Transition, War and Human Rights

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Transition, War and Human Rights April 1997 Vol. 9, No. 2 (A) ZAIRE TRANSITION, WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................................................................3 SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................................................4 RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................................................................6 THE STALLED TRANSITION...............................................................................................................................11 Mobutu Ushers in Mobutu...........................................................................................................................11 The Kengo Government...............................................................................................................................13 The Protocol of Agreement..........................................................................................................................15 Preconditions for Elections.............................................................................................................16 Reform of the Military and Security Services.................................................................................17 Reform of the Territorial Administration........................................................................................17 Elections on Hold ........................................................................................................................................18 THE WAR................................................................................................................................................................18 The Spreading Violence ..............................................................................................................................19 The Role of Foreign Forces .........................................................................................................................20 Violations of the Laws of War by All Parties to the Conflict.......................................................................22 Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) and Militia Attacks on the Banyamulenge .......................................22 Attacks by the ADFL and its Allies on Refugee Camps.................................................................24 Human Rights Abuses by the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR...............................................................27 Interference with Humanitarian Aid ...............................................................................................28 Attacks on Other Zairian Civilians .................................................................................................29 The Transitional Agenda of the ADFL........................................................................................................30 THE RIGHTS DENIED ...........................................................................................................................................33 Freedom from Arbitrary Arrests and Detention ...........................................................................................33 Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly ........................................................................................35 The Emerging Civil Society............................................................................................................36 Restrictions on Assembly ...............................................................................................................37 Freedom of Expression ................................................................................................................................39 Attacks on the Media and Journalists .............................................................................................40 Confiscation of Political Literature.................................................................................................42 Freedom of Movement.................................................................................................................................43 The Right to Nationality ..............................................................................................................................44 SHABA: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ...............................................................................................................45 Background..................................................................................................................................................45 Elections Climate.........................................................................................................................................48 Repercussions of the War in Shaba .............................................................................................................50 APay As You Go@: Justice and General Insecurity........................................................................................52 Arbitrary Detentions .......................................................................................................................52 Impunity for Abuses .......................................................................................................................53 Compromising the Independence of the Judiciary..........................................................................54 The Case of Lieutenant Mukelenge ................................................................................................55 Civil SocietyCHuman Rights NGOs ...........................................................................................................56 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.....................................................................................56 The European Union....................................................................................................................................57 The United States.........................................................................................................................................58 The United Nations......................................................................................................................................59 The O.A.U. and Other Regional Initiatives..................................................................................................60 Converging and Diverging Initiatives..........................................................................................................61 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................................63 Human Rights Watch/Africa 3 April 1997, Vol. 9, No. 2 (A) ABBREVIATIONS AZADHO: Association Zaïroise de Defense Des Droits de l=Homme, Zairian Association for the Defense of Human Rights CDH: Centre des Droits de l=Homme et du Droit Humanitaire, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law DSP: Division Spéciale Présidentielle, Special Presidential Division FAZ: Les Forces Armées Zaïroises, Zairian Armed Forces MPR: Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution, Popular Movement for the Revolution, Mobutu=s party. PALU: Parti Lumumbiste Unifié, Unified Lumumbist Party SARM: Service d=Action et de Renseignements Militaires, Service for Action and Military Intelligence SNIP: Service Nationale d=Intelligence et de Protection, National Service of Intelligence and Protection. UDPS: Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, Union for Democracy and Social Progress UFERI: Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendents, Union of Independent Federalists and Republicans USORAL: Union Sacrée de l=Opposition Radicale et Alliés, Sacred Union of the Opposition and its Allies VSV: La Voix Des Sans Voix Pour Les Droits de l=Homme, Voice of the Voiceless for Human Rights Human Rights Watch/Africa 4 April 1997, Vol. 9, No. 2 (A) SUMMARY Nearly seven years ago, on April 24, 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko ostensibly gave in to mounting pro- democracy pressure by announcing the end of the one party state and the beginning of transition to multiparty democracy in Zaire. Seven years into the transition, there have been at least ten different governments but no transition. The president=s refusal to step down or to relinquish control of the governments he appointed and manipulated have managed to make a mockery of the promised passage to democracy. The rapid advance of the rebel troops from the east, in turn, threatened to subordinate political change wholly to the passage of arms. Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo took office in June 1994 with promises to implement reforms and create an environment that would lead to elections by mid-1995. The promised elections never took place and genuine political participation and debate continued to be severely curtailed by government-imposed restrictions on basic democratic freedoms. The commanders of the military and the security services as well as regional and local administrators continued to be handpicked by the president to ensure consistent ethnic and regional loyalties to him and his political alliance. Military and police deployed throughout the country cracked down on opposition activities routinely and violence against the population continued unabated as unpaid
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