''I Know You Are but What Am I?!'': Neural Bases of Self- and Social Knowledge Retrieval in Children and Adults

‘‘I Know You Are But What Am I?!’’: Neural Bases of Self- and Social Knowledge Retrieval in Children and Adults Jennifer H. Pfeifer, Matthew D. Lieberman, and Mirella Dapretto Abstract & Previous neuroimaging research with adults suggests that the more active during social than self-knowledge retrieval. Direct medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the medial posterior parietal comparisons between children and adults indicated that children cortex (MPPC) are engaged during self-knowledge retrieval pro- activated the MPFC during self-knowledge retrieval to a much cesses. However, this has yet to be assessed in a developmental greater extent than adults. The particular regions of the MPPC sample. Twelve children and 12 adults (average age = 10.2 and involved varied between the two groups, with the posterior 26.1 years, respectively) reported whether short phrases de- precuneus engaged by adults, but the anterior precuneus and scribed themselves or a highly familiar other (Harry Potter) while posterior cingulate engaged by children. Only children activated undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. In both the MPFC significantly above baseline during self-knowledge re- children and adults, the MPFC was relatively more active during trieval. Implications for social cognitive development and the pro- self- than social knowledge retrieval, and the MPPC was relatively cessing functions performed by the MPFC are discussed. & INTRODUCTION larly think about—parallels one side of an ongoing The capacity to appreciate oneself as a distinct, unified, neuropsychological debate about whether the self is and enduring entity with abstract qualities such as ‘‘special’’ (Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Lieberman & Pfeifer, intelligence and agreeableness is one of the most unique 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005). The controversy has extended abilities of mankind. As might be imagined, however, the across several domains of self-processing, such as visual developmental trajectory to such an endpoint is rather self-recognition, agency, autobiographical memory, first- prolonged. Classic social developmental approaches person perspective-taking, as well as the object of this suggest that the foundations of our self-concepts are study: self-concept, also referred to as self-knowledge. gradually built during the first two decades of life, Supporting the position that the self is ‘‘special,’’ a through socialization processes and the assimilation of number of neuroimaging studies have found that certain self-definitions provided by the groups with which we neural regions are more active during self-knowledge identify (Harter, 1999; Damon & Hart, 1988; Mead, 1934; retrieval than other types of social or semantic retrieval Cooley, 1902; Baldwin, 1895). Several of these theorists tasks (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Lieberman, Jarcho, have more specifically proposed that self-knowledge is & Satpute, 2004; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; gained by internalizing the perspectives that other in- Fink et al., 1996). These studies have asked adults to dividuals take on ourselves, or assimilating others’ be- indicate whether trait words or sentences across a haviors into one’s self-concept, and therefore, social variety of domains describe themselves. Retrieving this knowledge capacities may actually precede their coun- kind of self-knowledge, in contrast to other tasks (e.g., terparts targeted on the self (e.g., Mead, 1934; Baldwin, social or semantic knowledge retrieval), has been asso- 1895). Thus, remove the impish refrain, ‘‘I know you are ciated with greater activity in the medial prefrontal but what am I?!’’ from its sarcastic context, and the re- cortex (MPFC; putative Brodmann’s area [BA] 10), and tort may quite aptly describe the budding state of self- often, the precuneus or posterior cingulate in the medial knowledge in children. posterior parietal cortex (MPPC; BA 7 and 31) as well. This developmental perspective—that the self is, in Interestingly, the MPFC and the MPPC also have some essence, no different from other social beings we regu- of the highest resting metabolic rates in the brain and tend to transiently decrease during goal-directed activity that is not self-referential, leading some to suggest University of California, Los Angeles this indicates their role in self-relevant processing or D 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19:8, pp. 1323–1337 conscious experience of a ‘‘self’’ in relation to its envi- Another level of complexity present in adult self- ronment during rest (e.g., Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). concepts emerges from cognitive advances facilitating On the other hand, several neuroimaging studies have integrative thinking, perspective-taking, and social com- not found activity in the MPFC or the MPPC unique to parison processes—all of which ultimately inform assess- self-knowledge retrieval (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2005; ments of one’s own competencies and attributes (Frey & Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004; Kircher Ruble, 1990; Damon & Hart, 1988; Fischer, 1980). Before et al., 2002; Craik et al., 1999). In these latter studies, children are 7 or 8 years old, they are likely to endorse it was often the case that self-knowledge retrieval and only positive or only negative attributes about them- control tasks (like retrieving knowledge about other selves (as well as other individuals; Harter, 1999; Saltz & social targets) engaged the MPFC and the MPPC to a Medow, 1971). For example, a young child might per- similar extent. Such findings have been used to argue ceive herself as ‘‘all bad’’ if convinced that she possesses that self-knowledge processes may not differ from those a single bad attribute such as ‘‘unintelligent.’’ Further, supporting knowledge about other people, and that they are unlikely to endorse significant variability in their these midline cortical structures are critically involved self-concept across different social roles and contexts in both social cognitive mechanisms (especially in un- prior to ages 9 and 10, an essential feature of adult self- derstanding others whom are similar to ourselves; see concepts. That is, younger children report being good Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Mitchell, Banaji, & and bad in similar ways across domains, and these per- Macrae, 2005). Furthermore, the MPPC has been impli- ceptions are less tightly yoked to objective variability in cated in a variety of more general functions, including the individual’s behaviors and attributes—whereas sig- episodic memory, perspective-taking, and a sense of nificant correlations between self-concepts and domain- agency (e.g., Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Ruby & Decety, specific outcomes (e.g., perceptions of reading abilities 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; and grades in relevant coursework) tend to emerge dur- Maguire, Frith, & Morris, 1999). ing middle childhood, as correlations across domains of The consensus thus seems to be that the MPFC is self-concepts also decline (Marsh, 1989; Marsh, Barnes, indeed a region essential to self-knowledge processes Cairns, & Tidman, 1984; Rholes & Ruble, 1984; Nicholls, (Heatherton et al., 2006), although it may also support 1979). This suggests that the evaluative content of chil- our understanding of other individuals, and the MPPC is dren’s self-concepts is also significantly less complex likewise implicated in both self and interpersonal un- than that of adults prior to middle childhood. derstanding. However, it is currently unknown what What then is occurring in the brains of children as neural systems support these socially significant pro- they reflect on their own selves, in comparison to think- cesses during development. Developmental psychology ing about the attributes of other people? To our knowl- suggests that there are numerous changes in the con- edge, no neuroimaging study has been conducted tents and processes of both self- and social knowledge examining self- or social knowledge retrieval processes during childhood. For instance, prior to approximately in children, although several studies have looked at the 8 or 9 years of age, children do not use psychological traits neural bases of other aspects of social cognition (e.g., in the same manner as adults. Although younger chil- face and emotion processing; Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, dren may be heard using trait words to describe them- Sigman, & Bookheimer, 2004; Monk et al., 2003; Thomas selves, they are not yet performing the same ‘‘mental et al., 2001). Therefore, the primary goal of the current arithmetic’’ as adults who are using trait words self- study was to examine task-related activity during self- descriptively—namely, the integration of specific behav- and social knowledge retrieval in children, and to di- ioral features of the self into higher-order generalizations rectly compare it to that of adults. We carefully selected of characteristics that drive behavior (for reviews, see children from a controlled age group (9- and 10-year- Harter, 1999; Damon & Hart, 1988; Rosenberg, 1986). For olds) whom we could be confident possessed concep- instance, a young child may use the words ‘‘smart’’ or tions of themselves and other individuals that shared ‘‘friendly’’ but they usually reflect single instances of certain critical features with those of adults. These fea- behavior; there is no evidence that the use of such trait tures included the two aspects of complex self-concepts words is based on perceptions of recurring attributes described in the introduction,

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