Positive Economic Analysis of the Constitutions - Case of Formation of the First Constitution of Pakistan
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Positive Economic Analysis of the Constitutions - Case of Formation of the First Constitution of Pakistan Inaugural – Dissertation zur Erlangung der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Philipps-Universität Marburg eingereicht von: Amber Sohail (MBA aus Chakwal, Pakistan) Erstgutachter: Prof Dr. Stefan Voigt Zweitgutachter: Prof Dr.Bernd Hayo Einreichungstermin: 27. August 2012 Prüfungstermin: 25.Oktober 2012 Erscheinungsort: Marburg Hochschulkennziffer: 1180 Positive Economic Analysis of the Constitutions - Case of Formation of the First Constitution of Pakistan PhD Dissertation Department of Business Administartion and Economics Philipps-Universität Marburg Amber Sohail First Supervisor: Prof Dr. Stefan Voigt Second Supervisor: Prof Dr.Bernd Hayo Defense Date: 25.Oktober 2012 : Pakistan in 19561 1Image taken from the online resource “Story of Pakistan”. The cities marked as Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta are the provincial capitals of Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan respectively. Karachi was the provincial capital of Sind as well as the capital of Pakistan in 1956. The silver line at the top of West Pakistan demaracates the disputed area, Kashmir. East Pakistan laid across India and had Dacca/Dhaka as the provincial capital. 3 Acknowledgements First of all I would like to thank my supervisor and mentor Professor Stefan Voigt for all the guidance that he provided. After 3 years of research when I look back at my initial documents, they seem embarrassingly inadequate and I once again marvel at the patience he showed while reading them. He not only read those documents but appreciated and encouraged me every step of the way. His guidance was so complete that I was able to finish my project in time and in a satisfactory manner despite many odds. I would also like to thank the wonderful scholars and academics who make up a great team with Prof Voigt. I would like to specially thank Nora-El Bialy, Sang Min Park, Matthias Dauner and Jerg Gutmann whose valuable inputs shaped my research for the better. I also owe my gratitude to the University of Marburg which gave me necessary resources and an opportunity to carry out my project. They have excellent faculty and infrastructure which help a scholar focus very diligently on the research. In addition I am grateful to my husband and my father who have supported me in every way they could. This project would not have been here without their help. 4 Abstract This book attempts an economic analysis of the first constitution of Pakistan. We use Rational Choice Model to carry out our research. We propose that the collective choice of constitution-making can be broken down to individual choices aggregated through aggregation mechanisms. Thus we analyse the decision-making at an individual level and take every member of the constitutional assembly as an individual unit. Assuming that the members of constitutional assembly are not participating in the process with altruistic motivations rather they participate because of their own self-interest and to maximize their own utility function. We chose to analyse six constitutional rules and developed hypotheses accordingly. Afterwards four other rules were also discussed because of their importance for the society and the constitutional makers. We used the constitutional choices of system of government, form of government, amendment rules, and human rights as dependent variables and the personal traits of members as independent variables. We find that in case of structure of government the ethnic majorities, linguistic majorities, political and religious majorities favored more the presidential system. While the political and religious minorities as expected favored the parliamentary system. In case of federalism we found out that as expected the older age group members, landowners and foreign educated members favored more the unitary system. Lastly for human rights, we found that that majority (ethnic, linguistic, political and religious) will try to curtail human rights for others. Similarly we assumed that minorities will opt for broader human rights which were corroborated by results in case of political and religious minorities but were not supported by empirical analysis in case of ethnic minority and linguistic minority. 5 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ 4 Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. 5 Glossary ............................................................................................................................................. 9 List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter I: Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 11 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 12 2 Constitutional Economics .......................................................................................................... 12 3 Constitution-making .................................................................................................................. 13 4 Constitution-Makers and Self Interest ....................................................................................... 15 Chapter II: Constitutions and their Formation ................................................................................. 17 1 ViewPoints on Constitutions ..................................................................................................... 18 2 What is a Constitution? .............................................................................................................. 18 3 Functionality of Constitutions ................................................................................................... 20 4 Formation of a Constitution ....................................................................................................... 22 5 Endogenising Constitutions ....................................................................................................... 24 Chapter III: An Economic Model of Individual Behavior in a Constitutional Setting .................... 28 1 The Economic Model of Constitutions ...................................................................................... 29 2 Rationality in Constitution-Making Settings ............................................................................. 32 3 Self-Interest in Constitution-Making Settings ........................................................................... 34 Chapter IV: Implications of the Model ............................................................................................ 37 1 The Designing of Pakistan’s Constitution ................................................................................. 38 2 Personal Attributes under Consideration ................................................................................... 40 3 A Snapshot of Country and Constitutional Assembly in 1956 .................................................. 41 4 Conjectures ................................................................................................................................ 43 Chapter V: Data Sources and Methodology .................................................................................... 59 1 Data Sources .............................................................................................................................. 60 6 2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 62 Chapter VI: Background Information of Pakistan and the Constitutional Assemblies of Pakistan .......................................................................................................................................... 66 1 Background about Pakistan in 1956 .......................................................................................... 67 2 States of Pakistan in 1956 .......................................................................................................... 67 3 Interest Groups in the Society .................................................................................................... 70 4 Interim Constitution of Pakistan ................................................................................................ 72 5 First Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan ................................................................................ 75 6 Delay in Constitution Making ................................................................................................... 79 7 Second Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan ............................................................................ 82 Chapter VII: Short Biographical Sketches of Members of Constitutional Assembly ..................... 89 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 90 2 Members of East Pakistan ......................................................................................................... 90 3 Members of West Pakistan