GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX APRIL 2021 2 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Laws Onthebooksinall50states

1 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX APRIL 2021 2 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX laws onthebooksinall50states. A comprehensive assessment ofthestructural riskofriggedmaps,basedonthe 10 years. of gerrymanderingandriggedmapsfor thenext than systems changeinthenext few months, more maps for partisan orpersonalgain.Unlessthese protection againstpoliticiansmanipulatingdistrict The redistricting laws inthesestatesprovide little rigged for thenextdecade. threat ofhavingtheirelectiondistricts 35 stateshave anextremeorhigh FINDINGS: THE GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX FINDINGS AT-A-GLANCE • to MassachusettsTexas. and South;from IllinoistoGeorgia, Wyoming small, across theNortheast,West, Midwest, includes red statesandbluestates,large and them atan More thanhalfofallstates 188 millionpeople extreme riskofriggedmaps. willlive withthethreat have laws thatput That

This report examines laws, not people group orindividualover another the redistricting process tobenefitone The actof manipulatingmapswithin population district mapstoreflect changesin The process of redrawing election incentive runsagainstit. to draw fair electionmapswhenevery benevolence of incumbent politicians or norms.We cannot dependonthe GERRYMANDERING REDISTRICTING BACKGROUND: DEFINITIONS:

3 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX independents. 1 districts, or75%oftheU.S. House. wipe outthethreatinremaining325 threat ofgerrymandering,thisbillwould of congressional districtsalready atalow congressional mapsnationwide. all buteliminatethethreatofrigged / S.1),orasimilarreform bill,would Passing the gerrymandering ofcongressional districts. passed —legislationthatwould endthe considering —andtheUSHousehas described inmore detailonpage12. state’s laws across METHODOLOGY: SOLUTION: ALG Research &GSStrategy Group for Campaign Legal Center Democrats, 93%ofIndependents, and88%ofRepublicans. the practice, Rigged mapsareasunpopularyou canimagine. THREAT 5 THREAT 4 THREAT 3 THREAT 2 THREAT 1 that willrepresent themfor thenext decade. FINDING: FINDING: map once passed. FINDING: the way communities can bedivided. FINDING: from accountability. FINDING:

The USSenateiscurrently For thePeopleAct To determinetheriskofriggedmapsundercurrent law, thisreport grades each : : : : : Are riggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? Are thelegalstandardsweak? Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? 26states five key threats, 20 states 27 states 28 states 33 states 93% viewgerrymanderingunfavorably,

make ithighlydifficulttoreverse agerrymandered putfew rulesonhow mapscan bedrawn, and allow partisanfactions toshieldthemselves allow thisclearconflict ofinterest. fail torequire thepublic’s inputinthedistricts

(H.R.1 With 25% buildingtoa

(December 12-16,2019).n=800onlineinterviewees, with n=100 oversample of single, cumulative score. THE FOR THE PEOPLE ACT COULD END CONGRESSIONAL GERRYMANDERING: Among Americans familiar with including97%of 1

Methodology is

4 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX root causes ofinequitiesin ourdemocracy, nationwide. ticipation. Withmembersacross thecountry, ourstrategy iscentral todismantling the pass powerful state,local, andfederal laws thatstoppolitical corruption andincrease civicpar RepresentUs may updateandexpandthisreport assystems change. [email protected] Note: Redistricting procedures can shiftrapidly. Pleasedirect comments andsuggestions to Katherine Hamilton,Adom Balcom. Design andweb development: HannahCollins, Jarod Landaker, JamieBronczyk, Nicolas Heidorn. Research andwriting:JackNoland,AllyMarcella, Anh-LinhKearney, Leif Maynard, and litigators.We gratefully direct readers especiallytothefollowing resources: districts. Itwould not have beenpossiblewithoutthework ofkey redistricting experts This riskanalysis details thebiggeststructural threats tofair, representative election tices are oftencomplex, vague, andfrustratingly dense. process for drawing itselectiondistrictmaps,andthese systems, authorities,andprac This report required anation’s worth ofresearch. Every statehasadifferent ABOUT REPRESENTUS CREDITS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • • • • • better representation. resources, andexplainers are invaluable toallthosewhoseekquantify andenact Princeton GerrymanderingProject their effect onredistricting hasbecome anessential resource thisyear. National Conference ofState Legislatures the organization’s guidetooptimizing transparency withintheredistricting process. for understandingthedemocracy landscape. We would refer readers specifically to Campaign LegalCenter and policychangesthatwillinfluence thisredistricting cycle. zation’s redistricting landscape report isavitalresource for understandingthelegal white papersare essential for linkingredistricting policywithadvocacy. Theorgani Brennan Center for Justice process andchallengestoenactedmapsaround thecountry. and litigationoverviews are invaluable for tracking changestotheredistricting All AboutRedistricting bringstogetherconservatives, progressives, andeveryone inbetween to . Loyola Law Professor JustinLevitt’s comprehensive guides . CLC’s work attheintersection oflawandreform iscrucial . We willbetracking thisprocess throughout theyear, andwe . Brennan Center’s explainers, 50-state analyses, and . PGP’s testsofcurrent maps,reform . NCSL’s work tracking Census delays and

- - - 5 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX   MISSOURI MISSISSIPPI MINNESOTA MICHIGAN MASSACHUSETTS MARYLAND MAINE LOUISIANA KENTUCKY KANSAS IOWA INDIANA ILLINOIS IDAHO HAWAII DELAWARE CONNECTICUT COLORADO CALIFORNIA ARKANSAS ARIZONA ALASKA ALABAMA STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARIES INTRODUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FINDINGS AT-A-GLANCE TABLE OF CONTENTS SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA 58 51 67 48 19 61 56 53 21 17 79 73 63 65 23 27 32 69 77 25 75 30 6 71

16 5 4 2 43 34

    NEW NEVADA NEBRASKA HAMPSHIRE MONTANA WYOMING WEST WASHINGTON VIRGINIA VIRGINIA VERMONT UTAH TENNESSEE SOUTH SOUTH RHODE DAKOTA CAROLINA OREGON ISLAND OKLAHOMA OHIO NORTH NEW DAKOTA NEW NEW YORK MEXICO JERSEY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA 107 138 86 112 142 SOLUTION THE SYSTEM-WIDE FINDINGS THE 5 KEY THREATS 140 158 82 94 84 110 129 90 92 145 1 123 127 105 88 125

7 14 10 7 114 1 131 97 49 47

6 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX real-world consequences. benefit onegroup over another, hastremendous, dering towns, andneighborhoods.Theactof the right groups ofpeople,can carve up cities, might snake andtwistbendtoincludejust own power. Theresulting electiondistricts,which erate insecret, cuttingdealstoguarantee their seeking torepresent. Theseofficialsoftenop ones tasked withorganizing thedistrictsthey’re gain —incumbent politicians—are oftenthe are ripefor abuse. In many states,thedistrict-drawing processes and ultimatelythelaws thoseofficialscreate. ed officialshave topayattention totheirvoters, we’re represented ingovernment, whetherelect Our electiondistrictmapsaffect everything: how in population,isn’t agame. of redrawing electiondistrictstoreflect changes But their own referees. Politicians mayeven writetherulesandserve as ten, there are trickplays, andwinnerslosers. and sidelines.There are rulesofengagement. Of it’s tempting tolooksports.There are teams In describingthefight over electiondistrictmaps, INTRODUCTION redistricting , ormanipulatingelectiondistrictmapsto , theonce-in-a-decade process Thepeoplewiththemostto gerryman - - - - (H.R.1 &S.1). level by passingthe to effectively endgerrymanderingatthefederal this Congress hastheremarkable opportunity manner andconduct ofitsown elections,and Congress clearauthoritytodeterminethe system-wide solution. Ultimately, asystem-wide crisiscallsfor a tricting laws create theriskofriggedmaps. nance isshared. Across thecountry, ourredis and itseffect onourrepresentation andgover ing isfirstandforemost aproblem ofprocess, The structurehasconsequences. ignore. miss. Thethreat ofriggedmapsistoogreat to a lifetime, andachance ourUnitedStates can’t on both sidesoftheaisle.It’s theopportunityof partisan gamesmanshipandback-room deals— and pullthemap-drawing process away from In onefell swoop, Congress could putvoters first For ThePeopleAct of 2021 The Constitution gives Gerrymander - - - district mapstodeny racial, ethnic,andlanguage has alongandongoinghistoryofriggingelection Gerrymandering isnothingnew. in place withnofear ofreproach. court can allow thepowers-that-be toputplans And makingitharder tochallengeriggedmapsin to electcandidates whorepresent theirinterests. several districts,leavinggroups ofvoters unable election districtlinesmight divideagroup into protect communities orpromote competition, at atime.Withoutclearstandards designedto locking intheirpartisanadvantage for tenyears centive tocreate mapsthatprotect theirpower, plexity oftheprocess. The riskofgerrymanderingthrives inthecom district plan.Andthey do. to squeeze any available advantage outofa tools have onlymadeiteasierfor thoseinpower power andtheprecision ofmodernmap-making mandered, ofcourse, butadvanced computing areas. Not every uncompetitive districtisgerry ing toclusterincities,andRepublicans inrural ent parts ofthecountry, withDemocrats tend have increasingly sortedthemselves into differ By itsnature, redistricting iscomplex. Americans THE 5 KEY THREATS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Politicians have every in This country - - - - - All ofthesefactors can stackontopofone may changetheredistricting playbook. Department ofJustice. Inthesestates,thisshift to clearany changeswithafederal court orthe a historyofracially discriminatoryvoting policies standards thatpreviously required places with place withoutfederal preclearance provisions, cycle willbethe firstinmodernmemorytotake racial gerrymandering,the 2021redistricting While there are federal restrictions against minority groups therepresentation they deserve. red flags. country. For eachkey threat, a“yes” raises identify theriskofriggedmapsacross the key threats, component parts.Thisreport zeroes inon the country, we have tobreak thisprocess into To assessthethreat ofriggedmapsacross each ofthesepieces matter. another, orholdeachother incheck.Ultimately, detailedonthefollowing page,to five

7 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 8 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX toward preventing partisanrigging. districts prioritize political andracial fairness andkeep communities togethercan go alongway state playasignificant role indeterminingthefinished product. Explicitrequirements that Because map-makers start withablankslate,thelegalstandards binding theprocess ineach • • • the redistricting process, thelesslikely themaps are toberadically rigged. A process isonlyasgoodthepeoplewhocontrol it.Themore groups required tocontribute to • • • or tosubmitmapsoftheirown. ings around thestate,allowing individualsthechance tooffer theirthoughts onproposed plans, backroom deal-makingandaclosed-doorprocess. Inothers, themap-drawers holdpublichear In somestates,themapsfirstappeartopublicwhenthey are allbutfinished,the product of • • • would rigthemapsfor political benefit.Every stateusesadifferent structure. The laws thatguideredistricting playtheprimaryrole inlimiting orempowering peoplewho The officialsorgroups charged withdrawing andapproving electiondistrictmapsvary by state. THREAT 4: THREAT 3: THREAT 2: THREAT 1: district map, reducing theriskoffoul play. Low riskstates tions diminishaspolitical power shifts. Moderate riskstates High riskstates their processes togreater citizen inputandpublicscrutiny. Low riskstates for congressional andstatelegislative map-drawing. Moderate riskstates limit transparency. High riskstates bipartisan orcross-partisan supportfor approval. Low risk propose mapsthat thelegislature can approve withasuper-majority orbipartisanvote. Moderate riskstates map-drawing process, allowing politicianstochoosetheirvoters. High riskstates states CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS WEAK? CAN ELECTION MAPS BE RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? CAN ELECTION MAPS BE DRAWN IN SECRET? create systems thatrequire robust, cross-partisan supportto passanelection require redistricting authoritiestoholdpublichearings,generally openingup empower independent commissions toredraw thedistrictmaps,requiring allow onepartycomplete control over theelectiondistrict-drawing process. donot require hearingsoropportunitiesfor publicinputby law, andoften putcurrent officials,oftenthestatelegislature, front andcenter inthe have somechecksonpartisanredistricting, butmayseethose protec mayhave minimaltransparency requirements, ordifferent standards have hybrid systems, suchasallowing independent commissions to - - 9 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX • • • defense againstgerrymandering. portant. Allowing citizens tochallengeriggedmapsfor beingtoopartisanprovides animportant gerrymandering cases. Asaresult, state-level legalprocesses have become allthemore im The UnitedStates Supreme Court ruledin2019thatfederal judgescannot consider partisan • • • THREAT 5: structure ofthemap-drawingsystem. are onlyassturdy asthey are allowed tobe. power, who come andgo. Finally, andcrucially, thisanalysis focuses onthemap-making laws—notthepeoplein comprehensive score. We detailthedifferences below. districts andfederal (USHouse) congressional districts,thisanalysis factors both into asingle, Because theelectiondistrict-drawing process sometimesvaries between statelegislative Georgia, NorthCarolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, andWisconsin. For thisreason, thisanalysis goesinto far greater detailin The fight over riggedmapswillbeespeciallysharpinanumberofbattleground states. states, there isaprecedent ofjudicialactioningerrymanderingcases. Low riskstates ered historyofjudicialreview around election districtmaps. Moderate riskstates edent, eithernot takingactionorallowing riggedmapstosurvive. challenges. Whenthecourts have reviewed themapsinthesestates,they have setbadprec High riskstates and/or abanonpartisanorpro-incumbent bias. for existing communities andenclaves ofinterest, anelectoral competition requirement, Low riskstates rather thanthestateconstitution, whichisharder toamend. might put toughrequirements inbasicstatelaw, whichissubjecttorevision by thelegislature, Moderate riskstates racial andlanguageminority requirements. High risk states

ARE RIGGED ELECTION MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? provide aclearopportunityfor peopletochallengebadmapsincourt. Inthese have strong mapstandards intheirstateconstitutions, includingprotections make theprocess for challengingmapsunclear, orlimitthescope ofthose create few standards for theshapeofdistrictsbeyond equalpopulationand mayprovide avague pathway for challenges,orthey mayhave acheck mayhave strong standards for onesetofmapsbutnot another, orthey If recent political historyhastaught usanything, it’s thatnorms The riskofriggedmapsisembeddedinthevery six key spotlightstates: Florida,

- - - 10 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX What follows isanoverview ofthefindings,describedinmore detailbelow: Idaho toMichiganHawaii. While thestatesat“low risk”endofthespectrumare fewer, they alsovary —ranging from in bluestates,red states,andswing states;instatestheSouth,Northeast,Midwest, andWest. The stateswiththeworst systems cross every spectrumimaginable.Thisanalysis findsseriousrisk failing toconstrain partisanpoliticians,dozens ofstateshave kneecapped fair representation. spectrum. Across thecountry, map-drawing laws create aseriousriskofriggedmaps.By That’s 35 stateshave anextremeorhighthreatofgerrymandering. THE FULL THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: FINDINGS New Hampshire Massachusetts North Carolina North Dakota Rhode Island New Mexico Mississippi Minnesota Louisiana Delaware Maryland Arkansas Kentucky Alabama Nevada Georgia Indiana Kansas STATE Illinois 70% ofthenation, EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME RANKING TOTAL TOTAL

containing more than188millionAmericans, bridgingthepolitical politicians control maps are drawn? Threat 1:Can how election HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH election mapsbe drawn insecret? Threat 2:Can L HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD † /H* partisan gain? election maps Threat 3:Can be riggedfor

HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD  † statelegislative mapsrating * congressional mapsrating Threat 4:Are the legal standards spotlight state L weak? HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD † /H*

rigged election maps hard to Threat 5:Are challenge in court? HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW

11 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX South Carolina South Dakota Pennsylvania West Virginia Washington Connecticut New Jersey Tennessee Oklahoma Wisconsin Nebraska New York Wyoming California Montana Michigan Colorado Vermont Missouri Arizona Virginia Oregon Hawaii Florida Alaska STATE Maine Idaho Texas Iowa Utah Ohio MODERATE MODERATE EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME EXTREME RANKING MINIMAL MINIMAL MINIMAL MINIMAL MINIMAL MINIMAL MINIMAL LOWER LOWER LOWER LOWER LOWER LOWER TOTAL TOTAL HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH

politicians control maps are drawn? Threat 1:Can how election M L L HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW † † † /H* / M* /H* election mapsbe drawn insecret? Threat 2:Can H L HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW † † H* / L* / partisan gain? election maps Threat 3:Can be riggedfor M HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW † /H*  † statelegislative mapsrating * congressional mapsrating Threat 4:Are the legal standards spotlight state M M L weak? HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW † † † / M* /H* /H* rigged election maps hard to Threat 5:Are challenge in court? HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 12 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX process. With few exceptions, current politicianscontrol theredistricting ency requirements,orsimplelegalstandardsfor mapmakers. protections intheircurrentpoliticallandscape,basic transpar High-threat statesareripefor riggedmaps,butmayseeminor incumbent protection, andpartisanbias. drawing systems thatcan besteered toward political domination, redistricting criteria,andpublicaccess categories, withmap- almost universally poormarksacross process, partisanabuse, often-secretive, poorly-protected process. Extreme-threat statesgive politicianscontrol over an nation dividesasfollows: The report below describesthesesystems andtheirrisksingreat detail.At thebroadest level, the negative results againstexpectations. outcome. Redistricting isashifting,human-ledprocess, andthatcomplexity can leadtopositive or lower, andminimal. Ultimately, thereport assignsstatesoneoffive overall threat levels: can make ithard toputbadmapsinfront ofajudge. rating addsinthequestion of passing anddefending itharder—and more politically risky. Finally, withthelowest weight, therisk illegal. Andwhilepopularinputmaynot beenoughtostopariggedmap, publicpressure can make (threats 4and2). With lesserweight, theanalysis factors inthe own advantage. fair mapsisasystem thatallows apolitical faction tocreate themapsby itself, lockinginits authority —the“Who”and“How”(threats13) To create acomprehensive riskrating, thereport gives themostweight to HIGH THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: 8 STATES EXTREME THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: 27 STATES METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW souri, Nebraska, Oklahoma,Oregon, Vermont. The high-threat states: Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Rhode Island,SouthCarolina, SouthDakota, Tennessee, New Hampshire, NewMexico, NorthCarolina, NorthDakota, Maryland, Massachusetts,Minnesota, Mississippi,Nevada, Georgia, Illinois,Indiana,Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, The extreme-threat states: Strong maprequirements can limittheworst partisanabusesby makingthem Note: Ineachstate,thescore isnot aguarantee oreven aprediction ofthe Alaska, Connecticut, Florida,Mis legalrecourse (threat5) Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, These statesearn legal standards . Thelackofaclearlegalchallengeprocedure —because thesinglegreatest threat to - and - transparency components extreme, high,moderate, issues ofprocess and

13 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX of riggedmaps. to earncross-partisan support,drastically reducing thelikelihood have putinplace allow for more independence andrequire maps citizens togetinvolved. rigged mapsandclear, structuredsystems thatencourage Minimal-threat stateshave strongerprotectionsagainst cy orallow for somepartisandecision-making. some have looserlegalstandards, whileothers limittransparen states have consistent strengths andavaried setofweaknesses: cians moreofasayinthedesign. that prevent theworstgerrymandering,butmayallowpoliti Lower-threat statestendtohave openmap-drawingsystems on thecurrent political landscape. to dominatetheprocess. Theexisting safeguards largely depend In thesestates,there issomethreat thatonefaction willbeable protections againstriggedmaps,andsomekey weaknesses. Moderate-threat statesareamixed bag,withsome good MINIMAL THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: 7 STATES LOWER THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: 6 STATES MODERATE THREAT OF RIGGED MAPS: 2 STATES Hawaii, Idaho,Michigan,Washington. The minimal-threat states: New York, Ohio, Virginia. The lower-threat states: The moderate-threat states: The map-drawing laws thesestates Iowa, Montana, NewJersey, Arizona, California, Colorado, MaineandPennsylvania. The systems inplace inthese

-

- 14 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX districts, or overnight, theFor thePeople Act could At present, just25%ofU.S. Housedistrictscurrently have aminimalriskofgerrymandering.Almost of gerrymanderingcorruption. Withasinglefederal bill,we could: fall once Census dataare final.ButifCongress actsnow, itcan swiftly prevent thenext decade This report lays outtheproblem. We standattheprecipice —gerrymanderingwillbegininthe it’s toolate—inevery state. anti-gerrymandering bill,we can fixthethreat ofriggedmapsfor congressional districtsbefore maps atthefederal level. The arm’s reach. Right now, we face onesuchopportunity. Theprospect oftransformative reform iswithin through clearlaw. They are thorny. Butthey are alsoproblems ofpolicy, andpolicyproblems can beaddressed as illustrated infar more detailbelow, theseissuesare varied, nuanced, andsurprisinglycomplex. Rigged mapsare firstandforemost aproblem ofweak redistricting laws. Asdescribedabove, and ANTI-GERRYMANDERING REFORM IMMEDIATE FEDERAL THE SYSTEM-WIDE SOLUTION: • • • • rigged mapspassedintheirstate. Provide a from beingmadeuncompetitive. Fair representation dependsonreal standards. Strengthen the Require party shouldnot beabletocontrol theprocess. Require For ThePeople Act public transparency bipartisan supportfor approval 75% oftheU.S. House. clear pathwayfor fair court review, legalmaprequirements of2021(H.R.1&S.1)hasthepowertoeliminatethreatrigged Withthispiece oflegislation,already passedby theHouse,orasimilar throughout theprocess.

We have never hadanopportunitylike thisone. solve theriskofriggedmapsinrest—325U.S. House toprevent communities beingcarved upanddistricts of any newelectiondistrictmaps.Asinglepolitical givingvoters afinallineofdefense against

15 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX We cannot letthisopportunitypassusby. The state-specific riskanalyses, detailedbelow, underscore theimportance ofthismoment. The road tobetterrepresentation startshere. Ultimately, theneedfor reform hasnever beenclearer. inspire future change.While Congress deliberates, and Ohiohave alllowered theirthreat level through state-level reform, andthoseefforts should laws thatgreatly reduce theriskofriggedmaps. Over thelastdecade, Michigan,Virginia, Colorado, States around thecountry have cleared apathtovictory, passingsweeping anti-gerrymandering released. Two-seat Rhode Islandisprojected toloseonedistrict. Note: Montana, whichcurrently hasonlyoneseat,isprojected togainasecond seatintheU.S. Housewhenpopulationdataare FUTURE RISK OF RIGGED CONGRESSIONAL MAPS CURRENT RISK OF RIGGED CONGRESSIONAL MAPS states canstilltake action. (UNDER THE FOR THE PEOPLE ACT) 16 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARIES 17 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ALABAMA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK dilute minorityvoting strength orpitincumbents againstoneanother, remain contiguous and further, stronger guidelinesfor theredistricting process, includingrequirements thatdistrictsnot similarly constrained. Duringthe2011cycle, thelegislative redistricting committee adopted redrawing districtsbefore thenext redistricting cycle. Congressional redistricting doesnot appear restrictions againstsubdividingcounties between districts,creating non-contiguous districts,or Constitution, includingarequirement thatsenatedistrictscontain nearlyequalpopulationsand Alabama hasminimalmandatory, unranked criteriafor statelegislative redistricting intheState margins inboth legislative houses.Vetoes maybeoverridden by asimplemajority. Republicans have tripartite(House-Senate-Governor) control oftheredistricting process, withlarge held anumberofhearings,andallowed membersofthepublictosubmitredistricting plans. Committee onRedistricting isempowered toholdpublichearings.Inthe2011cycle, thecommittee There are nopublicaccess requirements around redistricting inAlabama,thoughtheLegislative veto. Once reapportioned, statelegislative districtsmaynot beredrawn until afterthenext Census. authority toveto redistricting plans,the legislature needsonlyasimplemajoritytooverride the which balloonsduringtheredistricting cycle, oversees theprocess. Whilethegovernor hasthe redistricting plansby simplestatute.A Permanent Legislative Committee onReapportionment, The legislature retains theauthoritytodraft andapprove congressional andstatelegislative trial court threw outanumberofstatelegislative districtsfor theirdrafters’ improper useofrace. In the2011cycle, afederal challenge tocongressional districtswas unsuccessful, thoughafederal congressional redistricting plansmustbecommenced intheCircuit Court ofMontgomery County. It doesnot appearredistricting plansare automatically reviewed. Challenges tostatelegislative and the redistricting calculus. was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance requirement maychange 2021 cycle. This cycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act requirements uponitself. Itisunclearwhetherthecommittee willadopt similarstandards for the consulted aboutthelines.Thecommittee alsoimposedstrictertransparency andpubliccomment compact, andthatthey respect communities ofinterest, withcommunity andpolitical leaderstobe

18 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Alabama, 575U.S. 254 (2015);231F.Supp.3d 1026(M.D. Ala.2017). Relevant recent cases: Gerrymandering Project. Citations andreferences: redistricting. in acase where thefederal census isnot taken, orisnot fullandsatisfactory. There are noprescribed deadlinesfor congressional another provision intheAlabamaConstitution provides for astate-level enumeration toserve asthebasisofapportionment the takingofCensus, settofinishMay18,2021.Itisunclearhow thestatewillproceed pendingtheCensus delay, though Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ALABAMA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Per the Alabama Constitution, statelegislative redistricting mustbecompleted duringthefirstlegislative sessionafter

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Chestnutv. Merrill,446F. Supp. 3d908(2020),AlabamaLegis. BlackCaucus v. Alabama Const. Art.IX,§198-201;AlabamaCode §29-2-50-§29-2-52;AlabamaCode §29-1-2.5;Princeton Legislative Cmte onReapportionment (but pastpractice) Not Required (but heldin2011) None Potentially May2021 State leg.:May2021 Congressional: None Montgomery County. challenge mapsintheCircuit Court of Not automatically reviewed. Citizens may Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None with non-contiguous counties prohibits: subdividedcounties, anddistricts For stateSenatedistricts,theConstitution must benearlyequalinpopulation. Constitutional criteria:State senatedistricts Alabama Const. Art.IX,§200 appointments): Partisan elections(and vacancy Yes (1/2) 27R 75R Kay Ivey United - - - 8D 28D (R) Republican

(R: 77%)

(R: 73%) 9R - 0D 19 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ALASKA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK

interest, definedas“relatively integrated socio-economic area[s].” There isnocompetitiveness senate districts,usegeographic features indescribingboundaries,andpreserve communities of to becontiguous andcompact, preserve local government boundaries,nesthousedistrictsin There are mandatory, unranked criteriainthestateconstitution includingcriteriarequiring districts unregistered. functionally partisanbody. Thiscycle, three members are registered Republicans andtwo are There isnoeffective, formal mechanismthatkeeps theindependent board from becoming a groups, andorganizations were encouraged to submittheirown mapstobeevaluated athearings. and theboard’s proposed mapdrafts are available ontheboard website. Last cycle, citizens, hearings were heldinAprilaftermapswere drafted. Audio recording, minutesofprivate meetings, The board isrequired toholdanunspecifiednumberofpublichearings.Last cycle, several public after the2020Census. Alaska hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additionalseats to dominatethecommission. be considered whenchoosingmembers,buttheselectionsystem functionallyallows for oneparty must berepresented, andappointees cannot holdpublicoffice. Technically, partyaffiliationcannot and senaterespectively, two by thegovernor, andoneby thechiefjustice. Allfour judicialdistricts The commission consists of five members.Two are appointed by thepresiding officers ofthehouse An appointed commission (Redistricting Board) adopts legislative districtsby simplemajorityvote. maps beingredrawn twice. brought againsttheRedistricting Board and decidedintheplaintiff’s favor lastcycle, resulting inthe past, thatcourt hasbeenrelatively active inscrutinizingredistricting schemes.Several cases were petitions. Ifappealed,theSupreme Court willreview thecase inanexpedited process, and inthe There isnoautomaticreview, butasuperiorcourt willreview theplanifasingularqualifiedvoter Original jurisdictioninallmattersrelating toredistricting isvested intheAlaska SuperiorCourt. calculus, particularlyregarding thevoting power ofNative Alaskans. in Shelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance requirement maychangetheredistricting cycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act was weakened criteria. Themapsare then testedagainsttheVoting Rights Act andaltered onlyifnecessary. This criteria. Consistent withtheHickel process, initialmapsmustbedrafted usingonlythesestate 20 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Redistricting Cases (2012):274P.3d 466,282P.3d 306,4FA-11-2209CI, 2013WL6074059. Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: delay. Candidates mustfilefor thestateprimaryelectionsby June1,2022;adelaywilllikely not affect theprocess. the dataare obtained. Last cycle, hearingsstartedinApril 2011;thetimingofprocess thiscycle willfullydependoncensus data Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ALASKA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Legislative mapsmustbedrafted 30days aftercensus dataare reported, andthefinalmapsare due90days after

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLeavitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Hickel vs. SoutheastConference 846P.2d 38,44-46(1992);Inre 2011 Alaska Const. ArtVI,§6-10;Princeton Gerrymandering Project; Redistricting Board Website Archive. N/A Not required (butpastpractice) One Likely fall 2021 days afterreport report ofcensus data,finalplandue90 State leg:Draft mapsdue30days after challenge mapsintheSuperiorCourt No automaticreview, butcitizens may No No (Redistricting Board) Political appointee commission Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL N/A socio-economic area[s].” of interest, definedas“relatively integrated boundaries, andpreserving communities using geographic features indescribing nesting HousedistrictsinSenatedistricts, preserving local government boundaries, districts (unranked): contiguous, compact, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Southeast Conference (1992) Alaska Constitution art.VI,§6;Hickel v. nominees: Appointed from judicialcommission N/A 13R +1D ( 14D +3I1NP2R Mike Dunleavy government dominated by Democrats Republican Senate Functionally Divided- N/A D-dominated coalition: 50% - 4 R-appointed 6D ( R: 70% (R) , House -coalition Republican governor - ) 19R +1D - 1 I-appointed )

, 21 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ARIZONA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK

and competitive, respectful ofcommunities ofinterest, drawn tousecity, town, county, census which adjustments are madetomake districtscompliant withfederal requirements, contiguous first, thecreation ofamapdistrictsequalpopulationdrawn ina grid-like pattern,from There are mandatory, unranked redistricting criteriaintheArizona Constitution, whichmandates, the pastandduringcurrent cycle, thoughtheseclaimshave beencast aside. approval serves tolimitthebiasofplans.There have beenaccusations ofpartisaninfluence in of themembers,andrequirement thatredistricting plansreceive cross-partisan supportfor affiliates can control theprocess, theapplication poolingsystem helpstocontrol thepartisanship The commission’s appointment andapproval structure helpstomitigatepartisanrisk:noparty’s 45 hearingsacross two publiccomment periodsfrom JulytoNovember. published, andredistricting dataare publiclyavailable. Duringthe2011cycle, thecommission held in various locations inthestate,a30dayperiodofpubliccomment is required, draft mapsare Arizona hasstrong openmeetingsrules;allcommission meetingsare opentothepublicandheld as apartyofficer orregistered lobbyist three years priortoappointment. may share any partisanaffiliation.Commission memberscannot have heldelectedoffice orworked than two commission members maybefrom thesamecounty, andnomore thantwo members party memberisselectedfrom theapplicant poolby thefour previously selectedmembers.Nomore unaffiliated applicants—by theCommission onAppellateCourt Appointments. Next, onenon-major an applicant poolsolicitedandnarrowed down to25—10Democrats, 10Republicans, andfive One memberisselectedby eachofthefour partyleaders ineachchamberofthelegislature from congressional redistricting plansby simplemajorityvote. Thecommission consists offive members. Arizona empowers anindependent redistricting commission todraft andadopt legislative and Redistricting Commission, 2016). Commission, 2015)andonce dismissingchallengestoits adopted districts(Harris v. AZInd. redistricting commission, once reaffirming itsright toexist (AZState Leg. v. AZInd.Redistricting commission nomineesin2020.TheUnited States Supreme Court hastwice ruledinfavor ofthe Mathis in2011,andtheSuperior Court ofMaricopa County dismissedDemocratic challengesto courts, theArizona Supreme Court struckdown thegovernor’s effort toimpeachCommission Chair related totheredistricting process have gonethrough both stateandfederal courts. Instate Arizona, anditisnot clearcitizens enjoy aright tochallengeapproved maps.Inthepast, cases There isnoautomatic judicialreview ofnewdistrictmapsfollowing theredistricting process in preclearance requirement maychangetheredistricting calculus. of Section5theVoting Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofa incumbents or candidates maynot beconsidered. Thiscycle represents thefirstsince theprotection and voting historydatamaybeusedtotestthemapsagainstthesecriteria, buttheresidence of district, andother geographical boundaries,andcompetitive, where practicable. Party registration 22 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2016);Fernandez vCommission onAppellateCourt Appointments (2020). Relevant recent cases: redistricting panellist,” TheAssociated Press (Oct. 23,2020);Princeton Gerrymandering Project; Brennan Center. Citations andreferences: weather thedelayinCensus populationdatatransmission. commission inJanuaryof2012.Because Arizona hasnoformal deadlineandalate2022primary, thecommission shouldbeableto Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ARIZONA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Legislative andcongressional mapshave nodeadline for drafting oradoption. Last cycle, mapswere approved by the

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per thePrinceton GerrymanderingProject: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015); Arizona Const. Art.IV, Pt.2;State ofArizona Redistricting Commission Website; “Top Democrats sueover Arizona open topublic map drafting, allcommission meetings Public comment periodof 30days after open topublic map drafting, allcommission meetings Public comment periodof 30days after None specified Not specified None in court. it’s unclearifcitizens can challengemaps Maps are not automatically reviewed, and No No Independent commission Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL affiliation andvoting historydata todraft The Constitution prohibits usingparty significant detriment totheother criteria except whendoingsowould create boundaries; favor competitive districts, municipal, county, andcensus tract communities ofinterest; follow geographic, compactness; contiguity; preserve Nest housedistrictsinsenatedistricts; and congressional districts(unranked): Constitutional criteriafor both stateleg. Arizona Const. Art.IV, pt. 2 7R Assisted appointment: N/A 16R 31R Doug Ducey United - None prohibited. incumbent orcandidate addresses isalso with other criteria.Consideration of maps, butitmaybeusedtotestcompliance - - - 0D 14D 29D Republican ( ( (R) R: 53% R: 51% ) )

23 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ARKANSAS Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK of interest” isnot anexpress criterion.There are nostate-specific criteria for Congressional districts. population ofdistrictsasequalpossible(where practicable). Note: Keeping whole“communities criteria requiring statesenatedistrictstobecontiguous, andtofollow county linesandkeep the Arkansas hasmandatory criteriaintheState Constitution for statelegislative districts,including advantage. that redraws statelegislative maps,withnoapparent constraints onredistricting for partisan margins inboth legislative housesandcontrol over the offices empowered tositonthecommission Republicans have tripartite(House-Senate-Governor) control oftheredistricting process, withlarge legislature northepoliticiancommission. transcripts. There have beennoannouncements onpublicinputfor thiscycle from eitherthe legislative maps,thepoliticiancommission hasaccepted publiccomment andpostedhearing No publicaccess/participation requirements intheredistricting context, althoughfor state Commission consists of3members:theGovernor, Secretary ofState, andAttorney General. An unbalanced politiciancommission adopts statelegislative districtsby majorityvote. The does require theGovernor’s approval. Vetoes can beoverridden withanother majorityvote. The Legislature adopts Congressional districtsasaregular statuteby majorityvote, which court would treat ananti-gerrymandering challenge. court andwere rejected. Neitherplanwas challengedinthe2000cycle, soitishard tosayhow this to congressional mapsisless clear. Inthelastcycle, both setsofmapswere challengedinfederal legislative lines, andthecourt willreview theplanifacitizen petitions.Thepathway for challenges The Arkansas Supreme Court hasoriginaljurisdictionover any statecourt challengestostate

24 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX to beavailable until afterthatdate;lastcycle they were passed onJuly29,2011. 2011. Legislative mapsshouldbeadopted by February 1,2021according tothestateconstitution, butcensus dataisnot expected Timing note: Jeffers v. Beebe,895F. Supp. 2d920(E.D. Ark.2012). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ARKANSAS Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Arkansas statelawimposesnodeadlinefor thedrawing ofCongressional maps;lastcycle they were passedonApril13,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Larry v. Arkansas, No.4:18-cv-00116, 2018WL4858956(E.D. Ark.Aug. 3,2018);

Arkansas Const. Art.8,§1-5;Arkansas Secretary ofState N/A Not required (butpastpractice) None Not specified State leg.:Feb. 1,2021 Congressional: None jurisdiction court, but theSupreme Court hasoriginal Maps are not automatically reviewed in State leg.:No Congressional: Yes No State leg.:politiciancommission Congressional: legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None practicable”. to beequallypopulated“as nearlyas requirements. Italsorequires thedistricts necessary tocomply with other legal they follow county linesexcept where districts (unranked): contiguous, andthat Constitutional criteriafor stateSenate Ark. Const. Art.8,§2,3,4 7 nonpartisanmembers Nonpartisan election: Yes (simplemajorityneeded) 26R 78R AsaHutchinson United - Multi-member districts - - 9D 2D Republican - (R:78%) 1I ( R: 77% (R) ) 25 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY CALIFORNIA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK communities ofinterest, definedas“a contiguous populationwhichshares common socialand maps are ranked inthisorder: compact, contiguous, preserve political subdivisions,andpreserve In additiontotheVoting Rights Act, statecriteriafor both statelegislative andcongressional map-making. interests, andcross-partisan mapapproval requirements greatly minimize theriskofpartisan California’s independent redistricting authority, applicant review system, balanced partisan 20,000 writtencomments were alsosubmitted. cycle, thecommission held34publicmeetingsinwhichmore than2,700 peopleparticipated; and thecommission mustholdpublichearingsbefore andafterreleasing draft maps.Inthelast The redistricting process issubjecttostrong openmeetingsrules;allare livestreamed, members. Finalmapsmaybesubjecttoreferendum ifoneisrequested. 9 affirmative votes are required, 3from eachof the2majorpolitical partiesand3unaffiliated worked asalobbyist, orcontributed large amounts topolitical campaigns. To approve finalmaps, party officer positions10year priortoselection,andthey cannot have ever heldpolitical office, influence andreasonably representative of[the] State’s diversity.” Commissioners cannot have held six. According totheState Constitution, theCommission mustbe“independent from legislative who randomly selectsthefirst8commissioners. These8membersthenchoosetheremaining The Legislature can thenremove upto24candidates before passingthepooltoState Auditor interviewed by theApplicant Review Panel, 60dividedevenly across partyaffiliationsare selected. both majorpartiesand4unregistered independents. First,the120mostqualifiedcandidates are The independent California Citizens Redistricting Commission iscomposed of14members,5from to reflect thediversity of thestatewas illegal. v. California (2017),astatetrialcourt dismissedacase allegingthatthecommission’s requirement rejected achallengeofthecommission’s useofracial identity datawhendrawing maps.InConnerly the commission’s redistricting process. InRadanovich v. Bowen I(2011),theState Supreme Court deadline for mapsgranted by theState Supreme Court, there have been two other cases relating to its own mapsifthecommission fails toapprove one.Inadditiontotherecent extension ofthe will review theplanifaregistered voter petitions.TheSupreme Court alsohasthepower todraw There isnoautomaticjudicialreview ofnewdistrictmapsinCalifornia, buttheState Supreme Court the redistricting calculus. was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance requirement maychange is prohibited. This cycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act comply withfederal law, anddrawing mapstofavor ordisfavor anincumbent, candidate, orparty fair representation.” Thecommission isalsoprohibited from considering partisandataexcept to economic interests thatshouldbeincludedwithinasingledistrictfor purposesofitseffective and

26 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Connerly v. California (2017). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: the specialmasterstocomplete theirplan,butthefilingdeadline isMarch 11,2022for allcandidates. California Secretary ofState mustaskthe California Supreme Court toappoint specialmasterstodoso.There isnosetdeadlinefor is now February 14,2022for statelegislative andcongressional maps.Ifthecommission doesnot passaplanby thattime,the Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY CALIFORNIA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION InJuly, theSupreme Court granted aone-time extension ofthedeadlineduetocensus datadelay. Thedeadline

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Legislature oftheState ofCalifornia v. Padilla (2020);Radanovich v. Bowen I(2011);

California Const. Art.XXI,§1-3;California Gov. Code §8252-8253 None Required None specified Not specified are dueFeb.14, 2022 After court-granted extension, finalplans citizens can challengemaps incourt Maps aren’t automatically reviewed, but No Yes Citizens Redistricting Commission) Independent commission (California Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL residences, cannot draw districtswith Cannot consider incumbent orcandidate legislative andCongressional districts: Constitutional criteriafor both state practicable. within eachsenatedistricttotheextent compactness, (4)nesttwo house districts of interest totheextent possible,(3) boundaries andpreserve communities (ranked): (1)Contiguity, (2)follow political legislative andcongressional districts Constitutional criteriafor both state California Const. Art.XXI,§2(d) Gubernatorial appointment: N/A 30D 60D Gavin Newsom United - None required by federal law. partisan datamaynot beusedunless against acandidate, incumbent, orparty, the purposeoffavoring ordiscriminating - - 9R 19R Democratic (D:76%) - 1I

(D) (D: 75%) 5D - 2R 27 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY COLORADO Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK constructed todecrease partisaninfluence, andthe finalplansmustbeaccompanied by reports legislature. Thenewprocess isuntested, buttheindependent commissions have beendeliberately This cycle willbethefirstinwhichColorado usestheindependent commissions inplace ofthe is alsopubliclyavailable own maps andwrittencomments onthecommission websites throughout theprocess. Publicinput must hold3publichearingsineachcongressional districtandwelcomes citizens tosubmittheir Colorado hasstrong openmeetingslaws andpublicparticipationopportunities.The commission 15 for thestatelegislative maps. each commission, andmustmake itsdecisionby Nov 1,2021for theCongressional mapsandNov nonpartisan staffisenacted.TheColorado Supreme Court thenreviews theapproved plansfrom prepare 3newplans,andifnoneof theseare passed,the“third” planasdesignatedby the 2 unaffiliatedcommissioners. Ifcommissioners cannot agree onaplan,nonpartisan staffmust then modifyafterpublichearings.8votes are required toapprove plans,includingsupportfrom For eachcommission, nonpartisanstafffirstprepare aninitialplanwhichcommissioners can Republicans, and4independents. ethnic, gender, andgeographic diversity. Each commission isthuscomposed of4Democrats, 4 the judgespanelselects1candidate from eachofthesepools10withaneye towards racial, political affiliation.Thefour legislative leadersthenputforward 10additionalcandidates eachand each political affiliation,andthenrandomly choose2oftheremaining candidates from each multi partisanretired stateappellatejudgesreview applications andselect50candidates from Republicans, and450unaffiliatedvoters are chosenatrandom from allapplicants. Apanelof respectively. Both commissions are filledasfollows: Aninitialpoolof300Democrats, 300 independent commissions todraw mapsfor statelegislative andU.S congressional districts, In 2018,Colorado voters approved aconstitutional amendment establishingtwo 12-member language minoritygroup’s electoral influence. prohibited from drawing mapsthat harmtheright ofany citizen tovote ortheabilityofaracial or prohibited from drawing mapstofavor ordisfavor anincumbent, candidate, orparty. They are also these criteriaare met,maps mustbedrawn topromote competitiveness. Thecommissions are must becontiguous, compact, andpreserve communities ofinterest andpolitical subdivisions.After State legislative andcongressional districtsmapsmusthave apopulationdeviation oflessthan5%, explaining how theplan reflects thebalance ofpolitical competitiveness withother statecriteria.

here online. 28 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY COLORADO Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? MODERATE RISK DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REDISTRICTING PROCESS

None Required district) 21 (3ineachCongressional Not specified 2021 Congressional: September 1, State leg:September 15,2021 in theColorado Supreme Court Maps are automatically reviewed No Yes Two independent commissions

rejected statelegislative mapsonequal populationandcounty integrity grounds. 2011 cycle, theColorado Supreme Court upheldCongressional mapsthatfavored Democrats, but months toapprove orreject theplansfor both statelegislative andcongressional districts.Inthe There isautomaticjudicialreview ofredistricting plans.TheColorado Supreme Court hastwo Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: Requires:

REDISTRICTING CRITERIA Constitutional criteriafor both statelegislative Colorado Const. ArtV, §46-48 Appointed: N/A 20D 41D Jared Polis United - None language minoritygroup’s electoral influence.” right ofany citizen tovote orabilityofaracial or political party, cannot draw districtsto“harmthe or disfavor incumbent members,candidates, orany congressional maps:Cannot draw districtstofavor Constitutional criteriafor both statelegislative and the numberofcompetitive districts. subdivisions. After other criteriaare met,maximize preserve communities ofinterest andpolitical deviation oflessthan5%,contiguity, compactness, and congressional maps(unranked): Population POLITICAL CONTROL - - 15R 24R Democratic (D)

7D (D: 57%) (D: 63%) - 0R 29 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Assembly, 332P.3d 108(2011) Relevant recent cases: 2020) Citations andreferences: “conditions beyond thecommission’s control” (like adelayincensus data). and December 29,2021,respectively. Crucially, both commissions have theauthoritytoadjustthesedeadlinesaccommodate review andapprove orreturn submittedmaps.Finalmapsmustbeapproved by theSupreme Court nolaterthanDecember 15,2021 legislative districts.ThestateSupreme Court alsohasdeadlinesofNovember 1,2021andNovember 15,2021,respectively, to legislative redistricting. Finalplansfor congressional districtsmustbeadopted by September 1,2021andSeptember 15for state becomes available. Publichearingsmustbeconducted by July7,2021for Congressional redistricting andJuly21,2021for state Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY COLORADO Initialplansfor both statelegislative andcongressional redistricting are due30-45days afterthecensus data Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Hall v. Moreno, 270P.3d 961(2012);Inre Reapportionment ofColo. General

Colorado Const. ArtV, §44-48;“How willColorado’s redistricting commissions work in2021?”TheDenver Post (Dec.22, 30 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY CONNECTICUT Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK gerrymandering. Notably, there are nostate-mandated criteria for congressional maps. There isnoexpress prohibition onpartisan,pro/anti-incumbent, andracially-discriminatory contiguity andarequirement for statehousedistrictstofollow town boundarieswhenpracticable. Connecticut hascriteriaintheState Constitution for statelegislative districtsonly, including these safeguards. runaway partisanadvantage—though afuture changeinlegislative composition could hamper there isstillachance ofpro-incumbent biasinthefinalmaps,structural constraints shouldlimit commission fail, theState Supreme Court isempowered toassumeredistricting authority. While is evenly balanced, withnopartyabletocontrol themapapproval process. Shouldthebackup must receive theapproval ofa2/3supermajoritytopassthelegislature. Thebackupcommission There are several checksagainstpartisanabuseintheConnecticut redistricting process. First,maps 6 publichearingsontheredistricting process were heldinJuly. there are noredistricting-specific publichearingorcitizen mapsubmissionrequirements. Last cycle, Connecticut hasstrong openmeetinglaws thatapplygenerally totheredistricting process, but approve aplan,theprocess falls totheauthorityofState Supreme Court. of ninecommission membersare required toapprove thenewplans.Ifcommission fails to chosen by eachofthefour leaders,andtheinitial eight commissioners choosinganinth—five selected by legislative leadershipandappointed by thegovernor isconvened—with two members is not subjecttoveto by governor. IftheLegislature fails toadopt districts,abackupcommission Reapportionment Committee, theLegislature adopts both plansby supermajority(2/3)vote, which After theplansfor statelegislative andcongressional mapsare drafted by thebipartisan challenge tomapsdrawn by Supreme Court-appointed specialmasterNathanielPersily in2012. is vested with the State Supreme Court. TheConnecticut Supreme Court dismissed aRepublican draft themby theNovember 30thdeadline.Originaljurisdictiontochallengearedistricting plan receiving thepetition.TheSupreme Court alsodrafts themapsifbackupcommission fails to be reviewed uponpetitionfrom any registered voter witharesponse deadlineof45days after Legislative mapsare not automatically reviewed by theState Supreme Court, butmapswill

31 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: deadlines andtriggeringthebackup commission. in February 2012aftertheSupreme Court intervened. Even withoutcensus delays, Connecticut hasahistoryofmissingredistricting the Legislature fails toapprove maps,thebackupcommission hasuntil November 30toadopt aplan.Last cycle, mapswere adopted legislative session runsfrom January6,2021through June9,2021.Based onthe2011cycle, publichearingsshouldbeheldinJuly. If Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY CONNECTICUT Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Both state legislative andcongressional mapsmustbeadopted by theLegislature by September 15,2021.Thecurrent

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Inre Petition ofReapportionment Comm’n, 36A.3d 661(Conn. 2012) Connecticut Const. Art.III,§3-6;Connecticut Const. Amend.Art.XVI;XXVI;XXX. Reapportionment Committee Required (but pastpractice) None Not specified September 15,2021 Citizens maychallengemapsincourt. Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. No Yes backup commission ifnecessary Committee, passedby legislature or Proposed by bipartisanReapportionment

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None No criteriafor congressional districts districts boundaries whenpracticable for House districts (unranked): contiguity, follow town Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Const. amend.Art.XVI;XXVI;XXX Connecticut Const. Art.III,§3-6;Connecticut 7D Gubernatorial appointment: N/A 23D 97D Ned Lamont United - - - - 0R 12R 54R

Democratic (64%D) (65% D) (D) 32 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY DELAWARE Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK and natural boundaries,andtheprohibition ofunduefavoritism towards any personorparty. Delaware’s mandatoryunranked criteriainstatuteincludecontiguity, thefollowing ofmajorroads to redistricting for partisangain. margins inboth houses.There donot appeartobestructural constraints onthe legislature’s ability Democrats have tripartitecontrol ofthestatelegislative redistricting process, withrelatively large implemented stronger transparency andcomment policies. There are nopublichearingrequirements withintheredistricting process. Inthepast thestatehas seats afterthe2020Census. Delaware hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additional gubernatorial approval. Vetoes can beoverridden witha3/5majorityvote ineachchamber.| The Legislature adopts statelegislative districtsasasimplestatuteby majorityvote, whichrequires statute. There were nolegalchallengestomapsinthepast2cycles. There isnoautomatic judicialreview ofmapsandnoredistricting-specific legalrecourse definedby

33 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: legislature hastheauthoritytoextend thisdeadlineandconvene aspecialsessionifneeded. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY DELAWARE Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION State legislative mapsmustbeadopted by June30,2021(theend oftheregular 2021session)understatute.The

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A

Delaware Code Ann.Tit.29,§804-5; “Delaware SenateVotes toOpenRedistricting tothePublic,” Ballotpedia (2011) Services Comm. House Admin. Comm., SenateAdmin. (but pastpractice) Not Required Not specified Likely April June 30,2021 court. unclear ifcitizens can challenge mapsin Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. It’s Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None towards any personorparty and congressional maps:Unduefavoritism Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative boundaries Contiguity, follow majorroads andnatural and congressional maps(unranked): Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative Delaware Code Ann.Title29,§804-5 Assisted appointment: State House:no; Senate:yes (2/3) 14D 26D John Carney United - - - 7R 15R Democratic (D:66%)

(D: 63%) (D) 5D - 0R 34 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX A specialsessioncould becalled to passhousemapsinmid-2021. last cycle they startedinJuneof2011.There isnodeadlinefor U.S. Housemaps;lastcycle they were passedatthesametime.Note: Timing note: REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE THE SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK Legislative mapsmustbeadopted inthe2022 regular session(1/11/22–3/12/22).Hearingscan beginfar sooner; margins inboth houses.Floridahasahistoryofpartisangerrymandering. Republicans have tripartite(House-Senate-Governor) control oftheredistricting process, withlarge the redistricting context. though ithasdonesoextensively inpriorcycles. Floridahasstrong openmeetinglaws, especiallyin The legislature isprobably not legallyrequired toholdpublichearingsortake publiccomment, bill, whichrequires thegovernor’s approval. the governor’s approval. However, thelegislature adopts congressional districtsby majority-vote The legislature adopts legislative districtsby majority-vote joint resolution, whichdoesnot require however. gerrymandering precedent. Thecomposition oftheCourt haschangeddramatically inrecent years, Legislative mapsare automatically reviewed by theSupreme Court. Floridahasstrong anti- dilution andretrogression. Note: Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. which iswell-developed inSupreme Court case law. TheConstitution alsoprohibits minorityvote The State Constitution prohibits intentional partisanandpro/anti-incumbent gerrymandering, 35 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Sen. Reapportionment Cmte House Redistricting Cmte. (but pastpractice) Not Required (but dozens in2011) None Likely 2021 Congressional: None State legislative: March 2022 by theSupreme Court. Legislative mapsautomatically reviewed Congressional: Yes State legislative: No No Legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL gerrymandering partisan, incumbent, &racially discrim. and statelegislative districtsprohibits: Constitutional criteriafor both congressional 4. follow political/geographic boundaries 3. compactness 2. nearlyequalinpopulation 1. contiguity and statelegislative districts(ranked): Constitutional criteriafor both congressional Fl. Const. Art.III,§20 7R Appointing governor (merit): needed) Congressional: No(2/3supermajority State legislative: N/A 24R 78R Ron DeSantis United - None - 0D -16D -42D Republican

(R: 60%) (R: 65%) (R) 36 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 9 8 7 Jun. 7,2019)(congressional redistricting accomplished by bill). redistricting. SeeSenateBill1174(Ch. 2012-2)(2010cycle redistricting bill).SeealsoBrennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Florida” (Upd. 6 may beassignedtoanindependent commission) Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576U.S. 13(2015)(U.S. Constitution assignscongressional redistricting tothestate’s legislative authority, which holding Electionsfor Senatorsand Representatives, shallbeprescribed ineachState by theLegislature thereof”); Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 5 responsible for it. 4 3 our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 2 1 congressional redistricting plan,like any veto, may legislature hasadjourned). or fails toveto itwithinseven days (or 15days ifthe both housesandifthegovernor eithersignsthebill A billbecomes lawifpassedby a majorityvote of nal redistricting plansare passedasordinary bills. accomplished through ajoint resolution, congressio But unlike inthecase ofstateredistricting the statelegislature, thesameasstateredistricting. sional redistricting. tion doesnot specifywhoisresponsible for congres For congressional redistricting: of theapportionment.” for “a declaratory judgment determiningthevalidity general automatically petitionstheSupreme Court veto. are not presented tothegovernor for signature or both housestopass.Unlike abill,joint resolutions houses. districts through ajoint resolution passedby both constitution, thelegislature adopts itsown legislative For statelegislative redistricting: congressional mapsare slightly different. However, theprocesses for adopting legislative and cess for both stateandcongressional redistricting. In Floridathestatelegislature controls thepro HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA Fl. Const. Art.III,§4(e); Fl.Const. Art.I,§24(b)-(c). Fl. Const. Art.III,§8(c). Fl. Const. Art.III,§7;§8(a). This follows from thefact resolution) thataspecialmeans(joint isprovided for stateredistricting, whilenoneisprovided for congressional See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Florida”(Upd.Jun.7,2019)(Legislature redistricting congressional seats), The onlyreference tocongressional redistricting isinFl.Const. Art.III,§20,whichspecifiesthecriteriafor redistricting withoutindicating whois Fl. Const. Art.III,§16(c). See Fl. Const. Art.III,§16(a). Fl.Const. Art.III,§7;8.SeealsoBrennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Florida”(Upd.Jun.7,2019), 2 Once new mapsare adopted, theattorney 1 Theresolution requires amajorityvote of 4 By default, thispower falls to 3 7 Agovernor’s veto ofa The stateconstitu Under thestate . 5 , whichis - 6

- - - . SeealsoU.S. Const. Art.I,§4,cl.1(“TheTimes,Places andMannerof the legislature helddozens ofpublichearingsin strengthened intheredistricting context. Last cycle, open meetinglaws, whichtheSupreme Court has ing. Withthatsaid,Floridadoeshave very strong hearings andreceive publiccomment onredistrict legal requirements thatthelegislature holdpublic There are noredistricting-specific oreven general Court review thelegalityofcongressional maps. districting, there isnorequirement thattheSupreme of eachhouse. be overridden by theLegislature by atwo-thirds vote of whichistoagree uponformal legislative action… legislature, orbetween thegovernor …thepurpose erings, between more thantwo membersofthe legislative meetingsbroadly: “all prearranged gath stated purposeofthelaw.” Theconstitution defines be “nobroader thannecessary toaccomplish the “public necessity justifyingtheexemption,” andmay this requirement. house, passesageneral lawexempting itselffrom unless thelegislature, by atwo-thirds vote ofeach legislative meetingsneedtobe“open andnoticed,” Open Meetings: comment. different locations where thepubliccould provide DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE 8 Inanother departure from statere UndertheFloridaConstitution, all 9 Theexemption mustexplain the https://www.brennancenter.org/ https://www. - - -

37 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 2020). 20 19 and decidingquestionsoforder.”) (emphasis added); establishing eachmeetingagenda,determining theorder inwhichmattersare tobetaken up, has allauthoritynecessary to ensure theorderly operation ofthecommittee orsubcommittee, including, butnot limitedto,presiding over meetings, noticed andreasonably accessible tothepublic,not thatthepublichas theright tobe heard atsuch meetings”). 18 https://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/meeting-transcripts/ 17 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 tional mandate.” the claimthatLegislature thwarted theconstitu “parallel process isimportant evidence insupportof Republicans andincumbents.” redistricting process, toproduce amapfavoring the Legislature’s purportedlyopenandtransparent with partisanpolitical operatives, intheshadow of mandering by “communicat[ing] andcollaborat[ing] the State Constitution’s prohibition onpartisangerry lower court findingthattheLegislature hadviolated illegal partisanintent. Last cycle, theCourt uphelda support aninference thataplanwas created with held thatanon-transparent redistricting process may In theredistricting context, theSupreme Court has plan, ortheamendment, isfiled.” such planoramendment until abillimplementing the thereto. Any supportingdocuments associatedwith ment planorredistricting planandanamendment “draft, andarequest for adraft, ofareapportion a statuteexempting from copying orinspectionany thirds vote. lative records, unlesssimilarlyexempted by atwo- to “inspectorcopy” any publicrecord, includinglegis The constitution alsoprovides thepublicwitharight protection. tation, implementation, andenforcement” ofthis the legislature isthe“sole judgefor theinterpre shall bereasonably opentothepublic.” SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA Florida Senate,“Appearance Record,” House Rule7.21.Seealso7.20(presenters mustsubmita“committee appearance record”). See Herrin v. Cityof Deltona, Meeting archives maybefound here: FloridaHouseofRepresentatives’ Redistricting Committee, “MeetingTranscripts,” Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Florida”(Upd.Jun.7,2019), League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, Fl. Stats. Tit.III,§11.0431(e). Fl. Const. Art.I,§24(a); (c). Fl. Const. Art.III,§4(e). Fl. Const. Art.III,§4(e) 11 12 However, thelegislature hasenacted 15 121 So.3d1094,1097(Fla.5thDCA2013)(phrase “open tothepublic”meansthat“meetingsmustbeproperly 14 http://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Committees/CommitteeAppearanceForm.pdf Theexistence ofthis 13 172So.3d363,394(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,376(Fla.2015). 10 However, (accessed Dec.9,2020). - - - - - maps inFebruary. 2011 through January2012before adopting final committee hearingsonredistricting from September islature alsoheld23legislative committee orsub state from Junethrough September 2011.TheLeg held 26publichearingsindifferent citiesacross the In the2010redistricting cycle, theFloridalegislature began inJuneof2011. ings can beginfar earlier. Inthe2010cycle, hearings January toMarch 2022regular session,publichear Although finalmapswilllikely bepassedduringthe teeing thepublicavoice intheredistricting process. Legislature’s discretion, asthere are nolaws guaran Hearings: many personsaspossiblecan beheard.” speak maybeasked tolimittheirremarks sothatas to speakbeheard atthismeeting.Thosewhodo testimony, timemaynot permitallpersonswishing “While itisaSenatetradition to encourage public speaking. TheSenate’s includesthedisclaimerthat to complete an“Appearance Record” form priorto and theHouseboth require nonmemberspeakers and presentations by non-members.” discretion “toimposetimelimitations ontestimony The HouseRulesgive thecommittee chairthe that thepublicmayspeakbefore thecommittee. is noguarantee ineitherthe HouseorSenateRules including intheredistricting process; however, there tive committees hasbeentopermitpubliccomment, Public Comment:

. Past hearingshave beenheldatthe recognizing ornot recognizing non-memberpresenters, 17 The traditional practice oflegisla Seealso House Rule7.3(“Thechair

(accessed Dec.10, 19 TheSenate 20 18 -

- - - 16 -

38 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 26 “Freedom ofSpeech,Freedom ofAssembly, Due Process, Equal Protection”). 22 U. Pa. J.Const. L.203(2019)(identifying thefollowing general constitutional rights inFloridawhichmight prohibit partisangerrymandering: 25 disfavor apolitical partyoranincumbent.” (Emphasisadded.)The difference isprobably adrafting error andmostlikely legallyimmaterial. political partyoranincumbent,” whereas Section20says “[n]o apportionment planor 24 23 22 21 enact partisanlines. no apparent constraints onthelegislature’s abilityto not required tonegotiate withDemocrats. There are state andcongressional redistricting process andare Office. Asaresult, Republicans fullycontrol both the islature (by substantial margins) andtheGovernor’s Florida: Republicans control both houses oftheLeg Republicans have astategovernment “trifecta” in They were: four guidelinesit“urged theLegislature tofollow.” gressional redistricting maps,theCourt alsoprovided In 2015,inordering theLegislature toredraw con impermissibly engagedinpartisangerrymandering. process maysupportafindingthattheLegislature ulation.” the [FloridaConstitution] tooutlawpartisanmanip “transparency iscritical inlight of…thepurpose The Supreme Court hasrepeatedly stressed that Transparency andParticipationinRedistricting: RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq. See The onlydifference isthatSection21provides that“[n]o apportionment planordistrictshallbedrawn withtheintent tofavor ordisfavor a League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, SamuelS.Wang, Richard F. OberJr., &BenWilliams,“Laboratories ofDemocracy Reform: State Constitutions andPartisan Gerrymandering,” 21 for itschosenconfiguration.” “(4) topubliclydocument thejustifications related totheredrawing ofthemap;and “(3) preserve alle-mails anddocuments posed alternative maps; to permitdebateonthemeritsofpro and others tosubmitalternative mapsand “(2) provide amechanismfor challengers record any non-publicmeetings; decisions onthenewmapinpublicandto “(1) conduct allmeetingsinwhichitmade Asdiscussedabove, anon-transparent 172 So.3d363,374(Fla.2015)(citations omitted). 179 So.3d258,265(Fla.2015)(summarizingpriororder). 172 So.3d363,415(Fla.2015)(citations omitted). 22 - - - - separately codified inSections20and21ofArticle gressional andlegislative redistricting criteriaare of theFair DistrictsAmendment.” favoritism was thedrivingforce behind thepassage the goalofminimizingopportunitiesfor political Court hasexplained that“[t]here isnoquestionthat redistricting tothestateconstitution. TheSupreme criteria andprohibitions for stateandcongressional as the“Fair DistrictsAmendment,” whichaddednew constitutional amendments, collectively referred to in itsState Constitution. In2010,voters passedtwo Florida hasstrong anti-gerrymandering protections required preclearance; however, in covered by Section5oftheVoting Rights Act and norities). discrimination againstracial andlanguagemi Section 2oftheVoting Rights Act (which prohibits and theuseofrace asaredistricting criterion)and Clause (which addresses equalpopulationstandards clude theFourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection federal legalrestrictions onredistricting, whichin Finally, like allstates,Floridamustcomply with examined ordeveloped incase law. tial ancillaryprotections have not beenthoroughly strong anti-gerrymandering protections, thesepoten However, because Florida’s constitution already has challenge partisangerrymanderinginother states. tection rights, whichhave beensuccessfully usedto protections, like statefree speechandequalpro Florida’s constitution alsoincludesother general are essentially identical. III, respectively, thecriteria(discussed indetailbelow) WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS individual 26 Formerly, several Floridacounties were districtshallbedrawn withtheintent tofavor or 24 23 Shelby County v. Whilethecon - - - - 25

- 39 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 unconstitutional intheabsence ofimproper intent.” favoring onepolitical party over another isnot perse effect,” andamap thathas“theeffect orresult of has emphasized this“provision prohibits intent, not political party oranincumbent.” plan ordistrict“withtheintent tofavor ordisfavor a state constitution prohibits adopting aredistricting (1a) PartisanorIncumbentGerrymandering: Tier-One MandatoryStandards: Each criterionisexamined furtherbelow. the other.” be read toestablishany priorityofonestandard over that theordering ofthecriteriawithinatier“shall not geographic boundaries. tion, or tier-one criteria,require (2a) followed totheextent they donot violatefederal law uous. and (1c) of disenfranchising racialorlanguageminorities, hibition ondrawingmapswiththeintentorresult or pro/anti-incumbent gerrymandering, teria include(1a) “tier-two” standards for redistricting. Thetier-one cri State Supreme Court hasdescribedas“tier-one” and ida’s constitution, Sections20/21create whatthe Returning totheexpress redistricting criteriainFlor are subjecttofederal preclearance. ance. mula for whichjurisdictionswere subjecttopreclear Holder, SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, l. Const. Art.III,§20(a); §21(a). Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(c); §21(c). Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(b); §21(b). Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(a); §21(a). 570 U.S. 529(2013). (2b) 27 28 Therefore, for thiscycle, noFloridacounties theU.S. Supreme Court struckdown thefor Thetier-two criteria,whichmayonlybe a requirementthatdistrictsbecontig compactness, 30

a prohibitionintentionalpartisan and(2c) 29 Theconstitution specifies nearly equalpopula 31 using political and TheSupreme Court 172 So.3d363,394(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,375-376(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,375(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,375(Fla.2015)(citations omitted). 172 So.3d363,375(Fla.2015)(citation omitted). (1b) 1176, 83So.3d597,618(Fla.2012). 1176, 83So.3d597,618(Fla.2012). 1176, 83So.3d597,618(Fla.2012). a pro The - - - 32

- - - -

• inference ofimproper intent, including: of circumstantial evidence whichmaypermitan er may.” dicate intent …areview ofalltheevidence togeth while “[o]ne piece ofevidence inisolationmaynot in direct andcircumstantial evidence ofintent,” and In proving improper intent, acourt willlookto“both can render amapordistrictconstitutionally invalid. showing ofpartisanorincumbent (dis)favoring intent of malevolent orevil purpose”isnot required. acceptable level ofimproper intent” and“a showing However, theintent standard isstrict:“there isno rather aneutral one;”the resulting districtsdonot not, however, require thecreation ofa“fair plan,but The prohibition onpartisangerrymanderingdoes incumbents’ addresses.” relevant voter registration andelectionsdata[and] against “undisputedobjective data,suchasthe This lastexample maymeanevaluating districtlines • • that was undertaken contrary totheLegisla the “existence ofadifferent, separate process intent.” factors thatserve asobjective indicators of lines, andthedemographics ofan area are all “the effects oftheplan,shape district geographic boundaries; ing principles”like compactness andfollowing quirements, whichsetforth traditional redistrict a disregard for the“constitution’s tier-two re ture’s publictransparent redistricting effort;” 35 TheCourt hashighlighted several examples 38

39 37 and 33 A - - 36 34 - - - 40 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 dent ofSection5.” statewide non-retrogression requirement indepen under theState Constitution, “Floridanow hasa Shelby County were covered by Section5oftheVRA.Since the tricting cycle. Inthe2010cycle, five Floridacounties sion maytake onaddedimportance inthisredis The FloridaConstitution’s non-retrogression provi language. differently thanthefederal VRA,despitethesimilar ly-discriminatory gerrymandering maybeinterpreted possibility thatFlorida’s protections againstracial constitutional provisions.” constitutional obligationtointerpret ourown state the federal VRA,whilerecognizing its“independent the Court therefore looked tojudicialconstruction of tion andretrogression.” of minoritygroups againstboth impermissibledilu Act” (VRA) andaimtosafeguard “thevoting strength requirements embodiedintheFederal Voting Rights stitutional imperatives follow almostverbatim the Supreme Court hasexplained thatthese“dual con ability toelectrepresentatives oftheirchoice.” participate inthepolitical process ortodiminishtheir equal opportunityofracial orlanguageminoritiesto “with theintent orresult ofdenying orabridgingthe second tier-one criterionprohibits drawing districts (1b) Racially-Discriminatory Gerrymandering: to registration for Florida’s political parties. need toresult inrepresentation thatisproportional SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA

In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, Reynolds v. Sims, Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(b); §21(b). In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(a); §21(a). decision, noneare covered. However, 377 US533,577(1964). 44 42 Inconstruing thisprovision, 43 Thisleaves openthe 83So.3d597,619,621(Fla.2012)(citation andbrackets omitted). 83 So.3d597,630(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,619,624(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,619,620(Fla.2012)(citation andbrackets omitted). 817So.2d819,828(Fla.2002)(citation omitted). 40 1176,83So.3d597,628(Fla.2012) (citation omitted). 1176,83So.3d597,628(Fla.2012) (citation omitted). 1176, 83So.3d597,643(Fla.2012). 41 The The ------Tier 2Secondary Standards: Court’s standard for determining contiguity.” reach other partsofthedistrict,doesnot violatethis cessitates landtravel outsidethedistrictinorder to of water withoutaconnecting bridge,even ifitne a specialcase: “[T]hepresence inadistrictofbody However, islandsanddistrictsbisectedby rivers pose common corner orright angle”are not contiguous. territories orlandsthat“mutuallytouchonlyata along aboundaryoratpoint.” contiguous as“beinginactualcontact: touching redistricting criterion.TheSupreme Court hasdefined contiguity, atraditional andmostlystraightforward (1c) Contiguity: traditional districtingobjectives,” like compactness or [when drawing legislative districts] toaccommodate deviate somewhatfrom perfect populationequality remains thegoal,“jurisdictionsare permittedto Under federal jurisprudence, whileequalpopulation standard. the samemannerasfederal equalpopulation population provision should beinterpreted inmostly Court heldthattheFloridaConstitution’s equal is practicable.” lative districtstobe“as nearlyofequalpopulationas interprets theU.S. Constitution torequire statelegis longstanding U.S. Supreme Court case law, which tion asispracticable.” requires thatdistricts“beasnearlyequalinpopula (2a) PopulationEquality: 50 49 Because of this,theFloridaSupreme The lasttier-one requirement is 48 Thislanguageistaken from Florida’s constitution 45 Disconnected 47 - 46 - -

41 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 County Com’n, 51 districts usingany numberofstandard compactness the relative geometriccompactness score ofdifferent Under amathematical analysis, courts willlookat necessary tocomply withsomeother requirement.” design, oranunnecessary appendageunless itis to whetheradistricthas“an unusualshape,abizarre measurements.” “visually andby employing standard mathematical Compactness shouldbeevaluated intwo ways: and thatbizarrely shapeddistrictsare avoided.” The goalistoensure thatdistrictsare logically drawn “is astandard thatrefers totheshapeofdistrict. “[C]ompactness,” according totheSupreme Court, (2b) Compactness: ties ofinterest, would not be. are not intheconstitution, like preserving communi to accommodate traditional redistricting criteriathat tutional criteriawould bepermissible,but deviation to accommodate other tier-one andtier-two consti redistricting, populationdeviation upto10percent standards.” be baseduponcompliance withother constitutional tion from thatgoalofmathematical precision must mandate undertheFloridaConstitution, any devia practicable’ isanexplicit andimportant constitutional caveat: “Because obtaining equalpopulation‘if da’s constitution withthesamemeaning,one The FloridaSupreme Court has“imbue[d]” Flori plan ispresumptively constitutional. largest legislative districtislessthan10percent, the so longasthedeviation between thesmallestand preserving communities ofinterest. SPOTLIGHT: FLORIDA In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(b); §21(b). In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, Fl. Const. Art.III,§20(b); §21(b). In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, Evenwel v. Abbott, Evenwel v. Abbott, 133S.Ct. 3(2012). 53 Thispresumably meansthat,for state 56 136 S.Ct. 1120,1124(2016). 136 S.Ct. 1120,1124(2016)(citation omitted). For thestandard for congressional redistricting, see Underavisualanalysis, courts look Districts mustalsobecompact. 51 83So.3d597,638(Fla.2012). 83So.3d597,639(Fla.2012). 83So.3d597,636(Fla.2012). 83So.3d597,630(Fla.2012). 52 83 So.3d597,637(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,633(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,635-636(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,634(Fla.2012). 83 So.3d597,636(Fla.2012). Inwhichcase, - 55

- - - 57 54

close examination.” “non-compact and‘bizarrely shapeddistricts’require est mathematical compactness scores;” however, districts withinaredistricting planachieve thehigh The FloridaConstitution doesnot mandate“that tests, like theReock andArea/Convex Hulltests. analysis.” Court, doesnot “involve acommunity ofinterest one another.” Compactness inFlorida,cautioned the in thedistrictare abletorelate toandinteract with other states,whichlooksat “whetherconstituents the “functionalcompactness” approach usedinsome refers onlytogeographic shape.TheCourt rejected The Court hasalsomadeclearthatcompactness applying theseprotections. Asinmost states, the dering inFlorida,withequallystrong precedents there are strong legalprotections against gerryman As thediscussionofcriteriaabove demonstrates, or minorroad.” state roads,” andnot justany boundarylike a“creek understood, suchasrivers, railways, interstates, and those thatare “easily ascertainable andcommonly county boundaries.” to accept, “primarilyencompasses municipalor boundaries.” feasible, utilize existing political andgeographical last tier-two criterionisthat“districts shall,where (2c) PoliticalandGeographicBoundaries: MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION 60 61 “Political boundaries,” theCourt seems 63 59 62 “Geographical boundaries”are Tennant v. Jefferson The 58

- - 42 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 69 68 67 66 65 64 made, theCourt ordered theLegislature toredraw tion.” unjustifiably rejected alessfavorable configura criteria violation,orshowing that“theLegislature tional intent andthedistrict,” showing atier-two mean “showing anexus between theunconstitu the Legislature’s chosenconfiguration,” whichcould “challengers stillmustidentify someproblem with district lines.” to justifyitsdecisionsindrawing thecongressional ing [is] found, theburden [shifts] totheLegislature stitution’s prohibition onpartisanintent inredistrict However, “[o]nce adirect violation oftheFloridaCon invalidity. ally onopponents ofaredistricting plantoshow its legislature isvalid.” but rather todecidewhethertheoneadopted by the and theCourt’s role is“not toselectthebestplan, plan comes “withaninitialpresumption ofvalidity” deference tothelegislature’s redistricting plans.A Legal Standard: for thelegislature’s redistricting plans. and adopt afar more deferential standard ofreview whether thenewCourt willoverturn priorcase law favorable case law. There are strong questionsasto State Supreme Court threaten tounderminethis However, recent changesinthecomposition ofthe and congressional maps. successfully invalidated gerrymandered statesenate of advocates includingtheLeague ofWomen Voters of successful litigation: inthe2010cycle, acoalition Good government advocates alsohave atrack record submit abriefinginthisprocess.) pliance withstateandfederal law. (Advocates may Court willautomatically review districtsfor com the legislature. For legislative districts,theSupreme aries’ compliance withtheconstitution switches to can beshown, theburden ofjustifyingdistrictbound however, once animproper intent togerrymander Legislature’s mapshave apresumption ofvalidity; League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, In re Senate Joint Res. of Leg. Apportionment, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, League of Women Voters of Fla.v. Detzner, 66 Inpastchallengeswhere suchashowing was 65 Even withtheburden intheirfavor, Generally, Floridacourts willshow 64 Theburden is,therefore, gener 172So.3d363(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,413(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,371(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,371(Fla.2015). 172 So.3d363,397-398(Fla.2015) (citations omitted). 83So.3d597(Fla.2012). ------new plan,theCourt adopted newmapsofitsown. nal maps;because theLegislature failed toadopt a litigation, theCourt alsostruckdown thecongressio struck down theState Senatedistricts. In 2012,theCourt upheldtheState Housemapsbut State Constitution’s anti-gerrymandering protections. down several Legislature-drawn mapsunderthe Prior History: thrown out. exceptionally egregious cases anentire mapmaybe certain districts;however, theCourt allowed thatin 67 The FloridaSupreme Court hasstruck 68 Inseparate 69 - 43 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 3/11/22. starts 1/11/21buthasnosetenddate.In2011,mapswere adopted inAugust. Note: Thestate/federal candidate filingdeadlineis Timing note: REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE THE SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK There are nolegalrequirements for whenlegislative orcongressional mapsmustbeadopted. The2021regular session redistrict withoutDemocrats. Georgia hashadclaimsofpartisangerrymandering. Republicans control both legislative houses(by large margins) andtheGovernor’s Office socan to beopenthepublic. Legislature heldadozen publichearings.State lawgenerally requires standingcommittee hearings Georgia hasnospecialtransparency orhearingrequirements for redistricting. However, in2011,the approved orvetoed by theGovernor. Vetoes maybeoverridden by 2/3vote. The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby majority-vote bill,whichmaybe selected innonpartisanelections or, ifthere’s avacancy, by theGovernor’s appointment. There isnospeciallegalprocess for challenging redistricting maps.Supreme Court justices are requirements for congressional redistricting. The onlyconstitutional criterionfor state redistricting isthatdistrictsbecontiguous. There are no 44 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Senate Reapportionment &Redistricting Reapportionment House Legislative &Congressional Not Required (butpastpractice) None (butdozens in2011) 2021 None citizens tochallengemaps. court. There’s nospeciallegalprocess for Maps are not automatically challengedin Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None There are nocriteriafor congressional maps. districts require contiguity. Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Ga. Const. art.III,§II elections: Gubernatorial appointment &nonpartisan No (2/3supermajorityneeded) 34R 103R Brian Kemp United - - - 22D 77D Republican 8R

(R: 61%) (R)

- (R: 58%) 1NP 45 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX https://www.dropbox.com/s/i8zqyivtr8iozs8/GeorgiaSenateCommitteeGuidelines2011-12.pdf https://www.dropbox.com/s/2egd5vpo0djzqt5/GeorgiaHouseCommitteeGuidelines2011-12.pdf 11 3 (1988). the HouseRulesdorequire open meetingsofconference andinterim committees, theConstitution maynot. SeeMurphy v. ACLU, 258Ga.637,638n. 10 9 2011), HB20EX(Congress) (enrolled Aug. 30,2011). 8 2021). web/20121104064635/http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/house/Committees/reapportionment/gahlcrCalendarJT.html (accessed Jan.5, 7 Jan. 4,2021). princeton.edu/reforms/GA (accessed Jan.3,2020);JustinLevitt, “Georgia,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/georiga (accessed www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting; 6 https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/public-input-and-redistricting.aspx 5 4 3 Jan. 4,2021). princeton.edu/reforms/GA (accessed Jan.3,2021);JustinLevitt, “Georgia,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/georiga (accessed www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 2 1 Committees heldadozen publichearingsindifferent cycle, theState HouseandState SenateRedistricting lative orcongressional maps. requiring publichearingspriortoadopting newlegis Hearings: and transparency requirements. public hearings,comment, oropenmeeting Georgia hasnoredistricting-specific requirement for 40 days. more than40days, inwhichcase thegovernor has unless thelegislature hasadjournedsinedieorfor signed orvetoed withinsixdays orthey become law, the governor for signature orveto. Like other bills, redistricting billsare presented to procedural considerations for redistricting plans. ing (“apportionment”) process. controls both thestateandcongressional redistrict In Georgia, thelegislature (“General Assembly”) DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA Ga. Const. art.III,§IV, ¶XI. See legislative historyfor Georgia General AssemblybillsHB1EX(State House) (enrolled Aug. 23,2011),SB1EX(State Senate) (enrolled Aug. 23, See HouseReapportionment Committee, “Legislative andCongressional Reapportionment -VideoArchives,” available at:https://web.archive.org/ See National Conference ofState Legislatures, “PublicInputandRedistricting; Georgia” (Upd.Sep. 9,2019) Ga. Const. art.III,§V, ¶XIII(a). Ga. Const. art.III,§V, ¶XIII(a). See Ga. Const. art.III,§II. Archived by thePrinceton Gerrymandering Project at See 2019-2020HouseRules,Rule14.1 (adopted Jan.14,2019);2019-2020SenateRules, Rule1-5.1(adopted Mar. 29,2019).Note that while Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Georgia” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Georgia” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), 4

There are noredistricting-specific laws 6 However, inthe2011 1 There are nospecial 5 3 Allbillsmustbe

2

- - held hearingsacross thestatefor thepublicto rules donot mandatethis.In2011,thelegislature at legislative committee meetings;however, the Public Comment: provided anexception for redistricting intheirrules. exceptions tothisrequirement.” public,” buteither“housemayby ruleprovide for committee meetingsthereof shallbeopentothe “sessions oftheGeneral Assemblyandallstanding Open Meetings: in JulyandAugust before beingadopted. by theHouseandSenateRedistricting Committees June 30,2011. locations across thestate,from May16through Congressional Reapportionment.” available attheOffice ofLegislative and the publiceitherelectronically orby hard copy meetings willbemadeavailable for inspectionby requiring thatall“planspresented atcommittee Records: provide comment. . ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Georgia,” https://gerrymander. Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Georgia,” https://gerrymander.

In 2011,thelegislature adopted rules (accessed Jan.3,2021). 7 and Each redistricting billwas alsoheard Under thestateconstitution, the Generally thepublicmayspeak

9 Neitherhousehas 11 8

10

46 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX https://www.dropbox.com/s/i8zqyivtr8iozs8/GeorgiaSenateCommitteeGuidelines2011-12.pdf https://www.dropbox.com/s/2egd5vpo0djzqt5/GeorgiaHouseCommitteeGuidelines2011-12.pdf 20 body ofwater, ortouch-point contiguity, whichispredicated onfacing corners inachecker-board like fashion.”). districts achieve thatdesignation through theuseofwater contiguity, whichispredicated ontheassumption ofline-of-sight across alake orother 19 18 17 16 15 14 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 13 12 to prohibit partisangerrymanderinginother states. general civilrights protections which have beenheld However, Georgia’s constitution doesincludeseveral no express prohibition onpartisangerrymandering. Unlike somestates,theGeorgia Constitution has ing communities ofinterest –todraw maps. redistricting criteria–like compactness andrespect legislature (and thecourts) have alsousedtraditional has widelatitudeindrawing maps. Inpriorcycles, the side ofensuringcontiguous districts,thelegislature exercising thatpower. the contiguity clauseisarestriction onthemeansof grant ofplenaryreapportionment power” andthat constitution provides thelegislature witha“general ing. plies onlyfor state tory redistricting criterion–contiguity –whichap The Georgia Constitution provides partisan advantage. in 2011,whenRepublicans drew linestomaximize Georgia hasahistoryofgerrymandering,including are not required tonegotiate withDemocrats. and congressional redistricting process in2021and As aresult, Republicans fullycontrol both thestate es oftheGeorgia legislature by substantial margins. Republicans control thegovernorship andboth hous WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA Archived by thePrinceton Gerrymandering Project at Larios v. Cox, 300F. Supp. 2d1320,1332(N.D. Ga.2004)(“Whileallofthedistrictsare technically contiguous (as required by statelaw), many Ga. Const. art.II§2,¶II. 570 U.S. 529(2013). U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq. See Blum v. Schrader, 637SE2d396,398(2006). Ga. Const. art.III,§II,¶II.SeealsoBrennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Georgia” (Upd. Jun.7,2019), Charles S.BullockIII,“TheHistoryofRedistricting inGeorgia,” 52Ga.L.Rev. 1057(Summer2018). 13 TheGeorgia Supreme Court explained thatthe Johnsonv. Miller, 922F. Supp. 1556(S.D. Ga.1995)andLarios v. Cox, 314F. Supp. 2d1357(N.D. Ga.2004). but notcongressional 12 14 Thismaysuggestthat,out only one

redistrict manda 15 ------federal preclearance. for thiscycle, Georgia’s redistricting isnot subjectto risdictions were subjecttopreclearance. Supreme Court struckdown theformula for whichju ance; however, inShelby County v. Holder, theU.S. of theVoting Rights Act (VRA)andrequired preclear ties). discrimination againstracial andlanguageminori Section 2oftheVoting Rights Act (which prohibits and theuseofrace asaredistricting criterion)and Clause (which addresses equalpopulationstandards clude theFourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection federal legalrestrictions onredistricting, whichin Finally, like allstates,Georgia mustcomply with two housesadopted thefollowing “guidelines:” tional redistricting criteriaby resolution. In2011,the the legislature hastypically adopted itsown tradi other mandatedcriteriaundertheState Constitution, Legislatively-Adopted Criteria: “technically contiguous.” the stateconstitution required onlythatdistrictsbe A federal districtcourt, indictum,similarlyassumed single point), common forms ofredistricting abuse. contiguity (where two partsofadistrict touchata water (even withoutbridgeorferry access) andpoint permits, for example, contiguity across bodiesof has embraced aloosedefinitionofcontiguity which contiguity requirement. Previously, theLegislature y.” r “districts shallbecomposed ofcontiguous territo Contiguity: 18 . TheSupreme Court hasnot furtherdefinedthe 16 Formerly, Georgia was covered by Section 5 The Georgia Constitution provides that (accessed Jan.3, 2021). and

19

Whilethere are no 17 Therefore, 20 ------47 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-case-summaries-2010-present.aspx 25 24 23 22 pdf GeorgiaHouseCommitteeGuidelines2011-12.pdf 21 taining districtcores, and protecting incumbents. districts, creating an“urbanminoritydistrict,” main keeping counties intact, preserving four key “corners” the priorthree decades todraw itsmaps,including: influenced pastapportionment plans”inGeorgia in able to.Thecourt looked tothecriteriathat“heavily congressional districtsaftertheLegislature was un in the1990s,afederal districtcourt redrew Georgia’s standards inadopting remedial maps.For example, criteria, for example. were necessary toother traditional redistricting legislative districtscan beupheldifthedeviations these criteria.Somepopulationdeviation between While discretionary, courts dosometimeslookto factors thattheCommittee deemsappropriate.” to limittheconsideration ofany other principlesor that the“identifying ofthesecriteriaisnot intended However, theguidelinesalsoincludeddisclaimer SPOTLIGHT: GEORGIA (accessed Jan.3,2021). National Conference ofState Legislatures, “Redistricting Case Summaries” (Upd.Dec.1,2020), Ga. Const. art.I§I,¶¶II,V, IX. Johnson v. Miller, Larios v. Cox Archived by thePrinceton GerrymanderingProject at 8. Avoid pairingincumbents. 7. Consider: 6. Nomulti-memberdistricts. 5. Districtcontiguity, excluding point contiguity. 4. Comply withU.S. andGeorgia Constitutions. 3. Comply withVRA. populations. 2. Legislative districtshave substantially equal within +/-1person. 1. Congressional districtshave equalpopulation c. Communities ofinterest. b. Compactness; and a. County andprecinct boundaries , 300F. Supp. 2d1320,1331(N.D. Ga.2004) 922 F. Supp. 1556,1564-65(S.D. Ga.1995),aff’d 22 Courts willalsolooktothese and https://www.dropbox.com/s/i8zqyivtr8iozs8/GeorgiaSenateCommitteeGuidelines2011-12. https://www.dropbox.com/s/2egd5vpo0djzqt5/ 21 23 - - Abrams v. Johnson context. have not beenappliedby acourt intheredistricting and equalprotection. antees offree speech,free assembly, dueprocess, constitution includessimilarprovisions, like guar used tostrike down partisangerrymanders.Georgia’s sylvania, general civilrights protections have been civil rights protections. InNorthCarolina andPenn U.S. Constitution, they maybeundergeneral state gerrymandering claimsare not justiciableunderthe General CivilRights Protections: Althoughpartisan the partieslateragreed todismissthesuit. ruled againsttheplaintiffs butwithleave toamend; gerrymandering oftheState Housemaps.TheCourt ture engagedinracially-discriminatory andpartisan The NAACP suedinfederal court allegingtheLegisla Prior History: adopted by theLegislature. the legalityunderstatelawofany redistricting plan Georgia Supreme Court remains thefinalarbiterof redistricting mapsfor violationsofstatelaw. The ticulated aspeciallegalstandard whenreviewing Legal Standard: MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION , 521U.S. 74(1997). Georgia redistricted mid-cycle in2015. .

The Supreme Court hasnot ar 24 However, theseprovisions 25

- - - - 48 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY HAWAII Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK CONGRESSIONAL LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK

:

allocated perbasicislandunit,andiftheinitialallocation would provide fewer than2senators population ineachstatelegislative district,except atleastonememberineach houseshallbe congressional redistricting). Thoseauthoritiesalsorequire districtscontain equalproportions of political faction inthestateConstitution (for statelegislative redistricting) andinstatute(for Hawaii hasmandatory, unranked criteriaprohibiting districtsthatundulyfavor onepersonor justices selected by Democratic governors, and1by aRepublican governor. risk ofdeadlockforcing thechairappointment totheHawaii Supreme Court, whichconsists of4 by theminorityparty, withaninth commissioner chosenby supermajorityvote. There isanonzero The apportionment commission isbalanced, with4membersselectedby themajorityparty, and4 data, eitherorally orinwriting. of thecommission’s establishment. At thehearings,publicisallowed tosubmittestimony and announced with at least20days notice, andproposed plansmustbereleased within100days proposed reapportionment plansineachbasicislandunitbefore passage.Hearingsmustbe Hawaii statuterequires theapportionment commission holdatleastonepublichearingonthe reapportionment planswithin150days ofthecommission’s creation. commission istobeconstituted onorbefore May1ofthereapportionment year, andistofile basic islandunittoserve onanadvisorycommittee throughout thetermofcommission. The Court shallfillthevacancy. Additionally, eachappointing authorityistoselectapersonfrom each a ninth membertoserve aschair. Shouldthecommissioners fail toagree, theHawaii Supreme leaders oftheState SenateandHouse.Theseinitialeight membersthenselectby supermajority vote. TheCommission consists of9members:2eachappointed by themajorityandminority A balanced political appointee commission adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby majority candidate orpartyisprohibited. different socioeconomic interests predominate, where practicable. Undulyfavoring ordisfavoring a though relevant languageprohibits submerging into larger districtsareas inwhichsubstantially four membersper district.Note: Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot an express criterion, where possible.State legislative districtsare not toexceed basicislandunitsorincludemore than possible; for statelegislative districts,thatrepresentative districtsnestedwithinsenatorialdistricts, more thanoneisland); compactness; accordance topermanent features andCensus tracts, where to attainthatnumber. Othercriteriainclude:contiguity (except whendistrictwould encompass and 3representatives toanislandunit,additionalmemberswithfractional votes shallbeadded 49 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY HAWAII Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? LOW RISK REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Supreme Court. challenge mapsinthestate reviewed incourt. Citizens may Maps are not automatically State leg.:No Congressional: No No commission Balanced political appointee populations, andrejected furtherchallengestorevised maps. Hawaii Supreme Court threw outtheoriginalstatelegislative maps,whichincludednonresident its redistricting duty, ortocorrect errors inaplan.Duringthe2011redistricting cycle, the days, any registered voter maypetitiontheSupreme Court tocompel anauthoritytoperform Original jurisdictiontoreview redistricting planslieswiththeHawaii Supreme Court. Within45 Source: Allows: Prohibits: Requires: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA member ineachhouseperbasicislandunit.Ifinitial (unranked): equalproportions except atleastone Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts Hawaii Const. Art.IV, §4-6.HRS§25-2(b) None interests predominate, where practicable where substantially different socio-economic or political faction; districtsnot toincludesubareas (unranked): Districtsnot toundulyfavor aperson Constitutional criteria for congressional districts economic interests predominate. subareas where substantially different socio- four membersper district;districtsnot toinclude or political faction, where possible;nomore than island unit;districtsnot toundulyfavor aperson (unranked): Districtboundariesnot toexceed basic Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts tracts, where possible. accordance topermanent features andCensus encompassing more thanoneisland;compactness; (unranked): equalpopulation;contiguity except when Constitutional criteriafor congressional districts possible districts nestedwithinsenatorialdistricts,where and Census tracts, where possible;representative compactness; accordance topermanent features district would encompass more thanoneisland); to attainthatnumber;contiguity (except when members withfractional votes shallbeadded and 3representatives toanislandunit,additional allocation would provide fewer than2senators 50 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Solomon v. Abercrombie, 270P.3d 1013(Haw. 2012) Recent relevant cases: Citations andreferences: Census datawilllikely require thecourts tointervene. the creation ofthe apportionment commission. Changingconstitutional timingrequirements intheface ofthedelayed release of Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY HAWAII Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Legislative andcongressional mapsmustbeadopted by September 21,2021,150days aftertheMay1deadlinefor

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Kostick v. Nago,960F. Supp. 2d1074(D. Haw. 2013);aff’d 134S.Ct. 1001(2014); Hawaii Const. Art.IV, §2-10.HRS§25-2(b) N/A Required 1 perbasicislandunit Summer 2021 September 21,2021 Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Supreme Court:

Gubernatorial appointment: N/A 24D 47D David Ige United - 4D POLITICAL CONTROL - - - 1R 4R 1R Democratic (D) (D:96%) (D: 92%) 51 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY IDAHO Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK

making themsubjecttolegislative amendment. pro-incumbent districts.Mostofthestrong standards are onlyembeddedinstatute,however, neighborhoods andvoting precinct boundaries;prohibits oddlyshapeddistricts,floterial districts, districts tobecontiguous, counties preserved intact whenpossible,preserve traditional Mandatory, unranked criteriainthestateconstitution andinstatute,includingcriteriarequiring partisan abuses,thoughtheeven partisansplitmayproduce deadlock,requiring intervention. Idaho’s bipartisancommission structure insulatesthestate’s redistricting process from theworst submitted mapsare publiclyavailable. held invarious locations inthestate,draft mapsare published,redistricting dataandpublic- Idaho hasstrong publicinputopportunities.AllCommission meetings are opentothepublicand by thechairsofstate’s two largest political parties. Commission consists ofsixmembers:four appointed by partyleadersineachhouse,two appointed A bipartisancommission adopts legislative and congressional districtsby 2/3majorityvote. The to remove 2commissioners afterpartyleaderstriedtofire them. 2011 cycle, they struckdown thestatelegislative planandaffirmedtheSecretary of State’s refusal apportionment andwillreview theplansifany registered voter, town, orcounty petitions.Inthe The State Supreme Court hasoriginaljurisdictionover allstatecourt legalchallengestolegislative 52 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Redistricting, 271P.3d 1202(2012). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: I commission’s formation orthedatecensus databecomes available, whichever islater. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY IDAHO Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Legislative andcongressional mapshave nodeadlinefor adoption butmustbedrafted within90days ofthe

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Denney v. Ysursa, No. 39570-2012(2012);Twin Falls County. v. IdahoComm’n on None Required None Not specified None state Supreme Court. may challengemapsinthe reviewed incourt. Citizens Maps are not automatically No No commission Political appointee daho Const. Art.III,§§2,4,5;IdahoCode §§34-1501–1508 Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows:

order toprotect apolitical partyorincumbent, useof districts, floterial districts,divisionofcounty linesin congressional districts:Prohibits oddlyshaped Statutory criteria for both statelegislative and voting precinct boundaries(ifpossible) traditional neighborhoods,communities ofinterest, congressional districts(unranked): preserve Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative and (unranked): contiguity, counties preserved intact Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts 72-1501 –1508 Idaho Const. Art.III,§§2,4,5;IdahoCode §§ Elected: N/A 58R 28R Brad Little United - None any databesides populationdata REDISTRICTING CRITERIA POLITICAL CONTROL - - 12D 7D 5R Republican (R:80%) (R:82%) (R) - 0D 53 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ILLINOIS Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE HIGH RISK HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE STATE HIGH RISK :

member beoftheoppositeparty). a balanced backup commission withanincentive tocompromise (lesttherandomly selectedninth be delays toCensus databeingreleased, whichcould force redistricting authorityinto thehandsof giving partisanactorsfree rein todraw mapstotheirbenefit.Theonlymitigatingfactor may, infact, Democrats holdthegovernorship andveto-proof majoritiesinboth chambersofthelegislature, no suchhearingswere heldpriortoplanadoption. proposals. Congressional redistricting lackssimilartransparency standards, andinthe2010cycle, public hearingsaround thestatetoreceive testimony andconsider statelegislative redistricting redistricting committees, orajoint committee ofthetwo, are required toscheduleatleastfour After thestatehasreceived Census datafrom thefederal government, SenateandHouse with five votes. as theninth memberofthecommission, whichhasuntil October5tofinalize aredistricting plan two potential commissioners ofdiffering parties,andtheSecretary randomly selectsonetoserve bipartisan support.Shouldnoplanbeapproved, theSupreme Court sendstheSecretary ofState each chamber. Thatbodyhasuntil August 10topassaplanwithfive votes, effectively requiring of onelegislatorandnon-legislatorchosenby eachofthemajorityandminorityleadersin commission—the Legislative Redistricting Commission—takes over. Thepaneliscomposed in eachchamber. Shouldthelegislature fail toapprove statelegislative plansby June30, a backup redistricting plansby simplestatute,and tooverride gubernatorialvetoes withathree-fifths vote The legislature retains theauthoritytodraft andapprove both statelegislative andcongressional congressional districtsrequires unattached landbeattachedtocontiguous districts. prescribed by theUSConstitution, federal law, andcase law, thoughthestatutelayingout2011 district. There are noapparent universal standards for congressional redistricting outside of those choice. Two statehouse(“Representative”) districtsnestedwithin eachstatesenate(“Legislative”) enough toexert influence ontheoutcome ofanelectionwithout electingacandidate oftheir of theirchoosing,and3)influence districts,inwhichminoritypopulationvoters maybenumerous districts, inwhichvarious racial andlanguageminoritiesmayactasacoalition toelectacandidate majority populationvoters toelectcandidates oftheminoritypopulation’s choosing;2)coalition crossover districts,inwhichminoritypopulations might benumerous enoughtovote inconcert with including amandatethatthestatedraw, totheextent practicable, three typesofdistricts:1) equal inpopulation.TheIllinoisVoting Rights Act, passedin2011,addssubsequent requirements, The IllinoisConstitution requires statelegislative districtsbecompact, contiguous, andsubstantially 54 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ILLINOIS Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? HIGH RISK DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Committees, orjoint committee House andSenateRedistricting State leg.:Required Congressional: Not required State leg.:4 Congressional: None Upon receipt ofCensus data backup comm.) State leg.:6/30/21(leg.),10/5/21(final Congressional: None Supreme Court. Citizens maychallengemapsinthestate Maps are not automatically reviewed. State leg.:Onlyif leg.passesmaps Congressional: Yes backup commission State leg.:Onlyin case of8-member Congressional: No backup commission State leg.:legislature or89-member Congressional: legislature and statelegislative planswere ultimatelyturnedaside. made by theAttorney General. State andfederal court challengestothe2011-cycle congressional original andexclusive jurisdictionover statelegislative redistricting challenges,whichare tobe The IllinoisSupreme Court doesnot automatically review redistricting plans,butthebodyretains Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: Requires: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL Constitutional criteriafor state 120/5-5 Illinois Const. Art.IV, §2,Art.IV§3;10ILCS 4D Partisan elections: Yes (3/5) 41D 73D J.B. Pritzker United - None None No criteriafor congressional districts crossover, coalition, andinfluence districts districts (unranked): totheextent possible: Statutory criteria for statelegislative compactness, substantially equalpop. legislative districts(unranked): contiguity, - - - 3R 17R 45R Democratic (D:69%) (D:62%) (D) 55 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 2430 (2012). F. Supp. 2d563(N.D. Ill.2011);League ofWomen Voters v. Quinn,No.1:11-cv-05569, 2011WL5143044(N.D. Ill.Oct.28,2011),aff’d, 132S.Ct. Bd. ofElections,836F. Supp. 3d759(N.D. Ill.2011),aff’d, 133S.Ct. 103(2012);Comm. for aFair andBalanced Mapv. Ill.State Bd.ofElections,835 Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: transmission ofCensus datastandstoseriouslyimperilanironclad constitutional timeline. ninth commission member. Thenine-person commission istofileanapproved redistricting planby October5,2021.Any delayinthe Court transmits thenamesoftwo potential commissioners ofoppositepartiestotheSecretary ofState, whorandomly selectsa Commission becomes effective asaneight-person body. Ifthecommission fails topassaredistricting planby August 10,theSupreme legislative redistricting. Thelegislature hasuntil June30,2021,to enactaredistricting plan,atwhichpoint theLegislative Redistricting Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY ILLINOIS There isnodeadlinefor congressional redistricting inIllinois,butthestateconstitution establishesacleartimetablefor

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Cross v. Ill.State Bd.ofElections,No.113840(Ill.June7,2012);Radogno v. Ill.State IllinoisConst. Art.IV, §2-3,Art.IV§3;10ILCS 120/5-5,77/20;Princeton GerrymanderingProject 56 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY INDIANA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK

“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. districts becontiguous. Note: There’s nosuchcriteriafor congressional districts.Keeping whole Indiana hasmandatoryredistricting criteriainthestateconstitution requiring thatstatelegislative allows for partisanbiasatevery stage. large margins inboth legislative houses.Thebackupcommission iswhollyunbalanced. Theprocess Republicans have tripartitecontrol ofthelegislative andcongressional redistricting process, with context. Inthelastcycle ElectionCommittees inboth Housesheldseveral publichearings. Indiana lawdoesnot have specificpublic access/participation requirements in theredistricting and signedby theGovernor. house, plusastatelegislatornominatedby thegovernor. Theirmapispassedwithamajorityvote politician backupcommission, madeupoftheMajorityLeader andtheredistricting chairfrom each the Legislature fails topassamapby theendofsession,authoritythenmoves toa5-member majority vote subjecttoGovernor veto. However, for congressional districts,statuteprovides thatif The Legislature adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statute,by a recourse might look. Since neithermapwas challenged inthelasttwo cycles, itisunclearhow theprocess for legal Indiana lawprovides noapparent automaticjudicialreview orcitizen-initiated legalchallenges. 57 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: commission willhave 30days topassnewplans.Thesedeadlineswillrequire intervention following Census delays. which isApr. 29,2021.For congressional districts,ifthelegislature fails topassaplan by theendofsession,a5-memberbackup Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY INDIANA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Understatute,statelegislative andcongressional mapsmustbeadopted by theendoffirstsessionaftercensus,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A Ind. Const. Art.IV, §5; Ind.Code §3-3-2-2; Committees House andSenateRedistricting (but pastpractice) Not required None Not specified Apr. 29,2021 in court. Citizens are not abletochallengemaps Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No politician commission Congressional: legislature withbackup State leg.:legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None No criteriafor congressional districts districts: contiguity Constitution criteriafor statelegislative Ind. Const. Art.IV, §5;Ind.Code §3-3-2-2 5R Gubernatorial appointment:: Yes (1/2) 39R 71R Eric Holcomb United - - - - 0D 11D 29D Republican (R:78%) (R:71%) (R) 58 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY IOWA Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK

of partisanintervention. However, thisdeference isrooted innorms,andthelegislature’s ultimatecontrol creates somerisk commission plans,substantially removing partisaninterests from theredistricting process. Since adopting thisredistricting process, thelegislature hasapproved theLSA andadvisory public mapsubmissions. and testimony for thelegislature shortlythereafter. Itisnot clearthere willbeamechanismfor plans thelegislative services agencyrenders for thelegislature, andtosummarize publiccomment The redistricting advisorycommission isrequired toholdatleastthree publichearingsontheinitial to approve aplanwithintheallotted timeframe, theIowa Supreme Court istoadopt aplan. legislative amendment. Thegovernor retains veto power over theprocess. Shouldthelegislature fail Should thatplanfail tobeapproved, theLSA shallpresent athird plan,whichissubjecttoregular drafts asecond plantocomply withthereasons for non-approval, andsubmitsittothelegislature. legislative services areport detailingthereasons for not approving theplans.Inthatcase theLSA fail toapprove theplan(s), theclerkofhouseorsecretary ofthesenateistoprovide the sion istotransmit areport containing publictestimony withinfourteen days. Shouldthelegislature legislative services agencyhastransmitted theinitialplans.Following thesehearings,thecommis where guidelinesorunclearandholdatleastthree publichearingsaround thestateafter leaders andonefinalmemberselectedby thosefour appointees, toguidetheredistricting process commission, comprised of four non-politiciansselectedby thefour majorityandminoritylegislative congressional redistricting planstothelegislature. Statute alsoempowers aredistricting advisory collecting data,preparing local andcounty mapsinthestate,andpresenting statelegislative and Iowa’s redistricting process isunique:statutetasksthenonpartisanlegislative services agencywith are tonestlewithincongressional districts. state senatedistricts,and,tothe extent practicable aftermeetingtheabove criteria,senatedistricts or any demographic information asidefrom population. State housedistricts are tonestle within Mapmakers maynot consider incumbent addresses, voter political affiliation,pastelection results, and maynot be drawn toaugment ordilutethevoting power ofalanguageorracial minority. compactness. Districtsmaynot bedrawn tobenefitapolitical party, incumbent, oranyone else, the banagainstcounty subdivision), respect for political subdivisions,contiguity, andreasonable mandating nearlyequalpopulation(within 5%,except, inthecase ofcongressional maps,tosatisfy non-contiguous counties. Stronger statutorystandards stackontopofconstitutional requirements, with theUSConstitution, andbarscongressional districtsfrom subdividingcounties orcontaining The Constitution requires statelegislative districtsbecompact, contiguous, andnot inconflict The Iowa Constitution andstatutelayoutcriteriafor redistricting both stateandfederal maps. - 59 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY IOWA Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? LOW RISK

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Supreme Court. challenge mapsinthestate reviewed. Citizens may Maps aren’t automatically Yes No mapss. State leg.approves. advisory commission drafts Legislative Services Agency w/ not appearmapswere challengedinthe2000or2010cycles. noncompliant, thebodywillhave 90days toredraft oroversee theredrafting oftheplan.Itdoes to thedistrictplans,whichany qualifiedvoter maybring. ShouldtheCourt findtheplan There isnoautomaticreview, buttheIowa Supreme Court hasoriginaljurisdictionover challenges Source: Allows: Prohibits: Requires: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA Iowa Const. Art.III,§34,§37;Iowa Code §42.4 None affiliation, pastelec.results, demographic info. may not useincumbent addresses, voter political of language,racial minoritygroups. They also party, incumbent, oraugment/dilute voting strength congressional districts:Districtscan’t favor apolitical Statutory criteria for both statelegislative and compactness Statutory criteria for congressional districts: contiguity (unranked): districtsmustfollow political boundaries, Constitutional criteriafor congressional districts senate districts state housedistrictsmustbenestedwithin (unranked): districtsmustfollow political boundaries, Statutory criteria for statelegislative districts (unranked): compactness, contiguity Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts 60 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: Feb. 15authorizes aproportional delayintransmission date. is totransmit statelegislative andcongressional planstothelegislature by April1,thoughany delayinCensus dataavailability past by December 31.Nosuchprovision exists for congressional plans.TheLegislative Services Agency, whichdoestheinitialline-drawing, year following theCensus, andifnoplanisapproved by September 15,theIowa Supreme Court istoredraw thestatelegislative lines Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY IOWA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

TheIowa Constitution requires thegeneral assembly toapprove statelegislative districtplansby September 1ofthe

N/A Iowa Const. Art.III,§34-37;Iowa Code §42.2-6 Unclear reports toleg. Required; advisorycommission At least3 Potentially April2021 State leg.:9/15/2021 Congressional: None Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Supreme Court:

No 31R 53R Kim Reynolds United - 5R Gubernatorial appointment: - POLITICAL CONTROL - - 2D 18D 47D Republican (R:62%) (R:53%) (R) 61 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY KANSAS Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK

“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. requirements, theVoting Rights Act, andother constitutional rulesonrace. Note: Keeping whole permanent residence. Like allstates,Kansas mustcomply withconstitutional equalprotection for statelegislative districtsinorder tocount militarypersonnelandcollege students attheir Kansas hascriteriainthestateconstitution andinstatutethatrequires census datatobeadjusted the political landscape mayhampersafeguards. Democratic majority, whichmaycheckthepowers oftheRepublican legislature. Future changesto Republican supermajority thatcan override theveto. TheState Supreme Court hasanapparent Kansas hasadividedgovernment; theGovernor isaDemocrat andtheLegislature hasaveto-proof been held. Nothing instatuterequires publicaccess orparticipation,butinpastcycles publicmeetingshave chamber. subject togubernatorialveto, whichmaybeoverridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineach The legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statute,by majorityvote court drew linesinstead. upheld both. In the2011cycle, thelegislature could not agree oneithersetofmapsandafederal maps are not. Inthe2001cycle, both setsofmapswere challengedandtheKansas Supreme Court State legislative mapsare automatically reviewed by theSupreme Court, thoughcongressional 62 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: were 14publicmeetings. 2022 -theendofregular session.Hearingsare expected totake place duringthe2022legislative session,lastcycle there Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY KANSAS Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Whilethere isnodeadline for thedrawing ofcongressional maps,statelegislative mapsmustbeadopted by Apr. 10,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A Kansas Const. Art. II,§8,X,§1;Kansas Stat. Ann.§25-205;Kansas Stat. §§11-301–307 Legislative redistricting committee (but pastpractice) Not Required None (butpastpractice) With 2022session State leg.:endof sessionin2022 Congressional: none reviewed State legislative mapsare automatically Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None permanent residence personnel andcollege students attheir maps: adjustcensus datatocount military both statelegislative andcongressional Constitutional andstatutorycriteriafor Kansas Const. Art.10,§1 5D Gubernatorial appointment: Yes (2/3) 29R 86R Laura Kelly Democratic Governor Divided - - - 2R - 11D 38D Republican legislature - (R: 72.5%) (D) 1I (R: 69%) and 63 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY KENTUCKY Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK congressional maps.Note: Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. and nearlyequalpopulationineachstatelegislative district.There are nosimilarlaws for Kentucky hasmandatorycriteria intheState Constitution, requiring minimaldivisionofcounties on thelegislature’s abilitytoredistrict for partisangain. margins tooverride theirDemocratic Governor’s veto. There are noapparent structural constraints While Kentucky hasadividedstategovernment, theRepublican-majority legislature haswide unclear whetherthere willbeopportunitiesfor publicparticipation beyond openmeetings. Kentucky hasstrong openmeetingslaws, butnothing specifictotheredistricting process. Itis chamber. Gubernatorial approval. Vetoes maybeoverridden withthevote ofasimplemajorityineach The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statute,subjectto challenges. excessive divisionofcounties, andnewmapswere not challenged.The2001cycle sawnosuch cycle, statelegislative mapswere struckdown by thejudicialpanelfor malapportionment and legislative lines. There are nosimilarprovisions instatelawfor congressional lines.Inthe2011 A panelofthree statecircuit court judgeshasoriginaljurisdictionover any challengestostate

64 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Fischer, 366S.W.3d 905(2012) Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: likely occur duringthattimeframe. constitution requires theGeneral Assemblytoadopt newmapsduring the2022cycle, settolastfrom Jan4toApr. 15.Hearingswill Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY KENTUCKY Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Kentucky lawdoesnot imposeany deadlinesfor drawing U.S. House lines. For statelegislative lines,thestate

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Brown v. Ky. Legis. Res. Comm’n, 966F. Supp. 2d709(2013);Legis. Res. Comm’n v. Kentucky Const. §33,36,42;Kentucky Stat. §5.005 and State andLocal Government (Senate) State Government Committee (House) Not required None Unclear State leg.:April15, 2022. Congressional: None Citizens maychallengemapsincourt. Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None No criteriafor congressional districts. possible county, dividefewest numberofcounties population asmaybe,” withoutdividinga districts (unranked): “as nearlyequalin Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Ky. Const. §33 4NP vacancies: Nonpartisan elections,withGov filling Yes (simplemajorityrequired) 30R 75R Andy Beshear legislature Divided - - - - 8D 25D 2R (R:79%) Democratic Governor, -appt’d - (R:75%) (D) 1D -appt’d

Republican 65 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY LOUISIANA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK calculus. Shelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance requirement maychangetheredistricting represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act was weakened in rules onrace. Note: Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion.Thiscycle comply with constitutional equalpopulationrequirements, theVoting Rights Act, andconstitutional the State Constitution orinstatuterelated toCongressional districts.Like allstates,Louisiana must to beapportionedonthebasisofpopulation“as equally aspracticable”. There’s nosimilarcriteriain Louisiana has discretionary criteriainthestateconstitution whichrequires statelegislative districts the future, itisnot clearthere would beany structural constraints onpartisanredistricting. Edwards mayretain hisveto power over redistricting plans.Shouldthepolitical landscape changein with two independents servinginthechamber. Inthisenvironment, Democratic Gov. JohnBel majority intheSenate,butisstillahandfulofseatsaway from supermajoritycontrol oftheHouse, Louisiana is underdividedpolitical control. TheRepublican-controlled Legislature hasaveto-proof participation intheredistricting context. Louisiana has strong openmeetingslaws, butnofurther requirements for publicaccess or gubernatorial approval. Vetoes maybeoverridden by a2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. The Legislature adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statutesubjectto challenge maps. extend tocongressional redistricting. Inthelasttwo cycles, nolawsuits successfully proceeded to a voter, ifthelegislature isunabletoreapprove aplan,thoughthatauthoritydoesnot explicitly The Supreme Court retains theexplicit right toredraw statelegislative lines,uponpetition from

66 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: were heldbetween February andMay2011. year aftertheyear inwhichthestatewillpresumably receive Census populationdata.Hearingsmaybegininthespring;lastcycle they Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY LOUISIANA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Whilestatelawimposesnodeadlinefor congressional districts,statelegislative mapsmustbeadopted in2022,the

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A

Louisiana Const. Art.III,§6(A-B); Louisiana Rev. Stat. §§42.4.1-13;Louisiana Op. Atty. Gen.No.99-54(1999). Sen. Redistricting Com. House andGov Com. Not Required (butpastpractice None (butpastpractice) Potentially spring2021 State Leg.: December 31,2021 Congressional: None legislature fails todoso. Court todraw statelegislative linesifthe court. Citizens may askthestateSupreme Maps are not automatically reviewed in Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None districts There are nocriteriafor congressional practicable” onthebasisofpopulation districts: districtsmustbe“as equallyas Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Louisiana Const. ArticleIII,§6(A). 7R Gubernatorial appointment: House,no(2/3supermajorityrequired) Senate, yes 27R 66R John BelEdwards Democratic Governor Divided - - - - 0D 12D 35D Republican Legislature -2I-2V (R: 69%)

(D) (R: 63%) with 67 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MAINE Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: MODERATE RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE MODERATE RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK

Congressional districtsmustbecontiguous, compact, andfollow political boundarieswhenpossible Maine hasunranked constitutional criteriafor statelegislative andcongressional redistricting. no longerhold. drew andadopted maps.Shouldthepolitical landscape changeinthefuture, thesesafeguards may congressional redistricting planduetopartisangridlock,andtheMaineSupreme Court ultimately required for the2/3approval threshold. Inthe2000cycle, thelegislature failed toenacta legislative houseshinderthemfrom passingredistricting planswithouttheRepublican support Democrats have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, buttheirnarrow margins inboth to doso. Supreme JudicialCourt eventually drew thecongressional districtsafterthelegislature failed was heldinAugust, 2011togatherpublicinput.There were alsohearingsbefore theMaine the advisorycommission sendsitsplanstothelegislature. Last cycle, atleastonepublichearing Maine hasstrong openmeetinglaws. At leastonepublichearingisconstitutionally required before fails toadopt maps,theMaineSupreme Court isresponsible for adopting aplan. 2/3 vote inboth chambers,andplansare thensubjecttogubernatorialapproval. Ifthelegislature third andfinalmember. TheLegislature mayadopt, modify, orreject thecommission’s planswitha representatives coordinating tochooseonecommissioner, andthoseonecommissioners selecta choose one.Thosetwelve commissioners thenchoosetwo more from thepublic,witheachparty’s majority andminorityleaderseachchoosethree; andthechairofstate’s two majorpartieseach The statesenatemajorityandminorityleaderseachchoosetwo commissioners; statehouse district mapstosendthelegislature for approval. Thecommission ismadeupof15members: A bipartisanadvisorycommission isresponsible for drafting statelegislative andcongressional cycle, anindependent voter challenged thecongressional plansincourt andthey were heldup. districts itdrew butdidaltersometoproduce districtswithmore equalpopulations.Inthe2011 In acollection ofcases following the2001cycle, thecourt upheld mostofthestatelegislative that thelegislature fails toadopt aplan.Citizens have the ability tochallengeunfair plansincourt. jurisdiction over redistricting cases and thecourt isresponsible for drawing districtsintheevent Maps are not automatically reviewed by theMaineSupreme Court, butthecourt hasoriginal interest” isnot anexpress criterionfor congressional districts. pro/anti-incumbent, andracially-discriminatory gerrymandering.Keeping whole“communities of boundary decisions’’for state legislative redistricting. There are nostatecriteriaprohibiting partisan, that thecommission must“give weight totheinterests oflocal communities whenmakingdistrict while preserving similar populationnumbers.Inadditiontothesecriteria,a statestatuterequires

68 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Districts, 827A.2d844(2003);Inre 2003Legislative Apportionment oftheHouseRepresentatives ,827A.2d810(2003) Relevant recent cases: Citations andresources: mandated; extensions willrequire formal legislative orlegal action totemporarily delay theprocess. responsible for implementing areapportionment plan60days afterthelegislative deadline.Allofthedeadlinesare constitutionally commission’s planoritsown mapsby June11,2021.Ifthelegislature fails toadopt newdistricts, theMaineSupreme Court is by June1,2021. Apublichearingmustbeheldbefore theplanissubmitted tothelegislature. Thelegislature mustadopt theadvisory Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MAINE Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION State legislative andcongressional mapsdrawn by theredistricting advisorycommission mustbesent tothelegislature

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Inre 2003Apportionment oftheState SenateandUnitedStates Congressional Maine Const. Art.IV, Pt.3,§1-3, Art.IX,§24;MaineRev. Stat. Tit.21-A, §1206-A Advisory redistricting commission Required 1 Likely mid-2021 June 11,2021 Supreme Court. Citizens maychallengemapsinthestate Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes Yes commission) Legislature (aided by abipartisanadvisory Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None districts: weight tocommunities ofinterest Statutory criteriafor statelegislative political subdivisionsasmuchpossible (unranked): compact, contiguous, follow legislative andcongressional districts Constitutional criteriafor both state 21-A, §1206-A Const. Art.IX,§24;MaineRev. Stat. tit. Maine Const. Art.IV, pt. 3,§1-3;Maine senate: Gubernatorial appointment, confirmed by No (2/3) 21D 80D Janet Mills United - None - - 13R 66R 5D Democratic (D) - (D:60%) - 2R 4I - 1L

(D: 52%) 69 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MARYLAND Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK constraints, andthere are few safeguards ontheirbias. incumbency advantage. While thisisencouraging, legislative mapsare not underthesame Advisory commission maps are prohibited from considering thepastbehaviorofvoters and limited by theadvisorycommission balanced between Democrats, Republicans, andindependents. gubernatorial veto andpushthrough partisancongressional maps.Partisan abuseissomewhat Republican governor. Supermajoritieswould allow Democrats inthelegislature tooverturn a Maryland’s government isdivided,withDemocratic supermajoritiesinthelegislature anda legislative portionoftheprocess. and submitcomments. There donot seemtobeany similarpublicaccess requirements for the allow citizens tocomment onthemaps,andprovide anelectronic portalfor citizens toreview data meetings inlinewithMaryland’s OpenMeetingsAct. They mustalso allow regional summitsto plan. Thenewadvisorycommission, created by executive order, isalsorequired toholdpublic legislative plantothelegislature. There isnosuchrequirement for thelegislature’s congressional Maryland’s constitution requires publichearingsbefore theGovernor submitsaproposed state their submissionstothelegislature are final. than thoseofthelegislature. Itisunclearifthegovernor can overrule thecommission’s mapsorif other commissioners ineachgroup. Thecommission mapsalsofollow different, stronger criteria Democrat, andoneindependent. Thesethree thenappoint theother sixcommissioners withtwo citizen redistricting commission. Three membersare appointed by thegovernor: one Republican, one On January12,2021,Gov. Larry Hogansignedanexecutive order creating anine-member advisory the governor’s veto) by February 27,2022,thegovernor’s mapsare automatically implemented. or reject. Ifthelegislature fails topassmapsby joint resolution withamajorityvote (not subjectto The governor firstpresents theirown plantothelegislature whichthey can eitheradopt, modify, veto, whichcan beoverridden witha3/5supermajorityineachchamber. For statelegislative lines, The legislature enactsacongressional redistricting planby simplestatute,subjecttoagubernatorial and was defeated by voters inNovember of2012, keeping theplaninplace. of themapstoputissuebefore voters asareferendum petitionwhichadvanced totheballot and partisangerrymanderchallenge tothecongressional planinthelastcycle, causing opponents and federal court. Apanel of3judgesinthe4thUSCircuit Court ofAppealsdismissed acivilrights though not over congressional plans.Legal challengestomaps inthelastcycle were heard instate The MarylandSupreme Court retains originaljurisdictionover statelegislative redistricting plans, minority votes, considering pastvoting behavior, andconsidering incumbencyadvantage. commission isunderdifferent, stronger criteriathanthelegislature, includingprohibition ofdiluting and natural features. Congressional mapsdonot face thesamerequirements. Theadvisory criteria requiring districts tobecontiguous, compact, andgive “due regard” for political boundaries Maryland hasmandatorycriteriaintheState Constitution for statelegislative districts,including

70 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Supp. 2d887(D. Md.2011),aff’d, 133S.Ct. 29(2012);Martinv. Maryland, No.1:11-cv-00904, 2011WL 5151755 (D. Md.Oct.27,2011). Misc. No.13(Md.Ct. Appeals Jan.10,2012);Gorrell v. O’Malley, 1:11-cv-02975, 2012WL226919(D. Md.Jan.19,2012); Fletcherv. Lamone, 831F. Districting oftheState, 80A.3d1073 (Md.2013);Olsonv. O’Malley, No. 1:12-cv-0240, 2012WL764421(D. Md.Mar. 6,2012);Olson v. O’Malley, jurisdiction, 137S.Ct. 654(2017);Bouchat v. Maryland,No.06C15068061(Md. Cir. Ct., Carroll Cnty. May1,2015);IntheMatterof2012Legislative 02417, 2016WL4699415(D. Md.Sept. 7,2016);Parrott v. Lamone, No. 1:15-cv-01849, 2016WL4445319(D. Md.Aug. 24, 2016),dismissedon Relevant recent cases: Southern MarylandOnline(2012). Citations andreferences: governor’s proposal becomes law. For thiscycle, thatdeadlinefalls onFebruary 27,2022. 2022. State legislative mapsmustbe adopted by the45thdayof startofsessiontwo years afterthefederal Census, orthe Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MARYLAND Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There’s nodeadlinefor congressional maps,butcandidates mustfilefor congressional primaryelectionsby Feb. 22,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Lamone v. Benisek,139 S.Ct. 2484(2019);Bouchatv. Maryland, No.1:15-cv-

MarylandConst. Art.III,§5;MarylandCode, ElectionLaw, §5-303(a); “Democratic Lawsuit Challenges GOPPetition Success,” Advisory Commission Required are required No specificnumber, butpublichearings Before aplanissubmitted State leg.:Feb. 27,2022 Congressional: nodeadline maps inthestateSupreme Court. Citizens maychallengestatelegislative Maps are not automatically reviewed. State leg.:no Congressional: yes No maps, legislature modifies/passes Governor andadvisorycommission draft Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL advisory commission mapsprohibits: Executive order criteriafor both setsof with other prohibitions. for statemapsby theconstitution along maps are underthesamecriteriarequired advisory commission maps:Both setsof Executive order criteriafor both setsof boundaries andnatural features. compactness, and“due regard” for political maps passedby thelegislature: contiguity, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Maryland Const. Art.III,§5 and senateconfirmation: (Court ofAppeals) Assistedappointment Yes 32D 98D Larry Hogan legislatur Divided - None incumbency advantage past voting behavior, andconsidering diluting minorityvotes, considering - - 15R 42R Republican governor

(68% D) (70% D) (R) 3R - 3D , Democratic 71 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MASSACHUSETTS Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. no criteriaprohibiting partisan,pro/anti-incumbent, andracially-discriminatory gerrymandering. be contiguous, ofnearlyequalpopulation,andfollow political boundarieswhenpossible. There are legislative districtsbutnostatecriteriafor congressional districts.State legislative districtsmust Massachusetts haslimitedmandatoryunranked criteriainthestateconstitution for state the process, withlimitedconstraints onredistricting for partisan gain. large margins inboth legislative chambersguarantee aveto-proof majorityandeffective control of While Democrats donot technically have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, theirvery related toredistricting andhashad opportunities for participationinthepast. it hasdonesoextensively inpriorcycles. Massachusettshasrelatively strong openmeetinglaws The General Court isnot legallyrequired toholdpublichearingsortake publiccomment, though legislative chamber. vote, subjecttogubernatorialveto. Thelegislature can override aveto witha2/3vote ineach The General Court adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsasregular statuteby majority dismissed accusations ofgerrymanderingandupheldthenewlydrawn statehousemaps. house mapsviolatedequalprotection, andthey were redrawn. TheMassachusettsSupreme Court districts unnecessarily anddilutedRepublican representation. Thefederal court ruledthatthestate the equalprotection clause,andstatecourt over claimsthatitdividedseveral towns into multiple the 2001cycle, thestate houseplanwas challengedinfederal court over claimsthatitviolated state legislative maps ifany registered voter petitionswithin30days oftheplan’s approval. After Supreme Court, butthecourt hasoriginaljurisdictionover allredistricting cases andwillreview State legislative andcongressional mapsare not automatically reviewed by theMassachusetts

72 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Mass. 614(2002). Relevant recent cases: Meeting Law, G.L.c.30A,§§18-25;Princeton GerrymanderingProject Citations andreferences: though thedelaycould condense theprocess considering constitutional constraints toadopt mapstheyear aftertheCensus istaken. significantly impact theredistricting process inMassachusettssince theGeneral Court, thestate’s legislature, meetsyear-round, There isnodeadline for congressional maps,butcandidates mustfileby June7,2022.Itisunlikely thattheCensus delaywill Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MASSACHUSETTS Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION UndertheMassachusettsconstitution, statelegislative mapsmustbeadopted intheyear aftertheCensus istaken.

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Mayor ofCambridge v. Secretary, 436Mass.476(2002);McClure v. Secretary, 436 Massachusetts Const. Amend.Art.CI,§1-3,CXIX,§1-2;Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ch.56&57;MassachusettsOpen on HouseSteering, Policy andScheduling Committee onHouse Rules,Committee Special Joint Committee onRedistricting, and citizen mapsubmission) Not Required (butpastpractice ofwebsite None required (but~13in2011) Likely Mid-2021 census (December, 2021) State leg.:endof firstsessionafter Congressional: None maps inthestateSupreme Court. Citizens maychallengestatelegislative Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None districts There are nocriteriafor congressional possible equal pop, follow political boundarieswhen districts (unranked): contiguity, nearly Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Const. amend.Art.CXIX,§1&2 Mass. Const. amend.Art.CI,§1-3;Mass. bipartisan council): Gubernatorial appointment (aided by Yes (2/3) 37D 128D Charlie Baker legislature Divided - None - - 3R 30R (D:92%) Republican governor -1O (R) (D:80%) 7R - 0D , Democratic 73 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MICHIGAN Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK maps, prohibition of favoring candidates orincumbents, reflection ofcounty, city, andtownship of thestate’s diversity andrespecting communities ofinterest, prohibition ofdrawing partisan Michigan hasmandatoryranked criteriainthestateconstitution inthisorder: contiguity, reflection criteria, includingcompetitiveness. the finalplansmustbeaccompanied by reports explaining how theplanmeetsallestablished constructed todecrease partisaninfluence, withstrong cross-partisan approval requirements, and legislature. Thenewprocess isuntested, buttheindependent commissions have beendeliberately This cycle willbethefirstinwhichMichiganusesanindependent commission inplace ofthe process. on finalmaps,andmustaccept writtencomment andpublicmapssubmissionsthroughout the proposed. Thecommission mustadvertise andprovide a45-daycomment periodbefore they vote 10 publichearingsthroughout thestatebefore plansare drafted andfive hearingsafterplansare redistricting commission issubjecttoopenmeetinglaws andisconstitutionally required tohold The redistricting process inMichiganprovides ampleopportunitiesfor publicparticipation.The a proposed plan. the commissioner whosubmittedtheplan.Ifthere isatie,theSecretary ofState randomly selects ranked amongthetophalfofplansby atleasttwo commissioners not affiliatedwiththepartyof vote, commissioners rank eachproposed planandadopt thehighest-ranked planthatisalso at leasttwo membersfrom eachpartyandtwo unaffiliatedcommissioners. Ifthere isnomajority qualified candidates from thepool.8/13votes are required toapprove aplan,withsupportfrom qualified applicants afterthetwo partyleadersineachlegislative househave eachstricken five four Republicans, andfive unaffiliated.Commissioners are selectedatrandom from apoolof legislative andcongressional districts.Thecommission consists of13members:four Democrats, An independent commission, establishedin2018,ischarge ofdrawing andadopting state Michigan Supreme Court alsoupheldthecongressional mapsagainstlegalchallenges. same groups were deniedachallengetostateHouseplansinfederal court. Inthe2001cycle, the and other laborandcivilrights groups inLeague ofWomen Voters v. Benson(2019).In2012,these were upheldby theMichiganSupreme Court againstchallenges from theLeague ofWomen Voters legislative redistricting cases. Last cycle, congressional mapsdrawn by theRepublican legislature Court, butunderstatute, thestatecourt has originaljurisdictionover both congressional andstate State legislative andcongressional mapsare not automatically reviewed by theMichiganSupreme requirement maychangetheredistricting calculus. 5 oftheVoting Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance boundaries, andlastly, compactness. Thiscycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection

74 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: be required toshiftdeadlines schedule for comparison. Itislikely thatthecensus delaywillimpacttheconstitutionally mandatedtimeline;formal actionmay required 45daypubliccomment period.Thisisthefirstyear Michiganwillusetheindependent commission, sothere isnopast per thestateconstitution. Undertheestablishedtimeline,draft plansmustbedoneby September 17,2021toaccommodate the Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MICHIGAN Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION State legislative andcongressional mapsmustbeadopted by theindependent commission by November 1,2021,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: League ofWomen Voters v. Benson(2019) Michigan Const. Art.IV, §6;MichiganComp. L.§§3.71,4.262;Princeton GerrymanderingProject Independent commission Required drafts 10 before drafting, 5for comments on Before plansare drafted Nov. 1, 2021 Supreme Court. Citizens maychallengemapsinthestate Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. No Yes Independent commission Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL legislative andcongressional districts: Constitutional criteriafor both state 6. compactness one candidate; 5.reflect political boundaries; cannot draw districtstofavor ordisfavor disproportionately favor oneparty;4. of interest;” 3.cannot draw districtsto state’s diversity andrespect communities (ranked): 1.contiguity; 2.“reflect the legislative andcongressional districts Constitutional criteriafor both state Michigan Const. Art.IV, §6 4D endorsements (Gov. appoints vacancies): Nonpartisan electionswithparty N/A 20R 58R Gretchen Whitmer Republican legislature Divided - None one partyorcandidate Cannot draw districtstofavor ordisfavor - - - 3R 16D 52D Democratic governor,

(R: 55%) (R: 52%) (D)

75 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MINNESOTA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK substantially equalinpopulationandthatavoid dividingpolitical subdivisionsmore thannecessary. require congressional districtstobecontiguous, andthatredistricting planscreate districtsthatare and thathousedistrictsbenestedwithinstatesenatedistricts.Beyond that,statutoryprovisions The redistricting criteriaintheMinnesota Constitution onlyrequire contiguous statesenatedistricts dominant party’s abilitytoredistrict for partisanadvantage. Should thepolitical landscape changeinthefuture, however, there are noapparent constraints ona by Republicans andtheHouseby Democrats. Thisdynamicshouldlimittheriskofpartisanabuse. The process ismainlycarried outby thelegislature, ofwhichcontrol issplit:theSenatecontrolled 2012, andaccepted mapproposals from thepublic. panel tasked withconducting redistricting heldpublichearingsfrom October2011toJanuary Public hearingsare not required throughout theprocess, thoughthey are pastpractice. Thejudicial redraw thelines. override aveto hasledtheMinnesota Supreme Court tointervene andappoint ajudicialpanelto each legislative bodytooverride theveto. Inpastcycles, thelegislature’s failure topassaplanor subjected tothegovernor’s approval. Ifthegovernor vetoes themaps,ittakes a2/3majorityin The legislature drafts andpassesmapswithasimplemajorityineachhouse.Allare two redistricting cycles. Itisunclearifcitizens are abletochallengeunfair maps. Supreme Court hasdelegatedjudicialpanelstoredraw mapsifthelegislature hasfailed inthepast Maps passedby thelegislature are not automatically reviewed by any court, thoughtheMinnesota

76 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: February 15,2022. requires thelegislature tofinish redistricting activities nolaterthan25weeks before the2022stateprimaryelection, whichwould be scheduled toendonMay21,2021—or thefirstsessionafterCensus data have been delivered tothestate.Further statute though itisunclearwhethertheprovision willbeinterpreted tomeanthefirstsessionaftertakingofCensus—currently Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MINNESOTA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION TheMinnesota Constitution authorizes thelegislature toenactredistricting plansthefirstsessionafterCensus,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A

Minnesota Const., Art4,§3,23;Minnesota Stat. §204B.14(1a); Minnesota Stat. §2.91(2) State SenateRedistricting Committee State HouseRedistricting Committee Not required None Unclear 2022. deadline could be read tobeFeb. 15, or aftercensus data isreleased. Final scheduled toendonMay21,2021), the census hasbeentaken (Currently Either firstlegislative sessionafter court. unclear ifcitizens can challenge mapsin Maps are not automatically reviewed. It’s Yes No Legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL necessary dividing political subdivisions more than and congressional districtsprohibits: Statutory criteria for both statelegislative requires contiguity. Statutory criteriafor congressional districts districts. districts benestedwithinstatesenate state senatedistrictsandthathouse districts (unranked): contiguous districtsfor Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Minnesota Constitution, Art4,§3and23 election: Basedonappointments, Appointment by governor andnonpartisan No (2/3) 34R 70D Tim Walz house Divided - N/A - - , 31D 64R Republican senate Democratic governor (D) - (D:52%) 2I (R:51%) , Democratic 5D - 2R 77 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MISSISSIPPI Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion.There are nostatecriteriafor criteria prohibiting partisan,pro/anti-incumbent, and racially-discriminatory gerrymandering,and compactness, andthefollowing ofpolitical boundarieswithemphasisoncounties. There are no Mississippi hasstatutorycriteriafor statelegislative districtsonly. Criteria includecontiguity, a federal court drawing congressional mapsafterthelegislature failed todoso. commission isalsodesignedtoshutouttheminorityparty. Last cycle, partisandisputesresulted in is dominatedby legislatorschosenby leadership ofthelegislative majority, andthebackup the statehouse.TheJoint Legislative Reapportionment Committee where theplansare drafted with large margins inboth legislative houses,thoughthey fall justshortofa2/3majorityin Republicans have tripartitecontrol ofthestatelegislative andcongressional redistricting processes, legislators andthecommittee itselfonlybecome publicuponintroduction tothelegislature. access policylastcycle allowing citizens tosubmitwrittencomments andmaps.Mapsproposed by no requirements for publicaccess totheprocess instatute,thoughtheCommittee passedapublic The Joint Committee onReapportionment issubjecttoMississippi’s openmeetinglaws. There are a congressional plan,theUnitedStates DistrictCourt, JacksonDivision,draws themaps. Secretary ofState, andthemajorityleadersofHouseSenate.Iflegislature fails toadopt commission composed of the ChiefJustice ofthestateSupreme Court, theAttorney General, the its own plan.Ifthelegislature fails toadopt astatelegislative plan,redistricting falls toabackup Committee onReapportionment before moving tothefloor, buttheentire legislature can adopt be overridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. Both plansare drafted inaJoint by majorityvote, requiring gubernatorialapproval. Aveto toacongressional redistricting pancould not require gubernatorialapproval, whilecongressional districtsare adopted asaregular statute The legislature adopts statelegislative districtsasajoint resolution by majorityvote, whichdoes of dilutingthevoting power ofBlackcitizens; itwas redrawn by thelegislature in2019. Senate District22was found by afederal districtcourt toviolatetheVoting Rights Act onthebasis 2011 cycle, congressional mapswere drawn by afederal court andfaced nochallenges.State Mississippi statecourts have nojurisdictionover congressional maps understatestatute.Inthe Supreme Court. InMauldinvBranch (2003),theMississippiSupreme Court determinedthat State legislative andcongressional mapsare not automatically reviewed by theMississippi may changetheredistricting calculus. Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. The absence ofapreclearance requirement congressional districts.This cycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting

78 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Mauldin v. Branch, 866So.2d429(Miss.2003). 189 F. Supp. 2d512(S.D. Miss.2002);Smithv. Clark,189F. Supp. 2d548(S.D. Miss.2002),aff’d subnom.Branch v. Smith,538U.S. 254(2003); Relevant recent cases: issue closesttoheartsoflawmakers iscoming: legislative redistricting,” SunHerald (Feb. 15,2021) Citations andreferences: maps thisfall. December 30,2011.TheHouseredistricting manager, Rep. JimBeckett, hassignaled thathewould like totry topasscongressional congressional maps;lastcycle thelegislature was unabletoagree onaplansothey were drawn by afederal court andadopted on ends withoutaplan,thebackupcommission willbeconvened andmustapprove aplanwithin180days. There isnodeadlinefor the census. Ifthelegislature fails toenactaplan,itwillbecalled into aspecialsessionlasting30additionaldays. Ifthatsessionalso Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MISSISSIPPI Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Thefirstdeadlinefor state legislative mapsisApril3,2022,theendofregular sessioninthesecond year following

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Branch v. Clark,No.G-2001-1777 (Miss.Chancery Ct. Dec.21,2001);Smithv. Clark, Mississippi Code Ann.§5-3:81-129,MississippiConst. Art.XIII,§254;Joint Committee onReapportionment Website; “The Congressional Redistricting Comm. Reapportionment, Standing Joint Standing Joint Leg. Comm. on public comment policylastcycle) Not Required (butcommittee adopted None (butpastpractice) Not specified State leg.:April2022 Congressional: None court. Federal mapscan’t beredrawn instate Maps are not automatically reviewed. State Leg.: No Congressional: Yes No commission State leg:Legislature orbackup district court Congressional: Legislature orfederal

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL districts prohibits: county splits Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts There are nocriteriafor congressional districts: mustfollow political boundaries Statutory criteriafor statelegislative districts: contiguity Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Art. 13,§254 Miss. Code Ann.§5-3:81-129,Miss.Const. 8R through gubernatorial appointment): Nonpartisan elections(vacancies filled N/A 36R 75R Tate Reeves United - state law Overlapping districtsmaybeallowed under - - - 1D 16D 46D Republican (R:69%) - (R) 1I (R: 61%) 79 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MISSOURI Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: MODERATE RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE

partisan bias. maps, disproportionately hurtingcommunities ofcolor andpotentially leadingtoheightened maps are allowed tousecitizen voting-age population,rather thanthetotal population,todraw 15% efficiencygap, whichcould enableextremely partisanmaps. Beyond that,statelegislative partisanship, considering criteriaexplicitly allow for extreme partisanship, includinganallowable legislature andaRepublican governor. However, thestatelegislative process remains opento congressional redistricting process, withaRepublican supermajorityinboth chambersofthe state legislative redistricting process limittheriskofpartisanabuse,whichremains highinthe The balanced commissions, bipartisanapproval requirements, andjudicialbackstopinthe redistricting process. judicial portionoftheprocess. There are alsonopublichearingrequirements inthecongressional and partisandatausedtocreate themaps.There are nopublichearingrequirements through the Both thecommissions andthebackupappellatejudgepanelsmustmake publicthedemographic sessions are allowed) andthecommissions mustholdhearingsaftertentative plansare released. The statelegislative redistricting commissions musthold atleastthree hearings(thoughexecutive of appellatejudgestodraw thelines. members. Shouldacommission deadlock,thestatesupreme court shallselectasix-member panel to draft tentative plans,andafurthermonth toapprove planswiththesupportof70% shall selectfrom thepoolsatotal of10membersperparty. Thecommissions have five months district committees for thetwo largest political partiesnominatemembers tothegovernor, who commissions are appointed todraw statehouseandsenatemapsaftercongressional veto, whichcan beoverridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. Separate balanced The statelegislature enactscongressional mapsvianormal statute,subjecttogubernatorial congressional districtsbecontiguous andas compact andnearly equalinpopulationasispossible. who have losttheright tovote from inclusioninpopulation totals. TheConstitution alsorequires to belitigatedby courts andcould potentially beusedtodeny immigrants, children, oreven people to require divisionbasedonthecitizen voting-age, rather thantotal, population.Thisphrase hasyet legislative districtsare tobedrawn on thebasisof“one person,onevote,” whichmaybeinterpreted which, undertheguiseofensuring competition, allows for extremely partisanmaps.Additionally, elections for governor, USsenate, andpresident. There isa15%cap onwasted votes statewide, by anelectoral performance index calculated by assessingwasted votes inthethree preceding distinct procedures for subdivisions;4.partisanfairness, thencompetitiveness, asdetermined compliance; 3.contiguity andcompactness; 4.preservation ofcounties andmunicipalities,with ranked by priority:1.equalpopulation(up to3%divergence); 2.federal constitutional andstatutory State legislative: in population. Congressional:

Congressional mapsare onlyrequired tobecompact, contiguous, and nearlyequal Missouri’s Constitution provides for mandatory legislative redistricting criteria, 80 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MISSOURI Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? HIGH RISK

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

only ifthey can show specificinjury. Citizens maychallengespecificdistricts Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. State leg.:No Congressional: Yes State leg.:Yes Congressional: No commissions Congressional: legislature State leg.:political appointee unsuccessfully. In the2010cycle, both congressional andstateHouseplanswere challengedinstatecourt must befiledintheCircuit Court ofCole County, withdirect appealtotheMissouriSupreme Court. to thechallengeddistrict,andmaynot allow for revision ofthemapinitsentirety. Challenges individual injuryandpotential remedy underadifferently drawn district.Remedy islimitedonly For challengestostatelegislative districts,standingisnow limitedtoeligiblevoters whocan show Source: Allows: Prohibits: Requires: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA Constitutional criteriafor congressional Mo. Const. Art.III,§3(b); Art.III,§7(c) and children. population, excluding non-citizens, felons, require theuseofcitizen voting-age one vote,” whichmaybeinterpreted to are tobedrawn onthebasisof“one person, votes statewide.State legislative districts senate, andpresident. 15%cap onwasted three preceding electionsfor governor, US calculated by assessingwasted votes inthe State leg.:Electoral performance index districts prohibits racial gerrymandering Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative competitiveness municipal lines;5.partisanfairness, then 3. contiguity &compactness; 4.county/ 2: federal const. andstat.compliance.; districts (ranked): 1:equalpop. (up to3%); Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative compactness, nearlyequalpop. districts (unranked): contiguity, 81 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX (Mo. 2012). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: Should thecommittee(s) deadlockorfail, apanelofsixappellatejudgeswilldraw lineswithinthenext 90days. days thereafter. Tentative mapsare duewithinfive months afterthepanelshave beenappointed, andfinalmapswithinsixmonths. and Senatemapsare nominatedwithin60days of populationdatabeingreleased, andthegovernor appoints memberswithin30 State legislative maptimelinesare peggedtothereceipt ofCensus populationdata;themembersofcommittees thatdraw House Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MISSOURI Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There are nodeadlinesaround theapproval ofacongressional map, andthecandidate filingdeadlineisMarch 29,2022.

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Pearson v. Koster, 367S.W.3d 36(Mo.2012);Johnsonv. Missouri,366S.W.3d 11 Missouri Const. Art.III,§3(b)-(j), Art.III,§7(b)-(i), Art.III,§45;V.A.M.S. 127.030 each chamber Likely specialstanding committees in Required 3 percommission 8 months postdatarelease release State leg.:within9months ofpop. data Congressional: none Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Supreme Court:

POLITICAL CONTROL State leg.:N/A Congressional: Yes (2/3) 23R 113R Mike Parson United - Gubernatorial appointment:: - - 8D 48D Republican (R:68%) (R:69%) (R) 4D - 3R 82 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MONTANA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK communities ofinterest intact asadiscretionary criterion.Itisunclearifthey willdosoagainthis the useofpartisandataisprohibited. Last cycle, thecommission passedguidelinesthatkept in statesenatedistricts.Understatute,mapscannot favor apolitical partyorincumbent, and the following ofpolitical boundaries,compactness andcontiguity, andnestingstatehouse districts Montana hasmandatoryranked criteriaintheState Constitution, includingnearlyequalpopulation, bipartisan commissioners collectively. lead toapartisanselection,especiallyifchosenby theMontana Supreme Court rather thanthe risk ofpartisanabuse.However, there are nocriteriaonthepartisanleaningsofchair. Thiscould cycles. Thelegislature hasnoinputonthemapsother thanrecommendations, whichdoeslimitthe power tochooseatiebreaking chairhasfallen totheMontana Supreme Court for thepastseveral The makeup ofthecommission isdesignedtodecrease theriskofpartisanabuse,though comments andaccess meetingrecordings onthecommission’s website. to thelegislature; lastcycle, 15hearingswere heldacross thestate.Citizens can submitwritten laws. Thecommission isrequired toholdatleastonepublichearingbefore theplansare proposed commission isfunctionallyapartoftheLegislature andisnot subjecttoMontana’s openmeeting In 2014theMontana Supreme Court ruledin gubernatorial approval. simple majorityofcommissioners topass,andmapsdrawn by thecommission are not subjectto approval offinalplansissolelytheresponsibility oftheindependent commission. Mapsneeda not electedofficials.Draft mapsmustbesent tothelegislature for recommendations, butthe agree onachair, theMontana Supreme Court choosesone.Allcommissioners mustbecitizens, of eachpartyandachairselectedby thefour political appointees. Ifthepolitical appointees cannot majority vote. TheCommission consists offive members:four appointed by legislative leadership A bipartisanpolitical appointee commission adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsby and Apportionment Commission (2003). legislature andSecretary ofState interfering intheredistricting process in challenge unfair mapsincourt. Inthe2000cycle, theFirstDistrictJudicialCourt ruledagainst the judicial courts andhave beenappealed totheMontana Supreme Court. Citizens are ableto automatically reviewed by theSupreme Court, andprevious cases have originatedinstatedistrict There isnospecial legalrecourse for redistricting challengesinMontana; mapsare not cycle.

Willems v. State of Montana Brown v. Mont. thattheredistricting

Districting 83 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 1896 (Mont. Dist. Ct. July2,2003);Willemsv. Montana, 325P.3d 1204(Mont. 2014). Relevant recent cases: chair ofMontana’s redistricting commission,” Missoula Current (Dec.18,2020); Montana DistrictingandApportionment Commission. Citations andreferences: redistricting deadlinesinMontana. Census databecomes available, andhearingswilllikely take place inmid-late2021.Itisunlikely thattheCensus delaywillimpact Montana isestimatedtogainasecond congressional seatafterthe2020Census. Congressional districtmapsare due90days after commission hasanadditional30days tofinalize andadopt theplans.Thedeadlinewilllikely fall inmid-March 2023. the 10thdayinlegislative sessionstartinginearlyJanuary2023.Thelegislature thenhas30days toreturn themaps,and Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY MONTANA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REDISTRICTING PROCESS State legislative mapsmustbeproposed by theredistricting commission tothelegislature for recommendations by

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Brown v. Mont. Districting&Apportionment Comm’n, No.ADV 2003-72,2003ML Montana Const. Art.V, §14;Montana Code Ann.§5-1-108-115, §5-1-109-11,§5-1-108-11;“Tribal lawexpert isnew None Required the legislature 1 before plansare submittedto Congressional: mid-late2021 State leg.:late2022 after census datareleased districts thiscycle): 90days Congressional (potential for 2 State leg:mid-March, 2023 challenge mapsincourt. reviewed. Citizens may Maps are not automatically No No citizen commission Balanced political appointee

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows:

congressional districtsprohibits: Favoring apolitical Statutory criteria for both statelegislative and population aspossible districts beasnearlyequalin Statutory criteriafor congressional districtsrequires 4. statehousedistrictsnestedinsenate 4. compact; 3. contiguous; political boundaries; 1. asnearlyequalinpopulationpossible;2.follow legislative districts(ranked): Congressional andstatutorycriteriafor state 5-1-108-115 Montana Const. Art.V, §14;Montana Code Ann§ 1 appointed by JudyMartz 4 nonpartisan,2appointed by Steve Bullock Nonpartisan elections(Gov. appoints vacancies): N/A 31R 67R Greg Gianforte United - None partisan dataisalsoprohibited) party orincumbent (use ofincumbent addresses or REDISTRICTING CRITERIA POLITICAL CONTROL -19D -33D Republican (R: 62%) (R: 67%)

(R)

(R)

(D) ,

84 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEBRASKA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK forbidding theintentional favoring ordisfavoring ofaparty, group, orperson.Thisislikely, butnot that cycle, including preserving thecores ofpriordistricts,prohibiting theuseofpartisandata,and in 2011,theredistricting committee adopted itsown additionalsetofcriteriafor drafting districts formal prohibitions onpartisan,pro-incumbent, orracially-discriminatory gerrymandering,however, compactness, contiguity, andthefollowing ofcounty boundarieswhenpracticable. There are no Nebraska’s criteriaintheState Constitution for statelegislative andcongressional districtsinclude is therest oftheprocess, withfew apparent constraints onpartisanredistricting. geographical “caucuses.”) Functionally, theCommittee isguaranteed tobeRepublican controlled, as and Vice Chair electedatlarge by thelegislature, andtwo membersselectedfrom eachofthethree Committee membersare chosenby thelegislature’s Executive Board (President oftheSenate,Chair is composed ofnineSenators;nomore thanfive ofitsmembers maybefrom thesameparty. Nebraska alsohasaRepublican governor. TheSpecialRedistricting Committee withinthelegislature Republicans control theunicameral legislature andare onevote shortofaveto-proof majority. delays. hearings were heldinMay. Thistimelinewillprobably bepushed backthiscycle duetoCensus and drafts anddatamustbemadepublically available throughout theprocess. In2011,public At leastonepublichearingmustbeheldineachcongressional districtbefore mapsare finalized, can override itwitha3/5vote. legislature somapsonlyhave topassthrough theonechamber. Ifaplanisvetoed, thelegislature majority-vote regular statute,subjecttogubernatorialapproval orveto. Nebraska hasaunicameral congressional districtsandproposes themtothelegislature, thedistrictsare approved by asimple After theSpecialRedistricting Committee votes by simplemajoritytoadopt legislative and Court oftheDistrictNebraska. through appeal.Challenges tocongressional mapsinNebraska have beenbrought totheUS District first tocounty districtcourts andhave onoccasion advanced totheNebraska Supreme Court not challenged incourt. Earlier legalchallengestostatelegislative redistricting have beenbrought Nebraska, butcitizens are abletochallengemaps.Inboth the2001and2011cycles, mapswere There isnoautomatic judicialreview ofnewdistrictmapsfollowing theredistricting process in guaranteed for thecurrent cycle.

85 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 603 (D. Neb. 1967). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: were adopted onMay26,2011,butduetoCensus delays, thewholeprocess willmostlikely bepushedback. through June10,2021, butthere isnorequirement mapshave tobecompleted atthistime.Last cycle, congressional andstatemaps Committee mayintroduce theirproposal totheentire legislature atany point duringtheirsession. Thecurrent legislative sessionruns Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEBRASKA Likely Committees: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnosetdeadline for adopting congressional orstatelegislative lines.Once formed, theSpecialRedistricting

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Dayv. Nelson, 240Neb. 997,485N.W.2d 583 (1992),Exon v. Tiemann,279F.Supp.

Nebraska Const. Art.III,§5;LR102;RulesoftheNeb. Unicameral Legis., Rule3,§ 6 Special Redistricting Committee At least1ineachcongressional district Not specified No deadline Citizens maychallengemapsincourt. Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No committee tasked withdrafting) Legislature (SpecialRedistricting Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. (unicameral): State Senate Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL In 2011,additionalguidelinesadopted by None districts There are nocriteriafor congressional practicable contiguity, follow county boundarieswhen districts (unranked): compactness, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Nebraska Const. Art.III,§5 Assisted appointment: No (2/3) Pete Ricketts United - disfavoring ofaparty, group, orperson. forbidding theintentional favoring or prohibiting theuseofpartisandata,and preserving thecores ofpriordistricts, the redistricting committee included 6R, 32R

1D - 17D Republican (65% R) (R)

86 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEVADA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK

express criterion. known residence before incarceration. Note: keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot an does require census datatobeadjustedinorder tocount incarcerated individualsattheirlast are subjectto(equal population,Voting Rights Act). Whilenot redistricting criteria,statestatute Nevada hasnoexpress redistricting criteriaoutsideofconstitutional requirements thatallstates constraints onredistricting for partisanadvantage. legislative houses.There are alsonocriteriarelating topartisanshiporfairness, andnoclear Democrats have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, withnarrow margins inboth around thenumberofpublichearingsorspecificsinputin restricting process. Committee hearingsare available for publictestimony, butthere are nospecificrequirements to astatetrialcourt todraw themaps. vote, whichdoesrequire gubernatorialapproval. Ifthelegislature cannot passaplan,thetaskgoes The legislature adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statuteby amajority court. Thosemapswere not furtherchallengedincourt. special mastersissuedareport with districtmapplans,whichwere slightly modifiedby thetrial district linesaftertheGovernor vetoed thelegislature's plansaftertheirsessionhadadjourned.The masters appointed by aNevada districtcourt inCarson Citywere responsible for drawing new There isnoautomatic judicialreview orclearcitizen right torequest review. Last cycle, three special

87 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: court todraw thelines.Itisnot clearhow theCensus delaywillinfluence theredistricting timeline. maps mustbeadopted by theendofsessiononJuly1,2021.Iflegislature fails topassmaps,thetaskgoesaNevada trial Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEVADA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Whilethere isnodeadline instatutefor congressional maps,candidates mustfileby March 18,2022.State legislative

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Guyv. Miller, No.11OC000421B(Nev. Dist.Ct., Carson CityOct.27,2011). Nevada Const. Art.IV, §5;Nevada Rev. Stat. §§218B.105,304.065,360.288 None (but pastpractice) Not required None With startofsession State leg.:July1, 2021 Congressional: None Maps are not automatically challenged Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL known residence before incarceration. count incarcerated individualsattheirlast legislative andcongressional districtsto Census datatobeadjustedfor state None congressional maps There are nocriteriafor statelegislative and Nev. Const. art. IV, §5 appointment): 6 elected,1appointed Elected (with Gov. fillingvacancies by No (2/3) 11D 25D Steve Sisolak United - - - 9R 16R Democratic - 1V - 1V - 1V (D) (52% D)

(60% D)

(R)

88 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW HAMPSHIRE Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK congressional redistricting plans.Thiscycle represents the firstsince theprotection ofSection5 whole “communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion.There are nostate-level criteriafor prohibiting partisan,pro/anti-incumbent, andracially discriminatorygerrymandering,andkeeping referendum orifnecessary todecrease severely uneven populationdistribution.There are nocriteria follow political boundariesoftowns andwards except whenamunicipalityrequests divisionby state legislative districts,includingrequirements thatdistrictsare drawn tobecontiguous and New Hampshire haslimitedmandatoryunranked criteriainthestateconstitution andstatutefor majority’s abilitytoredraw thelinesfor partisanadvantage. both legislative housesandcontrol ofthegovernorship. There are noapparent constraints onthe Republicans have tripartitecontrol oftheNewHampshire government, withnarrow margins in during the2011cycle. Avenues for publicparticipationare not required by law. TheGeneral Court held10publichearings overridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. by majorityvote asanormalstatute,subjecttogubernatorialapproval orveto, whichcan be The General Court, NewHampshire’s legislature, adopts statelegislative andcongressional districts were upheld. brought againstthestatehousemapsrelated totheredistricting process, andevery timethemaps reviewed by thestateSupreme Court. Inthe2011andin2001cycles, legalchallengeswere There isnospecial legalrecourse for redistricting inNewHampshire; mapsare not automatically the Voting Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder.

89 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 864 (N.H.2012). Relevant recent cases: “New Hampshire Supreme Court Vacancy, 2019,” Ballotpedia (2019) Citations andreferences: There isnodeadline for theapproval ofcongressional maps. last cycle plans were adopted theyear following thepost-Census year. Itisunclearhow theCensus delaywillchange thetimeline. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW HAMPSHIRE Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION State legislative mapsmustbeadopted inthe2021regular session,whichis scheduledtoconclude June28,although

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Inre Below, 855A.2d459(N.H.2004);City ofManchesterv. Sec’yofState, 48A.3d NewHampshire Const. Pt.II,Art.9,11,26,44;NewHampshire Rev. Stat. Ann.§662;Princeton GerrymanderingProject; Committee Redistricting, Sen.Internal Affairs House SpecialCommittee on (but pastpractice) Not required (but pastpractice) None Unclear (though potentially 2022) State leg.:June28, 2021 Congressional: None Citizens maychallengemapsincourt. Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL to decrease severe populationdeviation Town andwards can bedividedifnecessary None ivision by referendum. except whentown orward requests d ward, andplace boundaries, districts (unranked): contiguity; follow town, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative 26; NewHampshire Rev. Stat. Ann.§662 New Hampshire Const. pt. II,Art.9,11& 3R (with advisorycouncil): Gubernatorial appointment No (2/3) 14R 212R Chris Sununu United -

- 2D -10D - 186D Republican (R: 58%) (R) - 2V

(R: 53%)

90 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW JERSEY Threat 5:Areriggedelection mapshardtochallengeincourt? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: MODERATE RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE MODERATE RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK CONGRESSIONAL: HIGH RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE LOW RISK

Court appoints another membertoserve asatiebreaker. the commission for statelegislative redistricting fails topassmaps,theChiefJustice oftheSupreme by achairchosenby thewholecommission or, for congressional redistricting, theSupreme Court. If The balanced commissions helptogird againstpartisanabuse,withthetie-breaking vote tobecast redistricting commission, butthecommission hasheldhearingsonasimilarscheduleinpastcycles. least 3publichearingsaround thestate.Thisrequirement doesnot applytothestatelegislative New Jersey’s constitution requires thatthecongressional redistricting commission holdsat member toserve astiebreaker. members fail topassmaps,theChiefJustice oftheNewJersey Supreme Court appoints an11th political partieseachchoosefive memberswhorepresent thevarious partsofthestate.If The Commission for State Legislative consists of10or11members:thechairsboth major maps, itmustsubmittwo planstoNewJersey Supreme Court andthejustices selectamap. Supreme Court withtwo names,oneofwhomthecourt willselect.IfthatCommission fails topass serve asChair. Shouldthecommissioners fail toselectachair, they are toprovide theNewJersey represent thestate’s demographic andgeographic diversity. Those12choosea13thmemberto major political partiesandthefour legislative leaderseachchoosetwo commissioners, selectedto vote. TheCommission for USCongressional linesconsists of13members:thechairsboth Two separate appointed commissions adopt legislative andcongressional districtsby majority plans were challenged instatecourt andupheld. districts; statelegislative challengesare not similarlydefined.Inthelasttwo cycles, statelegislative The NewJersey Supreme Court hasexclusive jurisdictionover legalchallengestocongressional known residence. Keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress criterion. extent practicable. Note: Census dataisadjustedtocount incarcerated individualsattheirlast contiguity, protection ofpolitical boundaries,andhaving districtsbeofequalpopulationtothe the State Constitution andinstatute pertainingtostatelegislative linesincludingcompactness, There are nostate-level criteriafor congressional districts.NewJersey hasmandatorycriteriain

91 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX McNeil v. Legis. Apportionment Comm’n, 828A.2d840(N.J.2003). 2012); Page v. Bartels,144F. Supp. 2d346(D.N.J. 2001); Robertson v. Bartels,148F. Supp. 2d443(D.N.J. 2001), aff’d 534U.S. 1110(2002); Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: Census datawillbe released afterFeb. 15,2021,the2021electionswillbeheldusingexisting districts. maps willlikely beginwhenthecommission beginsconvening; nolaterthanonemonth afterreceiving Census data.Note: Since Hearings for congressional mapswilllikely beginafterthecommission isfinalized; by July15,2021.Hearingsfor statelegislative Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW JERSEY Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Congressional mapsmustbeadopted by Jan.18,2022andstatelegislative mapsmust beadopted by Mar. 1,2022.

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Gonzalez v. N.J.Apportionment Comm’n, 53A.3d1230(N.J.Super. Ct., App. Div. NewJersey Const. ArtII,§II,Art.IV, §II-III;NewJersey Stat. §§52:4-1.1–1.5. N/A (but pastpractice) Not required State legislative: 0(butpastpractice) Congressional: 3 Unclear State leg.:Mar. 1,2022 Congressional: Jan.18,2022 maps inthestateSupreme Court. Citizens maychallengecongressional Maps are not automatically reviewed. No No Two redistricting commissions

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL Also prohibits prisongerrymandering. except where otherwise required by law. districts prohibits divisionofmunicipalities, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts There are nocriteriafor congressional possible” compactness, “as equallypopulatedas districts (unranked): contiguous, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative New Jersey Const. Art.IV, §II 4R Gubernatorial appointment:: N/A 25D 52D Phil Murphy United - None

- 3D - 14R - 28R Democratic (D:65%) - 1V (D) (D: 63%) 92 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW MEXICO Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK districts, andtoconsider theresidence ofincumbents. to preserve communities ofinterest, respect political subdivisions,preserve thecore ofexisting statutes require compact andcontiguous districts,andthere were constitution doesnot provide for other requirements. Beyond thosestandards, NewMexico Like allstates,NewMexico mustfollow nationalstandards intheVoting Rights Act, butitsstate redistricting toentrench partisanadvantage. though they lackaveto-proof supermajority. There appeartobenostructural constraints on Democrats enjoy tripartitecontrol inNewMexico andcomfortable majoritiesinboth chambers, making isdonebehindcloseddoorsbetween legislators. hearings allover thestate,thisprocess isapparently largely symbolic asmostofthedecision- participation. Even thoughtheInterim Redistricting Committee hasahabitofsettinguppublic There are nomandatorypublichearings andapparently littleopportunityfor meaningfulpublic chambers. to gubernatorialapproval orveto, whichcan beoverridden witha2/3supermajorityvote inboth The Legislature adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsasaregular statutesubject difficult. Itisnot clearcitizens enjoy aspecificright torequest review ofredistricting plans. access tothemapsbefore they are voted onsoacourt challengetounfair mapsmaybeespecially There have not beenany recent court cases challengingredistricting maps.Citizens have limited

guidelines implementedin2011

93 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: 2011, thelegislature then attempted todraw themapsinaspecial sessionclosedtothepublic. ing committee metthroughout the summerfrom May-August, takingpublictestimony from different partsofthestate.InSeptember Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW MEXICO Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnoredistricting deadlinefor eitherstatelegislative orcongressional maps,butinyears pastaninterim redistrict

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A New Mexico Stat. §2-8D-2,2-7C-3; NewMexico Const. Art.4,§3C N/A Required 15 Not clear State leg.:July1, 2021 Congressional: None court. unclear ifcitizens can challenge mapsin Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. It’s Yes No Legislature

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None districts There are nocriteriafor congressional contiguity districts (unranked): compactness and Statutory criteriafor statelegislative N.M. Stat. §2-8D-2,2-7C-3 5D Assisted appointment andpartisanelection: No (2/3) 27D 45D Michelle Lujan Grisham United - - 0R -15R -24R Democratic D: 64%) -1I

(D:64%) (D) -

94 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW YORK Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK There are constraints onpartisanbiasintheredistricting process inthebalance ofthe advisory own plans athearings.Citizens are alsoallowed tochallengemapsincourt afterplansare finalized. the publicatleast30days before theirfirstofficialhearingsopeoplecan develop anddiscusstheir limited tothat.Beyond publicaccess tomeetings,dataandcommission plansmustbereleased to There are atleast12publicadvisory commission hearingsrequired across thestate,thoughnot map by just2%ofthepopulationany district. legislature thengetstoamendmapsthemselves, thoughthelegislature maymodifyacommission ending in2todraft newmaps.Ifthelegislature orgovernor rejects thesecond round ofmaps,the Legislature rejects themaps,commission haseither15days oruntil February 28oftheyear majority topass.Inallcases, thegovernor can veto theplans,andveto can beoverridden. Ifthe support from membersappointed by thespeaker andpresident pro tempore), mapsneedasimple the control ofdifferent partiesandthecommission passeditsplanwithseven votes (including passed itsplanwithoutseven votes, mapsneed60%supporttopass.Ifthetwo bodiesare under chamber topass.Ifthetwo bodiesare underthecontrol ofdifferent partiesandthecommission of thetwo legislative bodies.Ifonepartycontrols both chambers,mapsneed2/3support ineach the maps.There are three different thresholds required topassmapsdependingonthemakeup After thecommission submitsmapsfor legislative approval, thelegislature eithervotes upordown point themostpopularmapwillbetransmitted tothe legislature. appointed by eachlegislative leader, tobeadvanced, unlessnomapsreach thatthreshold, atwhich by asingleparty, redistricting plansmustreceive seven votes, includingavote from amember members are chosenby thoseeight initialmembers.WhentheSenateandAssemblyare controlled each tothe10-memberadvisorycommission tasked withdrawing themaps.Theother two and approved by thestatelegislature. Thelegislative leadersofeachpartyappoint two members State legislative andcongressional mapsare drawn by abalanced political appointee commission absence ofapreclearance requirement maychangetheredistricting calculus. the protection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act was weakened in Shelby County v. Holder. The through statuteistheprohibition ofprisongerrymandering.Thiscycle represents thefirstsince communities ofinterest, andpreserve thecores ofpriordistricts.Theonlycriteria established Beyond that,mapsmustalsobecompact andcontiguous, preserve political subdivisions, protect favoring incumbents, parties,andcandidates for office whilealsopromoting competitiveness. The redistricting criteria are strong andembeddedwithinthe Constitution, prohibiting intentionally flag, the2%populationconstraint certainly helpslimitpartisanabuse. maps by 2/3supermajority vote. Andwhile allowing thelegislature toamendthemapsisared However, ifcommission plansare rejected twice, thelegislature maybeable to amendandapprove commission, commission mapsubmissionthresholds, and legislative mapapproval requirements.

95 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW YORK Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? MODERATE RISK REDISTRICTING PROCESS

trial court. maps instate reviewed. Citizens maychallenge Maps are not automatically Yes Yes, atvarying thresholds legislative approval commission, 10-member advisory challenges tomaps,thoughnomapswere altered duetochallenges incourt. in 2014,makingthisthefirstcycle afteritsimplementation. Inthepast,there have beencitizen the legalrecourse inpractice ofthisprocess considering theredistricting process was overhauled in anunspecifiedtrialcourt. Thatcourt then has60days tomake adecision.Itishard toassess While mapsare not automatically reviewed by any court, citizens are allowed tochallengemaps

Source: Allows: Prohibits: Requires: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA Constitutional criteriarequires both state New York Constitution Art.III§3,4 None • • • 5. promote competitiveness 4. preserve thecores ofpriordistricts 3. preserve communities ofinterest 2. preserve political subdivisions 1. becompact and contiguous (unranked): legislative andcongressional districtsto prohibits prisongerrymandering Statutory criteria for both setsofmaps maps more than2%ofadistrict’s population amendments prohibits amendingcommission Constitutional criteriafor legislative an incumbent, party, orcandidate for office prohibits: intentionally favoring ordisfavoring legislative andcongressional districts Constitutional criteriafor both state

96 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Ct., Albany Cnty. Dec.1,2011) Cohen v. Cuomo, 969N.E.2d754(N.Y. 2012);Littlev. N.Y. State Task Force onDemographic Research andApportionment, No.2310-2011(N.Y. Sup. Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: the Census delaywillaffect theredistricting process. the mapswillbecompleted by April7,2022,thefilingdeadlinefor congressional andstatelegislative candidates. Itisnot clearhow either another 15days orby February 28oftheyear endingin2tosubmitadifferent plan.Whilethere isnodeadline,itassumed must thensubmittheirplanstothelegislature by January15oftheyear endingin2.Iftheplansare voted down, thecommission has ending in1torelease theirdrafted plansanddatatothe public.After aseriesofatleast 10 publicmeetingsaround thestate,they Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NEW YORK Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The10-memberadvisorycommission hasuntil either30days before theirfirsthearingorSeptember 15oftheyear

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Favors v. Cuomo, No.1:11-cv-05632, 2014WL2154871 (E.D.N.Y. May22,2014);

NewYork Const. Art.III§3,4;2012N.Y. Sess.L.ch.17(S6736),§3; Advisory commission Required 12 No required date Final approval: Feb. 28,2022 Submission toleg.:Jan.15,2022; 2021; Commission draft maps:Sept. 15, Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Supreme Court: Supermajority?

Yes (2/3) 43D 106D Andrew Cuomo United - appointed by Democratic governor. All technically nonpartisan, butall7 through assistedappointment: Court ofAppeals(highestinNY)judgesselected POLITICAL CONTROL - 20R - 43R Democratic (68%)

- 1O (D) (71%)

97 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 12/17/21. Sessions generally endinJuly. Congressional mapshave nodeadline.Note: State andfederal candidates mustfilefor office by Timing note: REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE THE SPOTLIGHT: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK Legislative mapsmustbeadopted inthe2021 regular session,whichbegins1/13/21buthasnosetenddate. The stateconstitution hasmandatoryredistricting criteriafor legislative redistricting, butnot no meaningfulstructural safeguards around redistricting for partisanadvantage. governor doesnot have arole inapproving/vetoing redistricting plans.Assuch,there appeartobe Republicans have unitedcontrol ofthelegislature. Althoughthegovernor isaDemocrat, the could speak atredistricting hearings.For 2019,anonlinecomment portalwas alsosetup.) in committees; however, there isnorequirement thatthey doso.(In2011andin2019,thepublic public engagement. Generally, theLegislature allows membersofthepublictoprovide comment There are noredistricting-specific laws requiring publichearingsorproviding opportunitiesfor require Governor approval. The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby majority-vote bill,whichdoesnot Carolina. history ofmapsbeingstruckdown for racially-discriminatory andpartisan gerrymanderinginNorth Court. Thethree-judge panelincludestheseniormostjudgeofWayne County. There isalong Challenges toredistricting mapsare heard by athree-judge paneloftheWayne County Superior its own criteriaby resolution. The Supreme Court hasnot reviewed thatholding.Inpriorcycles, thelegislature hasalsoadopted provisions prohibit extreme partisangerrymanderingofboth legislative andcongressional districts. communities ofinterest. In2019,asuperiorcourt heldthatNorthCarolina’s general civilrights legislature mayalsoconsider other traditional redistricting criteria,like compactness and congressional redistricting. They are: equalpopulation,contiguity, andwholecounties. The NORTH CAROLINA 98 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Senate Redistricting House Redistricting Not Required (butpastpractice) None (butdozens in2011) 2021 Cong. Seats:None State Leg. Seats:endof2021session. redistricting cases Three-judge superiorcourt hearsall No No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL Traditional redistricting criteria(case law) case law) Partisan gerrymandering(non-precedential contiguity; respect county boundaries. State legislative: Nearlyequalpopulation; Congressional: None. N.C. Const. Art.II,§3,5,22 4D Partisan elections: N/A 28R 69R Roy Cooper Republican Legislature Divided - - 3R -22D -51D Democratic Governor

(R: 56%) (R: 58%) (D)

;

99 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 12 11 10 9 8 SupplementalDocs/2011/publichearings/redistricting (accessed Jan.3,2021). 7 gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/NC (accessed Jan.3,2020). www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 6 5 4 3 2 1 public comment portal. 18, 2011. locations across thestate,from April13through July mittees helddozens ofpublichearingsindifferent State HouseandState Senate Redistricting Com lative orcongressional maps. requiring publichearingspriortoadopting newlegis Hearings: adopt newmaps. lature hastwo weeks from thedateitreconvenes to to reconvene within45oftheCourt’s order, thelegis issues itsorder invalidating amap, butisscheduled maps. legal defect before itmayimposeitsown interim must give thelegislature two weeks toremedy any court, state law(statute) provides thattheCourt If aredistricting mapissuccessfully challengedin be signedby thepresiding officers ofboth houses.” times ineachhousebefore itbecomes lawandshall or veto. and are not presented tothegovernor for signature bills become lawafterbeingpassedby both houses redistricting process. bly”) controls both thestateandcongressional In NorthCarolina, thelegislature (“General Assem DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA Phone call withNorthCarolina Legislative Librarian (Jan.4,2021). N.C. G.S.§143-318.14A.SeealsoSenate Rule36(no secret meetings). North Carolina General Assembly, “NorthCarolina Redistricting -2011PublicHearingInformation,” www.ncleg.gov/Legislation/ See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: NorthCarolina” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), N.C. G.S.§120-2.4(a). N.C. G.S.§120-2.4(a). N.C. Const. Art.II,§22(5)(b) -(d). N.C. Const. Art.II,§22(5)(b) -(d). N.C. Const. Art.II,§3;5;22(d). Common Cause v. Lewis, N.C. G.S.§120-133. N.C. G.S.§120-19.1. 4 (Ifthelegislature isinrecess whentheCourt 2 Each redistricting billmustbe“read three 7 There are noredistricting-specific laws In2019,thelegislature setupawritten 5 ) 1 No.18-CVS-014001, (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Sept. 13,2019). Unlike mostbills,redistricting 6 Inthe2011cycle, the - - 3 - - confidential andbecome publicrecords uponthe legislators concerning redistricting …are no longer and documents prepared by legislative employees for ing andinformation requests tolegislative employees Records: ment onredistricting plans. 2011, legislative committees received publiccom comment. required andsometimeschairswillnot allow public legislative committee meetings;however, thisisnot Public Comment: public. standing committees are required tobeopenthe Open Meetings: requirements are not ineffect for 2021. considerations were usedindrawing amap. extent towhichincumbency-protection orpartisan every alternative mapthatwas considered, andthe process ofdrawing andenactingtheRemedial Maps,” closing the“identity ofallparticipants involved inthe ing amore transparent process, whichrequired dis dered thelegislature todraw remedial mapsfollow legislature’s legislative maps,thesuperiorcourt or Other Transparency: law.” act establishingtherelevant districtplanbecoming ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “NorthCarolina,” https:// 11 8 North Carolina lawprovides that“all draft 9 Committees mayalsocall witnesses.

Understatelaw, allhearingsby Generally thepublicmayspeakat In2019,afterinvalidating the

12 Those 10 - - In - - - 100 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 22 21 20 19 18 that “[e]xtreme partisan gerrymanderingviolates...theNorthCarolina Constitution” withoutexplaining decision’s precedential value). precedential value”). 17 686 S.E.2d493,505n.1(N.C. 2009)(Supreme Court not boundby superiorcourt decisions). 16 4569584 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Sept. 3,2019) 15 14 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 13 case thatmaybeappealedtotheState Supreme value butare not bindingprecedent for any future were trialcourt opinions,they mayhave persuasive state andcongressional redistricting. clauses –prohibit partisangerrymanderinginboth tection, freedom ofspeech,andfreedom ofassembly constitution –includingthefree elections,equalpro found thatseveral general provisions ofthestate court with originaljurisdictiononredistricting suits However, in2019athree-judge panelofthesuperior protection gerrymandering. has noexpress prohibition onpartisanorincumbency that respect county boundaries. nearly equalpopulation,thatare contiguous, and requires thelegislature todraw districtsthathave redistricting. criteria for statelegislative The NorthCarolina Constitution provides mandatory and are not required tonegotiate withDemocrats. state andcongressional redistricting process in2021 plans. Asaresult, Republicans fullycontrol both the does not have the power tosignorveto redistricting governor, Roy Cooper, isaDemocrat, thegovernor olina legislature by substantial margins. Whilethe Republicans control both housesoftheNorthCar WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA Stephenson v. Bartlett, N.C. Const. Art.II,§3(1);5(2). N.C. Const. Art.II,§3(1);5(1). 570 U.S. 529(2013). U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq. See Estate of Browne v. Thompson, See Stephenson v. Bartlett, Harper v. Lewis, N.C. Const. Art.II,§3;5. Compare N.C. Const. Art.II,§3;5 13 For stateredistricting, theconstitution No. 19-CVS-012667 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Oct.28,2019); But seeHarper v. Lewis, 82 S.E.2d247(N.C. 2003). 595 S.E.2d112,118(N.C. 2004)(upholding three-judge panelandidentifying itasasuperiorcourt); State v. Williams, with id. but not 727 S.E.2d573,576(N.C. App. 2012)(opinions ofspecialsuperiorcourts, like other superiorcourts, have “no 14 No.19-CVS-012667 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Oct.28,2019)(citing Common Cause for proposition §22 (d). Theconstitution congressional 15 Because these See also Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: NorthCarolina” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), - - County v. Holder, theU.S. Supreme Court struckdown (VRA) andrequired preclearance; however, inShelby were covered by Section5oftheVoting Rights Act minorities). prohibits discriminationagainstracial andlanguage terion) andSection2oftheVoting Rights Act (which standards andtheuseofrace asaredistricting cri tection Clause(which addresses equalpopulation include theFourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro with federal legalrestrictions onredistricting, which Finally, like allstates,NorthCarolina mustcomply panel. ions are bindingprecedents onany future three-judge Court. contiguity requirement. tricting planfailed tomeettheState Constitution’s a lower court findingthata2002legislative redis However, theSupreme Court didquote thenaffirm strictly thistraditional redistricting criterionisapplied. tory.” that legislative districts“consist ofcontiguous terri Contiguous Territory: standard underfederal constitutional law. +/- 5%oftheaverage districtpopulation;thesame has interpreted thistorequire districtstobewithin equal inpopulation. that legislative districtsbe“as nearlyasmaybe” Equal Population: Carolina counties are subjecttofederal preclearance. preclearance. the formula for whichjurisdictionswere subjectto . 21 16 Common Cause v. Lewis, 17 TheSupreme Court hasnot addressed how (Itisalsounlikely thatthesetrialcourt opin ) 18 Formerly, 40NorthCarolina counties 19 Therefore, for thiscycle, no North Thestateconstitution requires 20 TheState Supreme Court The stateconstitution requires 22 No. 18-CVS-014001, 2019WL Thetrialcourt tookastrict - - - - - 101 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 • condensed form, theWCP requires that: point framework for complying withtheWCP. The Supreme Court hasdeveloped anextensive nine- the “maximumextent practicable.” and VRA-compliant districtsthatfollow theWCP to that thelegislature muststilldraw equalpopulation However, theNorthCarolina Supreme Court hasheld must prevail over conflicting statelawrequirements. clause totheU.S. Constitution, federal requirements requirements, inwhichcase, underthesupremacy bly conflict withfederal equalpopulationandVRA county provisions” (WCP) willsometimesinevita grouping ofcontiguous counties.” District beconfined toasinglecounty orminimum generally require “thateachState HouseandSenate Supreme Court hasinterpreted thisprovision to the formation ofa[legislative] district.” tution provides that“[n]o county shallbedividedin Whole County Provisions (WCP): ered water contiguity tobesufficient. Legislature adopted rulesspecifyingthatitconsid guity. However, inthe2017redistricting cycle, the The Supreme Court hasnot addressed water conti a singlepoint). (where two districtscan cross through eachother at parts connected atasinglepoint) and“crisscrosses” its “point” contiguity (where adistrictissplitinto two that touchesfor anon-trivial distance,” whichprohib that two districtsmustshare acommon boundary view ofcontiguity: “theterm‘contiguity’ …means SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA

Dickson v. Rucho, Dickson v. Rucho, Stephenson v. Bartlett, Dickson v. Rucho, N.C. Const. Art.II,§3(3);5(3). Common Cause v. Lewis, Stephenson v. Bartlett, possible; must comply withtheWPCtoextent The Legislature firstdraw VRAdistricts,which

23 766 SE2d238,269-270(N.C. 2014). 766 SE2d238,269-270(N.C. 2014)(brackets, ellipses,andquotation marksinoriginal). 781 S.E.2d404,412(N.C. 2015). 82S.E.2d247,254(N.C. 2003)(citations omitted)(quoting trialcourt). 562 S.E.2d377,397(N.C. 2002). No.18CVS 014001,2019N.C. Super. LEXIS56,*25(Wake Cnty Sup. Ct., Sep. 3,2019). 26 The stateconsti 27 The“whole 24 25 TheState 28

In - - - -

- • • • • decisions …butitmustdosoinconformity withthe tion intheapplication ofitsdiscretionary redistricting consider partisanadvantage andincumbencyprotec the Supreme Court allowed thatthelegislature “may on NorthCarolina’s enumerated redistricting criteria, redistricting. In lina Constitution astoboth stateandcongressional U.S. Constitution, they maybeundertheNorthCaro gerrymandering claimsare not justiciableunderthe Anti-Gerrymandering Protections: Althoughpartisan • tion standard, multi-county groupings mustbe at leastonedistrictwould fail theequalpopula cannot bedividedinto wholedistrictsbecause to beasingledistrict,orfor large counties that For smallcounties withinsufficient residents pact anddonot traverse county lines; into two ormore wholedistrictsthatare com Each large county bedivided,where possible, the idealbeitsown district; Each county withapopulationwithin+/-5%of be kept whole aspossible; district populationsothatasmany counties may Districts vary by asmuch+/-5%oftheideal electoral districts.” in theformation ofcompact andcontiguous “Communities ofinterest shouldbeconsidered shall becombined; and to comply withtheequalpopulationstandard nally, thesmallestnumberofcounties necessary comply with equalpopulationrequirements. Fi county linesbutonlytotheextent necessary to ing. Thegrouping’s interior districtlinescan cross do not traverse theexterior border ofthegroup created withoneormore compact districtsthat Stephenson I 29 , aseminal2002case ------102 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 37 36 35 34 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/common-cause-v-lewis 33 32 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2507(2019). were not justiciable infederal court. However, theCourt noted thepossibilitythatsuchclaimswere justiciableinstatecourt. 31 30 Court could repudiate thesuperiorcourt’s holding binding ontheSupreme Court. AlthoughtheSupreme Superior court decisionsare non-precedential andnot to vote onequaltermsinaninvidious manner.” partisan classifications ordeprive citizens oftheright permissible redistricting whichis“intended toapply litical strengths” ofthetwo majorparties,versus im achieve arough approximation ofthestatewidepo incumbents” orcreating a“districting planthatwould consideration mayincludeavoiding “thepairingof According tothesuperiorcourt, legitimatepartisan its decisionwiththeSupreme Court’s earlieropinion. state equalprotection analysis, whichmayreconcile ble partisanconsiderations inredistricting underits differentiate between permissibleandimpermissi Cause). InCommon Cause, theSuperiorCourt did general civilrights provisions (HarperandCommon redistricting isprohibited undertheConstitution’s phenson I Carolina’s Constitution’s enumerated criteria( partisan redistricting ispermissibleunder North distinguishable, because afindingthatconstrained erations” passagein court decisions,directly address the“partisanconsid Neither HarpernorCommon Cause, thetwo superior Constitution. general civilrights provisions oftheNorthCarolina gerrymanders are unconstitutional underseveral twice held(unanimously) thatextreme partisan with originaljurisdictionover redistricting claims However, in2019,thethree-judge superiorcourt would seemtoauthorize partisangerrymandering. State Constitution.” SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA

N.C. Const. Art.I,§19. Harper v. Lewis, State exrel. Quinn v. Lattimore, N.C. Const. Art.I,§10. Brennan Center, “Court Case Tracker: Common Cause v. Lewis” (Apr. 16,2020), Common Cause v. Lewis, In acase involving NorthCarolina’s congressional maps,theU.S. Supreme Court heldthatconstitutional claimsagainstpartisangerrymandering Stephenson v. Bartlett, ) doesnot preclude aholdingthatpartisan 31 No. 19-CVS-012667, 2019N.C. Super. LEXIS122,*9(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Oct.28,2019). 30 562S.E.2d377,390(N.C. 2002). Thisphrase, potentially dictum, Stephenson I No.18-CVS-014001, 2019N.C. Super. LEXIS56,*350-351(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Sept. 3,2019). 26S.E.638,638(1897)(citations omitted). . Thecases maybe Ste 32 - - - - - . has longheldthat“all acts providing for elections, sistent withthisprincipal,theState Supreme Court declares that“[a]ll electionsshallbefree.” Free Elections: different legaltheories: gerrymandering” can bestruckdown underthree The SuperiorCourt found that“extreme partisan claims, butdeclinedtoreview thecase. it could have closedthedoorongerrymandering hear anappealintheCommon Cause litigationwhere example, theCourt hadanopportunity, in2019,to a 4-3Democratic majority, would embrace it.For it seemsmore likely thattheCourt, presently with that partisangerrymanderingclaimsare justiciable, laws.” person shallbedeniedtheequalprotection ofthe tion guarantees toallNorthCarolinians that“[n]o Equal Protection: principles that: Harper, theSuperiorCourt extrapolated from these a fair electionorexpression ofthispopularwill.” should beliberally construed, thattendtopromote

and truthfully, thewillofpeople.” ducted freely andhonestlytoascertain, fairly North Carolina citizens tohave electionscon others—is contrary tothefundamental right of devalue votes ofsomecitizens compared to parties over thepublicgood,and thatdiluteand voters by servingtheself-interest ofpolitical power, thatevince afundamental distrustof redistricting plansthatentrench politiciansin “extreme partisangerrymandering—namely 37 TheState Supreme Court hasinterpreted The NorthCarolina Constitution TheNorthCarolina Constitu Common Cause v. Rucho, 33 34 36 Con - - 35 In - 103 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 45 44 43 omitted). 42 41 40 omitted). 39 38 tion’s free speechandassociationprovisions: of viewpoint discriminationundertheState Constitu partisan gerrymanderingisanunconstitutional form Harper, theSuperiorCourt concluded thatextreme ment from engaginginviewpoint discrimination. tions have generally beenheldtoprohibit thegovern First Amendment’s free speechandassembly protec common good.” have aright toassembletogetherconsult for their … shallnever berestrained” andthat“[t]he people Constitution provides thatthe“[f]reedom ofspeech Free Speech&Free Assembly: violation: (3) causation” –tofindapartisangerrymandering a three-part test–for “(1)intent, (2)effects, and ing power.” each NorthCarolinian tosubstantially equalvot this provision toprotect “thefundamental right of SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA

Dickson v. Rucho, Stephenson v. Bartlett, Stephenson v. Bartlett, Harper v. Lewis, See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors of Univ. of Va., N.C. Const. Art.I,§14;12. Harper v. Lewis, Stephenson v. Bartlett, while targeting certain disfavored speakers (e.g. preferred speakers (e.g. Republican voters) partisan gerrymandering,itidentifies certain “When alegislature engagesinextreme preserve itsmap.” impermissible intent didnot cause theeffect) to mate, non-partisanjustification (i.e.,that the those showings, theState mustprovide alegiti diluting theirvotes. Finally, iftheplaintiffs make fact have theintended effect by substantially plaintiffs mustestablishthatthelinesdrawn in votes ofcitizens favoring theirrival. Second, the entrench [their party] inpower by dilutingthe inant purposeindrawing districtlineswas to plan mustprove thatstateofficials’predom “First, theplaintiffs challengingadistricting 38 InHarper, theSuperiorCourt applied No.19-CVS-012667, 2019N.C. Super. LEXIS122,*13(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Oct.28,2019)(citations andquotation marks No. 19-CVS-012667, 2019N.C. Super. LEXIS122,*10(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake Cnty. Oct.28,2019)(citations andquotation marks 40 781 S.E.2d404,414(N.C. 2015). UndertheU.S. Constitution, the 562SE2d377,407(N.C. 2002). 562 S.E.2d377,397(N.C. 2002). 562 S.E.2d377,394(2002). 39 TheNorthCarolina 515U.S. 819,828(1995). - 41 - In - - - - Non-Enumerated Criteria: interest.” respect for political subdivisionsandcommunities of principles suchascompactness, contiguity, and may consider permissibleandtraditional redistricting ated three additionalcriteria:“theGeneral Assembly tory criteria.” such usedoesnot result inaviolationofthemanda protection, andpartisanconsiderations—so longas acceptable—i.e., community ofinterest, incumbent datory criteriaacknowledged by thefederal courts as said thattheLegislature “mayalsoutilize nonman ture mayconsider. In six examples oftraditional criteriathattheLegisla meet federal law. ciding where tosplitcounties thatmustbedividedto deciding whichwholecounties tocombine orinde consider other traditional redistricting criteriawhen General Assemblyfor redress ofgrievances.” struct theirrepresentatives, andtoapplythe associational rights ofdisfavored voters toin extreme partisangerrymanderingburdens the views. Moreover, alegislature thatengagesin be abletoelectacandidate whoshares their less likely, incomparison tofavored voters, to ensuring thatthesevoters are significantly of dilutingtheirvotes and,incracked districts, cracked into legislative districtswiththeaim Then, disfavored speakers are packed and with theviews they express whenthey vote. Democratic voters) because ofdisagreement 45 44 In Dickson 43 TheSupreme Court hasprovided Stephenson I (2015)theCourt enumer The legislature mayalso (2002),theCourt 42 - - - - -

- 104 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Carolina” (UpdatedDec.1,2020), 55 https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/choosing-state-judges-plan-reform 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/inline-files/LDTX007.pdf?AWycoM7DqSN6eFcPDV9CezABNe7RmFFS 47 46 legislature only totheextent necessary toremedy may differ from the districtingplanenactedby the general electiononly, butthatinterim districtingplan impose aninterim districtingplanfor useinthenext defect. The legislature thenhastwo weeks toremedy the plan asawholeandtoindividualdistricts.” tify every defect found by thecourt, both astothe “findings offact andconclusions oflaw”that“iden more redistricting mapsisinvalid mustissuespecific North Carolina statelaw, acourt holdingthatoneor power todeclare any actunconstitutional. plans are constitutional, althoughcourts retain the there isa“strong presumption” thatredistricting Legal Standard: erations, andnoconsideration ofracial data. boundaries, incumbencyprotection, political consid ings, compactness, fewer splitprecincts, municipal tricting: equalpopulation,contiguity, county group adopted thefollowing criteriafor legislative redis for legislative redistricting. In2017,thelegislature sistent withtheenumerated constitutional criteria the legislature hasalsoadopted itsown criteria,con Legislatively-Adopted Criteria: compactness andcommunities ofinterest. Court hasalsoinstructedthelegislature toconsider Within thecontext ofthewholecounty rule,the MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION SPOTLIGHT: NORTH CAROLINA For adetailedhistoryof this litigation,seeNationalConference ofState Legislatures, “Redistricting Case Summaries|2010-Present: North Alicia Bannon,“ChoosingState Judges:APlanfor Reform,” Brennan Center, 3(Oct. 10,2018), N.C. G.S.§1-267.1(a). N.C. G.S.§120-2.1. N.C. G.S.§120-2.4(b). N.C. G.S.§120-2.4(a). N.C. G.S.§120-2.3. Stephenson v. Bartlett, North Carolina General Assembly, Dickson v. Rucho, 50 Ifthelegislature fails to,theCourt “may 766 SE2d238,269-270(N.C. 2014). As withany actofthelegislature, 562 SE2d377,384(N.C. 2002). www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-case-summaries-2010-present.aspx “2017 HouseandSenatePlansCriteria” (Aug. 2017), Inpriorredistrictings, 48 46 Under 47 49

- - - - - of theSupreme Court, afterreviewing alistrecom Those two judgesare chosenby theChiefJustice court judge ofWake County andtwo other members. The panelconsists oftheseniorresident superior case willbeheard by aspecialthree-judge panel. be filedinWake County SuperiorCourt, where the court. State lawrequires redistricting challengesto procedures for challengingredistricting mapsinstate Superior Court: the bill. legal effect totheremaining legalprovisions of severable, meaningacourt shouldattempt togive declares thatillegalprovisions ofredistricting billsare any defects identified by thecourt.” were struckdown for partisangerrymandering. rior court approval, afterapriorsetofremedial maps The current mapswere adopted in2019,withsupe went toboth theState andU.S. Supreme Courts. state andfederal court, includingseveral cases that redistricting litigationandmapsbeing struckdown in Prior History: by partisanjudicialelections. ture. TheNorthCarolina Supreme Court isselected law ofany redistricting planadopted by thelegisla remains thefinalarbiteroflegality understate Supreme Court: Court Judges. mended by theNorthCarolina Conference ofSuperior 52

North Carolina hasalonghistoryof .

North Carolina provides special The NorthCarolina Supreme Court . 54 . 51 State lawalso

55 53 -

-

- 105 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NORTH DAKOTA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK or prohibiting partisan,pro/anti-incumbent, orracially-discriminatory gerrymandering. “kept ataminimum.” Note: There’s nocriteriakeeping whole“communities ofinterest” together districts bedrawn sopopulationsare asequal“as ispracticable” withany necessary deviations contiguous andcompact. There’s alsodiscretionary criteriainstatute,requiring statelegislative North Dakota hasmandatorycriteriainthestateconstitution requiring districtstobedrawn checks ontheLegislative Assembly’s authoritytoeffect partisanbiasinredistricting. veto-proof supermajoritiesinboth chambersoftheLegislative Assembly. There are noapparent Republicans have tripartite(House-Senate-Governor) control oftheredistricting process, with the redistricting process thatisclearlyspecified. redistricting hearingsavailable tothepublic,there isrelatively littleopportunityfor publicinputin North Dakota hasstrong “sunshine” laws, oropenmeetinglaws. However, apartfrom making seats afterthe2020Census. North Dakota hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additional both chambers. subject tothegovernor’s approval orveto, whichmaybeoverridden witha2/3supermajorityin The Legislative Assemblyadopts statelegislative districtsasaregular statuteby amajorityvote, challenged incourt. citizen-initiated legalchallenges.Inthepasttwo redistricting cycles, statelegislative maps were not There isneitherautomatic judicialreview ofstatelegislative maps,norclear opportunity for

106 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: end onApr. 28,2021,thoughtheNorthDakota Constitution andpastpractice provide for implementation laterthereafter. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY NORTH DAKOTA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION State legislative mapsare tobeadopted by theendoffirstregular sessionafterthecensus, whichis scheduledto

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A North Dakota Const. Art.IV, §2;NorthDakota Code §54-03-01.5; NorthDakota Statute 44-04-17.1.13 Joint Legislative Redistricting Committee Not required None Start oflegislative session State leg.:April28, 2021 Congressional None Citizens maynot challengemapsincourt. Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None deviations. nearly equally“as practicable” withminimal districts require districtstobepopulated Statutory criteriafor statelegislative representatives from eachdistrict) compactness, nested(one senatorandtwo legislative districts(unranked): contiguity, Constitutional criteriafor state 54-03-01.5 N.D. Const. Art.IV, §2;N.D. Code § 3R or nonpartisanelection: Gubernatorial appointment Yes (2/3) 40R 79R Doug Burgum United - None - -7D - 14D 1D - Republican (R: 85%) 1 non-partisan - 1V (R)

(R: 84%) elected

107 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OHIO Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK CONGRESSIONAL: LOW RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE

manipulation. years, aprocedure thatserves asacheckagainstpartisanabuse,thoughonestillripefor partisan 10-year cycle. Plansthatreceive thesupportofasimplemajoritymayonlytake effect for 4 redistricting procedures require planstoreceive bipartisansupporttotake effect for thefull, a political party, and,asdescribedabove, Ohio’s stagedcongressional andstatelegislative There are someconstitutional restrictions againstredistricting plansthatserve tofavor ordisfavor submissions. are required toholdatleasttwo hearings,andtheauthoritiesare required tofacilitate publicmap the General Assemblyandtheredistricting commission (depending onthestageofprocess) comment afterreleasing another proposed plan.Priortoadopting acongressional districtplan,both plan withbipartisansupport,thecommission istoholdanother publichearingandallow public releasing aproposed statelegislative redistricting plan.Shouldthecommission fail toadopt a The OhioRedistricting Commission isrequired toholdatleastthree hearingsfor publicinputafter plan approved by theGeneral Assembly. a simplemajoritythatwilltake effect for two general elections(4years). Thegovernor mayveto a for 10years. IftheGeneral Assemblystillfails toattainthosestandards, itmaypassaplanwith approved by 60%,withatleast1/3supportfrom eachofthetwo largest parties,itshalltake effect years. Shouldthecommission fail, theGeneral Assemblyagainisempowered toadopt amap, andif votes from atleasttwo membersrepresenting eachofthelargest parties,whichtakes effect for 10 threshold, theRedistricting Commission istoadopt amapwithfour affirmative votes, including takes effect until thenext year endingin1(10years). IftheGeneral Assemblyfails toattainthat including halfofthelegislative caucus ofeachthetwo largest partiesineach chamber, it The General Assemblyistopassacongressional districtmap. Ifpassedwitha60%supermajority, elections (4years). Themap isnot subjecttogubernatorialveto. the commission fails, andpassesamapwithsimplemajority, itistotake effect for two general of thelargest partiesapprove amap, ittakes effect until thenext year endingin1(10years). If legislative redistricting plan.Ifamajority ofmembersandatleasttwo membersrepresenting each and theappointees ofthefour legislative leadersofthetwo majorparties,istoadopt astate The OhioRedistricting Commission, whichiscomprised ofthegovernor, auditor, secretary ofstate, 108 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OHIO Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? HIGH RISK LOW RISK

REDISTRICTING PROCESS No for 4-year plans. Yes for fullcycle plans. backup commission Congressional: legislature withappointee State leg.:appointee commission beyond areasonable doubt. (the apportionment board) andnoting thechallengershadfailed toestablishunconstitutionality to thelegislative lines,carving substantial deference tothethen-prescribed redistricting authority congressional challengefaltered, andin2012,theOhioSupreme Court deniedrelief inthechallenge court, respectively. Following theUSSupreme Court’s decisioninRuchov. Common Cause, the cycle, both thecongressional andstatelegislative planswere challenged,infederal andstate the legislature, withtheredistricting commission againservingasabackstop. Inthe2010 to congressional redistricting plans,andinvalidated mapsordistrictsare toberedrawn by commission. Similarly, theOhioSupreme Court hasoriginal, exclusive jurisdictionover challenges legislative maps,thoughinvalidated mapsordistrictsmayonlyberedrawn by theredistricting The OhioSupreme Court retains original,exclusive jurisdictionover challengesbrought tostate Act requirements. redistricting planstake communities ofinterest into consideration outside offederal Voting Rights bipartisan support,not toundulyfavor apolitical partyoritsincumbents. Itdoesnot appearOhio’s are clearprocedures andrequirements around splittingjurisdictions—and, ifadopted without federally compliant, compact, contiguous, respectful ofcounty andmunicipalboundaries—there of theirprevious district.Similarly, congressional districtsare toberoughly equalinpopulation, than two years leftintheirterm,thesenatorserves inthenewdistrictthatcontains themajority three contiguous stateHousedistricts,andifthelinesare changedwhiletheincumbent hasmore party preferences inelectionsover thepreceding 10years. State senatedistrictsare tocomprise the statewideproportion ofdistrictsthatfavor eachpartyistocloselycorrespond withstatewide jurisdictions—and compact. Plansare not tobedrawn tofavor ordisfavor apolitical party, and county andmunicipalboundaries—there are clearprocedures andrequirements around splitting (with afive percent buffer ineitherdirection), federally compliant, contiguous, respectful of partisan fairness requirements. State legislative districtsare tobenearlyequalinpopulation Ohio’s Constitution provides for anumberofunranked redistricting criteria,incorporating some Requires: Source: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA between districtandstatewidepartisanship compactness, closecorrespondence municipal subdivision(by spec.procedure), variance ineitherdir.), contiguity, county/ districts (unranked): equalpop(5% Constitutional criteria for statelegislative rules for subdivision) compactness, county boundaries(specific districts (unranked): contiguity, Constitutional criteria for congressional Ohio Const. Art.XI; OhioConst. Art.XIX 109 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Householder, 373F. Supp. 3d978(S.D. Ohio2019),vacated by 140S.Ct. 101(2019). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: unavailable, another basisasdirected by thegeneral assembly.” in particular;federal linesmayberedrawn usingpopulationdataasdeterminedby theCensus, or“ifthefederal decennial census is November 30,2021.Itisunclearhow adelayinthetransmission ofCensus datawillaffect thestatelegislative redistricting timeline, Redistricting Commission istopassa planby October31,2021,andifunabletodoso,theGeneral Assemblymustpassaplanby passing acongressional districtplan by September 30,2021withbipartisan support.IftheGeneral Assemblyfails to do so,theOhio introduce another plan,holdapublichearing,andadopt afinalplanby September 15,2021.TheGeneral Assemblyistasked with September 1,2021,unlessaplanfails topasswiththebipartisansupportrequired for adoption, inwhichcase thecommission will Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OHIO Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/

DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION TheOhioRedistricting Commission isconstitutionally required toadopt afinalstatelegislative redistricting planby

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Wilsonv. Kasich, 134OhioSt.3d 221(2012); OhioA.PhilipRandolph Inst.v. OhioConst. Art.XI;OhioConst. Art.XIX N/A Not clearlyrequired No required number Nov. 15, 2021 the release ofCensus dataand No setdate,butsometimebetween needed) April 30,2022(Supreme Court maps,if 30 additionaldays for leg.amendment; Nov. 15, 2021(commission maps); state Supreme Court. court. Citizens maychallengemapsinthe Maps aren’t automatically reviewed in State leg.:No Yes ifpassedby thelegislature Congressional:

United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government?

POLITICAL CONTROL None disfavoring apolitical party districts prohibits primarilyfavoring or Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative bipartisan support) political partyorincumbent (ifadopted w/o districts prohibits: favoring ordisfavoring a Constitutional criteriafor congressional 4R Nonpartisan elections(partisan primaries): State legislative: N/A Congressional: Yes 25R 64R Mike DeWine United - - - - 35D 3D

8D Republican (R: 76%) (R: 65%) (R)

110 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OKLAHOMA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK criterion. TheHouseandSenatecommittees have setguidelinesfor the2021process, withHouse discriminatory gerrymandering.Note: keeping whole“communities ofinterest” isnot anexpress factors, totheextent feasible.” There are noprohibitions onpartisan,pro-incumbent, orracially- historical precedents, economic andpolitical interests, contiguous territory, andother major senate linesbedrawn togive consideration to“population,compactness, area, political units, Oklahoma hasmandatorycriteriaintheState Constitution, includingrequirements thatstate state legislative leaderstoappoint members outsidetheirpartymayraise concerns. risk ofpartisanabusebecomes slightly diluted,althoughthemechanismallowing thegovernor and each chamber. Should statelegislative redistricting authorityfall tothebackupcommission, the Republicans have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, withaveto-proof supermajorityin opportunity. redistricting committee hasalsopromised publichearingswithcomment andmapmaking the stateHousehasalready scheduledseveral publichearingsfor 2021,andthestateSenate participation andinputintheredistricting process. Publichearingshave beenheldinprevious cycles; Oklahoma hasstrong openmeetingslaws, butthere are norequirements around public four ofthesemembersmustapprove aplanfor ittobefiledwiththeSecretary ofState. Republicans chosenby theGovernor, Senatemajorityleader, andHousemajorityleader. At least Lieutenant Governor, servingasanon-voting member, andcomposed ofthree Democrats andthree within theallotted time-frame, theauthoritymoves toabackupcommission chaired by the vote ineachchamber. Shouldthelegislature fail topassastatelegislative redistricting plan statute, subjecttogubernatorialapproval orveto, whichmaybeoverridden by 2/3supermajority The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby asimplemajority-vote regular challenged instatecourt andupheld. though itisnot clearthesameappliestocongressional maps.Last cycle, thestatesenateplan was Challenges tolegislative maps are automatically reviewed by theOklahomaSupreme Court, “seek topreserve thecore ofexisting districts,andmayconsider theresidence ofincumbents.” and protection ofsomepolitical subdivisionboundaries,andspecifically noting thecommittee may guidelines explicitly seekingtopreserve long-standing communities ofinterest behindcompactness

111 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Wilson v. Fallin, 262P.3d 741(Okla. 2011). Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: redistricting process. Senate redistricting committee hasalsopromised toholdpublichearings.Itisnot clearexactly how theCensus delaywillinfluence the will beconvened. HearingsintheHousehave already begun,there are several scheduledfor December 2020andJanuary2021.The the takingofCensus or thetransmission ofCensus data.Shouldthelegislature fail topassaplanintime,backupcommission after thestartoffirstsessionfollowing theCensus, thoughitisnot clearwhetherthe provision shouldbeinterpreted tomean Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OKLAHOMA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnodeadline for adopting federal congressional lines. For statelegislative lines,mapsmustbeadopted 90days

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Wilsonv. Oklahomaex rel. State ElectionBd.,270 P.3d 155(Okla. 2012);

Oklahoma Const. Art.V, §§9A,11A;25O.S. Sections301–314 Committee House State andFederal Redistricting Senate SelectCommittee onRedistricting (but pastpractice) Not required None December 2020 session State leg.:90days afterthestartof Congressional: none Supreme Court. Citizens maychallengemapsinthestate Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes No bipartisan commission) (Backup for stateleg.: Legislature

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Other General: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL House andSenateredistricting committees None There are nocriteriafor congressional maps. factors, totheextent feasible.” contiguous territory, andother major precedents, economic andpolitical interests, compactness, area, political units,historical “consideration shallbegiven topopulation, districts (unranked): for statesenatelines, Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Okla. Const. Art.V, §§9A,11A commission Appointed by governor through nominating Yes. (2/3supermajorityrequired) 38R Kevin Stitt United - cycle. have adopted guidelines for theprocess this 4D 82R

- -8D - 19D 4R Republican - 1V (R) (81% R)

(79% R)

112 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OREGON Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK

the divisionofcommunities ofinterest instatelegislative andcongressional redistricting plans. Additionally, statutorycriteriaprohibit partisanorpro/anti-incumbent gerrymandering,andrestrict districts becontiguous, contain roughly equalpopulations,andprotect political boundaries. Oregon hasmandatoryredistricting criteria intheState Constitution requiring thatstatelegislative clear constraints onredistricting for partisanadvantage. the stateSupreme Court, thebackstopauthorities for statelegislative redistricting. There are no legislative houses.Additionally, Democrats control theoffice ofSecretary ofState, andpotentially Democrats have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, withrelatively large margins inboth one afterward. in thelastdecade, thelegislature isrequired toholdatleastonehearingbefore releasing amapand districts orby video.Additionally, for “areas thathave experienced the largest shiftsinpopulation” proposed, there mustbe5more meetings(ifpracticable by deadline) indifferent congressional each congressional district,before proposing acongressional andlegislative plan.After aplanis Oregon statelawprovides thatthelegislature musthold10publichearings,andatleastonein State mustbereviewed andapproved by theSupreme Court. Secretary ofState, whichretains thatauthorityuntil August 15.Plansdrafted by theSecretary of state legislative lines,ifthelegislature fails todraw aplanby July1,2021,thedutypassesto gubernatorial veto, whichmaybeoverridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. For The legislature adopts congressional andlegislative districtsasaregular statute,subjectto challenges tomapsfrom thelastcycle. each congressional districttodecide theoutcome ofacase. Thesecourts didnot hearany legal jurisdiction, withappealtothestateSupreme Court, toconvene aspecialpanelofonejudgefrom Secretary ofState. For challengestocongressional lines,MarionCounty Circuit Court hasoriginal to statelegislative maps, andtoconsider andapprove statelegislative mapsdrawn by the The stateSupreme Court hasoriginaljurisdictiontooversee legalchallengesinstatecourt 113 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: Oregon Supreme Court. Itis not clearhow theCensus delaywillinfluence theredistricting process. July 1,2021orelsetheprocess falls totheSecretary ofState, whowould have until August 15todraw thelinesfor approval by the Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY OREGON Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnodeadline for adopting congressional linesinOregon statelaw, butstatelegislative mapsmustbeadopted by

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A Oregon Const. art.IV, §7;Oregon Rev. Stat. §188.010,§188.016,§188.125,§§249.037, 254.056 N/A Required 15 Not clear State leg.:July1, 2021 Congressional: None Supreme Court. and statelegislative mapsinthestate maps inMarionCounty Circuit Court Citizens can challengecongressional Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No (Backup for stateleg.:Sec.ofState) Legislature

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL communities ofinterest, favoring oneparty/ state legislative mapsprohibits: dividing Statutory criteria for both congressional and transportation links political boundaries,beconnected by contiguous, utilize existing geographic/ state legislative maps(unranked): Statutory criteriafor both congressional and protect county boundaries maps (unranked): contiguous, equalpop., Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative 188.010 Oregon Const. Art.IV, §7;Or. Rev. Stat. § Gubernatorial appointment: No (2/3) 18 D 37 D Kate Brown United - N/A incumbent/person 7D

- -11R -23R

0R Democratic (D) - 1I - 1I (62%D) (60% D)

114 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX December. Note: Thestate/federal candidate filingdeadlineis3/8/22. data isavailable oraredistricting Commission iscreated, whichever islater. In2011,state/congressional mapswere adopted in days scheduledthrough December 15.State mapsmustbeproposed within90days (and adopted within150days) aftercensus Timing note: THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK CONGRESSIONAL: MODERATE RISK LEGISLATIVE: STATE

There are nolegaldeadlinesfor adopting congressional maps.The2021regular sessionbegan1/5/21with

on thelegislature’s abilitytoredistricting congressional linesfor partisan advantage. For state lines. Shouldthepolitical landscape shiftinthefuture, there appearfew meaningfulconstraints compromise mapordeadlockoncongressional redistricting, inwhichcase acourt willdraw the a gubernatorialveto. Because ofthis,thelegislature andgovernor are likely to either adopt a control both housesofthelegislature butdonot have thesupermajoritiesneededtooverturn to theGovernor. Pennsylvania hasdividedgovernment. Thegovernor isaDemocrat. Republicans In Pennsylvania, thelegislature redraws congressional districtsby bill,whichmustbepresented 2011, theCommission heldover adozen publicmeetingsbefore adopting statemaps. Commission mustpostitsdraft planandreceive objectionsfor 30days before finalizingitsmap. In engagement for congressional redistricting. For statelegislative redistricting, theReapportionment There are noredistricting-specific laws requiring publichearingsorproviding opportunitiesfor public maps are directly appealedtotheSupreme Court. legislative housesandafifthmemberthey pick.TheGovernor cannot veto Commission maps.State majority vote ofafive-member Commission, consisting ofthemajorityandminorityleadersboth by theGovernor. Vetoes maybeoverridden by 2/3vote. State legislative districtsare adopted by The legislature adopts congressional districtsby majority-vote bill,whichmaybesignedorvetoed constitution’s Free ElectionsClause. considerations, like gerrymanderingtogainan unfair partisanadvantage, violate thestate standards (compactness, contiguity, equalpopulation, respect for political subdivisions) toother or inthestatecode. However, congressional mapsthatsubordinate thestateredistricting subdivisions. There are noenumerated criteria for congressional redistricting intheconstitution single-member districts,compactness, contiguity, equalpopulation,andpreservation ofpolitical The stateconstitution enumerates five mandatorycriteriafor statelegislative redistricting: meaningful decisionaround partisancontrol. though vesting backstop appointment power withtheSupreme Court mayvest thatbodywiththe if thefour members deadlock).Thebalance ofthe commission helpstoconstrain partisanbias, deputies, andafifthmemberappointed by theother four commissioners (or theSupreme Court consists ofthemajorityandminorityleadersboth housesoftheLegislature, ortheirappointed legislative redistricting, theLegislative Reapportionment Commission redistricts. TheCommission

115 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallengeincourt? MODERATE RISK DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Senate State Govt. Cmte House State Govt. Cmte. Congressional: None receive comment ondraft maps State legislative: Commission must None Likely mid-2021 Congressional: None commission formed orcensus published; State legislative: +90days after appealed toSupreme Court. State leg.:Commission mapsdirectly Cong.: Yes State Leg: No No Congressional: Legislature State legislative: Political Commission adopted by theCommission in2012. also struckdown in2011for violatingstateconstitutional redistricting criteria;newmapswere the Court adopted newmaps.TheLegislative Reapportionment Commission’s legislative mapswere state constitution. Because thelegislature failed tosubmitaremedial planby theCourt’s deadline, down in2018by theState Supreme Court for impermissiblepartisangerrymanderingunderthe government anddrew congressional mapstomaximize theirparty’s advantage. They were struck and congressional mapswere struckdown inthe2010cycle. In2011,Republicans hadunited days ofthemapsbeingadopted. There isahistoryofgerrymanderinginPennsylvania: both state contrast, stateredistricting cases maybefileddirectly withtheSupreme Court, ifbrought within30 There are nospeciallegalprocedures for bringingcongressional redistricting cases instatecourt. By Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL 5D Partisan elections: needed) Congressional: No(2/3supermajority State Leg.: N/A 27R 112R Tom Wolf Republican Legislature Divided - None Elections Clause) Partisan gerrymandering(under theFree There are nocriteriafor congressional maps. equal population,political subdivisions. State legislative: compactness, contiguity, Pa. Const. Art.II,IV

- 2R

+

- 90D 1I (D) Democratic Governor - 20D

- 2V

- 2V

(R: 55%)

(R: 56%) ;

116 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/public-input-and-redistricting.aspx 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Justin Levitt, “Pennsylvania,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/pennsylvania (accessed Jan. 4,2021). state-guide-redistricting 2 at any timeby Law make oraltersuchRegulations ..”). and MannerofholdingElectionsfor SenatorsandRepresentatives, shallbeprescribed ineachState by theLegislature thereof; buttheCongress may districts are drawn by thestatelegislature asaregular statute,subjecttoveto by theGovernor.”). SeealsoU.S. Const. art.I,§4,cl.1(“TheTimes, Places presentment) applies.SeeLeague ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737,742(Pa. 2018)(“Pennsylvania’s congressional 1 legislative maps,are made by majorityvote. Commission decisions,includingthe adoption of appoints thefifthmemberby majorityvote. ber, ashappenedin2011,theState Supreme Court initial membersdeadlockonselectingafifthmem which thoseinitialfour membersselect. deputies appointed by eachofthem,andachairman” the SenateandHouseofRepresentatives, or consists of “themajorityandminorityleadersofboth census, or 2021. which mustbeconstituted intheyear following each the “Legislative Reapportionment Commission,” assigns theresponsibility for stateredistricting to State Legislative: after thedateofadjournment. adjourned, inwhichcase thegovernor has30days days orthey become law, unlessthelegislature has veto. bills are presented tothegovernor for signature or nal redistricting plans. no specialprocedural considerations for congressio redistricting (“apportionment”) process. (“General Assembly”)controls thecongressional Congressional: HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA Pa. Const. art.II,§17(c). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(a). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(b). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(b). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(a). Pa. Const. art.IV, §15. Pa. Const. art.IV, §15. See The Constitution doesnot provide specialprocedures for congressional redistricting, soPa. Const. art.IV, §1(billsrequire bicameral passageand National Conference ofState Legislatures, “Public InputandRedistricting; Pennsylvania” (Upd.Sep. 9,2019) Pa. Const. art.II,§17(h). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(d). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(d). Albert v. Leg. Reapportionment Comm’n, Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Pennsylvania” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), 3 Allbillsmustbesignedorvetoed withinten In Pennsylvania, thelegislature 5 Thefive-member commission ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Pennsylvania,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/PA (accessed Jan.3,2021); The Pennsylvania Constitution 2 Like other bills, redistricting 4 790 A.2d989,995(Pa. 2002). 1 6 There are Ifthefour 7 8 Before - - occurred inthe2010cycle. the mapstocommission toredraw them,which Court strikes down themaps,Court willremand them, they gointo effect for thenext election.Ifthe If noonechallengesthemapsorCourt upholds the State Supreme Court tochallengethemaps. plan, anaggrieved personmayfilesuitdirectly with commonwealth.” “authorized by lawtoexercise theright tovote inthis defined aggrieved persontoonlyincludea plan withthecommission. any “aggrieved person” mayfileexceptions tothe a preliminary planfor 30days, duringwhichtime adopting afinalmap, thecommission mustrelease sional redistricting. meeting andtransparency requirements for congres ment for publichearings,comment, oropen Pennsylvania hasnoredistricting-specific require districts onitsown. shall “immediatelyproceed” toredistrict legislative Supreme Court for cause shown,” theSupreme Court plan” andthosedeadlinesare not “extended by the a “preliminary, revised orfinalreapportionment If theCommission missesitsdeadlines for filing DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE . www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50- 10 After thecommission finalizes its 14 13 For stateredistricting, thestate

9 12 TheSupreme Court has 11 -

- 117 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 2021). 22 for individual membersoftheGeneral Assembly”). ruling. ThisCourt hasnever interpreted ourSpeechandDebate Clauseasproviding anything more thanimmunityfrom suit,incertain circumstances, 21 20 aspx?NewsID=11187. Congressional Redistricting Hearings(Apr. 27,2011),https://web.archive.org/web/20111107065519/http://www.repmetcalfe.com/NewsItem. 19 2011), 18 2021). 17 Pennsylvania (accessed Jan.4,2021). gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/GA (accessed Jan.3,2020);JustinLevitt, “Pennsylvania,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/ www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 16 15 be correct. State Supreme Court strongly impliedthismaynot and DebateClause.Withoutdecidingtheissue, ing litigationundertheState Constitution’s Speech records were protected from disclosure inredistrict Records: such asought tobekept secret.” whole shallbeopen,unlesswhenthebusinessis “sessions ofeachHouseandcommittees ofthe Open Meetings: locations across thestate. mittees alsoheld3joint publichearingsindifferent December before beingadopted. House andSenateState Government Committees in the congressional redistricting billwas heard by the May through December, 2011. mission held14publichearingsormeetings,from 2011 cycle, theLegislative Reapportionment Com legislative orcongressional maps. requiring publichearingspriortoadopting new Hearings: in anewspaper ineachdistrict. sons. TheCommission’s plansmustalsobepublished plan andreceive “exceptions” from aggrieved per tionment Commission topublishadraft redistricting constitution doesrequire theLegislative Reappor SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA Legislative Reapportionment Commission, “MeetingsandUpdates,” www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Commission/Commission.cfm (accessed Jan.24, League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, Pa. Const. art.II,§13. Representative DarylMetcalfe, Press Release: McIlhinney &Metcalfe toConvene Unprecedented, Joint PublicState Government Committee See Pennsylvania General Assembly, “SenateBill1249”(2011-2012reg. sess.)(finalpassage:Dec.20,2011;approved by Governor: Dec.22, Legislative Reapportionment Commission, “MeetingsandUpdates,” www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Commission/Commission.cfm (accessed Jan.24, See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Pennsylvania” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Pa. Const. Art.II,§17(c) &(i). https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/BillInfo.cfm?syear=2011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=1249 In2018,atrialcourt heldthatlegislative 21 There are noredistricting-specific laws Under thestateconstitution, the 19 17 15 20 18 Inthelegislature, 16 Thetwo com However, inthe 178A.3d737,767n.38(Pa. 2018)(“we caution againstreliance ontheCommonwealth Court’s - - - - - or, ifthere isadeadlock, thecourts mayberequired Democrats toadopt congressional redistricting maps result, Republicans willlikely have tonegotiate with the supermajoritiesrequired tooverturn aveto. Asa al Assembly”)by substantial margins, butlessthan both housesofthePennsylvania Legislature (“Gener vania, Tom Wolf, isaDemocrat. Republicans control has dividedgovernment. TheGovernor ofPennsyl houses overriding thatveto). Presently, Pennsylvania (or, ifvetoed by theGovernor, by a2/3vote ofboth passed by thelegislature andsignedby theGovernor Congressional districtsare redistricted by abill Legislature are seekingtoplace aconstitutional Court ismajority-Democrat, butRepublicans inthe a retired judgefor therole. fifth commissioner, andtheSupreme Court selected 2011, thefour legislative leaders didnot agree ona four commissioners are unabletoselectsomeone.In commissioners orby theState Supreme Court ifthe and afifthcommissioner, choseneitherby thosefour State HouseandSenate(or theirappointed deputies) consists of themajorityandminorityleadersof Legislative Reapportionment Commission, which State redistricting isperformed by thefive-member divided government. to adopt maps,ashashappenedlastcycle with RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Pennsylvania,” https://

22 Thecurrent Supreme .

- - 118 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 32 31 (2018). 30 29 28 27 26 25 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 24 23 minorities). prohibits discriminationagainstracial andlanguage terion) andSection2oftheVoting Rights Act (which standards andtheuseof race asaredistricting cri tection Clause(which addresses equalpopulation include theFourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro with federal legalrestrictions onredistricting, which Finally, like allstates,Pennsylvania mustcomply tially usingadifferent legaltest. may alsoprohibit partisangerrymandering,poten the rights offree expression andequalprotection, tion’s other general civilrights protections, including left openthepossibilitythatsomeofConstitu prohibits partisangerrymandering. the Constitution’s Free andEqual ElectionsClause ing. However, theState Supreme Court recently held has noexpress prohibition onpartisangerrymander Unlike somestates,thePennsylvania Constitution plies thestatecriteriatocongressional redistricting. preme Court, discussedfurtherbelow, essentially ap recent anti-gerrymandering decisionby theState Su at allfor congressional redistricting. contrast, thestateconstitution provides nocriteria tion, andpreservation ofpolitical subdivisions. districts, compactness, contiguity, equal popula datory criteriafor stateredistricting: single-member The Pennsylvania Constitution provides five man reconstitute theCourt tobeelectedby district. amendment ontheMay2021 ballot whichwould WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 645Pa. 1,126(2018). Commonwealth ex rel. Specterv. Levin, 448Pa. 1, 19,25(1972). Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, Pa. Const. art.II,§16. 570 U.S. 529(2013). U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Pennsylvania” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Pa. Const. art.II,§16. 27 Pennsylvania was never required to 26 25 24 178 A.3d737,802n.63(Pa. 2018). 178 A.3d737(Pa. 2018). TheCourt also Nonetheless,a 614Pa. 364,440(2012); 23 - - By By ------districts whichwander seeminglyarbitrarily across “crooked finger,” aswell as“oddly shaped, sprawling non-compact districtsthatlooklike a“wishbone”or dispersion ofdistricts.TheCourt hascriticized as this criterionlooksatthegeographic shapeand defined compactness, case lawmakes clearthat territory.” lative districtsmustbe“composed ofcompact … Compactness: clearance, didnot impactit. which struckdown thelistofstatesrequiring pre (VRA). Assuch,the of Justice underSection5oftheVoting Rights Act preclear itsdistrictlineswiththefederal Department include the“Reock, Schwartzberg, Polsby-Popper, Tests theCourt has used tomeasure compactness applying traditional redistricting considerations.” nary range of, plansgenerated withsolicitudetoward shapes are neithernecessary to,norwithintheordi criteria, whichcan confirm thatsome“anomalous maps tocomputer-generated mapsthatfollow state the Court hassupportedcomparing theadopted ness tofindviolationsofthiscriterion.Inparticular, and mathematical measurements ofmapcompact looked for both examples ofoddly shapeddistricts Instead, inrecent decades, theSupreme Court has not aesthetically pleasing.” simply because “theshapeofaparticular districtis ment scheme”andamapaswholeshouldnot fail unavoidable non-compactness inany reapportion acknowledged thatthere willbe“a certain degree of Pennsylvania.” League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, .

29 WhiletheSupreme Court hasnot further 30 Under thestateconstitution, legis At thesametime,Court has Shelby County v. Holder 31 28 645 Pa. 1,125 decision, 32 - -

- - - 119 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 to 10percent are generally permissibleifdoneto deviations between statelegislative districtsofup requirement. Underthefederal standard, population struction oftheU.S. Constitution’s equalpopulation This criterionsoundssimilartothejudicialcon tory asnearlyequalinpopulationpracticable.” legislative districtsmustbe“composed of…terri Equal Population: contiguity. contiguity, atleastastotheacceptability ofpoint the Court isleaningtowards astricterstandard of facility andaseafood/steakhouse,” whichsuggests uous intwo locations onlyby virtueofamedical expressed skepticism atadistrict“whichiscontig are permissible.However, inarecent case theCourt two parts ofadistricttouchonlyatsinglepoint), no bridgeorferry access) orpoint contiguity (where contiguity across bodiesofwater even where there is as aliberal definitionofwater contiguity (allowing er other common forms ofcontiguity abuse,such The Supreme Court hasnot directly discussedwheth from any other part.” no partofthedistrictiswhollyphysically separate district withoutleavingthedistrict,oroneinwhich point withinthedistrictto any other point withinthe district as“one inwhichapersoncan gofrom any tory.” districts mustbe“composed of…contiguous terri Contiguity: superior toanother. to endorseany onemeasure asbeingdefinitive or measures.” Population Polygon, andMinimumConvex Polygon SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA Pa. Const. art.II,§16. Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,419(2013). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614Pa. 364,445(2012). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,418(2013). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,418(2013). Pa. Const. art.II,§16. League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 645Pa. 1, 125(2018). Commonwealth ex rel. Specterv. Levin, 448Pa. 1,17-18(1972)(brackets, quotation marks,andcitationsomitted). Pa. Const. art.II,§16. Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,423(2013). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 181A.3d1083,1087(2018). 35 TheSupreme Court hasdefinedacontiguous 37 33 Underthestateconstitution, legislative However, theCourt hasbeencareful not Under thestateconstitution, 34 36 - - 38 - -

- narrowest possible[population] deviation” between not require thatstateredistricting plans“pursuethe equality] ismostpracticable.” in the[Commission] todeterminewhat[population indicated thatthere “obviously isdiscretion vested population equalitysimilartofederal case law, ithas While theCourt hasnot provided abright-line rulefor in populationaspracticable.’” deviation range; itrequires districts‘as nearlyequal Pennsylvania Constitution doesnot speakofa10% cal tothefederal one:“Section16ofArticleIIthe that thestate’s equalpopulationstandard isidenti the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hasrefused tohold achieve alegitimateredistricting objective. However, counties (many ofthosesplitsbeinginevitable based of 4462wards” intheSenateand“50outof67 two outof2563municipalities,andonlyten a mapthatsplit“only 25outof67counties, only the Voting Rights Act. In2012,theCourt upheld dards ortocreate majority-minority districtsunder necessary tomeetfederal equalpopulationstan lines thatsplitpolitical subdivisions,whichare often an absolute,theSupreme Court hasuphelddistrict rial orrepresentative district. ough, township orward” informing eitherasenato division ofa“county, city, incorporated town, bor tution prohibits, “[u]nless absolutely necessary,” the No DividingPoliticalSubdivisions: which theCourt deemed“not surprising.” smallest district;thatdeviation was not challenged, lation deviation of8percent between thelargest and sion adopted remedial planswithamaximumpopu objectives” like compactness. districts “at theexpense ofother, legitimatestate 43 39 41 40 Althoughframed as In2012,theCommis TheConstitution does The stateconsti 42 ------120 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 ria [for statelegislative redistricting] have been show thatthestateconstitution’s “neutral crite under theFree Elections Clause,aplaintiff must To stateaclaimagainstthecongressional maps provision inthecontext ofcongressional redistricting. er todoso.” her choice, andbarsthedilutionofpeople’s pow effective power toselecttherepresentative ofhisor antees “thepeopleofthisCommonwealth anequally The Supreme Court explained thattheClauseguar prevent thefree exercise oftheright ofsuffrage.” power, civilormilitary, shallatany timeinterfere to provides: “Electionsshallbefree andequal;no tion’s Free andEqual ElectionsClause. Court hasheldthatthey are underthestateconstitu der theU.S. Constitution, thePennsylvania Supreme illegal partisangerrymanderingare not justiciableun Free andEqual ElectionsClause: by theCommission. lower numberofsubdivisionsplitsthanwas adopted constitutional requirements, thathave adramatically submitting alternative maps,consistent withState can attempt toprove aviolationofthiscriterionby district.” have the‘ideal’populationfor aHouseorSenate is inevitable since mostpolitical subdivisionswillnot since “a certain amount ofsubdivisionfragmentation whole rather thanonindividualsplitsanddistricts” the “focus necessarily mustbeontheplanasa In evaluating subdivisionsplits,theCourt explained ably small.” Court describedthesenumbersofsplitsas“remark and 103outof4462wards” intheState House;the on populationalone), 68outof2563municipalities, SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,817(Pa. 2018)(emphasis added). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,818-819(Pa. 2018). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,817(Pa. 2018). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,816(Pa. 2018). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,817(Pa. 2018). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,814(Pa. 2018). Pa. Const. art.I,§5. League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737(Pa. 2018). Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,421(2013). Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,421(2013). 45 Focusing onthemapasawhole,plaintiffs 44 48 Thusfar, theCourt hasonlyappliedthis Although claimsof 46 ThatClause - 47 -

- - - - population aspracticable; and…donot divideany compact and contiguous territory;asnearlyequalin created underaredistricting planare: composed of must lookat“whetherthecongressional districts In reviewing aFree ElectionsClauseclaim, acourt a measure” ofvote dilution. Pennsylvania, andtherefore “particularlysuitableas benchmarks,” “deeply rooted intheorganic law”of ing themtocongressional redistricting as“neutral redistricting, theCourt justifiednonethelessapply does not applythestatecriteriatocongressional san political advantage.” siderations suchasgerrymanderingfor unfair parti subordinated, inwholeorpart,toextraneous con partisan gerrymanderingthatisstillconsistent with gets more sophisticated, whichmayenableextreme 5 maybeestablished.” Asredistricting software sive meansby whichaviolationofArticleI,Section The Court statedthatthisnewtest“isnot theexclu ditional criteriawere subordinated toother factors.” criteria toother considerations,” justthat“thesetra districts plaintiffs toshow that“thecreators ofcongressional division splits.” districts thatcause plainlyunnecessary political-sub violations ofthestatecriterialike “tortuouslydrawn as a“layexamination ofthePlan,” whichmayreveal populous, compact, andcontiguous districts,” aswell Plan cannot plausiblybedirected atdrawing equally plans thatfollow thestatecriteriatoshow “thatthe paring theadopted planwithhundreds ofsimulated pelling expert statistical evidence,” for example com of population.” or ward, except where necessary toensure equality county, city, incorporated town, borough, township, intentionally 51 52 Thiscan beevaluated through “com Significantly, itisnot necessary for subordinated thesetraditional 49 Althoughtheconstitution 50 - - - - 53 - - - - 121 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 unfair partisanpolitical advantage, acongressional traneous considerations suchasgerrymandering for have beensubordinated, inwholeorpart,toex of legislative districts,” butwhere “neutral criteria factors have historically played arole inthedrawing by thelegislature, theCourt recognized that“other Similarly, astocongressional redistricting performed state redistricting: constitution goals –beyond thestatecriteriaenumerated inthe ing communities ofinterest butalsosomepolitical other redistricting objectives –includingpreserv that theCommission orLegislature maypursue Other Criteria: claims.” “address atthisjuncture thepossibilityofsuchfuture neutral criteriatopartisanends,theCourt declinedto claim basedonthelegislature’s subordination of Court was abletoresolve theFree ElectionsClause be needed.However, because inthecase athandthe the stateredistricting criteria,other legaltestsmay SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,821(Pa. 2018). Pa. Const. art.II,§17(d). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614Pa. 364,432(2012). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614Pa. 364,429(2012). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614Pa. 364,402(2012). Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614Pa. 364,402(2012). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,801(Pa. 2018). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 645Pa. 1,122,178(2018). Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,412-413(2013). Holt v. 2011Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 620Pa. 373,422(2013). League ofWomen Voters v. Commonwealth, 178A.3d737,817(Pa. 2018). political subdivisions.” ty, compactness, andrespect for theintegrity of straints regarding populationequality, contigui do not doviolence totheconstitutional re factors can operate atwill—solongasthey to reflect populationchanges....These ‘political’ the samenewseat,etc.,indrawing newmaps bent legislatorswould beforced tocompete for incumbents, avoiding situationswhere incum of existing legislative districts,protection of ing political factors, includingthepreservation reapportionment commission from consider “There isnothing atalltoprevent aparticular 54 55 . In TheSupreme Court hasalsostated Holt , theCourt explained, asto 56 ------not entitled toasimilarlydeferential presumption of Reapportionment Commission, astateagency, are state redistricting mapspassedby theLegislative and plainlyviolatestheConstitution.” burden ofproof thattheenactment clearly, palpably, tional onlyifthechallengingpartiescarry theheavy sumed tobevalid, andwillbedeclared unconstitu legislature, acongressional redistricting billis“pre Legal Standard: Pennsylvania Constitution.” redistricting planviolatesArticleI,Section5ofthe undertake todraw itsown maps. tunity” totimelyremedy thedefect before acourt will legislature must firstbegiven an“additional oppor if acourt strikes down thecongressional maps,the ment Commission toremedy thedefect. remand theplanbacktoLegislative Reapportion lines, thestateconstitution requires thattheCourt If theSupreme Court invalidates statelegislative evidence thattheFinalPlanwas contrary tolaw.” ‘better than’ or‘preferable to’ theFinalPlan,butas plans not inthehopeofhavingthemaccepted as defects inanadopted planby “proffering alternative not onindividualdistricts.” the “focus” should“beontheplanas awholeand In proving aviolationofthestateredistricting criteria, constitutional violation. defending themap(like thecommission), toprove a the partychallenginganadopted map, not theparty constitutionality. MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION 59 Like allstatutespassedby the Even so,theburden isalways on 60 61 57 Aplaintiff mayshow the 64 58 However, 63 Similarly, 62 - - - - 122 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-case-summaries-2010-present.aspx 66 65 sion, whichdrew newdistrictlinesfor 2014. criteria. TheCourt sent thelinesbacktoCommis in 2012for failing toadhere tothestateredistricting which were struckdown by theState Supreme Court on a4-1vote. Democrats suedover thoselines, Commission adopted statelegislative mapsin2011 adopted newmaps.TheLegislative Reapportionment a remedial planby theCourt’s deadline,theCourt Elections Clause.After thelegislature failed tosubmit voters inviolationoftheState Constitution’s Free they impermissiblydiscriminatedagainstDemocratic Court struckthosemapsdown onthegrounds that political advantage. In2018, theState Supreme drew congressional mapstomaximize Republicans’ control ofthelegislature andgovernor’s office and Prior History: may beheldfor thatseat. consent of2/3theSenate,until aspecialelection appoint areplacement justice, withtheadvice and there isavacancy ontheCourt, thegovernor may retention electionevery tenyears. However, when san elections,followed by anup-or-down statewide seven membersinitiallyelectedinstatewideparti or thecommission. TheSupreme Court consists of of any redistricting planadopted by thelegislature mains thefinalarbiteroflegalityunderstatelaw Supreme Court: SPOTLIGHT: PENNSYLVANIA National Conference ofState Legislatures, “Redistricting Case Summaries” (Upd.Dec.1,2020), Pa. Const. art.V, §§ 2(b), 13,15,16(b). In2011,Republicans hadunified The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re 65 66

- - - .

123 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY RHODE ISLAND 5. Arebadmapshardtochallengeincourt? 4. Aretheredistrictingstandardsweak? 3. Can themapsberiggedfor partisangain? 2. Can theprocess besecretive? 1. Can politicianscontrol howthemapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK equal populationfor state legislative districts.The2011advisorycommission statuterequired Rhode IslandhaslimitedmandatorycriteriaintheState Constitution requiring compactness and Assembly’s power toredistrict for partisangain. chambers andaveto-proof supermajority. There appeartobefew constraints ontheGeneral Democrats have tripartitecontrol oftheredistricting process, withrelatively large margins inboth issuing theirrecommendations. Redistricting Advisory Commission required theCommission toconduct publichearingsbefore the statemayretain stronger publicinput opportunities. Thelegislationthatestablishedthe Rhode Island.ShouldtheRedistricting Advisory Commission beempowered for thecurrent cycle, It isnot clearthatthepublichasaopportunitytoparticipateinredistricting process in state asingleat-large districtandnegatetheneedfor congressional redistricting. Rhode Islandmayloseacongressional districtfollowing the2020Census, whichwould give the consider thecommission’s proposed congressional orstatelegislative plans. commissioners whoare membersofthelegislature. TheGeneral Assemblyfaced norequirement to who were not; thestateSenateandHouseminorityleaderseachchosetwo additional majority leaderseachchosefour commissioners whowere membersofthelegislature andthree redistricting process. Commissioners were chosenasfollows: thestateSenateandHouse cycle, thelegislature created the18-memberRedistricting Advisory Commission toadviseonthe to gubernatorialveto, whichmaybeoverridden witha3/5supermajorityvote. Duringthe2011 The General Assemblyadopts congressional andlegislative districtsasaregular statute,subject the Voting Rights Act. new stateSenatelinesredrawn by the Legislature duetopressure ofafederal case brought under were challengedinstatecourt andupheld.Thecycle before sawnewcongressional linesdrawn, and least. Congressional challengeauthorityislessapparent. Duringthe2011cycle, stateHouselines It appearscitizens have the power tochallengestatelegislative redistricting plansinstatecourt, at possible. Itisunclearwhetherthosestandards willapplythiscycle. the extent practicable. State legislative andcongressional districtsshouldalsocoincide wherever representation, andconsideration ofexisting cultural, historical, geographical, andpolitical lines,to additional statelegislative andcongressional redistricting criteria,includingcontiguity, fair

124 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: 17-14-1; RhodeIsland Statute 42-46-2; Citations andreferences: primary electionsby June29,2022. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY RHODE ISLAND Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnodeadlinefor adopting congressional orlegislative lines.Candidates mustfilefor stateandfederal

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Mettsv. Murphy, 363F.3d 8(1st Cir. 2004) Rhode IslandConst. Art.VII,§1;VIII,2011R.I. Laws ch.106,§1-3;2011R.I.Laws ch.100,§1-2(d); R.I.Gen.Laws § House Judiciary Senate Judiciary commission) (but required for pastadvisory Not clear None required Not clear None maps incourt. Citizens maychallengestatelegislative Maps aren’t automatically reviewed. Yes No General Assembly

Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL creating voting precincts withdistinctballot “to theextent practicable”, coincide toavoid geographical, municipalandpolitical lines contiguous andreflect natural, historical, as compact interritory“as possible”, and congressional districts(unranked): Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative “as possible;”equalpopulation districts (unranked): ascompact interritory Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Laws ch.100,§2(d); 1 2011R.I.Laws ch.106,§2(d); 2011R.I. Rhode IslandConst. Art.VII,§1;VIII, 3R nominating commission: Gubernatorial appointment through Yes (3/5) 33 D 65 D Daniel McKee United - None None people options inaprecinct withlessthan100 - 2D - 5R - 10R

Democratic (87% D) (87% D) (D)

125 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY SOUTH CAROLINA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK requirement maychangetheredistricting calculus. 5 oftheVoting Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance demographic datamaybeconsidered. Thiscycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection follow political boundaries,protect incumbents, andpreserve communities ofinterest. Partisan and have adopted theirown guidelines,includingcriteriarequiring districtstobecontiguous, compact, legislative orcongressional districts.Inthepast, legislative committees responsible for redistricting Beyond federal requirements, SouthCarolina hasnomandatorycriteriainstatutefor eitherstate the legislature’s abilitytoredistrict for partisanadvantage. with widemargins inboth legislative houses.Itisnot clearthere are any meaningfulconstraints on Republicans have tripartitecontrol ofthestatelegislative andcongressional redistricting processes, provided awebsite for citizens tosubmitcomments andmaps. cycle, theSenatesubcommittee onredistricting held10 publichearingsaround thestate,andalso South Carolina lawdoesnot require thelegislature toholdpublichearingsonredistricting. Last statute, subjecttoGovernor approval. 2/3votes are required ineachchambertooverride aveto. The Legislature adopts statelegislative andcongressional districtsby majorityvote asanormal South Carolina (2012). were upheldinafederal districtcourt againstcharges ofracial gerrymanderinginthecase reviewed by thestateSupreme Court. Inthe2011cycle, both statelegislative andUSHousemaps There isnospecial legalrecourse for redistricting inSouthCarolina; mapsare not automatically

Backus v. 126 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX (2012); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201F. Supp. 2d618(D.S.C. 2002) Relevant recent cases: Redistricting; Princeton Gerrymandering Project Code Ann.§7;SouthCarolina SenateJudiciaryCommittee Redistricting Subcommittee; 2011GuidelinesandCriteria For Congressional andLegislative Citations andreferences: and congressional districtswere passedonJuly26,2011. but changesdonot take effect until afterthenext general election.Last cycle, statelegislative districtswere passedon June22,2011, Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY SOUTH CAROLINA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnostatutory deadlinefor statelegislative orcongressional maps;drawing districtsmid-decade isnot prohibited,

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Backusv. SouthCarolina, 857F. Supp. 2d553(D.S.C. 2012),aff’d, 133S.Ct. 156 South Carolina Const. Art.III,§§3,6,13;SouthCarolina Const. Art.VII,§13;SouthCarolina Code Ann.§2;SouthCarolina Redistricting Subcommittee Subcommittee; Sen.JudiciaryCommittee, House JudicialCommittee, ElectionLaws (but pastpractice) Not required (but pastpractice) None Not specified No deadline Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL political and demographic data Previous guidelineshave allowed theuseof None congressional maps criteria for both statelegislative and There are noconstitutional orstatutory ANN. §7 VII, §13;S.C. CODE ANN.§2;S.C. CODE S.C. CONST. art.III,§§3,6;S.C. Const. art. Republican-controlled All 5technically nonpartisan, butelectedby Legislative election: No (2/3) 30R - 81R - Henry McMaster United - 16D 43D Republican (R:65%) (R:65%) (R) legislature

127 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY SOUTH DAKOTA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK law, thoughtheseprinciplesare subjecttochange.Housedistrictsare tobedrawn whollyinside minority voting rights protections, asconsistent withthestateandUSConstitutions andfederal through compact andcontiguous districts,respect for geographical andpolitical boundaries,and significance: adherence tostandards ofpopulationdeviance, protection ofcommunities ofinterest part ofthe2011redistricting process, thelegislature assertedanumberofprinciplesprimary be compact, contiguous, andofnearlyequalpopulation,pertheSouthDakota Constitution. As Constitutional andstatutoryrequirements constrain redistricting inSouthDakota. Districtsmust actors from manipulatingredistricting for political benefit. override aveto from agovernor ofthesameparty, suggestingthere isvery littlestoppingpartisan There isallbutsingle-party control intheSouthDakota legislature andmore thanenoughvotes to reservations. Redistricting Committee scheduledfive summerhearings,includingonNative American There are noapparent publiccomment requirements inSouthDakota. In2011,theLegislative seats afterthe2020Census. South Dakota hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additional gubernatorial veto, whichmaybeoverridden witha2/3supermajorityvote ineachchamber. The legislature retains complete control over thestatelegislative redistricting process, subjectto South Dakota Supreme Court retains particularjurisdiction over redistricting challenges. was brought infederal court over Voting Rights Act compliance. Itisnot cleartowhat extent the apportionment by December 1.Over thepasttwo cycles, theonlychallengetoaredistricting plan The SouthDakota Supreme Court retains backstopauthorityifthelegislature isunabletocomplete change theredistricting calculus. Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance requirement may partisan bias.Thiscycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights senate districtsandare to electoneortwo members each.There are noapparent restrictions on

128 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Hazeltine, 461F.3d 1011(8thCir. 2006). Relevant recent cases: South Dakota Code §2-2-41 Citations andreferences: March 1,2022.Case lawbansmid-cycle redistricting. legislature fail toenactaplan,theSouthDakota Supreme Court has90days todraft aplan,puttingthebackstopdeadlineat Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY SOUTH DAKOTA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION The SouthDakota Constitution requires thelegislature tocomplete apportionment by December 1,2021.Shouldthe

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Inre Certification ofaQuestionLaw, 615N.W.2d 590(S.D. 2000);BoneShirtv. South Dakota Const. Art.III,§5;SouthDakota Code §2-2-41;SB1(2001SpecialSession);HB1001(2011 Legislative Redistricting Committee (but pastpractice) Not required (but pastpractice) None Potentially Summer2021 December 1,2021 court. unclear ifcitizens can challenge mapsin Maps are not automatically reviewed. It’s Yes No State legislature

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL political and demographic data Previous guidelineshave allowed theuseof None congressional maps criteria for both statelegislative and There are noconstitutional orstatutory ANN. §7 VII, §13;S.C. CODE ANN.§2;S.C. CODE S.C. CONST. art.III,§§3,6;S.C. Const. art. 5R Gubernatorial appointment: Yes (2/3) 32R 62R Kristi Noem United - - - 3D - 8D 0D Republican (R:91%) (R:89%) (R)

129 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY TENNESSEE Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK weakened inShelby County v. Holder. This cycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5theVoting Rights Act was that subdividenomore than30counties. There are noadditionalcriteriafor congressional maps. multi-county districts.Tennessee statutes provide for statehousemapswithcontiguous districts Beyond federal requirements, theTennessee Constitution limitsthedivisionofcounties informing constraints ontheGeneral Assemblyintheredistricting process. Republicans enjoy tripartitecontrol over theTennessee government, andthere are noapparent the maps. There isnoevidence ofpublicparticipationinthepastduringthisshortperiodleadingtochanges practice, there maybeaboutaweek between whenthey are released andwhenthey are passed. required orheld.Whilethemapsare presented tothepublicbefore they are voted on,basedonpast of themapmakingisdonebehindcloseddoorsinGeneral Assembly. Nopublichearingsare There are few meaningfulavenues for publicparticipationintheredistricting process, asmost regular statutesubjecttogubernatorialveto, which can beoverridden by asimplemajority. The General Assemblyadopts statelegislative andcongressional redistricting plansthrough a (2011 maps), mapshave not been altered asanoutcome oftheprocess. precedent. Whilepastmapswere challengedincourt in2001(challenging 1990maps) and2014 citizens mayhave theauthority tochallengeredistricting plansinstatecourt, basedonpast There isnoautomatic judicialreview ofmapsproposed andpassedby thelegislature. Tennessee

130 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX S.W.3d 775(Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: passed inlateJanuaryorearlyFebruary ofthesameyear. House andSenateRedistricting Committees heldprivate hearingsinmid-January 2002 and2012.Inboth cases, theplanswere Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY TENNESSEE Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION There isnodeadline for eithercongressional orstatelegislative maps,butinthelasttwo rounds ofredistricting, the

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Crone v. Darnell,176F. Supp. 2d814(W.D. Tenn. 2001);Moore v. Tennessee, 436

Tennessee Constitution Art.2,§4-6; Tennessee Code §§3-1-102,103 Senate Redistricting Committee House Redistricting Committee Not required None Likely duringthe2022 legislative session. No deadline Citizens can challengemaps incourt. Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes No Legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL districts prohibits thesubdivisionofmore Statutory criteria for statelegislative representative percounty divided unlessthey have more thanone districts prohibits counties from being Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative districts There are nocriteriafor congressional districts requires districtsbecontiguous Statutory criteriafor statelegislative Tennessee Constitution Art.2,§4-6 3R General Assembly: Appointed by governor andconfirmed by Yes (1/2) 27R 73R Bill Lee United - None districts than 30counties toform multicounty -2D - 6D - 26D (R) Republican (82%) (74%)

131 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX filing deadlineis12/13/21. Commission maybeseatedfrom 6/1to8/30/21.There isnodeadlinefor congressional maps.Note: Thestate/federal candidate Timing note: REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE THE SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK Legislative mapsmustbeadopted duringthe 2021regular session,whichgoesfrom 1/12to5/31.ABackup ability toredistrict for partisanadvantage. without Democratic support.There donot appeartobemeaningfulconstraints onthelegislature’s Republicans have unitedcontrol ofthelegislature andgovernor’s office andsocan passmaps public comment inthelegislative redistricting committees. in committees. In2010through 2011,theLegislature heldregional publichearingsandallowed public engagement. Generally, theLegislature allows membersofthepublictoprovide comment There are noredistricting-specific laws requiring publichearingsorproviding opportunitiesfor to draw legislative maps,aBackupCommission doesso. approved orvetoed by theGovernor. Vetoes maybeoverridden by 2/3vote. IftheLegislature fails The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby majority-vote bill,whichmaybe allegations ofracially-discriminatory gerrymandering. of aLegislature’s maps.Texas’s 2010redistricting cycle was litigatedfor mostofthedecade over defect inaredistricting plan.Court-adopted plansshouldattempt togive effect to thevalid parts Court. Before adopting anew map, statecourts are asked toallow thelegislature toremedy any suits beheard by athree-judge panel.Decisions by thatpanelare appealeddirectly totheSupreme The stateAttorney General may, by petitiontotheSupreme Court, require thatallredistricting criteria, contiguity andkeeping counties whole. contiguity, in statesenateredistricting. Onthestatehouseside,constitution requires two The stateconstitution hasnomandatorycriteriafor congressional redistricting, andonecriterion, 132 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Senate SpecialCmte. on Redistricting House Redistricting Cmte. (but pastpractice) Not Required (but multipleheldin2011) None 2021 Congressional: None State legislative: 2021session 3-judge panelhearallcases Both: Attorney Gen.mayrequire a if legislature deadlocks; State leg.:Backup commission redistricts Congressional: Yes commission maps) State legislative: Yes (butnot for backup No Legislature

Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None districts. There are nocriteriafor congressional of wholecounties. State Housedistrictsmustalsobemadeup districts requires districtsbecontiguous. Constitutional criteriafor statelegislative Tex. Const. Art.III,§28 9R Partisan elections: No (2/3supermajorityneeded) 18R 82R Greg Abbott United - None -0D

- 13D - 67D Republican

(R: 58%) - 1V (R)

(R: 55%)

133 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 13 12 11 10 4, 2021). princeton.edu/reforms/TX (accessed Jan.3,2021);JustinLevitt, “Texas,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/georiga (accessed Jan. www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 4, 2021). princeton.edu/reforms/TX (accessed Jan.3,2021);JustinLevitt, “Texas,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/georiga (accessed Jan. www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 2 III, §30(laws require bicameral passageandpresentment) applies. 1 governor vetoes theplanandlegislature fails to the legislature deadlocksonalegislative plan,ifthe adopt mapsby majorityvote. regular sessionand,uponmeeting,has 60days to 90 days aftertheadjournment oftheLegislature’s Land Office.” Public Accounts andtheCommissioner ofthe General sentatives, theAttorney General, theComptroller of tenant Governor, theSpeaker oftheHouseRepre of Texas,” consisting offive electedofficials:the“Lieu up commission, the“Legislative Redistricting Board the stateconstitution calls for thecreation ofaback If thelegislature fails toredistrict ridden by atwo-thirds vote ofboth houses. case thegovernor has20days. law, unlessthelegislature hasadjourned,inwhich within tendays (excepting Sundays) orthey become signature orveto. redistricting billsare presented tothegovernor for for approving redistricting plans. cess. congressional redistricting (“apportionment”) pro In Texas, thelegislature controls both thestateand HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Texas” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board, 471S.W.2d 570(Tex. 1971);Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,726(1991). Tex. Const. art.III,§28. Tex. Const. art.III,§28. Tex. Const. art.III,§14. Tex. Const. art.III,§14. Tex. Const. art.III,§14. See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Texas” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Tex. Const. art.III,§28(legislative redistricting). TheConstitution doesnot provide specialprocedures for congressional redistricting, soTex. Const. art. Tex. Gov. Code §22A.006. Tex. Gov. Code §22A.003. Tex. Gov. Code §22A.002. Tex. Gov. Code §22A.001(a)(2). 1 There are nospecialprocedural requirements 6 Theboard isrequired tomeetwithin 3 Allbillsmustbesignedorvetoed 7 Theboard iscreated if 4 Vetoes can beover 2 Like other bills, legislative 5 seats, - - - - -

which consists oftheoriginaldistrictjudge assigned Supreme Court mustappoint athree-judge panel, Upon receiving thepetition,chiefjustice ofthe special three-judge districtcourt tohearthematter. general maypetitiontheSupreme Court toconvene a state orcongressional maps,thestateattorney In any redistricting lawsuit filedinstatecourt over redistricting. No similarprocess isprovided for congressional in thepast. convened. period afterregular sessionwhentheBoard mustbe islature’s mapsduring(butnot beyond) the90-day override it,orifthecourts entirely invalidate theleg el are appealeddirectly totheSupreme Court. three-judge panel. all redistricting suitsare considered togetherby the original suit,betransferred andconsolidated sothat courts ofthe statemay, by petitionofapartytothe district judgessit. does not includethecounties where theother two appellate court judgefrom anappealsdistrictthat ent county thantheoriginaljudge,andanelected to thecase, anelecteddistrictjudgefrom adiffer

; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Texas,” https://gerrymander. ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Texas,” https://gerrymander. 8 Thebackupcommission hasredistricted 9 11 12 Allother suitsinother district Holdingsofthethree-judge pan 13 - - 10 -

134 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 “Texas,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/texas (accessed Jan.4,2021). guide-redistricting; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Texas,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/TX (accessed Jan.3,2020); JustinLevitt, 15 public-input-and-redistricting.aspx. 14 legislative committee meetings;however, therules Public Comment: advance inspecialsessions). to members48hoursinadvance (or 24hoursin committee reports onredistricting mustbeprovided be called. when an“executive session” (or, closedsession)may stitution northeSenateRulesspecifylimitationson Senate wheninExecutive session.” “sessions ofeachHouseshallbeopen,except the Open Meetings: proposals are beingconsidered by thelegislature.” once census databecome available andredistricting consideration by legislative committees are alsoheld Council, “[p]ublic hearingsonredistricting billsunder been announced. new scheduleofredistricting publichearingshasyet of 2020,butcancelled themduetoCOVID-19; no had scheduledregional hearingsinMarch andApril the adoption deadlineinMay. tricting committees beginninginFebruary through of 2020andfocused hearingsintheselectredis including regional hearingsinthesummerandfall cycle, thelegislature heldseveral publichearings, lative orcongressional maps. requiring publichearingspriortoadopting newlegis Hearings: other transparency protections. public hearings,comment, openmeetings,or Texas hasnoredistricting-specific requirements for DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Justin Levitt, “Texas,” All AboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/texas (accessed Jan.4,2021). Sen. Rule12.09. See Sen.Rules,art.XV. Tex. Const. art.III,§16. Texas Legislative Council, GuidetoRedistricting (Jan.2021),https://redistricting.capitol.texas.gov/docs/guide_to_2021_redistricting.pdf. Texas Redistricting, “Meetings,” https://redistricting.capitol.texas.gov/2020s (accessed Jan.18,2021). See Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Texas,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/TX (accessed Jan.3,2020). See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Texas” (Upd.Jun.7,2019),www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50-state- National Conference ofState Legislatures, “PublicInputandRedistricting: Texas” (Upd.Sep. 9,2019)https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/ 20 There are noredistricting-specific laws SenateRulesprovide that conference Under thestateconstitution, the 17 Generally, thepublicmayspeakat According totheTexas Legislative 21 15 16 However, inthe2011 TheTexas legislature 14 19 Neitherthecon - 18 - -

something similarthiscycle. through workstations intheCapitol, andplanstodo access totheState’s redistricting software (RedAppl) In thelastcycle, theLegislature gave thepublic here submit electronic comments for 2021redistricting established anonlineportalwhere thepubliccan The SenateSpecialCommittee onRedistricting has allowed publiccomment. 2011 atleastsomelegislative committee meetings comment (and hadplannedtodosoin2020)and hearings across thestatefor thepublictoprovide do not mandatethis.In2010, theLegislature held assignments. Representatives hasyet torelease itscommittee leadership andmembers;however, theHouseof the SenateSpecialCommittee onRedistricting’s committees. TheLieutenant Governor hasannounced Both theHouseandSenatehave redistricting meetings andcontrols committee assignments. actual leaderoftheState Senate,whopresides over unlike moststates,theLieutenant Governor isthe The Lieutenant Governor isRepublican DanPatrick; The Governor ofTexas isRepublican Greg Abbott. not required tonegotiate withDemocrats. congressional redistricting process in2021andare a result, Republicans fullycontrol both thestateand es oftheTexas legislature by substantial margins. As Republicans control thegovernorship andboth hous RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE . Submittedcomments can bereviewed 22 here . - 135 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 30 29 28 27 26 research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting 25 24 23 preclearance. cycle, Texas’s redistricting isnot subjecttofederal were subjecttopreclearance. struck down theformula for whichjurisdictions in Rights Act (VRA)andrequired preclearance; however, merly, Texas was covered by Section5oftheVoting tion againstracial andlanguageminorities). of theVoting Rights Act (which prohibits discrimina use ofrace asaredistricting criterion)andSection 2 (which addresses equalpopulationstandards andthe Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause legal restrictions onredistricting, whichincludethe Finally, like allstates,Texas mustcomply withfederal to prohibit partisangerrymandering in other states. general civilrights protections whichhave beenheld However, Texas’s constitution doesinclude several express prohibition on partisangerrymandering. Unlike somestates,theTexas Constitution has no sional redistricting. Constitution has county rule. districts mustbecontiguous andfollow thewhole datory criterion–contiguity –whereas statehouse tricting. State senatedistrictshave onlyoneman criteria for thestatehouseandsenateredis The Texas Constitution provides different redistricting down for racial gerrymandering. 2011, whenRepublicans drew linesthatwere struck Texas hasahistoryofgerrymandering,includingin WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Shelby County v. Holder, Smith v. Craddick, 471SW 2d 375, 377-378(Tex. 1971). Tex. Const. art.III,§26. Tex. Const. art.III,§25,§26. 570 U.S. 529(2013). U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq. See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Texas” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Tex. Const. art.III,§25(Senate) and§26(House). Justin Levitt, “Texas,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/texas (accessed Jan.4,2021). 24 Unlike for stateredistricting, theTexas no 25 mandatorycriteriafor congres theU.S. Supreme Court 27 Therefore, for this 23 . 26 For - - - - -

2. 1. ble. Thisprovision provides: tempt tokeep counties whole,totheextent practica Whole County Rule: has not elaborated onthedefinitionofcontiguity. tricts mustbecontiguous. Contiguity: tion. federal constitutional requirement ofequalpopula provision shouldbeappliedinconjunction withthe The Texas Supreme Court haselaborated onhow this make upadistrictofproper population,the “when two ormore counties are required to substantially equalledorisexceeded;” is entitled whentheidealdistrictpopulationis members towhichthatcounty’s own population tive” and“a county [must] receive thememberor if ithassufficient populationfor onerepresenta “a county mustbeformed into aseparate district 30 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/ than sufficient populationtobeentitled toone each other; andwhenany onecounty hasmore sentation, suchcounties shallbecontiguous to ties are required tomake uptheratio ofrepre sentative District,andwhentwo ormore coun county shallbeformed into aseparate Repre ulation tobeentitled toaRepresentative, such “whenever asinglecounty hassufficient pop any other contiguous county orcounties.” may bejoinedinaRepresentative Districtwith county, andfor any surplusofpopulationit or Representatives shallbeapportionedtosuch or more Representatives, suchRepresentative TheCourt hasheldthat: Both statehouseand senatedis State housedistrictsmustat 28 ThestateSupreme Court

29 ------136 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX determination withrespect tosomeother statute.”). that anapportionment statuteviolatesaconstitutional provision isnomore anencroachment ontheprerogative oftheLegislature thanthesame 38 37 texas-lawmakers-promote-transparency-in-redistricting/. 36 35 34 33 32 31 had options for redistricting thatresulted infewer providing alternative mapsproving the legislature islature’s State Housemapscan beattacked by The stateSupreme Court hasheldthattheleg that statesenatedistrictsbesingle-seat. decades. By contrast, theTexas constitution requires had multi-memberhousedistrictsfor atleastseveral multi-member districts; neither thestatenorfederal constitutions prohibited tion. under theassumption itviolatesthefederal constitu Court nullifiedthatclauseofthestate constitution apportioned.” another seatintheparticularlegislative bodybeing conglomerate populationentitles theentire area to be entitled toadditionalrepresentation butwhose separate districts…whichindependently would not districts toinclude“withinitsboundariesseveral districts, whichare districtsthatfloatover other surplus population,authorizes theuseof“flotorial” The finalclauseofthewholecounty rule,relating to 4. 3. SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Clements v. Valles, 620SW 2d112,115(Tex. 1981).SeealsoTerrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,717(Tex. 1991)(“A judicialdetermination Tex. Const. art.I,§3a,§8,§13,§19,§27;VI§2,§4. Erin Anderon, “Texas Lawmakers Promote Transparency inRedistricting,” Texas Scorecard (Feb. 3,2020),https://texasscorecard.com/state/ Clements v. Valles, 620SW 2d112(Tex. 1981). Tex. Const. art.III,§25. Smith v. Craddick, 471SW 2d375,377(Tex. 1971). Smith v. Craddick, 471SW 2d375,378-379(1971). Davis v. Mann,377U.S. 678,686-87n.2(1964). requirement.” in order tocomply withtheequalpopulation “a county maybedividediftodosoisnecessary tled toonerepresentative;” achieve adistrictwiththepopulationtotal enti must bejoinedtocontiguous counties soasto a “county not entitled toitsown representative the counties shallbecontiguous;” district linesshallfollow county boundariesand 32 (The State Supreme Court noted, however, that 31 However, in1971,theTexas Supreme 33 however, Texas hasnot 34 ) - - -

civil rights protections. InNorthCarolina andPenn U.S. Constitution, they maybeundergeneral state gerrymandering claimsare not justiciableunderthe General CivilRightsProtections: and compactness. districting criteria,includingcommunities ofinterest that theLegislature would alsofollow traditional re mittee in2020,pledgedataredistricting hearing Phil King,thechairofHouseRedistricting Com other mandatedcriteriaunder theState Constitution, Legislatively-Adopted Criteria: tion standards. splits were not legallyrequired tomeetequalpopula counties beingdivided,orshowing thatsomecounty tutional challengetoastatute,never tobe taken that “a court’s dutytoconsider aparty’s consti tion. been) invalidated for violatingthestateconstitu enjoy a“presumption ofvalidity,” butcan (and have Legal Standard: gerrymandering by acourt. provisions have not yet beenappliedagainstpartisan protection, andpurityofelections. tees offree speech,free assembly, dueprocess, equal constitution includessimilarprovisions, like guaran used tostrike down partisan gerrymanders.Texas’s sylvania, general civilrights protections have been MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION 38 However, theSupreme Court hasalsonoted 35

Redistricting bills,like other bills, 36 Whilethere are no Although partisan 37 However, these ------137 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 48 redistricting-case-summaries-2010-present.aspx 47 selection/index.cfm?state=TX 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 not invalid.” the legislature’s redistricting decisionsasare map and“mustattempt togive effect toasmany of ture’s mapsasthe“beginningpoint” for itssubstitute the court should usethevalid parts ofthelegisla of theLegislature” initsredistricting plan. interests oftheState asawhole,andthedecisions “the interests ofallpersonswhoappearbefore it,the make aninformed ruling.” some other manner, topermitthedistrictcourt to adduced by testimony, documents, stipulationsor hold ahearingwhichwill“provide sufficient evidence, If adistrictcourt doesadopt anewmap, itmustfirst pired) anopportunitytoremedy thedeficient maps. give thelegislature (unless itsauthoritytoacthasex cess.” the effect ofthecourt’s order ontheelectionpro to rectify itsown statutes,andafterdueregard for ests affected, afterduedeference tothelegislature and careful consideration ofthemany, diverse inter “that power ought tobeusedonlyafterinvestigation of newmapswhenthelegislature’s are invalidated, Because ofthis,whilecourts mayorder theadoption highly politically charged subjectofapportionment.” matters thanwhenthestatuteattacked involves the of government, are rarely more sensitive ofserious lightly, andthedeference owed acoordinate branch SPOTLIGHT: TEXAS Abbott v. Perez, 138S.Ct. 2305(2018). National Conference ofState Legislatures, “Redistricting Case Summaries” (Upd.Dec.1,2020), Tex. Const. art.V, §29.SeealsoNationalCenter for State Courts, “MethodsofJudicialSelection:Texas,” Tex. Const. art.V, §2. Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,718,720(Tex. 1991). Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,718,726(Tex. 1991). Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,718,720(Tex. 1991). Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,718,720(Tex. 1991). Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,718(Tex. 1991). Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829SW 2d712,717(Tex. 1991). 40 Before acourt adopts anewplanitmustfirst 44 (accessed Jan.5,2021). 42 Thecourt shouldconsider . 43 Finally,

- - - 41 39 -

which mostlyupheldtheLegislature’s mapsexcept ultimately arrived before theU.S. Supreme Court, and Equal Protection Clause. gerrymandering underboth theVoting Rights Act tied upinclaimsofillegalracially-discriminatory Prior History: of theSenate. the replacement justice withtheadvice andconsent is avacancy ontheCourt, thegovernor mayappoint terms inpartisanelections. Court consists ofninememberselectedtosix-year tricting planadopted by thelegislature. TheSupreme arbiter ofthelegalityunderstatelawany redis Supreme Court: an impermissibleracial gerrymander. as toonestatehousedistrict,whichwas heldtobe Texas’s 2010redistricting cycle was 46 https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/ The Texas Supreme Court isthefinal http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_ 45 47 However, whenthere Many ofthese claims 48

- 138 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY UTAH Threat 5:Areriggedelection mapshardtochallengeincourt? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK

party, orcandidate for office onlyapplytothecommission maps. three for theminorityparty. Criteria prohibiting intentionally favoring ordisfavoring anincumbent, appointed by themajority partyifthegovernor andlegislature are unilaterally controlled, leaving unconstrained inthemapapproval process. Ontheadvisorycommission, four commissioners are Republicans enjoy tripartitecontrol oftheUtahgovernment, andthelegislature isultimately 15, 2021. process are fairly insubstantial. Theironlyrequired publicmeetingissetanytime before September and practices related tothecommission are strong, thoserelated tothelegislative portionofthe stream hearings,allow for publiccomment andmaps,share information. Whilerequirements their mapsfor required publicconsideration by thecommission, and acommission website willlive- and participationrequirements. At eachmeeting,membersofthepublicare allowed tosubmit Seven publichearingsare required by theadvisorycommission alongwithstrong publicaccess the commission. these advisorymaps,andmayintroduce mapsof theirown, unbeholdentothecriteriaguiding maps atapublichearingwithcomment. Thelegislature bearsnoobligationtovote on Maps are promptly submittedtothelegislature, whichhasuntil September 15toconsider the the memberselectedby Republican leadershipandthememberselectedby Democratic leadership. three setsoflegislative andcongressional mapsby 5/7supermajorityvote, includingsupportfrom hearings around thestate,accepting publicmapproposals, andby August 21,2021,approves and theleadershipofmajorityminoritypartiesinSenate.This commission holdspublic create redistricting plans.Onemembereachischosenby thegovernor, thefour legislative leaders, in both chambers.Additionally, Utahstatutecreates aseven-member advisorycommission to by normalstatute,subjecttoagubernatorialveto whichcan beoverridden by a2/3supermajority The UtahLegislature isempowered toenactstatelegislative andcongressional redistricting plans past two redistricting cycles. past ruleswhethercitizens can challengemapsincourt. There were noapparent challengesinthe Maps are not automatically reviewed inany partoftheprocess anditisunclearfrom thecurrent or which face few tonorequirements basedontheconstitution alone. legislative districts. Theserequirements donot appeartoapplymapsdrafted by thelegislature, 1% populationdeviation limitbetween congressional districts anda10%deviation limitfor state favoring ordisfavoring anincumbent, party, orcandidate for office. Beyond that,there isastrict preserve geographic andpolitical subdivisions,preserve thecores ofpriordistricts, andprohibit compactness andcontiguity requirements, requirements topreserve communities ofinterest, Advisory commission mapsare heldtofairly strong statutoryredistricting criteria,including

139 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Citations and references: session startson January24,2022andendsMarch 12, 2022,atthelatest. be passedby thelegislature during thefirstlegislative sessionaftertherelease of Census data.For thiscycle, the next legislative Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY UTAH Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Whilethecommission mustpresent advisorymapstothelegislature by August 31,2021,redistricting plansmustthen

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Utah Code §20A-20-408; UtahConst. Art. VI,§2,16, IX§1 Legislative redistricting committee Advisory independent commission Required 1 (legislature). 7, across thestate (commission) September (legislature). Spring/summer 2021(commission). Final approval, Mar. 12,2022. August 31,2021 Advisory commission maps dueby in court. It isunclearifcitizens can challenge plans Maps are not automatically reviewed. Yes Yes, advisorycommission No, legislature commission advising Legislature, withunbalanced

Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: Relevant recent cases: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL Maps drafted by thecommission: legislature There are nocriteriafor mapsdrafted by the 5. Follow natural andgeographic boundaries 4. preserve communities ofinterest 3. contiguity 2. compactness 1. minimize division ofpolitical boundaries and congressional districts(ranked): Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative Maps drafted by thecommission: Utah Code §20A-20-302 5R governor) andthengubernatorialapproval: voting commission membersappointed by Appointed by commission selection(all Yes (2/3) 23R 58R Spencer Cox United - N/A incumbent, party, orcandidate for office. intentionally favoring ordisfavoring an deviation for statelegislative districts, congressional districts,more than10% than 1%deviation inpopulationbetween and congressional districtsprohibits: more Statutory criteria for both statelegislative - - - 0D 6D 17D Republican (79%)

(77%) (R)

N/A

140 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY VERMONT Threat 5:Areriggedelection mapshardtochallengeincourt? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK hold. the political landscape changeinthefuture, however, itisnot clearhow well thesesafeguards will of theseatsonboard asRepublicans andDemocrats, potentially limitingpartisanabuse.Should appointed by five different sources. Itisalsonotable thattheProgessive Party hasanequalshare Additionally, theLegislative Apportionment Board ismadeupofmultipledifferent partiesand Progressives andIndependents joiningDemocrats would give thatcoalition thestrength. veto authority, andnopartycurrently hasthevotes tooverride aveto ineachchamber, though While thelegislature doespassthefinalplansfor thegovernor’s approval, thegovernor retains approval mayprovide more timefor comment. require planstobe“available for publicinspection.” Thelongrunway between mapintroduction and Public hearingsare not required by law, thoughthey are pastpractice, andstatestatutedoes seats afterthe2020Census. Vermont hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additional approve, modify, orreject themaps. by citiesandtowns before thefinaldraft ispresented tothelegislature. Thelegislature can then to belegislatorsorlegislative staffers. After themapsgothrough theboard, they can bereviewed appointed by thechiefjustice oftheVermont Supreme Court. Commissioners are alsonot allowed each partyandpolitical partyappoints onecommissioner themselves. The“special master”is Board alongsideDemocrats andRepublicans. Thegovernor appoints oneofthecommissioners from Vermont’s legislature ispartoftheProgressive Party, givingittwo seatsontheApportionment members total; two from eachpartyandone“special master.” Asignificant enoughportionof reapportionment process isinitiatedby theLegislative Apportionment Board madeupofseven subject togubernatorialveto, whichcan beoverridden witha2/3vote ineachchamber. The The Vermont legislature retains theauthoritytoapprove redistricting plansby simplestatute, maps. Inthiscase, theVermont Supreme Court heldupthestate’s plan. days oftheenactment. Thelasttimemaps were reviewed incourt was in2004, challenging2002 Vermont Supreme Court, whichhasexclusive jurisdiction, toreview aredistricting planwithin30 Vermont doesnot have automaticjudicialreview, butany group offive citizens maypetitionthe Protecting incumbents isexplicitly allowed andplayed asignificant factor inthe2011cycle. lack ofprohibition ofunfair practices, makes thereapportionment opentopartisanorunfair plans. allow for theconsideration ofincumbencywhendrawing maps.Theseallowances, as well as a political subdivisions.Further statutesrequire thepreservation ofcommunities ofinterest and unfair maps.TheVermont Constitution onlyrequires compact, contiguous districtsthatpreserve There are relatively few redistricting criteria beyond thefederal standards, potentially allowing for

141 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: Census delaywillinfluence theredistricting process. towns andcitiesuntil Aug. 1,2021.Theboard mustsendfinalmapstothestatelegislature by Aug. 15,2021.Itisnot clearhow the has earlierdeadlinesthroughout thedrafting process. Maps mustbeinitiallydrafted by July1,2021and thenopenfor suggestions by Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY VERMONT Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Whilefinalmapsmustbeapproved duringthelegislature’s regular 2022session,theLegislative Apportionment Board

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per Justin Levitt’s AllAbout Redistricting: Apportionment ofTowns ofWoodbury andWorcester, 861A.2d1117 (Vt. 2004) Vermont Const. Ch.II§§13,18,73; 17Vermont Stat. §1903-1909,2356;Princeton GerrymanderingProject Board Committee andLegislative Apportionment House Government Operations Not required. (But pastpractice) No publichearingsrequired Started fall 2020;ongoing. Aug. 15,2021. through Aug. 1.Finaladvisorymapsdue cities maycomment oninternal divisions draft mapsdueJuly1,2021.Towns and 2022 legislative session.Advisory board’s petition. jurisdiction. 5ormore citizens may Vermont Supreme Court retains exclusive Yes No Legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None interests.” interaction, trade, political ties,andcommon defined as“patternsofgeography, social preservation ofcommunities ofinterest, and statelegislative mapsrequire the2. Statutory criteriafor both congressional subdivisions. contiguous districtsthatpreserve political and statelegislative maps:1.compact, Constitutional criteriafor both congressional Vermont Constitution Ch.II§§13,18,73 by Democratic governors. ( appointed by Republican governors andtwo All officiallynonpartisan,thoughthree were approval: Assisted appointment andthenlegislative supermajority required) independent membervotes (2/3 Potentially, with progressive and 21D 92D Phil Scott Republican governor Divided – districts Considering incumbency, Multi-member + 2P + 7P5I

(R) Democratic legislature, - 7R - 46R (70%) (61%) 3R - 2D )

142 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY VIRGINIA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK

also have proportional population,protect acitizen’s right tovote onthebasisofrace, provide partisan andprisongerrymandering,whilealsoprotecting communities ofinterest. Mapsmust Statutory redistricting criteriafor statelegislative andcongressional mapsare very strong, banning all electedby thelegislature. legislature fails topassaplanmaynot protect mapsfrom partisaninfluence, asthosejustices are further girds againstabuse.Vesting finaldecision-makingintheVirginia Supreme Court ifthe against partisaninfluence, andtheinabilityofGeneral Assemblytoamendsuggestedmaps requirements for allmaps,includingasupermajorityofcitizen commissioners, helptoprotect While thecommission’s appointment structure prevents real independence, supermajorityapproval public. Thewebsite mustalsohave aportalfor publiccomment andsubmissions. commission mustalsodevelop awebsite where dataandcurrent planscan beaccessed by the various partsofthestatebefore drafting orvoting hastaken place onany particularplan.The Public inputisrequired throughout theprocess, includingthree publiccommission meetingsat redraw thelines. or thecommission fail totransmit aplan,theVirginia Supreme Court retains backstopauthorityto and mustvote commission plansupor down. ShouldtheAssemblyreject two commission plans, chamber approving aredistricting planfor thatchamber). ThefullGeneral Assemblycannot amend the 8citizen commissioners tobesent tothelegislature (with 3of4thelegislatorsfrom either legislative leaders). Mapsmust receive thesupportof68legislative commissioners and6of by aselectionpanelofretired judges(two nominatedfrom alistprovided by eachoftheabove each chosenby majorityandminorityleadersineachchamber), andeight are citizens chosen legislative andcongressional lines.Eight ofthecommissioners are tobelegislators(with two The Virginia Constitution empowers a16-memberredistricting commission toredraw thestate upheld by theSupreme Court. of Virginia’s districtsviolatedtherights ofBlackvoters toequalprotection. Thisdecision was later clear pathtocitizen challengesofunfair mapsincourt. In2018,athree-judge panelruledthat11 unconstitutional, butbasedontheprocess laidoutintheconstitution andstatutes,there isnot a Statute authorizes thecommission toremediate redistricting plansfound unlawful or requirement maychangetheredistricting calculus. of theVoting Rights Act was weakened inShelby County v. Holder. Theabsence ofapreclearance to electcandidates oftheirchoice. Thiscycle represents thefirstsince theprotection ofSection5 population, contiguous and compact territory, andopportunitiesfor racial andethniccommunities contiguous andcompact. Constitutional requirements are much slimmer, however, requiring equal language andracial minoritieswith equalopportunity, preserve communities ofinterest, andbe

143 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX

REDISTRICTING SUMMARY VIRGINIA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REDISTRICTING PROCESS

N/A and comment. Public authorized tosubmitmaps At least3 released 60/45 days afterCensus datais No setdate,butlikely inthe redrafting. additional days for consideration, maps within60days. 36 of Census deadline,congressional legislative mapswithin45days 2021. Commission submits backstop authority Virginia Supreme Court retains No legislature Yes, for maptransmission to half-citizen) commission (half-legislative, 16-member balanced redistricting

Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits:

REDISTRICTING CRITERIA of interest equal opportunity 4. of citizens’ right tovote onthebasisofrace compliance withVoting Rights Act) requirements (makes sure statemapsare in population additional criteria(unranked): There are additionalstatutesimplementing compact andcontiguous. The Virginia Constitution requires districtstobe Virginia Constitution, Art.II,6 7 justices allofficiallynonpartisan governor ifleg.isnot insession: Appointed by thelegislature, appointed by the N/A 21D - 55D - Ralph Northam United - None gerrymandering, prisongerrymandering state legislative mapsprohibits: partisan Statutory criteria for both congressional and territory Provide languageandracial minoritieswith POLITICAL CONTROL 18R 45R Democratic 6. - (55%) 2. Contiguous territory 1V Adhering tofederal andstate (D) (54%) 5. Preserve communities 1. Proportional 7. 3. Compact No denial

144 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX (Va. 2018). F. Supp. 3d128(E.D. Va. 2018);Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.ofElections,137S.Ct. 788(2017);Vesilind v. Va. State Bd.ofElections,813S.E.2d739 dismissed for lackofstandingsubnom.Va. HouseofDelegatesv. Bethune-Hill, 139S.Ct. 1945(2019);Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.ofElections,326 Relevant recent cases: (Mar. 19,2021); Citations andreferences: Census delaywillinfluence theredistricting process. using current maps,withnewlydrawn mapsusedfor 2022specialelectionsand2023regular elections.Itisnot clearhow the Virginia Supreme Court. Because Virginia holdsstatelegislative electionsin2021,itispossiblethesecontests willhave toberun rejected. Thelegislature thenhas7days tovote onthealtered plan.Ifthealtered planisrejected again,themapsare drawn by the swiftly with15days for thelegislature tovote upordown onmaps,andthen14days for thecommission toalterthemapsif a congressional redistricting planwithin60days. After thoseinitialdeadlinestopresent mapstothelegislature, theprocess moves must submitstatelegislative redistricting plans totheGeneral Assemblywithin45days ofreceiving Census data,andmustsubmit Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY VIRGINIA TheVirginia Constitution statesreapportionment mustbedonein2021,and,further, that theredistricting commission

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.ofElections,368F. Supp. 3d872(E.D. Va. 2019),appeal Virginia Const, Art.II,§6;Va. Code §24.2-304.04,30-400;“2020Census Delays andtheImpactonRedistricting,” NCSL 145 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WASHINGTON Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? LOW RISK LOW RISK LOW RISK MODERATE RISK LOW RISK The Washington Constitution requires statelegislative and congressional redistricting plansbe Democrats. the Washington Supreme Court, abody, which,whileofficiallynonpartisan,appearstofavor the effective representation. However, ifmapsfail tomake itoutofcommission, they’re drawn by the commission todraw districtsthatencourage electoral competition andprovide fair and a plantopurposelyfavor ordisfavor apolitical partyorgroup, andstatutefurtherrequires amendments unilaterally. Additionally, thestateconstitution barsthecommission from drawing gird againstpartisanabuse—at present, neitherpartyhastherequisite 2/3strength topass Supermajority approval requirements for commission maps andlegislative amendments helpto is considered. must holdacertain numberofhearingsaround thestate,anditisnot apparent ifpubliccomment Additionally, plansmustbepublishedwithanexplanation ofcriteria.Itisnot clearthecommission Commission meetingsmustbeopentothepublic,andare subject toOpenPublicMeetingslaws. November deadline,theWashington Supreme Court hastheauthoritytoredraw thelines. more than2percent ofthepopulationany district.Ifthecommission doesn’t passmapsby the commission witha2/3vote ineachbody. Statute dictatessuch amendments maynot include legislature thenhas30days toreconvene thecommission toamendthemapsorreconvene the To approve theredistricting plans,3/4ofthevoting commissioners mustvote infavor. The Democratic leadershipcan befound commissioners have already beenselectedfor thecurrent cycle. Commissioners appointed by member toserve aschair. There isnoapparent deadlinefor whenmembersmustbechosen,and major partyineachlegislative body. Thesefour commissioners thenselectafifth,non-voting The redistricting commission ismadeupoffive members,withoneeachchosenby headsofeach recent examples ofmapschanging duetoacourt challenge. appears thosechallengeswere withdrawn. Whilecitizens can challengethemaps,there are not any maps afterpassageoramendment. Mapsfrom the2010cycle were challengedincourt, butit retains originaljurisdictionover redistricting cases, and any registered voter maychallengethe The process doesnot includeautomaticjudicialreview ofmaps.TheWashington Supreme Court commission toprovide fair andeffective representation andencourage electoral competition. statute requires recognition ofcommunities ofinterest, minimalcounty subdivision, andthe purposely favor ordisfavor apolitical partyorgroup. Thesecriteriaare unranked. Additionally, geographic barriers,artificial barriers,orboundariesofpolitical subdivisions,andnot drawn to drawn withcontiguous, compact, andconvenient districtsofequalpopulationseparated by natural

here andRepublican leadership here.

146 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: §44.05.080, §44.05.130 Citations andreferences: the mapswithadeadline ofApril30,2022. to reconvene thecommission and/or amendplans.Ifthecommission fails tosendaplan thelegislature, theWashington Supreme Court thendrafts legislature for possibleamendment withadeadlineof30days afterplanswere received (December 15,2021).A2/3vote ineachchamberisrequired Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WASHINGTON Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required # of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Theredistricting commission hasuntil November 15,2021topassplanswith3/4support(three members). Theplansthengotothe

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per Justin Levitt’s AllABout Redistricting: 2012Wash. State Redistricting Plan,No. 86976-6(Wash. S.Ct. Nov. 2d,2012). Washington Const., ArtII,§43;Washington Code §44.05.090,§§44.05.010 –.140,§§29A.24.050;44.05.100, N/A Not clearly required No required number Nov. 15,2021 the release ofCensus dataand No setdate,butsometimebetween needed) April 30,2022(Supreme Court maps,if 30 additionaldays for leg.amendment; Nov. 15, 2021(commission maps); and explicit backstopauthority. original jurisdictioninredistricting cases, The Washington Supreme Court has No Yes, 3/4neededtopassmaps commission 5-member balanced redistricting

Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: Prohibits: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL commission toprovide fair andeffective minimal county subdivision,andthe recognition ofcommunities ofinterest, and congressional maps(unranked): Statutory criteriafor both statelegislative subdivisions. artificial barriers,orboundariesofpolitical separated by natural geographic barriers, convenient, withequalpopulation (unranked): contiguous, compact, and legislative andcongressional maps Constitutional criteriafor both state Washington Constitution, Art2,Sect.43 5 D governor incase ofvacancy: Nonpartisan electionorappointment by No (2/3supermajorityneeded) 28D - 57D - Jay Inslee United - None Partisan mapsandprisongerrymandering competition. representation andencourage electoral appointments, 41R 20R +1D Democratic (D) (58%) (57%) 4 NP elected

147 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WEST VIRGINIA Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK communities ofinterest through statutefor thatcycle’s redistricting plan. be drawn tobecompact. In2011,thestatelegislature passedafurtherrequirement toprotect population, and,inthecase ofcongressional andstatesenatedistricts,preserve counties and Overall, redistricting criteriaare weak, requiring onlythatdistrictsare contiguous, contain equal case found partisangerrymanderingpermissibleunderthelaw. 77% ofthestatehouseand68%senate,aswell asthegovernorship, anda2012court There are noreal checksthrough theprocess thatcould prevent partisanmaps.Republicans hold over thesummerin2011 cycle, whiletheHousecommittee didnot. There are nopublichearingsrequired, thoughtheSenatecommittee didhold9informal meetings to gubernatorialveto, whichmaybeoverridden withanother simplemajority. The West Virginia legislature hastheauthoritytoenactredistricting plansby simplestatute,subject courts. Additionally, a2012court case found partisangerrymandering permissibleunderthelaw. both congressional andstateplanswere challengedandboth were heldupby theirrespective passed instatecourt for statemaps andafederal court for congressional maps.Inthepastcycle, While mapsare not automatically reviewed, citizens are allowed to challengemapsafterthey’re

148 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 3 (2012);West Virginia ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant, 730S.E.2d368(W. Va. 2012). Manchin, 188F. Supp. 2d651(N.D.W.Va. 2002),aff’d subnom.Unger v. Manchin,536U.S. 935(2002);Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 133S.Ct. Relevant recent cases: Project Citations andreferences: The onlyrequirement isthatstatelegislative mapsmaynot bedrafted mid-decade. Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WEST VIRGINIA Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION West Virginia doesnot have asetdeadlineonwhenstatelegislative orcongressional mapsmustbedrafted orpassed.

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Per JustinLevitt’s AllAboutRedistricting: West Virginia ex rel. Cooper v. Tennant, 730S.E.2d 368,390(W. Va. 2012);Deemv. West Virginia Const. Art.I,§4,VI,10,VII,§14;West Virginia Code Chap. I,Art.II,§1;Princeton Gerrymandering House Redistricting Committee Senate Redistricting Task Force (But pastpractice) None required None required Not clear No deadline congressional maps court for statemapsandfederal court for Citizens can challengemaps inastate Yes No Legislature

Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL gerrymandering Multi-member districts(statelevel), partisan None equal aspossible. congressional districtsonly),and 3. congressional districtsonly) (unranked): legislative andcongressional districts Constitutional criteriafor both state 6, Sect.4 West Virginia Const Art.1,Sect.4and on appointments, Technically 5 nonpartisanjudges,butbased election: Appointment by governor andnonpartisan Yes (simplemajority) 23R - 77R - Jim Justice United - preserve county lines(statesenateand 11D 23D Republican (77%) (R) (68%) 1. compact (statesenateand 4R - 1D 2. contiguous 4. beas

149 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX adopted on7/20/11.Note: Thestate/federal candidate filingdeadlineis6/1/22. 3/10/22. There isnolegaldeadlinefor adopting congressional maps.Inthe2010cycle, both stateandcongressional mapswere Timing note: REDISTRICTING PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE ESPECIALLY CONTENTIOUS. THIS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SEVERAL BATTLEGROUND STATES WHERE THE SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? HIGH RISK HIGH RISK MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK Legislative mapsmustbeadopted inthefirst sessionafterthecensus, currently scheduledtogofrom 1/5/21to to protect againstadominant partyredistricting for partisangain. redistricting maps.Inthefuture, shouldthepolitical landscape shift,there appearstobevery little contrary toprevailing legalprecedent, thattheGovernor’s signature isnot required toadopt deadlock onredistricting, inwhichcase acourt willdraw thelines.SomeRepublicans have argued, Because of this,theLegislature andGovernor are likely toeitheradopt acompromise mapor of theLegislature butdonot have thesupermajoritiesneededtooverturn agubernatorialveto. Wisconsin hasdividedgovernment. TheGovernor isaDemocrat. Republicans control both houses Senate ontheproposed statelegislative andcongressional mapsandnoneintheAssembly. stated they willbeignoringthisprocess. In2011,theLegislature heldonlyonepublichearing inthe Commission thatisholdingpublichearings.However, Republican leadershipintheLegislature have engagement. Democratic Governor Evers has, by executive order, created anonpartisanAdvisory There are noredistricting-specific laws requiring publichearingsorproviding opportunitiesfor public may argue theGovernor hasnorole approving redistricting bills. Governor mayapprove orveto. Vetoes maybeoverridden by 2/3vote. Note: TheGOPLegislature The Legislature adopts legislative andcongressional districtsby majority-vote bill,whichthe the U.S. Constitution, aWisconsin districtcourt dismisseditspartisangerrymanderinglawsuit. Rucho v. Common Cause, whichheldthatpartisangerrymandering claimsare not justiciable under discriminatory andpartisangerrymandering, andasaresult oftheU.S. Supreme Court’s decision in legislative andcongressional redistricting plansfrom the2010cycle were challengedfor racially- There are nospeciallegalprocedures for bringingredistricting cases instatecourt. Wisconsin’s within it. and cannot divideassembly districts;thus,eachsenatedistricthasthree Assemblydistrictsnested political subdivisions.State senatedistrictsmustbecomposed of“convenient” contiguous territory redistricting, state assemblydistrictsmustbecontiguous, compact, andfollow theborders of The stateconstitution provides noredistricting criteriafor congressional redistricting. For state 150 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Process Reform &Ethics Elections; SenCmte. onElections,Election Assembly Cmte. onCampaigns & unless waived All billsrequire 1publichearinginSenate, (only 1heldin2011) None Likely 2021 Congressional: Note State legislative: 2022session No Yes No Legislature Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided Allows: REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None There are nocriteriafor congressional maps. convenient contiguity maps (unranked): nest3Assemblydistricts; Constitutional criteriafor stateSenate use political subdivisionboundaries maps (unranked): contiguity; compactness; Constitutional criteriafor stateAssembly Constitution 4 conservative Nonpartisan election: No (2/3supermajorityneeded) 20R 60R Tony Evers Republican legislature Divided - None

- -

12D 38D Democratic governor, (D) - 1V - 1V

- 3liberal

(R: 61%) (R: 61%)

151 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX the more traditional pathoflitigation,where suitsbeginwiththetrialcourt thencan beappealedtohighercourts. 8 justices-skeptical-of-gop-redistricting-proposal/article_9dbadd5e-45c4-5344-bb90-5c805b64da52.html 7 maps once in1972). 6 5 4 30, 2020), a9d61773-5765-5f52-86b2-659dab84b023.html madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/rumors-of-gop-move-to-redistrict-without-tony-evers-approval-spark-controversy/article_ 3 2 1 den by thelegislature by a2/3vote ofboth houses. case itshallnot belaw.” final adjournment, prevents thebill’s return, inwhich the billoritbecomes law, unlessthelegislature “by the governor, heorshehassixdays tosignorveto Once aredistricting bill,like any bill,ispresented to overturn thispriorprecedent from decades ago. the present conservative-majority Supreme Court will to redistricting by joint resolution, inthehopesthat the Democratic governor by once more attempting Republican legislature mayattempt tocircumvent well-settled, there are nonethelessrumorsthatthe of both legislative houses. passed over hisorherveto by asupermajorityvote through abillthatiseithersignedby thegovernor or held thatredistricting planscould onlybeenacted do not gotothegovernor for approval), andinstead the legislature toredistrict by joint resolution (which consin Supreme Court struckdown anattempt by for hisorhersignature or veto. In1964,theWis process, whichincludespresentment tothegovernor through billsgoingthrough theordinary legislative and historical practice, newdistrictsare adopted of inhabitants.” of thesenateandassembly, according tothenumber ture shallapportionanddistrictanewthemembers process. TheConstitution provides that“thelegisla and congressional redistricting (“apportionment”) In Wisconsin, thelegislature controls both thestate HOW ELECTION MAPS ARE DRAWN? THREAT 1: CAN POLITICIANS CONTROL SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN In other words, the plaintiffs were askingtheSupreme Court for permissiontofilearedistricting lawsuit directly withtheSupreme Court, rather than Scott Bauer, “Wisconsin justices skeptical ofGOPredistricting proposal,” APGMedia(AP) (Jan.18,2020), Jensen v. Wisconsin ElectionsBd., Wis. Const. art.IV, §9(2)(a). Wis. Const. art.IV, §9(3). Scott Bauer, “Rumors ofGOPmove toredistrict withoutTony Evers’ approval sparkcontroversy,” Wisconsin State Journal(Jul.31,2019), State exrel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, Wis. Const. art.IV, §3. https://thebadgerproject.org/2020/11/30/the-election-is-over-wisconsin-turns-to-redistricting/ 1 Underlongstandinglegalprecedent 4 Vetoed billsmaybeoverrid 2 249Wis.2d706,710(2002)(between 1962and2002theLegislature onlysuccessfully adopted redistricting Whilethisprecedent is 22 Wis.2d544,553-559(1964). ; Peter Cameron, “TheElectionisOver. Wisconsin Turns toRedistricting,” TheBadgerProject (Nov. 3 - - 5 - legislature fail todoso.Thepetitionisopposedby and not afederal court, draws newmapsshouldthe claims thiswillhelpensure theState Supreme Court, er thanatrialcourt) over redistricting litigation.WILL jurisdiction (i.e.bethefirstcourt tohearacase, rath to adopt arulesothatthe Court willassumeoriginal preme Court (which hasa4-3conservative majority) Law &Liberty(WILL),haspetitionedtheState Su conservative organization, theWisconsin Institutefor sin’s history over thepasthalf-century. which hashappenedmore oftenthannot inWiscon fails toadopt mapsduetosomepolitical deadlock, and particularlyfor addressing whenthelegislature process for redistricting litigationinstatecourts, There are nostatutesproviding aspeciallegal Court hadtoolittletimetoadopt mapsbefore the refused toaccept originaljurisdictionbecause the ordinarily behighlyappropriate,” butinthisinstance participation intheresolution oftheseissueswould the “absence ofatimelylegislative compromise, our adopt legislative maps. with theCourt (insteadofatrialcourt), askingitto sin Supreme Court for leave tofileanoriginalaction maps, Republican legislatorspetitionedtheWiscon bly andDemocratic senatedeadlocked onadopting ago. Inthe2000cycle, whentheRepublican assem aborted rulemakingby theCourt from two decades The conservative petitionisfollowing uponan Supreme Court. are better-equipped todoinitialfact-finding thanthe tions, amongothers, whoargue thatlower courts Democrats andgoodgovernment reform organiza 7 www.apg-wi.com/news/state/wisconsin- 8 TheCourt agreed that,in . . 6 However, a https:// ------152 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX 19 also Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Wisconsin,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/WI (accessed Jan.3,2020). Wisconsin Legislature, “SenateBill149”(2011-12Session)(congressional districts), 18 17 16 Levitt, “Wisconsin,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/wisconsin (accessed Jan.4,2021). state-guide-redistricting 15 redistricting/public-input-and-redistricting.aspx 14 wisconsin-justices-skeptical-of-gop-redistricting-proposal/article_9dbadd5e-45c4-5344-bb90-5c805b64da52.html 13 scrules/pending/2003.htm 12 11 10 9 want to. original jurisdictionover redistricting cases shouldit has authoritywithoutadopting rulestoassume of theproposal, inpartbecause theCourt already both liberal andconservative justices seemskeptical According tonewspaper coverage, atthehearing a hearingonWILL’s petitiononJanuary14,2021. for theCourt toadopt afinalmap. the publictoprovide comment onthatproposal, and to collect evidence andtopropose adraft map, for steps for partiestosubmitdraft maps,for theCourt adopted maps,theproposed rulewould alsosetup intervene intheaction.IfLegislature hasnot the assembly, andthepolitical partiestheright to proposed rulewould give thegovernor, thesenate, actions relating toredistricting before theCourt. The to amenditsrulesallow plaintiffs tobringoriginal With thependingpetition,WILLhasasked theCourt to adopt anewprocedural rule. the issuefor sixyears, before ultimatelydecidingnot in [future] redistricting cases.” ceedings regarding procedures for originaljurisdiction comment, butpledgedto“initiaterulemakingpro clude opportunitiesfor adversarial briefingandpublic place procedures for redistricting, whichwould in was alsoconcerned thatitlacked thetimetoputin vanced lawsuit pendinginfederal court. upcoming electionandthere was already amore-ad SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Jensen v. Wisconsin ElectionsBd., Governor Tony Evers, Executive Order No.66(Jan.27,2020), See Wisconsin Legislature, “SenateBill148”(2011-12Session)(legislative districts), Senate Rule18(1m). Assembly Rule14(1). See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Wisconsin” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), National Conference ofState Legislatures, “PublicInputandRedistricting; Wisconsin” (Upd.Sep. 9,2019) Scott Bauer, “Wisconsin justices skeptical ofGOPredistricting proposal,” APGMedia(AP) (Jan.18,2020), Wisconsin Supreme Court, “Pending Petitions: 20-03Amendment toWis.Stat. §809.70(Redistricting)” (Jun.3,2020), Wisconsin Supreme Court, Order No.02-03(Jan.30,2009). Jensen v. Wisconsin ElectionsBd., 13 ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Wisconsin,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/WI (accessed Jan.3,2020);Justin . 249 Wis.2d706,710(2002). 249Wis.2d706,720(2002). 10 11 ThatCourt studied 12 . TheCourt held 9 TheCourt https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO/EO066-PeoplesMapsCommission.pdf - - - Organization. requirement iswaived by theCommittee onSenate every billmustreceive apublichearing, unlessthis hearing attheirdiscretion. rules, any committee chairmayscheduleapublic lative orcongressional maps. requiring publichearingspriortoadopting newlegis Hearings: and transparency requirements. for publichearings,comment, oropenmeeting Wisconsin hasnoredistricting-specific requirement least onepublichearingineachofthestate’s eight judges, whoare required undertheorder toholdat sion” hasninemembers,selectedby three retired to theLegislature. and recommend legislative andcongressional maps “nonpartisan advisorycommission” toholdhearings Governor Evers, by executive order, hascreated a only committee toheartheredistricting bills. congressional mapsonJuly13,2011. Operations heldonepublichearingonthestateand on Judiciary, Utilities,Commerce, andGovernment Senate. Inthe2011cycle, theSenateCommittee redistricting billsreceived onlyonehearinginthe DRAWN IN SECRET? THREAT 2: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/sb149 www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50- https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/sb148 There are noredistricting-specific laws 17 In2011,thestateandcongressional 19 The“People’s MapsCommis www.apg-wi.com/news/state/ https://www.ncsl.org/research/ 16 Underthesenaterules, 15 Undertheassembly 14 . www.wicourts.gov/ 18 Thiswas the . . See - ; - 153 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX See the Supreme Court clarifiedthatallegations ofpartisangerrymanderingare not required tofindaviolationoftheConstitution’s redistricting criteria. gerrymanders” mayrunafoul oftheConstitutional criteria. 26 Levitt, “Wisconsin,” AllAboutRedistricting, https://redistricting.lls.edu/state/wisconsin (accessed Jan.4,2021). state-guide-redistricting 25 org/2020/11/30/the-election-is-over-wisconsin-turns-to-redistricting/ 24 23 22 21 6750dab064f7.html tony-evers-appoints-judges-to-select-members-of-redistricting-commission-application-process-opens/article_e267b2c8-1db1-53c7-a554- commission, application process opens,” Wisconsin State Journal(Jul.10,2020), 20 break withpriorhistorical practice. without thegovernor’s signature, whichwould bea legal argument thatthelegislature maypassmaps ment. However, someRepublicans are advancing a happened inprevious cycles withdividedgovern the courts mayberequired toadopt maps,ashas to adopt redistricting mapsor, ifthere isadeadlock, licans will likely have tonegotiate withDemocrats ties required tooverturn aveto. Asaresult, Repub substantial margins, butlessthanthesupermajori control both housesoftheWisconsin legislature by Wisconsin, Tony Evers, isaDemocrat. Republicans Wisconsin hasdividedgovernment. TheGovernor of the course ofitsenactments.” utes have beencomplied withby thelegislature in whether internal operating rulesorprocedural stat stitutional mandates,“thiscourt willnot determine the Supreme Court hasheldthat,asidefrom con rules whichincludenotice requirements; laws, andeachhouseofthe legislature hasadopted Wisconsin hasadditionalstatutoryopenmeeting when thepublicwelfare shallrequire secrecy.” “doors ofeachhouseshallbekept openexcept Open Meetings: accepting electronic publiccomment onitswebsite. congressional districts. RIGGED FOR PARTISAN GAIN? THREAT 3: CAN ELECTION MAPS BE SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN State exrel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, State exrel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, See Brennan Center, “50State GuidetoRedistricting: Wisconsin” (Upd.Jun.7,2019), Peter Cameron, “TheElectionisOver. Wisconsin Turns toRedistricting,” TheBadgerProject (Nov. 30,2020), State exrel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, See, e.g., Sen.Rule25(b) (requiring notice ofcommittee meetings24hoursinadvance). Wis. Const. art.IV, §10.SeealsoJoint Rule27(committee hearingsopentothepublic). Governor Tony Evers, Executive Order No.66(Jan.27,2020);MitchellSchmidt,“Gov. Tony Evers appoints judgestoselectmembersofredistricting . Under thestateconstitution, the ; Princeton GerrymanderingProject, “Wisconsin,” https://gerrymander.princeton.edu/reforms/WI (accessed Jan.3,2020);Justin 20 TheCommission isalso 798NW2d436,440(Wis.2011)(citations omitted). 23 22Wis.2d544,566-567(1964). 81Wis.440,485(1892)(emphasis inoriginal).Early cases suggestedonly “clear andobvious 24 22 however, See State exrel. Bowman v. Dammann, 21

- - - - - . district. uous assemblydistrictsare packaged asasenate districts are drawn first,thensetsofthree contig with thesecriteriagenerally meansthatassembly tory andcannot divideassemblydistricts.Complying must becomposed of“convenient” contiguous terri the borders ofpolitical subdivisions.Senatedistricts districts mustbecontiguous, compact, andfollow but noneforcongressional redistricting. criteria for drawing assemblyandsenatedistricts, The Wisconsin Constitution establishesredistricting federal legalrestrictions onredistricting, which Finally, like allstates,Wisconsin mustcomply with gerrymandering inother states. protections whichhave beenheldtoprohibit partisan tion, however, doesincludeseveral general civilrights tion onpartisangerrymandering.Thestateconstitu the Wisconsin Constitution includesnodirect prohibi adoption ofthecurrent criteria,unlike somestates, partisan gerrymanderingmayhave motivated the sentation inthelegislature.” that sacred right ofafree people,— ofequalrepre tion asabsolutelynecessary tosecure tothepeople regarded by thevery ablemembersoftheconven gerrymandering ground thatthey would prevent thelegislature from at itsconstitutional convention “upontheexpress Wisconsin’s stateredistricting criteriawere adopted WEAK? THREAT 4: ARE THE LEGAL STANDARDS https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/gov- www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/50- 209 Wis.21,31(1932).However, inlatercases, thestate.Theserestrictions were https://thebadgerproject. 26 But,whilepreventing 25 Assembly ------154 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX prevailing ward-based method ofredistricting infavor ofablock-based planputforth before local governments had finishedwiththeirlocal lines”). Keane, “Redistricting inWisconsin,” Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 12(Apr. 1,2016) (2011planwas “notable for havingabandoned the legislature redistricting legislative districts under articleIV, section3,oftheconstitution orredistricting congressional districts”).Seealso Michael 37 36 Wisconsin nolongerhasprecincts.”). 35 34 race-representation-redistricting-why-milwaukee-s-wards-became-districts#stream/0 Salazar, “Race, Representation &Redistricting: Why Milwaukee’s Wards Became Districts,” WUWM(Jan. 11, 2019), 33 32 county was regarded inthenature of‘a smallrepublic’”). Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, contemplated thatthenecessity was likely toarisefor dividingupcitiesby ward linesintheformation ofassemblydistricts”). 31 http://www.lwm-info.org/DocumentCenter/View/1032/17-2-Citizens-Guide-?bidId= 30 29 28 27 goal ofnot splittingWisconsin’s municipalities. on, thelegislature andcourts have oftenadopted a not. as citiesandvillagessometimessplitcounties, sodid county, andsorespected county boundaries,where the timewere required tobelocated entirely inone districts thatrespected county boundaries:towns at villages. Thiswas donetoprioritize thecreation of counties andtowns, notably leavingoutcitiesand Of these,theconstitution onlyexpressly protects governments: counties, cities,villages,andtowns. four typesoflegally-distinct, general-purpose local fact includeallpolitical subdivisions.Wisconsin has lature respect “political subdivisions,” itdoesnot in often generally framed asrequiring that theLegis precinct, town orward lines.” Assembly districtsmustbe“boundedby county, Assembly -County, Precinct,Town orWard Lines: does not impactWisconsin. struck down thelistofstatesrequiring preclearance, such, the under Section5oftheVoting Rights Act (VRA). As district lineswiththefederal Department ofJustice ties). its discriminationagainstracial andlanguageminori and Section2oftheVoting Rights Act (which prohib dards andtheuseofrace asaredistricting criterion) tion Clause(which addresses equalpopulationstan include theFourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Wis. Stat. §5.15(1)(c) (once adopted ward boundariesmaynot bechangedfor adecade “unlessadivisionisrequired toeffect anactofthe Wis. Stat. §5.15(1)(b). Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., Wis. Stat. §5.15et seq. Michael Keane, “Redistricting inWisconsin,” Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, 12(Apr. 1,2016).SeealsoAngelinaMosher See, e.g., Wis.State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., State exrel. Lamb v. Cunningham, Curt Witynski,“A Citizen’s GuidetoWisconsin CitiesandVillages,” League ofWisconsin Municipalities(Feb. 2017), Wis. Const. art.IV, §4. 570 U.S. 529(2013). U.S. Const. amend.XIV, §1;52U.S.C. §10101etseq 31 27 Nonetheless,whilenot aconstitutional criteri Wisconsin was never required topreclear its Shelby County v. Holder 81Wis.440,513(1892)(Pinney, J.,concurring) (at theconvention the“leadingideaseemstohave beenthateach 81Wis.440,521-522(1892)(Lyon, C.J.,concurring) (cities andvillagessometimessplitcounty lines); 28 83 Wis.90,148(1892)(“itismanifest thattheframers oftheconstitution, even atthatearlyday, 543F. Supp. 630,635n.2.(E.D. Wis.1982)(“TheConstitution alsorequires adherence toprecinct lines,but 29 Whilethiscriterionis decision,which 543F. Supp. 630,635-636(E.D. Wis.1982). 32 - 30 - - - -

- - also identified intheConstitution asapermissible (Further complicating matters,theterm“precincts,” law, andfunctionasvoting precincts inWisconsin. wards islefttolocal governments, regulated by state legislative districtsinthefuture.” and tofacilitate thecreation ofequalpopulation the Census Bureau toprovide local populationdata was created “toserve assub-districtstobeusedby districts” and“a newgeographic subunitcalled ward” the terminologysothatwards became “aldermanic to council districts,in1971thelegislature changed Bureau, whereas “wards” hadpreviously referred tion. According toWisconsin’s Legislative Reference evolution since itwas firstusedintheConstitu The term“ward” inWisconsin hasundergone some to benear-absolute. In1953,theSupreme Court sion boundaries,andparticularlycounties, used The requirement topreserve political subdivi legislature duringredistricting. state andcongressional boundariesadopted by the that wards boundariesbechangedtoconform to 2011 thelegislature amendedstatecode torequire important redistricting buildingblockinWisconsin, in ritory. other settlements” andconsist of“contiguous” ter community ofinterest ofexisting neighborhoodsand far aspracticable, bekept compact andobserve the State Code. Assembly boundary, isnolongerusedinWisconsin 36 However, whilewards were traditionally an . . 35 ) Understatecode, “each ward shall,as www.wuwm.com/post/

37 33 Thecreation of See alsoState exrel. State exrel. - - - 34

155 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX discretion ofthelegislature.”). especially therulewhichprohibits thedismemberment oftowns andwards. Themode ofcompliance therewith mustnecessarily rest largely inthe rel. Attorney Gen.v. Cunningham, 81Wis.440,530(1892)(Lyon, C.J.,concurring) (compactness is“largely modifiedby other constitutional rules, (“Compactness, beingoflesserimportance, maytosomeextent yieldinaidofsecuringa nearer approach toequalityofrepresentation”); State ex 47 are also higherthanthosefor theJensenandBaumgartplans,usingsmallestcircle andperimetertoarea measures.”). 46 (where the “smallest districtisentirely surrounded by oneoftheother districts,” it“thusdestroy[s] compactness intheoutsidedistrict”). 45 44 Scharping v. Johnson,32Wis.2d383,392(Wis.1966). districts, we conceive thattherequirement of“compactness” isaddressed primarilytotheregularity oftheshapeproposed annexation.” respected instateredistricting –theCourt said:“Inviewoflegislative concern over attenuatedannexations andgerrymandered “shoestring” shaped related context –theincorporation ofnewvillageswhich,understatestatute,musthave compact area, andwhoseboundariesmust thenbe 43 42 41 40 39 38 include compactness, for example. of theprovisions oftheconstitution,” whichmight fit, provided thatindoingsothey donot violateany see fit,ortogroup towns andwards asthey maysee they mayseefit,andtogroup wards asthey may legislature hasbroad discretion to“group towns as assembly districts,oldercase lawsuggeststhe When acounty mustbesplittofashion two ormore be kept wholewhere possible.” sin Constitution dictatethatwards andmunicipalities principle, respect for theprerogatives oftheWiscon ing thedivisionofcounties isnolongeraninviolable equipopulous districts.Asaresult, “[a]lthough avoid to respect allcounty boundarieswhilemaintaining ly yieldbecause itisnot mathematically possible tricts. Inmodernredistricting, therulemustfrequent decisions requiring equalpopulationbetween dis whole county rulepredated federal Supreme Court county.” eral assemblydistrictsplaced whollywithinasingle either awholecounty, several wholecounties orsev [were] held inviolable. Assemblydistrictsconsist of was forced toredistrict thestate,“[c]ounty lines counties.” of more thanonecounty unlessittookinallofsuch ation ofanassemblydistrictwhichtookinportions summarized theconstitution asprohibiting “thecre SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., See, e.g., Baumgartv. Wendelberger, Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., Wis. Const. art.IV, §4. State exrel. Lamb v. Cunningham, Baumgart v. Wendelberger, State exrel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, State exrel. Thomsonv. Zimmerman, 39 However, thesestrictapplications ofthe 38 Later, in1964,whentheSupreme Court No.01-C-0121, 2002 U.S. Dist.LEXIS29373,at*11-12(E.D. Wis.May30,2002). 83 Wis.90,150,53N.W. 35,57(1892). 543F. Supp. 630,634(E.D. Wis.1982).SeealsoState ex rel. 543F. Supp. 630,634(E.D. Wis.1982)(citation omitted). 543F. Supp. 630,634(E.D. Wis.1982)(Supreme Court hasnot definedcompactness). Inaseparate but 543 F. Supp. 630,634(E.D. Wis.1982).SeealsoState ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 83Wis.90,151(1892) No. 01-C-0121, 2002U.S. Dist.LEXIS29373,at*23(E.D. Wis.May30,2002)(“Districtcompactness levels 264Wis.644,656(1953). 23 Wis.2d606,606(Wis.1964). 40 41 Inthemodern ------looks athow communities relate tooneanother, called “functional approach” tocompactness, which referring togeographic shape,asopposedtotheso- Courts have interpreted thecompactness criterionas provision “as meaningcloselyunitedinterritory.” However, afederal districtcourt hasinterpreted the not beendefinedby theWisconsin Supreme Court. “compactness,” asusedintheState Constitution, has be “inascompact form aspracticable.” Assembly –Compactness: create majority-minority districts. require thegrouping ofcertain wards andtowns to the Voting Rights Act, whichmayinsomecontexts era, thisdiscretion would alsocertainly belimitedby sion boundariesmaylegitimatelyvary theshapesof ractical factors suchasnatural orpolitical subdivi ary importance” toother criteria. held thiscriterion“isnot absolute”andisof“second respected “as practicable,” courts have consistently However, because compactness mustonlybe pactness scores ofthedistricts. legislative mapsby lookingatmathematical com non-contiguous. and meanderwithoutany discernible reason” are districts shapedlike adonutordistrictsthat“wiggle used insomeother states.For example, “hollow” 45 Lamb v. Cunningham, Similarly, courts have justified Assembly districtsmust 46 47 83Wis.90,151(1892) Inaddition,“[p] 42 Theterm 44 - -

43

- 156 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX districts nestedinSenatedue tostateandfederal requirements). 59 58 57 56 and brackets omitted).SeealsoHippert v. Ritchie,813NW2d391,401 (Minn.2012). 55 54 53 52 argument thattheWisconsin constitution requires literal contiguity.” Id. treat islandsascontiguous withthecitiesorvillagestowhichthey belong.Wis.Stat. §§4.001(3),5.15(1)(b). We are not persuadedby theplaintiffs’ failure ofthelegislative plantoachieve literal contiguity aseriousdemerit;andwe note thatithasbeenthepractice oftheWisconsin legislature to and thetown thatowns itinthesamedistrictwithtown and theisland.Since thedistance between town andislandisslight, we donot thinkthe areas are called, asif they were contiguous, buttheProsser plansrequire literal contiguity andtherefore always place thearea between anisland are permittedtoannex noncontiguous areas, andthisissometimesdone.Thelegislative plantreats these“islands,” asthenoncontiguous annexed differences are few. Both districtingplanscreate districtshaving ahighdegree ofcompactness andcontiguity, withoneexception. Towns inWisconsin 51 634 (E.D. Wis.1982)(quoting Lamb). 50 49 48 ration between thetwo boundariesisdeminimis.” and themunicipality’s boundary, orwhenany sepa of physical contact between theannexed territory found contiguity where there is“a significant degree uous” territory, Wisconsin statecourts have generally annexations, whichare onlypermittedasto“contig point), are permissible.Withinthecontext ofcity (where two partsofadistricttouchonlyatsingle there isnobridgeorferry access) orpoint contiguity lowing contiguity across bodiesofwater even where such asaliberal definitionofwater contiguity (al whether other common forms ofredistricting abuse, The Wisconsin Supreme Court hasnot discussed non-contiguous inasingledistrict. tiguity enabledkeeping towns thatwere themselves noncontiguous districts,tothedegree thatnon-con ly. Inthe1990safederal districtcourt approved of least onecourt hasnot treated thisstandard strict or more pieces ofdetachedterritory.” to meanthatadistrict“cannot bemadeupoftwo consin Supreme Court defined“contiguous territory” ous territory.” and senatedistrictsmustbecomposed of“contigu Assembly &Senate–Contiguity: ably, thoughnot perfectly, compact.” districts. Inother words, districtsshouldbereason SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN State exrel. Lamb v. Cunningham, Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., See, See Wis.Stat. §4.001 (“Thisstateisdividedinto 33senatedistricts,eachcomposed of3assembly districts.”). Wis. Const. art.IV, §5. Hippert v. Ritchie, Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, State exrel. Thomsonv. Zimmerman Wis. Const. art.IV, §5. Town of Lincoln v. Cityof Whitehall, Prosser v. ElectionsBd., Wis. Const. art.IV, §4,§5. e.g., Raphael J.Sonenshein,“WhenthePeople Draw theLines,” League ofWomen Voters of California, 54(2013)(few California Assembly 49 Inanearlyredistricting case, theWis 813NW2d391,401(Minn.2012). No. C0-01-160,2002Minn.LEXIS884,*9(Minn.2002)(Supreme Court actingasSpecialRedistricting Panel) (citations 793F. Supp. 859,866(W.D. Wis.1992).Thedistrictcourt explained: “Between Prosser IIIAandthelegislative plan,the 83Wis.90,148,53N.W. 35,57(Wis. 1892).Seealso 543F. Supp. 630, 634(E.D. Wis.1982). 912 NW2d403,413(Wis.Ct. App. 2018). , 264Wis.644,654(1953). 51 State assembly 48 50 However, at - 52 ------highways. munities are allconnected by thoroughfares, suchas nient contiguous districtwould beonewhosecom reach; easilyaccessible.” mean, inpart,“thatadistrictmustbewithineasy Supreme Court hasinterpreted therequirement to requirement for “convenient contiguity,” thatstate’s ture.” convenience was “inthediscretion ofthelegisla ity. Inonecase theCourt suggested,indictum, that convenient contiguity differs from traditional contigu Supreme Court hasprovided littleguidance astohow “convenient” contiguous territory. ment, statesenatedistricts mustbecomposed of As contrasted withtheassemblycontiguity require federal law, particularlytheVoting Rights Act. when necessary tocomply withother criteriaorwith requirements have sometimesviolatedthisprovision senate districts;however, other stateswithnesting Assembly districtswere perfectly nestedwithin (or “nested”)withinonesenatedistrict. assembly districtsmustbeplaced perfectly inside 33 Senatedistrictsand99assemblydistricts,three mation ofasenatedistrict.” an assemblydistrictfrom being“divided inthefor Senate –Nesting: 54 InMinnesota, whichhasanalmostidentical 56 Wis. State AFL-CIO v. ElectionsBd., Thestateconstitution prohibits 55 Anexample ofaconve 57 Because Wisconsin has 53 TheWisconsin 543 F. Supp. 630, 58 In2011, 59 ------157 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX redistricting-case-summaries-2010-present.aspx 67 66 65 64 obvious: redistricting remains aninherently political andlegislative—not judicial—task.”). 2002) (“Despitethereality thatredistricting isnow almostalways resolved through litigation rather thanlegislation,we are moved toemphasize the 63 State ex rel. 62 61 60 narily political innature, courts shouldbehesitant ecause controversies over apportionment are ordi law.” should “indulgeevery presumption tosustainthe tive acts[,]are presumed constitutional” andcourts Legal Standard: this rule. cases; however, theCourt seemsunlikely toadopt to assumeoriginaljurisdictionover allredistricting Court isconsidering apetitionaskingthatCourt cases. As discussed above, theWisconsin Supreme There are nospeciallegalprocedures for redistricting the redistricting context. sions have not beenappliedby aWisconsin court in process, andequalprotection. However, theseprovi like guarantees offree speech,free assembly, due Wisconsin’s constitution includessimilarprovisions, been usedtostrike down partisangerrymanders. Pennsylvania, general civilrights protections have state civilrights protections. the U.S. Constitution, they maybeundergeneral gerrymandering claimsare not justiciableunder General CivilRightsProtections: boundaries andunitingcommunities ofinterest. vided intheconstitution, for example preserving city adopted other redistricting goals,not expressly pro Other Criteria: MAPS HARD TO CHALLENGE IN COURT? THREAT 5: ARE RIGGED ELECTION SPOTLIGHT: WISCONSIN Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Madison Teachers, Inc.v. Walker, National Conference ofState Legislatures, “Redistricting Case Summaries”(Upd. Dec.1,2020), Wis. Const. art.VII,§9. Wis. Const. art.VII,§4(1). State exrel. Thomsonv. Zimmerman, State exrel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, Wis. Const. art.I§3,§4,§8,§9,§15. 62 Wisconsin courts have alsonoted that“[b] Bowman v. Dammann, Courts andthelegislature have also Redistricting bills,like “[a]ll legisla No. 01-C-0121, 2002U.S. Dist.LEXIS29373,at*20 (E.D. Wis.May30,2002). 209Wis.21,28(1932). 851 NW2d337,349(Wis.2014).See alsoState ex rel. 61 InNorthCarolina and 264 Wis.644,648, 60N.W.2d 416,417(1953). 261Wis.398,412-413(1952).Compare with Although partisan . 60 - - - - may appoint thereplacement justice. when there isavacancy ontheCourt, thegovernor ten-year termsinnon-partisanelections. Supreme Court consists ofseven memberselectedto any redistricting planadopted by thelegislature. The the finalarbiteroflegalityunderstatelaw Supreme Court: constitution’s redistricting criteria. which might excuse somedeviations from thestate the legislature hasfallen shortofaperfect result,” taken into account, andnot isolatedinstances where tionment, thewholescheme ofthestatutemustbe provides that,in“viewingthefairness oftheappor to intervene therein.” dismissed thepartisangerrymanderinglawsuit. Constitution. Asaresult, theWisconsin districtcourt mandering claimsare not justiciableundertheU.S. v. Common Cause, whichheldthatpartisangerry ing. Intheinterim, theSupreme Court decidedRucho Court toreconsider itstestofpartisangerrymander to theU.S. Supreme Court, whichremanded for the tection Clause;however, thedecisionwas appealed gerrymandering inviolationofthefederal Equal Pro that theassemblymapswere theproduct ofpartisan the Voting Rights Act. Aseparate districtcourt held redrawing oftwo assemblydistrictstocomply with gerrymandering. Afederal districtcourt ordered the challenged for racially-discriminatory andpartisan sional redistricting plansfrom the2010cycle were Prior History: Jensen v. Wis.ElectionsBd., Broughton v. Zimmerman, Wisconsin’s legislative andcongres https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/ The Wisconsin Supreme Court is 63 Anolderlineofcases also 249Wis.2d706,713(Wis. 261Wis.398,411(1952); 64 66 65 However, 67 - -

- - - 158 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WYOMING Threat 5:Areriggedelectionmapshardtochallenge in court? Threat 4:Arethelegalstandardsweak? Threat 3:Can electionmapsberiggedfor partisangain? Threat 2:Can electionmapsbedrawninsecret? Threat 1:Can politicianscontrol howelectionmapsaredrawn? MODERATE RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK HIGH RISK criteria. protections againstpartisanmaps,prisongerrymandering,ornoncompetitive districtsinany ofthe minority communities, butsimilarguidelineshave not beenintroduced for thiscycle. There are no time. Beyond that,there were additionalguidelinespassedin2011toprotect thevoting power of contiguous andavoid county splits,thoughWyoming hasonlyonecongressional districtatthis legislative districts.Constitutional languagerequires congressional districtsbecompact and The criteriaintheconstitution are very limited,withnostate-level constraints placed onstate constraints onthelegislature’s ability toredistrict for partisanbenefit support asRepublicans make up85%oftheSenateand93%House.There are noapparent if theRepublican governor vetoes themaps,itwould stillbeeasy tooverturn theveto with2/3 well ascontrol ofthegovernorship. Mapsonlyneedasimplemajorityineachhousetopass.Even There isahighriskofpartisanabuseasRepublicans have strong majoritiesinboth housesas allowed peopletoleave comments onitswebsite. 2011, theredistricting committee heldpublichearingsacross thestate.Further, thecommittee also While there are norequired publichearings,they appeartobepastpractice. Inthesummerof seats afterthe2020Census. Wyoming hasasingleat-large congressional district,andisnot expected togainany additional vetoed by thegovernor. To override theveto, ittakes 2/3supportineachlegislative body. Maps are drawn solelyby thestatelegislature tobepassedby asimplemajorityandthensignedor altered. WY DistrictCourt inLaramie County. Even thoughthechallengewas heard, themapswere not an unspecifiedcourt. Inthepasttwo cycles, there was onlyonechallengeanditwas heard inthe While mapsare not automatically reviewed, citizens dohave theright tochallengeunfair mapsin

159 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX Relevant recent cases: Citations andreferences: their respective years andsignedby thegovernor justdays later. Census. Next year, thissessionstartsonFebruary 14,2022.Inthelasttwo redistricting cycles, mapswere passedby March 1stof Timing note: REDISTRICTING SUMMARY WYOMING Likely Committees: Public Comment: Hearings: Required #of Hearings start: Deadline: Redistricting Process? Special Legal Vetoes? Governor Signs/ Needed? Supermajority Vote Redistricting Body: DEADLINE/PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Theonlydeadlineontheredistricting process isthatitmustbecompleted atthefirstbudgetsessionfollowing the

REDISTRICTING PROCESS

Hunzie v. Maxfield,No.179-562(Wyo. Dist.Ct., Laramie Cnty. Nov. 30,2015). Wyoming Const Art.III,§48 House Redistricting Committee Senate Redistricting Task Force (But pastpractice) None required None required Not clear No deadline District Court. Citizens can challengemapsinWY Yes No Legislature Allows: Prohibits: Requires: Source: Supreme Court: Supermajority? Veto-Proof Leg. State Senate: State House: Governor: Government? United/Divided REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

POLITICAL CONTROL None None avoid county splits. districts tobecompact, contiguous, and lines. Constitution requires congressional No state-level requirements for legislative Wyoming Const. Art.III,Sect.48 appointed by Gov. MattMead 5 judges,officiallynonpartisan.All Wyoming JudicialNominatingCommission: Appointment by Governor, assistedby the Yes (2/3) 28R 51R Mark Gordon United -

- -

7D 2D Republican

(R:93%) -

1I -1L (R) (R:85%) (R)

160 GERRYMANDERING THREAT INDEX UPDATEDAPRIL 4, 2021 VERSION 1.0