 1984:107) towardECOWAS and other regional states or atbestindifferences for the Žrstcouple of years. The PNDC’s active re-involvement inECOWAS began with the payment ofGhana’ s arrearsto the sub-regionalorganization which run intoapproximately eighteen milliondollars (Wright 1998), and Rawlings subsequentattendance at ECOWAS Summit in Lome-Togo in 1988 (Lancaster1995:197). 20 Withinthe shortspace of time between paying Ghana’s debtto the organization,mending relations with the West African Headsof States Club (WAHSC), and attending his Ž rstmeeting ofHeads ofState and Government, Ghana wasto join Togo, Nigeria, the Gambia andMali toform the StandingMediating Committee (SMC) in 1990. Ghana’s decisionto join the SMCcanbe seen asa continuanceof her interestsin regional security since the 1960s(Nkrumah 1963), and with the PNDC’s statedpro-Nkrumah tendencies. It was not surprising that the governmentalso decided to play an activistrole in sub-regional efforts at collective securityand Ž ndingsolution to the Liberiancrisis. The PoliticsSurrounding ECOMOG Formation Initialsub-regional responses to the Liberiancrisis should be viewed, as discussedin this section, irrespective of the Protocolsof 1978 and 1981. Thisperiod of immobilism characterized West Africanleaders’ response toregional crisis by constantly referring to stipulation of non-interference inthe internalaffairs of member states. Several incidentswere to change thisuntenable position when the crisisbecame manifest in early 1990. Twoissues are of critical importance in appreciating the volte-face responses ofregional leaders. One wasthe amazingrapidity with which the Cold Warended, taking all regionalleaders by surprise (Oyebade 1998).The subsequentcontours of an emerging-uni- or multiplier world order were indeŽnite, and the remainingsuperpower, the UnitedSates, made it categoricallyclear that the UnitedStates perceived and projected the Liberiancrisis as an Africanproblem. 21 The secondissue was the crucial questionof the involvement ofoutside countries in the training,Ž nancing andmulti-national character of the invadingforce and the promiseby CharlesTaylor 22 tounleash hisforces on the regionafter his military victory.Due to these pronouncement,the regionalleaders decided to devise an appropriatecollective responseto the newthreat and the realizationof

20 West Africa,Togo/Ghana —LoveThy Neighbor,8 August1988. 21 West Africa,1990issues; TheEconomist (London),1992. 22 LiberianPresident and former rebelleader of the governingNational Patriotic Front ofLiberia(NPFL). Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 28 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² the factthat any furtherdelay wouldamount to rebel success, that the StandingMediating Committee was formed, and the relevant sectionsof the twoprotocols invoked forthe peacekeeping tocommence. Ghana, Liberia, and ECOMOG Diverse reasonswere in circulation seeking tointerpret Ghana’ s re- emergence intoactive ECOWASpolitics. These explanationssimilarly contendto provideexplanatory paradigms for the Rawlingsregime promi- nent rolein ECOMOG. This section deals with the diversejustiŽ cation presented,both from ofŽ cial statements bythe PNDCto engage inECO- MOGinits proper context as to whether it was based on altruism, prag- matismor whether it was a regime— preservingaction. This myth of altruismhas been sharplycriticized by Zaya Yeebowho perceives that the unholyalliance betweenNigeria and Ghana wasdirected more by a “granddesign to dominate West Africanpolitics” (Yeebo 1991:273), than byany altruisticreasons to save trappednationals, control refugees  ows, help indemocratizingLiberia, and to help LiberiansŽ ndpolitical solutions totheir problem (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 1993:264). Other perspectives support thiskind of analysis. In itsMay 1991issue AfricaConŽ dential pointed out that:

“The most telling toget regional heads tofall inline with the ECOMOG projectswas that ofself-interest. What is happeningin Liberiacould set an unfortunateprecedent forthe region.In the eyes ofmany regional militaryrulers (includingGhana), since (Charles Taylor) is acivilian arming ordinarycitizens tomarch onthe capitaland overthrow military government isunacceptableand must bestopped to avoid future occurrence.” 23

Apartfrom citing the supposedtendencies ofGhana, Yeebothen asserts thatRawlings’ ulterior motives for active commitment to ECOWAS was Žrstand foremost to “ prevent anti-Doeforces in Liberia from exporting theirexample toother West Africanstates” (Yeebo 1991:274). The multi- nationalcharacter of Charles Taylor invading force and the possibilityof a domino effectafter a Taylorvictory were instrumental factors in the way Ghana andECOWA reacted to thispolitical crisis. The immediatepost-1981 PNDC foreign policy statements assuredthe internationalcommunity of Ghana’ s non-interferenceof joining power blocs.The governmentsought friendship and co-operation with all coun- tries,regardless of ideology. 24 ObedAsamoah, the PNDCSecretary for ForeignAffairs, asserted, “ thatirrespective of the initialmisunderstanding

23 AfricanConŽ dential 32(10), May 1991. 24 AfricanResearch Bulletin issues,1988. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 29 ² inneighboringcountries of whatwas occurring in Ghana, andthe possibil- ity ofaspill-over,the governmenthad already sent goodwill delegation to Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, andNigeria.” 25 Being asigna- torystate of both the OAUandECOWAS treaties prohibiting interference inthe internalaffairs of member states, initial PNDC ofŽ cial statements eluded,when the Liberiancrisis began, that what referred to itscognizance ofinternationallyaccepted norms of behavior. Ghana’s deputyminister of defense underthe lastadministration, the NationalDemocratic Congress (NDC), Tony Aidoo, has arguedthat Ghanaian defense policyis based on an ideologyof “ positiveneutrality” ofwhich the “mostimportant output is to create conditions for economic growthto deliver tothe peopleand dissuade attempts at the destabilization ofconstitutional government as we have seen before,”it has tobe a force,he noted,capable of “ deterringpotential aggressors both from neighboringcountries and from within.” 26 RobertKaplan’ s article“ The ComingAnarchy” discussed the challengesd facingWest Africaas follows:

West Africa is becomingthe symbol ofworldwide demographic environment, andsocietal stress, inwhich criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strate- gic”danger. Disease, over-population, unprovoked crime, scarce ofresources, refugeemigrations, the increasing erosionof nation-states andinternational borders,and the empowerment ofprivate armies, security Žrms, andinterna- tionaldrug cartels arenow most telling demonstrationthrough a West Africa prism.West Africa providesan appropriateintroduction to the issues, often extremely unpleasantto discuss, that will soonconfront our civilian —there is noother place onthe planetwhere politicalmaps are so deceptive : : : Where, in fact,they tell such lies : : : asin West Africa. 27

Kaplan’s analysis has arguablyattracted more controversy than credibil- ity.Nonetheless itis evident thatWest Africain general andGhana’ s neighborsin particular face signiŽ cant challenges, thatGhana’ s political andeconomic situation is somewhat different from those of its neighbors andthat sustained application will be required for regional solutions to these problems.While Ghana itselfmay bemoving away from Kaplan’ s apocalypticvision, there isnodoubt that it Žndsitself in a roughneighbor- hood.This regional dimension lends particularsigniŽ cance to the mainte- nance ofdemocracy and conditions of good governance in Ghana: “ifit [Ghana]plays bythe rulesand remains clean, thiswill send positive sig-

25 West Africa,5July1982. 26 Interview, Accra 15December 2000. 27 SeeRobert Kaplan, “ The ComingAnarchy,” TheAtlantic Monthly ,February1994 on http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/anarct.htm. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 30 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² nals world-wideincluding down south in Africa.” 28 Dueto the natureof the Liberiancrisis and the potentialfor spillover (Zark-Williams 1999:143- 162;Ero 2000), the Ghana governmentpromptly changed this stance, and madeits position known. Ghana assertedthat the Liberiancrisis created aspecialsituation, making it difŽ cult to draw the line betweeninternal mattersand matters impinging on the interestsof other countries in the sub-region. 29 These factors,according to the publiclystated ofŽ cial ver- sion,were the reasonsthat led the PNDCand NDC governments into the Liberianimbroglio. Thus, on the surface,it was the prevalent moral,hu- manitarian,and strategic security motivations that guided Ghana’ s resolve tointervene. Conclusion Between 1975and 1990, ECOWAS functioned as an annualdiplomatic gatheringfor the ECOWASHeads of State club. The Liberian situation changedthe perceptionsand the conŽgurations of the sub-regionalcon- icts.The ECOWASsystem expandedsomewhat in terms of function scopebut there wasan increasein institutionalcapacity. At the beginning ofthe early andlate 1980s,the ECOWASshowed signs of both system consolidationand system stagnation.The system problemsolving and ac- tiveness wasvery low,especially inthe politicalfront. The  owofdemands fromkey memberstates such as Nigeria and Ghana wasdrying up due to the countriesown economic down drum and political crisis. Thecreation of a Nigerian-ledpeacekeeping forcein August 1990 by Žve ECOWASstates to intervene inthe Liberiancivil was a signiŽcant precedentfor the Africancontinent. ECOMOG wasan embodimentof newAfrican political dimension. The regionaleconomic, political, and securityinterdependence in West Africahas developedthe traditionalform ofpeaceful resolution of inter-state disputes and con ict. The challenges facingthe ECOWASCommunity are how to prevent notonly deadly conict but also how to manage andremove those that have already escalatedinto bloody wars. Coups, revolutions, mutinies, and military orpopular uprisings do not strike out of the blue.These phenomena developedand thrive in states, where corruption, injustice, ethnically orregionally-based politics have been keenly adoptedand entrenched. ECOWASshould foster dialogue and consensus building within the sub- regionon issues that border on con ict and security as well asmap strategiesfor con ict prevention and resolutions. The regionalcountries shouldbe called on sub-regional governments to develop conŽ dence

28 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gh.html. 29 West Africa,Ghana’s Diplomacy,4-10 March 1991. Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access Transformation of ECOWAS 31 ² buildingmeasures in their relationships that could lead to discussing the perceivedand real internaland external securityconcerns of individual governmentsand adopt collective initiativesto alleviate suchthreats. The need forstrengthening collective securitystructures in the sub- regionhas assumeda prominentposture in recent times in view ofthe immense challenges tosecurity resulting from political, ethnic, religious andchieftaincy disputes. Peaceand security of the sub-regionhave been threatenedon numerous occasionsby violent domesticcon agrations in several states.It is worth suggestingthe development ofmilitary capacity to respond rapidly and effective tocombat potential crisis, and restore peace and stability in conict countries. The ECOWAS’initiative in Liberia and its success in stemmingthe devastatingcivil war have gonea longway in raisingpublic consciousnessof the efŽcacy of collective securityschemes. The collective effortby ECOWAS to reverse the Liberiancatastrophe has provedthe necessity forcollective actionin maintainingpeace and stability in the sub- region.The desirefor sub-regional collective securityschemes shouldalso beseen asanattemptto bluntneo-colonial tendencies inthe management andresolution of Africancon icts. Foreign interventions in con icts do not serve the bestinterests of Africans, since they tendto promote their own interestsrather than those of the countriesin whichthey intervene. The civilwars and political unrest in some West Africanstates have forcefullyrevealed the value ofsocial and political stability to the develop- ment process.This development precipitated by the conicts re-enforced the emergence ofamorestable security system: the ECOWASMechanism forcon ict management, resolution, peacekeeping andsecurity, which it establishedin December 1999. The ideaof trying to solve these crises contributedto give birthto peace, security, political integration and good governance.The currentphase in the evolutionof ECOWAS may bedis- tinguishedprimarily by the fudgingof economic and political objectives. The ECOWAStransformation to political security apparatus has brought tothe forethe strongcorrelation between external inuences andthe dy- namicsof the internalpolitical situation in Ghana togain sub-regional inuence byexible andcooperative policies. Despite such inconsistencies, however,the lessons ofthe ECOMOG exploithas amplydemonstrated the sheddingof the immobilismthat characterized both the individualand collective securityforeign policies of ECOWAS member states. Even thoughGhana’ s worseninginternal and economic conditions have forcedher towish to disengage from the crisis,two crucial factors may becentral to her decision to stay: that is her long credentials for global collective securityefforts and the conceptof regional security system. The securityfactors should be seen asan ambitionto create a moresub- Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 10:31:04PM via free access 32 JoshuaDapaah-Agyemang ² regionalenvironment for the developmentefforts as well asto enhance the possibilitiesof inter-state cooperation by creating better relations between memberstates as a resultof the refugeein ux, created by the civil warsin some neighboring states including Ghana, whichwas milking the fragileeconomy. What thistransformation of ECOWAS has shownand itsimplications in Ghana’ s politicalorientation is that Ghana underwent aseriesof internal and external crisisthat compelled her tochange its policyof splendid isolationism to one of active regionalinvolvement. These occurrenceswent unnoticed until the outbreakof the Liberian crisis.Ghana’ s ECOMOG stancehas demonstrateda rolefor the country’s politicalwill to respond to regional problems, irrespective of Ghana’ s own economiccrisis and international marginalization.

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